Latest / The Vault: The Epstein Files / The OIG Report Into Jeffrey Epstein's Death: The Events Of August 8-10 And Epstein's Death (Chapter 5)( Part 2)

Transcript

The OIG Report Into Jeffrey Epstein's Death: The Events Of August 8-10 And Epstein's Death (Chapter 5)( Part 2) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
• 0:04
  In this episode, we're picking right up where we left
• 0:07
  off in the last episode, talking about the OIG's report
• 0:12
  into the circumstances surrounding Jeffrey Epstein's death. Part D failure
• 0:20
  to assign Epstein a new cellmate on August ninth, Section
• 0:24
  one Daywatch staff actions on August ninth, the Shoe Lieutenant
• 0:29
  told the OIG that he worked at MCC New York
• 0:33
  on August eighth, twenty nineteen, from approximately six a m.
• 0:37
  Until approximately two pm, and that he was off on
• 0:41
  August ninth, twenty nineteen. The Shoe Lieutenant, who shift ended
• 0:46
  over an hour before the USMS sent the second email
• 0:49
  regarding in May three's impending transfer, told the OIG that
• 0:54
  he was not aware that in May three was scheduled
• 0:57
  to be transferred out of MCC New York, and therefore
• 1:00
  he did not notify the captain that Epstein would require
• 1:04
  a new cell mate. According to the Shoe Lieutenant, as
• 1:08
  soon as the Shoe staff learned that in May three
• 1:10
  would be transferred, they should have notified a lieutenant on duty,
• 1:14
  the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, and the day Watch Activities
• 1:18
  lieutenant told the OIG on August ninth, twenty nineteen, they
• 1:22
  had oversight of the shoe from approximately six am until
• 1:26
  two pm due to their position descriptions and because of
• 1:30
  the shoe lieutenant's absence. According to the mcc New York
• 1:34
  staff roster on August ninth, twenty nineteen, Shoe Officer number
• 1:39
  one was listed as Senior Officer Specialist number five, although
• 1:44
  Shoe Officer number one is typically the officer in charge.
• 1:47
  Another senior Officer specialist told the OIG that in actuality
• 1:53
  he was the day watch shoe officer in charge on
• 1:55
  August ninth from approximately six am until two pm. The
• 2:00
  day watch shoe officer in charge said that since he
• 2:03
  had the most experience and seniority, he was considered by
• 2:07
  everyone to be the shoe officer in charge, which the
• 2:10
  shoe lieutenant confirmed. The day watch shoe officer in charge
• 2:14
  told the OIG that he knew that Epstein had to
• 2:17
  have a cell mate. He said that as a general practice,
• 2:21
  every inmate who was transferred from suicide watch and or
• 2:24
  psychological observation to the shoe is placed with the cell mate.
• 2:29
  He also confirmed that the shoe lieutenant also instructed him
• 2:33
  that Epstein was to be housed with a cell mate
• 2:35
  at all times. According to the day Watch Shoe Officer
• 2:39
  in charge, between July thirtieth and August ninth, twenty nineteen,
• 2:44
  he told other mcc new York staff members who worked
• 2:47
  in the Shoe of Epstein's cellmate requirement, and further stated
• 2:51
  that everyone who worked in the Shoe should have known
• 2:54
  that Epstein was required to have a cell mate due
• 2:58
  to their knowledge, training, and expl experience. The day Watch
• 3:02
  Shoe Officer in charge confirmed that on the morning of
• 3:05
  August ninth, twenty nineteen, the Shoe staff received an inmate
• 3:09
  call out list that listed in May three as WAB,
• 3:13
  which he explained, meant that in May three was being
• 3:16
  removed from mcc new York. He told the OIG that
• 3:21
  sometime between eight am and nine am, he escorted Epstein
• 3:25
  to the Shoe to the attorney conference room for Epstein's
• 3:29
  daily legal visit, during which time Epstein joked around with him.
• 3:33
  The day Watch Shoe Officer in charge said that he
• 3:36
  and Epstein were accompanied by CO one, who was escorting
• 3:40
  in May three to receiving and discharge. The day Watch
• 3:44
  Shoe Officer in charge and CO One both told the
• 3:48
  OIG that in May three was escorted to receiving and
• 3:52
  discharge with all of his belongings, and both said that
• 3:56
  during the escort, the day Watch Shoe Officer in charge
• 3:59
  informed an Epstein that he would be assigned a new
• 4:02
  cellmate due to Inmate three's departure and the requirement that
• 4:05
  Epstein have a cellmate. In his interview with the OIG,
• 4:09
  CO One confirmed this conversation between the day Watch Shoe
• 4:13
  Officer in Charge and Epstein, but he did not provide
• 4:17
  any additional information regarding notifications made either by him or
• 4:22
  the day Watch Shoe Officer in charge. The day Watch
• 4:27
  Shoe Officer in Charge told the OIG that when he
• 4:30
  and the CO one left the Shoe with Epstein and
• 4:33
  in May three, both the day Watch Operations Lieutenant and
• 4:37
  the day Watch Activities Lieutenant should have been physically present
• 4:41
  in the Lieutenant's office and should have seen that in
• 4:44
  May three was departing the institution when they passed the office.
