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05 - The Natural History of Morals - Beyond Good and Evil - Friedrich Nietzsche · Logic Library

• Chapter five, The Natural History of Morals one hundred and eighty six. The moral sentiment in Europe at present is perhaps as subtle, related, diverse, sensitive, and refined as the science of morals, belonging there too is recent, initial, awkward, and cose fingered, an interesting contrast which sometimes becomes incarnate and obvious in the very person of a moralist. Indeed, the expression science of morals is in respect to what is designated thereby farch presumptuous, encountered to good taste, which is always a foretaste of more modest expressions. One ought to avow with the utmost fairness, what is still necessary here for a long time, what is alone proper for the present, namely, the collection of material, the comprehensive survey and classification of an immense domain of delicate sentiments of and distinction of verse, which live, grow, propagate, and perish, and perhaps attempts to give a clear idea of the recurring and more common forms of these living crystallizations, as preparation for a theory of types of morality. To be sure, people have not Histheroe been so modest, or the philosophers with the pedantic and ridiculous seriousness demanded of themselves something very much higher, more pretentious and ceremonious. When their concern to themselves as morality as a science. They wanted to give a basic to morality, and every philosopher hithero has believed that he has given it a basis. Morality itself, however, has been regarded as something given. How far from their awkward pride, was a seemingly insignificant problem left in Doten't decay of a description of forms of morality, notwithstanding that the finest hands and senses could hardly be fine enough for it. It was precisely owing to moral philosophers knowing the moral facts imperfectly in an arbitrary abitomee or accidental abridgment, perhaps as the morality of their environment. Their position their church is that sidgeist their climate and sown. It was precisely because they were badly instructed with regards to nations, eras and past ages, and whereby no means eager to know about these matters, that they did not even come in sight of the real problems of morals, problems which only disclose themselves by a comparison of many kinds of morality. And every signs of moral syerow. Strange as it may sound, the problem of morality itself has been omitted. There has been no suspicion that there was anything problematic there that, with philosophers called giving a basis to morality and endeavored to realize, has, when seen in a right light, proved merely a learned form of good faith and prevailing morality, a new means of its expression. Consequently just a matter of fact within the sphere of a definite morality, yeah its ultimate motive, a sort of denial that it is lawful for this morality to be called in question and in any cave, the reverse of the testing, analyzing, doubting, and with exacting of this very faith. Here for instant what was innocent, almost worthy of honor. Schopmuer represents his own task and drawer conclusions concerning the scientificness of his science, whose latest master still talks in the strain of children and old wives. The principle, he says, page one hundred and thirty six of the kron problemata etic the axiom about the purport of which all moralists are practically agreed neminem lade imo omneus quantum purtis uva is really the proposition which all moral teachers strive to establish the real basis of ethics, which has been thought like the philosopher's stone for centuries. The difficulty of establishing the proposition referred to may indeed be great. It is well known that Schupenhaower also was unsuccessful in his efforts, And whoever has thoroughly realized how absurd he falls and sentimental this proposition is in a world whose essence is a will to power, may be reminded that Schupmahaower, also a pessimist, actually played the flute daily after dinner. One may read about the matter in his biography. A question, by the way, a pessimist, a repudiator of God and of the world, who makes a halt at morality, who assents to morality and plays the flute to a lady naming im morals, what is that really a pessimist one hundred and eighty seven. Apart from the value of such a surgeon, as there is a categorical imperative in us, one can always ask what does such an assertion indicate about him who makes it? There are a system of morals which are meant to justify their also in the eyes of other people. Other systems of morals are meant to tranquilize him and make himself satisfied. With other systems. He wants to crucify and humble himself with others. He wishes to take revenge with others, to conceal himself with others, to glorify himself and give superiority and distinction. This system of morals helps its author to forget. That system makes him or something of him forgotten. Many a moralist would like to exercise power and creative arbitrariness over mankind. Many another, perhaps kind especially, gives us to understand by his morals that what is estimable in me is that I know how to obey, and with you it shall not be otherwise than with me. In short, systems of morals are only a sign language of the emotions one hundred and eighty eight. In contrast to lesser Alie, every system