Latest / ACLED Audio / WEBINAR: Extraction under fire: How mining reshapes conflict in the Sahel

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WEBINAR: Extraction under fire: How mining reshapes conflict in the Sahel · ACLED Audio

• 0:06
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you all for joining.
• 0:08
  SPEAKER_00: Welcome.
• 0:09
  SPEAKER_00: Colleagues, partners, friends to this uh webinar on extraction under fire, how mining reshapes conflict in the Sahel.
• 0:18
  SPEAKER_00: Um, Jeremy Burgoyna will be facilitating this exchange today.
• 0:23
  SPEAKER_00: I'm a researcher from the French Agricultural Research and Cooperation Organization, Sierat, and I'm also the lead on knowledge and research at the International Land Coalition.
• 0:34
  SPEAKER_00: Um, I'm presenting today.
• 0:35
  SPEAKER_00: And very honored to facilitate today's conversation alongside our co-host at ACLET and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
• 0:45
  SPEAKER_00: And very thrilled to have so many of you tuning in live from around the world.
• 0:51
  SPEAKER_00: From our perspective at the International Land Coalition, land has always been uh the heart of conflict, increased competition over access to use of the land has intensified tensions across the world.
• 1:04
  SPEAKER_00: And the exploitation of how value natural resources, minerals, oils, gas, timber has become a major driver of violent conflict while it reshapes itself under land tenure system through displacements, dispossession, erosion of legitimate land rights.
• 1:21
  SPEAKER_00: Um ILC is a land organization, um, and this is a particular interest of ours.
• 1:27
  SPEAKER_00: Uh, but these dynamics are unfolding in an increasingly fragile global context, marked by geopolitical instability, environmental pressures, growing competition over strategic resources.
• 1:38
  SPEAKER_00: And understanding for us how land rights both influence and are affected by conflict is therefore essential to designing more effective peace building and governance responses.
• 1:48
  SPEAKER_00: And nowhere this is more evident than in Sahel.
• 1:52
  SPEAKER_00: Mining is often portrayed simply as a source of revenue for armed groups, but its role is far more complex.
• 1:57
  SPEAKER_00: Mining areas have become strategic territories where armed actors, state authorities, companies, local communities compete for control, influence, and livelihoods, reshaping patterns of insecurity over entire regions.
• 2:12
  SPEAKER_00: And this raising two fundamental questions that we'll be addressing and guiding today's discussion.
• 2:17
  SPEAKER_00: Why has the mining sector become such an important part of today's conflict landscape in the Sahel?
• 2:22
  SPEAKER_00: And how has the relationship between armed groups mining evolved over the recent years?
• 2:28
  SPEAKER_00: To help us unpack these complex dynamics between resource extraction, criminal networks, conflict, I am joined today by two distinguished experts.
• 2:38
  SPEAKER_00: Um, Lucia Burderis Benitez de Lugo is the director of the West Africa Observatory of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, GI Talk.
• 2:49
  SPEAKER_00: And drawing on GI Talk's research, Lucia will examine how illicit mining economies, criminal networks, governance dynamics intersect with armed violence in the region.
• 2:59
  SPEAKER_00: Eni in Sibiya, West Africa's senior analyst at AccLED will be drawing on AccLED's latest research and analyze how jihadist groups exploit mining economies to finance operations, consolidate territorial control, wage economic warfare against state actors.
• 3:17
  SPEAKER_00: Lucia Eni, thank you both so much for bringing your vital research to this conversation today.
• 3:22
  SPEAKER_00: And before we get started, just a few housekeeping rules.
• 3:27
  SPEAKER_00: Please use the QA feature at any point during the presentations to submit your questions.
• 3:32
  SPEAKER_00: We will reverse dedicated time near the end to address as many as we can.
• 3:38
  SPEAKER_00: Feel free also to use the chat to introduce yourself, share the name of your organization, where you connect from, and then collect with your fellow participants.
• 3:47
  SPEAKER_00: And as you've seen, today's webinar is being recorded.
• 3:51
  SPEAKER_00: And without further delay, let's jump into the research provided by Lucia and Eni.
• 3:57
  SPEAKER_00: Any will provide, as I said, more conflict dynamics and armed groups-oriented perspectives, whereas Lucia will also dive deeper into economies and governance issues.
• 4:06
  SPEAKER_00: Lucia, I turn to you.
• 4:08
  SPEAKER_00: Can you tell us about the nexus between gold mining extremist groups and in particular how violent groups hold and transfer wealth?
• 4:17
  SPEAKER_00: Over to you.
• 4:19
  SPEAKER_02: Thank you, Jeremy.
• 4:21
  SPEAKER_02: So a key a key question for researchers is with the significant um wealth that these groups amass, how do they hold and transfer it?
• 4:32
  SPEAKER_02: For example, the$50 million ransom payment uh reported recently for an MRIT national, how how do you store what you don't immediately need to spend?
• 4:45
  SPEAKER_02: We know that some of the finances are invested in local businesses, on the agreement that it can be recovered when the group needs it.
• 4:56
  SPEAKER_02: And both JNIM and ISAHL have used these tactics.
• 5:00
  SPEAKER_02: Um, but we we also know that JNIM and ISahL move finances between different katibas and units in different regions.
• 5:07
  SPEAKER_02: And how is this done?
• 5:09
  SPEAKER_02: Some of it is in cash, but gold is also part of the answer.
• 5:13
  SPEAKER_02: Uh and this is not just armed groups.
• 5:16
  SPEAKER_02: Across the region, gold is also used as a form of currency, a way of holding value.
• 5:21
  SPEAKER_02: And we've seen through raids on bases, uh, particularly of JNEM, um, that groups can sometimes have really quite significant volumes of gold in these bases.
• 5:33
  SPEAKER_02: For example, one and a half kilograms of gold was seized in a March 2024 raid on a JNEM base in Jigue, in the Sudest region of Burkina Faso, close to the border with Côte d'Ivoire.
• 5:46
  SPEAKER_02: And part of this may be due to JM taxing the gold sector in kind, so in gold itself, but it's also likely partly a way of storing wealth until it's needed and used to purchase operational resources and simply uh the materials that different group elements need to survive.
• 6:07
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you very much, Lucia.
• 6:09
  SPEAKER_00: And any which countries or regions best illustrate these dynamics today, and how do they differ, to your opinion?
• 6:16
  SPEAKER_01: Uh thank you, Jeremy.
• 6:18
  SPEAKER_01: So uh as our latest report uh details, it is the central Sahel, uh Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
• 6:26
  SPEAKER_01: Uh however, the dynamics are different across uh these uh three countries.