• 4:48
  The day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge said that while
• 4:51
  he did not expect in May three to return to
• 4:54
  mcc New York, there had been times when inmates had
• 4:57
  been escorted to receiving in discharge and as an expected removal,
• 5:02
  only to be returned to the shoe later the same
• 5:05
  day due to unforeseen circumstances. According to the day watch
• 5:09
  shoe officer in charge, he did not select a new
• 5:12
  cell mate for Epstein because he was not certain that
• 5:15
  in May three had been discharged from the institution, although
• 5:19
  he assumed that in May three would not return to
• 5:22
  the shoe. The day watch shoe officer in charge told
• 5:26
  the OIG that when his shift ended at approximately two pm,
• 5:30
  he informed the evening watch shoe officer in charge and
• 5:34
  Senior Officer Specialist five that if in May three did
• 5:38
  not return to the shoe, Epstein would need a new
• 5:40
  cell mate. Upon Epstein's return from his attorney visit, the
• 5:45
  day watch shoe officer in charge said he specifically recalled
• 5:49
  telling the evening watch shoe officer in charge, in the
• 5:52
  presence of a senior Officer Specialist five, make sure this
• 5:56
  guy gets a bunkie, to which the evening shoe watch
• 5:59
  officer in charge replied, all right. The day watch shoe
• 6:03
  officer in charge said that at some point that day
• 6:07
  it was likely that he also informed the day watch
• 6:10
  Operations Lieutenant, but he could not specifically recall if he
• 6:14
  had done so. The day Watch Shoe Officer in charge
• 6:17
  told the OIG that a replacement cell mate should have
• 6:21
  been identified as soon as it was confirmed that in
• 6:24
  May three had left the institution. He said a new
• 6:27
  cellmate could have been reassigned before the four pm Shoe
• 6:31
  count if it was known that in May three was
• 6:33
  not coming back, but the Shoe staff members had until
• 6:36
  Epstein returned from his attorney visit to assign Epstein a
• 6:40
  new cellmate. According to the day Watch Shoe officer in charge,
• 6:45
  Shoe staff definitely should have realized that in May three
• 6:49
  was not returning, both during the four PM count and
• 6:52
  when Epstein returned from his attorney visit later that evening.
• 6:56
  The day Watch Shoe officer in charge told the OIG
• 6:59
  that Epstein's daily routine was that he would be with
• 7:02
  his attorneys in the attorney conference room until approximately eight pm,
• 7:07
  so Shoe personnel had time to make a new cellmate assignment.
• 7:12
  He had all Shoe staff members share the responsibility to
• 7:15
  find a replacement cell mate, and that anyone assigned to
• 7:18
  the Shoe could have found another inmate to replace in
• 7:22
  May three. However, he also said that due to Epstein's
• 7:26
  high profile, the Shoe personnel should have asked a lieutenant
• 7:29
  to contact the psychology department to see which inmate should
• 7:33
  have been placed with Epstein. On August twelfth, twenty nineteen,
• 7:38
  following Epstein's death, the day watch Shoe Officer in charge
• 7:42
  wrote a memorandum to the wardens dating on Friday, August ninth,
• 7:46
  twenty nineteen, at approximately one fifty pm iOS, the day
• 7:51
  Watch Shoe Officer in Charge passed on to the oncoming
• 7:55
  staff members the evening Watch Shoe Officer in Charge and
• 7:58
  president Ship Staff Senior Officer Specialist five in CO two
• 8:03
  that in May three was going wab Ie with all
• 8:06
  of his belongings and possibly he may not return. Also
• 8:11
  that inmate Epstein number seven sixty three one eight DASH
• 8:15
  zero five to four will be needing a cell mate
• 8:18
  upon arrival from his attorney visit. The day watch Shoe
• 8:22
  Officer in charge departed the Shoe at approximately two PM
• 8:26
  and worked an overtime shift as a driver for mcc
• 8:29
  New York. He stated that he did not follow up
• 8:32
  with the Shoe staff to verify that Epstein had been
• 8:35
  assigned another cell mate. Mcc new York staff with responsibility
• 8:41
  for oversight and staffing of the Shoe during the day watch,
• 8:45
  including the Warden Associate, Warden one, the Captain, the Shoe Lieutenant,
• 8:49
  the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the day Watch Activities Lieutenant,
• 8:53
  and the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, told the
• 8:56
  OIG that they all knew Epstein was required to have
• 8:59
