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06 - Nicomachean Ethics - Aristotle · The Philosophy Insights Collection

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Chapter one. Since, however, we have before observed that it is necessary
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the medium in conduct should be chosen, and neither excess nor deficiency, but
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the medium is to act as right reason prescribes. Let us now consider what
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right reason is. For in all the above mentioned habits, as in other
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things, there is a certain scope to which he who possesses reason looking acts
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with intention and remission. And there is a certain boundary of media, which
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we say are situated between excess and defect, and which exist conformably to right
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reason. Thus to speak, however, is indeed true, but is not
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at all clear. For in other pursuits, also with which science is conversant,
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it is indeed true to say that it is not proper to labor either
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more or less, nor to be indolent, but to labor moderately and as
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right reasons scribes. He, however, who alone knows this, will know
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nothing more. As if on inquiring what kind of things are to be administered
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to the body, it should be said they are such as medicine, and
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he who possesses the medical art prescribe. Hence, it is necessary, with
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respect to the habits of the soul, that this should not only be truly
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said, but that it should also be definitely shown what right reason is and
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what is the definition of it. But we have distributed the virtues of the
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soul, and have said that some of them are ethical, and others dionoetical,
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or belonging to the discoursive power of the soul. With respect to the
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ethical virtues, therefore we have indeed discussed them. But with respect to the
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remaining virtues, these we shall discuss. After we have first spoken concerning the
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soul. It has therefore been before observed by us that there are two parts
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of the soul, that which possesses reason and that which is irrational. But
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now we shall make a division, after the same manner, of the part
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which possesses reason. And it must be admitted that there are two parts possessing
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reason, one indeed by which we survey those kinds of beings, the principles
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of which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, and the other by which we
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survey things of a contingent nature. For since the objects of knowledge are specifically
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different, it follows that there are also different species of knowledge. For it
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is necessary that knowledge should be similar to the thing known, and that the
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knowledge of that which is necessary should be necessary, but contingent of that which
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is contingent. For all knowledge subsists according to similitude and affinity, since it
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is a certain adaptation and contact of that which is known and that which knows.
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But of these parts of the soul, the one is called scientific,
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but the other ratiocinative. For to concert and reason are the same thing.
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No one, however, consults about things which cannot subsist otherwise than they do.
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So that the rationios in native power is one certain part of the rational
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part of the soul. It must therefore be shown what is the best habit
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of each of these, for this is the virtue of each. But virtue
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is referred to its proper work. Chapter two. There are, however,
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three things in the soul which have dominion over action and truth viz. Sense,
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intellect, and appetite. But of these sense is the principle of no
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one action. Which is evident from this that brutes have indeed sense, but
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have no communion with action, so as to have dominion over it. What,
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however, affirmation and negation are in the discoursive energy of the rational part.
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That pursuit and avoidance are in appetite. Hence, since ethical virtue is
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a habit accompanied with deliberate choice, but deliberate choice is an appetite adapted to
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consultation. Hence, it is necessary that reason should be true and the appetite
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right if the deliberate choice is good, and that the one should assert and
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the other pursue the same things. This discursive energy of the soul, therefore,
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by which we judge that something is to be desired, is practical reason
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and practical truths. But of the discursive energy of reason, which is contemplative
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and neither practical nor effective, the good and the evil are truth and falsehood,
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for this is the work of the whole of the discursive power. The
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work, however, of the practical and at the same time discursive energy of
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reason is truth, subsisting in concord with right appetite. The principle therefore of
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action, whence motion is derived, is deliberate choice, though this principle is
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not the final cause of action. But appetite and that reason, which is
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for the sake of something, or which is directed to the final cause,
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are the principles of deliberate choice. Hence, deliberate choice is not without intellect
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and the discursive energy of reason, Nor is it without the ethical habit for
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a good conduct, and the contrary to it in action are not without the
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discursive energy of reason and manners. The discursive energy, however, of reason
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itself, does not move anything except that which is for the sake of something
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and is practical, since this has dominion over that which is effective. For
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everyone who affects anything does it for the sake of something, And that which
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is affected is not simply the end, but is a relative and pertains to
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something. Though this is not the case with that which is practicable. For
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good conduct is the end of action, but appetite is directed to the end.
