Latest / The Morning Edition / Nick McKenzie on how North Korean spies are infiltrating Australian companies
Transcript
- 0:03S1: Investigative reporter Nick McKenzie logged on to the Zoom meeting
- 0:07S1: to meet the man who said he was Aaron Pearson. McKenzie, too,
- 0:12S1: was hiding his real identity, pretending to be a recruiter
- 0:15S1: for an Australian tech company. The whole thing was a setup,
- 0:19S1: a trap for someone McKenzie suspected to be a spy
- 0:22S1: for North Korea. I'm Samantha Cylinder Morris, and you're listening
- 0:27S1: to Morning Edition from the Age and The Sydney Morning
- 0:30S1: Herald today. Nick McKenzie on the new way that spies
- 0:34S1: are targeting Australian businesses. And what happened in that Zoom call.
- 0:44S1: So ASIO has told you that North Korean spies have
- 0:47S1: infiltrated companies in Australia, using what you've described as an
- 0:50S1: ingenious method. Tell us about this.
- 0:54S2: Well, just how ingenious it is is perhaps open to debate,
- 0:58S2: but it's certainly malicious and it's certainly at vast scale.
- 1:02S2: So what's happening? The North Koreans need money. Kim Jong
- 1:05S2: un has a, as we know, uh, illicit weapons program,
- 1:08S2: nuclear ballistic and other. It needs to fund that. North
- 1:13S2: Korea is also on a mission to steal sensitive commercial
- 1:16S2: IP defense IP from Western nations across the world. And
- 1:20S2: ultimately it wants leverage points, not just weapons, but if
- 1:23S2: it can go and sabotage companies involved in vital infrastructure.
- 1:27S2: These are all things the North Koreans want. Now, what
- 1:29S2: North Korea has done is deploy an army of agents
- 1:32S2: who are pretending to be non-north Koreans. So American, Western European,
- 1:39S2: South Asian, Southeast Asian, remote IT workers offering themselves out
- 1:44S2: as job applicants at major companies and small companies and saying,
- 1:48S2: we can work for your Australian company. Well, one little thing,
- 1:50S2: we'll have to work offshore. Just think of it as
- 1:52S2: a stay at home workout. We'll work in your IT
- 1:54S2: department or as an IT contractor, or through an IT
- 1:57S2: contractor third party, and you'll be none the wiser that
- 2:00S2: we are, in fact a North Korean agent. The money
- 2:02S2: you pay us goes straight back to the regime of
- 2:04S2: Kim Jong un. And once we're in your systems, once
- 2:08S2: we're in your networks, we can steal your secrets. And
- 2:13S2: worst case scenario, engage in acts of sabotage if and
- 2:16S2: when the need arises. Now, no less than the Director-General
- 2:20S2: of security, the head of ASIO, Mike Burgess, has sounded
- 2:23S2: the alarm that Australian companies have been infiltrated. His investigators
- 2:26S2: have found this going on in Australia. It's a real,
- 2:30S2: clear and present danger.
- 2:33S1: Okay, well, this is what I wanted to ask you,
- 2:35S1: because you said that it's actually rare to get an
- 2:37S1: invite into the ASIO building. This, of course, is our
- 2:40S1: leading spy agency. But not only did ASIO boss Mike
- 2:43S1: Burgess invite you in, but he invited the whole 60
- 2:46S1: minutes video crew into the building to film your interview.
- 2:50S1: So is this an indication of how damaging you know,
- 2:52S1: these North Korean spies are potentially to Australians? And what
- 2:55S1: exactly is at stake here? Like, what threat do they
- 2:58S1: pose to anyone who's listening?
- 3:00S2: Well, I think the reason that they're normally very secretive
- 3:04S2: ASIO and it is extremely rare to get access to
- 3:07S2: ASIO and its Director-General. Open the doors on this occasion
- 3:10S2: is because the spy agency by itself, with its partners,
- 3:14S2: the AFP and others, can only do so much for
- 3:16S2: Australia to actually properly combat these malicious actors. We've got
- 3:20S2: to get on the front foot. And that's not the
- 3:22S2: job of the spies, the spooks and the cops. It's
- 3:25S2: the job of the companies and the communities. How dangerous
- 3:28S2: is it? Well, the world is a more hostile and
- 3:31S2: more complex place arguably than ever before. We know North
- 3:34S2: Korea wishes to do the West harm. We know North
- 3:37S2: Korea is building stockpiles of terribly destructive weapons. We know
- 3:41S2: North Korea already has very active cyber operations across the world,
- 3:46S2: seeking to infiltrate Western companies, Western governments to steal secrets
- 3:51S2: most significantly, once. And this is the danger of the
- 3:55S2: cyber digital economy world in which we now all live.
