Latest / Beyond The Horizon / Mega Edition: The OIG Report Into The Death And Circumstances Of Epstein's Death (Part 8) (6/14/26)
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: One and welcome back to the program. In this episode,
- 0:04we're going to continue taking a look at the OIG
- 0:07report into the circumstances surrounding the death of Jeffrey Epstein.
- 0:14Section A. Mcc new York staff failed to ensure that
- 0:20Epstein had a cell mate on August ninth, as instructed
- 0:24by the Psychology Department on July thirtieth. On July thirtieth,
- 0:29twenty nineteen, the mcc new York Psychology Department sent an
- 0:34email to over seventy BOP staff members stating that Epstein
- 0:39needs to be housed with an appropriate cell mate. The
- 0:42psychology departments directive that Epstein have an appropriate cell mate
- 0:47arose out of the events that occurred on July twenty third,
- 0:51twenty nineteen, when Epstein was found lying on the floor
- 0:55of his cell with a piece of orange cloth around
- 0:58his neck. Epstein. At the time, Inmate one told mcc
- 1:03new York staff that Epstein had tried to hang himself
- 1:06and another inmate housed on the same shoe tier at
- 1:09the same time, Inmate two, corroborated several aspects of inmate
- 1:14one's account. Epstein's account of what had occurred varied. Epstein
- 1:19initially told mcc new York staff that he thought his
- 1:23cellmate had tried to kill him, but thereafter he repeatedly
- 1:28said he did not know what had occurred. Epstein later
- 1:32asked two different mcc new York staff members if he
- 1:35could be housed with the same cell mate Epstein initially
- 1:38accused of having tried to harm him. As a result
- 1:42of this incident, Epstein was placed on suicide watch and
- 1:46then psychological observation consistent with the psychology departments directive. The
- 1:51Captain and the Shoe Lieutenant each told the OIG that
- 1:55they verbally informed Shoe staff of Epstein's cellmate requirement. These
- 2:00and other witnesses said staff members regularly assigned to the
- 2:05Shoe knew that Epstein needed to have a cell mate. However,
- 2:09despite the Psychology departments widely disseminated July thirtieth email instruction
- 2:15and the subsequent verbal direction provided by the Captain and
- 2:19the Shoe Lieutenant, Epstein was left without a cell mate.
- 2:22On August ninth, less than twenty four hours later, Epstein
- 2:26died by suicide. One. Failure to make required notifications regarding
- 2:33the need to assign Epstein a cell mate, the OIG's
- 2:38investigation and review revealed that on August ninth, twenty nineteen,
- 2:43mcc new York staff assigned to the Shoe failed to
- 2:47notify their superiors that Epstein's cell mate in May three
- 2:51had been transferred out of mcc new York and therefore
- 2:54Epstein needed to be assigned a new cell mate. The
- 2:58failure to make these require notifications and the supervisor's failure
- 3:02to properly supervise the Shoe staff discussed further below, resulted
- 3:07in Epstein being housed without a cellmate at the time
- 3:11of his death, which was contrary to the Psychology Departments
- 3:15directive issued just ten days earlier. BOP standards of conduct
- 3:21require that employees obey the orders of their superiors at
- 3:25all times. Mcc new York post orders for the Shoe require,
- 3:30among other things, that all Shoe officers maintain a log
- 3:34of pertinent information regarding inmate activity, detailing time, persons involved,
- 3:40if pertinent, and the event which must be logged into truscope. Importantly,
- 3:46the Shoe post orders clarify that they are not intended
- 3:50to describe in detail all of the officer's responsibilities. Good
- 3:54judgment and common sense are expected in all situations not
- 3:59covered in these post orders. On August ninth, the day
- 4:03Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, the Evening Watch Shoe Officer
- 4:07in Charge, and CO. Tobnoel were each assigned to the
- 4:11MCC New York Shoe as their permanent quarterly assigned post
- 4:16and served as the Shoe Officer in charge during their
- 4:19respective shifts. The OIG investigation found that of these employees
- 4:25knew that Epstein was required to have a cellmate at
- 4:28all times per the Psychology Departments directive. The OIG further
- 4:34found on August ninth, the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge,
- 4:38the Evening Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, and Noel each
