Latest / The PhilStockWorld Investing Podcast / 💥 The AI Bubble, Wealth, and Consumer Collapse: 2025

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💥 The AI Bubble, Wealth, and Consumer Collapse: 2025 · The PhilStockWorld Investing Podcast

• 0:00
  Penny: Welcome to the deep dive. Today, we're trying to cut through all the market noise, looking at a really detailed set of sources. Basically, a timeline tracking the financial story of 2025. Specifically, we're digging into the analysis from philstockworld.com or PSW. They track these two, well, almost catastrophic economic forces taking shape last year.
• 0:19
  Roy: Yeah. The these sources, they give us a kind of road map, right, to understand something pretty complex. What the PSW team saw happening in real time was this huge split in the economy. You had this AI market boom, this massive concentration of wealth, but it was basically hiding a, a deep systemic problem underneath. The foundation, the average consumer was collapsing.
• 0:41
  Penny: Right. So we're going beyond just, oh, is this a market correction? We're looking at, you know, a potential systemic risk scenario here. The plan is to unpack the specific warnings Phil and his team were putting out things like extreme market concentration, these circular financing schemes, they famously called the great tech circle jerk, and this mountain of consumer debt. Predictions that, looking back from late twenty twenty five, seem scarily accurate.
• 1:03
  Roy: Exactly. And if you've been wondering, you know, how can the market be hitting record highs while for maybe half the country it feels like we're grinding through a recession? Well, this deep dive should shed some light. We're really looking at the dangerous meeting point of two big leverage threats. These inflated valuations and the heavy concentration in the magnificent seven, the M7 stocks.
• 1:26
  And then underneath that, this severely weakened and debt laden foundation of the American household.
• 1:32
  Penny: And just before we jump in, it's worth pointing out where this foresight came from. This timeline we're using, it's a perfect example of the kind of deep financial insights you can find over at philstockworld.com. Mhmm. They're a top site for stock and options trading. Their founder, Phil Davis, he's actually recognized by Forbes as a key influencer in market analysis.
• 1:52
  It's really that mix of, you know, skepticism and just solid data analysis that let them connect the dots when maybe others weren't.
• 1:58
  Roy: It's more than just news. It's a place to learn, connect. They've trained hedge fund managers
• 2:02
  Penny: Mhmm.
• 2:03
  Roy: Use advanced AI. It's pretty unique.
• 2:05
  Penny: Okay. So let's tackle the market side first. We're starting back in early twenty twenty five. The alarm bells, they weren't just ringing about how fast things were going up, but the the price people were paying. It was just unsustainable.
• 2:18
  PSW's warning from 01/03/2025 laid it out pretty starkly. The Nasdaq at 40 times earnings, the S and P over 30 times.
• 2:27
  Roy: Yeah. And just to put that in perspective, right, historically, average PE for the S and P 500 is what? Closer to 16? Yeah. So when you're hitting 30 x, 40 x, the market isn't just pricing in growth, it's pricing in absolute perfection.
• 2:40
  And the stakes were huge because all this enthusiasm, it was almost entirely pinned on AI. We saw the numbers Big Tech was planning to spend this just astronomical figure, dollars $325,000,000,000 on AI development.
• 2:51
  Penny: $325,000,000,000 Wow!
• 2:53
  Roy: Yeah, I mean for some of these companies that's like two years worth of income. They were essentially betting the farm on future revenue streams that frankly hadn't shown up yet.
• 3:00
  Penny: And PSW's warning was, if that spending, that huge capital expenditure didn't actually lead to real commercially viable products, it wouldn't just be another bubble popping. It could be, quote, an economic mistake that makes the .com crash look like a pothole. That's a that's a pretty heavy statement.
• 3:20
  Roy: It is. Because that $325,000,000,000, it wasn't just going into r and d, you know, paying smart people. A huge chunk was physical infrastructure, building out data centers, buying jillions and billions of dollars worth of these advanced chips. They weren't just buying code. They were building the, like the industrial engine for AI.
• 3:38
  Penny: Okay.
• 3:39
  Roy: The problem is this massive upfront cost is being funded by stock prices that are already stretched thin. So you're creating this future debt obligation, this vulnerability, if the expected payoff, that exponential return doesn't happen on the timeline, everyone just assumes it will.
• 3:53
  Penny: But the core issue PSW kept highlighting as the timeline shows, wasn't just high prices generally, it was this intense focus, this concentration of value in just those seven companies, the magnificent seven.