- 3:58S2: Once a hostile actor, a North Korean agent is in
- 4:01S2: your systems. They can do untold damage. We've seen what
- 4:05S2: happens when large organizations are hacked. We've seen systems go down.
- 4:09S2: We've seen hospitals and places providing acute services, much needed
- 4:14S2: services held to ransom. These are all massive sabotage like dangers.
- 4:19S2: And that's bad enough. It's not just that you're funding
- 4:21S2: the North Korean regime when you employ these North Korean
- 4:24S2: agents unwittingly. But the risk is you're also giving up
- 4:28S2: your commercial secrets. It could be secrets that are sensitive
- 4:31S2: to national security, but also you could be compromising. If
- 4:34S2: you say a company working in critical infrastructure, you could
- 4:38S2: be compromising national security that way because of the risk
- 4:41S2: that these same remote IT secret agents can work as
- 4:46S2: saboteurs down the track.
- 4:48S1: Okay. And ASIO actually has examples of Australian companies that
- 4:52S1: have been infiltrated by these North Korean spies. So tell
- 4:55S1: us about that.
- 4:57S2: Well, the director general of ASIO didn't say a great
- 5:00S2: deal about that Other than his investigators have found these
- 5:04S2: threat actors. They found them operating in Australia because we're
- 5:07S2: talking about essentially criminal acts. It's one for the AFP.
- 5:11S2: So these matters have been referred to the federal police.
- 5:14S2: We have detects a cyber company that's leading the charge
- 5:17S2: here in this nation, protecting the private sector. Also referring
- 5:20S2: matters to the AFP. We know there are live AFP
- 5:23S2: assessments and or investigations into these threat actors here operating
- 5:27S2: in Australia, either from a remote location or in some cases,
- 5:31S2: onshore in Australia. The most prominent case that we uncovered
- 5:37S2: involved the National Australia Bank, the NAB, one of the
- 5:41S2: big four banks. It found one of these North Korean
- 5:43S2: agents had infiltrated its workforce, posing as a remote IT worker,
- 5:47S2: albeit through a third party contractor identified the threat it
- 5:50S2: got rid of the actor. But the point to be
- 5:52S2: made is if a very sophisticated beast like the NAB,
- 5:57S2: with all its cyber and security controls, can be so
- 6:00S2: easily infiltrated. Think how the rest of our tech, commercial,
- 6:04S2: financial services, defense sectors are exposed, and even more so
- 6:08S2: when there are players without those controls that the NAB
- 6:11S2: and other big players naturally have.
- 6:16S1: Okay, well, let's get into how these North Korean spies
- 6:19S1: have actually infiltrated companies in Australia and elsewhere. Perhaps you
- 6:23S1: can just tell us about how you actually caught one
- 6:25S1: of these operatives in the act. What happened?
- 6:28S2: Well, we know there are thousands of North Korean agents
- 6:31S2: posing as these remote IT workers. They're using networks of
- 6:35S2: intermediaries who play certain roles in this scheme. There are
- 6:39S2: managers of the scheme. Think of them as, I guess,
- 6:41S2: as more senior agents or more senior spies calling the shots.
- 6:45S2: There's a system that's been put into place and developed,
- 6:48S2: and it's developing in time. So, for instance, one of
- 6:50S2: the more recent developments is the North Koreans are using AI.
- 6:53S2: The AI programs create resumes. They scoured the internet looking
- 6:57S2: for remote IT job opportunities. The AI programs initially sometimes
- 7:03S2: interact with recruiters as if they're a real person once
- 7:06S2: they get through the door. Then the North Korean agent,
- 7:09S2: who's a well trained operative who speaks pretty good English
- 7:13S2: and is trained to say, I'm actually stationed right now.