- 4:42became aware at various times during their respective shifts that
- 4:46Epstein's cellmate in May three had been transferred from the
- 4:50institution with all of his belongings, a status known to
- 4:54all MCC New York staff members is meaning the inmate
- 4:58was being permanently trans Txford out of the institution. Specifically,
- 5:03the OIG investigation found that on the morning of August ninth,
- 5:07the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge NC one, who
- 5:11was also assigned to the Shoe Review the MCC New
- 5:14York Daily call Out List, a document that identifies all
- 5:19inmates who were leaving their house units each day, which
- 5:22listed in May three as being scheduled to depart mcc
- 5:26New York with all of his belongings. At approximately eight
- 5:30thirty am, CO one escorted Inmate three from the Shoe
- 5:35two receiving and discharge to be transferred out of the institution,
- 5:40and the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge escort at
- 5:43Ebstein from the Shoe to the Attorney Conference Room for
- 5:47his daily meeting with his attorneys. During this escort, the
- 5:52day watch Shoe Officer in Charge and CO one discussed
- 5:55the need to assign Epstein with a new cellmate due
- 5:59to Inmate three's trans The day watch Shoe Officer in
- 6:02Charge told the OIG and stated in a memorandum that
- 6:06he prepared following Epstein's death, that he notified his relief
- 6:11the evening watch Shoe Officer in charge of the need
- 6:14to assign Epstein a new cellmate, and that he likely
- 6:18notified an unspecified lieutenant. However, the OIG did not credit
- 6:24the day Watch Shoe Officer in charge his account because
- 6:27no other witnesses or evidence confirmed that he had in
- 6:31fact passed on information regarding Epstein's need for a new cellmate,
- 6:36either to a supervisor or to his relief. The OIG
- 6:40investigation also found that during the next shift in the
- 6:44mcc New York Shoe, both the evening watch Shoe officer
- 6:48in charge and Noel became aware that Epstein was without
- 6:52a cell mate. The evening watch Shoe officer in charge
- 6:55told the OIG that when he escorted Epstein back to
- 6:59his cell after Epstein's telephone call, he saw that in
- 7:03May three was not there, and then he, Noel, and
- 7:07the material handler discussed the need for Epstein to have
- 7:10a new cellmate. The evening watch Shoe officer in charge
- 7:14also told the OIG that he notified an unspecified supervisor. However,
- 7:20other witnesses did not corroborate his account. Noel told the
- 7:25OIG that she was unaware of both that Epstein needed
- 7:29to have a cell mate and that Inmate three had
- 7:31been removed from the institution. Noel told the OIG that
- 7:36she went to Ebstein's cell at approximately ten PM, a
- 7:40time of day when all inmates were secured in their cells,
- 7:44and may have plugged in Epstein's medical device forum. The
- 7:49OIG did not credit Noel's statements that she did not
- 7:53know that Epstein needed a cell mat or that in
- 7:56May three had been removed from the shoe based on
- 7:59contradictory witness statements, including her own regarding shoe STAPs, knowledge
- 8:04of Epstein's cellmate requirements, and Inmate three's transfer out of
- 8:09the shoe, The OIG investigation concluded that on August ninth,
- 8:14twenty nineteen, the day Watch Shoe Officer in charge, the
- 8:18Evening Watch Shoe officer in charge, and no well Feld
- 8:22to notify a supervisor as required after Epstein's cellmate was
- 8:27permanently removed from the MCC new York Shoe, which constituted
- 8:32in a violation of BOP standards of conduct. Additionally, they're
- 8:38in action violated mcc new York Shoe post orders because
- 8:42none of these individuals documented the fact that Epstein needed
- 8:46a new cell mate as required. Finally, all of these
- 8:50officers failed to exercise good judgment and common sense as
- 8:55required by the shoe post orders by not immediately undertaking
- 8:59steps through their chain of command to ensure that a
- 9:02high profile inmate who had been released from Suicide Watch
- 9:06and Psychological Observation ten days earlier had an appropriate cell mate.
- 9:12Section two failure to adequately supervise Shoe's staff. The OIG
- 9:18also found that mcc new York's supervisory personnel failed to
- 9:23effectively perform their duties, which contributed to the fact that
- 9:27Epstein was housed without a cellmate at the time of
- 9:30his death. Rather than passively relying on a notification from subordinates.
