Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 008 - Opening Farm Gate
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter seven of Vietnam The Advisory Years to nineteen sixty
- 0:05Speaker 1: five by Robert Fotrell and Martin Blumenson. This is a
- 0:08Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
- 0:12Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
- 0:18Speaker 1: Chapter seven Opening farm Gate. The USAF combat detachment that
- 0:24Speaker 1: President Kennedy ordered to Vietnam on October eleventh, nineteen sixty one,
- 0:29Speaker 1: had its roots in a small secret organization created in
- 0:33Speaker 1: the late nineteen fifties when General LeMay was Vice Chief
- 0:37Speaker 1: of Staff. In March nineteen sixty one, LeMay responded to
- 0:41Speaker 1: the President's instructions for the armed services to examine how
- 0:45Speaker 1: each could best contribute to counterinsurgency when there was no
- 0:50Speaker 1: doubt about Communist aggression. LeMay personally favored a direct and
- 0:54Speaker 1: open American response with the necessary strength. He defined ness
- 1:00Speaker 1: as more than is actually necessary to do the job,
- 1:04Speaker 1: hitting with overwhelming weight to avoid stretching things out over
- 1:08Speaker 1: a period of time. Le May, soon to be Chief
- 1:12Speaker 1: of Staff, was very much aware that the military services
- 1:16Speaker 1: had to abide by different rules. Tactical Air Command was
- 1:20Speaker 1: therefore directed to form a small elite volunteer unit around
- 1:25Speaker 1: the organization. Its mission would be air operations in support
- 1:30Speaker 1: of ground forces, to be flown in older conventional aircraft.
- 1:35Speaker 1: The forty four hundredth Combat Crew Training Squadron, nicknamed Jungle Jim,
- 1:40Speaker 1: came into being at Elgin Air Force Base, Florida on
- 1:44Speaker 1: April fourteenth, nineteen sixty one. Commanded by Colonel Benjamin H. King,
- 1:49Speaker 1: the unit had one hundred twenty four officers and two
- 1:52Speaker 1: hundred twenty eight airmen. Sixteen C forty SEVENS, eight B,
- 1:57Speaker 1: twenty six's and eighty twenty eights. Equal numbers of the
- 2:01Speaker 1: same types of aircraft were in temporary storage. The squadron's
- 2:06Speaker 1: mission of training indigenous air forces in counterinsurgency would combine
- 2:11Speaker 1: with a mission of air operations. Officers and airmen of
- 2:15Speaker 1: the forty four hundredth, at times called Air Commandos, were
- 2:20Speaker 1: volunteers above average in physique, hardiness, and sense of adventure.
- 2:25Speaker 1: Each was closely interviewed and approved by Colonel King. Next
- 2:30Speaker 1: came psychiatric screening at Lachland Air Force Base, Texas, and
- 2:34Speaker 1: survival in doctrination at stead Air Force Base, Nevada. Those
- 2:39Speaker 1: completing the program were certified to be emotionally mature, highly motivated,
- 2:44Speaker 1: and stable. Unfortunately, not all were mentally attuned to teaching
- 2:50Speaker 1: members of other cultures or in fact to perform a
- 2:54Speaker 1: training mission. They were combat oriented. Later, several men would
- 2:59Speaker 1: prove unable to work with Asian officers. As volunteers dwindled,
- 3:05Speaker 1: the rigorous standards were eventually lowered. The picturesque air Commando uniform,
- 3:11Speaker 1: personally picked by General LeMay, featured an Australian type bush
- 3:16Speaker 1: hat with turned up brim, fatigues and combat boots. Two
- 3:21Speaker 1: of the three types of jungle Gym aircraft were extensively modified.
- 3:26Speaker 1: The T twenty eight received armor plate and carried about
- 3:30Speaker 1: fifteen hundred pounds of bombs and rockets, plus two fifty
- 3:34Speaker 1: caliber machine guns with three hundred fifty rounds per gun loaded,
- 3:39Speaker 1: the aircraft could speed at one hundred sixty knots to
- 3:42Speaker 1: a target two hundred miles distant, then returned to base.
