Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / Indexing’s Godfather John Bogle’s Warns: Have ETFs Gone Too Far? Final Alarm: Why ‘Set-and-Forget’ Investing Is at Risk
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome to the Deep Dive. We sift through sources to give
- 0:02you the key insights. Basically a shortcut to
- 0:05understanding complex topics. Glad to be.
- 0:07Here. Today we're looking at something
- 0:09really interesting. Kind of a paradox, actually.
- 0:11The man who, you know, arguably saved ordinary investors maybe a
- 0:15trillion dollars in fees. John Bogle, right?
- 0:17John Bogle. He later became a major critic
- 0:20of the the very market he helped create.
- 0:22It's quite a story it. Really is.
- 0:24It's less about regret, I think, and more a deep philosophical
- 0:27clash over what investing should be.
- 0:29Yeah, exactly. So this deep dive is all about
- 0:31Bogle Vanguard's founder and this Bogle Paradox.
- 0:35We want to unpack his core ideas 1st and then explore why he was
- 0:40so critical of modern index funds, especially ETFs, those
- 0:43exchange traded funds. You know, how did they stray
- 0:45from his original vision? And why should you, listening
- 0:48now, care about these warnings today?
- 0:50That's key. Absolutely.
- 0:52We're pulling mainly from sources like Bogle's critique of
- 0:55modern indexing, which really gets into his thinking.
- 0:58OK, so before we get into the critiques, we really need to
- 1:00nail down his foundation. What were those core principles?
- 1:03It wasn't just investment advice, it was almost a moral
- 1:07code. Yeah, you could say that his his
- 1:10whole view hinged on what he called the Cost Matters
- 1:12hypothesis. It sounds simple, but he
- 1:15hammered it home constantly. Cost matters.
- 1:16Basically minimize fees, commissions, any frictional
- 1:19cost, he argued. That's the single most critical
- 1:22thing for long term success. Why was it so critical for him?
- 1:25Well, his logic was look all investors together as a group,
- 1:28they earn whatever the market return, right?
- 1:30The total pie. Exactly.
- 1:32So once you start subtracting fees, management fees, trading
- 1:36costs, as it inevitably becomes a loser's game, someone has to
- 1:39underperform for others to cover those costs.
- 1:41OK, makes sense. And he warned about the tyranny
- 1:44of compounding costs. He actually calculated it could
- 1:47eat up something like 2/3 of an investor's potential games over,
- 1:50say, an investing lifetime. 2/3 that's huge.
- 1:53It's. Staggering.
- 1:54So for him, it wasn't just math. It was almost a moral point
- 1:58against an industry he felt often put its own profits first.
- 2:01Got it. And building on that cost focus,
- 2:04he drew this really sharp line between investment and
- 2:07speculation. How did he define those
- 2:09differently? Because people often mix them
- 2:11up. Yeah, they do.
- 2:13For Bogle, investment was about long term ownership.
- 2:15You own a piece of actual businesses.
- 2:17You capture their value over decades, you know, through
- 2:19earnings, dividends, the. Slow and steady approach.
- 2:22Right speculation on the other hand was just short term
- 2:24betting, betting on price swings, getting caught up in
- 2:26market noise, emotions. Stuff that happens day-to-day.
- 2:29Exactly. His famous advice was buy, write
- 2:32and hold tight. He even joked, maybe half joked,
- 2:35that investors would be better off if they just never looked at
- 2:37their four O 1K statements for 45 years.
- 2:40I don't. Think I could?
- 2:41Do that. Me neither, but it shows his
- 2:43conviction. He summed it up.
- 2:44Time is your friend, impulse is your enemy.
- 2:47And that distinction is absolutely key to understanding
- 2:49why he got worried later. Impulse is the enemy.
- 2:52OK. And from those ideas, low cost,
- 2:55long term ownership avoiding impulse, came his belief in
- 2:58simplicity and diversification, the whole buy the haystack idea.
- 3:02Precisely, he thought, trying to find the needle, the winning
- 3:05stock, the genius fund manager was, well, mostly a waste of
- 3:09time and money. A fool's errand, he'd say to
- 3:11just. Own everything.
- 3:12Yeah, the most rational, efficient way was to own the
- 3:14entire market. We're a huge chunk of it.