- 9:36Supervisory personnel also had an obligation under federal regulations to
- 9:41put forth honest effort in the performance of their duties,
- 9:45which included supervision of SHOE personnel. The OIG's investigation revealed
- 9:52that the Captain and the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the
- 9:55day Watch Activities Lieutenant, the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, in
- 10:00the Morning's Watch Operations Lieutenant, among other mcc new York staff,
- 10:06received an email from the US Marshall Service USMS on
- 10:10August eighth, twenty nineteen, notifying them that inmate three was
- 10:15scheduled to be transferred to another facility the following day.
- 10:20If any of these supervisors had read the email attachment,
- 10:24they would have known of the need to assign Epstein
- 10:27a new cellmate. Instead, many of these individuals told the
- 10:31OIG that they believed that Inmate three had gone to
- 10:35court on August ninth, and they were unaware that he
- 10:38would not return and Epstein needed a new cell mate.
- 10:42The Shoe lieutenant shift on August eighth ended over in
- 10:45an hour before the USMS sent the email notification, and
- 10:50he was not working on August ninth. In his absence,
- 10:53the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the day Watch Activities Lieutenant,
- 10:58the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, and the Morning Watch Operations
- 11:02Lieutenant had oversight of the Shoe during their respective shifts,
- 11:07and the Captain had oversight over all of the lieutenants.
- 11:12The OIG found that the failure of these individuals to
- 11:15adequately supervise Shoe staff and ensure that a high profile
- 11:19inmate who had recently been on suicide watch and psychological
- 11:24observation had an appropriate cellmate constituted a job performance failure
- 11:31Part three failure to have a contingency plan for the
- 11:34assigning of Epstein a cellmate. Additionally, the OIG found that
- 11:40the warden's failure to have a backup cell mate assignment
- 11:43for Epstein constituted poor judgment. The evening Watch Shoe Officer
- 11:49in charge told the OIG that although he knew that
- 11:52Epstein needed to be assigned another cell mate, SHOE staff
- 11:56coundnot just put anyone in the cell with Epstein the war,
- 12:00and confirmed this in his OIG interview when he explained
- 12:04that he and BP executive leadership selected inmate three as
- 12:09Epstein cellmate following the events of July twenty three, twenty nineteen.
- 12:14The Warden told the OIG that no inmates were pre
- 12:18vetted to serve as Epstein cellmate if Inmate three left
- 12:22mcc New York. The Northeast Regional Director, the Warden, and
- 12:27the Captain all told the OIG that if Inmate three
- 12:30had been removed as Epstein's cellmate, they would have had
- 12:34to review a new list of potential cellmate candidates to
- 12:38ensure that Epstein was housed with an appropriate inmate. This
- 12:42selection process, which involved the multiple steps undertaken by high
- 12:47level BOP management, would be difficult to accomplish in short
- 12:51periods of time and ultimately may have impeded Shoe Officer's
- 12:55ability to house Epstein with a cellmate on August ninth, nineteen.
- 13:01Section four lack of candor BOP policy requires that during
- 13:06the course of an official investigation employees are to cooperate
- 13:10fully by providing all pertinent information that they might have.