of morals is a sort of tyranny against nature and also against reason. That is, however, no objection unless one should again decree by some system of morals, that all kinds of tyranny and unreasonableness are unlawful. What is essential and invaluable in every system of morals is that it is a long constraint. In order to understand stoicism, or portrayal or politanism, one should remember the constraint under which every language has attained to strength and freedom, symmetrical constraint, the tyranny of rhyme and rhythm. How much trouble have the poets and orators of every nation given themselves, not accepting some of the prose writers of today, in whose ear dwells in exorable consciousness, not accepting some of the prose rights of today, in whose ear dwells an exorable consciousness for the sake of a folly, a utilitarian bungler say, and thereby deem themselves wise from submission to arbitrary law, as the anarchists say, and thereby fancy themselves free, even free spirited. The singular fact remains, however, that everything of the nature of freedom, elegance, boldness, dance, and masterly certainty which exists, or has existed, whether it be in thought itself, or in admiration, or in speaking and persuading, in an art, as in conduct, has only developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary law, and in all seriousness, it is not at all improbable that precisely this is nature and natural, and not less early. Every artist knows how different from the state of letting himself go is his most natural condition, the free arranging, locating, disposing, and constructing in the moments of inspiration, And how strictly and delicately he then obeys a thousand laws which the very rigidness and precision defy all formulation by means of ideas. Even the most stable idea has in comparsion therewith something floating, manifold and ambitious in it. The essential thing in heaven and in earth is apparently to repeat it once more. When there should be long obedience in the same direction. There thereby results, and has always resulted, in the long run, something which has made the life worth living. For instance, virture, art, music, dancing, reason, spirituality, anything whatever that is transfiguring, refined, foolish or divine, the long bondage of the spirit, the distrustful constraint in the communicability of ideas, the discipline which the thinker imposed on himself to sink in a chord with the rules of a church, or a court or comfortable. To Aristotelian premises, the persistent spirital was to interpret everything that happened according to a Christian scheme, and in every occurrence to rediscover and justify the Christian God. All the violence, arbiterness, severity, dreadfulness, and unreasonableness has proved itself as disciplinary means, whereby the European spirit has attained its strench, its remorseless curiosity, and subtle mobility. Granted also that much irrecoverable strench in spirit has to be stifled, suffocated, and spoiled in the process. For here, as everywhere, nature shows herself as she is in all her extravagant and indifferent magnificent, which is shocking but nevertheless noble that for centuries thinkers only thought in order to prove something. Nowadays, on the contrary, we are suspicious of every thinker who wishes to prove something that it was always settled beforehand, What was to be the result of the strictest thinking, as it was perhaps in the asiatic astrology of former times, or as it is still at the present day, in the innocent Christian moral explanation of the immediate personal events for the glory of God or for the good of the soul. This tyranny, this arbitrariness, the severe and magnificent stupidity, has educated the spirit. Slavery, both in the course and the finer sense, is apparently an indispensable means, even of spiritual education discipline. One may look at every system of morals in this light. It is nature therein which teaches to hate the lesser early, the too great freedom, and implants the need for limited horizons for immediate duties. It teaches the narrowing of perspectives, and thus, in a certain sense that stupidity is a condition of life and development. You must obey someone and for a long time, otherwise you will come to grief and lose all respect for yourself. This seems to me the moral imperative of nature, which is certainly neither categorical, as old Kunt wished. Consequently the otherwise, nor does it address itself to the individual. What does nature care for the individual but to nations, races, ages, and ranks above all, however, to the animal man generally, to mankind one hundred and eighty nine industrious races find it a great hardship to be idle. It was a master stroke of English instinct to hallow and be gloom Sunday to such an extent that the Englishman unconsciously hankers for his week and workday again as a kind of cleverly devised, cleverly intercalated fast, such as is also frequently found in the ancient world, although as is appropriate in southern nations, not precisely with respect to work. Many kinds of fasts are necessary, and wherever powerful influences and habits prevail, legislators have to see that intercolorie days are appointed on which such impulses are fettered and learn to hunger. Anew fewed from a highest standpoint, holding a rations and epochs when they show themselves infected with any moral phanitism, seem like