- 3:46Speaker 1: The C forty seven, redesignated the SC forty seven after modification,
- 3:52Speaker 1: boasted twice the normal fuel load, a stronger landing gear
- 3:55Speaker 1: suited to dirt strips, and jet assisted takeoff jato racks
- 4:00Speaker 1: for operation from short fields. The B twenty six twin
- 4:04Speaker 1: engine attack bomber needed no modification, carrying six thousand pounds
- 4:09Speaker 1: of bombs and rockets plus machine guns. When fully loaded,
- 4:13Speaker 1: it had a combat radius of four hundred miles at
- 4:16Speaker 1: a normal speed of two hundred knots, and could loiter
- 4:19Speaker 1: thirty to forty five minutes. The B twenty six was
- 4:23Speaker 1: designed for a glide bomb delivery pattern, not for dive
- 4:27Speaker 1: bombing with rolling pullouts, nor for landing with external ordinance
- 4:31Speaker 1: in place. After an aborted mission to halt Communist infiltration
- 4:36Speaker 1: into South Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs on August twenty fourth
- 4:40Speaker 1: suggested to Secretary macnamara air interdiction of the inland trails
- 4:45Speaker 1: over which the Vietcong secured supplies. If the United States
- 4:49Speaker 1: had no desire to commit American forces openly, why not
- 4:53Speaker 1: institute unconventional guerrilla type operations. The President had mentioned several
- 5:00Speaker 1: times to the Secretary of Defense the benefits of testing
- 5:04Speaker 1: counterinsurgency techniques in Vietnam. On September fifth, Macnamara informed the
- 5:10Speaker 1: three service secretaries that he intended to establish an experimental
- 5:15Speaker 1: command under mag as a laboratory for refining organizational and
- 5:19Speaker 1: operational procedures. General LeMay at this point invited Secretary of
- 5:25Speaker 1: the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert's attention to the forty
- 5:29Speaker 1: four hundredth Combat Crew Training Squadron, Sending an element of
- 5:33Speaker 1: the unit to Vietnam would be an ideal way to
- 5:36Speaker 1: devise and evaluate special warfare methods. On September nineteenth, Secretary
- 5:42Speaker 1: zucker recommended this to Secretary McNamara. A detachment of the
- 5:47Speaker 1: forty four hundredth had just become operationally ready. If moved
- 5:51Speaker 1: to Vietnam, it would acquire counterinsurgency experience and at the
- 5:56Speaker 1: same time train the Vietnamese. Macnamara liked the propos asked
- 6:01Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment, and on October
- 6:04Speaker 1: fifth had their recommendation to place a detachment of Jungle
- 6:08Speaker 1: Gym with mag in Vietnam. The Secretary next made the
- 6:12Speaker 1: idea known to the President. President Kennedy weighed the burgeoning
- 6:16Speaker 1: Vietcongs strength, the more frequent reference in planning papers to
- 6:21Speaker 1: US covert operations, the desire of the Joint Chiefs to
- 6:25Speaker 1: make a reassuring commitment of air strength to Vietnam, and
- 6:29Speaker 1: President DM's change of heart on acceptance of American combat
- 6:33Speaker 1: units in his country. On the morning of October eleventh,
- 6:37Speaker 1: nineteen sixty one, the Commander in Chief authorized the deployment
- 6:41Speaker 1: of the jungle Gym Squadron to Vietnam to serve under
- 6:44Speaker 1: the mag as a training mission and not for combat
- 6:47Speaker 1: at the present time. But the forty four hundredth was
- 6:51Speaker 1: not specifically a training unit. It was designed to fight.
- 6:56Speaker 1: It had been singled out for deployment because its combat capacity.
