Latest / Guide to Stoicism / 004 - Ethic Part A
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Section three of A Guide to Stoicism by Saint George
- 0:04Speaker 1: William Joseph Stock. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain.
- 0:09Speaker 1: Section three Ethic, Part A. We have already had to
- 0:16Speaker 1: touch upon the psychology of the Stoics in connection with
- 0:19Speaker 1: the first principles of logic. It is no less necessary
- 0:23Speaker 1: to do so now in dealing with the foundation of ethic.
- 0:27Speaker 1: The Stoics. We are told reckoned that there were eight
- 0:30Speaker 1: parts of the soul. These were the five senses, the
- 0:34Speaker 1: organ of sound, the intellect, and the reproductive principle. The passions,
- 0:39Speaker 1: it will be observed, are conspicuous by their absence. For
- 0:43Speaker 1: the Stoic theory was that the passions were simply the
- 0:46Speaker 1: intellect in a diseased state, owing to the perversions of falsehood.
- 0:52Speaker 1: This is why the Stoics would not parley with passion,
- 0:55Speaker 1: conceiving that if once it were let into the citadel
- 0:58Speaker 1: of the soul, it would supplant the right place full ruler.
- 1:01Speaker 1: Passion and reason were not two things which could be
- 1:04Speaker 1: kept separate, in which case it might be hoped that
- 1:07Speaker 1: reason would control passion. But were two states of the
- 1:10Speaker 1: same thing, a worse and a better. The unperturbed intellect
- 1:16Speaker 1: was the legitimate monarch in the kingdom of Man. Hence
- 1:19Speaker 1: the Stoics commonly spoke of it as the leading principle.
- 1:23Speaker 1: This was the part of the soul which received fantasies,
- 1:26Speaker 1: and it was also that in which impulses were generated,
- 1:30Speaker 1: with which we have now more particularly to do. Impulse
- 1:34Speaker 1: or appetition, was the principle in the soul which impelled
- 1:38Speaker 1: to action in an unperverted state. It was directed only
- 1:42Speaker 1: to things in accordance with nature. The negative form of
- 1:45Speaker 1: this principle, or the avoidance of things as being contrary
- 1:48Speaker 1: to nature, we shall call repulsion. Notwithstanding the sublime heights
- 1:54Speaker 1: to which Stoic morality rose, it was professedly based on
- 1:58Speaker 1: self love, wherein the Stoics were at one with the
- 2:01Speaker 1: other schools of thought. In the ancient world, the earliest
- 2:05Speaker 1: impulse that appeared in a newly born animal was to
- 2:08Speaker 1: protect itself and its own constitution, which were conciliated to
- 2:12Speaker 1: it by nature. What tended to its survival it sought.
- 2:16Speaker 1: What tended to its destruction it shunned. Thus, self preservation
- 2:21Speaker 1: was the first law of life. While man was still
- 2:24Speaker 1: in the merely animal stage, and before reason was developed
- 2:27Speaker 1: in him. The things that were in accordance with his
- 2:30Speaker 1: nature were such as health, strength, good bodily condition, soundness
- 2:34Speaker 1: of all the senses, beauty, swiftness, in short, all the
- 2:39Speaker 1: qualities that went to make up richness of physical life
- 2:43Speaker 1: and that contributed to the vital harmony. These were called
- 2:46Speaker 1: the first things in accordance with nature. Their opposites were
- 2:49Speaker 1: all contrary to nature, such as sickness, weakness, mutilation. Under
- 2:55Speaker 1: the first things in accordance with nature came also congenial
- 2:58Speaker 1: advantages of soul, such as quickness of intelligence, natural ability, industry, application, memory,
- 3:06Speaker 1: and the like. It was a question whether pleasure was
- 3:09Speaker 1: to be included among the number. Some members of the
- 3:12Speaker 1: school evidently thought that it might be, but the orthodox
- 3:15Speaker 1: opinion was that pleasure was a sort of after growth,
- 3:19Speaker 1: and that the direct pursuit of it was deleterious to
- 3:22Speaker 1: the organism. The after growths of virtue were joy, cheerfulness,
- 3:27Speaker 1: and the like. These were the gambolings of the spirit,
- 3:31Speaker 1: like the frolicsomeness of an animal in the full flush
- 3:33Speaker 1: of its vitality, or like the blooming of a plant.
