Latest / Deep Dive / Australia’s $11.7 Billion Housing Tax System: Who Really Benefits?
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome to today's deep Dive. I mean, imagine a government
- 0:03program that cost the public about $11.7 billion every single
- 0:09year. Yeah, that is a staggering
- 0:11amount of money. Right.
- 0:12And it's a program where the bottom 50% of income earners
- 0:15essentially funded through their daily taxes, but they see, you
- 0:20know, almost 0 statistical benefit from it.
- 0:22Which is pretty hard to wrap your head around at first
- 0:24glance. Totally.
- 0:25And we aren't talking about some controversial corporate bailout
- 0:29or a massive defense contract here.
- 0:32We are looking at the fundamental tax architecture of
- 0:35the Australian housing market. Exactly.
- 0:37It's heavily embedded in just the mundane realities of
- 0:40property ownership, and to understand how this whole system
- 0:43operates, we're relying on 2 highly consequential pieces of
- 0:47research today. Yes.
- 0:48So let's set the table for the listener.
- 0:50What are we looking at? So first we've got the Gratton
- 0:52Institute's comprehensive report.
- 0:54It's called Hot Property, negative Gearing and Capital
- 0:57gains tax reform, and that was authored by John Daly and Daniel
- 1:00Wood. Right, a very well known paper.
- 1:02Very much so. And 2nd, we are analyzing the
- 1:06rigorous modeling from AHURI, which is the Australian Housing
- 1:10and Urban Research Institute. Their work really maps out the
- 1:15the mathematical realities of proposed reforms to this exact
- 1:20system. Perfect.
- 1:21So the mission for this deep dive is to really look at the
- 1:23structural mechanics of two specific tax policies.
- 1:27Talk about the capital gains tax discount, usually just called
- 1:30the CGT discount and negative hearing.
- 1:32Yeah, the two big pillars. Exactly.
- 1:34And whether you are, you know, actively managing a property
- 1:37portfolio, or maybe you're a renter watching housing prices
- 1:40just totally detached from local wages, or even just a taxpayer
- 1:43looking at the national deficit, these policies dictate the flow
- 1:47of hundreds of billions of dollars.
- 1:48They really do. They alter banking structures,
- 1:51they influence land values, and they fundamentally shape the
- 1:54distribution of national wealth. So to really grasp the gravity
- 1:57of all this, we kind of have to start with the macroeconomic
- 2:00environment surrounding them, right?
- 2:01Yeah, absolutely. The Graton report was published
- 2:04in a very specific physical context.
- 2:07Basically, the Commonwealth government was running
- 2:10persistent structural deficits. Like really massive ones.
- 2:14Right. We are talking about deficits
- 2:15exceeding 2% of GDP in five of the six years prior to the
- 2:20report. Which is huge.
- 2:21I mean, in a mature economy running a structural deficit of
- 2:25that magnitude outside of the severe recession, that's a
- 2:29pretty clear indicator that the revenue base is just, well, no
- 2:32longer aligned with expenditure. Exactly.
- 2:35And the government's strategy for returning the budget to
- 2:38surplus was highly reliant on some rather generous
- 2:42assumptions, let's say. Generous is a polite way to put
- 2:45it. What were they counting on?
- 2:46The primary mechanism they were counting on was a return to
- 2:49robust economic growth. They were forecasting around
- 2:523.25% annually. OK.
- 2:55And combining that with fiscal drag?
- 2:56Right, exactly. Fiscal drag or bracket creep,
- 2:59basically allowing inflation to organically push wage earners
- 3:02into to higher tax brackets over time.
- 3:04So it's essentially this passive strategy of just letting
- 3:06inflation repair the balance sheet for them.
- 3:08It is entirely passive and it's heavily exposed to global
- 3:13macroeconomic realities. I mean, the International
- 3:16Monetary Fund, along with a bunch of other economic bodies
- 3:19had already revised long term potential growth for advanced
- 3:22economies downward. Right, They're suggesting A
- 3:25settling point closer to 2.5%, right?
- 3:27Yeah, 2.5 S When a National Treasury relies on 3.2 5% growth
- 3:33and a 2.5% global environment, you aren't solving the
- 3:36structural deficit, you're simply rolling it over.