- 7:00Speaker 1: An involvement would shore up South Vietnamese sagging morale. The
- 7:05Speaker 1: President's decision five months earlier to send an Army Special
- 7:09Speaker 1: Forces group to Vietnam now enunciated a new mission statement
- 7:14Speaker 1: for jungle Gym. It was to train indigenous airmen while
- 7:18Speaker 1: working with and supporting the Special Forces, Rangers and irregular
- 7:22Speaker 1: forces along the border. In this light, General le May
- 7:26Speaker 1: saw the USAF unit as a regular part of the
- 7:29Speaker 1: tri Service Team. Essentially, however, jungle Gym was an experiment,
- 7:34Speaker 1: and one of its purposes was to forge counterinsurgency tactics.
- 7:39Speaker 1: It could use sawed runways and operate austerely in remote areas,
- 7:44Speaker 1: carry out strike reconnaissance and airlift missions, fly close support
- 7:49Speaker 1: for ground troops, drop small forces up to company size,
- 7:53Speaker 1: deliver supplies and perform medical evacuation. Thus it was that
- 8:00Speaker 1: one hundred fifty five Air Force officers and airmen volunteers
- 8:04Speaker 1: to support friendly guerrillas flying eight extemporized fighter bombers, four
- 8:09Speaker 1: light bombers of World War II vintage, and four twin
- 8:12Speaker 1: engine transports designed prior to the Second World War, learned
- 8:17Speaker 1: that they would go to Vietnam to support the government
- 8:20Speaker 1: of President DM. Exactly how was in some dispute. On
- 8:25Speaker 1: the thirteenth of October, Colonel King and two of his
- 8:28Speaker 1: officers visited Hawaii to coordinate Jungle Jim's movement with Admiral
- 8:33Speaker 1: Felt sink Pak, who enthusiastically supported the approved deployment in Saigon.
- 8:39Speaker 1: The three officers briefed Ambassador Noltinge, who was happy to
- 8:43Speaker 1: have Jungle Gym to train Vietnamese, develop tactics and techniques,
- 8:47Speaker 1: and conduct other operations. As directed by the Ambassador, he
- 8:52Speaker 1: asked that all aircraft arrive with Vietnamese insignia. Returning to Hawaii,
- 8:58Speaker 1: King was assured by Paka officers that no major problems existed.
- 9:03Speaker 1: A ten camp would be ready for the detachment's arrival
- 9:06Speaker 1: at Binhi Airfield and support arrangements were under way. On
- 9:11Speaker 1: October twenty eighth, Felt ask that the detachment be sent
- 9:14Speaker 1: forward at once, without waiting for the Air Force to
- 9:17Speaker 1: procure some L twenty eight Helio super Courier light aircraft
- 9:22Speaker 1: and Sidewinder air to air missiles for the T twenty
- 9:24Speaker 1: eighths at Elgin. The task force designated for Vietnam received
- 9:29Speaker 1: the formal name of Detachment two, a forty four hundredth
- 9:33Speaker 1: Combat Crew Training Squadron, and the code name of farm Gate. Meantime,
- 9:40Speaker 1: members of the six thousand ninth Tactical Support Group under
- 9:43Speaker 1: Colonel Claude G. McKinney Junior, entered Vietnam with the utmost secrecy.
- 9:48Speaker 1: During late October. These officers and airmen deployed on temporary
- 9:53Speaker 1: duty from Tachikawa Air Base, Japan, to Clark, then to Binhi,
- 9:58Speaker 1: where they prepared the base facility for Farmgate. Additional detachments
- 10:03Speaker 1: came from thirteenth Air Force in pack Calf, chiefly from
- 10:07Speaker 1: the six thousand tenth Tactical Support Group, to service and
- 10:11Speaker 1: support the beginnings of an expanded USAF presence in Vietnam
- 10:15Speaker 1: and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. All were formed into numbered
- 10:20Speaker 1: temporary duty detachments on November fifteenth, seven and eight at Tansannut,
- 10:27Speaker 1: nine at Binhois, and ten at Damang, Thailand. Detachment seven
- 10:32Speaker 1: was a headquarters staff. Eight operated the prime set up
- 10:37Speaker 1: for an air operations and a combat reporting center, as
- 10:40Speaker 1: well as a photo processing cell, while nine and ten
- 10:44Speaker 1: maintained and serviced aircraft. Farmgate departed Florida on the fifth
- 10:49Speaker 1: of November. Four SC forty sevens flew to Clark Air Base.