- 3:17Use a single broad super low cost index fund.
- 3:21He really distrusted complexity. I saw it as a way the industry
- 3:24could, you know, muddy the waters, hide high costs, and
- 3:26basically encourage people to trade more than they should.
- 3:29More activity means more fees for.
- 3:30Them right back to the cost matters hypothesis.
- 3:32Always back to cost. So all these principles led him
- 3:34to create the original traditional index fund, the TIF.
- 3:38Tell us about Bogle's folly. Right, 1976 he launches the
- 3:41first index investment trust. We know it now is the Vanguard
- 3:44500 Index fund. It was a classic mutual fund key
- 3:47thing. It priced only once a day after
- 3:49the market closed at its net asset value, or NAV.
- 3:53And that was deliberate. Absolutely deliberate.
- 3:55It was designed to discourage people from jumping in and out
- 3:57during the day. To encourage that long term
- 3:59mindset. Its goal was simple.
- 4:01Match the S&P 500 return minus tiny costs.
- 4:05Not beat. It just get the market return
- 4:07reliably. Exactly.
- 4:08It cut out manager risk, kept cost rock bottom.
- 4:11People mocked it, called it Bogle's Folly, even UN American,
- 4:14because it wasn't trying to win. UN American Wow.
- 4:17Yeah, but for Bogle it was the purest, most investor focused
- 4:20vehicle possible. OK, so that's the foundation,
- 4:23the simple low cost long term TIF.
- 4:25Yeah, but things didn't stay that simple, did they?
- 4:28This is where the mutation part comes.
- 4:30In right the financial industry, always innovating, always
- 4:32looking for new profit avenues. They took his core index idea
- 4:35and morphed it into something very different.
- 4:38The ETF. The exchange traded fund.
- 4:40How did that happen? Well, the ETF was born partly to
- 4:43address what some saw as a drawback of mutual funds.
- 4:46You can only buy or sell them once a day at the closing price.
- 4:48Not NAB Price. Exactly so.
- 4:50The first USETF, the SPDR S&P 500, nicknamed the Spider,
- 4:54launched in 1993. It tracked the same index as
- 4:58Bogle's fund, but you could trade it all day long on the
- 5:00Stock Exchange like a stock. So intraday trading, the very
- 5:03thing Bogle tried to discourage with the TIF structure.
- 5:07Precisely. And here's the kicker.
- 5:09The guy who invented the USETF, Nathan, most apparently went to
- 5:13Bogle and Vanguard first with the idea.
- 5:15And what did Bogle say? He turned it down flat.
- 5:18Bogle's quote was something like since I see trading as a loser's
- 5:21game for investors and a winner's game for brokers, I
- 5:23declined his offer. Wow, so right from the start he
- 5:26saw the fundamental conflict. Absolutely.
- 5:28The core innovation of the ETF, that constant liquidity, the
- 5:31ability to trade instantly was exactly the specular feature he
- 5:34was warning against. It violated his impulse is your
- 5:37enemy principle. OK.
- 5:38So Bogle says no, but the ETF launches anyway.
- 5:41And then what happened? Then came the explosion of
- 5:43choice and complexity, as you called it, the ETF market just.
- 5:46Blew up? How big are we talking?
- 5:47Today, it's something like a $14 trillion global industry, and it
- 5:52quickly went way beyond just tracking broad markets like the
- 5:55S&P 5. 100 right? You started seeing ETFs for
- 5:58everything. Everything narrow sectors like
- 6:00tech or healthcare. Specific investment styles like
- 6:03value or growth. Sometimes called smart beta.
- 6:06Smart beta. Yeah.
- 6:07Rules based funds. Right.
- 6:09And then really popular themes like robotics, clean energy, you
- 6:12name it, there was an ETF for it.
- 6:14So a complete departure from buy the haystack.
- 6:17Now it's like buy this specific blade of grass.
- 6:20Exactly. It was basically bringing stock
- 6:22picking back, but you were picking funds instead of
- 6:24individual stocks and encourage market timing and chasing
- 6:26trends. And it didn't stop there, did
- 6:28it? It got even more extreme.
- 6:29Oh. Yeah.