• 6:33
  SPEAKER_01: Initially, when looking at mining adjacent conflict, Burkina Faso accounted for 75% of all the events that we identified by exploring uh violent events surrounding 44 sites uh throughout these three countries.
• 6:52
  SPEAKER_01: There are obviously many more sites, artisanal ones, but we have focalized on the main industrial uh mining sites, but also sites that we describe as key mining sites, which are semi-mechanized and artisanal mines that really have a strategic value for armed actors operating uh in the region.
• 7:17
  SPEAKER_01: Uh, but if we kind of look into the differences between these countries, in Burkina Faso, you have a large number of industrial operations that have been targeted by militant activities.
• 7:31
  SPEAKER_01: Uh, but you also have these dispersed hotspots across the country in different regions, and we highlighted some of the uh main cases, including the Bongo mine in the east region, uh, Inata in the north, uh, and also Taparko.
• 7:50
  SPEAKER_01: Uh, because each site has different dynamics by itself.
• 7:54
  SPEAKER_01: Inata was the first uh major industrial site that was targeted by violent activities by militant groups, and also prompted the first French uh aerial or even military intervention in Burkina Faso back in 2018.
• 8:12
  SPEAKER_01: Uh, while Bongo mine has been an industrial mine that has uh shifted hands, but it was also a deadly uh ambush against a convoy of the mining company Semapho in 2019 that informed the creation of Burkina Faso's uh state-backed volunteers for the defense of the homeland or VDP, uh the country's state-backed militia that has proliferated in recent years.
• 8:42
  SPEAKER_01: While Taparco is a different case because it sits uh along a key transit route or transport corridor uh on the national entry uh road that also leads to Esakan, which is the largest gold mine in the country.
• 9:00
  SPEAKER_01: And militant activities along that uh key transit route has disrupted logistic convoys and caused significant disruption to activities along that road.
• 9:12
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you, Inni.
• 9:14
  SPEAKER_00: And and yes, go ahead.
• 9:16
  SPEAKER_01: Yeah, and and also to kind of detail uh how the situation is in Mali, uh, where we have different dynamics in the extreme north.
• 9:25
  SPEAKER_01: We have uh an artisanal gold mining belt.
• 9:28
  SPEAKER_01: Uh for instance, there are sites in Tinsawatan, uh Igusar, around Kidal, uh Tasik, and others, while in the Gurma region, more in the southern borderlands of northern Mali, you also have a different dynamic where there is more multi-actor uh competition involving uh rebel factions, militant groups, uh, state forces, uh, Russian partner forces, and last but not least, the southern mining belt on the borders with uh Ivory Coast and Guinea, which really is where most of the industrial and semi-mechanized uh operations take place in Mali that also have been subjected to JM's economic warfare in order to deprive the state of revenue, but also to disrupt financial or economic relations between the Malian state and some of its foreign partners involved in mining operations.
• 10:32
  SPEAKER_01: As for Niger, it is a broader mining belt in the western parts of Tilabery that also sits between areas of influence of Islamic State Sahel province in the north, and further south, uh the Al-Qaeda affiliated Jamanusratul Islam al-Muslimin.
• 10:53
  SPEAKER_01: So these are the different kinds of mining belts or these different sites and hotspots in a sort of overview uh across the region and these three countries in particular.
• 11:07
  SPEAKER_01: Over to you.
• 11:08
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you, Elian.
• 11:09
  SPEAKER_00: Thanks for this zoom on Mali, Burkina, Niger.
• 11:13
  SPEAKER_00: Um, maybe Lucia, can you provide us uh a little bit of insight on how does this Sahelian illicit gold economy intersect with those of coastal countries in West Africa?
• 11:25
  SPEAKER_02: Yeah.
• 11:26
  SPEAKER_02: Um so the economies are really uh tightly bound, and perhaps we can show that with the map exactly.
• 11:33
  SPEAKER_02: And um, we we conduct ongoing mapping and monitoring of artisanal gold supply chains across the central Sahel and West Africa.
• 11:42
  SPEAKER_02: And it's really evidence that artisanal gold in the central Sahel, Senegal, northern Côte d'Ivoire, and northern Ghana is processed mainly through five primary hubs, and those are the Sahelian capitals.
• 11:55
  SPEAKER_02: So Bamako and Jamina, Niame, and Wagadougou, um, with Bamako really playing the most dominant role.
• 12:01
  SPEAKER_02: And from these hubs, gold is largely exported to the UAE, sometimes via secondary hubs like Togo.
• 12:08
  SPEAKER_02: Now, the major role of these Sahelian capitals as gold training hubs means that a significant proportion of gold from artisanal mining areas in coastal states, but areas that are bordering uh Sahelian countries, so typically in the north or in Sengul in the southeast, um, those gold flows are actually being moved through areas of the Sahel to the Sahelian capitals for purchase and then re-export.
• 12:35
  SPEAKER_02: What that means in Mali and Bikina Faso in particular is that these gold flows are being moved through territories that increasingly controlled by JM and I Sahel to reach Bamako Owaga for purchase.
• 12:50
  SPEAKER_02: So maybe to give one example in particular, which is the one that you can see here on the slide, Artisal gold mining in northern Ghana is largely informal.
• 13:00
  SPEAKER_02: Um, and our research found the of the extraction in northern Ghana, an estimated 60 to 70 percent of the gold is sold to Burkinabi traders and then smuggled north over the border, predominantly to WAGA.
• 13:17
  SPEAKER_02: And then financing flows in the other direction, so from Burkina Faso into Ghana.
• 13:22
  SPEAKER_02: Um and we we have um some indicators that J ⁇ M-linked buyers in Bikina Faso are suspected to be purchasing some of the gold extract in northern uh Ghana.
• 13:35
  SPEAKER_02: Um, but at this stage, the the robust evidence is not quite there.
• 13:41
  SPEAKER_02: But this is a risk because of the shape of um the coastal gold markets and the intersections between them, um, and a risk that already has manifested in the past.
• 13:51
  SPEAKER_02: So, for example, in 2023, JNIM reportedly infiltrated the Artissan gold supply chain in northeastern Cote d'Ivoire, um, partly through pre-financing arrangements where uh JN would provide financing ahead of the mining operation that can be used to buy equipment or buy some of the chemicals that are needed to process the gold, such as mercury or cyanide.
• 14:14
  SPEAKER_02: And in return, they're able to buy the gold at a favorable trade trade price.
• 14:20
  SPEAKER_02: So that's to say that the territories in southern Mali, um, southern Bikina in particular, um, are bisected by gold flows not only from those countries, but also from neighboring regions in Senegal, Guinea, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire.
• 14:36
  SPEAKER_02: And these intersections um mean that there's an even greater volume of gold that that becomes available for predation.
• 14:43
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you, Lucia.
