Latest / TFTC: A Bitcoin Podcast / #744: Your Face Is Not A Password with Gerald Glickman

Transcript

#744: Your Face Is Not A Password with Gerald Glickman · TFTC: A Bitcoin Podcast

• 0:00
  Gerald Glickman, welcome to the show, sir.
• 0:02
  Thank you.
• 0:03
  Great to be here.
• 0:05
  Freaks for context of how Gerald and I met.
• 0:08
  We met outside of the TFTC and PubKey bus in Miami.
• 0:12
  What was that, four years ago?
• 0:13
  Five years ago now at this point?
• 0:14
  Yeah.
• 0:16
  At the time you were working in the banking sector helping,
• 0:21
  correct me if I'm wrong, if you're comfortable with me saying this,
• 0:24
  if not, we can cut it out, but helping cannabis businesses get banks.
• 0:30
  bank accounts and navigating the regulatory landscape that comes with running a
• 0:37
  business that is perceived to be uncouth by the government.
• 0:42
  And so you're on the ground there, correct?
• 0:45
  Yeah, and went there because they had a crypto banking portfolio that I wanted to support.
• 0:52
  The bank was called MBB Bank.
• 0:53
  They're still called MBB Bank.
• 0:54
  But yeah, I was there in a fraud and identity risk management kind of oversight role.
• 0:59
  So, you know, you're there was a lot of we also did gambling, you know, FanDuel and DraftKings.
• 1:05
  So all the all the things that maybe big banks didn't want to touch MBB was was all about it.
• 1:12
  Yeah. And so that's your background.
• 1:15
  But why we're here to talk today is digital identity.
• 1:18
  This is something that you've been passionate about.
• 1:20
  We've talked about for many years behind the scene.
• 1:24
  And I think we should just jump right into it.
• 1:26
  I think when most people hear digital identity, their eyes glaze over, but you argue that we're at an inflection point.
• 1:34
  In your mind, what broke that made this whole conversation about digital identity urgent and what misconceptions do Bitcoiners have around it?
• 1:48
  What broke?
• 1:49
  Well, start there.
• 1:51
  Yeah, I mean, I think the model for digital identity broadly in the United States has been breaking for a few decades.
• 2:01
  Certainly, the step change in AI and LLMs, generative content has accelerated that to the point where, you know, fraud and identity risk managers, you know, the half-life of new controls that they're putting into production is just in a nosedive.
• 2:18
  But fundamentally, the paradigm is broken in and of itself, like the security model of how we do identity, which is, you know, we're effectively using our identifiers, right?
• 2:35
  Like our name, address, social security number, these types of things as our authenticators, basically using that information and possession of that presentation of that information to prove that we are ourselves or in a lot of cases, somebody else.
• 2:50
  And this is a fundamentally flawed model.
• 2:53
  It's based on the assumption that that information is a secret.
• 2:58
  Maybe at one point it was a secret.
• 3:00
  Hasn't been a secret for years, like decades, right?
• 3:02
  Everybody knows their private information is massively compromised.
• 3:06
  You would think that that would mean that we have to change the way that we do identity verification.
• 3:11
  I think you'd be right, but we haven't done it.
• 3:13
  So over the years, I've seen more and more fraud risk managers in the business.
• 3:21
  These are not bad people.
• 3:22
  They're trying to protect the corporations that they work for and their clients from fraudsters.
• 3:29
  But the way that they've been trying to keep that edge and maintain their performance, you know, in these probabilistic systems is to consume more and more aggregated information, including biometrics.
• 3:42
  And I've been particularly alarmed at that. That's the type of thing that you don't get back.
• 3:48
  You know, you can't you can't rotate your face. You can't rotate your fingerprint.
• 3:51
  We should presume that information is going to be compromised like all other secret information that we trust centralized third parties to protect.
• 4:00
  And once that information is compromised and already has been, you're not getting out of that hole and you have you have no other trigger to pull.
• 4:07
  So, yeah, I think the model has been breaking.
• 4:12
  Bitcoiners and many other people all around the world have significant concerns about the proliferation of digital identity.
• 4:23
  No one can argue that it's a significant vector for authoritarian control.
• 4:28
  This isn't a hypothesis. We can just look around the world and see this.
• 4:31
  Um, and, you know, for me, um, I've historically been, you know, working in financial services
• 4:40
  and, uh, been on the inside.
• 4:43
  I've also worked at, I, you know, led the fraud team at one of the largest entity verification
• 4:47
  companies during the height of COVID as well.
• 4:49
  So I have the public sector kind of experience as well.
• 4:52
  And, and, uh, you know, we, we want to make sure that, uh, as practitioners in the space,
• 4:59
  We have a sense of the work that we're doing and how it's connected to the root problem and the systems that we're operating in.
• 5:06
  And I fear that most people don't.
• 5:10
  And, yeah, as as these things accelerate globally, I mean, even the United States, many states are rolling out digital driver's licenses.
• 5:16
  I feel, you know, as though it's really, really important for everybody to understand how these things work, how they don't work, and what other tools, technologies, approaches and policies are out there that we should consider refine and advocate for.
• 5:32
  Yeah, I guess going from there, it seems that the power structure, whether for nefarious reasons or legitimate reasons, has identified that the system is broken.
• 5:47
  It cannot persist in its current form.
• 5:49
  And we need to transition to a new way of verifying individuals, particularly in the digital world, verifying that individuals are who they claim to be in the digital world.
• 6:00
  And there's a plethora of solutions that have been brought to market, E-Verify, obviously WorldCoin, and the Orb, and the preconditions of a digitalized D system that leverages some form of blockchain technology or some government database that consolidates it.
• 6:25
  And so I think with that context, what in your mind are the proposed solutions today?
• 6:31
  What do they maybe get right?
• 6:33
  And what do they get terribly wrong?
• 6:35
  Yeah.
• 6:35
  So let's start with kind of both ends of the spectrum.
• 6:38
  One is pure knowledge-based identification and verification.
• 6:43
  Fundamentally broken, right?
• 6:45
  Like we cannot use these systems anymore.
• 6:48
  Everyone's information is massively compromised.
• 6:51
  I've written and said before that that security model is is effectively using your address to your home as the key to your front door.
• 7:04
  Right. Like no one would do that. But that's effectively what we're doing.
• 7:08
  We're using now public information that was once secret as a means of authenticating ourselves.
• 7:13
  We cannot do it. It doesn't work. And in many, you know.
• 7:17
  not even high assurance but even like medium assurance use cases like practitioners kind of
• 7:24
  have moved away from that but you still see that for low assurance certification use cases in the
• 7:28
  public sector it's bad um the other end of the spectrum i would say is full-on biometrics like
• 7:34
  the world coin piece that you mentioned of like using your uh identifiers uh you know your
• 7:42
  your biometrics as authenticators as well. And it's, again, you can't give that back, right?