- 3:39OK, let's unpack this, because rolling over a deficit has a
- 3:42very specific demographic cost. It's kind of like a household
- 3:46hoping for some, you know, miraculous job promotion to pay
- 3:50off massive credit card debt rather than just cutting their
- 3:53expenses or finding a side hustle.
- 3:55That is a perfect analogy. You're banking on a best case
- 3:57scenario that probably won't happen.
- 3:59And the Granton research actually quantified that cost in
- 4:02pretty stark terms, right? They did.
- 4:04They found that every year the government runs a $40 billion
- 4:07deficit, it effectively increases the lifetime tax
- 4:11burden for a household headed by a 25 to 34 year old by $10,000.
- 4:16Wow, wait 10,000 dollars? Yeah, $10,000 of future tax
- 4:20burden. Just add it on.
- 4:22So relying on this phantom economic growth isn't just some
- 4:25abstract accounting issue. It mathematically transfers the
- 4:29cost of current government operations directly onto the
- 4:32future labor of young workers. If we connect this to the bigger
- 4:37picture, that intergenerational transfer is the core reason why
- 4:40budget repair requires actual active revenue measures, not
- 4:44just passive forecasting. Right, you can't just cross your
- 4:47fingers and hope for the back. Exactly when Treasury officials
- 4:50look for tangible revenue retrieval, the combined $11.7
- 4:53billion annual cost of negative gearing and the capital gains
- 4:57tax discount becomes a very obvious target.
- 5:00It's the elephant in the room. It really is.
- 5:02You simply cannot repair a structural deficit while
- 5:05maintaining a nearly $12 billion annual tax concession that
- 5:09predominantly services existing asset holders rather than, you
- 5:13know, productive economic output.
- 5:15OK, so let's dissect the first half of that $12 billion
- 5:18concession, the capital gains tax discount, because the
- 5:22history of capital gains taxation in Australia is
- 5:25actually surprisingly recent. Yeah, a lot of people don't
- 5:28realize that prior to 1985 there was no broad general tax on
- 5:33capital gains at all. Which is wild to think about
- 5:36today. If an asset appreciated in
- 5:38value, the profit was just largely ignored by the tax
- 5:41system. Basically, yeah.
- 5:43So the 1985 introduction of a broad capital gains tax was
- 5:46really an integrity measure, and the initial design was actually
- 5:49quite elegant in its economic logic.
- 5:52How did it work back then? So between 1985 and 1999,
- 5:55capital gains were taxed at the individual marginal income tax
- 5:59rate, but the cost base of the asset was adjusted for
- 6:02inflation. Right, the indexation method and
- 6:04the logic there makes perfect sense.
- 6:06I mean, if an asset double s in price over a decade, but
- 6:09inflation is basically halved the purchasing power of your
- 6:12money over that same decade, there's no real economic gain.
- 6:15Exactly. Taxing that nominal gain would
- 6:18effectively just be a wealth tax on inflation rather than a tax
- 6:21on genuine real profit. So the indexation protected the
- 6:25investor from being penalized by just the general macroeconomic
- 6:29environment. Precisely, but the complication
- 6:31arose with the 1999 Ralph review of Business Taxation.
- 6:36The Ralph Review What do they change?
- 6:38The review argued that the inflation indexation method was
- 6:41just too complex for everyday accounting.
- 6:43They also said Australia needed to stimulate capital markets to
- 6:46remain internationally competitive.
- 6:48So what was their fix for this supposedly too complex system?
- 6:53The proposed solution was to abolish the complex inflation
- 6:55indexation entirely. Instead, they replaced it with a
- 6:58flat 50% discount on the nominal game.
- 7:01The only catch was you had to hold the asset for more than 12
- 7:03months. The premise being that the 50%
- 7:07discount would act as a sort of rough, simplified proxy for
- 7:11inflation overtime. That was the idea, yeah.
- 7:13It was supposed to ensure that the tax system remained neutral
- 7:17so it wouldn't distort an individual's choice between
- 7:20consuming their income today versus investing it for the
- 7:23future. But there is a massive
- 7:25structural flaw in using that proxy, right, because it relies
- 7:29on asset prices and general inflation moving at basically
- 7:33somewhat comparable rates. You hit the nail on the head,
- 7:35and the reality of the Australian property market
- 7:38completely broke that mathematical assumption.
- 7:40I can imagine. Let's look at the.
- 7:41Numbers From 1999 until the Graton Reports publication,
- 7:45average house prices grew at an annual rate of 7.3%.