• 4:04
  Roy: Precisely. That concentration really became the story of the 2025 market. By the January, the M7 made up a just a shocking 34% of the S and P five hundred's total value.
• 4:16
  Penny: 34% from just seven stocks.
• 4:19
  Roy: Right. And by March 12, Phil noted their combined value hit $12,300,000,000,000 That's when he called it an oligarchy. Yeah. Basically saying, look, this isn't really a market anymore in the broad sense. It doesn't function like one.
• 4:30
  Penny: Let me just push on that term oligarchy for a second. Isn't that just, you know, capitalism doing its thing? If these seven companies really are driving almost all the big innovation right now, AI, cloud, or shouldn't they be valued higher? What's the concrete proof this is broken besides just saying it's different from the past?
• 4:47
  Roy: Well, the evidence is in the market's lack of breadth, its narrowness, and a huge gap in earnings. It points to a structural fragility. Think about this, the year leading up, the M7 drove something like 86.7% of all the earnings growth in the S and P 500.
• 5:01
  Penny: 87% from just seven companies.
• 5:03
  Roy: Almost 90%. Then look at Q2 twenty twenty five. The M7 kept powering ahead 26% year over year earnings per share growth. Fantastic numbers. But the other four ninety three companies in the S and P?
• 5:17
  They collectively managed maybe 2% to 4%. That's not a gap, that's a chasm. A healthy market sees growth across the board. This was like, you know, seven negi yachts sailing on a sea that was otherwise pretty flat. When your whole market structure rests on so few pillars, if one of them stumbles, the whole thing gets shaky.
• 5:34
  Penny: And that risk isn't just abstract, it hits the average investor directly. If you're putting retirement money into common index funds like SPY for the S and P five hundred or QQQ for the Nasdaq, the PSW data showed you actually had 5233% of your money respectively tied up in those exact same seven stocks.
• 5:50
  Roy: Right. You think you're buying the market, getting diversification across 500 companies, but bam, you've actually concentrated your risk massively without even realizing it.
• 5:58
  Penny: That's a really crucial point for listeners, hidden concentration.
• 6:01
  Roy: Absolutely. You're way more exposed to the fortunes of just these few companies than you probably think. And historically, this level of concentration is just off the charts. Analysis from Osborne Partners confirmed it. By 2025, the top 10 S and P stocks made up nearly 40% of the index value.
• 6:18
  Penny: 40%. What was the peak back in 2000 during the tech bubble?
• 6:22
  Roy: It was about 26%. So we blew past that peak. We're in completely uncharted territory for market imbalance.
• 6:28
  Penny: And history usually isn't very kind when things get this top heavy, is it? The timeline pointed out that after the concentration peaks in 1980 and February, those biggest companies went on to underperform significantly for several years afterward. Money rotated out, looking for value elsewhere.
• 6:44
  Roy: Exactly. And we're seeing those same kinds of warning signs today in the valuation metrics. You look at something like the Russell one thousand Growth Index, heavily weighted towards these tech names, it's trading at a forward PE over 30X. But what's really telling is the relative price. That growth index is trading at an 83% premium compared to value stocks.
• 7:02
  Penny: 83% premium, so you're paying almost double for the expected earnings of a growth company compared to a stable value company.
• 7:09
  Roy: Pretty much. That huge gap suggests the market believes the future growth for these few AI focused companies is basically a sure thing justifying that massive premium. It almost exactly matches the premium we saw at the peak in 2021 and before that, it echoes that kind of manic pricing from the late 90s. The market is pricing these companies for absolute total perfection leaving zero room for error.
• 7:33
  Penny: Okay, so this extreme valuation, this concentration, it leads right into the next big structural issue PSW identified.
• 7:40
  Roy: Yeah.
• 7:40
  Penny: How this AI growth and the valuations tied to it were actually being generated. And this gets us to the origin of that that infamous PSW term, the great tech circle jerk.
• 7:49
  Roy: Yeah. It's a memorable term. And what's interesting is where it came from. Started with just a simple kind of skeptical observation from Phil on 07/31/2025. Mhmm.
• 7:59
  He basically asked, you know, it occurs to me all these tech companies are just giving money back and forth to each other. Somehow it doesn't seem real. If it's not real are the valuations. He had this gut feeling they were just using their huge cash piles to buy stuff from each other, making the revenue numbers look bigger than the actual underlying economic activity.