those intercalated periods of restraint and fasting, during which an impulse learns to humble and submit itself, at the same time also to purify and sharpen itself. Certain philosophical sects likewise admit of similar interpretation. For instance, the Stoa in the midst of Hellenic culture, with the atmosphere rank and overcharged with afrothesiacal odors. Here also is a hint for the explanation of the paradox why it was precisely in the most Christian period of European history, and in general, only under the pressure of Christian sentiments, that the sexual impulse sublimated into love Armoor Passion one hundred ninety. There is something in the morality of Plato which does not really belong to Plato, but which only appears in his philosophy, one might say, in spite of him, namely so chatism, for which he himself was too noble. No one desires to injure himself. Hence all evil is done unwittingly. The evil man inflicts injury on himself, he would not do so, however, if he knew that evil is evil. The evil man therefore is only evil through error, if, when free and from error, one will necessarily make him good. This mode of reasoning the savors of the populace, who perceive only the unpleasant consequences of evil doing, and practically judge that it is stupid to do wrong, while they accept good as identical with useful and pleasant without further thought. As regards every system of utiliterism, one may at once assume that it has the same origin and follow a scent, one will seldom err platted all he could to interpret something refined and noble into the tenets of his teacher, and above all, to interpret himself into them. He the most daring of all interpreters, who lifted the entire Socrates out of the street as a popular theme and song, to exhibit him in endless and impossible modifications, namely in all his own disguises and multiplicities in yest in numeric language as well, what is the Platonic Socrates if not cross the platon or biten the platon teses Tchemaira one hundred and ninety one. The old theologis problem of faith and knowledge, or more plainly, of instinct and reason, the question whether, in respect to the valuation of things, instinct deserves more authority than rationality, which wants to appreciate and act according to motives according to a why, that is to say, in conformity to purpose and utility. It is always the old moral problem that first appeared in the person of Socrates, and had divided men's minds long before Christianity. Socritus himself, following, of course, the taste of his talent that of a surpassing dialectician took at first a side of reason, And in fact, what did he do all his life but love at the awkward incapacity of the noble Athenians, who were men of instinct, like all noble men, and could never give satisfactory answers concerning the motives of directions. In the end, however, though silently and secretly, he loved also at himself. With his finer conscience and introspection, he found in himself the same difficulty and incapacity. But why, he said to himself, should one, on that account separate one's self from the instincts. One must set them right and the reason also one must follow the instinct, but the same time persuade the reason to support them with good arguments. This was the real falseness of that great and mysterious ironist. He brought his conscience up to the point that he was satisfied with the kind of self outwitting. In fact, he perceived the irrationality in the moral judgment. Plato, more innocent in such matters, and without the craftiness of the Plebeian, wish to prove to himself the ex expenditure of all his change, the greatest change a philosopher had ever expanded the reason and instinct leads spontaneously to one goal, to the good, to God, And since Plato all theologians and philosophers have followed the same path, which means that in matters of morality, instinct, or as Christian call it faith, or as I call it the heard the sistero triumphed, unless one should make an exception the case of the card, the father of rationalism and consequently grandfather of the Revolution, who recognized only the authority of reason, but the reasons only a tool, and the card was superficial one hundred and ninety two. Whoever has followed the history of a single science finds in its development a clue to the understanding of the oldest and commonest process of all knowledge and cognizance. There As here the premature hypothesis, the fiction the good, stupid will to believe, and the lack of distrust and patience are first developed. Our senses learn late, and never learn completely, to be subtle, reliable, and cautious organs of knowledge. Our eyes find it easier, on a given occasion to produce a picture already often produced, than to seize upon the divergence and novelty of an impression. The latter requires more force, more morality. It is difficult and painful for the ear to listen to anything new. We hear strange music badly. When we hear another language spoken, we involuntarily attempt to form the sounds into words with which we are more familiar and conversant. It was thus, for example, that the Germans modified the spoken word ar kubalista into armbost that means crossbow. Our senses are also hostile and our worse to the new, and generally, even in the simplest procession of sensation, the emotions dominate, such as fear, love, hatred, and the passive emotion of