- 3:38Speaker 1: For one and the same power manifested itself in all
- 3:41Speaker 1: ranks of nature, only at each stage on a higher
- 3:44Speaker 1: level to the vegetative powers of the plant, the animal
- 3:47Speaker 1: added sense and impulse. It was in accordance, therefore with
- 3:51Speaker 1: the nature of an animal to obey the impulses of sense,
- 3:54Speaker 1: but to sense and impulse. Man superadded reason, so that
- 3:59Speaker 1: when he became of himself as a rational being, it
- 4:02Speaker 1: was in accordance with his nature to let all his
- 4:05Speaker 1: impulses be shaped by this new and master hand. Virtue
- 4:09Speaker 1: was therefore pre eminently in accordance with nature. What then,
- 4:13Speaker 1: we must now ask, is the relation of reason to
- 4:16Speaker 1: impulse as conceived by the Stoics. Is reason simply the
- 4:20Speaker 1: guiding and impulse the motive power. Seneca protests against this
- 4:26Speaker 1: view when impulses identified with passion. One of his grounds
- 4:30Speaker 1: for doing so is that reason would be put on
- 4:32Speaker 1: a level with passion if the two were equally necessary
- 4:35Speaker 1: for action. But the question is begged by the use
- 4:38Speaker 1: of the word passion, which was defined by the Stoics
- 4:42Speaker 1: as an excessive impulse. Is it possible, then, even on
- 4:46Speaker 1: Stoic principles, for reason to work without something different from
- 4:49Speaker 1: itself to help it? Or must we say that reason
- 4:53Speaker 1: is itself a principle of action. Here Plutarch comes to
- 4:57Speaker 1: our aid, who tells us on the authority of crit
- 5:00Speaker 1: Ysippus in his work on Law, that impulse is the
- 5:03Speaker 1: reason of man commanding him to act, and similarly that
- 5:07Speaker 1: repulsion is prohibitive reason. This renders the Stoic position unmistakable,
- 5:14Speaker 1: and we must accommodate our minds to it in spite
- 5:17Speaker 1: of its difficulties. Just as we have seen already that
- 5:20Speaker 1: reason is not something radically different from sense, so now
- 5:24Speaker 1: it appears that reason is not different from impulse, but
- 5:27Speaker 1: itself the perfected form of impulse. Whenever impulse is not
- 5:32Speaker 1: identical with reason, at least an a rational being, it
- 5:36Speaker 1: is not truly impulse but passion. The Stoics, it will
- 5:40Speaker 1: be observed, were evolutionists in their psychology, but like many
- 5:44Speaker 1: evolutionists at the present day, they did not believe in
- 5:48Speaker 1: the origin of mind out of matter. In all living things,
- 5:51Speaker 1: there existed already what they called seminal reasons, which accounted
- 5:55Speaker 1: for the intelligence displayed by plants as well as by animals.
- 6:00Speaker 1: As there were four cardinal virtues, so there were four
- 6:03Speaker 1: primary passions. These were delight, grief, desire, and fear. All
- 6:09Speaker 1: of them were excited by the presence or the prospect
- 6:11Speaker 1: of fancied good or ill. What prompted desire by its
- 6:15Speaker 1: prospect caused delight by its presence, and what prompted fear
- 6:19Speaker 1: by its prospect caused grief by its presence. Thus, two
- 6:23Speaker 1: of the primary passions had to do with good and
- 6:27Speaker 1: two with evil. All were furies which infested the life
- 6:32Speaker 1: of fools, rendering it bitter and grievous to them, and
- 6:35Speaker 1: it was the business of philosophy to fight against them.
- 6:39Speaker 1: Nor was this strife a hopeless one, since the passions
- 6:41Speaker 1: were not grounded in nature, but were due to false opinion.
- 6:45Speaker 1: They originated in voluntary judgments and owed their birth to
- 6:49Speaker 1: a lack of mental sobriety. If men wished to live
- 6:53Speaker 1: the span of life that was allotted to them in
- 6:55Speaker 1: quietness and peace, they must, by all means keep clear
- 6:58Speaker 1: of the passions. The four primary passions having been formulated,
- 7:03Speaker 1: it became necessary to justify the division by arranging the
- 7:07Speaker 1: specific forms of feeling under these four heads. In this task,
- 7:11Speaker 1: the Stoics displayed a subtlety which is of more interest
- 7:14Speaker 1: to the lexicographer than to the student of philosophy. They
- 7:18Speaker 1: laid great stress on the derivation of words as affording
- 7:21Speaker 1: a clue to their meaning, and as their etymology was
- 7:24Speaker 1: bound by no principles, their ingenuity was free to indulge
- 7:28Speaker 1: in the wildest freaks of fancy. Though all passions stood
- 7:33Speaker 1: self condemned, they were nevertheless certain eupathies or happy affections
- 7:37Speaker 1: which would be experienced by the ideally good and wise man.