- 7:16S2: In the case of the operative that I encountered in
- 7:19S2: San Jose, California. Then the operative steps in and conducts
- 7:22S2: the job interview and hopefully lands the job. So knowing
- 7:25S2: all that, we actually set up a trap. We knew
- 7:28S2: the sorts of jobs the North Koreans were after. We
- 7:32S2: advertised one of those jobs using a friendly recruiter, in fact,
- 7:36S2: working for us. And we were partnered. We did this
- 7:39S2: with Dtex, the cyber company that's leading the charge, fighting
- 7:42S2: these malicious actors. Put the job out there. Sure enough,
- 7:46S2: AI interacts with what looks like AI interacts with us
- 7:49S2: saying yes, love to go for this role. I'm a
- 7:52S2: Californian based IT professional. This is my resume and keen.
- 7:56S2: Let's do the interview. There were some things about that
- 7:59S2: identity used. We knew that was an identity that had
- 8:02S2: been used previously in North Korean operations, so we had
- 8:05S2: a very good sense. This was likely to be a
- 8:07S2: North Korean operation, but we didn't know until that interviewee
- 8:12S2: appears the job applicant appears. So I take the place
- 8:15S2: as the recruiter I'm being secretly filmed. I say, hello, welcome.
- 8:18S2: I'm a recruiter and who are you and who pops
- 8:20S2: up on the screen? Well, the person had gone for
- 8:23S2: the job. His name is Aaron Pearson or his alias
- 8:26S2: is Aaron Pearson. And the photo I had of Aaron
- 8:28S2: Pearson was of a Black American. That was the person
- 8:31S2: we thought would be popping up on screen, because that
- 8:33S2: person had been involved in other job applications that were
- 8:36S2: of suspicion. In fact, what pops up or the person
- 8:39S2: that pops up is someone who looks Asian. Hello? Is
- 8:42S2: that Aaron?
- 8:43S3: Yeah. Hey. Sorry for being late. Yeah, that's okay to me. So, yeah.
- 8:49S2: They don't look like an Aaron Pearson. They certainly don't
- 8:51S2: look like Aaron Pearson, the black American on the resume.
- 8:54S2: I had already knew likely it was to be an operative,
- 8:57S2: so I had to test that theory. He went through
- 9:00S2: his technical expertise, but I then asked him, okay, are
- 9:02S2: you saying you were living in San Jose, California? Have
- 9:06S2: you been to Santa Cruz? That local surf break of yours?
- 9:10S2: He doesn't like sharks, he tells me. What about Big Sur,
- 9:12S2: that very famous landmark that. Think of the big Californian redwoods.
- 9:16S2: He wasn't overly okay with those, either. New York. He'd
- 9:20S2: lived there for three years. He could not name the
- 9:24S2: area in New York. Think about those famous New York areas. Manhattan, Brooklyn,
- 9:29S2: the Bronx. He could not name where he lived. All
- 9:32S2: he could say was on the west. Where are you living?
- 9:35S2: What's that? What suburb?
- 9:37S3: Uh. I'm sorry.
- 9:39S2: Where in New York did you live?
- 9:42S3: I'm in west coast of the New York. I mean,
- 9:44S3: west part of the New York area.
- 9:47S2: The more I drilled, the more stilted he became. Finally
- 9:51S2: I said to him, well, you don't look like the
- 9:53S2: Aaron Pearson, who I believe is the real Aaron Pearson.
- 9:57S2: And he began to panic and push back. We know
- 9:59S2: that when North Korean Asians are challenged about the regime
- 10:02S2: for who they operate. If you say to them, tell
- 10:04S2: me about the North Korean regime, they cannot ever speak
- 10:07S2: ill of their dear leader, Kim Jong un or the
- 10:10S2: regime itself. So I put it to him pretty frankly.
- 10:13S2: I said, we're worried about North Korean operatives. What do
- 10:16S2: you think about the North Korean regime? And that's when
- 10:18S2: he very quickly wrapped up the interview we have in
- 10:21S2: Australia sanctions. It means we cannot deal with anyone from
- 10:24S2: North Korea. Are you comfortable with that?
- 10:25S3: Hey, I'm being asked at this interview.
- 10:29S2: Um, can I can I tell you, Aaron, because I
- 10:31S2: have a photo of Aaron Pearson. It's a different you look,
- 10:34S2: the photo I have is of a of a, of
- 10:36S2: a black American.
- 10:37S3: I'm not interested in any more. By.
- 10:39S2: By then we had enough data points to know that
- 10:42S2: he was a North Korean agent. We'd caught him out
- 10:44S2: in the act and we. For the first time, I
- 10:46S2: think really ever of any Western media company caught out
- 10:50S2: a North Korean operative actually doing what's of such great
- 10:53S2: concern to our intelligence agencies across the world.