• 7:52
  Like you're handing that over to a private corporation. They might make claims about,
• 7:56
  oh, we delete it. I don't know. I mean, I don't know why anybody should believe that.
• 8:03
  But it's just not a great idea. The things that I advocate for are largely around open standards.
• 8:12
  These are not my ideas, by the way. These are other people's ideas. They've done the work. I've just kind of discovered them as a practitioner looking for better answers.
• 8:21
  And the approach there is to really, you know, use cryptography to secure the attestations that we make the same way that we secure the rest of digital life.
• 8:32
  Right. With with private keys and public keys.
• 8:36
  Um, and this fully satisfies what I call like authorship fraud, right?
• 8:43
  So basically how do I know that the attestation that Marty made actually made it?
• 8:48
  Well, like I can grab his, his public key.
• 8:50
  I can verify the digital signature.
• 8:52
  And now I'm not relying on probabilistic inference of like taking a picture of a driver's license.
• 8:58
  Like I'm using cryptography and math, uh, to, to provably know that, um, you authored this attestation.
• 9:06
  So that doesn't mean I should trust it. Right. Of course, like it's just something that you said and I can prove that you said it or wrote the message and signed it.
• 9:14
  That doesn't mean that like I should rely on the message. So that's like a whole other thing in terms of like trust frameworks, credentials and things like that.
• 9:22
  But broadly, my advocacy is around open standards and frameworks that are and policies that are going to empower people to be able to control their identities.
• 9:35
  The biggest thing for me, Marty, being a practitioner in this space is and again, knowing how it works in the private sector and the public sector is just seeing the results.
• 9:45
  Right. Like in the next hour of this conversation, at least 3000 Americans will be victims of identity theft.
• 9:53
  This is unacceptable. Like we're just doing it right.
• 9:55
  It's like through no fault of their own. There's this there.
• 10:00
  Something is happening to them because of our approach that is going to have a massive negative impact on their lives.
• 10:05
  It's just unacceptable as somebody in the space.
• 10:07
  So, yeah, I'm all about open standards, cryptography, empowering individuals and actually like doing a better job at preventing fraud.
• 10:17
  Yeah. I mean, and just to add to those numbers, I think you've written about it.
• 10:20
  Three trillion in fraud across federal programs in two decades, four thousand, more than four thousand breaches per year, deep fakes, fooling automated systems.
• 10:29
  And it's only accelerating with AI.
• 10:32
  Yep.
• 10:34
  Yep.
• 10:34
  Yeah.
• 10:34
  Yeah.
• 10:35
  so that's what i mean so i agree i think this problem needs to be solved and matt and i talk
• 10:41
  about it particularly on rhr because we do the live stream via the via nostr and then matt will
• 10:49
  go to the official rhr account and post a note of of the video and that post that note comes signed
• 10:59
  with our um with our private key associated with the rabbit hole recap account so you know that like
• 11:04
  like, hey, we have access to the private key.
• 11:08
  Nobody else does.
• 11:08
  We're signing and attesting that this is the real rabbit hole recap of this week.
• 11:13
  But getting into it, like obviously, Nasser, you can use your real name, but most people
• 11:20
  use it pseudo anonymously.
• 11:22
  And so that's what I'm trying to get a better understanding of once we transition to a world
• 11:29
  that is, whether you like it or not, likely going to necessitate the use of digital IDs.
• 11:37
  What is the spectrum of acceptable types of IDs?
• 11:43
  I imagine I will keep my Noster account.
• 11:45
  I have a web of trust associated with my public address on Noster.
• 11:51
  I think I've been using it for five years now.
• 11:53
  So I think people trust that it is me and know that it is me.
• 11:56
  and I've built up a reputation there.
• 11:59
  And that reputation associated with my Nostra key
• 12:02
  should be able to enable me to interact
• 12:05
  with people that need a degree of trust on the web.
• 12:11
  However, is that going to be okay with governments,
• 12:15
  with tech companies, with other actors
• 12:18
  that may demand a form of digital ID in the future?
• 12:22
  Yeah, yeah.
• 12:23
  So there's a lot of, there's so much to talk about here.
• 12:26
  Um, the first thing I would say is, um, and to give some credit, my views here are significantly
• 12:33
  influenced by Christopher Allen, who's been in this space for a long time.
• 12:38
  If you don't know that, for sure.
• 12:40
  But, um, trust, when we talk about trust and digital trust, like trust is a contextual
• 12:46
  thing, right?
• 12:47
  Like it's, it's not a one or a zero concept.
• 12:51
  Um, and I think the easiest way to think about trust in a digital context is to kind of step
• 12:56
  back into the need space and think about how we develop and manage trust in the physical world.
• 13:04
  And, you know, trust is contextual, right? And usually, if you want to engage in some kind of
• 13:12
  relationship, private, commercial, whatever, like, it's usually progressive, right? Like,
• 13:16
  you're usually sharing more and more information and establishing, like, a higher level of assurance
• 13:21
  and trust, maybe even getting third parties involved to validate the claims that other
• 13:26
  people are making if it really matters to you.
• 13:30
  So I think the context is like always the first thing to start with.
• 13:34
  Like if it's making a post on social media and knowing that like Marty authored it, cool.
• 13:38
  Like that's a pretty low risk thing.
• 13:40
  It's probably more medium or maybe even higher risk for you.
• 13:43
  But like that's that's you.
• 13:45
  It's different for me.
• 13:46
  It's going to be different for everybody else.
• 13:48
  So I think that's kind of always the first thing to start with is there's, like, we're so trained as modern humans to, like, look for a singular answer in all contexts.
• 13:59
  And, like, we just have to, like, stop that right there.
• 14:01
  Like, it's that this is, like, not how this works.
• 14:04
  So context is king.
• 14:06
  When it comes to the different methods and what's acceptable in different contexts, both for individuals, for businesses, for states, it's actually interesting.
• 14:20
  So today, there's some legislation going into effect in Utah called Steady State Endorsed Digital Identity, which is really interesting.
• 14:29
  It's also
• 14:31
  We can talk about this later about like
• 14:33
  You know no single
• 14:35
  Person or entity is
• 14:37
  Like a universal actor
• 14:39
  Like also today Utah's
• 14:41
  Like VPN ban
• 14:43
  It's not quite a ban but it's effectively a ban
• 14:45
  Is also going into effect so
• 14:47
  On one hand we have this super
• 14:49
  Great digital identity infrastructure
• 14:51
  And bill that protects individual liberties
• 14:53
  We'll talk about that more and on the same
• 14:55
  Day we have this like VPN issue
• 14:57
  Going into effect so like
• 14:59
  It's very confusing if you're just looking at it from a high level, but SETI in Utah would actually allow you to bring your own identifier like an NPUB.
• 15:09
  And as long as you demonstrate control over that public identifier, you know, sign a message with your with your insect, private key, the state will actually issue a credential to your public identifier.
• 15:24
  And it sounds like, OK, well, like, so what? Who cares?