- 6:30Then you got what Bogle called the extreme Etps, exchange
- 6:33traded products. These are things like leveraged
- 6:35and inverse funds. Leveraged and inverse, what do
- 6:37they do? They use derivatives, complex
- 6:40financial instruments, to try and deliver, say, double the
- 6:42daily return of an index or the exact opposite return.
- 6:45Double or nothing basically on a daily basis.
- 6:48Sort of, but the math gets tricky.
- 6:51Because they reset daily, their long term performance can get
- 6:54totally disconnected from the indexes long term return, often
- 6:57in a bad way. Extremely.
- 7:00Bogle called it absolute speculation.
- 7:02He warned these things had hurt a lot of people.
- 7:04Regulators worry about them too. These products were about as far
- 7:07from Bogle's original vision of long term low cost ownership as
- 7:11you could possibly get. It turned indexing into high
- 7:15states gambling for some. OK, so let's just crystallize
- 7:18the difference. Tiffs buy from the fun company.
- 7:21Price once a day at NAV Low expense ratio, super low
- 7:24portfolio turnover. Like maybe 3% a year.
- 7:26Designed for holding. Right discourages trading.
- 7:28ETFs buy and sell on exchange like stocks.
- 7:31Price changing constantly. Low expense ratio, but you've
- 7:33got bid as spreads, maybe commissions.
- 7:34Those extra trading costs? And the turnover, you mentioned
- 7:36some crazy numbers earlier. Yeah, the average ETF reportedly
- 7:39turns over its portfolio maybe 880% a year.
- 7:42And something like S PY, the Big S&P 500 ETF, its shares change
- 7:47hands at rates, suggesting annual turnover between 3000
- 7:501000% and even 10,000%. 10,000% so people are trading these
- 7:53things constantly. That's what the numbers suggest.
- 7:56For Bogle, Tiffs were for long term investing.
- 7:59ETFs, he feared, were built for and encouraged short term
- 8:03trading. Which in his view was the losers
- 8:05game. All that activity just generates
- 8:08costs. Costs that subtract directly
- 8:10from the investor's return. It's the friction he warned
- 8:12about. OK, so let's breakdown Bogle's
- 8:14main criticisms. You said there were three big
- 8:17ones. The first was this idea of the
- 8:19ETF as the trading trap. Exactly the offer called the
- 8:23ETFA wolf in sheep's clothing. It looked like a low cost index
- 8:27fund, but it had this hidden danger.
- 8:29The danger being the ease of trading, yes.
- 8:31That once a day pricing of the TIF, it acted like a pause
- 8:34button, a little cooling off period.
- 8:36It made it harder to react impulsively to every market
- 8:38Which? Right, you had to wait till the
- 8:40end of the day. ETFs remove that friction
- 8:42entirely. It makes it dangerously easy to
- 8:44trade on emotions, on news headlines, on noise.
- 8:47He famously said giving an investor in ETF was like handing
- 8:50an arsonist to match. Strong words.
- 8:52Very. He felt it preyed on our worst
- 8:55behavioral impulses, fear, greed, the desire to do
- 8:59something. It violated his core principle.
- 9:02Impulse is your enemy. He worried it would seduce long
- 9:05term investors into becoming traders.
- 9:08And that constant trading leads to his next point.
- 9:10The croupiers triumph. Yes.
- 9:12The croupier? Yeah.
- 9:13The person running the gambling table at a casino.
- 9:15The house. The house, Exactly.
- 9:17His philosophical worry wasn't just theoretical.
- 9:20He pointed to those massive ETF turnover rates as hard evidence.
- 9:24880% average turnover. That's not investing, that's
- 9:27frantic activity. And who benefits from that
- 9:29activity? Not the investor, usually.
- 9:31Yeah. Every trade generates cost.
- 9:33Those bid ask spreads, commissions, even tiny ones, add
- 9:36up. For Bogle, this turns the ETF
- 9:38from a tool for the investor into a profit machine for the
- 9:41croupies of Wall Street. The brokers, the market makers,
- 9:43the exchanges. Right, they collect a little bit
- 9:45on every trade. They are the sure winners.
- 9:47When trading volume is high, the house always wins, essentially
- 9:50in the rapid trading game. Beyond the individual investors
- 9:53getting hurt by trading costs, he also worried ETFs could
- 9:56destabilize the whole market. He did, especially later on
- 9:59around the time of the 2010 flash crash, where the market
- 10:01suddenly plunged and recovered very quickly.