- 7:49Wow. OK.
- 7:50But over that exact same period, general inflation averaged just
- 7:532.8%. So the asset is appreciating at
- 7:56nearly triple the rate of inflation.
- 7:58Exactly. And when that happens, a flat
- 8:0150% tax discount stops being a protective measure against
- 8:04inflation. It shifts into becoming a
- 8:07massive direct subsidy on real profit.
- 8:10Right property investors were receiving a tax concession far,
- 8:14far in excess of what was actually required to just
- 8:17preserve the real value of their capital.
- 8:20And that divergent created a highly regressive benefit
- 8:23distribution. Because a discount scales
- 8:25infinitely with the size of the gain, it overwhelmingly
- 8:29advantages those with the largest capital pools.
- 8:31Meaning the worthiest people get the biggest slice of the pie.
- 8:34Much more than just the biggest slice, the gratin data indicates
- 8:37that the top 10% of income earners in Australia receive 67%
- 8:42of all capital gains income. Wait. 67% goes to just the top
- 8:4710%. Yes, the policy essentially
- 8:49concentrates the vast majority of its fiscal benefit straight
- 8:53into the highest decile of wealth.
- 8:56And it also incentivizes a very specific behavioral strategy,
- 8:59right, regarding when those gains are actually realized.
- 9:02Oh absolutely. Because capital gains tax is
- 9:04only triggered upon the sale of the asset.
- 9:06High income earners who hold these assets deliberately defer
- 9:10realization. They hold off on selling until
- 9:12they exit their peak earning years.
- 9:14Because the timing is everything in tax minimization.
- 9:18Let's say you're a taxpayer earning the highest marginal
- 9:20bracket, paying $0.47 on the dollar.
- 9:23You'll hold that appreciating asset throughout your entire
- 9:26working life. Right.
- 9:27You defer selling until retirement, at which point your
- 9:30regular taxable income drops significantly.
- 9:33And the data backs this up perfectly.
- 9:36For an individual over 65, the average tax rate applied to
- 9:40their first dollar of realized capital gains is approximately
- 9:4320%. But for someone still actively
- 9:46in the workforce, it's 28%. Which means the system
- 9:49mathematically rewards the wealthiest investors for
- 9:52hoarding assets and basically delaying market liquidity.
- 9:55Exactly. Here's where it gets really
- 9:57interesting though. Wait, if I'm just an everyday
- 9:59listener saving money in a regular bank account, how to get
- 10:01this discount right? So isn't the government
- 10:04basically picking favorites on how we save?
- 10:06Yes, that creates a stark discretion.
- 10:09The tax system treats standard savings completely differently.
- 10:13Bank deposits are overwhelmingly the primary savings vehicle for
- 10:16the lowest income decile, and they receive absolutely no such
- 10:20discount. So the interest I earn in a
- 10:22standard savings account is just taxed at my full marginal rate,
- 10:26even though those interest returns are also being eaten
- 10:28away by inflation. Exactly.
- 10:30The tax code is active, penalizing low risk accessible
- 10:33savings while heavily subsidizing high risk leveraged
- 10:37asset speculation. And the term for that is a non
- 10:40neutral tax environment. When capital is highly mobile,
- 10:45it flows toward the path of least fiscal resistance.
- 10:48That makes sense. By taxing bank deposits fully
- 10:51and discounting property gains by half, the government
- 10:54artificially reroutes capital out of the banking sectors
- 10:57deposit base and funnels it straight into real estate.
- 11:01It essentially forces ordinary savers to take on leverage and
- 11:04market risk just to keep pace with the tax advantage investor
- 11:07class. Which brings us to the leverage
- 11:09side of the equation. We've established how the CGT
- 11:12discount subsidizes the profit at the very end of an investment
- 11:16life cycle, but the entry point into that life cycle is usually
- 11:19debt. Almost always and.
- 11:20In this tax environment, the costs of carrying that debt
- 11:23introduce the mechanics of our second topic, negative gearing.
- 11:27Right negative gearing is the mechanism where the divergent
- 11:30between Australian tax law and global standards becomes the
- 11:33most pronounced. So let's define it clearly for
- 11:36everyone. At its core, gearing is simply
- 11:39borrowing to invest. A property becomes negatively
- 11:42geared when the deductible expenses exceed the rental yield
- 11:45generated by the property. And those expenses are
- 11:48overwhelmingly just the nominal interest paid on the mortgage,
- 11:51so the investment is operating at a net rental loss.