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Hence Deli is either erectic intellect or appetite, possessing a discourse of energy,
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and man is a principle of this kind. Nothing, however, that
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has been done, is an object of deliberate choice. Thus, for instance,
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no one deliberately chooses to subvert Troy, for neither does any one deliberate
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about what is past, but about that which is future and contingent. But
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it is not possible that what has been done should not be done. Hence
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Agatho says rightly quote all things to God are possible, but one that to
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undo, which is already done. Close quote of both the intellective parts.
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Therefore the work is truth. Hence, those habits according to which each of
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these parts enunciates the truth are the virtues of both. Chapter three, Assuming
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therefore a more elevated exordium, let us again speak concerning these virtues. Let
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therefore the habits by which the soul enunciates truth in affirming or denying, be
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five in number. But these are art, science, prudence, wisdom,
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and intellect. For it is possible that both hypolepsis and opinion may assert what
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is false. What science therefore is will be from hence evident, if it
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is necessary to investigate accurately and not to follow similitudes. For all of us
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are of opinion that it is not possible for that which we know scientifically to
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subsist otherwise than it does. But with respect to things which may subsist otherwise,
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of these, when they are out of our view, we are ignorant
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whether they exist or not, the object of scientific knowledge, therefore is from
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necessity. Hence it is eternal. For all beings which are simply from necessity
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are eternal. But things eternal are with us, generation and incorruptible. Again,
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all science appears to be capable of being taught, and the object of
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scientific knowledge may be obtained by discipline. But all doctrine is produced from things
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previously known, as we have said in the Analytics, for it partly subsists
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through induction and partly from syllogism. Induction therefore is indeed a principle, and
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the principle of universal, But syllogism is from universal. The principles therefore,
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from which syllogism consists are things of which there is no syllogism, Hence they
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are obtained by induction. Science therefore is indeed a demonstrative habit in such other
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things, as we have added to the definition of it in the Analytics.
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For when a man believes that a thing is after a certain manner, and
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the principles of it are known to him, he has a scientific knowledge of
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that thing. For if the principles are not more known to him than the
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conclusion, he will have a scientific knowledge from accident. Let these things therefore
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be admitted concerning science. Chapter four. Of that, however, which may
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subsist otherwise than it does, or which has a various subsistence and is contingent.
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There is something which is effective in something which is practicable, but production
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and action differ. Credibility, however, may be obtained concerning these things from
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exoteric discussions, so that the practic habit in conjunction with reason is different from
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the effective or productive habit in conjunction with reason. And neither are they contained
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by each other. For neither is action affection, nor is affection action.
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But since the building art is a habit effective in conjunction with reason, and
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neither is there any art which is not a habit effective in conjunction with reason,
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nor any set habit which is not art. Art and habit effective in
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conjunction with true reason will be the same. All art, however, is
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conversant with generation, and machinates and contemplates in order that something may be produced
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which is capable either of existing or not existing, and of which the principle
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is in the maker, but not in the thing made. For art neither
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belongs to things which necessarily are or are necessarily generated, nor to things which
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have a natural subsistence, for these contain in themselves the principle. Since,
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however, production and action are different. It is necessary that art should pertain
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to production, but not to action, And after a certain manner, fortune
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and art are conversant with the same things. As also Agatho says, quote
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art, fortune loves and fortune art close quote. Art. Therefore, as
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we have said, is a certain habit effect of inconjunction with true reason.
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But the privation of art, on the contrary, or the inartificial habit,
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is a habit effect of inconjunction with false reason, about that which may have
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a various subsistence. Chapter five. With respect to prudence, we shall apprehend
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what it is if we survey who those are whom we denominate prudent persons.
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It appears therefore to be the province of a prudent man to be able to
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consult well about things which are good and advantageous to him, not partially as
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about what contributes to health or strengths, but about what universally contributes to a
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happy life. But this is indicated by our calling men prudent about anything when
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they reason well with a view to some worthy end in things in which there
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is no art. So that, in short, he who has adapted to
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consultation will be a prudent man. No one, however, consults about things
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which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, nor about things which it is impossible
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for him to perform. Hence, if science indeed subsists in conjunction with demonstration,
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but of those things of which the principles may have a very subsistence,
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of these there is no demonstration, for all these are contingent. And if
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it is not possible to consult about things which subsist from necessity, prudence will
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neither be science nor art. It will not be science because that which is
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practicable may have a various subsistence, and it will not be art because the
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genus of action is different from the genus of production. It remains, therefore,
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that it is a true habit in conjunction with reason, practical about human
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good and evil. For the end of production indeed is different from the production.