• 8:16
  Penny: That skepticism then led some analysis suggesting it was basically a kind of shell game. Right? The core finding was pretty explosive, that for every $1,000,000,000 in real new economic value, meaning money coming into the M seven system from outside, say from small business buying cloud services or actual consumers, it was somehow generating $4,000,000,000 of reported revenues across that interconnected M7 group through this circular spending. How does that math even work?
• 8:44
  Roy: Let's try to break it down simply. Imagine Company A is a chipmaker, like Nvidia. They get a huge $1,000,000,000 order from Company B, say a big cloud provider. Company A books $1,000,000,000 in revenue. Great.
• 8:56
  But then, maybe Company A turns around and agrees to pay Company B $200,000,000 for cloud services to run its own internal AI development. Now company B books $200,000,000 in revenue. Now let's say company B uses $100,000,000 of that money to buy some specialized AI software from company C, Maybe Company C is partially owned by or has a strategic partnership with Company A. See how the money moves. That initial $1,000,000,000 injected from outside has now resulted in $1,000,000,000 plus $200,000,000 plus $1,300,000,000 in reported revenue across these companies, even though the net new cash into the system was only $1,000,000,000.
• 9:33
  It creates these layers of recorded revenue that make the whole ecosystem look bigger and more profitable than it might be, justifying those sky high valuations for everyone involved.
• 9:40
  Penny: Right. Inflating the numbers through internal transactions. And that theory, that analysis, it got some pretty dramatic validation later in the year, didn't it? With those huge partnership deals announced in October 2025.
• 9:51
  Roy: Absolutely. The Nvidia and OpenAI deal was like the poster child for this. Nvidia, sitting there with a market cap north of $4,500,000,000,000 agrees to invest up to $100,000,000,000 into OpenAI, which itself was valued around $500,000,000,000 The money was specifically earmarked for building out massive new data centers. But here's the kicker. OpenAI, in turn, committed to buying millions of NVIDIA's chips to actually fill those data centers.
• 10:18
  Penny: So NVIDIA is literally funding its own biggest customer. That sounds exactly like vendor financing, just on a completely insane scale.
• 10:25
  Roy: It does. And critics jumped on it immediately, drawing direct lines back to the .com era, especially the telecom bubble around ninety nine-two thousand. Back then, you had equipment makers like Cisco or Lucent lending money to smaller telecom carriers so those carriers could afford to buy Cisco or Lucent gear.
• 10:41
  Penny: Right, I remember that. It didn't end well.
• 10:43
  Roy: No, it didn't. And people like James Anderson, a well known UK investor, called these sudden valuation jumps 'disconcerting' and specifically pointed to those telecom bubble parallels. When the telecom carriers inevitably went bust, the equipment makers got hit twice. They lost the loan repayments and their main customers. It caused a cascade.
• 11:04
  Penny: And the worry now is that the AI interdependence is maybe even more complex?
• 11:10
  Roy: Potentially, yeah. Cause not just one to one. Look at OpenAI, they struck deals not just with Nvidia, but also with Nvidia's rival, AMD. So they're hedging bets maybe, but also weaving this incredibly tangled financial web.
• 11:22
  Penny: And it keeps going, right? OpenAI also signed that massive $300,000,000,000 data center deal with Oracle.
• 11:28
  Roy: Right. And guess what Oracle needs to power those data centers? Billions of dollars worth of Nvidia chips. So the money just cycles right back to one of OpenAI's main backers. It stops looking like pure competition and starts looking like this engineered systemic interdependence.
• 11:40
  It feels less like 1999 tech and maybe more like the complex layered derivatives we saw before 02/2008.
• 11:46
  Penny: Which brings us straight to the profitability question. If this is all sustainable business, the margins should be good. But they weren't, were they? The timeline mentioned internal documents showing a crack in the facade with Oracle.
• 11:58
  Roy: Yeah, that was a big one. Despite Oracle generating $900,000,000 selling access to these NVIDIA powered servers for AI tasks, those internal docs showed their gross margin was only about 14¢ on the dollar.
• 12:12
  Penny: 14¢? That seems razor thin for this kind of high-tech, high growth area. What does that signal?
• 12:18
  Roy: It signals that the actual cost of building, powering, cooling, and maintaining these massive AI infrastructures might be way higher than people thought. If a company like Oracle, known for operational efficiency, can only squeeze a 14% gross margin out of renting the core hardware, it casts serious doubt on the long term profitability of that $325,000,000,000 Big Tech is pouring in. In. If you can't make good money on the basic infrastructure layer, the whole thing starts to look like a giant low margin utility that's servicing a huge pile of debt taken on to build it.