- 11:54But the uniquely Australian aspect is how we treat that
- 11:57loss. In a standard, you know, ring
- 11:59fence tax system, a loss on an investment property would only
- 12:03be deductible against future income from that same property.
- 12:06Or at best, other passive investment income.
- 12:10But the Australian tax code does something unusual.
- 12:12It allows the investor to apply that rental loss against their
- 12:15primary labor income. Meaning their normal wage or
- 12:18salary from their day job. Exactly, and that cross
- 12:20subsidization is massive in scale.
- 12:23Let's look the AURI data on this.
- 12:25There are roughly 2 million rental investors in the
- 12:28Australian market. And a remarkable 61% of those
- 12:31investors record a net rental loss. 61%, So the vast majority
- 12:36of the market is actively bleeding cash on a month, month.
- 12:39Basis. Yes, they are.
- 12:40Making a loss sounds like a terrible investment strategy on
- 12:43paper. Why are hundreds of thousands of
- 12:46people lining up to deliberately lose money?
- 12:48Like who is actually doing this? The demographics are highly
- 12:52specific here. The AURI profiling shows that
- 12:55the typical negatively geared investor is a male in his mid to
- 12:59late 40s, employed full time with a baseline tax assessable
- 13:03income of roughly $91,000. OK, so a solid middle class
- 13:08professional. Right, by applying his rental
- 13:10losses, he legally reduces his taxable income down to $80,000.
- 13:15The average annual loss he is carrying is about $8800.
- 13:19That is wild, and you have to contrast that with the 39% of
- 13:22investors who are positively geared, the ones actually
- 13:25operating a profitable rental enterprise.
- 13:27And the demographic shifts entirely when you look at them.
- 13:30The positively geared cohort is generally older, heavily skewed
- 13:33towards retirees, with a much more even gender split.
- 13:37Right. And their baseline income is
- 13:39lower, averaging around 78,500, but their properties generate a
- 13:43positive annual yield of $16,000.
- 13:46That demographic split highlights a strange
- 13:49psychological inversion in the investment market.
- 13:53The rational objective of capital allocation is to
- 13:55generate a positive yield. Right to make money.
- 13:58Exactly. Yet hundreds of thousands of mid
- 14:01career professionals are deliberately taking on highly
- 14:05leveraged debt to lock in an 8800 dollar annual loss.
- 14:09The investment is mathematically failing on a cash flow basis.
- 14:13What's the justification for that cash flow failure?
- 14:16It has to be heavily reliant on the anticipated capital gain.
- 14:19Right. What's fascinating here is the
- 14:21behavioral economics at play. Yes, the investor is absorbing
- 14:24the annual loss under the assumption that the property's
- 14:27overall capital value will increase by a factor much
- 14:30greater than the cumulative losses.
- 14:32Sure, they think the house will eventually be worth a fortune.
- 14:35But studies suggest the primary driver is often the immediate
- 14:38psychic payoff of tax minimization.
- 14:41The psychic payoff, like the dopamine hit of a tax return.
- 14:44Exactly that, the immediate gratification of receiving a
- 14:48substantial tax refund, of visibly reducing the tax burden
- 14:52on your labor. Amber frequently overrides
- 14:54rational yield analysis. So the pursuit of the tax
- 14:57deduction just becomes the primary investment thesis.
- 15:00It completely divorces the assets purchase price from its
- 15:04actual economic utility. And to contextualize how unusual
- 15:07this is, we have to look internationally, because most
- 15:10advanced economies have recognized the distortionary
- 15:13effects of cross subsidizing asset speculation with labor
- 15:16income. Right, the United States
- 15:18implemented passive activity loss rules specifically to
- 15:22prevent this exact tax scenario. And the UK and the Netherlands
- 15:25utilize quarantine systems or box systems where property
- 15:28losses are strictly ring fenced. They cannot be used to erode the
- 15:32income tax base of a wage earner.
- 15:34So Australia really stands out as a global outlier in its
- 15:37generosity toward leverage loss making.
- 15:39Very much so, but the true systemic risk isn't found in
- 15:43negative gearing or the CGT discount in isolation.
- 15:46Right, it's what happens when they collide.
