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China, Coalitions, and the Future of Asian Security with Ely Ratner | China Considered | Hoover Institution · China Considered

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[MUSIC]
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>> Elizabeth Economy: Welcome to China Considered,
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a podcast that brings fresh insight and informed discussion to one of the most
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consequential issues of our time: how China is changing and changing the world.
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I'm Liz Economy, Hargrove Senior Fellow and co-director of the program on
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the U.S.-China and the World at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
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Today we're going to be talking about US national security,
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specifically what the United States should be doing in the Indo Pacific in the face
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of an increasingly powerful and assertive China.
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Most of the focus of the Trump administration for the past five months
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has been on trade and on the bilateral trade deficit, on what we should do about
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fentanyl and its precursors coming to the United States from China, and
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how we should balance our trade, our technology, and our national security.
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But there are other issues in the US China relationship
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that also deserve our attention, like China's growing military capabilities and
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presence in the Indo Pacific.
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So to help us understand why this issue matters,
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what the Trump administration strategy is, and what more we should be doing,
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I'm delighted to welcome Dr. Ely Ratner.
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Ely is a principal at the Marathon Initiative and
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formerly served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
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Indo-Pacific Security Affairs in the Biden administration.
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Welcome, Ely.
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>> Ely Ratner: Great to be here, Liz.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: So, Ely, let's start with the basics.
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What is the Indo Pacific and why should we care about it?
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>> Ely Ratner: Well, maybe I'll just start from a defense and security perspective,
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since you've obviously talked to a lot of different experts about Asia and China.
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And from my perspective, looking out,
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what we see is a very challenging security environment insofar as for
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several decades we had great power peace in the Indo Pacific.
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We had a system that was guided by US Alliances in the Indo Pacific and
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that provided the foundations for just the remarkable economic growth that
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we've seen throughout the region and, frankly, throughout the world.
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But what we've seen in the last few decades is big changes,
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obviously in the PRC with very rapid military modernization.
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But that is not only just military modernization.
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The real challenge is that that has been conjoined with what we understand is,
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frankly, ambition in Beijing to reorder, refashion the international system.
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And you heard repeatedly during the Biden administration,
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whether it was in the national defense strategy or
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the national security strategy, that China was the only country in the world
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with both the will and increasingly the capability to change the international
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system in a way that would really disadvantage the United States.
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So we see that potential coming, and it would happen in ways that could be very
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destabilizing to trade, to technology, and, frankly, to U.S. interests.
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So from the perspective of the Pentagon during the Biden administration,
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we articulated China as what we called the pacing challenge, which was
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the principal effort that the Pentagon needed to focus on to maintain peace and
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stability in the Indo Pacific.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: So if you were to say sort of what are China's top three
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ambitions?
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You talked about sort of reordering the international system or
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reshaping the international system.
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But if you were just to focus on the Indo Pacific itself,
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what would you say were China's sort of top three ambitions for
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changing the structure of the relationships or the architecture there?
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>> Ely Ratner: Well, I think the overriding goal is to dominate
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the Western Pacific and the East Asian littoral.
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And the specific objectives therein would be, number one, the seizure and
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control of Taiwan, number two, effective control of the South China Sea, and
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number three, undermining, breaking apart, if possible, but at least undermining and
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weakening US Alliances such that China had effective control of its periphery
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all the way up from the East China Sea down through the Taiwan Strait and
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through the South China Sea.
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And thereby it's not just a military issue.
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Once you control the, the sea lanes, you are therefore controlling the flow of
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people and commerce and technology and ultimately diplomacy and politics as well.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: And what do you see as its strategy for doing this?
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I mean, you mentioned it's got a very aggressive military buildup.
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Is it building bases?
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Is it forging new security relationships with actors in the region?
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How's it going about trying to realize its objectives?
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>> Ely Ratner: It's done a little bit, Liz, of what you just described in terms
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of trying to build stronger security ties with other countries.