• 14:45
  SPEAKER_00: Um, any Lucia has told us about this infiltration of networks and value chains.
• 14:51
  SPEAKER_00: Can you tell us a little bit more from your insights and your research?
• 14:54
  SPEAKER_00: How and when we talk about our groups benefiting from mining, what does it look like in practice?
• 15:00
  SPEAKER_00: Is it only the direct control of the mine or integration into the value chain process?
• 15:05
  SPEAKER_00: But can you tell us also about taxation, protection, and other forms of influence that looks like in your in your case studies?
• 15:13
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you.
• 15:14
  SPEAKER_01: Absolutely.
• 15:14
  SPEAKER_01: So when we talk about armed groups benefiting benefiting from mining, we're we're not simply referring to the extraction of gold.
• 15:22
  SPEAKER_01: So one of the findings is that much of mining-related violence doesn't really take place at the actual sites, it's often in the surrounding communities along supply routes or or access uh routes and so forth.
• 15:39
  SPEAKER_01: That means that it's the broader mining environment that these groups also engage with.
• 15:45
  SPEAKER_01: And we see that as a case in point in northeastern Burkina Faso, where ISSP really controlled the access routes surrounding, for instance, the Esakan mine, but also artisanal sites in Saitenga.
• 16:00
  SPEAKER_01: Uh there is a particular case in Salaten, which is probably the most affected site by armed group activity uh throughout the region.
• 16:10
  SPEAKER_01: So they intercept travelers, miners, uh, they extort uh cash, gold, and other equipment and yeah, components that they have they have use for.
• 16:24
  SPEAKER_01: Uh so it's direct exploitation of sites, but also the economic activities surrounding the sites that they benefit from.
• 16:34
  SPEAKER_01: But not only the economic activities, they also seek to influence and control the populations by imposing their own political or social order through psychological operations, for instance, preaching and sermons, and really trying to make these civilian communities sort of supportive of their uh agenda.
• 17:00
  SPEAKER_01: And that is where economic activity, governance, but also security provision intersect in this broader kind of conflict environment or mining environment, which is an integral part of the conflict ecosystem.
• 17:21
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you.
• 17:22
  SPEAKER_00: And Lucia, is it also what you've been observing?
• 17:24
  SPEAKER_00: How important this um the gold mining control uh compares to other sources of financing for these groups?
• 17:32
  SPEAKER_00: Um we hear a lot about livestock, theft, taxation, exhaustion, smuggling, and kidnapping.
• 17:38
  SPEAKER_00: But um what is your insight in um this um involvement in in gold value chains in comparison to these other sources of financing?
• 17:49
  SPEAKER_02: It's really difficult to assess the relative financing streams, and it varies over time as the groups lean into uh one economy or another more.
• 18:02
  SPEAKER_02: But we believe that gold is likely to feature in the top three sources of financing for violent extremist groups in the Sahel, probably together with taxation and extortion on the one hand, and particularly since late 2024, early 2025, kidnapping of foreigners for ransom.
• 18:21
  SPEAKER_02: And I'll quickly run through these and their relationships.
• 18:24
  SPEAKER_02: So perhaps kicking off with gold, of course, the Sahelian gold market is very significant, um, including the artisanal production, um, which for now is is where most of the value extraction by violent extremist groups is concentrated.
• 18:41
  SPEAKER_02: So, for example, in Mali, artisanal gold uh mining is estimated to produce between 35 and 50 tons per year.
• 18:50
  SPEAKER_02: And with the global spot price uh extremely high, that is a huge amount of value to be able to predate.
• 18:58
  SPEAKER_02: Um, and it's important to say that we don't believe that these groups are setting up uh kind of alternative parallel gold supply chains.
• 19:07
  SPEAKER_02: They are merely predating and inserting themselves into those that exist.
• 19:11
  SPEAKER_02: Um, and and JM in particular is increasingly well positioned across the region to extract a significant proportion of value from particularly the artisanal gold mining economy.
• 19:23
  SPEAKER_02: Just to give one example, that it's estimated that about 20% of all artisanal mining uh in central Sahel is in the Sahel region of the Kina Faso, which has around 450 pits.
• 19:35
  SPEAKER_02: JNU has been present there since 2018 with quite a stable influence since 2020.
• 19:42
  SPEAKER_02: Um, and this really shows you that some of the areas falling under influence really are very significant to the mining economy.
• 19:49
  SPEAKER_02: Um, and IS Sahel has also increasingly positioned itself on several gold mining areas, but also other strategic minerals.
• 19:58
  SPEAKER_02: So, for example, until May of 2024, ISL had control of the Tosika mine in Mali, which is for manganese and was taxing miners there.
• 20:07
  SPEAKER_02: Moving then to the protection rackets uh and taxation that we would also say are critical in the financing of these groups.
• 20:16
  SPEAKER_02: Protection rackets are a foundational criminal activity in Sahelin conflict zones, um, which really transform illicit economies and livelihoods into critical sources of revenue.
• 20:29
  SPEAKER_02: And within these protective rackets, roads really emerge as particularly key spaces, as Henley also said.
• 20:37
  SPEAKER_02: So these access points to mines, but also control of movement generally is really control of people and positioning to predate economies.
• 20:48
  SPEAKER_02: And that's why we see these kind of major road corridors emerging as important sites of contestation between non-state armed groups and states.
• 20:58
  SPEAKER_02: And we see a lot of violence concentrated there.
• 21:01
  SPEAKER_02: So, for example, in Niger in 2025, about 70% of I Sahel attacks on civilians occurred close to the N1 or N23 highways.
• 21:11
  SPEAKER_02: And then thirdly, for uh in this kind of top three of VO financing and Sahel, right now we would include the kidnap of foreigners for ransom, which really surged in 2025 as both I Sahel and Jim really restructured their approach.
• 21:29
  SPEAKER_02: So I Sahel strategically pivoted towards kidnapping of foreigners, which has historically not been so much a part of the group's playbook.
• 21:38
  SPEAKER_02: Um, we understand that they have established a dedicated team for kidnapping operations and in the past year targeted at least probably more 10 victims.
• 21:49
  SPEAKER_02: Um, our monitoring indicates that bandits can receive between 130,000 euros and 350,000 euros for delivering a foreign hostage to IS Sahel.
• 22:01
  SPEAKER_02: And that shows that the ransom payments must be materially higher for that to be a profit.
• 22:07
  SPEAKER_02: And similarly, JNM has uh reportedly kidnapped over 30 foreign nationals in southern Mali since the beginning of uh 2025.
• 22:15
  SPEAKER_02: And that's really one of the highest on record for a similar period.
• 22:19
  SPEAKER_02: And the scale of individual ransom payments is also extremely big.