indolence. As little as a reader nowadays reads all the single words, not to speak of syllables of a page, he rather takes about five out of every twenty words at random and guesses the probably appropriate sense to them. Just as little do we see a tree correctly and completely in respect to its leaves, branches, color, and shape. We find it so much easier to fancy the chance of a tree. Even the midst of the most remarkable experiences, we still do just the same. We fabricate the greater part of the experience, and can hardly be made to contemplate any event, and except as in ventures thereof all this goes to prove that from our fundamental nature and from remote ages, we have been accustomed to lying, or to express it more politely and hypocritically, In short, more pleasantly. One is much more of an artist than one is aware of. In an animated conversion, I often see the face of the person with whom I am speaking so clearly and sharply defined before me according to the thought he expresses, or which I believe to be evoked in his mind, that the degree of distinctnessphar exceeds the strenge of my visual faculty. The delicacy of the play of the muscles and of the expression of the eyes must therefore be imagined by me. Probably the person put on quite a different expression, or none at all. One hundred and ninety three quick coldlude the fuet Te Neebres argit. But also contrariwise, what we experience in dreams, provided we experience it, often pertains at last just as much as the general belongings of our soul as anything actually experienced by virtual. Thereof we are richer or poorer, we have a requirement more or less, and finally, in broad daylight, and even in the brightest moments of our waking life, we are ruled to some extent by the nature of our dreams. Supposing that someone has often flown in his dreams, and then at last, as soon as he dreams, he is conscious of the power and art of flying as his privilege and his peculiarly inviolable happiness. Such a person who beliefs that on the slightest impulse he can actually all sorts of curves and angels, who knows this sation of a certain divine levity, and upwards without effort or constraint, and downwards without standing or lowering without trouble. How could the man with such dream experiences and dream habits fail to find happiness differently colored and defined even in his waking hours. How could he fail to long differently for happiness? Flight such as is described by poets, must, when compared with his own flying, be far too earthly, muscular, violent, far too troublesome for him one hundred and ninety four. The difference among men does not manifest itself only in the difference of their lists of desirable things. In the regarding different good things as worth striving for, and being disagreed as to the greater or less value the order of rank of the commonly recognized desirable things. It manifests itself much more in what they regard as actually having and possessing a desirable thing. As regards to a woman, for instance, the control over her body and her sexual gratification serves as an amply sufficient sign of ownership and possession. To the more modest man, another with the most suspicious and ambitious first for possession, sees the questionableness, the mere apparentness of such ownership, and wishes to have finer tests in order to know, especially whether the woman not only gives herself to him, but also gives up for the sake what she has or would not like to have. Only then does he look upon her as possessed. A third, however, has not even here got to the limit of his distrust and his desire for possession, asks himself whether the woman, when she gives up everything for him, does not perhaps do so far for a phantom of him. Her wishes first to be thoroughly indeed profoundly well known. In order to be loved at all, he ventures to let himself be found out only then as he feels the beloved one fully in his possession, when she no longer deceives herself about him, when she loves him just as much for the sake of his devilry and concealed in seatability as for his goodness, patience, and spirituality. One man would like to possess a nation, and he finds all the higher arts of Cagliosto and Catalina suitable for his purpose. Another with a more refined source of possession, sighs to himself. One may not deceive where one desires to possess. He is irritated and impatient at the ideas that a mask of him should rule in the hearts of the people. I must therefore make myself known, and first of all learn to know myself. Among helpful and charitable people, one almost always finds the awkward craftiness which first gets up suitable him who has to be helped, As though, for instance, he should merit help, seek just their help, and would show himself deeply grateful, attached, and subservient to them for all help. With these conceits. They take control of the needy as a property, just as in general they are charitable and helpful out of a desire for property. One finds them jealous when they are crossed or forestalled. In their charity, parents involuntarily make something like themselves out of their children. They call that education. No more the doubts at the bottom of her heart. With the al she is born, as thereby her property. No father hesitates about his right to his own ideas and notions of worth. Indeed, in former times, fathers seemed to try to use