- 7:41Speaker 1: These were not perturbations of the soul, but rather constancies.
- 7:46Speaker 1: They were not opposed to reason, but were rather part
- 7:49Speaker 1: of reason. Though the Sage would never be transported with delight,
- 7:53Speaker 1: he would still feel an abiding joy in the presence
- 7:56Speaker 1: of the true and only good. He would never, indeed
- 7:58Speaker 1: be agitated by deay desire, but still he would be
- 8:01Speaker 1: animated by wish, for that was directed only to the good.
- 8:06Speaker 1: And though he would never feel fear, still he would
- 8:09Speaker 1: be actuated in danger by a proper caution. There was therefore,
- 8:14Speaker 1: something rational corresponding to three out of four primary passions.
- 8:19Speaker 1: Against delight was to be set joy against grief. There
- 8:23Speaker 1: was nothing to be set for that arose from the
- 8:25Speaker 1: presence of ill, which would rather never attached to the sage.
- 8:30Speaker 1: Grief was the irrational conviction that one ought to afflict
- 8:33Speaker 1: one's self where there was no occasion for it. The
- 8:36Speaker 1: ideal of the Stoics was the unclouded serenity of Socrates,
- 8:40Speaker 1: of whom Xantippe declared that he had always the same face,
- 8:45Speaker 1: whether on leaving the house in the morning or on
- 8:47Speaker 1: returning to it at night. As the motley crowd of
- 8:51Speaker 1: passions followed the banners of their four leaders, so specific
- 8:55Speaker 1: forms of feelings sanctioned by reason were severally assigned to
- 8:59Speaker 1: the three eupathies. Things were divided by Zeno into good, bad,
- 9:06Speaker 1: and indifferent. To good belonged virtue and what partook of virtue,
- 9:10Speaker 1: to bad, vice and what partook of vice. All other
- 9:14Speaker 1: things were indifferent to the third class then belonged such
- 9:18Speaker 1: things as life and death, health and sickness, pleasure and pain,
- 9:22Speaker 1: beauty and ugliness, strength and weakness, honor and dishonor, wealth
- 9:27Speaker 1: and poverty, victory and defeat, nobility, and baseness of birth.
- 9:33Speaker 1: Good was defined as that which benefits. To confer benefit
- 9:37Speaker 1: was no less essential to good than to impart warmth
- 9:40Speaker 1: was to heat. If one asked in what to benefit lay,
- 9:43Speaker 1: one received the reply that it lay in producing an
- 9:46Speaker 1: act or state in accordance with virtue, And similarly it
- 9:50Speaker 1: was laid down that to hurt lay in producing an
- 9:53Speaker 1: act or state in accordance with vice. The indifference of
- 9:58Speaker 1: things other than virtue and vice was apparent from the
- 10:01Speaker 1: definition of good, which made it essentially beneficial. Such things
- 10:05Speaker 1: as health and wealth might be beneficial or not according
- 10:08Speaker 1: to circumstances. They were therefore no more good than bad. Again,
- 10:13Speaker 1: nothing could be really good, of which the good or
- 10:16Speaker 1: ill depended on the use made of it. But this
- 10:19Speaker 1: was the case with things like health and wealth. The
- 10:23Speaker 1: true and only good, then, was identical with what the
- 10:25Speaker 1: Greeks called the beautiful and what we call the right.
- 10:30Speaker 1: To say that a thing was right was to say
- 10:33Speaker 1: that it was good, and conversely, to say that it
- 10:35Speaker 1: was good was to say that it was right. This
- 10:37Speaker 1: absolute identity between the good and the right, and on
- 10:41Speaker 1: the other hand, between the bad and wrong, was the
- 10:44Speaker 1: head in front of the stoic ethics. The right contained
- 10:48Speaker 1: in itself all that was necessary for the happy life.
- 10:51Speaker 1: The wrong was the only evil, and made men miserable,
- 10:54Speaker 1: whether they knew it or not. As virtue was itself,
- 10:59Speaker 1: the end was of course choice worthy in and for itself,
- 11:03Speaker 1: apart from hope or fear, with regard to its consequences. Moreover,
- 11:07Speaker 1: as being the highest good, it could admit of no
- 11:10Speaker 1: increase from the addition of things indifferent. It did not
- 11:13Speaker 1: even admit of increase from the prolongation of its own existence.