• 12:49
  Penny: And the core problem is still that unproven monetization down the line. Bain and Company had that projection right, needing $2,000,000,000,000 in annual AI related revenue by 2030 just to justify the spending levels. But the forecast showed revenue falling $800,000,000,000 short. That's a massive funding gap opening up just a few years away.
• 13:09
  Roy: It is and that gap really backs up the PSW perspective that this AI boom, at least currently, is more of a credit story than a proven revenue story. It's fueled by investment and borrowing based on future hopes. If you need one more piece of evidence, that MIT study cited in the sources found that 95% of companies trying out generative AI pilots were getting zero measurable returns so far.
• 13:31
  Penny: 95% seeing no return.
• 13:33
  Roy: Yeah, spending the money doing the pilots but the actual ROI, the productivity boost, just wasn't showing up yet. That's billions flowing out based on hype and hope, not hard results.
• 13:41
  Penny: Okay. So the market side looks shaky, leveraged, concentrated. But the piece that elevates this, the reason PSW argued it's a true systemic risk and not just another tech bubble, is what was happening underneath all that the foundation, the mass consumer economy, was crumbling.
• 13:58
  Roy: That s the absolute critical link. We have to shift focus now to the macro reality outside the M7 bubble. Phil was warning consistently that this AI boom wasn't lifting all boats. It was creating a stark two speed economy. The top 10% were doing great, driving almost all the growth while everyone else was falling behind or treading water.
• 14:17
  Penny: Back in February 2025, Phil made that pretty provocative statement. Never in the history of the planet Earth has income inequality been so pronounced as The United States in 2025. And he wasn't just talking feelings, he was pointing to the clear split in retail luxury goods flying off the shelves while mass market stores were really struggling.
• 14:37
  Roy: And the hard numbers backed him up completely. Moody's Analytics put out data showing that the top 10% of US households folks earning $250,000 a year or more were responsible for a record high 49.7% of all consumer spending.
• 14:50
  Penny: Almost half of all spending from just the top 10%.
• 14:54
  Roy: Basically, yeah. Think about that. US economic growth or GDP is becoming primarily dependent on the shopping habits of less than half of the wealthiest slice of the population.
• 15:03
  Penny: That feels inherently unstable. If that top 10% sneezes, the whole economy catches a cold.
• 15:09
  Roy: Precisely. And the spending divergence data really highlighted the strain. Between September 2023 and September 2024, that top 10%, they increased their spending by a hefty 12%. But spending by lower and middle income households actually went down during that same period. The bottom 90% were pulling back, contracting their economic footprint, while the top 10% were still spending aggressively.
• 15:32
  Penny: That creates a really dangerous dynamic, doesn't it? The market's growth depends on the top 10%, but ultimately, the wealth of that top 10% still relies on the other 90% having jobs, paying rent, buying basic goods and services. If the 90% are under stress, that eventually undermines the whole structure.
• 15:48
  Roy: Absolutely, it's a feedback loop waiting to happen. And the signs of that stress in the 90% were flashing red all through the PSW timeline. Consumer sentiment for instance plunged to what they called depression level lows. It hit 57 in March, then 58.2 in August. Those are numbers we previously only saw during the absolute depths of the two thousand and eight banking crisis fears or the very beginning of the pandemic lockdowns.
• 16:14
  That reflects deep, deep financial anxiety.
• 16:16
  Penny: And that anxiety was pushing people towards debt, right? Because incomes weren't keeping up with inflation, which the sources pegged at around 19% higher than pre pandemic levels overall.
• 16:26
  Roy: Exactly. For the vast majority, personal spending wasn't funded by wage growth, it was funded by borrowing. That's how we ended up with that staggering $1,210,000,000,000 in outstanding credit card debt. And consequently, S. Consumer delinquency rates, people falling behind on payments climbed to their highest levels since the Great Recession.
• 16:43
  Penny: Wow. $1,210,000,000,000 on credit cards. And the delinquency problem wasn't staying contained, was it? It started spreading. The timeline noted student loan delinquencies exploding past 10% by q two twenty twenty five.
• 16:56
  What's the significance of hitting 10% delinquency on student loans?
• 16:59
  Roy: It's a major warning sign. It means financial distress is moving beyond the most vulnerable and hitting the balance sheets of younger professionals. People who often form new households, buy cars, etc. High student loan defaults are often a leading indicator for trouble in auto loans and credit cards down the line. When those start to go bad, it directly impacts the health of banks, both regional and national.