- 13:15Full cooperation requires truthfully responding to questions. As discussed above,
- 13:21The day watch Shoe Officer in charge and the Evening
- 13:24Watch Shoe Officer in charge told the OIG that they
- 13:28notified supervisory personnel regarding the need to assign Epstein a
- 13:33new cellmate. Based on a lack of corroborating evidence for
- 13:37these assertions, the OIG found that they lacked candor in
- 13:41their OIG interviews in violation of BOP policy. Similarly, the
- 13:47OIG found that Noel lacked candor in violation of BOP
- 13:52policy when she said she did not know that Epstein
- 13:55needed a cellmate or that his then cellmate in May
- 13:59three had been transferred out of SHU. The OIG also
- 14:04found that the Morning Watch Operations lieutenant lacked candor in
- 14:08her interview with the OIG and violation of BOP policy
- 14:12when she said she was not aware that Epstein was
- 14:16required to be housed with the cellmate. Her statement is
- 14:20contradicted by the fact that she was one of the
- 14:22mcc New York staff members who responded to the July
- 14:27twenty third, twenty nineteen incident involving Epstein, which resulted in
- 14:32him being placed on suicide watch and psychological observation. She
- 14:37was a recipient of the psychology departments July thirtieth, twenty
- 14:42nineteen email identifying the cellmate requirement and the statements of
- 14:47multiple witnesses who told the OIG that Epstein's cellmate requirement
- 14:52was widely disseminated verbally by mcc new York leadership. All right, folks,
- 14:58we're gonna end this one here, and then in the
- 15:00next episode we're going to be taking a look at
- 15:03Part B. Mcc new York staff failed to conduct mandatory
- 15:08rounds and inmate counts, resulting in Epstein being unobserved for
- 15:12hours before his death. All of the information that goes
- 15:17with the episode can be found in the description box. Well, well, welcome,
- 15:22what's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
- 15:27In this episode, we're going to pick back up with
- 15:29the OIG report, and to do that, we're going to
- 15:32look at Part B of chapter seven. So let's dive
- 15:37right back. In Part B, mcc new York staff failed
- 15:43to conduct mandatory rounds and inmate counts, resulting in Epstein
- 15:47being unobserved for hours before his death. The OIG's investigation
- 15:53and review revealed that on August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen,
- 15:57mcc new York Shoe staff didn't not conduct the mandatory
- 16:01rounds and inmate counts during their shift in the shoe.
- 16:05The failure to undertake these required measures to account for
- 16:09inmate whereabouts and well being, and the supervisor's failure to
- 16:14properly supervise the shoe staff as discussed further below, resulted
- 16:19in Epstein being unobserved for hours before his death, which
- 16:23compounded the failure of mcc new York staff to ensure
- 16:27that Epstein had an appropriate cellmate one failure to conduct
- 16:33rounds and inmate counts in the shoe. Federal regulations require
- 16:39that employees use official time in an honest effort to
- 16:42perform official duties. Additionally, BOP standards of conduct required that
- 16:48employees conduct themselves in a manner that foster's respect for
- 16:53the Bureau of Prisons, the Department of Justice, and the
- 16:56US government, because in attention to duty intercorrectional environment can
- 17:01result in escapes, assaults, and other incidents. BOP standards of
- 17:06conduct also require employees to remain fully alert and attentive
- 17:11during duty hours. BOP policy also requires continuous inmate accountability,
- 17:18which is accomplished through rounds and inmate counts. Among other things,
- 17:24Rounds and inmate counts enable staff to observe inmates and
- 17:27ensure that they are safe and secure in their cells
- 17:31and are in good health. BOP policy and mcc new
- 17:35York Shoe post orders set out the requirements for these
- 17:39inmate accountability measures, specifying that correctional staff must conduct rounds
- 17:44on an irregular schedule at least twice each hour, no
- 17:48more than forty minutes apart. BOP policy and mcc new
- 17:53York Shoe post orders further specify that at least two
- 17:57mcc New York Shoe staff members must get conduct inmate
- 18:00counts at twelve am, three am, five am, four pm,
- 18:05and ten pm daily, and also at ten am on
- 18:08weekends and federal holidays. The OIG's investigation and review revealed
- 18:14that an inmate in May four was internally transferred from
- 18:18the Shoe to receiving in discharge at approximately three fifteen