- 10:04He became more vocal about this. What was his concern there?
- 10:07He called the speculation in some of these instruments on the
- 10:10edge of insanity, saying they've destabilized the market.
- 10:13He worried particularly about niche or complex ETFs,
- 10:16especially in times of stress. Like what kind of problems?
- 10:19Liquidity crises. Ituations where the market price
- 10:22of an ETF might disconnect sharply from the actual value of
- 10:25the stuff it holds. If everyone rushes for the exit
- 10:28in a secialized ETF, it could trigger wider sell offs.
- 10:32So his critique moved from just investor behavior to potential
- 10:35systemic risks. OK, so that's the training trap
- 10:38and its consequences. The second big critique was
- 10:40about the peril of proliferation moving away from by the
- 10:43haystack. Exactly.
- 10:45He called it junk food investing.
- 10:46Junk food investment. Or investment fried chicken.
- 10:49His original index fund idea was about liberation.
- 10:52He didn't need specialized knowledge.
- 10:53Just buy the whole market. Low cost dunce the modern ETF
- 10:57world. Flip that, it created thousands
- 10:59of funds slicing and dicing the market into tiny, narrow pieces.
- 11:03Specific industries, themes, factors.
- 11:06So instead of diversifying your concentrating risk again.
- 11:09Precisely. It defeats the whole purpose of
- 11:11broad diversification. You're back to betting not on
- 11:14one stock, but maybe on one narrow sector or theme.
- 11:17You're not buying the haystack. You're betting on one specific
- 11:20stock, often right when it's most popular and, you know,
- 11:23possibly overpriced. And he saw a lot of marketing
- 11:26behind this proliferation. Oh, absolutely.
- 11:28He was very cynical about things like Smart Beta.
- 11:30He dismissed it often as just a fancy name, maybe a closet
- 11:33tracker, a marketing gimmick to charge slightly higher fees than
- 11:36a plain vanilla index fund. An.
- 11:38Oxymoron, he called. It yeah, smart beta itself and
- 11:41the sheer number of really niche, almost bizarre thematic
- 11:45ETF's funds based on political affiliations or specific
- 11:48lifestyle trends. For him, that was proof the
- 11:50industry had become more about marketing than about serving
- 11:52investors long term interests. A marketing business, not a
- 11:55fiduciary 1. That was his fear, and again,
- 11:58his harshest words were for the leveraged and inverse ETFs.
- 12:02Absolute speculation, he called them.
- 12:04The Purdy shotgun analogy, right?
- 12:05Great for big game in Africa and great for suicide.
- 12:09A stark warning about how dangerous they could be because
- 12:12of that complex daily reset mechanism leading to potentially
- 12:15catastrophic losses. And the third big area of
- 12:18concern, especially later in his life, was systemic, the
- 12:22leviathans dilemma. This was about corporate
- 12:24governance. Yes, this became a major focus
- 12:26for him. It's a really profound point.
- 12:28He saw where indexing was heading.
- 12:30Owning more and more of the market.
- 12:31Exactly. He projected index funds would
- 12:33eventually own over 50% of all U.S.
- 12:35Stocks. But the crucial part was the
- 12:37concentration. Concentration among the fund
- 12:40providers. Yes, just three huge asset
- 12:41managers, Vanguard, Black Rock and State Street.
- 12:44The Big Three already controlled and still control something like
- 12:478085% of all index fund assets globally.
- 12:50Wow, 80% just between 3 firms, yeah.
- 12:53And Bogle calculated this would soon give them voting power over
- 12:57maybe 30% or more of the shares in most major American
- 13:00companies. He stated it very bluntly.
- 13:03I do not believe that such concentration would serve the
- 13:06national interest. Why did he think it wouldn't
- 13:08serve the national interest? What was the danger?
- 13:10He feared a corporate governance vacuum.
- 13:11Meaning. Well, the classic idea is
- 13:15shareholders keep company management in check, right?
- 13:17They vote on directors, pay big decisions.
- 13:20Shareholder democracy, Sort of. Kind of.
- 13:22But Bogle argued index funds have a problem here.