• 17:20
  It's like watching a debt problem migrate from the edges towards the core of the financial system, very reminiscent of how the subprime mortgage issue started small before it metastasized.
• 17:28
  Penny: And you could see people changing their behavior too, trying to cope. The sources mentioned consumers feeling the pinch, eating out less, trading down from name brands to store brands, flocking to discount stores. Phil pointed to Dollar Tree warning about pressure on their profit margins back in May as a clear signal that quote, the bottom 80% of consumers are tapped out.
• 17:50
  Roy: Yeah. That Dollar Tree warning was like a canary in the coal mine for the mass market. And it led Phil to that broader conclusion, summing up the instability of the whole situation. We can't have sustainable capitalism where 80% of the population gets progressively poor while 20% gets progressively richer. You just can't build long term market growth, even for an AI oligarchy, on a consumer foundation that's steadily cracking under the weight of debt.
• 18:15
  It makes the whole fancy structure incredibly vulnerable to the first real shock.
• 18:19
  Penny: Okay, this really leads us to the crux of the PSW timeline's argument. Why did they insist the situation was more than just a normal market downturn? Why draw that direct and frankly quite scary comparison to the two thousand and eight financial crisis?
• 18:32
  Roy: The key difference is the concept of systemic risk. We're not just talking about one sector, like tech stocks, getting overvalued and correcting. Systemic risk is about the potential collapse of the entire financial system because of how interconnected and interdependent everything has become. It's that idea of 'too connected to fail' where the failure of one seemingly manageable part can trigger a domino effect, a cascade of failures throughout the whole structure, often in unpredictable ways.
• 19:00
  Penny: And PSW made that link explicit on October 6 saying the AI bubble is not like the .com bubble, This is like the February. And the justification was crucial because the financial plumbing underneath the AI boom relies on, quote, bullshit accounting practices, that's the circle jerk, and this extreme leveraged interdependence between the key players.
• 19:21
  Roy: That's the core insight exactly. Think back. The .com bubble was mostly about hype and companies with zero revenue being valued insanely high. When it burst, it mainly hit tech stocks and VC funds. Painful, yes, but relatively contained.
• 19:34
  2008 was different. It was about complex, opaque, interconnected financial engineering CDOs, credit default swaps, layers upon layers of debt nobody fully understood.
• 19:44
  Penny: Right.
• 19:45
  Roy: The argument PSW made is that this AI circular financing video propping OpenAI with investment. OpenAI committing to buy NVIDIA chips. OpenAI signing huge deals with Oracle. Oracle then buying NVIDIA chips creates precisely that same kind of complex, layered, dependent financial web. If one critical link in that chain breaks, maybe OpenAI can't monetize its tech as expected, or the cost of running these systems proves too high, the failure could cascade rapidly through all the interconnected players.
• 20:13
  It's demand fueled by investment, which is fueled by more investment, all leveraged up.
• 20:17
  Penny: It's the complexity and the sort of hidden liabilities that make the 2008 parallel resonate. Just like in 02/2007, nobody really knew the total exposure to mortgage backed securities hidden inside various financial products. Today, PSW argued, nobody really knows the true net external cash flow supporting that 12 plus trillion dollar m 7 valuation given how much seems to be just money sloshing around internally.
• 20:42
  Roy: Exactly. And while this potentially fragile structure was being built on the market side, the foundation underneath the consumer finally gave way. The timeline highlights that tipping point indicator on October 7. A really stark warning sign for the economy consumer credit growth basically flatlined. It fell to just $400,000,000 for the month, down from $18,000,000,000 the previous month.
• 21:05
  Penny: 400,000,000.0, that's effectively zero gross. It signals, as PSW put it, that consumers stopped new borrowing completely. The mass market basically hit its borrowing limit and slammed on the brakes. That kind of sudden stop in consumer credit expansion is historically a very powerful recession signal, isn't it?
• 21:20
  Roy: It absolutely is. And this ties straight back to the fragility in the market, even at the top. Moody's Chief Economist, Mark Zandi, issued a warning around that time saying the wealth effect, you know, people feeling richer because their stocks are up and spending more as a result, was at serious risk of reversing. Given the stretched valuations and all the economic policy uncertainty, Zandi said the risk of a major market correction was becoming uncomfortably high and rising.