• 15:27
  but it's actually a really kind of profound
• 15:31
  like architectural thing in the sense that
• 15:35
  it's giving control back to individuals
• 15:39
  because if let's say for example the state issues your driver's license
• 15:42
  the subject in it is your decentralized identifier let say you get into a bunch of accidents you get your license revoked they have to pull it for a lot of people you know the license in the united states is like your
• 15:55
  primary identity document and having that revoked has a significant impact on your life with this
• 16:00
  model you would retain control over your identifier now it's just your credential is no longer valid
• 16:06
  you can't really present it anymore but you you haven't been like rug pulled in terms of your
• 16:13
  entire identity so yeah your your credential to drive has been taken from you correct correct but
• 16:18
  not your the foundation of your of your digital and physical life when it comes to identifying
• 16:22
  yourself so you know nostr um is certainly interesting there are a lot of different
• 16:29
  decentralized identity like methods and basically it all comes down to like where do you anchor the
• 16:37
  the actual public identifier such that people can get the information that they need about
• 16:42
  you know the cryptographic schemes and other things to be able to verify your
• 16:45
  digital signature so you can anchor and identifier and a lot of different places
• 16:49
  and a lot of different ways and these different ways again going back to
• 16:53
  context are more appropriate given different contexts right but for example
• 17:01
  like most people are familiar with like domain names you could anchor a did on a
• 17:04
  domain name pretty easy for institutions the dependency there is DNS most people
• 17:10
  know how like dns is actually managed but it is like centrally managed and controlled um most
• 17:16
  people find it acceptable but like there are trade-offs with all these things um you can
• 17:21
  anchor it in like a social media public key like nostr which is like portable to a large degree
• 17:26
  you're relying on the network of relays um the trade-offs there around are around like uh
• 17:32
  correlation and like key rotation with that with that specifically um you can anchor an identifier
• 17:39
  on a blockchain, which can give you some sense of neutrality and durability.
• 17:44
  But again, you have the public metadata risks there.
• 17:49
  And there are some emerging methods that are more self-contained, I would say, with no
• 17:55
  external dependencies.
• 17:56
  I would point to Carrie and XID from Chris Rowan and Blockchain Commons folks, where
• 18:03
  the continuity there really comes from signed control over a key registry that you make
• 18:09
  that you maintain that you can give to somebody,
• 18:10
  you can anchor it somewhere else,
• 18:12
  but it's basically like a log that you can present.
• 18:15
  And it has the cryptographic assurance
• 18:17
  throughout that whole thing.
• 18:18
  So it really depends on the context
• 18:21
  and like where the continuity comes from
• 18:24
  and the assurances come from.
• 18:25
  But ultimately like the design choices like do matter
• 18:29
  in terms of like who can sensor and route
• 18:32
  and like recover and correlate
• 18:33
  or like take away your ability to represent yourself
• 18:36
  in these contexts.
• 18:37
  Well, I mean, it's a perfect point to bring out what are the black mirror scenarios that can unfold if we get this wrong.
• 18:47
  man um it's it's really interesting i think about this a lot um is kind of the the jevons paradox
• 18:57
  of it all right like um by being an advocate for these tools and advancing the standards and
• 19:04
  ability for people to be able to do this in a in an easier way uh yes the goals are are ease of use
• 19:11
  but largely the goals are around like privacy and like individual empowerment but nonetheless like
• 19:17
  it has to be easier or else people won't use it.
• 19:19
  But given that one of the goals is to make it easier,
• 19:22
  like going back to Jevon's paradox,
• 19:24
  like we don't want to enable a world where we're now like being asked to
• 19:32
  present our papers to like, you know,
• 19:35
  go into the public square digitally or physically. Right.
• 19:39
  So I think one of the,
• 19:40
  one of the guiding principles that I like to kind of true back to is like
• 19:44
  whatever the rights and norms are in the physical space around identification,
• 19:49
  like we should look to preserve and fight for those in a digital context.
• 19:53
  So the black mirror, you know, manifestation,
• 19:58
  again, we don't have to look far.
• 20:00
  Like these things are happening today.
• 20:02
  You've talked about China, social credit scores,
• 20:05
  ability to access like basic public services and have an impact like,
• 20:09
  you know, your eligibility for transactions in the private sector as well.
• 20:12
  like we do not want that we do not want over identification just because identification is
• 20:18
  now easier um what we're trying to do is make it easier for people to retain their privacy and even
• 20:25
  claw some of that privacy back uh and do so in a way that they control and is also can be done
• 20:30
  you know easily um yeah and uh you saw me fidgeting over here because as you were saying
• 20:38
  that this is something that we covered yesterday in the bitcoin brief i'm not sure if you saw it
• 20:41
  of the Guard Act, protect the children.
• 20:44
  Trojan horse for digital identity.
• 20:46
  Basically, in the past, the Senate Judiciary Committee 22 to 0,
• 20:52
  requiring age verification for all chatbots slash AI users,
• 20:55
  bipartisan unanimity to basically try to throw age verification.
• 21:02
  And I think that's another important topic to bring up is the nefarious ways
• 21:09
  and framings that governments will use to Trojan horse centralized panopticon digital IDs on the
• 21:18
  masses. And I think age verification is the number one way that they'll do that.
• 21:22
  People are not wrong. The fear is grounded. This is often the vector and framing that is presented
• 21:32
  to the public around safety, affecting the children.
• 21:37
  What we have to true back to is, again, the principles of what are the expectations in
• 21:43
  the physical world?
• 21:45
  And do I have to identify?
• 21:46
  I don't have to identify myself when I go into Walmart, as an example.
• 21:50
  But if I go to walmart.com, I am behind the scenes being identified, right?
• 21:55
  And I've agreed to it.
• 21:58
  whether or not I understand what I clicked when I said I allow cookies or what, you know, it's,
• 22:04
  it's such a mess. Um, but like, yeah, we need to find a way to build and amplify the standards,
• 22:11
  policies and tools to like, get us closer back to those real world expectations of privacy.
• 22:17
  It also is very troubling, you know, not just the age verification stuff, but like I mentioned,
• 22:22
  Utah's effective like VPN ban as well, which, you know, the net effect of that.
• 22:29
  And it's not again, it's not really a ban.
• 22:30
  It's more nuanced than that.
• 22:31
  But like the likely result is that like VPNs will be less used and, you know, sites will
• 22:39
  either block users that are using VPNs or, you know, in an effort to like mitigate this
• 22:45
  liability that is now on them, they will attempt to like age verify everyone.
• 22:49
  Right.
• 22:49
  and we'll be in this world where it's like a norm
• 22:53
  to hand over all of your basic personal identification information
• 22:57
  just to read the news or check the weather.
• 23:00
  We have to make sure we avoid that outcome.