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But the end of action is not always different from action. Hence,
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we are of opinion that Pericles and such like persons are prudent men because they
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are able to survey what is good for themselves and for mankind. And we
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also think that economists and politicians are persons of this description. Hence, also
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we call temperance by this name as preserving prudence, But it preserves an opinion
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of this kind. For the delectable and the painful. Do not corrupt or
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distort every opinion, such as that a triangle has or has not angles equal
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to two rights. But those opinions which pertain to what is practicable. For
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the principles, indeed, of practicable things are those things for the sake of
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which they are performed. But to him who is corrupted through pleasure or pain,
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the principle is not immediately apparent, nor does he perceive that for the
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sake of this and through this, it is necessary to choose and perform all
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things. For vice is destructive of the principle. Hence, it is necessary
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that prudence should be a habit in conjunction with true reason, practical about human
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good. Moreover, of art, indeed there is a virtue, but of
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prudence there is not. And in art, indeed, he who voluntarily errs
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is to be preferred to him who errs involuntarily. But in prudence, he
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who voluntarily errs is a subordinate character. He in the same manner as in
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the virtues. It is evident therefore that prudence is a certain virtue, and
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not art. But since there are two parts of the rational soul, prudence
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will be the virtue of the doxastic part, or that part which forms opinions
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of things. For both opinion and prudence are conversant with that which may have
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a various subsistence. Nor yet, is prudence a habit alone in conjunction with
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reason, of which this is an indication that there may be an oblivion of
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such a habit i e. It may be lost through oblivion, But there
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cannot be of prudence. Chapter six. Since, however, science is an
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assent to universals and things which have a necessary subsistence. But there are principles
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of things demonstrable and of every science, for science is accompanied with reason.
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This being the case, there will neither be science, nor art, nor
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prudence of the principle of the object of science. For the object of science
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is demonstrable, but art and prudence are conversant with things which may have a
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various subsistence. Neither therefore will wisdom be that through which this principle is known.
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For it is the province of a wise man to have demonstration about certain
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things. Hence, if the habits by which we enunciate the truth and are
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never deceived about things which cannot or which can have a various subsistence. Are
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science and prudence, wisdom and intellect. But no one of these three can
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be the habit by which we know principles. But by the three I mean
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prudence, wisdom, and science. It remains that intellect is the habit by
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which principles are known. Chapter seven. We attribute, however, wisdom in
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the arts to those who are most accurately skilled in the arts. Thus we
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say that Phidias was a wise sculptor, and Polyclidus a wise statuary. Here
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therefore we signify nothing else by wisdom, then that it is the virtue of
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art. But in short, we think that certain persons are wise, not
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partially, and that there are not anything else than wise men. As Homer
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says in his marginies quote the gods, nor minor hymn, nor plowmen made
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nor wise in anything beside close quote. So that it is evident that wisdom
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will be the most accurate of the sciences. Hence it is necessary that the
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wise man should not only know those things which are inferred from principles or the
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conclusions of scientific reasoning, but that he should also perceive and enunciate the truth
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about principles themselves. Wisdom, therefore will be intellect and science, and will
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possess as a head or summit the science of the most honorable things, i
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e. Of divine natures. For it would be absurd for anyone to fancy
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that the political science or prudence is a thing of all others, the most
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excellent, unless man is the best of everything the world contains. If,
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however, what is salubrious and good is to man one thing and another to
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fishes, but that which is white and that which is straight are always the
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same. All men will acknowledge that a wise man is the same. But
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the prudent man is a mutable character. For they will say that the being
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is prudent who surveys what is excellent in particulars according to the nature of each
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and to him they will commit these particulars. Hence also they say that some
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brutes are prudent viz. Such as appear to have a providential power about what
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pertains to their life. It is evident, however, that the political science
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and wisdom are not the same. For if it should be said that wisdom
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is that which is conversant with what is useful to mankind. There will be
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many kinds of wisdom, since there is not one science which is conversant with
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the good of all animals, but a different science is conversant with a different
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good, unless indeed, there is one medical science which extends to all beings.