• 21:46
  Penny: And why should an investor focus only on the magnificent Seven Care if the average consumer stops borrowing? Because if that wealth effect reverses, if stocks start to fall, then that top 10%, the very group that's been propping up almost half of all spending they're likely to pull back to, that hits luxury goods, travel, high end services, which then ripples through the real economy leading to layoffs for the other 90% making their situation even worse. It becomes that negative spiral Zandi was warning about.
• 22:14
  Roy: It absolutely does. You end up in a situation where the extreme market concentration actually amplifies the impact of the consumer collapse. If the M7 stocks stumble, it directly hurts the wealthy cohort currently driving GDP growth, which then further destabilizes the already stressed masses. The two speed bifurcated economy basically starts to eat itself.
• 22:34
  Penny: So, pulling together everything from this PSW timeline, what are the really big pressing uncertainties we're left facing? What are the key questions for the future?
• 22:42
  Roy: Well, based on these sources, I think there are three huge ones. First, and maybe most fundamental, is will all this massive spending, this $325,000,000,000 and counting, actually generate real, external, profitable returns? The source has brought up this growing concern about work slop, you know, AI churning out vast amounts of content that lack substance, accuracy, or real value. There are already reports suggesting this flood of low quality AI output might actually be costing companies millions in wasted time fixing errors' legal reviews. If AI just ends up generating noise, the whole economic premise collapses.
• 23:18
  Penny: Okay, so monetization is number one. What's the second big question?
• 23:21
  Roy: The second is about socialized costs. Phil raised this point sharply. Big tech seems to be privatizing the AI profits, concentrating the financial gains within those M7 stocks, while effectively socializing the costs onto consumers' electric bills. They're doing this through things like sweetheart deals for nuclear power to run data centers or placing massive data centers in locations that strain local power grids pushing up costs for everyone else. The question is, how long can that go on?
• 23:49
  How long can they push these huge infrastructure and energy burdens onto the public before regulators step in? Or political pressure forces a change, maybe demanding a different pricing structure or challenging that market concentration.
• 24:00
  Penny: Right. The hidden subsidies. And the third uncertainty?
• 24:03
  Roy: The third is simply gravity. Can a market this concentrated, financed largely by internal dealing and circular revenue flows, sitting atop a crumbling consumer base? Can it really defy financial gravity forever? The underlying mechanics we've discussed the debt, the overvaluation, the extreme interdependence, the weak foundation all suggest this structure is incredibly fragile. It seems highly vulnerable to any significant external shock, whether it's geopolitical, economic, or even just a major technology failing to deliver on its promises.
• 24:33
  Outrotrek
• 24:34
  Penny: So to quickly recap the journey through 2025 as mapped out by the PSW timeline, We saw a market becoming dangerously concentrated and structurally dependent on itself via this great tech circle jerk, all while the economic bedrock it supposedly rests on the average consumer was steadily dissolving under a mountain of debt and rising defaults.
• 24:53
  Roy: And this really highlights the value of seeking out independent, skeptical analysis like you find at Phil Stock World. The ability to look past the hype and connect these seemingly disparate dots mechanisms that's what gave them that kind of prophetic edge. Phil Davis and his team were calling out the bifurcation, the debt bomb, the circular financing long before it became mainstream chatter or fear.
• 25:19
  Penny: That depth of analysis really gives you, the listener, a different lens to view things through. We know from history, for instance, that when the top 10 stocks in the S and P 500 trade at an 80% or higher premium to value stocks, which is where we are now, value tends to outperform growth significantly by about 12% on average in the years that follow. So that leaves us with a pretty provocative final thought for you to chew on. Is 2025 going to be the year that breaks the historical mold, an exception where extreme growth premiums are justified indefinitely? Or are we just watching the slow, inevitable and likely painful return of financial gravity?
• 25:53
  Roy: And if you want to keep tabs on this kind of deep dive analysis, see what Phil Davis and the PSW team are predicting for the next chapter of this unfolding systemic risk story, we definitely encourage you to check out philstockworld.com. As we mentioned, they're a premier site for stock and options trading and their insights are recognized by major financial outlets like Forbes, Bloomberg, Fortune, and investing.com. They consistently offer that skeptical, data driven perspective.
• 26:20
  Penny: It's worth noting, they're not just looking at charts. PSW incorporates insights from some really advanced AI and AGI entities. You can even follow some of these discussions at their AGI roundtable, featuring entities like Quixote, supposedly the world's first AGI, and his sister Anya. It their commitment to using cutting edge tools to try and spot these market cracks early. Definitely worth exploring if you found today's discussion insightful.