• 22:23
  SPEAKER_02: Um, the most widely reported, of course, being that I mentioned the um$50 million payment for the NRIT national.
• 22:32
  SPEAKER_02: So that's really recentered kidnapping in that top three as a major source of revenue.
• 22:37
  SPEAKER_02: We do think the livestock uh sector through theft, but also through taxation, is also a very key source of financing, but probably just below those those top three.
• 22:51
  SPEAKER_02: And currently the the thefts appear to be at a slightly lower level than in the earlier 2020s.
• 22:59
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you, Lucia.
• 23:01
  SPEAKER_00: And that brings me to Any about the the trade-off, the balance those GID groups uh need to strike, also to balance coercion, social peace, and uh how what are the efforts they they make into building relationships with local communities around those mining sites uh to reinforce their presence and enhance some form of legitimacy?
• 23:25
  SPEAKER_00: Thanks, Annie.
• 23:29
  SPEAKER_01: Uh thank you, Jeremy.
• 23:30
  SPEAKER_01: So I I would just add uh I I totally agree with with Lucia, it's very difficult to rank these top revenues of income, but I would also add battlefield capture captures, and that relates to arms, equipment, ammunition as a major source that is frequently mentioned by local interlocutors as a key revenue stream alongside kidnapper ransom, cald rustling, but also uh you know extraction of resources from artisanal gold mining.
• 24:04
  SPEAKER_01: Uh but to your question and the relationship uh between armed groups and local communities around mining sites, it's it's definitely much more nuanced than just simple coercion.
• 24:17
  SPEAKER_01: So even if we pull up the heat map, we can see you know the armed engagement surrounding these mining sites.
• 24:28
  SPEAKER_01: And and JNIM, for instance, is by far the most prolific.
• 24:33
  SPEAKER_01: Even if you aggregate state forces across all three countries, JNim is the actor present at, I mean, most frequently at these sites, but they also use, as I already mentioned, persuasion that that they try to influence these local uh communities through preaching and sermons, and really try to kind of sway them to their side and to undermine state authority and legitimacy in these specific very contested mining uh environments.
• 25:11
  SPEAKER_01: So, in practice, they combine coercion and persuasion uh in order to influence these communities, but also that they act as gatekeepers, which means that they also are selective and you know they can facilitate access to mining sites.
• 25:33
  SPEAKER_01: Sometimes they even exclude certain communities that they perceive as state-aligned.
• 25:39
  SPEAKER_01: That was the case in southwestern Niger, around the locality of Bose Bango, which sits on the border with Burkina Faso, where they prohibited inhabitants from that specific locality to mine at key sites in Jabale and Alareni and so forth.
• 25:56
  SPEAKER_01: These are small localities that the audience probably not necessarily are aware of, but that kind of speaks to the dynamics.
• 26:04
  SPEAKER_01: And the same goes for state actors or state affiliated or pro-government forces like militias, that they may exclude communities that they perceive as complicit with militant groups and vice versa.
• 26:18
  SPEAKER_01: So there is really competition, you know, in order to provide not only security but also access to these uh mining sites.
• 26:28
  SPEAKER_00: And Any, just a follow-up question, um, maybe for after, but do you think there are ways uh those mining activities, are they also changing the ways those groups organize themselves, compete with each other, creating also tensions with it within these groups?
• 26:46
  SPEAKER_01: Absolutely.
• 26:47
  SPEAKER_01: And I mean I think in 2023 specifically, we saw a lot of competition between JM and ISSP, especially in Mali's uh Gurma region, which is the southern borderlands of northern Mali.
• 27:00
  SPEAKER_01: So you have a main or a major mining area named Intahaka, which is subject to this kind of multi-actor uh competition between Yihali groups, state forces, Russian partner forces, uh, rebel factions, pro-government militias like Gatya, uh, and so forth.
• 27:22
  SPEAKER_01: However, there are other sites in the area like Tinaikaren and also Inabao, and these areas sit in an area that is really kind of contested between the groups.
• 27:34
  SPEAKER_01: JNim has historically been more dominant, but ISSP really uh poses uh a challenge to that.
• 27:42
  SPEAKER_01: And even in recent days, we we saw ISSP activities encroaching on JNI's area of influence in this part of uh Mali.
• 27:53
  SPEAKER_01: Uh but it kind of you know links to wider contests over territory mobility and local authority among our armed actors.
• 28:07
  SPEAKER_01: So uh and this is for the reason that mining activities really incentivize you know taxation, governance, but also long-term entrenchment by armed groups.
• 28:20
  SPEAKER_01: And if we look at you know historically expansion by these groups, mining activities have held a quite central role in their territorial expansion efforts as well, which further demonstrates the risks in neighboring regions, in for instance, coastal states, so not confined to the central style, as we could probably predict that these dynamics will continue to spread to other areas.
• 28:55
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you, Any.
• 28:56
  SPEAKER_00: Um, Lucia, if we can take a step back, you mentioned this a little bit.
• 29:00
  SPEAKER_00: Maybe we can dive deeper into it about this international demand.
• 29:04
  SPEAKER_00: You spoke of gold, but also critical minerals.
• 29:07
  SPEAKER_00: Uh, how this has influenced, aggravated the situation, influencing these dynamics, the move uh into these regions, or or developing further into the ties that they already had before we get into the look ahead and what can be done to address these issues.
• 29:27
  SPEAKER_02: Of course, first perhaps just to add to something that Henny was saying, I think we need to be very clear that the way that these that both Jane M and Aya Sahel are extracting value from the mining sector is largely indirect.
• 29:42
  SPEAKER_02: That means that in order to be able to get the value to tax it, they need the communities to be doing the mining first.
• 29:51
  SPEAKER_02: So that means there has to be a relationship with these communities.
• 29:54
  SPEAKER_02: It's not like kidnapping or rustling of cattle where it's pure predation.
• 30:00
  SPEAKER_02: It's a more negotiated settlement.
• 30:03
  SPEAKER_02: Um, and that's partly why mining areas emerge as really important areas, not just for financing, but as Henny was saying, for the kind of building of alliances between different groups, between shaping the relationships between violent extremist groups and communities, and really building that legitimacy.
• 30:24
  SPEAKER_02: And in many areas, we can see JM in particular that their taxation rates are actually set at a level that is perceived as relatively reasonable by mining communities.
• 30:36
  SPEAKER_02: And that shows you that balance between, of course, predation extracting revenue, but also needing the mining community in the first place.
• 30:44
  SPEAKER_02: And then turning to the international um demand point, of course, the the Sahelian extractives um markets are really sensitive to shifts in uh global demand.
• 30:55
  SPEAKER_02: And on a few developments recently really highlighted this.