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Nor is it of any consequence if it should be said that man is
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the most excellent of all other animals, For there are many animals naturally more
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divine than man, such as those most apparent beings from which the world is
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composed. From what has been said, therefore, it is evident that wisdom
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is the science and intellect of things most honorable by nature. Hence, the
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multitudes say that Anaxagoras and Thales and such like persons were indeed wise but not
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prudent men in consequence of perceiving that they were ignorant of what was advantageous to
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them with respect to a corporeal life. And they say that they knew indeed
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things superfluous and admirable, difficult and divine, but which are useless because they
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did not investigate human good. Prudence, however, is conversant with human affairs
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and with those things which are the subjects of consultation. For we say that
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this is especially the work of a prudent man to consult well. But no
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one consults about things which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, nor about things
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of which there is not a certain end, and this practical good. He,
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however, simply consults well, who conjectures, by a reasoning process what
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is best to man among practicable things. Nor is prudence only directed two universals.
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But it is also necessary that it should no particulars, for it is
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practical, but action is conversant with particulars. Hence, also some persons who
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have only experimental knowledge without science are more adapted for practical affairs than those who
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possess a scientific knowledge without experience. For he who knows that light flesh is
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easily concocted, but is ignorant what flesh is light will not produce health,
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but he will rather produce it. Who knows that the flesh of birds is
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light and salubrious. Prudence, however, is practical, so that it is
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necessary to possess both viz. A knowledge of what is to be done universally
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and in particular circumstances, or rather the latter than the former. But prudence
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here also i e. Among the practical powers will be a certain architectonic power,
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or a power belonging to a master art Chapter eight. The political science,
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however, and prudence, are indeed the same habit, though they have
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not the same essence. But of the science pertaining to a city, the
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one part, which is legislative, is, as it were, architectonic prudence.
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But the other, in the same manner as particulars, is denominated by
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a common name the political science. This, however, is practical and occupied
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in consultation, For a decree is a thing practicable as the extreme. Hence,
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those alone who possess the political science are said to act in a political
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capacity, for they alone act in the same manner as manual artificers. That
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also appears to be especially prudence which a man employs about himself and about one
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thing, And this is called by a common name prudence. But of these
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species of prudence, the one is economy, another legislation, and another the
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political science. And of this last one part pertains to consultation, but another
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is judicial. For a man, therefore, to know his own concerns will
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be one species of knowledge Nevertheless, it possesses a great difference. And he
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who knows things pertaining to himself and is conversant with them, appears to be
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a prudent man. But those who apply themselves to the management of public affairs
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are busily employed in a multitude of concerns. Hence, also Euripidy says,
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quote, how can the name of wise to me belong who might have mingled
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in the martial's wrong and vexed with business, and exempt from care taking of
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spoils my honorable share, yet chose by over anxious thought to move the direful
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hate of all commanding Jove close quote. For these men explore what is good
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for themselves, and are of opinion that it is necessary to do this.
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From this opinion, therefore it comes to pass that these men are prudent.
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Though perhaps it is not possible for a man to know his own concerns without
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echoes gnomic and political prudence. Again, how a man ought to manage his
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own affairs is a thing immanifest and requires consideration, but as an indication of
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the truth of what has been said. A youth may become a geometrician and
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a mathematician, and may be skilled in things of this kind, but it
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does not appear that he will be prudent. The cause, however, of
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this, is that prudence pertains two particulars, which become known from experience,
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but youth is without experience, which is produced by length of time. Since
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this also deserves to be considered. Why a boy may become a mathematician but
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cannot be wise or a physiologist, shall we say it is because mathematical objects
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subsist by an oblation from matter. But the principles of the objects of wisdom
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and physiology are derived from experience. And with respect to metaphysical principles, indeed,
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youth did not believe in but admit them. But with respect to mathematical
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principles, it is not a manifest what they are. Farther still, error
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in consultation either pertains to universals or particulars. For in order that a man
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may not drink heavy and therefore bad water, it is requisite that he should
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know either that all heavy water is bad, or that this particular water is
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heavy. But it is evident that prudence is not science, for it pertains
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to the extreme, as we have before observed, Since that which is practicable
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is a thing of this kind. It is therefore indeed opposed to intellect.
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For intellect is conversant with terms i e. Universals, which are the extremes
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upward and above which there are no other principles. But prudence is conversant with
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the extremes downward, which are particulars of which there is no science, but
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only a sensible perception. And this is not a sensible perception of peculiarities,
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but such as that by which we perceive in mathematics that a triangle is the
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extreme, for we stop there. It is therefore rather this sense which is
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prudence. But of that there is another species. Chapter nine. To investigate,
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however, and to consult differ. For to consult is to investigate something.