  a cell pursuant to the Psychology Department's determination. They also
• 9:05
  confirmed that everyone who regularly worked in the Shoe knew
• 9:09
  of this requirement and that it was the responsibility of
• 9:11
  all Shoe staff to notify a supervisor upon learning that
• 9:15
  Epstein needed to be assigned the new cellmate due to
• 9:19
  Inmate three's transfer to another prison. The day watch Shoe
• 9:23
  Officer in Charge and CO one, however, were the only
• 9:26
  two mcc new York staff members working the day watch
• 9:30
  on August ninth, twenty nineteen, who told the OIG that
• 9:34
  they were aware of Inmate three's transfer and the need
• 9:37
  to assign Epstein a new cellmate. CO one's immediate superior,
• 9:42
  the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, was already aware
• 9:45
  of the need to assign Epstein a new cellmate, while
• 9:48
  the day Watch Shoe Officer in charge told the OIG
• 9:51
  that he made a number of notifications. Other witnesses couldnot
• 9:55
  confirm that he passed on information regarding Epstein's need for
• 10:00
  a new cellmate. The day Watch Operations Lieutenant and the
• 10:04
  day Watch Activities Lieutenant both told the OIG that they
• 10:07
  did not know in May three had been transferred out
• 10:10
  of the facility, despite the fact that both were recipients
• 10:14
  of the second email the USMS sent out on August
• 10:17
  eighth that included the information about in May three's and
• 10:21
  pending transfer out of mcc New York. On August ninth, Rather,
• 10:26
  the day Watch Operations Lieutenant and the day Watch Activities
• 10:29
  Lieutenant told the OIG that they believed in May three
• 10:33
  had been removed from MCC New York for a court appearance.
• 10:38
  The day Watch Activities Lieutenant did not recall in May
• 10:41
  three departing the institution with all of his belongings, or
• 10:45
  having any conversations with day Watch Shoe Officer in charge
• 10:49
  or anyone else regarding Inmate three's departure from MCC New York.
• 10:54
  According to the day Watch Activities Lieutenant, he did not
• 10:57
  know that Epstein was without a cell mate. Other senior officials,
• 11:02
  including the warden Associate Warden I, and the captain, were
• 11:05
  also unaware of Inmate three's transfer and the need to
• 11:09
  assign Epstein a new cell mate. These officials concurred that
• 11:14
  while all shoe staff and supervisors were responsible for notifying
• 11:18
  a supervisor in the chain of command of the need
• 11:20
  to assign Epstein a new cellmate, the day watch shoe
• 11:23
  officer in charge bore a primary responsibility for the notification
• 11:28
  because he was the shoe officer in charge and one
• 11:31
  of the two people who saw the inmate three leave
• 11:34
  the facility with all of his belongings. The Captain told
• 11:38
  the OIG that since Epstein was in the attorney conference
• 11:42
  room all day, no one may have even thought about it,
• 11:46
  and may have only become aware when they put Epstein
• 11:49
  back in his cell after his attorney visit that evening.
• 11:52
  The Captain said, as soon as the shoe staff became
• 11:55
  aware that Epstein was without a cell mate, they should
• 11:58
  have notified the evening watch Operations lieutenant. The Captain said
• 12:02
  that if he had been informed, he would have taken
• 12:04
  immediate action to ensure that Epstein was either assigned a
• 12:08
  new cell mate or monitored until that assignment occurred. The captain, however,
• 12:15
  was one of the recipients of the USMS August eighth
• 12:18
  email that notified members of mcc New York supervisory staff
• 12:23
  of inmate three transfer to another facility. The warden and
• 12:27
  associate warden did not receive this email. The warden told
• 12:31
  the OIG that he was off duty on August ninth,
• 12:34
  twenty nineteen. The warden said that in the event Epstein
• 12:38
  was without a cell mate, the plan was to review
• 12:41
  the situation and decide who should replace Inmate three, but
• 12:45
  that no inmate in the shoe was pre selected to
• 12:48
  replace in May three if this event occurred. All right,
• 12:52
  So we're going to wrap up this episode right here,
• 12:55
  and then in the next episode, we're going to pick
• 12:57
  up where we left off, and that's going to be
• 13:00
  with Section two evening watchstaff actions on August ninth. All
• 13:06
  of the information that goes with the episode can be
• 13:08
  found in the description box.