- 11:18Speaker 1: For the question was not one of quantity, but of quality.
- 11:21Speaker 1: Virtue for an eternity was no more virtue, and therefore
- 11:25Speaker 1: no more good than virtue for a moment. Even so,
- 11:29Speaker 1: one circle was no more round than another, whatever you
- 11:32Speaker 1: might choose to make its diameter, nor would it detract
- 11:36Speaker 1: from the perfection of a circle if it were to
- 11:38Speaker 1: be obliterated immediately in the same dust in which it
- 11:42Speaker 1: had been drawn. To say that the good of men
- 11:45Speaker 1: lay in virtue was another way of saying that it
- 11:47Speaker 1: lay in reason, since virtue was the perfection of reason,
- 11:51Speaker 1: as reason was the only thing whereby nature had distinguished
- 11:55Speaker 1: man from other creatures. To live the rational life was
- 11:58Speaker 1: to follow nature. Nature was at once the law of
- 12:02Speaker 1: God and the law for man. For by the nature
- 12:05Speaker 1: of anything was meant not that which we actually find
- 12:08Speaker 1: it to be, but that which, in the eternal fitness
- 12:11Speaker 1: of things. It was obviously intended to become. To be happy,
- 12:16Speaker 1: then was to be virtuous. To be virtuous was to
- 12:19Speaker 1: be rational. To be rational was to follow nature, and
- 12:22Speaker 1: to follow nature was to obey God. Virtue imparted to
- 12:26Speaker 1: life that even flow in which Zeno declared happiness to consist.
- 12:30Speaker 1: This was attained when one's own genius was in harmony
- 12:33Speaker 1: with the will that disposed of all things. Virtue, having
- 12:37Speaker 1: been purified from all the dross of the emotions, came
- 12:41Speaker 1: out as something purely intellectual, so that the Stoics agreed
- 12:44Speaker 1: with the Socratic conception that virtue is knowledge. They also
- 12:49Speaker 1: took on from Plato the four cardinal virtues of wisdom, temperance, courage,
- 12:54Speaker 1: and justice, and define them as so many branches of knowledge.
- 12:59Speaker 1: Against these were set four cardinal vices of folly, intemperance, cowardice,
- 13:04Speaker 1: and injustice. Under both the virtues and vices there was
- 13:08Speaker 1: an elaborate classification of specific qualities. But notwithstanding the care
- 13:13Speaker 1: with which the Stoics divided and subdivided the virtues, virtue,
- 13:17Speaker 1: according to their doctrine, was all the time one and indivisible,
- 13:21Speaker 1: For virtue was simply reason and reason if it were
- 13:24Speaker 1: there must control every department of conduct alike, he who
- 13:28Speaker 1: has one virtue as all was a paradox with which
- 13:32Speaker 1: the Greek thought was already familiar. But Chrysippus went beyond this,
- 13:36Speaker 1: declaring that he who displayed one virtue did thereby display all.
- 13:41Speaker 1: Neither was the man perfect who did not possess all
- 13:44Speaker 1: the virtues, nor was the act perfect, which did not
- 13:47Speaker 1: involve them all. Where the virtues differed from one another
- 13:51Speaker 1: was merely in the order in which they put things.
- 13:54Speaker 1: Each was primarily itself, secondarily all the rest. Wisdom had
- 13:59Speaker 1: to determine what was right to do, but this involved
- 14:03Speaker 1: the other virtues. Temperance had to impart stability to the impulses.
- 14:07Speaker 1: But how could the term temperate be applied to a
- 14:10Speaker 1: man who deserted his post through cowardice, or who failed
- 14:14Speaker 1: to return a deposit through avarice, which is a form
- 14:17Speaker 1: of injustice, or yet to one who misconducted affairs through rashness,
- 14:22Speaker 1: which falls under folly. Courage had to face dangers and difficulties,
- 14:26Speaker 1: but it was not courage unless its cause were just. Indeed,
- 14:30Speaker 1: one of the ways in which courage was defined was
- 14:32Speaker 1: a virtue fighting on behalf of justice. Similarly, justice put
- 14:38Speaker 1: first the assigning to each man his due, but in
- 14:41Speaker 1: the act of doing so, had to bring in the
- 14:43Speaker 1: other virtues. In short, it was the business of the
- 14:46Speaker 1: man of virtue to know and to do what ought
- 14:48Speaker 1: to be done. For what ought to be done implied
- 14:51Speaker 1: wisdom and choice, courage in endurance, justice in assignment, and
- 14:55Speaker 1: temperance in abiding by one's conviction. Virtue never acted by itself,
- 15:01Speaker 1: but always on the advice of a committee. The adverse
- 15:04Speaker 1: to this paradox, he who has one vice as all vices,
- 15:08Speaker 1: was a conclusion which the Stoics did not shrink from drawing.