- 13:25Their whole model is built on being passive and super low
- 13:28cost. They don't have a strong
- 13:29financial incentive to spend a lot of time and money deeply
- 13:32monitoring thousands of companies, challenging CE OS,
- 13:35scrutinizing pay packages. It's expensive work.
- 13:38It costs money, which goes against their low cost model.
- 13:41Exactly. So he worried this passivity
- 13:43could leave corporate executives effectively unaccountable.
- 13:46If your biggest shareholders are passive, who's minding the
- 13:49store? This could hurt long term
- 13:51company performance, which ironically hurts the index fund
- 13:53investors themselves. So his own creation, the index
- 13:56fund, could inadvertently weaken the whole system of corporate
- 13:59accountability. That's the paradox.
- 14:01That's the Bogle paradox at its sharpest, his triumph
- 14:04potentially undermining a key part of shareholder capitalism.
- 14:07Did he have solutions? It sounds like a tricky problem.
- 14:10He apparently saw index funds as both a threat and the last best
- 14:14hope. How does that work?
- 14:15It's complex. He did support ideas like more
- 14:18transparency. Make proxy voting records public
- 14:21and clarifying that fund managers have a fiduciary duty
- 14:24to act in their investors best interests when voting.
- 14:26OK, so push them to be more responsible, yes.
- 14:29But crucially, he strongly opposed limiting the voting
- 14:32power of index funds. Why not, if concentration was
- 14:35the worry? Because, he argued, who would
- 14:37that power go to instead? It would likely shift to more
- 14:40transient short term shareholders, active traders,
- 14:44hedge funds, people he called stock renters, not long term
- 14:46owners and. Their interest might not align
- 14:49with long term value. Right.
- 14:50He reasoned that index funds because they can't easily sell a
- 14:54stock just because they don't like management.
- 14:56It's in the index, they have to hold it.
- 14:58They are structurally positioned to be the best potential long
- 15:01term stewards. Their only real option is to
- 15:04engage to try and fix the management.
- 15:08Because they're stuck with the company.
- 15:09Their permanent capital, essentially.
- 15:11But again, the incentive structure wasn't quite there.
- 15:13So his warnings were really a call to action for the big index
- 15:16providers. You have immense power now step
- 15:19up and use it responsibly. Become active stewards.
- 15:22OK, so those are Bogle's big critiques, the trading trap, the
- 15:25proliferation of junk, and the governance dilemma.
- 15:29But for you listening, it's important to get a balanced
- 15:31picture. Bogle was consistent, but were
- 15:33some fears maybe overstated? Let's hear the other side.
- 15:36Definitely, it's crucial to weigh these things first.
- 15:39There's what many see is the undeniable case for ETFs,
- 15:41especially for certain investors.
- 15:43Like who? Particularly people investing in
- 15:45regular taxable brokerage accounts, not retirement
- 15:47accounts. Why them specifically?
- 15:48Tax efficiency. This gets a bit technical, but
- 15:52the way ETFs create and redeem shares in kind, swapping baskets
- 15:55of stocks instead of cash, generally means they distribute
- 15:58far fewer taxable capital gains to their shareholders compared
- 16:01to traditional mutual funds. And those capital gains
- 16:03distributions can be a drag on returns in a taxable account.
- 16:07A significant drag, Yeah. Over time, this tax efficiency
- 16:11can make a real difference to your bottom line.
- 16:13Plus ETFs are often more accessible.
- 16:15Lower or no investment minimums often Commission free trading
- 16:18now. Easier to get started with.
- 16:20Exactly. So for a disciplined investor
- 16:22who just wants to buy and hold a broad market index, especially
- 16:25in a taxable account, the ETF might actually lead to better
- 16:29after tax returns than the traditional fund Bogle champion.
- 16:32OK, that's a strong practical point.
- 16:34What about investor behavior? Do ETF's really make disciplined
- 16:37people trade wildly or is it more complex?
- 16:39That's a great question. Bogle's view, you could argue,
- 16:42was a bit paternalistic. It assumes giving people the
- 16:45tool intraday trade ability inevitably leads them to misuse.
- 16:48It like the arsonist in the match.
- 16:50Right, but an alternative view is maybe the people who trade
- 16:53ETSA lot are people who would have been active traders anyway.