- 15:47Exactly the profound structural distortion occurs when these two
- 15:51policies interact together. They create a highly efficient,
- 15:55legally sanctioned tax shelter. The Super shelter.
- 15:58Yes, and the Graton report illustrates this synthesis
- 16:01beautifully through a detailed case study of a hypothetical
- 16:05taxpayer. They call him Dan the lawyer.
- 16:07Dan the lawyer. Let's walk through Dan's
- 16:09situation, because the mechanics here perfectly encapsulate the
- 16:12asymmetry of these tax rules. So Dan has a high labor income.
- 16:17He earns $250,000 annually, which places him firmly in the
- 16:21highest marginal tax bracket. OK.
- 16:23So he takes on significant leverage, borrowing $750,000 to
- 16:27purchase an investment property. Right now the yield on this
- 16:30property is a very low 2.5%, but his mortgage interest rate is
- 16:356%. So from a pure cash flow
- 16:37perspective, the investment is severely underwater.
- 16:41His financing costs vastly exceed his rental income.
- 16:44Exactly. But Dan is operating on the
- 16:46assumption of a 5% annual capital appreciation on the
- 16:50property itself. OK.
- 16:51So if we track this investment over a five year horizon, we
- 16:55really see the asymmetry of the tax code do all the heavy
- 16:58lifting? Yes.
- 17:00Over those five years, Dan is utilizing negative gearing to
- 17:03its maximum potential. He takes those substantial
- 17:07annual rental losses and deducts them directly against his
- 17:10$250,000 legal salary. And because those deductions are
- 17:15applied at his highest marginal rate of 47%, they are incredibly
- 17:20valuable to him. Over the five year period, those
- 17:23rental losses reduce his total wage tax liability by $57,000.
- 17:29Then, at the end of the five years, Dan decides to liquidate
- 17:31the asset. He sells the house.
- 17:33Thanks to the 5% annual appreciation, he realizes a
- 17:37gross nominal capital gain of $207,000.
- 17:41And this is where the CGT discount finally engages, right?
- 17:43Exactly. Instead of that $207,000 being
- 17:46added to his income and taxed at his marginal rate, the 50%
- 17:50discount just halves the assessable amount.
- 17:52So Dan ends up paying only $49,000 in capital gains tax.
- 17:56The final reconciliation of those two tax buckets is just
- 17:59the most revealing part of this whole Graton analysis.
- 18:03Dan saved $57,000 in taxes on his labor income over the five
- 18:08years, and he paid $49,000 in taxes on his capital gain at the
- 18:12end. Right.
- 18:14So despite holding the property, covering all those interest
- 18:16shortfalls, and walking away with a nominal net profit of
- 18:20$86,000 after all his expenses, Dan has effectively paid $8000
- 18:25less in total taxation than if he had never entered the
- 18:28property market at all. It is an incredible outcome.
- 18:31The structural outcome is that Dan has successfully laundered
- 18:35highly taxed labor income into concessionally taxed capital
- 18:39gains. It's like having a magical
- 18:40accounting coupon that lets you secretly scoop money out of a
- 18:43heavily taxed bucket, your hard earned wages, and just pour it
- 18:46into a half price tax bucket for capital gains and it's all
- 18:50completely subsidized by the public.
- 18:51That's a great way to visualize it.
- 18:53And the tax code has subsidized to speculation to the point
- 18:56where his net tax contribution to the state has decreased,
- 18:59despite his net wealth actually increasing.
- 19:01Which completely undermines the progressivity of the income tax
- 19:05system. It effectively creates an
- 19:07optional tax system for those with access to leverage.
- 19:10Historically, as the Grattan report notes, aggressive tax
- 19:13avoidance via the conversion of income into capital was really
- 19:17the domain of ultra high net worth individuals utilizing
- 19:21complex corporate structures. Right, something out of reach
- 19:24for most people. But what the combination of
- 19:27negative gearing and the CGT discount has achieved is the
- 19:31democratization of sophisticated tax avoidance.
- 19:34It has brought these elite wealth shielding tactics
- 19:37straight to the suburban middle and upper middle classes.
- 19:41And that democratization has drastically altered the
- 19:44macroeconomic landscape of the country.
- 19:46I mean starting with just the composition of private debt.