- 10:54Speaker 1: Eighteen twenty eighths were disassembled in California and together with
- 10:58Speaker 1: one hundred forty officers and airmen, were ferried to Clark
- 11:02Speaker 1: by mats. After reassembly, Colonel King led two flights of
- 11:07Speaker 1: T twenty eighths to Tnsannut. The detachment became operationally ready
- 11:12Speaker 1: on the sixteenth, though a week passed before the last
- 11:15Speaker 1: of the SC forty sevens and T twenty eights arrived.
- 11:19Speaker 1: Farm Gate accepted four B twenty six's previously sent to
- 11:23Speaker 1: the Far East. These hard nosed strayfing model light bombers
- 11:28Speaker 1: reached Binhois near the close of December. At Binhois, the
- 11:32Speaker 1: farm Gate Detachment found a run down French air base
- 11:35Speaker 1: with a flight surface consisting of a single pierced steel
- 11:39Speaker 1: plank runway fifty eight hundred by one hundred and fifty feet.
- 11:44Speaker 1: Tear Outs in the steel tie strips demanded constant attention
- 11:48Speaker 1: of welding crews, and the three hundred fifteenth Air Division
- 11:51Speaker 1: C one thirties, bringing in communication equipment for a tactical
- 11:55Speaker 1: air control system further tore up the runway. About seven
- 12:00Speaker 1: hundred Vietnamese soldiers defended the airfield because heavy vegetation and
- 12:05Speaker 1: swampy terrain nearby afforded good cover for Vietcong troops surrounding
- 12:10Speaker 1: the air base. Farmgate at once contacted the two USAF
- 12:15Speaker 1: mobile reporting posts at Tansan Jut and set about to
- 12:19Speaker 1: organize a tactical air control system of sorts and to
- 12:22Speaker 1: establish communications and supply requirements. The members of Farmgate thought
- 12:28Speaker 1: they were to conduct combat operations while training the Vietnamese.
- 12:33Speaker 1: That was how generalle May had briefed Colonel King, and
- 12:36Speaker 1: King was more than willing to make his unit combat
- 12:39Speaker 1: capable and responsive to Admiral Nolting and to American military authorities.
- 12:44Speaker 1: In early familiarization flights, T twenty eight crews trailed Vietnamese
- 12:50Speaker 1: eighty sixes to targets, observed their attack procedures, and when authorized,
- 12:55Speaker 1: fired on targets. The one hundred fifty five men were
- 12:59Speaker 1: highly evated and eager to fight. Nevertheless, on November sixteenth,
- 13:05Speaker 1: Admiral Felt tasked farm Gate with conducting tactical training and
- 13:09Speaker 1: pilot upgrading for the Vietnamese President. Kennedy was advised that
- 13:14Speaker 1: the unit was training Vietnamese air crews and supporting Vietnamese
- 13:18Speaker 1: operations against the Vietcong. Uncertainties of mission and the absence
- 13:24Speaker 1: of combat lowered morale from the start. The pilots expected
- 13:28Speaker 1: to carry an air offensive to the Viet Kong. Instead,
- 13:32Speaker 1: they trained and supplemented the Vietnamese Air Force, seeking to
- 13:36Speaker 1: evolve techniques for what Macnamara described to the press as
- 13:40Speaker 1: not full scale warfare, but guerrilla warfare. Without clear cut
- 13:45Speaker 1: agreement at higher levels on Farmgate's mission, the early operations
- 13:49Speaker 1: tended to be improvised and experimental rather than systematic. Farmgate's
- 13:56Speaker 1: first regular employment was to reconnoiter and count the junkins
- 14:00Speaker 1: sampan traffic in Vietnam coastal waters, a tedious job lasting
- 14:05Speaker 1: from December sixth through twenty second, nineteen sixty one Sea
- 14:09Speaker 1: forty sevens and pairs of T twenty eights flew four
- 14:13Speaker 1: hour search patterns recorded sightings. Thirty seven sorties turned up
- 14:18Speaker 1: six thousand, two hundred ninety four vessels, but the air
- 14:21Speaker 1: crews had no way to tell how many were enemy.