• 23:03
  Yeah, and I mean, this is something that's been discussed
• 23:06
  in the world of dids, particularly in the Bitcoin slash Noster ethos
• 23:13
  is particularly via zero knowledge first,
• 23:17
  and please step in if i'm speaking out of line but there are ways to selectively verify that you are
• 23:24
  21 without revealing your exact birthday right absolutely i think that is where
• 23:35
  not enough focus is on and it's a shame that like web5 the blocks initiative sort of fell under
• 23:41
  because I've talked to Daniel quite a bit
• 23:44
  and actually talking to him makes me,
• 23:46
  made me pretty bullish in what they built
• 23:48
  and how you could do things.
• 23:50
  I think there's definitely some design choices
• 23:52
  that they made that others should be paying attention to,
• 23:55
  maybe go back and see what they were doing.
• 23:57
  But I think around this selective,
• 24:00
  the ability to verify that you do meet certain credentials
• 24:05
  that are necessary to interact in the digital world
• 24:08
  without actually giving up all the information itself.
• 24:11
  Yes, 100 percent. Coin Center is also like a big advocate for these types of approaches as well.
• 24:21
  So grateful for Daniel Buckner, Peter, Coin Center, everybody there who's keyed in on these things and has been doing the work for years and years.
• 24:31
  But yeah, you know, the outside of a did. Right. So if we think about a did, what is it?
• 24:36
  It's it's basically a way it's a decentralized identifier. It's a private public key pair. Cool.
• 24:41
  what does that give us that give us gives us the ability to verify if somebody authored something
• 24:47
  great the other piece of this is around credentials right so we talked about the state issuing you a
• 24:52
  driver's license with the subject of that credential being your did and not like your
• 24:56
  bii that's that's fantastic it's it's also not enough right like we don't want to be in a world
• 25:02
  where it's like cool i have this verifiable credential that i can present um and authenticate
• 25:09
  with my did by using my private key to sign the presentation of the credential.
• 25:15
  We don't want to end up in a world where we're basically just now taking a copy of the digital
• 25:20
  credential and now storing that for seven years instead of a picture of your license,
• 25:25
  which it's basically financial services.
• 25:29
  So the ideal flow and the tools and technologies are here.
• 25:35
  They exist.
• 25:37
  They're still emergent around some of the edges, but like we do have the ability to issue credentials such that they have these these specific proof points in them such that, like, when I go to the bar, I don't have to reveal my birthday.
• 25:53
  I just have to selectively disclose the attestation that's a part of my signed credential from the state that says I'm over 21.
• 26:01
  One, maybe that credential also has a picture of my face, or maybe that credential requires me to locally, like biometrically authenticate myself to the device that the credential is bound to.
• 26:12
  But there's a lot of different ways that we can build assurance between the credential and the presenter of the credential to ensure that the credential isn't lost, stolen, and misused.
• 26:27
  And there's a lot of things that the issuers of these credentials can do to ensure that like the holders of these credentials can present attestations or verified attributes of the credential without completely revealing like their whole dossier.
• 26:42
  Right. So, yeah, I think that is that is the way forward.
• 26:47
  There's I can like describe like that ideal flow if you're interested.
• 26:51
  But that's like really what we're aiming for is composability.
• 26:57
  Right. And the ability to just like share proofs, not documents.
• 27:01
  Yeah. Please explain the flow because I think it's important.
• 27:05
  Yeah, yeah, yeah. Sure.
• 27:06
  So I think like when I think about the ideal flow here, like I think an issuer and you think about an issuer, who's an issuer?
• 27:14
  I could be an issuer. I could say I'm going to issue you a credential, Marty, that says you have a red hat.
• 27:20
  I have reason to believe you have a red hat. It can be anything.
• 27:23
  Anyone can be an issuer of a credential or an attestation.
• 27:26
  What I'm going to do then is I'm going to craft that credential in a standard that allows for privacy-preserving presentation of that credential, which is going to allow for selective disclosure and zero-knowledge proofs.
• 27:41
  And I'm going to sign it, and it's going to be bound to your public key.
• 27:48
  So you can only present it if you authenticate yourself with your private key.
• 27:53
  Right. So that completely removes the what happens if somebody gets a hold of your digital credential.
• 27:58
  It's useless unless that threat actor also then has the private key, which if that's the case, you have bigger problems.
• 28:05
  But I'm going to craft the credential in such a way that I'm going to say Marty has a hat.
• 28:12
  Marty also has a hat that's red.
• 28:15
  And he also has a hat that has a reference to the Bitcoin Park classic golf tournament from 2023.
• 28:21
  different levels of specificity then you could selectively reveal them as you as you choose
• 28:26
  um let's say you're going to a bar and uh they're going to say hey like only people that possess
• 28:34
  red hats um from 2023 can get in here um that's a very specific request right and and honestly
• 28:42
  like when you think about going to a bar like they're looking for a very specific request as
• 28:46
  well like they want to know that you're over 21 they don't care where you live they don't care
• 28:50
  what your name is, if you're an organ donor, all that stuff, you have to reveal all of that to
• 28:54
  satisfy the requirements. But like, let's say you're at this place. The bar is you must have
• 29:00
  verified proof that you could, you know, own a Red Hat. I'm going to make that request to you
• 29:06
  in a format that like your wallet and your credential can directly respond to, right?
• 29:11
  So I'm going to say, please provide proof of Red Hat ownership. You'll go into your wallet and
• 29:16
  you'll be like cool here's my verified claim from gerald i'm i'm gonna i'm gonna present this
• 29:22
  attribute um and there we go now should the bar to the bar trust that that gerald is a is a
• 29:30
  trustworthy source of authoring this information that's up to them right you're a red hat oracle
• 29:36
  man you're a trusted red hat oracle yeah but again this goes back to like context right like
• 29:41
  most people at a bar right like you need that attestation needs to come from a state but like
• 29:46
  in this context, whatever, it's private attestation, you happen to have a credential, you can selectively
• 29:51
  reveal the component of that. So you're going to generate the presentation of that claim
• 29:58
  with a zero knowledge proof. You present that, you don't have to hand over your phone or anything,
• 30:04
  you can do it via QR, or maybe even NFC. And it's like a one to one, like non space request,
• 30:13
  right like that's not a replayable thing they can't take your authenticated presentation of
• 30:18
  this credential and use it anywhere else it's a it's a peer wise presentation um the verifier then
• 30:26
  validates it right so they they take a look at okay like who signed this gerald okay gerald's
• 30:31
  like the man when it comes to you know inspecting red hats we trust him um they might have like a
• 30:39
  a a challenge of some kind they might if the credential doesn't include it like they want
• 30:43
  want to make sure that the presentation of this credential is in fact like signed by the by the
• 30:49
  person or the controller of the did so you could just authenticate yourself to your phone to sign
• 30:53
  it you didn't already do that and what we've done is we've we've enabled like the this club to you
• 31:03
  know protect your privacy satisfy the information that they want and they don't have to call me
• 31:09
  right like they're as a part of digesting that that um that credential they're not like phoning
• 31:14
  home to some state agency or gerald's like red hat oracle business to be like hey marty's here
• 31:20
  at this time at this location does he have a red hat no like the credential stands alone by itself
• 31:26
  it's anchored to your did and it's built in such a way such that you can select and and present
• 31:32
  authenticated piece of it.