• 30:59
  SPEAKER_02: So we we track uh gold prices at mining areas and trading hubs across the central Sahel and in many areas in West Africa more broadly.
• 31:09
  SPEAKER_02: And they closely track uh global prices.
• 31:12
  SPEAKER_02: So typically trading at around 80 to 85 percent of the London spot price, um, which is a very close uh mirroring.
• 31:22
  SPEAKER_02: And of course, that means that the global um increase in the price of gold has made regional mining more profitable.
• 31:29
  SPEAKER_02: Um, a lot of the gold that is exported from the central Sahel goes to the UAE, which means that it's very influenced by market dynamics in the UAE.
• 31:42
  SPEAKER_02: Um, and we can see an almost immediate impact of the Iran war in February of this year is spillover into the Gulf and the subsequent closure of the Dubai airspace, where a lot of the Sahel in gold was moving into.
• 31:56
  SPEAKER_02: So we saw that the regional average mine site price collapsed in the central Sahel in March of this year, um, with miners reporting that buyers were paying much lower prices.
• 32:08
  SPEAKER_02: So a decrease from 85% of the London spot price to 55 to 60% of the global spot price.
• 32:15
  SPEAKER_02: Or in some cases, buyers were even refusing to buy gold.
• 32:20
  SPEAKER_02: Um, so we we see that almost immediate impact.
• 32:24
  SPEAKER_02: And while air connectivity to Dubai has improved, some disruption persists.
• 32:29
  SPEAKER_02: And that's partly due to reduced demand from uh kind of particularly Indian buyers based in the UAE who were evacuated from the central Sahel during the conflict.
• 32:42
  SPEAKER_02: We we also see that the extractive sector as a whole, both gold and critical strategic minerals, is very geopolitically contested across the central Sahel.
• 32:52
  SPEAKER_02: Um we've seen a broad push for nationalization of the sector, um, but we also see uh it crowded with several foreign interests.
• 33:00
  SPEAKER_02: And the lines between kind of informal, formal, criminal, geopolitical, are very blurred in this space.
• 33:07
  SPEAKER_02: And that's really highlighted um by gold refinery projects, which are currently underway in all three states of the central Sahel.
• 33:16
  SPEAKER_02: These are really intended to bring more gold into the formal space, but they're and are joint ventures between the state and foreign investors.
• 33:26
  SPEAKER_02: But interestingly, two of the three refinery projects, uh, one in Mali with a Russian partner and one in Niger with a partner from the UAE, involve the state partnering with entities that are subject to international sanctions, either as the entity or CEO within the entity, which could also mean that that relationship with international demand, that move to pull more of the gold flows into the formal sector, continues to face blockages in the future.
• 33:56
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you a lot, both of you, for this brilliant diagnosis, sharing your knowledge.
• 34:01
  SPEAKER_00: And um, of course, there are resources for our participants to look into, reportings and research that you've been producing.
• 34:09
  SPEAKER_00: And I would like to ask a few questions before we open up to discuss questions that are being put in the in the chat and the QA box.
• 34:17
  SPEAKER_00: Uh, about okay, well, let's look ahead.
• 34:19
  SPEAKER_00: About this is a starting point for our discussion.
• 34:22
  SPEAKER_00: Uh, we you've shared this diagnosis, but how could we advance uh from this situation?
• 34:28
  SPEAKER_00: And my first question to you both um would be about around the formalization of the mining sector.
• 34:35
  SPEAKER_00: Do you see a greater formalization reducing conflict or creating new risks?
• 34:47
  SPEAKER_01: I mean, I I could probably start on this one.
• 34:50
  SPEAKER_01: And I mean, formalization, especially of artisanal mining, is often presented as a straightforward and simple solution, but I would argue that it's really not the case, especially since a lot of the territory is contested by armed actors.
• 35:10
  SPEAKER_01: So, how to implement formalization when you don't really control the terrain?
• 35:16
  SPEAKER_01: So it's really hard to regulate.
• 35:19
  SPEAKER_01: And there is also major risks because artisanal mining is a key livelihood in especially remote border regions that sustain thousands of livelihoods, and even earlier efforts to try and close down artisanal sites have backfired significantly.
• 35:39
  SPEAKER_01: And I wanted to make the case of Kabonga in Eastern Burkina Faso, that was a major artisanal site, it still is, it's more like a large village surrounding you know artisanal uh pits in that area, and it facilitated JNM's implantation in the East region, and it also became a permanent base for the group that has projected force across not only the Est region but also the Centra Est.
• 36:10
  SPEAKER_01: So that is really an area that over time has transformed into a launch pad for expansion even further south into Benin, Togo, and border areas in Niger and as far as uh north central and northwest Nigeria.
• 36:29
  SPEAKER_01: So that is a great example, I believe, to show that an artisanal mine or the attempted closure really kind of linked Jim with these mining communities, but also managed to contribute to their entrenchment really long term.
• 36:51
  SPEAKER_01: And this implantation started in mid-2018, and it's today one of the most significant militant bases in eastern Burkina Faso.
• 37:02
  SPEAKER_01: And this is just one case out of many, but I think it's it speaks volumes to the challenges in trying to regulate artisanal mining, especially in remote border areas that are outside state control and contested by multiple actors.
• 37:22
  SPEAKER_02: It's definitely not a silver bullet, and often it's it's perhaps, as Hernanie said, presented a little bit simplistically.
• 37:30
  SPEAKER_02: Um but nonetheless, it depends on how formalization is done, it can also offer benefits.
• 37:39
  SPEAKER_02: Um and certainly trying to bring in the informal and artisanal mining communities can really help build relationships between them and the state.
• 37:49
  SPEAKER_02: So, for example, the the interhacker mine that um Henny was discussing previously, um, which was artisanal.
• 37:57
  SPEAKER_02: And then when the the Malian armed forces regained control in in 2023, briefly, um there was an immediately uh announced potential scoping of whether the site was um was potential for industrial mining.
• 38:16
  SPEAKER_02: Now, these kinds of things are very closely monitored also by artisanal mining communities and is seen as an ongoing exclusion of artisanal mining interests in favor of industrial mining.
• 38:27
  SPEAKER_02: So, even in areas where control is fragmented, um, the position towards artisanal mining communities is critically important.
• 38:35
  SPEAKER_02: Um, so back to depending on on and how uh the sector is formalized, where formalization is even an option because there is sufficient state influence.
• 38:46
  SPEAKER_02: Um, we've seen that often in the central Sahel, in West Africa as a whole, many efforts to formalize the sector have often centralized a desire to expand national revenue collection and kind of nationalize resources and often have yielded more administrative burdens on artisanal mining communities and limited benefits.