- 14:25Speaker 1: Mag were equally at a loss to interpret the findings.
- 14:28Speaker 1: The long, uneventful flight patterns were of physical hardship for
- 14:32Speaker 1: the T twenty eight crews. They were not allowed to
- 14:35Speaker 1: crack their canopies in flight, even though weakened by the
- 14:39Speaker 1: cockpit heat from the tropical sun. A second series, flown
- 14:43Speaker 1: during February fifth through seventh, nineteen sixty two, furnished no
- 14:47Speaker 1: meaningful intelligence. Farmgate likewise, also acquired the mission of supporting
- 14:53Speaker 1: the Army's Special Forces and their civilian Irregular Defense Group.
- 14:58Speaker 1: The Sea forty sevens operated under an ad hoc system
- 15:02Speaker 1: free of MAG and Vietnamese Army control. To keep materiel,
- 15:06Speaker 1: transportation and funds in US hands. The aircraft delivered locally
- 15:11Speaker 1: procured items and emergency ones flown in from the United States.
- 15:16Speaker 1: Formal supply accountability was discarded. These operations were small, Farmgate,
- 15:22Speaker 1: flying just two hundred and five sorties in the first
- 15:25Speaker 1: six months of nineteen sixty two. While valuable, these missions
- 15:30Speaker 1: were outside of what Farmgate wanted to do. When Admiral
- 15:34Speaker 1: Felt on December fourth, nineteen sixty one, directed General O'Donnell
- 15:38Speaker 1: at Packcafe to ready plans for operations, O'Donnell at once
- 15:43Speaker 1: permitted Farmgate to fly combat missions with at least one
- 15:47Speaker 1: South Vietnamese national aboard any aircraft so committed. Secretary Macnamara,
- 15:53Speaker 1: meeting with the Joint Chiefs that day, approved combat with
- 15:57Speaker 1: mixed crews. On December sixth, the jo Point Chiefs granted
- 16:01Speaker 1: formal authority for Farmgate aircraft to fly combat if Vietnamese
- 16:06Speaker 1: were a board for training. On the sixth, Packcaft submitted
- 16:10Speaker 1: to Sink Pack the same concept for operations. Actually, US
- 16:15Speaker 1: aircraft and personnel would support Vietnamese armed forces and help
- 16:19Speaker 1: them deny the Vietcong supply routes and concentration areas, fly
- 16:23Speaker 1: armed patrols of South Vietnam's land and sea borders, and
- 16:27Speaker 1: seek out and destroy Vietcong headquarters, as well as Communist
- 16:31Speaker 1: airlift into South Vietnam. Together, Vietnamese and Americans were to
- 16:37Speaker 1: destroy Vietcong lifelines and support bases. From Bonhoit, Tansignut, and
- 16:43Speaker 1: combat air bases to be developed at d Nang and
- 16:45Speaker 1: Plais Coups. Air operations were to stress photo reconnaissance, surveillance, interdiction,
- 16:52Speaker 1: and close support of ground operations. Needed at once were
- 16:56Speaker 1: a tactical air control system and adjointly manned a mare
- 17:00Speaker 1: ARK and Vietnamese Air Operations Center. When Admiral Felt approved
- 17:04Speaker 1: a limited tactical air control system on December eighth, it
- 17:09Speaker 1: appeared that operations would get under way. Thirteenth Air Force
- 17:13Speaker 1: issued a draft plan on the tenth and distinguished between
- 17:16Speaker 1: combat actions performed in support of the Vietnamese within South
- 17:20Speaker 1: Vietnam an advisory in training actions. On the fifteenth, Ambassador
- 17:26Speaker 1: Nolting directed that no combat mission of any description be
- 17:31Speaker 1: undertaken without his consent. The next day, General Lemnitzer suggested
- 17:36Speaker 1: that Farmgate should not wait for tailor made jobs, but
- 17:40Speaker 1: should center on training. Secretary Macnamara repeated his approval of
- 17:45Speaker 1: combat missions if the planes had Vietnamese aboard. However, he
- 17:49Speaker 1: wanted all such flights to be confined to South Vietnam
- 17:53Speaker 1: owing to the experimental nature of the program, stressing the
- 17:57Speaker 1: difference between riding double combat tree missions and operational missions.