their discretion concerning the life or death of the newly born, as among the ancient Germans. And like the father, so also do the teacher, the class, the priest, and the prince still see in every new individual and unobjectionable opportunity for new possession. The consequence is one hundred and ninety five. The Jews, a people born for slavery, as Tasitus in the whole ancient world say of them the chosen people among the nations. As they themselves say and believe, the Jews performed the miracle of the inversion of valuations, by means of which their life on earth obtained a new and dangerous charm. For a couple of millenniums, prophets fused into one the expressions rich, godless, wicked, violent, sensual, and for the first time coined the word world as a term of reproach. In this inversion of variations, in which is also included the use of the word poor a synonym with saint and friend, the significance of the Jewish people is to be found. It is with them that the slave insurrection in Morals commences one hundred ninety six. It is to be inferred that there are countless dark bodies near the sun, such as we shall never see among ourselves. This is an allegory, and the psychologist of morals reads the whole star writing merely as an allegorical and symbolic language in which much may be unexpressed. One hundred and ninety seven. The beast of prey and the men of prey, for instant saesa borgia, are fundamentally misunderstood. Nature is misunderstood so long as one seeks a morbidness in the constitution of these healthiest of all tropical monsters and growth, or even an innate hell in them. As almost all moralists have done. Hitherto, does it not seem that there is a hated of the virgin forest and of the tropics among moralists, and that the tropical man must be discredited at all costs, whether as a disease and deterioration of mankind, or as his own hell and self torture. And why in favor of the temperate zones, in favor of the temperate man, the moral, the mediocre. This for the chapter Morals es Timidity one hundred and ninety eight. All the systems of morals which address themselves with a few of their happiness, as it is called, What else are they but suggestion for behavior adapted to the degree of danger from themselves, in which the individuals live, recipes for their passions, their good and bad propensities, and so far as such have the will to power and would like to play the master. Small and great expediencies and elaborations permeated with the musty odor of old family medicines and old wife wisdom, all of them grotesque and absurd in their form, because they address themselves to all, because they generalize, whether generalization is not authorized, all of them speaking unconditionally, and taking themselves unconditionally all of them flavored not merely with some grain of salt, but rather endurable only, and sometimes even seductive when they are overspiced and begin to smell dangerously, especially of the other world, that is all of little value when estimated intellectually, and is far from being science, much less wisdom. But repeat it once more, and three times repeated. It is expediency, expediency, expediency mixed with stupidity, stupidity, stupidity, whether it be indifference and stato as coldness towards the heated folly of the emotions, which the Stokes are advised and fostered, or the no moral laughing and no more weeping of Spinoza, the destruction of the motions by their analysis and vivisection, which he recommended so naively, or the lowering of the emotions to an innocent mean at which they all may be satisfied. The Aristotelianism of morals, or even morality as the enjoyment of the emotions in a voluntary attenuation and spiritualization, but in symbolism of art, perhaps as music, or as love of God and of mankind for God's sake. For in religion, the passions are once more enfranchised, provided that, or finally, even the complaisant and wanton surrender of the emotions, as have been taught by halves and guilty, the bold letting go of the range the spiritual incorporeal lizentsia morum, in the exceptional cases of wise, cold cultures and drunkards, with whom it no longer has much danger. This also for the chapter moral as Timidity one hundred ninety nine. Inasmuch as in all ages, as long as mankind has existed, there have also been human herts, family alliances, communities, tribes, peoples, states, churches, and always a great number of who obey in proportion to the small number who command. In view, therefore, of the fact that obedience has been most practiced and fostered among mankind, to throw, one may reasonably suppose that generally speaking, the needs thereof is now innate in every one, as a kind of formal conscience, which gives the command you shall unconditionally do something, unconditionally refrain from something. In short, you shall This need tries to satisfy itself and to fill its form with the content according to its strength, impatience, and eagerness. It at once ceases as an omnivorous appetite with little a selection, and accepts whatever is shouted into its ear. They're all sorts of commanders, parents, teachers, laws, class, tragedice or public opinion. The extraordinary limitation of human development, the hesitation, protractedness, frequent retrogression, and turning thereof is attributable to the fact that the herd instinct of obedience is transmitted best and at