• 31:34
  So that it right You know on and after that once they do all that stuff like they don need to record your name They don need to record when you were there
• 31:46
  They just need to know,
• 31:48
  like, hey, like this requirement was satisfied
• 31:51
  and like this guy's in.
• 31:53
  Maybe there's a timestamp.
• 31:55
  Maybe they provide some sort of like proof verification result
• 31:58
  if necessary, but like no PII is exchanged,
• 32:01
  just the proof and like the requirement is satisfied
• 32:05
  and people move on. So this can be done in a privacy preserving way, using using proofs instead
• 32:12
  of just like handing over a digital credential itself. And that is the way that that we should
• 32:16
  do this for sure. You mentioned that if somebody loses or somebody loses access, maybe not loses
• 32:24
  access, but somebody else gains access to the private key credentials that you have big problems.
• 32:29
  But I don't want to gloss over that because I think that that is a massive point of friction that is unclear how you solve to me.
• 32:38
  It's like, obviously, we see this a lot in Bitcoin.
• 32:42
  Private key, losing private keys or somebody stealing private keys is not uncommon.
• 32:47
  I want to call it rare.
• 32:49
  I want to call it.
• 32:51
  I want to call it.
• 32:52
  Most people aren't susceptible to it or haven't.
• 32:57
  Befallen that I would imagine.
• 32:59
  however it does happen and I think this is something that we're still trying to
• 33:08
  gain a level of comfortability over is developing these new skills of handling
• 33:13
  private public heat pairs and securing them most importantly so what's your
• 33:19
  what are your thoughts on that and how that evolves?
• 33:21
  Yeah I mean as we incorporate these kind of approaches into more and more of our daily
• 33:29
  life like we need to get better here right like um not not just around like um you know individual
• 33:37
  responsibility like obviously that's like a key part of it but um we we need to like build systems
• 33:44
  and capabilities and make conscious choices around like hey if you lose your mpub like
• 33:50
  that's it right like that's all the protocol supports at the moment there are other did
• 33:55
  methods and approaches here which do solve for this or attempt to solve for this thing specifically
• 34:01
  they have other trade-offs um but i'll point to like carry as an example so um they they do like
• 34:08
  what they call like pre-rotation right so basically you you have a private key um you can like pre
• 34:14
  rotate your keys and like hold multiple private keys such that if you ever lose uh you know an
• 34:20
  earlier private key, you can broadcast a message that says, like, please disregard any messages
• 34:26
  from that in the future or if it was compromised, et cetera.
• 34:29
  So I think that is like something that we need to get better here across all of these
• 34:35
  methods, whether it's like, you know, collaborative custody kind of setups that you and your
• 34:40
  audience are probably familiar with around like multi-seg and just the whole spectrum
• 34:44
  there or building it into the protocol itself like carry where you're you can you can pre-rotate
• 34:53
  now obviously like if you lose all your pre-rotated private keys as well like what do you do here
• 34:59
  this is this is the problem with decentralized systems there's no hotline to call
• 35:04
  but that doesn't mean that we can't build in you know capabilities and recovery mechanisms in the
• 35:11
  protocols directly that enable people to like take these precautions. So you'll probably hear
• 35:16
  that in a lot of my answers. It's never like a one or a zero on these things. Like we should
• 35:20
  understand the middle ground and like make a deliberate choice that suits our context.
• 35:25
  Yeah. No, it makes sense. And I'm thinking of something like the big key here, like
• 35:30
  their social recovery, maybe there is something you can do with family. Maybe it would be mandated
• 35:36
  by the state has to be family members or somebody that's a bedded close friend and you get two of
• 35:41
  them and if they're willing to sign their behalf then you worry about like all right what if they
• 35:45
  blew it against you now i'm rambling but no i it's it's a lot of the same like like systems
• 35:51
  thinking and like threat factors um in this context as it is with like bitcoin security
• 35:56
  as well and private key and self-custody so um i think bitcoiners are like uniquely suited to be
• 36:03
  able to like advance this conversation because like we've already spent years thinking through
• 36:07
  like all the how all these threats manifest uh and like at what level certainly uh you want
• 36:16
  certain assurances about recovery um again for certain contexts like maybe it doesn't matter at
• 36:21
  all for others it's like you would never ever consider doing this yourself if you didn't have
• 36:26
  um these collaborative recovery mechanisms so yeah again context dependent but um there
• 36:33
  there are tools and methods today that, um, that, that care for these things. It's just,
• 36:39
  um, a lot of them are, are nascent and, uh, fundamentally like constrained, um, given the
• 36:45
  nature of like, Hey man, it's, it's entropy if you lose it, like, and you're, and you did it
• 36:50
  yourself, like that's it. Yeah. All right. So next up, you, you've written that the choices made in
• 36:57
  the next year or two will lock in the architecture for a generation. Why do you believe this? Why
• 37:03
  Why do you think this window is so narrow right now?
• 37:05
  I mean, I'm just looking around, man.
• 37:07
  Like I see the age verification stuff.
• 37:11
  I see more and more surveillance in public spaces and in private contexts as well.
• 37:22
  And I think, you know, you mentioned the angle of safety.
• 37:27
  I think AI, like fraud risk managers and identity practitioners have known this for a while that like, you know, this is a never ending battle, you know, with these digital tools.
• 37:37
  But I think it's become more obvious to folks like the level of impersonation risk.
• 37:44
  And I think that amplifies the likelihood that as a society, we will make hasty decisions and buy into simple framings and solutions.
• 37:56
  right of like hey this is a big problem uh it's wasting a lot of taxpayer money by the way it's
• 38:02
  already wasting a lot of taxpayer money but like it's probably going to get worse uh so therefore
• 38:06
  this is what we need to do and um you know i've already seen that for years right like that just
• 38:12
  the pressure that fraud and identity risk managers have to maintain their level of performance to
• 38:17
  determine if somebody is who they say they are and there's a lot of pressure to just like do
• 38:21
  something, right? And the something that we've been doing is on a path where, you know, we're
• 38:28
  collecting more and more biometric information, aggregating more and more signals. We have more
• 38:33
  and more listening devices around us all the time that are capturing and synthesizing and selling
• 38:37
  our personal information. We should just be very thoughtful about like where that's going to lead
• 38:43
  us. And I think the advances in technology over the last few years have like dramatically
• 38:47
  accelerated those timelines. So, yeah, at a time where we're, you know, half of the states in the
• 38:55
  United States have some kind of like age verification, dates are rolling out, digital credentials.