- 18:02Speaker 1: He charged sync Pack with the ladder. He wanted Admiral
- 18:06Speaker 1: Felt to use combat missions solely for important jobs and
- 18:10Speaker 1: to monitor them closely. In other words, according to McNamara,
- 18:15Speaker 1: jungle Gym is to be used for training and operational
- 18:18Speaker 1: missions in South Vietnam, with Vietnamese writing rear seats. On
- 18:23Speaker 1: October nineteenth, the Joint Chief sent a message to ensure
- 18:27Speaker 1: no misunderstanding in the authority granted for the use of
- 18:31Speaker 1: jungle Gym aircraft. Farmgate's principal purpose was training Vietnamese Air
- 18:36Speaker 1: Force personnel. On the following day, Admiral Felt made known
- 18:41Speaker 1: his conviction that Farmgate, besides training Vietnamese, could carry out
- 18:46Speaker 1: all kinds of conventional combat and combat support flights if
- 18:50Speaker 1: of Vietnamese was on board to receive training. Admiral Felt's
- 18:54Speaker 1: conviction sparked a re examination of American policy. In Washington,
- 19:00Speaker 1: National Security Council inclined toward authorizing US uniformed personnel in
- 19:05Speaker 1: Vietnam for instruction in and execution of air ground support
- 19:10Speaker 1: techniques that appeared broad enough to embrace all U S
- 19:15Speaker 1: air actions. Yet the State Department view, later voiced by
- 19:19Speaker 1: w Averil Harriman held that the statement hardly covered interdiction
- 19:24Speaker 1: air strikes far from friendly ground troops. General Lemnitzer forwarded
- 19:29Speaker 1: detailed clarifying instructions to Admiral Felt and General Magar on
- 19:34Speaker 1: December twenty sixth. He wanted Farmgate to conduct combat missions
- 19:39Speaker 1: only when the Vietnamese Air Force could not. Combined crews
- 19:43Speaker 1: on combat missions would fulfill the purpose of training to
- 19:46Speaker 1: allow Vietnamese to fly these missions alone as soon as possible.
- 19:51Speaker 1: When General Lemnitzer's directive reached Farmgate on the afternoon of
- 19:55Speaker 1: the twenty sixth, a strike mission was in the air.
- 19:58Speaker 1: Two Farmgate teas twenty eighth's were escorting two Vietnamese eighty
- 20:03Speaker 1: six's to hit Viet Coong houses in rice fields about
- 20:07Speaker 1: fifty miles north of Saigon. Despite recall efforts, the strike
- 20:12Speaker 1: went on, but thereafter the possibility of an independent American
- 20:17Speaker 1: combat role came to an end. Determining Farmgate's mission and
- 20:23Speaker 1: its place in the organizational and command structure would be
- 20:26Speaker 1: the subject of continuing discussion and controversy. Meanwhile, General Maxwell
- 20:32Speaker 1: Taylor had visited Vietnam and had reported his observations to
- 20:36Speaker 1: the President, thereby shaping and refining the purpose and direction
- 20:41Speaker 1: of national policy. End of Chapter seven