- 15:11Speaker 1: One might lose part of one's Corinthian wear and still
- 15:14Speaker 1: retain the rest, but to lose one virtue. If virtue
- 15:18Speaker 1: could be lost, would be to lose all along with it.
- 15:22Speaker 1: We have now encountered the first paradox of Stoicism, and
- 15:26Speaker 1: can discern its origin in the identification of virtue with
- 15:29Speaker 1: pure reason. In getting forth the novelties. In Zeno's teaching,
- 15:34Speaker 1: Cicero mentions that while his predecessors had recognized virtues due
- 15:38Speaker 1: to nature and habit, he made all dependent upon reason.
- 15:43Speaker 1: A natural consequence of this was the reassertion of the
- 15:46Speaker 1: position which Plato held or wished to hold, namely, that
- 15:50Speaker 1: virtue can be taught, but the part played by nature
- 15:54Speaker 1: in virtue cannot be ignored. It was not in the
- 15:56Speaker 1: power of Zeno to alter facts. All he could do
- 15:59Speaker 1: was to legislate as to names, and this he did vigorously.
- 16:04Speaker 1: Nothing was to be called virtue which was not of
- 16:07Speaker 1: the nature of reason and knowledge. But still it had
- 16:09Speaker 1: to be admitted that nature supplied the starting points for
- 16:13Speaker 1: the four cardinal virtues, for the discovery of one's impulses,
- 16:17Speaker 1: for right endurances and harmonious distributions from things good and bad.
- 16:22Speaker 1: We now turn to things indifferent. Hitherto the Stoic doctrine
- 16:26Speaker 1: has been stern and uncompromising. We have now to look
- 16:30Speaker 1: at it under a different aspect, and to see how
- 16:32Speaker 1: it tried to conciliate common sense by things indifferent were
- 16:37Speaker 1: meant such as did not necessarily contribute to virtue, for instance, health, wealth, strength,
- 16:42Speaker 1: and honor. It is possible to have all these and
- 16:46Speaker 1: not be virtuous. It is possible also to be virtuous
- 16:49Speaker 1: without them. But we have now to learn that though
- 16:52Speaker 1: these things are neither good nor evil, and are therefore
- 16:55Speaker 1: not matter for choice or avoidance. They are far from
- 16:58Speaker 1: being indifferent in the sense of arising neither impulse nor repulsion.
- 17:03Speaker 1: There are things, indeed, that are indifferent in the latter sense,
- 17:06Speaker 1: such as whether you put out your finger this way
- 17:09Speaker 1: or that, whether you stoop to pick up a straw
- 17:11Speaker 1: or not, whether the number of hairs on your head
- 17:14Speaker 1: be odd or even. But things of this sort are exceptional.
- 17:18Speaker 1: The bulk of things other than virtue and vice do
- 17:20Speaker 1: arouse in us either impulse or repulsion. Let it be understood, then,
- 17:25Speaker 1: that there are two senses of the word indifferent, one
- 17:28Speaker 1: neither good nor bad, two neither awaking, impulse nor repulsion.
- 17:33Speaker 1: Among things indifferent in the former sense, some were in
- 17:36Speaker 1: accordance with nature, some were contrary to nature, and some
- 17:40Speaker 1: were neither one nor the other. Health, strengths and soundness
- 17:44Speaker 1: of the senses were in accordance with nature. Sickness, weakness,
- 17:48Speaker 1: and mutilation were contrary to nature. But such things as
- 17:52Speaker 1: the fallibility of the soul and the vulnerability of the
- 17:55Speaker 1: body were neither in accordance with nature, nor yet contrary
- 17:59Speaker 1: to nature, but just nature. All things that were in
- 18:03Speaker 1: accordance with nature had value, and all things that were
- 18:06Speaker 1: contrary to nature, had what we must call disvalue in
- 18:10Speaker 1: the highest sense indeed of the term value, namely that
- 18:13Speaker 1: of absolute value or worth. Things indifferent did not possess
- 18:17Speaker 1: any value at all, but still there might be assigned
- 18:21Speaker 1: to them what antipater expressed by the terms selective value,
- 18:25Speaker 1: or what he expressed by its barbarous privative a dysselective disvalue.