• 39:01
  Some of them are done well. Some of them phone home. Nobody wants that, right? But like this is
• 39:06
  happening, right? So there are states in the United States where every time you present your digital
• 39:11
  driver's license it's a it's a it's a ping back um you know to the issuing authority you don't
• 39:17
  nobody wants that like but this is this is what we're gonna have if we don't lean in and put our
• 39:23
  hands up and say excuse me that is that is not my right and expectation uh as an american in the
• 39:29
  central context and i i reject it so yeah imagine the amount of blackmail that they could do like oh
• 39:34
  hey martin i know you've been telling your wife that you were uh going to the library to do some
• 39:39
  research, but we see that you were actually just going to the bar down the corner. It'd be a real
• 39:43
  shame if she found out we're going to need you to do something about that. Right. This thing that
• 39:47
  we want you to do. Yeah. So we, we, we don't, we don't want that. Um, and, uh, we don't expect that,
• 39:55
  right? Like we, there's been massive, you know, creep, I would say in terms of surveillance over
• 40:01
  the last like five years for sure, but really the last like 20 years, um, you know, predominantly
• 40:08
  through like the way that we monetize the internet honestly like i i started my career in like digital
• 40:13
  marketing and advertising and have like early you know experience with like these private identity
• 40:19
  graphs and like custom advertising and stuff like that um people have had many moments like
• 40:25
  we as a society have had many moments of like new levels of ick right of like oh i was talking about
• 40:33
  something with a friend and then i saw this ad like what the hell is that and like it deeply
• 40:37
  disturbs people for like half a minute. And then they're like, oh, but like that is kind of
• 40:42
  convenient. You know what I mean? So, you know, this is this is the challenge here is basically
• 40:48
  trying to get people to deeply understand that these are these are real fears.
• 40:55
  This is happening today in other countries throughout the world. People have much less
• 41:01
  freedom because of these systems. And, you know, I want to make sure that if we as Americans
• 41:08
  end up in that spot, it's because we understood the risks and we made the choices. Now, like,
• 41:16
  fewer and fewer people are actually like, aware and engaged. But like, that is never going to
• 41:22
  stop me. And I hope it doesn't stop people that are listening to this to like, try to make the
• 41:26
  world a better place and like uphold American values. Um, so yeah, man, it's, I feel like the
• 41:32
  window is as open as it's ever been for like real change, but, um, it's closing fast.
• 41:40
  Well, I mean, to your point there, I completely agree. The masses are never
• 41:43
  going to take the time to dive into the architecture, digital, uh, distributed,
• 41:51
  digital ID systems, decentralized digital ID systems, nor care to weigh the trade-offs.
• 41:58
  So that begs the question, who are the necessary stakeholders to get this message and these
• 42:04
  designs in front of?
• 42:06
  And obviously, I think politicians is the obvious one.
• 42:09
  Maybe big tech is another one.
• 42:10
  But I think maybe around, correct me if I'm wrong, is the industry which you come from,
• 42:17
  which is fraud prevention and compliance.
• 42:19
  And that begs the question, what is the state of their understanding around this topic from your perspective?
• 42:26
  The incentives are not good, man.
• 42:28
  You know, when you think about.
• 42:32
  OK, we want to do a few things.
• 42:35
  We want to actually like do a better job with determining if people are who they say they are.
• 42:41
  Cryptography helps with that massively.
• 42:43
  Fantastic.
• 42:44
  we want to enable people to be able to
• 42:48
  present or like hold and present their own
• 42:52
  identity related claims. Fantastic.
• 42:56
  The rub there is the entire identity
• 43:00
  verification model like the industry is like built on a model
• 43:04
  where like that fully conflicts and like
• 43:08
  subverts their business model. Like these people are getting paid for
• 43:12
  every verification that happens. So if you're working inside of one of these companies, and
• 43:17
  you come forward and say, you know what I think we should do? We should find a way for people to
• 43:23
  be able to present these claims themselves such that they don't have to take a picture of their
• 43:28
  face and upload a picture of their license for every website that they go to. You're going to
• 43:36
  hit a wall pretty quickly just given the economics of the business model. So yeah, the incentives are
• 43:41
  are not good there.
• 43:43
  Same with big tech.
• 43:44
  They're going to move if they need to.
• 43:48
  But broadly, this is a source of revenue
• 43:51
  and network effects and control for them.
• 43:56
  So they're not going to just hand it over.
• 43:59
  So that's why I was excited about SETI
• 44:01
  because I think states will likely need to lead the way here.
• 44:07
  At a federal level,
• 44:08
  We have seen recent requests for comment from Treasury on how can financial institutions rely on attestations from other financial institutions in the verifiable credential format.
• 44:23
  So if you've already gone through identity proofing somewhere else, they hate you that credential.
• 44:29
  You can then use that credential to skip some account opening and KYC process you at another bank.
• 44:34
  That would be a good thing.
• 44:35
  it all comes back to at this point, the trust model, like how do I know as bank B, what bank A
• 44:41
  did, what their processes were, all that stuff. And this again, goes back to the incentives of
• 44:47
  like, of the context, right? So identity verification today is a probabilistic process.
• 44:55
  The things that influence like the optimization targets of that probabilistic process in a private
• 45:01
  sector context are profit and loss, right? So if you're trying to open up a savings account
• 45:07
  that has a seven-day funds availability policy and I have very little risk,
• 45:16
  I'm going to have different thresholds on the identity verification than if you're trying to
• 45:20
  open up a mortgage and you want me to write you a check for half a million dollars, right? So
• 45:25
  So just that realization makes you realize that the assurance provided by any financial institution is a function of their own context, which makes it hard for other financial institutions to rely on those attestations because who knows what the context was.
• 45:40
  So I think there's some standardization work that needs to happen there as well. And we can NIST and other agencies can kind of help with that. But ultimately, private industry needs to lead here. There's been some good progress and states need to lead.