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But it is necessary to discuss good consultation and show what it is,
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whether it is a certain science or opinion, or a good conjecture, or
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some other genus. It is not therefore science, for men do not investigate
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about things which they know. But good consultation is a certain consultation. And
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he who consults investigates and reasons. Neither is a good conjecture. For good
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conjecture is without reasoning, and is something which is accomplished with celerity. But
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men consult for a long time, and say that the objects of consultation ought
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to be performed rapidly, but that consultation should be done slowly. Again,
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sagacity and good consultation also differ from each other. But sagacity is a certain
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good conjecture. Neither, therefore, is any good consultation opinion. But since
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he who consults badly heirs, but he who consults well consults rightly, it
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is evidence that good consultation is a certain rectitude. Nor is good consultation either
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science or opinion. For of science, indeed there is no rectitude, because
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there is no error. But truth is the rectitude of opinion. And at
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the same time, everything of which there is an opinion is definite and determined.
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Nevertheless, good consultation is not without reasoning. It falls short, therefore
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of dianoia, or the discursive energy of reason, for this is not yet
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nunciation, since opinion is not investigation, but is now a certain enunciation.
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He, however, who consults, whether he consults well or ill, investigates
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something and reasons. But good consultation is a certain rectitude of consultation, on
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which account it must in the first place, be inquired what consultation is and
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with what it is conversant. Since, however, rectitude is multifariously predicated,
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it is evident that not every rectitude is good consultation. For the incontinent and
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the bad man obtain from reasoning that which they propose to see, so that
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they will have consulted rightly, but have procured for themselves a great evil.
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But to have consulted well appears to be a certain good. For such a
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rectitude of consultation as becomes the means of obtaining good, is good Consultation good,
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however, may be obtained by false reasoning, And a man indeed may
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obtain that which ought to be done, yet not through a proper medium.
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But the middle term may be false. Hence, neither will that be good
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consultation, according to which that is obtained which ought to be obtained, yet
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not through a proper medium. Further still, it is possible that one man
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may obtain the object of his wishes by consulting for a long time, but
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another by consulting rapidly. Hence, neither is that yet good consultation. But
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the rectitude which subsists according to utility and to what is proper, and as
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and when it is proper again, it is possible simply to consult well,
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and also with a view to a certain end. Good consultation, therefore,
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simply is that which proceeds with rectitude to an end. Simply, but a
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certain good consultation is that which precedes with rectitude to a certain end. Hence,
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if to consult well is the province of prudent men, good consultation will
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be a rectitude according to utility, with a view to a certain end,
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of which prudence is the true hypothesis. Chapter ten. In intelligence, however,
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and the privation of intelligence according to which we denominate men intelligent or unintelligent,
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is neither wholly the same with science or opinion. For if it were,
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all men would be intelligent. Nor is intelligence some one of the particular
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sciences, such as medicine, for it would be conversant with health, or
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geometry, for it would be conversant with magnitudes. For neither is intelligence conversant
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with things which always are and are immovable, nor with things which are passing
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into existence, but with those which may be the subject of doubt and consultation.
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Hence it is conversant with the same things as prudence. Yet intelligence and
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prudence are not the same. For prudence, indeed, is of a commanding
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nature, for the end of it is what ought or what ought ought to
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be done. But intelligence is alone of a judiciary nature. For intelligence is
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the same as right intelligence, since intelligent men are also rightly intelligent. Intelligence,
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however, is neither the possession nor the acquisition of prudence. But as
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he who learns is said to understand what he learns when he uses science,
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the like also takes place in the use of opinion in forming a judgment of
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those things with which prudence is conversant, in judging of them well when another
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person is speaking, For what is well is the same with what is beautifully
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done. And hence the name intelligence was derived according to which men are said
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to be rightly intelligent viz. From intelligence in learning, For we frequently use
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the verb to learn as equivalent to the verb to understand Chapter eleven. But
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what is called upright decision, according to which we say that men decide rightly
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is the right judgment of the equitable man. As an indication of this,
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however, we say that the equitable man is especially inclined to pardon others,
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and that it is equitable to pardon certain things. But pardon is an upright
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judiciary decision of the equitable man, And the decision is upright which is made
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by a man observant of truth. All these habits, however, reasonably,
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tend to the same thing. For we speak of upright decision, intelligence,
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prudence, and intellect with reference to the same persons. When we say that
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there are men of upright decision, are endued with intellect, are prudent and
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intelligent. For all these powers pertain to the extremes downward and to particulars.