• 39:10
  SPEAKER_02: And typically a significant proportion of the revenues from artisanal gold mining right across the region is captured by the elite.
• 39:18
  SPEAKER_02: Um, and some attempts to formalize are seen as efforts to bring back more flows for the elite rather than benefiting uh communities that, as Henny said, have very few other livelihood alternatives.
• 39:32
  SPEAKER_02: And when done like this, formalization merely creates more tensions, multiplies risks.
• 39:38
  SPEAKER_02: But there are also models that have yielded better results.
• 39:42
  SPEAKER_02: And usually that involves empowering cooperatives and ensuring fairer resource sharing.
• 39:48
  SPEAKER_02: Um, there are also some interesting models across the region that have really kind of assessed the climactic conditions and and uh designed state control around that.
• 40:01
  SPEAKER_02: So, for example, in Mauritania, which has similar climactic conditions to much of the central Sahel, um, the kind of processing points were really highlighted as points of trying to exert greater influence and purchase um because a lot of water is needed in that processing um process.
• 40:22
  SPEAKER_02: Um, and water is is is scarce in the region.
• 40:25
  SPEAKER_02: And so therefore there couldn't be so many processing nodes, and there were an easier area to exert control in.
• 40:31
  SPEAKER_02: So, in short, there are models that either of uh kind of exerting greater state control um on artisanal mining or promoting more equitable resource sharing, decreasing environmental harms have yielded some positive uh results.
• 40:48
  SPEAKER_02: And it is worth exploring where the conditions allow and make sense.
• 40:54
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you.
• 40:54
  SPEAKER_00: And I'm also looking at the numerous questions that we are getting on the on the chat and the QA box, but something I wanted to close with, uh having your thoughts before we open up to others questions around the trends and developments that policymakers, businesses, humanitarian actors, uh the UN bodies uh would be watching for most closely.
• 41:19
  SPEAKER_00: What are for you the major aspects to be considered uh in order to alleviate or mitigate such situations of conflict?
• 41:30
  SPEAKER_02: Perhaps I'll I'll jump in here.
• 41:32
  SPEAKER_02: Um I think one point to watch very closely is um JM's movement into well, its increasing entrenchment in southern Mali and what that might mean for engagement with the gold sector.
• 41:45
  SPEAKER_02: Um I mean, we're already starting to see three key uh potential differences.
• 41:53
  SPEAKER_02: Firstly, there's a huge increase in the volume of gold and thus the potential value available for predict for predation when you compare um the gold um production in southern Mali and that in the north.
• 42:08
  SPEAKER_02: The region of CHAI alone accounts for roughly 80% of the national gold production.
• 42:13
  SPEAKER_02: Um, and there's a much more dense mix of artisanal trading routes, industrial mining sites.
• 42:18
  SPEAKER_02: And JNM's already taxing uh some artisanal sites in its zones of greatest influence in the south, um, taxes of about up to 10% of the gold mines in negotiated monthly cash payments.
• 42:32
  SPEAKER_02: Secondly, there's the there's a change of the type of mines.
• 42:35
  SPEAKER_02: So we have more industrial, semi-mechanized, um, and here we really see a differentiated approach.
• 42:41
  SPEAKER_02: So JM kind of caught in the artisanal uh and small-scale miners, but actually kind of kidnapping, attacking, um coercing industrial, semi-industrial foreign operators, particularly since late 2025.
• 42:57
  SPEAKER_02: So, how is this going to develop?
• 42:58
  SPEAKER_02: Not necessarily that JNM is going to seize industrial mines, um, although there have been cases, for example, in Burkina where it's done so.
• 43:06
  SPEAKER_02: Um, but how is it positioning itself around those industrial mining interests and how can the sector withstand the pressure on access routings and uh increased operating costs?
• 43:20
  SPEAKER_02: Um and then perhaps uh zooming out, something else to watch is the the development of the conflict in the Middle East and how that shapes the role of the UAE as the main gold purchase purchasing hub for the central Sahel going forwards.
• 43:39
  SPEAKER_02: This could reshape the Sahel's gold trade in the short to medium term.
• 43:43
  SPEAKER_02: We've already seen some displacement to other buying hubs like Turkey.
• 43:48
  SPEAKER_02: And also at a global level, gold prices are still high, but still below the kind of pre February, pre conflict in the Middle East outbreak levels.
• 43:58
  SPEAKER_02: And those uh conflict dynamics will have big knock on effects for the gold supply chains that are um moving out from the central Sahel.
• 44:07
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you, Lucia.
• 44:09
  SPEAKER_00: Any any reflections there?
• 44:12
  SPEAKER_01: Yeah, absolutely.
• 44:13
  SPEAKER_01: I I would probably add that as Lucia correctly mentioned, the southern Malian mining belt is very significant, and that is uh where JM has made most territorial gains in in terms of expansion over the past uh almost two years.
• 44:32
  SPEAKER_01: Uh and it has really reached an all-time high when it comes to the kidnapping of foreigners and especially Chinese uh miners, but this also adds a lot of pressure on the neighboring regions in the coastal states, like Ivory Coast, Guinea, where mining communities also depend on related economic activities on the Malian side.
• 44:56
  SPEAKER_01: And JN is running checkpoints, they are controlling the people's movements along key transit routes, but there's also precursor activities in these countries like Guinea, with you know Jinim being in some form of infiltration phase, trying to at least engage with the mining sector there.
• 45:20
  SPEAKER_01: So it's this kind of emerging risk or the risk of spillover to coastal states.
• 45:27
  SPEAKER_01: Uh, but there is another risk in this broader environment, and Lucia already mentioned uh you know, the nationalization efforts by governments in the region, you know, with the revision of mining codes, uh nationalization of uh extractive assets, uh, but also other emerging threats like you know, weaponized drones.
• 45:51
  SPEAKER_01: That is something, especially for mining companies, you know, as base camps and uh other kind of uh processing plants and other facilities may become targeted uh by by this emerging threat.
• 46:07
  SPEAKER_01: We haven't seen it so far, but it's it's still something to take into account.
• 46:13
  SPEAKER_01: But I also think that one point is the importance of communities because the contestation will increasingly revolve around communities.
• 46:24
  SPEAKER_01: As Lucia said, like artisanal miners, Jane intend to court to them while targeting industrial and semi-mechanized operations.
• 46:35
  SPEAKER_01: So this is really kind of a key dynamic in how they try to attract support from artisanal mining communities and to the detriment, obviously, of more industrial or semi-industrial operators.
• 46:50
  SPEAKER_01: So I think these kind of components or factors are something to watch moving forward.
• 46:57
  SPEAKER_01: But last but not least, it also the necessity to kind of assess or or observe the broader kind of conflict dynamics because it's not only the protection of the actual mining sites themselves, but the broader environment, including you know, transit routes.