• 45:55
  um because the the federal government you know is like they're aware of the problem they haven't
• 46:02
  really been doing a lot frankly over the last five ten yeah well you mentioned there's some
• 46:08
  good actors in the private sector making some progress in this uh direction you mentioned
• 46:13
  carry earlier i'm not sure if you believe they're one of them but anybody else in your mind is
• 46:17
  world coin actually good have i been wrong about world coin or no no you've not been wrong i mean
• 46:24
  mean it's just you know there's a reason why it gives people the ick right like you again like
• 46:31
  this is a very real problem like proving that humans are human um and proving that you are
• 46:37
  who you say you are like this is a very real problem and i don't know who started that project
• 46:42
  sam altman or like i don't know the people um i do know some people from like the standard space
• 46:48
  that like worked there for a little bit and then like left shortly thereafter um but uh
• 46:54
  no like we we should not be using our uh like biometrics as identifiers like it's it's a great
• 47:04
  way to authenticate yourself locally right like on your device fantastic right doesn't leave your
• 47:11
  device excellent but we do not want to live in a world where like you're just walking around and
• 47:17
  like private industry and government can just identify you from just like your face like yeah
• 47:22
  Yeah Well I think it important that you referencing face ID on the iPhone And I think there a lot of misconceptions about what happening there mainly people think that apple is storing your face id on some server that they host
• 47:36
  but however like what's happening there is like it's a secure enclave thing so it's biometric
• 47:41
  verification via the secure enclave that lives locally on your device which is the right model
• 47:46
  similar to what happens with bitcoin wallets um like i have the the fingerprint biometric here but
• 47:53
  it's stored in the secure enclave yeah yeah and and you mentioned seti as well like i'm not a
• 47:59
  technical expert there's some um things that i don't fully understand around like seti witnesses
• 48:05
  and um basically how you build that trust graph there um because there is no like uh external
• 48:12
  dependency or like anchor so it's like self-contained but they have these like witness
• 48:17
  network um so yeah i don't fully understand it but i am a fan of like people giving it the college
• 48:24
  try and like trying to trying to figure this stuff out but um yeah broadly like we we want to be using
• 48:31
  um identifiers that are not our biometrics and are not our personal information and we want to
• 48:38
  authenticate our ability to use those things locally um or with places that we trust a lot
• 48:45
  Like maybe that's, you know, the DMV, like I'll go to the DMV to authenticate myself.
• 48:49
  I'll let them take my picture, whatever, because I know that they're going to give me a credential that is like of high value for me that I can use in other contexts that other people are going to trust and use.
• 48:58
  I'm a lion. So, yeah, I think that's like my general frame is that like using your biometrics as an identifier is not good.
• 49:09
  again see china like americans probably i think do not want to live in that world it results in a
• 49:15
  world in society where people are just fundamentally less great uh i don't want to live there i don't
• 49:21
  want that to happen yeah i mean with the with the iris scans i mean minority report might be my
• 49:27
  favorite sci-fi movie of all time and it's just i just go immediately there like the combination of
• 49:35
  iris scans and self-driving cars it's just like tom hanks or not tom hanks tom cruise had to go
• 49:42
  get a get a new eyeball transplant to to avoid the the ire of uh of the authorities
• 49:48
  um they basically had autonomous drones that were able to go around and scan people's eyeballs to
• 49:54
  confirm who they were and we're not too far off from that reality right now yeah yeah and it's
• 50:01
  It's it. And now's the time, right? Like now, now that would be like my call to action.
• 50:07
  Like now, now is the time for people to move past the like, yeah, this is really scary and sucks.
• 50:14
  And like, we should avoid this to like, no, like, like these policies and technologies are like being developed out in the open now, like right now.
• 50:22
  Um, so now, now is the time to move past the black pill into the white pill of like, you know, let's find a way to instill American values around privacy and self sovereignty, uh, into these tools and policies, um, such that like, we don't end up there because I think it's fair, you know, to just observe that like directionally, like we are going that way.
• 50:48
  and I want people to be aware of that
• 50:53
  and you know
• 50:55
  Is minority report predictive programming where they're just saying
• 51:01
  hey get ready for this future, there's nothing you can do about it
• 51:03
  I believe not, like you're describing
• 51:07
  why we're having this conversation right now is because the potential to avoid that is very real
• 51:12
  the technology is at our fingertips and if we
• 51:15
  apply it the right way, we can get to the future that's privacy preserving and
• 51:21
  sovereignty preserving that we would all like to live in. And on that note, like, yes,
• 51:27
  let's move towards this. But for anybody listening, myself included, like, what are the low-hanging
• 51:33
  fruit first steps towards that direction? Is it interacting with policymakers? Is it interacting
• 51:39
  with private industry? Is it just making noise on X? Or is there some technical implementation
• 51:45
  that people should begin interacting with to signal like, hey, this is the direction I would like to go.
• 51:52
  Yeah. So there's thank you for asking.
• 51:54
  There's there's quite a few states that are issuing mobile driver's licenses now.
• 51:59
  For those that are like tech savvy and have the ability, like find out how that works.
• 52:03
  Like. You know, are is your is your state providing you a credential that phones home?
• 52:10
  Are you locked into a specific vendor? Are you able to selectively disclose attributes of your digital ID? Or is this like worse than physical ID?
• 52:23
  the other things I would I would that come to mind are like supporting open standards work right so
• 52:30
  that I'm a big fan of the W3C Mono Sporny has been doing an incredible job there for years and
• 52:36
  years in the decentralized identity space family Christopher Allen as well co-author of the
• 52:41
  original did spec trust over IP open ID foundation decentralized identity foundation all these are
• 52:47
  open to the public they have like a open source like development model anybody can can get up to
• 52:53
  speed, observe, contribute. I would also direct people to the SETI model legislation out of Utah.
• 53:01
  Take a look at it. There's some great stuff in there that does put some very real constraints,
• 53:07
  not just on the state, but on the private sector as well. And puts a digital identity bill of
• 53:15
  rights, if you will, in place to constrain private sector from just like willy-nilly
• 53:20
  selling your information. And yeah, just like broadly, like talk about these things and not in
• 53:27
  a, again, like understanding the fears and the problems is very important. Like we need the
• 53:32
  motivation there to like understand like why we care about these things, but then try to quickly
• 53:38
  move into like what we can do. And that's kind of where my journey started as well with BPI of just
• 53:44
  like, Hey, like we, these conversations are happening. I remember, I think you read the,
• 53:50
  the EPI event last year around summertime.
• 53:54
  Um,
• 53:54
  and I think on stage,
• 53:55
  Warren Davidson mentioned digital identity,
• 53:58
  uh,
• 53:58
  akin to the eye of star on.
• 54:02
  Yeah.
• 54:03
  Yeah.
• 54:03
  And I was like,
• 54:04
  well,
• 54:05
  you know,
• 54:07
  but this is an important point because I think there's a lot of people and I,
• 54:11
  I would have included myself in that camp probably like a year or two ago,
• 54:14
  just like digital identity avoided all costs,
• 54:17
  becoming abundantly clear with the emergence of AI that we're going to get DDoSed by computers
• 54:24
  and robots. And there is going to, whether you like it or not, recognize it or not. Like we are
• 54:30
  entering a reality. We are living in a reality where we are coexisting in the digital world with
• 54:36
  robots and humans need to be able to identify each other in that system. Yeah. And, and, and the
• 54:43
  ways that we should do that are the same ways that we create high assurance around any other
• 54:48
  exchange of information, which is we use cryptography, right? Like there's no reason
• 54:52
  why we shouldn't be doing that for like the layer zero of humanity, right? Like authenticating people.