- 19:48Absolutely. When a tax system guarantees A
- 19:50structural financial advantage for leveraged property
- 19:53speculation, the banking sector adapts to service that demand.
- 19:57They see where the money is flowing.
- 19:58Yeah. Over a 20 year period leading up
- 20:01to these reports, the proportion of investment property loans.
- 20:04Relative to total Australian debt tripled.
- 20:07It expanded from 110th to 3/10 of all outstanding credit.
- 20:11That is massive. A tripling of leveraged debt
- 20:15concentrated into a single highly illiquid asset class like
- 20:19residential property. That introduces massive
- 20:22fragility into the banking system.
- 20:24It does. But the more immediate, tangible
- 20:27impact is on the mechanics of property pricing itself.
- 20:30When investors are armed with a government underwritten tax
- 20:33advantage, their purchasing power at an auction is
- 20:36artificially inflated. They can just bid higher because
- 20:39the government is covering their downside.
- 20:40This is what economists call the crowding out effect.
- 20:43Investors taking an increasingly larger share of new credit
- 20:47directly translates to 1st home buyers being pushed out to the
- 20:50margins. Because the owner occupier the
- 20:52person just trying to buy a house to live in, they cannot
- 20:54deduct the interest on their mortgage and they do not receive
- 20:57a CGT discount on their primary residence.
- 21:00So they are mathematically disadvantaged when bidding
- 21:03against an investor who can utilize both of those loopholes.
- 21:07The playing field is just structurally tilted.
- 21:09And the disparity between those two groups is so stark in the
- 21:12data. The typical homeowner investor
- 21:15holds a property portfolio averaging over $730,000 in
- 21:19value, and that's supported by a taxable income of around
- 21:23$82,000. But conversely, A renting
- 21:26household with no property assets has an average income of
- 21:29roughly $31,000. And that renter receives
- 21:32absolutely no benefit from the $11.7 billion in tax
- 21:36concessions. Yet their broader tax
- 21:38contributions help fund the very subsidies that inflate the
- 21:42prices of the hongs they're desperately trying to buy.
- 21:45It's a vicious cycle. The gratin analysis frames this
- 21:48wealth concentration through the lens of macroeconomic theory.
- 21:51They specifically reference Thomas Piketty's work on capital
- 21:54accumulation. Piketty's spiral, right?
- 21:56Right. Piketty's central thesis is that
- 21:58when the return on capital exceeds the rate of economic
- 22:01growth, wealth inevitably concentrates, and that is highly
- 22:05visible here. But it is crucial to also
- 22:08include Matthew Wrongly's critique of Piketty, which the
- 22:11Gratton report touches upon. What was Rodney's point?
- 22:14Wrongly demonstrated that the surge in capital share of income
- 22:17isn't actually driven by productive industrial capital,
- 22:21it is almost entirely driven by housing.
- 22:23Oh, that distinction is vital. So the wealth isn't
- 22:26concentrating because these investors are, you know,
- 22:28building massive productive factories or funding
- 22:32technological innovation. Not at all.
- 22:33The wealth is concentrating because the supply of desirable
- 22:37urban land is highly constrained by geography and strict zoning
- 22:40laws, so the land simply yields an economic rent.
- 22:43And when the government injects massive tax subsidies into a
- 22:46market with those rigid supply constraints, the outcome is
- 22:50highly predictable. The subsidies do not trigger a
- 22:52proportional boom in the construction of new dwellings.
- 22:55The capital simply bids up the price of the existing
- 22:58constrained asset base. So the tax benefits are entirely
- 23:01capitalized into the land value. It just enriches those who
- 23:05already hold the asset while increasing the barrier to entry
- 23:09for everyone else. Yes.
- 23:11However, the Graton report is very careful to point out that
- 23:14unwinding these subsidies would not trigger the apocalyptic
- 23:18market collapse that's often touted by political lobbies.
- 23:21So what does this all mean for you, the listener?
- 23:24Especially if you are on the outside looking in trying to
- 23:26save for deposit. If they remove these tax breaks,
- 23:30does the market crash? Not according to the modeling.
- 23:33Because the fundamental constraint is land supply.
- 23:35Removing the tax benefits would primarily just remove the
- 23:38speculative premium. So it wouldn't tank the value of
- 23:41the actual houses. Right Grattan's modeling
- 23:43suggested a very modest cooling of the market, potentially
- 23:46lowering prices by up to 2%. It would deflate the artificial
- 23:50speculative fever without destroying the underlying
- 23:52utility value of the housing stock.