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It is, has been pursuing overseas basing opportunities.
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We could, we could talk about that separately.
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But primarily it has been building up its own capability to unilaterally achieve
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these objectives through aggression.
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And the way it's doing that is a little bit different vis a vis Taiwan or
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in other areas.
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But it has been very focused on building the capability to prevent
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the United States from being able to intervene into the Western Pacific to
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defend its allies and partners.
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So that's at the high level of military operations.
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And then, as you know, it's been working in a, in a very coercive,
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day to day fashion through a combination of its military, its coast guard,
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what's called its maritime militia, civilian,
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supposedly civilian vessels that are coordinating with its defense agencies and
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bit by bit, chipping away at some of the norms and international law and
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sovereignty of other countries in the region to try to more slowly and
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incrementally achieve its goals.
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So it is on the one hand, trying to achieve its revisionist aims
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without fighting, while also preparing for use aggression if necessary.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: So you were one of the chief
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architects of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy during the Biden administration.
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How did you approach the challenge that you saw?
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What were sort of the key elements of the Biden administration Indo Pacific
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strategy?
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>> Ely Ratner: Well, the dominant principle was one of deterrence.
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So the primary question was how do we sustain stability and peace and
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how do we prevent Chinese aggression?
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So that's always important to point out because the United States does not have
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territorial ambitions in the Indo Pacific, it does not have offensive aims.
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It's not planning to, for, for any reason attack China itself.
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So it's very much about defending the territorial status quo and
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defending the sovereignty of our allies and partners.
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So that's the overriding objective.
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The ways that we did that were through a variety of means designed to strengthen
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deterrence.
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And for folks who aren't steeped in international relations theory, what that
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means very simply is ensuring that the costs of conflict are sufficiently high
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for Beijing that it chooses alternative paths to try to achieve its aims,
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that it does not reach for the military lever or does not choose aggression,
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because the costs of doing that would be beyond its willingness to do so.
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And that was important because our understanding was that Beijing's
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aspirations, for instance, for Taiwan or in the South China Sea,
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were situated in the context of its goals for its overall development.
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So it was not yet willing to put at risk its entire economic growth or
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its diplomatic and political goals around the world to achieve these
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nearer term territorial ambitions.
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So what that means is if the costs are sufficiently high from a military and
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economic and
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diplomatic perspective, then Xi Jinping would decide it wasn't worth it.
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One of the shorthands that you heard U.S officials use for
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that quite often is that we want Xi Jinping.
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To wake up in the morning, look out the window, consider the cost of conflict, and
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say to himself, you know what?
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Today is not the day.
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The costs are too high, the risks are too high.
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So that was our goal, to strengthen deterrence.
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And the way that we did that was through a few different ways.
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One was through investing in US Capabilities that are particular
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to operational challenges in the Indo Pacific.
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For many years, the US Military was focused on counterinsurgency and
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counterterrorism in the Middle East.
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So it has been a shift back to thinking about great power competition.
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And our budgets reflected that in the kind of things that we were investing in
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capabilities relevant to the Indo Pacific.
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The Pentagon has also been developing new operational concepts,
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which just means the way that the US Military fights, which has had to be
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revised because of China's strategy, which has been designed in particular to defeat
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what I would describe as the old American way of war that we saw, for instance,
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in Operation Desert Storm in Iraq and other places in the post Cold War era.
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So the United States needs not just new hardware, but also a new way of fighting.
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So new operational concepts.
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We also updated the US Force posture in the western Pacific,
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which means just the disposition of U.S. forces where they have been situated.
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We traditionally have had the predominance of our forces be in
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Northeast Asia at major operating bases in South Korea and Japan.
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One of the things that we did throughout the Biden administration is developing
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a more distributed, more mobile, more resilient force posture that
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distributed within Japan, and then grew more opportunities for
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military operations, whether it's in the Philippines or Australia.
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So stretching out the US Troop presence in Asia in a way that increases deterrence.