the course of the art of command. If one imagines this instinct increasing to its greatest extent, commanders in independent individuals will finally be lacking altogether, or they will suffer inwardly from a bad conscience and will have to impose a deception of themselves in their first place in order to be able to command, just as if they also were only obeying with condition of things actually exists in Europe at present I called the moral hypocrisy of the commanding class. They know no other way of protecting themselves from their bad conscience, that by playing the role of executors of older and higher orders, of predecessors of the constitution of justice, of the law, or of God himself. Or they even justify themselves by maxims from the current opinions of the herd as first servants of their people or instruments of the public will. On the other hand, the gregarious European man nowadays assumes an air as if he were the only kind of man that is allowable. He glorifies his qualities such as public spirit, kindness, deference, industry, temperance, modesty, indulgence, sympathy, by vity of which he is gentle, endurable, and useful to the herd, as the peculiarly human virtues. In cases, however, where it is believed that the leader in belwether cannot be dispensed with, attempt after attempt is made nowadays to replace command wonders by the summing together of clever, gregarious men. All representative constitutions, for example, are of this origin. In spite of all, what a blessing, what a deliverance from a weight becoming unendurable, is the appearance of an absolute ruler. For these gregarious Europeans. Of this fact, the effect of the appearance of Napoleon was the last great proof the history of the influence of Napoleon is almost the three of the higher happiness to which the entire century has attained. In its versies, individuals and periods two hundred. The man of an age of dissolution, which mixes the races of one another, who has the inheritance of a diversified descent in his body, that is to say, contrary and often not only contrary instincts and as standards of value, which struggle with one another and are seldom at peace. Such a man of late culture and broken lights will on an average be a weak man. His fundamental desire is that the war which is in him should come to an end. Happiness appears to him in the character of as soothing, medicine, and mode of thought. For instant Epiqurean or Christian, it is above all things the happiness of repose, of undisturbedness, of repression of final unity. It is the sabbat of Sabbaths, to use the expression of the holy rhetorician Saint Augustine, who was himself such a man. Should, however, the contrary and conflict in such natures operate as an additional incentive and stimulus to life. And if, on the other hand, in addition to their powerful and irreconcible instinct they have also inherited and indoctrinated into them a proper mastery and subtlety for carrying on the conflict rich themselves, that is to say, the faculty of self control and self deception. There then arise those marvelously incomprehensible and inexplicable beings, those enigmatical men predestined for conquering and circumventing others, the finest examples of which are Elisibades and Caesar, with whom I should like to associate the first of Europeans, accounting to my taste, the houn Chauphan Frederic the second, and among artists perhaps Leonardo da Vinci. They appear precisely in the same periods when that weaker type, which is longing for repose, comes to the front. The two types are complimentary to each other and spring from the same causes two hundred and one. As long as the utility which determines moral estimates as only gregarious utility, As long as the preservation of the community is only kept in few and the immoral is thought precisely and exclusively in what seems dangerous to the maintenance of the community, there can be no morality of love to one's neighbor. Granted, even that there is already a little constant exercise of consideration sympathy, fairness, gentleness, and mutual assistance. Granted that even in this condition of society, all those instincts are already active, which are latterly distinguished by honorable names as virtues, and eventually almost coincide with the conception morality. In that period, they do not as yet belong to the domain of moral valuations. They are still ultra moral. A sympathetic action, for instance, is neither called good nor bad, moral or immoral in the best periods of the Romans, and should it be praised a sort of resentful disdain as compatible with this praise, even at the best. Directly, the sympathetic action is compared with bond, which contributes to the welfare of the whole, to the race publica. After all, love to our neighbor is always a secondary matter, partly conventional and arbitrarily manifested in relation to our fear of our neighbor. After the fabric of society seems on the whole established and secured against external dangers, it is the fear of our neighbour which again creates new perspectives of moral valuation. Certain strong and dangerous instincts such as the love of enterprise, foolhardiness, revengefulness, astuteness, rapacity, and love of power, which up toil then has not only been honored from the point of view of general utility under other names, of course, that those here given, but had to be fostered and