- 23:54OK, so the transition from identifying the structural flaws
- 23:58to actually modeling the solutions is where the HURI in
- 24:03Graton research becomes highly prescriptive.
- 24:05They offer tangible, mathematically modeled pathways
- 24:08for reform. They do.
- 24:09Gratton's primary proposal is a phased dual action approach.
- 24:14They recommend reducing the capital gains tax discount from
- 24:1750% down to 25%. And concurrently, they propose
- 24:21quarantining negative gearing losses, restricting investors to
- 24:25deducting property losses only against other passive investment
- 24:29income, effectively severing that link to their labor income.
- 24:32Exactly. And the fiscal impact of that
- 24:34proposal is substantial. Gratton models that this dual
- 24:37approach, if phased in over a five year period to allow market
- 24:40adjustment, would improve the Commonwealth budget position by
- 24:43approximately $5.3 billion annually.
- 24:46Wow, 5.3 billion. That is a permanent structural
- 24:51repair to the revenue base. It really is.
- 24:53Now, the immediate counter argument you always hear against
- 24:56quarantining negative gearing is the threat of rising rents.
- 25:00The property lobby frequently argues that if investors lose
- 25:03their tax subsidies, they will just simply pass the increased
- 25:06costs right onto tenants. Right, the classic rent rise
- 25:09myth. But the Gratton Report
- 25:11thoroughly dismantles this utilizing historical precedent.
- 25:14Yeah, the mid 1980s policy experiment is the perfect test
- 25:17case for this because the federal government actually did
- 25:21temporarily quarantine negative gearing between 1985 and 1987.
- 25:26Yes, they did. And if the lobby's theory holds
- 25:28true, rents should have skyrocketed nationwide during
- 25:32that period. But the data shows they did not.
- 25:34Rents remained entirely stable in Melbourne, Adelaide and
- 25:38Brisbane during that entire quarantine period.
- 25:41What about Sydney and Perth? Because I know rents went up
- 25:43there. They did, but the granular data
- 25:46attributes those increases to exceptionally low localized
- 25:50vacancy rates that existed prior to the policy change.
- 25:53It wasn't the tax change driving it.
- 25:55Furthermore, housing doesn't just disappear when an investor
- 25:58sells it. Right.
- 25:59If an investor exits the market due to tax changes, the property
- 26:03is often purchased by a former renter.
- 26:05Exactly. It converts A tenant into an
- 26:07owner occupier, which mathematically removes a unit of
- 26:10demand from the rental market alongside the unit of supply.
- 26:14The macro level rent rise argument just lacks empirical
- 26:17foundation. Despite the historical data, the
- 26:20political anxiety around reforming these policies remains
- 26:22super high. It's largely centered on this
- 26:25narrative of protecting the middle class, mom and dad
- 26:29investor. Which is where the AQRI modeling
- 26:31provides a master class in policy design.
- 26:34AQRI sought to model reforms that would repair the budget
- 26:37while specifically insulating the lower and middle income
- 26:41investor brackets. So Aqri analyzed several
- 26:44distinct models for limiting negative gearing deductions.
- 26:46The first was a really straightforward, blunt
- 26:48instrument, right A hard cap of $5000 on negative gearing
- 26:52deductions per taxpayer. Yeah, the blunt cap.
- 26:54The modeling showed this would yield $1.3 billion in budget
- 26:58savings. Which is good, but a static cap
- 27:01is fairly regressive in its application.
- 27:04It restricts the middle income earner just as rigidly as it
- 27:07restricts the high income earner.
- 27:08It lacks nuance, but AURI Second model introduces a progressive
- 27:13framework tied to income percentiles.
- 27:16It operates somewhat like a Weir in a river system.
- 27:19Explain that analogy. So it allows a base level of
- 27:22flow to pass unimpeded, but strictly regulates the surge at
- 27:25the top end. Under this progressive model,
- 27:28investors in the bottom 50% of the income distribution retain
- 27:32100% of their negative gearing deductions.
- 27:35OK, so the bottom half isn't touched at all?
- 27:37Right. The middle 25% of earners keep
- 27:3950% of their deductions, and the top 25% of earners, the highest
- 27:44income bracket, are restricted to 0 deductions against their
- 27:47labor income. That is fascinating.