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And then finally, we worked with, and certainly not last,
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certainly not least, we worked with allies and partners in really
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unprecedented ways to try to make the whole greater than the sum of the parts.
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And we did that through a lot of different constellations of partnerships.
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But that was, I think, one of the notable achievements of the administration.
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And just all of that collectively, I'll say.
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I mean, I think the way we thought about deterrence is
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that all of those activities collectively increased risk and
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cost sufficiently for China that we achieved.
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What we said at the time was that deterrence is real and
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deterrence is strong, and invasion of Taiwan in particular,
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we argued at the time, was neither imminent nor inevitable.
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And we were right in that regard in terms of the period of the Biden administration.
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And I think that's the legacy that we handed off to the Trump administration of
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that strength and deterrence and we'll see if they can carry that forward.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah, I mean, I think, you know, one of the things that
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was so striking to me looking at what was taking place in terms of our, you know,
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overall military strategy, was I think that last part that you raised,
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which was all those new arrangements like Aukus, right.
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With the UK and Australia and the United States and
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then the minilaterals with Japan, the Philippines, the United States,
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South Korea, the United States and Japan, there just seemed to be this proliferation
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of arrangements that I think at some point somebody was calling a lattice.
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I don't think, I don't know that that name stuck, but it did seem that we were
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developing a kind of web or a sort of reinforced network of capabilities.
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And, and also I think there was a sort of,
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it launched in some respects, new relationships among our partners.
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Right. So, so that notion that it was hub and
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spoke sort of didn't hold as much.
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I think it was a deliberate policy at the administration,
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correct me if I'm wrong, to enable and to support our allies and
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partners forming their own arrangements and
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their own set of sort of partnerships in the defense and security arena.
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>> Ely Ratner: Yeah, yeah, I think you, you described it well.
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And it's a really, really important trend.
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And for those of work on East Asian security issues, it is an exciting time,
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frankly, because this is something that folks have been talking about for
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15, 20 years as an aspiration that, hey, as you described,
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we have this hub and spoke model where unlike Europe, where we've got a big
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collective defense agreement in, in the United States or in, in Asia,
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the only formal security treaties outside of maybe one between China and
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North Korea are treaties that countries have singularly with the United States.
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There are no Intra-Asian defense treaties.
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So.
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But what we did see, I think, you know, credit to the Biden administration for
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bringing partners together.
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But at the same time we were riding a wave of trends that was
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enabling this in ways never before.
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And, and one of those trends was that what we saw in our, our closest partner
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countries is that they themselves were becoming increasingly alarmed about
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the China challenge in terms of their, the direct threat to their interests,
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whether it was India, Australia, Japan, Philippines, others.
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It wasn't the United States going into these meetings and
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saying, don't you realize that you're facing this threat from China?
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Or maybe that's what it was five, 10 years ago,
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that this time around it was fascinating for me to walk into these meetings and
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feel like the recitation we were hearing from our partners was very
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similar to what we were describing ourselves.
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And so these countries in many ways were already underway in terms of their
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own strategic transformation.
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India talking about China rather than Pakistan as its primary national
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security threat.
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The Australians talking about the threat to Australia rather than believing
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that China was sort of this distant issue and
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its military ought to be off in the Middle east doing stabilization operations.
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And of course, what we've seen in the Philippines,
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a total transformation from a defense strategy focused on internal security
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to one focused on external security.
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And then Japan in many ways leading the way in terms of thinking about some really
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fundamental changes to its historically much more reticent military and
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defense strategy.
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So these changes are all underway, and the United States is meeting these countries
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in the middle where their partnerships are.
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And then second, exactly as you described, the degree of intra Asian cooperation
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has been really interesting and encouraging over the last several years.
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And that was also in the context of these partners wanting to work more with
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the United States.
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So it was not a just a hedge or somehow a movement away from the United States, but
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it was behavior that was happening independent of Washington.