cultivated because they were perpetually required. And the common danger against the common enemies are now felt in the dangerousness to be doubly strong when the outlets for them are lacking and are gradually branded as immoral and given over calumny the contrary instincts and inclinations now attained to moral honor. The gregarious instinct gradually draws its conclusions how much or how little dangerousness to the community or to equality is contained in an opinion, a condition, an emotion, a disposition, or an endowment that is now the moral perspective. Here again in Fear, the mother of morals. It is by the loftiest and strongest instinct when they break out passionately and carry the individual far above and beyond the average and the low level of the gregarious conscience, that the self reliance of the community is destroyed, its belief in itself, its backbone, as it were, breaks. Consequently, these very instincts will be most branded and defamed. The lofty, independent spirituality, the will to stand alone, and even the cogate reason are felt to be dangerous. Everything that elevates the individual above the heard and is a source of fear to the neighbour is hencefor called evil. The tolerant, unassuming, self adapting, self equalizing disposition, the mediocrity of desires attains the moral distinction and honour. Finally, under very peaceful circumstances, there is always less opportunity and necessity for training the feelings to severity and rigor. And now every form of severity, even in justice, begins disturb the conscience. A lofty and rigorous nobleness and self responsibility almost offense and awakens distrust the lamp, and still more the sheep wins respect. There is a point of deceased mellowness and effeminacy in the history of society, at which society itself takes a part of him who injures it the part of the criminal, and does so in fact seriously and honestly. To punish appears to it to be somehow unfair. It is certain that the idea of punishment and the obligation to punish are then pain and alarming to people. Is it not sufficient and the criminal be rendered harmless? Why should we still punish? Punishment itself is terrible? With these questions gregarious morality, the morality of fear draws its ultimate conclusion. If one could at all do away with danger the cause of fear, one would have done away with this morality. At the same time, it would no longer be necessary. It would not consider itself any longer necessary. Whoever examines the conscience of the presenter, European will always elicit the same imperative from its thousand moral faults and hidden recesses, the imperative of the timidity of the heard. We wish that some time or other there may be nothing more to fear. Sometime or other, the will and the way there too, is nowadays called progress all over Europe two hundred and two. Let us at once say again what we have already said a hundred times, for people's ears nowadays are unwilling to hear such truths, our truths. We know well enough how offensive it sounds when any one plainly and without tougher counts men among the animals. But it will be accounted to us almost a crime, that it is precisely in respect to men of modern ideas, that we have constantly applied the terms heard, heard, instincts, and such like expressions. What avail is it? We cannot do otherwise, for it is precisely here that our new inside is. We have found that in all the principal moral judgments, Europe has become unenamious, including likewise the countries where European influence prevails. In Europe, people evidently know what so gret A thought he did not know, and what the famous serpent of old once promised to teach. They know today what is good and evil. It must then sound hard and be distasteful to the ear when we always insist that that which here thinks it knows, that which here glorifies itself with praise and blame and calls itself good is the instinct of the herding human animal, the instinct which has come, and is ever coming more and more to the front to preponderance and supremacy over other instincts, according to the increasing physiological approximation and resemblance of which is the symptom. Morality in Europe at present is herding animal morality, and therefore, as we understand the matter, only one kind of human morality, besides which, before which, and after which, many other moralities, and above all higher moralities are or should be possible. Against such a possibility, against such a should be. However, this morality defends itself with all its strenge. It says, obstinately and inexorably, I am morality itself, and nothing else is morality. Indeed, with the help of a religion which had humored and flattered the sublime's desires of the herding animal, things have reached such a point that we always find a more visible expression of this morality even in political and social arrangements. The democratic movement is the inheritance of the Christian movement. That its temple, however, is much too slow and sleep before the more impatient ones for those who are sick and distracted by the herding instinct. Is indicated by the increasingly furious, howling and always less disguised tea snashing of the anarchist dogs who are now roving through the highways of European culture, apparently in opposition to the peacefully industrious democrats and revolution ideologies, and still more so to the awkward