• 47:16
  SPEAKER_01: We have seen you know with embargoes uh on, for instance, Sky and Nioro du Sahel, even Bamako, how that has impacted you know, fuel transports, the movement of people.
• 47:31
  SPEAKER_01: So not only kind of focusing on security securitizing actual sites, but also kind of assessing the broader conflict environment.
• 47:42
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you.
• 47:43
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you very much.
• 47:44
  SPEAKER_00: I have a few more questions questions coming from the audience.
• 47:47
  SPEAKER_00: Uh I I've tried to um put them in um different kinds of questions.
• 47:54
  SPEAKER_00: There are so many uh that could be that you could address.
• 47:57
  SPEAKER_00: I think some of it was discussed.
• 47:59
  SPEAKER_00: Uh coastal countries were of high interest uh to our viewers, but something recurring was around uh the government responsibility and what is being done um to curb or control these uh these developments, and what can realistically be done to get a better grip on this and reduce conflict.
• 48:26
  SPEAKER_02: Um so there is a lot being done.
• 48:30
  SPEAKER_02: I think Henny and I have have both touched on various different um initiatives to to try and kind of um bring more uh more gold into the formal sector, the the establishment of of national refineries, the creation of national associations to control artisanal gold mining like the OMASP in Mali.
• 48:52
  SPEAKER_02: Um but so it's it's a very dynamic uh space, but it's also extremely complicated.
• 49:01
  SPEAKER_02: Um and so where efforts are to try and uh purchase more artisanal gold mining, bring it artisanal, artisanally mined gold um in the formal sector, to bring it into the formal um space, to support mining communities um in forming uh cooperatives, to support in mitigating the environmental harms, particularly the use of mercury cyanide.
• 49:28
  SPEAKER_02: Um there are uh kind of wins uh in in these projects, and these are supporting a more sustainable artisanal um mining sector.
• 49:37
  SPEAKER_02: Um and these but these wins are incremental, they're gradual, um, and they take time.
• 49:44
  SPEAKER_02: There is no quick solution.
• 49:46
  SPEAKER_02: What has not worked um across the region, which I think Henny uh touched on previously, is attempts to crack down on the mining sector.
• 49:56
  SPEAKER_02: Um and perhaps to take a bit of a kind of step back, I think what what we see um is that the mining sector, as we've already discussed, is a huge source of livelihoods.
• 50:09
  SPEAKER_02: I think in Mali alone, 700,000 people were estimated to work in the sector in 2019.
• 50:15
  SPEAKER_02: Um and so it's it's key also to take a look from those perspectives while balancing that with the fact that the mining sector in in Western and Central Africa could uh for is for armed groups uh in these regions, perhaps what you know, cocoa cultivation was for political and criminal groups in Latin America.
• 50:36
  SPEAKER_02: So it's it's really a sector where the state regulation is at odds with community perceptions of legitimacy and livelihood opportunities, um, which can really impact that relative legitimacy of the state and armed groups.
• 50:50
  SPEAKER_02: In short, what does that mean?
• 50:52
  SPEAKER_02: That where there are opportunities to um take initiatives to formalize, to provide greater security at mines, to mitigate harms, then you know these should continue to drive forwards.
• 51:04
  SPEAKER_02: But where this is not possible, seeking to purely crack down on activities is likely to backfire.
• 51:11
  SPEAKER_02: And it may just be better to have more humble aims, to increase security at the mine site, to um to promote uh less environmentally harmful practices rather than try and restructure the the entire economy in these areas.
• 51:26
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you.
• 51:28
  SPEAKER_00: Any any points you would like to add?
• 51:30
  SPEAKER_01: Any yeah, I mean, I I I would probably say that especially for mining companies and the states, uh employment within the sector, especially for industrial operations, uh, development and investment at the local level could potentially contribute uh to kind of attract some of these mining communities and also kind of to mitigate the environmental stress, obviously, because that is often a grievance, you know, uh dust from heavy traffic uh linked to industrial operations, but also you know, pollution from such activities.
• 52:16
  SPEAKER_01: So these three things like local employment to favor that, but also local development and investment to kind of maintain this social license among surrounding communities.
• 52:30
  SPEAKER_01: I I think that is will remain key uh you know for the near future in the mining sector.
• 52:38
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you.
• 52:38
  SPEAKER_00: I have two other questions before we close.
• 52:41
  SPEAKER_00: I see other questions popping up.
• 52:43
  SPEAKER_00: I'm sorry, won't be able to address them all, but a few came uh around the role of private military and security companies.
• 52:51
  SPEAKER_00: What is their role in relation to the exploitation of artisanal mining sites?
• 52:55
  SPEAKER_00: And also a lot came around Wagner Group, Africa Corp.
• 52:59
  SPEAKER_00: in the mining sector.
• 53:00
  SPEAKER_00: Um are they there, are they in practice securing the industry or rather rather escalating mining-induced conflicts, to your opinion?
• 53:14
  SPEAKER_02: It's both two two slightly different questions.
• 53:16
  SPEAKER_02: Firstly, on on PMCs and and private security actors.
• 53:20
  SPEAKER_02: Um of course, uh, gold mining areas are concentrations of wealth, and gold is incredibly valuable, and that's also why we often see, for example, a multiplication of weapons in artisanal gold mining areas also to protect the gold.
• 53:37
  SPEAKER_02: So we see a proliferation of different types of um protection groups, whether those can be defined as a kind of informal security protection arrangements that are created by the community, to hiring um kind of specific uh local defense groups or private military companies.
• 53:57
  SPEAKER_02: We see a whole range, both in the in the artisanal areas, also within the semi-mechanized and small-scale mining that is operated by uh Chinese nationals in many cases.
• 54:09
  SPEAKER_02: Um, and then, of course, hired private security by industrial mines.
• 54:13
  SPEAKER_02: So there is a whole proliferation of different types of security and military organizations that are brought in to secure the mine sites.
• 54:21
  SPEAKER_02: The regulation of these is very, very complex and often quite blurry and uh varies between countries and between regions.
• 54:30
  SPEAKER_02: Um often they can be accused of of escalating uh violence, um, but also they they are really baked into the shape of both the industrial and artisanal area.
• 54:42
  SPEAKER_02: In terms of uh Wagner or now Africa Corps, we've seen a very differentiated uh result in in the central to health with Africa Corps than, for example, what we saw in the Central African Republic.
• 54:56
  SPEAKER_02: We haven't seen this kind of wholesale, just direct uh control of artisanal gold mining areas and uh gold mines and supply chains that we saw in the Central African Republic.
• 55:09
  SPEAKER_02: The influence is is quite different.