• 54:57
  So yeah, it's not really like a technology pitch. It's more like a values pitch, like understand
• 55:03
  what's happening, understand the tools. The white pill is definitely not like everything will be
• 55:09
  fine it's like it's the tools exist the window is open and like the outcome depends on whether or
• 55:16
  not like the people who care show up um and support uh places like um you know jay stanley at the aclu
• 55:25
  is a is a great advocate and like fair advocate for these things uh peter at coin center um
• 55:32
  obviously you're you know your local legislators are like always great people to talk to
• 55:37
  um but like this stuff is happening regardless of whether or not we want it to like the worst
• 55:43
  case scenario is we don't engage and we continue on this trajectory so that's why it's like such
• 55:48
  an urgent moment for us to be able to like put our hands up and say wait let me learn about this
• 55:52
  we figure out what we're trying to do here um and ultimately like apply the physical world test
• 55:58
  right like we want to replicate like the the the rights and norms that we have in the physical
• 56:03
  space to the digital space. We don't want a digital identity. We want to like digitize identity.
• 56:09
  And that, that starts with individual control, not like corporate control and walled gardens.
• 56:15
  Yeah. And that's what I worry. I mean, we're seeing it with AI already with the hyperscalers
• 56:20
  trying to position themselves and the technology that they're forging forward as a matter of
• 56:30
  national security that needs to be controlled in a way that you create the regulatory mode,
• 56:35
  the license regime. And you can see in parallel, and you can actually see the same actors,
• 56:41
  obviously, with OpenAI and WorldCoin being loosely connected via the Sam Altman connection,
• 56:48
  the digital ID saying this is critical to national security and digital security,
• 56:53
  and we need a solution now. And oh, by the way, we have one. You should use this. And
• 56:59
  And they have a lot of lobbying power.
• 57:02
  They have a lot of social cachet because people are very impressed with what they've built.
• 57:07
  But as we've come to know, particularly Bitcoiners, big tech does not always have your best interest in mind.
• 57:15
  So it is imperative that we fight for these free, open, distributed solutions,
• 57:21
  the closed garden solutions that will inevitably be put forth by these actors.
• 57:27
  Yeah, that's the, you know, that's the defense here.
• 57:32
  Open systems, open standards and software, open tools that everybody can use that level the playing field here.
• 57:41
  And, you know, improve the floor for like our sovereignty as individuals.
• 57:47
  Certainly like private business is not going to go away here.
• 57:50
  The public sector also has some challenges because they have an access mandate.
• 57:59
  We talked about the relativity of assurance in a private sector context being a function of profit.
• 58:05
  In the public sector, they have an access mandate, so they have to over-anchor on, yeah, it's probably them.
• 58:15
  So you get error on both sides.
• 58:17
  and you know this is where like this the states and private sector can can play a role to
• 58:25
  put these different models forward and ultimately you know hopefully Americans who care about liberty
• 58:32
  and privacy will step up and make their voice heard here yeah well that's like the last last
• 58:38
  topic because again go back to Warren Davidson's comments and again hand up when like agenda 2030
• 58:45
  digital id you'll own nothing and be happy i was a big like avoid digital id at all costs
• 58:51
  and i think uh it's kind of forced an uphill narrative battle because i think many people
• 58:56
  have viewed a digital id as the mark of the beast a form of the mark of the beast if you will and so
• 59:04
  again reiterating what i said earlier but maybe reframing like how do we how do we uh convince
• 59:11
  people like, hey, not all digital IDs are bad. They're probably necessary in this world that
• 59:17
  we're emerging into unless you want to go live in the woods, which if you want to,
• 59:21
  more than happy for you to go do that for yourself. But we do have a society and a reality
• 59:27
  that is going to exist outside of your cabin in the woods and go down one path or the other.
• 59:33
  There's going to be a big narrative and anti-propaganda campaign that needs to be waged as
• 59:39
  well. I've heard you say it many times recently, like you may not care about the state, but the
• 59:45
  state cares about you like same context, brother. The alternative to engagement is not like freedom
• 59:53
  from digital identity. The alternative is digital identity, like designed without our input. Right.
• 59:59
  So we are kind of seeing where that's going. The fight is really over like whether digital identity
• 1:00:05
  preserves physical world privacy norms or continues to erode or fully destroy them.
• 1:00:12
  And our goal is to embed privacy, autonomy, portability, legal due process and individual
• 1:00:22
  control into the technology and policy stack such that the ability for this reality to
• 1:00:29
  manifest is severely constrained at a fundamental level.
• 1:00:32
  it's going to take a lot of work on a lot of different angles but
• 1:00:36
  it's critically important and I'm hopeful that
• 1:00:40
  many people continue to join the fight because
• 1:00:43
  it really matters. Alright freaks join the fight
• 1:00:48
  Gerald thank you for fighting on our behalf as many of us
• 1:00:52
  operate blissfully unaware of the
• 1:00:56
  progress that's being made I mean I'm more aware than most but I think most people are
• 1:01:00
  blissfully unaware of what's happening
• 1:01:02
  And again, it is uncomfortable because it is a fact that many people, including representatives like Warren Davidson, saying avoid the digital ID.
• 1:01:13
  Obviously, you have like Catherine Austin Fitz and many others in that part of the world saying avoid it at all costs.
• 1:01:21
  And again, I'm sure there will be people that listen to this podcast and say, Marty, Marty got turned.
• 1:01:28
  He's a spook now.
• 1:01:29
  The CIA got to him.
• 1:01:30
  He's pushing digital ID.
• 1:01:32
  Yeah. But that's like the weird thing is like, again, the ability to use cryptography to selectively reveal attestations.
• 1:01:42
  Of things being legitimate without actually revealing the information itself exists.
• 1:01:47
  And in the world of digital ID, that is much preferable to the world coin or the phone home to the government to verify and them knowing everywhere you're going.
• 1:01:58
  Yeah, we can we can not just like slow the rate of change here, like we can actually revert it with these tools and technology.
• 1:02:05
  So like that is what's on the table.
• 1:02:08
  How much of that we take advantage of, like will be determined in the next few years.
• 1:02:13
  And it's I think a lot of people, it's very scary and it's so scary that they disengage.
• 1:02:19
  Like I said, like that doesn't mean that like these efforts are going to stop.
• 1:02:23
  So like we need the engagement.
• 1:02:25
  If it scares you, lean in or more, become an advocate and join the fight.
• 1:02:33
  Gerald, it's been an honor and a pleasure.
• 1:02:36
  Where can more people figure or find out, excuse me, where you're talking about this?
• 1:02:41
  Where can they follow you?
• 1:02:42
  Where can they keep up with the progression of the conversation as it as it lays, as it gets as it progresses?
• 1:02:50
  Yeah, so I'm on X.
• 1:02:54
  I'm at geraldglickman.com, but you can find me always open to talk to people to help them
• 1:03:00
  kind of learn more about this and direct them to things that are of interest to them.
• 1:03:05
  But yeah, those are the two spots.
• 1:03:08
  All right.
• 1:03:09
  Well, I'm sure we'll have more conversations about this over the next couple of years as
• 1:03:13
  things progress.
• 1:03:14
  So until next time, thank you for coming, sir.
• 1:03:17
  Appreciate you, Marty.
• 1:03:18
  Thank you.
• 1:03:19
  Peace and love, freaks.