- 16:56They just chose the ETF as their preferred vehicle.
- 16:59It didn't make them trade. The tool didn't create the
- 17:01behavior, it just enabled it for those already inclined.
- 17:04Possibly. And look at the Bogleheads
- 17:06community online. These are people who follow
- 17:09Bogle's philosophy religiously. Low costs, diversification, buy
- 17:14and hold. Yeah, they're big proponents of
- 17:15his ideas. And many of them use broad
- 17:17market ETFs like Vanguard's own VTi or VOO to implement his
- 17:22strategy perfectly. They use the ETF structure but
- 17:25stick to the TIF philosophy. So maybe the problem isn't the
- 17:28tool itself, but how it's used. The user, not the ETF.
- 17:32That's a compelling counter argument, yeah.
- 17:34It suggests the ETF structure can serve Bobo's principles just
- 17:36fine if the investor has the discipline.
- 17:38OK. And finally, that big governance
- 17:40issue. Bogle feared a vacuum.
- 17:42Could the opposite be true? Could the big three actually be
- 17:45effective stewards because of their size?
- 17:46That's the other side of the coin, and it's a powerful
- 17:49argument because these firms, Vanguard, BlackRock, State
- 17:53Street, are essentially permanent owners.
- 17:56They can't just sell if they don't like a company in the
- 17:57index, right? Their only real leverage is
- 18:00engagement, talking to management, voting their shares,
- 18:03pushing for changes, and their sheer scale gives them
- 18:06incredible influence. More than any individual
- 18:09investor could ever have. Exactly.
- 18:11They can afford large, sophisticated stewardship teams
- 18:14that engage with literally thousands of companies globally.
- 18:17Small active managers just can't do that.
- 18:18So size becomes an advantage for oversight.
- 18:21Can be. And arguably these big firms
- 18:24have a strong incentive, both financial and reputational, to
- 18:27promote good governance across the entire market because that
- 18:30lifts the value of all their index funds.
- 18:32It helps all their clients. So instead of a problem of
- 18:34dispersed powerless shareholders, you get focused,
- 18:37powerful, long term oriented shareholders checking
- 18:40management. In this view, yes, the
- 18:43concentration Bogle worried about might actually be the
- 18:46solution to the classic governance problem, not the
- 18:49threat he feared. It potentially creates a more
- 18:52effective check on corporate power than we've ever had
- 18:54before. Fascinating, So a lot to think
- 18:57about there. Wrapping this up, what's the
- 18:59take away for you, the listener Jack Boble's complicated
- 19:02feelings about modern index funds?
- 19:04It wasn't really him rejecting his life's work, was it?
- 19:06No, not at all. He was, I think, a purist.
- 19:09He was defending the soul of his revolution, Simplicity, low cost
- 19:13long term ownership against the speculative high cost culture it
- 19:16was meant to replace. And while maybe some fears were
- 19:18perhaps a bit overstated, like how most regular folks use
- 19:21simple, broad ETFs. Yeah, most people using VOO
- 19:25probably aren't D trading it. Right.
- 19:26But his warnings about the dangers of those super
- 19:29concentrated thematic funds or the leverage products and
- 19:31especially those huge systemic questions about corporate power
- 19:34concentration, those still feel incredibly relevant today, don't
- 19:38they? Absolutely.
- 19:39There are questions we're still grappling with.
- 19:40At the end of the day, the Bogle paradox isn't really about Bogle
- 19:43himself contradicting anything. He reflects his ongoing tension,
- 19:47this battle between a sound, simple investment philosophy and
- 19:52a financial industry that often profits most from complexity,
- 19:55from concentration, from churning.
- 19:57His legacy, I think, is twofold. He gave us the index fund, this
- 20:00amazing tool, but he also gave us the critical mindset that
- 20:04Questioning Spirit needed to use it and any financial product
- 20:07wisely. So here's a final thought for
- 20:09you to chew on as you manage your own finances.
- 20:12How do you make sure the investment tools you pick,
- 20:14whether it's an ETF, a mutual fund, whatever, genuinely align
- 20:17with your long term goals? And how do you personally weigh
- 20:20the clear benefits of financial innovation against some of these
- 20:23potential risks? These systemic questions Bogle
- 20:25raised, what really stands out to you from his warnings?