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And the, the relationship, for instance, between Australia and Japan,
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you have experts describing that as alliance like, and
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all of these new cooperative efforts and, and diplomatic efforts.
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So you're right, we were able to harness those together.
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Rahm Emanuel and others did describe it as, as lattice work.
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I think we struggled to find the right metaphor for this kind of activity.
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But a web or a network, as you described, I think is the best description.
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And really the important point of this is that as I would describe it,
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these are complementary and overlapping institutions.
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It was not that one was the prime at the expense of others.
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And that's important because with ASEAN there, the Southeast Asia
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centered regional organization, it was important to be seen as being
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complementary to what was going on in the region and not exclusive to that.
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But I think these were more fit for purpose.
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And the different constellations of countries were in many
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ways working on problems that they could all unite around.
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And that was one of the important features.
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But it was a really exciting period.
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And I'll say it was a challenge too, from a strategic perspective,
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because we went from a period where, again, folks had been aspiring to have
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this kind of cooperation for a long time with our partners in these new ways.
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And very quickly we went from just dialogue and
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meetings to actual military cooperation.
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And there was even an excess of opportunity all of a sudden.
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So it required more prioritization about, okay, which of these really matter if
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we're going to send our leaders together, how should we focus?
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But a really important evolution in the regional security structure.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: Okay, so I think you can safely say that you left office
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having dramatically improved the sort of security
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architecture in the Indo Pacific and the US Position within it.
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Enter the Trump administration.
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Early on, we heard talk of some spheres of influence, I think,
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leading some people to believe that the United States,
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you know, was simply going to be focused on north and South America.
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We were basically ceding Europe to Russia, and
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China was going to have the Asia or the Indo Pacific.
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But I think that's not quite right.
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And I think what we've seen, and I want to get your take on this, is that, you know,
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Secretary Hexa, Secretary of Defense Hexa, former National Security Advisor Waltz,
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Secretary of State Rubio, really, you know, quietly.
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And then I think with Secretary Hegseth's speech at Shangri La dialogue,
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not so quietly.
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What they seem to be doing sounds a lot like what the Biden administration
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was doing.
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It seems that there's more continuity than change.
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Doesn't seem as though we're actually ceding the Indo or
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the Asia Pacific to China, and
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that maybe our sort of position with regard to Russia and Europe is different
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from our position with regard to China and the Indo or Asia Pacific.
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So how do you understand the Trump administration strategy?
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I haven't seen a great articulation of it, except for
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Secretary Hegseth's speech at Shangri La.
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I don't know whether you were there, but I'd be interested to get your take
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on what exactly how you think that the strategy is shaping up.
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>> Ely Ratner: Yeah, again, I think you've,
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you've provided a good context there, Liz.
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The I don't think yet we have seen either a coherent presentation
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of a singular grand strategy from the Trump administration or
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for that matter, of a, of a China strategy per se.
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I think we have seen different elements of that on the defense and security space.
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I think there is a little more clarity, which is what you're describing,
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which is that a lot of the early moves by the Trump administration, particularly as
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it relates to NATO and Europe, did present a certain orientation and
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skepticism toward alliances and partnerships.
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And folks frankly were watching to see how would that map on to the Indo Pacific.
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And thankfully, from my perspective, I think it has looked quite different that
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the Secretary Hegseth first made his first trip to the region to Philippines and
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Japan, and sent a very traditional message there of US Commitment to the region.
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And then as you mentioned just recently out in Singapore for
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the Shangri La dialogue, articulated a set of priorities on defense policy.
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Now, there were parts of the speech that were uniquely to the Trump administration,
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but when it came to the part of the speech of okay, on a no kidding activities,
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operations, exercises perspective, defense and
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security policy perspective, what are the priorities of the administration?
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And what they ticked through were very familiar focus areas that,
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that we were working on over the last several years, including force posture,
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as I described that building out that more distributed, mobile, resilient,
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lethal force posture, more cooperation on defense industrial base and
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efforts to strengthen the capabilities of our allies and partners, and
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many of the activities that Secretary Hegseth has advanced, broadened,
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strengthened, continued, do have their roots in the Biden administration.