- 27:49And the fiscal efficiency of that progressive model is pretty
- 27:53profound, isn't it? Because of the vast majority of
- 27:56the total dollar value of negative gearing deductions is
- 27:59heavily concentrated in the top quartile of earners, stripping
- 28:03the benefit from just that top tier loan generates $1.74
- 28:07billion in savings. The mathematics of that outcome
- 28:10are just incredible. The progressive model actually
- 28:14saves the federal budget slightly more money than the
- 28:17blunt $5000 cap, while completely quarantining the
- 28:20bottom 50% of earners for any policy impact whatsoever.
- 28:24It entirely neutralizes the political argument that reform
- 28:27would devastate working class investors.
- 28:29The policy can literally be surgically calibrated to only
- 28:32impact the highest earning demographics.
- 28:34And a similar progressive dynamic emerges in the AURI
- 28:37modeling of the CGT discount, doesn't it?
- 28:39Yes, it does. The concern is often that
- 28:41reducing the discount harms small investors.
- 28:44However, because capital gains are exponentially larger at the
- 28:46top end of the wealth spectrum, lowering the exemption forces
- 28:49high income earners to pay a significantly greater absolute
- 28:52dollar amount in tax. So while the percentage shift
- 28:55might appear uniform across the board, the sheer volume of
- 28:59capital captured from the top decile fundamentally narrows the
- 29:02wealth gap. Exactly.
- 29:04It repairs the revenue base far more effectively than any broad
- 29:07based tax increase on labor would.
- 29:09So what does this all mean? We hear politicians say they
- 29:12can't touch this because it will crush everyday people, but this
- 29:15AUI data says you can literally design the law to only target
- 29:20the wealthy. Why isn't that the headline?
- 29:22This raises an important question about the difference
- 29:24between economic reality and political reality.
- 29:27The math is clear. When we synthesize the findings
- 29:30from both Gratton and a URIA, very cohesive picture emerges of
- 29:35an economic system operating under a severe self-imposed
- 29:38handicap. We have a Commonwealth budget
- 29:40running structural deficits attempting to mask the shortfall
- 29:43with optimistic to growth forecasts and fiscal drag
- 29:46effectively shifting the tax burden to the upcoming
- 29:49generation. And we have clearly identified
- 29:51the $11.7 billion structural leak.
- 29:54It's caused by a CGT discount that wildly overcompensates for
- 29:58inflation and a negative gearing framework that allows the cross
- 30:02subsidization of asset speculation with labor income.
- 30:06The data clearly demonstrates that these policies artificially
- 30:09inflate urban land values, they introduced systemic leverage
- 30:13risks into the banking sector, and they actively crowd first
- 30:17home buyers out of the market by prioritizing tax advantage
- 30:20capital. Most importantly, we've seen
- 30:22that the solutions do not require a sledgehammer approach.
- 30:25Right through phase reductions in the CGT discount and the
- 30:29implementation of progressive income tested caps on negative
- 30:32gearing, the government could achieve multibillion dollar
- 30:35structural budget repair. And they can do it without
- 30:37crashing property prices or impacting the lower income
- 30:39investor base. The mathematical blueprints for
- 30:42a more equitable and stable system exist right within these
- 30:45reports. The barrier to implementation is
- 30:47not a lack of economic understanding, it is a question
- 30:50of political capital and the entrenched interests of those
- 30:53who currently benefit from the non neutral tax environment.
- 30:56Which is always the hardest barrier to overcome?
- 30:58Absolutely, which really leaves us with a necessary
- 31:01extrapolation regarding in the broader Australian economy.
- 31:05I want to leave you the listener with a final thought to ponder.
- 31:09If our current tax architecture provides massive government
- 31:13underwritten fiscal advantages for utilizing leverage to bid up
- 31:18the price of existing unproductive residential land,
- 31:22we have to consider the opportunity cost.
- 31:24We have to consider all the capital that isn't flowing into
- 31:26productive sectors. Exactly how many world changing
- 31:29businesses, innovative startups or technological advancements
- 31:32are we missing out on in Australia simply because the
- 31:35smartest financial move is to just buy another house and write
- 31:38off the loss? It's a huge question.
- 31:40It is because when the tax system rewards speculation over
- 31:43innovation is the future of the entire economy that pays the
- 31:47price.