• 55:11
  SPEAKER_02: Um, Russia does have a footprint in the Central's gold and strategic mineral sector, um, including in industrial mining.
• 55:19
  SPEAKER_02: So the licensing, for example, um in April of last year, we saw an expansion to the existing um licenses for nod gold um in the plateau central region.
• 55:32
  SPEAKER_02: Um we see uh involvement or kind of exchange um in the refinery projects that I referred to earlier, um, sometimes as a direct partner.
• 55:42
  SPEAKER_02: But it's quite different to that just direct predation of artisanal gold mining sites that we saw established in in some other areas.
• 55:53
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you.
• 55:55
  SPEAKER_00: Any uh final words on that point before I close on the last question?
• 56:00
  SPEAKER_01: No, I I I totally agree with Lucia.
• 56:02
  SPEAKER_01: It's very kind of diverse how Russian actors have engaged with the with the mining sector.
• 56:08
  SPEAKER_01: For instance, if you look at uh the northern uh Kidal region in Mali, it has been more kind of patrols or incursions at mining sites, but not any direct control.
• 56:20
  SPEAKER_01: Uh, the exception to that is the Manganese site in Tassiga, uh, which Lucia uh previously mentioned, because that was initially managed by pro-government uh militias, then taken over by Islamic State Sahel Province.
• 56:37
  SPEAKER_01: But by April 2024, ISSP had been pushed out from that site, and Wagner had at least temporarily taken over sort of the security or or the management around that site.
• 56:53
  SPEAKER_01: And similarly, in Burkina Faso, you have you had the Taparko mine, which is one of the cases mentioned in our latest report, that due to the insecurity, it wasn't sustainable, or they they couldn't even continue operations.
• 57:10
  SPEAKER_01: So eventually the Birkinab estate took over uh the mining site.
• 57:16
  SPEAKER_01: So there are definitely some challenges in the mining sector for foreign operators, including the Russians.
• 57:24
  SPEAKER_01: So it's not a kind of it's not very straightforward to just get a license and then start you know running operations, especially in the current you know environment marked by insecurity.
• 57:38
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you, and and thank you for the 180 plus uh participants that are still with us.
• 57:45
  SPEAKER_00: Uh final question, and maybe it I know it could be a longer answer, but a lot of a lot of concern or questions around your methodology.
• 57:53
  SPEAKER_00: A lot of uh participants were interested in the methodological aspect of observation on the ground for this particular dynamics.
• 58:02
  SPEAKER_00: And the some of the questions were around your concern to blind spots because of areas you could not access or where you wouldn't have any respondents to inform on the dynamics.
• 58:13
  SPEAKER_00: And maybe that can give an a little opportunity to speak about uh GI talk accolades um way to describe to do research on these aspects and and promote the data as it is.
• 58:28
  SPEAKER_00: So if you have closing remarks on something, a step back, a reflective stance on the data itself that you are providing.
• 58:39
  SPEAKER_01: Yeah, please go ahead.
• 58:45
  SPEAKER_02: Okay, I'll I'll jump in.
• 58:46
  SPEAKER_02: Um so we we use a very diverse set of data uh sources.
• 58:53
  SPEAKER_02: Of course, we we use the um existing uh kind of grey, grey literature, available data, we use ACLAD's uh some of that ACLAD's conflict and violence data, um, as well as the mapping of goal sites and also um open source intelligence.
• 59:11
  SPEAKER_02: Um but a very key part of how we work is also through field data.
• 59:16
  SPEAKER_02: And we work with very significant networks of individuals right across the areas that we work in, um who are well positioned to collect data on certain dynamics and are often quite specialized in the economy that we are seeking to better understand or research or monitor.
• 59:36
  SPEAKER_02: Um, for example, it might involve individuals very closely linked to the gold economy, uh individuals in key gold trading hubs or artisanal mining areas that have connections not just with, for example, miners, but also with some of those ancillary businesses at mine sites and who can really um share data uh in a way that provides a moving picture over time.
• 1:00:02
  SPEAKER_02: So we we try and, although snapshots and deep dives are for definitely part of what we do, um, we try and keep a consistent analysis of priority dynamics so that we get these evolutions over time and we can compare current um status against what uh has come before.
• 1:00:22
  SPEAKER_02: And this kind of constant flow of field data is absolutely critical.
• 1:00:26
  SPEAKER_02: Um, particularly now where we must recognize that information flows in many ways from parts of the central Sahel, particularly the more remote areas away from the capitals, um, are increasingly complex.
• 1:00:40
  SPEAKER_02: Um by no means, and I think Henny would agree, do we believe that you know our data sets are comprehensive?
• 1:00:47
  SPEAKER_02: Um, but uh through kind of consistent monitoring with a diverse array of sources and really that consistency over time, we try and make sure that we're bringing together field OSINT secondary literature to give um as accurate a developing picture as possible.
• 1:01:06
  SPEAKER_01: Yeah, and I mean Lucia already provided a quite exhaustive uh uh explanation for this.
• 1:01:14
  SPEAKER_01: And a lot of the work at ACLED is very similar in the way that we also have insulated networks or local networks that we leverage, especially due to the difficulties conducting field work and having even access to accurate information in the current uh conflict and information environment.
• 1:01:38
  SPEAKER_01: So, yeah, we we do depend on that.
• 1:01:40
  SPEAKER_01: And I don't claim that our data set is exhaustive or comprehensive in that way, but it is also based on knowledge accumulated in the course of a decade.
• 1:01:53
  SPEAKER_01: So it kind of takes its departure with an historical overview dating back to 2015, and these are cases that were monitored and closely tracked at the time, and with some of the you know specific cases that I mentioned, like Cabonga back in 2018, but also having access and knowing people within the sector with far greater experience from mining than than than myself, that is much more focused on on conflict, obviously.
• 1:02:25
  SPEAKER_01: Uh but yeah, that is that is really the approach.
• 1:02:29
  SPEAKER_01: But it's based on a select number of sites from which we have as I would describe as very reliable data to look at the conflict environment and the nexus to mining.
• 1:02:43
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you.
• 1:02:44
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you very much with this.
• 1:02:45
  SPEAKER_00: I think uh we are going to close this webinar.
• 1:02:48
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you, Lucia.
• 1:02:50
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you, Any, thank you, uh GI Talk and ACLED for co organizing this event.
• 1:02:55
  SPEAKER_00: And thank you, everyone, for participating actively uh in the chat.
• 1:03:00
  SPEAKER_00: Um, have a wonderful rest of the day.
• 1:03:03
  SPEAKER_00: I'm sure we'll continue discussing, exchanging, and learning even more from the research you are providing.
• 1:03:10
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you very much and goodbye.