- 18:22pm on August ninth, twenty nineteen. However, this inmate transfer
- 18:28was not documented until approximately twelve thirty five am on
- 18:32August tenth, twenty nineteen. Based on this internal transfer, BOP
- 18:37records and witness statements, the OIG determined that the four
- 18:41PM and ten PM shoe inmate counts on August ninth
- 18:45were aerinis. In addition, the OIG reviewed the available shoe
- 18:51security camera video, which did not show CEOs walking up
- 18:54or down the stairs leading to the various shoe tiers
- 18:59during the count time, a process that is necessary to
- 19:02conduct an accurate count of inmates. During their OIG interviews,
- 19:07the evening Watt shoe officer in charge, the material handler
- 19:11co Toven Noel, and material handler Michael Thomas each admitted
- 19:16that they did not conduct all of the mandatory rounds
- 19:20and inmate counts in the shoe on the evening of
- 19:23August ninth, and in the morning of August tenth. Noel
- 19:27told the OIG that she conducted the ten PM count
- 19:30on August ninth. The OIG did not credit her statement
- 19:34based on one its review of the shoe security camera video,
- 19:38which reflects Noel walking up and down the stairs leading
- 19:42to some but not all of the tears. Several minutes
- 19:45after the shoe inmate count, had been called into the
- 19:48control center. Two the ten pm councilate, which erroneousley included
- 19:53the Shoe inmate four who had been internally transferred to
- 19:56receiving and delivery, three other Bopie records, and four the
- 20:01material Handler's statements to the OIG that no one conducted
- 20:06the ten pm count because everyone was tired, instead of
- 20:10performing the required duties to account for inmate whereabouts and
- 20:14well being. The OIG found that officers assigned to the
- 20:17Shoe on August ninth and tenth, including the material handler,
- 20:21Noel and Thomas, primarily remained seated in the shoe officer's station,
- 20:26sometimes without moving for a period of time, suggesting that
- 20:30they were asleep, and conducted a variety of Internet searches
- 20:34on mcc New York computers. Thomas also admitted to the
- 20:38OIG that he dozed off for periods of time during
- 20:41his shift. The OIG's analysis of the Shoe security camera
- 20:46video revealed that after approximately ten forty pm, no coeo
- 20:51entered Epstein's tier in the Shoe until just before six
- 20:55thirty am, when Noel and Thomas began to serve breakfast
- 20:59to the inmates. The OIG Investigation and Review concluded that
- 21:04the Evening watch Shoe Officer in charge, the material Handler
- 21:07Noel and Thomas failed to conduct the mandatory rounds and
- 21:11inmate counts during their respective shifts in the mcc New
- 21:16York Shoe on August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen, and
- 21:20that their actions constituted violations of five CFR Section two
- 21:26six three five dot one zero one B five and
- 21:30two six three five dot seven zero five A, BOP
- 21:34Program Statements thirty four to twenty dot eleven and fifty
- 21:38five hundred dot fourteen, and mcc New York Shoe post
- 21:42Orders Section two, false statements and lack of candor. The
- 21:47OIG's investigation and review found that on August ninth and tenth,
- 21:51twenty nineteen, the Evening watch Shoe Officer in charge, the
- 21:55material Handler Noel and Thomas made false statements when they
- 22:00falsified BOP records by attesting that they had completed the
- 22:04mandatory rounds and inmate counts when in fact they had not.
- 22:08Federal law provides that whoever in any matter within the
- 22:12jurisdiction of the Executive Branch of the Government of the
- 22:16United States, knowingly and willfully makes or uses any false
- 22:21writing or document, knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious,
- 22:27or fraudilent statement or entry has violated eighteen US Code
- 22:33one zero zero, one A and three. As discussed above,
- 22:38the OIG found that the Evening Watch Shoe officer in
- 22:41charge the material handler Noel and Thomas, failed to conduct
- 22:45all of the mandatory rounds and inmate counts as part
- 22:50of each institutional inmate count BOP policy and mcc new
- 22:54York Shoe post orders required two CEOs to conduct each
- 22:58count and memorial the number of inmates in the shoe
- 23:02on an official mcc New York forum often called the
- 23:06count slip. On the count slip, both CEOs are required
- 23:10to fill in the date and time the count had
- 23:13been performed, write the total number of inmates physically present
- 23:17in the unit counted, and then sign the count slip.