- 18:31Speaker 1: If a thing possessed a selective value, you took that
- 18:34Speaker 1: thing rather than its contrary, supposing that circumstances allowed, for instance,
- 18:39Speaker 1: health rather than sickness, wealth rather than poverty, life rather
- 18:42Speaker 1: than death. Hence such things were called takeable, and their
- 18:47Speaker 1: contraries untakable. Things that possessed a high degree of value
- 18:51Speaker 1: were called preferred, Those that possessed a high degree of
- 18:54Speaker 1: disvalue were called rejected. Such as possessed no considerable degree
- 18:59Speaker 1: of either were neither preferred nor rejected. Zeno, with whom
- 19:04Speaker 1: these names originated, justified their use about things really indifferent
- 19:09Speaker 1: on the ground that at court, preferment could not be
- 19:12Speaker 1: bestowed upon the king himself, but only on his ministers.
- 19:17Speaker 1: Things preferred and rejected might belong to mind, body, or estate.
- 19:21Speaker 1: Among things preferred. In the case of the mind were natural, ability, art,
- 19:25Speaker 1: moral progress, and the like, while their contraries were rejected.
- 19:30Speaker 1: In the case of the body, life, health, strength, good condition, completeness,
- 19:35Speaker 1: and beauty were preferred, while death, sickness, weakness, ill condition, mutilation,
- 19:40Speaker 1: and ugliness were rejected. Among things external to soul and body, wealth, reputation,
- 19:47Speaker 1: and nobility were preferred, while poverty, ill repute, and baseness
- 19:52Speaker 1: of birth were rejected. In this way, all mundane and
- 19:56Speaker 1: marketable goods, after having been solemnly refused admit by the
- 20:00Speaker 1: stoics at the front door, were smuggled in that a
- 20:03Speaker 1: kind of tradesmen's entrance, under the name of things indifferent.
- 20:07Speaker 1: We must now see how they had as it were
- 20:09Speaker 1: two moral codes, one for the sage and the other
- 20:12Speaker 1: for the world in general. The sage alone could act rightly,
- 20:17Speaker 1: but other people might perform the proprieties. Anyone might honor
- 20:22Speaker 1: his parents. But the sage alone did it as the
- 20:24Speaker 1: outcome of wisdom, because he alone possessed the art of life,
- 20:28Speaker 1: the peculiar work of which was to do everything that
- 20:30Speaker 1: was done as the result of the best disposition. All
- 20:35Speaker 1: the acts of the sage were perfect proprieties, which were
- 20:39Speaker 1: called rightnesses. All acts of all other men were sins
- 20:43Speaker 1: or wrongnesses. At their best, they could only be intermediate proprieties.
- 20:49Speaker 1: The term propriety, then is a generic one, but as
- 20:53Speaker 1: often happens, the generic term got determined in use to
- 20:56Speaker 1: a specific meaning, so that intermediate acts are commonly spoken
- 21:00Speaker 1: of as proprieties in opposition to rightnesses. Instances of rightnesses
- 21:06Speaker 1: are displaying wisdom and dealing justly. Instances of proprieties or
- 21:11Speaker 1: intermediate acts are marrying. Going on an embassy and dialectic,
- 21:16Speaker 1: the word duty is often employed to translate the Greek
- 21:19Speaker 1: term which we are rendering by propriety. Any translation is
- 21:23Speaker 1: no more than a choice of evils, since we have
- 21:26Speaker 1: no real equivalent for the term. It was applicable not
- 21:30Speaker 1: merely to human conduct, but also to the acting of
- 21:33Speaker 1: the lower animals, and even to the growth of plants. Now,
- 21:37Speaker 1: apart from a craze of generalization, we should hardly think
- 21:41Speaker 1: of the stern daughter of the voice of God in
- 21:43Speaker 1: connection with an amiba corresponding successfully to stimulus. Yet the creature,
- 21:49Speaker 1: in its incoate way, is exhibiting a dim analogy to duty.
- 21:54Speaker 1: The term in question was first used by Zeno and
- 21:57Speaker 1: was explained by him, in accordance with its etymology, to
- 22:00Speaker 1: mean what it came to one to do, so that
- 22:03Speaker 1: as far as this goes, becomingness would be the most
- 22:07Speaker 1: appropriate translation. End of Section three