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And an intelligent man, and one who decides rightly, or a man disposed
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to pardon, will be one who possesses a judiciary power about things with which
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the prudent man is conversant. For things of an equitable nature are common to
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all good men in their intercourse with others. Everything, however, of a
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practicable nature, pertains to particulars and the downward extremes, for it is necessary
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that a prudent man should have a knowledge of these. And intelligence and equitable
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decision are conversant with things of a practicable nature. But these are extremes,
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and intellect pertains both to the upward and downward extremes. For intellect and not
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the discourse of energy of reason is conversant with both first and last terms i
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e. With universal principles. The one indeed, i e. The intellect,
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which is the principle of the demonstrative sciences, is conversant with immutable and
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first terms. But the intellect, which is occupied in practical affairs, or
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which is the principle of prudence, is conversant with the extreme and with that
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which is contingent and the other proposition. For these are the principles of that
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for the sake of which a thing is done, or the final cause.
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For universal is from particulars of these. Therefore it is necessary to have a
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sensible perception. But this is the practical In hence these habits appear to be
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natural. And no one indeed is wise by nature. But everyone possesses naturally
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the power of deciding rightly, together with intelligence and intellect. But as an
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indication of this, we are of opinion that these habits are attendants on the
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ages of the life of men. And we say that this age i e.
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Old age possesses intellect and upright decision, as if nature were the cause
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of this. Hence, also intellect is both the principle and the end,
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for from these demonstrations are framed, and with these they are conversant. Hence,
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in practical affairs it is no less necessary to attend to the undemonstrated assertions
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and opinions of elderly or prudent men than to demonstrations, For in consequence of
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possessing an eye from experience, they perceive the principles of things of a practicable
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nature. And thus we have shown what wisdom and prudence are, and with
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what particulars each is cant, and that each is the virtue of a different
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part of the soul Chapter twelve. Some one, however, may doubt concerning
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these in what their utility consists. For wisdom indeed contemplates none of those things
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from which men will obtain felicity, since it is not conversant with anything which
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is in generation, or which is becoming to be or passing into existence.
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But prudence indeed does consider those things from which human felicity is derived. Yet
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on what account is it necessary that it should? Since prudence is conversant with
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just and beautiful things and which are good to man. We do, not,
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however, become at all more practically virtuous by knowing these things, since
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the virtues are habits. As neither are things said to be salubrious or to
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conduce to a good habit of body, because they have an act of power,
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but because they proceed from habit. For we are not at all more
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practical from possessing the medical or gymnastic art. But if a man is not
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to be considered as prudent for the sake of these things, but for the
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sake of becoming worthy, they will not be at all useful to those who
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are worthy. Again, neither will prudence be useful to those who are not
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worthy, for it is of no consequence whether they are prudent or are persuaded
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by others that are. Since this will be sufficient in the same manner as
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in what pertains to health, For when we wish to be well, we
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do not at the same time learn the medical art, to which we may
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add that it will appear to be absurd that prudence, which is subordinate to
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wisdom, should possess a greater authority, For that which is effective governs and
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presides in everything. These things therefore must be discussed. For now the doubt
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is concerning them alone. In the first place. Therefore, we say that
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these virtues, wisdom and prudence, are necessarily eligible per se, since they
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are the virtues of each part of the soul. Though neither of them should
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affect anything. In the next place, they do indeed affect something, yet
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not in the same manner as medicine produces health, but as health produces the
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energies of a good habit of body, thus also wisdom produces felicity, for
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being a part of the whole of virtue, by the possession and the energy
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of it, it renders a man happy. Farther still, the work is
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accomplished by prudence and ethical virtue. For virtue renders the scope proposed by the
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agent right, but prudence gives rectitude to things which tend to the scope.
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A virtue, however, of this kind, does not belong to the fourth
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or nutritive part of the soul, because its energies are not in our power,
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nor irrational, either essentially or by participation. But with respect to our
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not being at all more adapted to the practice of things beautiful and just.
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Through prudence. In answer to this objection, we must begin a little higher,
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assuming the following principle. For as we say that certain persons who perform
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just things are not yet just, such as those who do what is ordered
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by the laws, either unwillingly or from ignorance, or from some other cause,
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and not on account of the things themselves, though they do those things
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which ought to be done, and such as a worthy man ought to do.