- 10:58S1: After the break.
- 11:00S2: The system or the operation put in place by North
- 11:03S2: Korea relies on companies taking shortcuts. And the terrifying thing is,
- 11:07S2: too many big Aussie corporates are taking those shortcuts. Why?
- 11:10S2: To save money.
- 11:16S4: And you've said that this is.
- 11:17S1: A relatively new problem for Australia. But we know that
- 11:20S1: it's not new in the US. Right. There was a
- 11:22S1: significant case there involving a woman who became one of
- 11:25S1: these so-called laptop farmers, these intermediaries. So tell us about that.
- 11:31S2: We know this North Korean operation has been operating at
- 11:35S2: scale for a decade. The US has been a great
- 11:38S2: hunting ground for the North Koreans. It's a massive economy.
- 11:41S2: Covid meant there was a huge reliance on stay at
- 11:44S2: home or remote workers, especially IT workers, contract workers. This
- 11:49S2: was a great time for North Korea to be operating
- 11:52S2: and people all over the world. You find people desperate
- 11:56S2: for money and happy to take money to look the
- 11:58S2: other way. And the North Koreans found a woman called
- 12:01S2: Christina Chapman. She was in Arizona on a run of
- 12:06S2: the mill, pretty poor, working class person who was desperate
- 12:11S2: for a job in the North Korean sense that they
- 12:14S2: gave her a job as what's known as a laptop farmer.
- 12:16S2: And her job was this whenever a North Korean agent
- 12:19S2: working undercover wins a job, gets a job at be
- 12:22S2: it a company like Nike or Boeing or any of
- 12:24S2: the other American companies that were ultimately compromised, these remote workers,
- 12:28S2: these undercover operatives, need a laptop to do their job.
- 12:31S2: And so the US company needs to send them a laptop.
- 12:34S2: She agreed to use her home address in Arizona to
- 12:38S2: receive those laptops. When the FBI finally raided, her, 90
- 12:42S2: laptops had been sent to her. It's estimated she helped
- 12:45S2: these North Korean agents infiltrate 300 US companies, including some
- 12:50S2: big names like Nike. And I think the remarkable thing
- 12:54S2: about her operation was not just how many companies were
- 12:57S2: infiltrated and how many agents were involved, but really the
- 13:01S2: unremarkable nature of her. She was a not too bright,
- 13:05S2: not too well spoken, very ordinary American doing some pretty
- 13:10S2: extraordinary things. Right now she's sitting in a jail cell,
- 13:13S2: serving eight and a half years in prison.
- 13:15S1: And in your investigation, she claims that she was unaware
- 13:19S1: that she was a so-called laptop farmer, that she was
- 13:21S1: an intermediary between these North Korean spies and these American companies.
- 13:26S1: Do you think there's any credibility to that? I mean,
- 13:28S1: certainly you also interviewed Jeanine Pirro, who is currently the
- 13:32S1: United States attorney for the District of Columbia, a very
- 13:35S1: high profile in her in her own right. She's prosecuted
- 13:38S1: this woman who, again, facilitated these North Korean fraudsters. So
- 13:43S1: is there any credibility, any possibility that she just didn't
- 13:46S1: know what she'd been contracted to do?
- 13:48S2: Well, the prosecutor, Jeanine Pirro, thought not. And I mean,
- 13:52S2: I think if any of our listeners, uh, consider that
- 13:56S2: their home would receive 90 laptops and they'd be asked
- 13:59S2: to plug in dozens and dozens of Asian IT workers
- 14:03S2: to US companies in such a bizarre fashion, you'd think
- 14:06S2: you'd have your hackles up. You think you'd be a
- 14:08S2: little bit suspicious? The idea that Chapman was an unwitting agent,
- 14:14S2: a dupe is pretty ridiculous, and I think we can
- 14:17S2: see that in her ultimate sentence of eight and a
- 14:20S2: half years for breaching, for harming US national security. But
- 14:24S2: I think what her case really tells Australia is we
- 14:27S2: know there's people out there that want to make a
- 14:29S2: buck and who'll do the wrong thing to do so. Uh,
- 14:31S2: they can do so in a way where they can
- 14:33S2: pretend to some extent that they're simply operating. Helping fill
- 14:37S2: an IT gap for some bizarre company overseas and not
- 14:39S2: really ask themselves, what am I truly up to? There
- 14:42S2: are those sorts of people we suspect in Australia today.