- 23:20Once the CEOs complete and sign the count slips, the
- 23:24count slips are then collected and delivered to the mcc
- 23:27New York Control Center. Officers assigned to the control Center
- 23:31are responsible for comparing the count slips from each housing
- 23:35unit to the institution's overall inmate count. Cheet to ensure
- 23:40that each inmate was accounted for. Now, Yeah, after all
- 23:44the count slips have been collected from each housing unit
- 23:47and the numbers on the count slips had been matched
- 23:49to the institution's overall count sheet, could the institutional count
- 23:54be deemed cleared or completed? The evening watch shoe officer
- 23:58in charge the material reel handler, Noel and Thomas each
- 24:02prepared and or signed a false count slip to create
- 24:05the impression that they had fulfilled their inmate accountability responsibilities,
- 24:10when in fact they had not. These individuals admitted to
- 24:15the OIG that instead of performing their assigned duties, they
- 24:19pre filled the count slips with a number of inmates
- 24:22they believed were in the shoe based on what officers
- 24:25from the previous shift had told them, and signed off
- 24:28on the documents knowing that they were falsely attested to
- 24:31having completed the counts. Additionally, Noel admitted to the OIG
- 24:36that she had pre filled the official mcc New York
- 24:40forms documenting the times of the thirty minute rounds, often
- 24:44referred to as round sheets, and falsely attested to having
- 24:48completed the rounds. Noel and Thomas were indicted by a
- 24:52grand jury for their false certification of having conducted rounds
- 24:56and counts. Subsequently, each entered into a deferred prosecution agreement
- 25:01with the US Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
- 25:05New York. The US Attorney's Office of the Southern District
- 25:08of New York declined prosecution for the Evening watch Shoe
- 25:12Officer in charge and the material Handler. The OIG investigation
- 25:17has found that the Evening watch Shoe Officer in Charge,
- 25:20the material Handler, Noel, and Thomas knowingly and willingly falsified
- 25:25BOP records in violation of federal law by attesting that
- 25:30they had completed the mandatory rounds and inmate counts on
- 25:33the evening of August ninth, twenty nineteen and the morning
- 25:37of August tenth, twenty nineteen. Additionally, as noted above, BOP
- 25:42policy requires employees to cooperate fully with an official investigation
- 25:48and truthfully respond to questions. The OIG found that Noel
- 25:52lacked candor when she told the OIG that she had
- 25:55conducted the ten PM count when the weight of evidence
- 25:59indicates that at most she may have conducted around at
- 26:02that time. Section three poor judgment regarding the use of
- 26:08overtime The OIG's investigation and review revealed that on August ninth,
- 26:13twenty nineteen, mcc New York supervisory staff requested that a
- 26:19staff member fill in an overtime position within the Shoe,
- 26:22which resulted in that staff member working three shifts back
- 26:26to back, that is, twenty four hours straight. The collective
- 26:30Bargaining Agreement between BOP and unions representing BOP employees provides
- 26:36that ordinarily, the minimum time off between shifts will be
- 26:40seven and one half hours and the minimum elapse time
- 26:44of on days off will be fifty six hours, except
- 26:48when the employee requests the change. The material handler told
- 26:53the OIG that on August ninth, he reported for a
- 26:56voluntary overtime shift from twelve am to eight am, and
- 27:01then worked as regular eight am to four pm shift
- 27:04in the warehouse. At some point during the day shift,
- 27:07the day watch Operations Lieutenant, a higher ranking official, called
- 27:11and asked the material handler if he could work over
- 27:14time in the shoe, and he agreed. The material handler
- 27:18told the OIG that he felt pressure to work the
- 27:21third shift, which resulted in him working twenty four hours
- 27:24straight from twelve am on August ninth through twelve am
- 27:28on August tenth. As discussed previously, the material handler admitted
- 27:33to the OIG that on the evening of August ninth,
- 27:36during his third shift, which he worked in the shoe,
- 27:39he did not conduct the mandatory in made counts in
- 27:42rounds because he was too tired. The OIG investigation review
- 27:47concluded the day Watch Operations Lieutenant exercise poor judgment when
- 27:52he requested that the material handler work a third consecutive shift.
- 27:56As the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, he had access to
- 27:59the staff roster and the schedule, and therefore he should
- 28:03have known that the material handler had already worked sixteen
- 28:06straight hours. Additionally, the day Watch Operations Lieutenant's actions was
- 28:11inconsistent with the collective bargaining Agreement and did not reflect
- 28:15sound correctional judgment, as it would have been extremely difficult
- 28:19for the material handler to have effectively performed as duties
- 28:23during the third shift. All right, folks, we're going to
- 28:26wrap it up here, and then in the next episode,
- 28:29we're going to pick back up with section four of
- 28:33Chapter seven, and that is clearing the ten PM institutional count.
- 28:38Knowing that it was inaccurate. All of the information that
- 28:42goes with this episode can be found in the description
- 28:45box