philosophastas and fraternity visionaries who call themselves socialists and want a free society. Those are really at one with them in all their thorough and instinctive hostility to every form of society other than the autonomous herd, to the extent even of repudiating the notions master and servant Nidia Nimitre says a social lists formula at one in the tenacious opposition to every special claim, every special right and privilege. This means ultimately opposition to every right, for when we all equal, no one needs the rights any longer. At one in their distrust of punitive justice, as though it were a violation of the weak, unfair to the necessary consequences of all former society, but equally at one in their religion of sympathy, in their compassion for all that feels, lives, and suffers, down to the very animals, up even to God. The extravagance of the sympathy for God belongs to a democratic age, altogether at one in the cry and impatience of the sympathy, in their deadly hatred of suffering, generality, in their almost feminine incapacity for witnessing it or allowing it. At one in their involuntarily be glooming in heart softening under the spell of which Europe seems to be threatened with a new Buddhism. At one in their belief in the morality of mutual sympathy, as though it were morality in itself, the climax, the attained climax of mankind, the sole hope of the future, the consolation of the present, the great discharge from all the obligations of the past, altogether at one in their belief in the community as a deliverer in the heart and therefore in themselves. Two hundred and three We who hold a different belief, we who regards the democratic movement not only as a degenerating form of political organization, but as equivalent to a generating a waning type of man, as involving his mediocrizing and deprecation. Where have we to fix our hopes in new philosophers? There is no other alternative in minds strong and original enough to initiate opposite estimates of values, to trans value and invert eternal valuations. In foreigunners, in men of the futures, who in the present shall fix the constraints and fasten the knots which will compel millennians to take new paths, to teach men the future of humanity as is a will, as depending on human will, and to make preparation for vast, hazardous enterprises and collective attempts in rearing and educating, in order thereby to put an end to the frightful rule of folly and chance, which are citherao gone by the name of history. The folly of the greatest number is only its last form. For that purpose, a new type of philosopher and commander will sometime or other be needed. And the very idea of which everything that has existed in the way of occult, terrible and benevolent beings might look pale and dwarfed the image of such leaders hovers before our eyes. Is lawful for me to say aloud, we free spirits. The conditions which one would partly have to create and partly utilize for their genesis, the presumptive methods and tests by virtue of which a soul should grow up to such an avolation and power as to feel a constraint to these tasks. A transvaluation of values under the new pressure and hammer of which a conscience should be steeled and a heart transformed into brass, so as to bear the weight of such responsibility. And on the other hand, the necessity for our such leaders, and on the other hand, the necessity for such leaders the dreadful danger that they might be lacking, or miscarry and degenerate. These are our real anxieties and glooms. We know it well, we free spirits. These are the heavy, distant thoughts and storms which sweep across the heaven of our life. There are few pains so grievous as to have seen, divined or experienced how an exceptional man has missed his way and deteriorated. But he who has a rare eye for the universal danger of man himself deteriorating. He who, like us, has recognized the extraordinariative fortitudes which have hitherto played its game in respect of the future of mankind, a game in which neither the hand nor even a finger of God has participated. He who divines the fate that is hidden under the idiotic unwariness and blind confidence of modern ideas, and still more under the whole of crystal. European morality suffers from an anguish with which no other is to be compared. He sees at a glance all that could still be made out of man through a favorable accumulation and augmentation of human powers and arrangements. He knows with all the knowledge of his conviction, how unexhausted man still is for the greatest possibilities, and how often in the past the type man has stood in presence of mysterious decisions and new paths. He knows still better from his painfullest recollections on what wretched obstacles promising developments of the highest rank have hitherto usually gone to pieces, broken down, sunk, and become contentable. The universal degeneracy of mankind to the level of the man of the future as idealized by the socialist fools and shallow pains. This degeneracy and dwarfing of men to an absolutely gregarious animal, or as they call it, to a man of free society. In this brutalizing of man into a pygmy with equal rights and claims, is undoubtedly possible. He who had thought out this possibility to his ultimate conclusion, knows and other low thing unknown to the rest of mankind, and Perrabs also a new mission end of chapter five.