- 14:46S2: We do believe there's at least one laptop farm operating
- 14:48S2: in Australia, similar to that of Kristina Chapman today. So
- 14:53S2: it really shows that ordinary people can get swept up
- 14:56S2: in what are very hostile operations by very dangerous Regimes,
- 15:01S2: in this case North Korea. They're likely to be here
- 15:04S2: already in Australia, and they're likely to be operating with
- 15:06S2: some success.
- 15:07S1: And Nick, just to wrap up, what can companies and
- 15:09S1: businesses do to protect themselves?
- 15:12S2: There's some very basic things check out in person who
- 15:16S2: you're hiring. Do proper due diligence. Yes, AI and we
- 15:21S2: know that China is now backing North Korea in this operation.
- 15:24S2: So we've got some pretty high level Chinese AI operating here.
- 15:27S2: China's government, uh, led Chinese technology created AI. It can
- 15:34S2: be remarkable. It can come up with very good resumes.
- 15:36S2: It can alter people's identities and video interviews. You can
- 15:39S2: feed answers into people's earpieces. Uh, but still, companies have
- 15:45S2: the ability to do thorough due diligence to combat that
- 15:48S2: AI and in-person or real person challenge by checking, well,
- 15:54S2: you say you did your university here. Tell me about
- 15:57S2: what was happening in the year 2002. When you say
- 15:59S2: you were stationed at Sydney University, Were you aware of
- 16:02S2: that flood event that happened in at Melbourne? When you
- 16:06S2: say you're at Melbourne University, there's ways you can test
- 16:09S2: these human. Now, the AI might be countering that, but
- 16:12S2: there are ways and means. See your employee face to face.
- 16:15S2: If they have an important role, ask them to come
- 16:17S2: into your satellite office. Present some ID in person knowing
- 16:22S2: that ID can be doctored and faked as well. Have
- 16:25S2: controls in place to make sure these North Koreans never
- 16:28S2: get in the door. The system or the operation put
- 16:32S2: in place by North Korea relies on companies taking shortcuts.
- 16:35S2: And the terrifying thing is, too many big Aussie corporates
- 16:38S2: are taking those shortcuts. Why? To save money that has
- 16:42S2: to end. The issue really is these North Korean agents
- 16:45S2: are good at their jobs. They are trained in coding,
- 16:48S2: they are trained in other IT disciplines. They will be
- 16:53S2: able to perform the role. So looking at their work
- 16:56S2: won't necessarily raise any concerns. It will be other things.
- 17:01S2: It will be there. Unusual flags about their working hours.
- 17:06S2: The way they're logging in, uh. The systems they're using
- 17:10S2: to log in. Keeping in mind that they're going to
- 17:13S2: be trying to counter the counter-attack from the companies. Now,
- 17:17S2: this is an evolving fight. Just as companies begin to
- 17:19S2: have technology to really detect whether fake IP addresses are
- 17:23S2: being used to obscure a remote workers real location. Just
- 17:27S2: as that technology is developed and employed, new technology will
- 17:31S2: be put in place to defeat it. So we need
- 17:33S2: to have a continuous and continuously improving system of countering
- 17:37S2: what is a very IT proficient army of North Korean agents,
- 17:43S2: ultimately working for one of the most pernicious and dangerous
- 17:46S2: regimes in modern human history.
- 17:49S4: Well, thank you.
- 17:49S1: So much for your time.
- 17:51S2: Great to be with you.
- 18:02S1: In other news today, politicians will be guarded at public
- 18:06S1: events while their homes and offices will undergo security upgrades
- 18:10S1: due to the most dangerous security environment in generations, according
- 18:14S1: to experts. Sydney and Melbourne house values have fallen for
- 18:18S1: a second consecutive month, but values soared in Perth, Brisbane
- 18:22S1: and Adelaide and more people are renting electric vehicles ahead
- 18:27S1: of Easter amidst surging petrol and diesel prices. To find
- 18:31S1: out more, visit the Ajcosta or smh.com.au. Today's episode was
- 18:38S1: produced by Kai Wong. Our executive producer is Tammy Mills,
- 18:42S1: and our podcasts are overseen by Lisa Muxworthy and Tom McKendrick.
- 18:47S1: If you like our show, follow The Morning Edition and
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- 18:53S1: for listening.