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Thus, also as it seems, it is possible to do everything with
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a certain disposition of mind, so as to be a good man. I
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mean, for instance, that it is possible to do everything with which virtue
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is concerned from deliberate choice, and for the sake of the things which are
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done. Virtue therefore produces a right deliberate choice. But it is not the
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business of virtue, but of some other power to render the deliberate choice disposed,
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to embrace what truly contributes to the end. It is requisite, however,
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to speak more clearly on this subject. There is therefore a certain power,
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which is called skill. But this is a power of such a kind
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that by its assistance those things may be performed and obtained which contribute to the
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proposed scope. And if indeed the scope is beautiful, this power is laudable.
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But if the scope is bad, this power becomes craft on which account
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also we say that prudent men are skillful and not crafty. Prudence, however,
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is not this power, yet does not subsist without it, but habit
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is not acquired by this eye of the soul without virtue, as we have
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said, and is evident for the syllogisms of practical affairs rank as a principle.
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Since the end is a thing of this kind, and that which is
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best, whatever it may be. Let the end, for instance, be
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something casual. But this is not apparent except to a good man, for
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depravity distorts the judgment and produces deception about the practical principles. Hence, it
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is evident that it is impossible for anyone to be a prudent unless he is
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a good man Chapter thirteen. Again, therefore, let us direct our attention
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to virtue, for as prudence is not the same, indeed, but is
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similar to sagacity. Thus also natural virtues subsists similarly with reference to that which
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is properly so called. For the several manners appear to all men to subsist
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in a certain respect. Naturally since we are just and temperate and brave,
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and possess the other virtues immediately from our birth. At the same time,
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however, we investigate something else as that which is properly good, and are
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of opinion that such like virtues are inherent after another manner. For the physical
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habits are inherent in children and brutes, but they are seen to be noxious
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without intellect. Thus much indeed is apparent that, as it happens, that
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a strong body which is moved without sight, very much errs in its motions
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in consequence of being deprived of sight. This likewise is the case here with
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respect to the physical virtues. But if the possessor of these virtues obtains intellect
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also, he will excel in his actions. The habit, however, being
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similar, will then be properly virtue. Hence, as in the doxastic part
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of the soul, or that part which is characterized by opinion, there are
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two species skill and prudence. Thus also in the ethical part there are two
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species, one of which is physical virtue, but the other is virtue properly
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so called. And of these, virtue properly so called, is not without
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prudence. Hence, it is said that all the virtues are prudence. And
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Socrates indeed investigated partly with rectitude and partly with error. For because he thought
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that all the virtues are prudences, he aired. But it is well said
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by him that the virtues are not without prudence. But as an indication of
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this, all men, now, when they define virtue, add to the
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definition habit, and that they energize according to right reason. And right reason
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is that which subsists according to prudence. All men therefore appear in a certain
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respect to prophesy that a habit of this kind which subsists according to prudence is
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virtue. It is necessary, however, to change in a small degree the
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definition, for not only a habit according to right reason, but also a
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habit in conjunction with right reason, is virtue. But prudence is right reason
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energizing about things of this kind. Socrates therefore thought that the virtues indeed were
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reasons, because all of them are sciences. But we think that they subsist
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in conjunction with reason. Hence, it is evident from what has been said,
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that it is not possible to be a good man properly without prudence,
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nor a prudent man without ethical virtue. After this manner, Also, the
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reasoning may be dissolved by which some one may contend that the virtues are separated
41:58
from each other. For the same person is not naturally well adapted to all
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the virtues. Hence he has now obtained this, but not yet that virtue.
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For this may indeed happen according to the physical virtues, but is not
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possible in those virtues according to which a man is said to be simply a
42:15
good man. For all the virtues are present at the same time that prudence,
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which is one virtue, is present. But it is evident that though
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prudence were not a practical thing, it would be necessary because it is the
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virtue of a part of the soul, and because deliberate choice will not be
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right without prudence nor without virtue. For one of these is the end,
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but the other causes us to do things which contribute to the end. Prudence,
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however, neither has dominion over wisdom nor over the better part of the
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soul, as neither has the medical science dominion over health, for it does
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not use health, but considers how it may be obtained. It prescribes,
42:57
therefore for the sake of health, but has no meaning over it again.
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To say that prudence rules over wisdom is just as if some one should say
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that the political science rules over the gods, because it orders everything which is
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done in the city. End of Book six