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So I think that that's a good thing.
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And the overriding message of one of US Commitment to the region and US Commitment
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to allies and partners was welcome in the region and is a good message.
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So I do hope that continues.
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The challenge, of course, is that in the areas of economics and
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foreign assistance and on some other diplomatic measures,
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you do have actions that are being taken that are creating a lot of stir and
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tension within these broader bilateral relationships in the region.
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And I think the question is what is the push and
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pull going to be between what seems to be an effort in Washington, but
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also in the region to continue on the defense cooperation and
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the security cooperation because of the challenges from China and
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North Korea as well, but from particularly from China?
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On the one hand, that has a very strong motivator behind it.
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On the other hand, some of the economic and trade and
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tariff issues do create headwinds.
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So at what point do the politics and the economics of the tariffs become so
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overriding that they become very negative upon the trade the defense and
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security, that's a big question.
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It hasn't happened yet.
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So the, the ability to silo, we have seen to date,
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but there are probably limits to that.
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But to your broader question, I think for
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now we have seen relative continuity and, and also reporting that the Trump
22:17
administration has put out an interim national defense strategy
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internally to the department with China as a priority for the department.
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And that national defense strategy is reportedly due to the secretary at
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the end of August.
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So we may see the first formal articulation of at least defense strategy,
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if not a national security strategy, by the end of the summer.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: Let me ask you, because, you know, in the trade space,
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of course, you know,
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people were describing the range of perspectives within the cabinet and
22:52
among the sort of senior advisors as, you know, a team of rivals, right.
22:57
You had very different perspectives.
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Everybody from deeply engaged in trade with China on
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the sort of Elon Musk side to Peter Navarro, who would be,
23:05
forget about strategic decoupling, let's just decouple the two economies.
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I mean, do you sense that there's a similar debate or range of perspectives
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on the defense and security side when it comes to the Indo Pacific?
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I mean, I have been struck by some of the appointments that seem to be more
23:24
in the Taiwan doesn't need to be a, you know,
23:27
strategic national priority for the United States.
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It's not essential to our national security.
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You know, there seems to be a little bit of difference of opinion.
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If you look at some voices in the administration again, they,
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they don't seem to be, you know, at the forefront right now.
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But I wonder whether you have any thoughts about, you know,
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is there a kind of team of rivals as well on the security and
23:53
defense part when it comes to our China security strategy?
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>> Ely Ratner: I think there, there are different perspectives throughout
24:00
the administration as, as you've described.
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And there, there are folks who come from more of a,
24:05
what's often called a restrainer background which wants to
24:08
see the United States less involved in international affairs.
24:12
I think that is predominantly been a reaction to wars in Iraq and
24:16
Afghanistan and some of our policies in the Middle east and
24:20
even possibly some of the ways in which we've been engaged in Ukraine.
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So in some ways that element or that national security orientation has been
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more focused on reducing or undoing commitments in other parts of the world
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and hasn't always been very focused on the Indo Pacific.
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So I think the arguments of that community are maybe stronger,
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more strongly applied to other places.
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You do have the prioritizers or the China hawks or as they're described,
24:50
who want to put forward a, a national security strategy more focused on China.
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And then I think you have folks in the administration who aren't particularly
25:00
concerned about geopolitics in general and
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come to the region with that economic orientation.
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So I think we are seeing different bits and pieces of that.
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But at least the Pentagon seems to be driving pretty
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clearly from a prioritization perspective of the prc.
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And we have, like you said, some of those more skeptical voices may still be
25:23
existent, but haven't, haven't really manifested themselves.
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But I think it is the interplay in part between the national security folks and
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the economic policy folks that, that may be determinative here.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: Okay, so I think that's a perfect segue to your great piece
25:42
in foreign affairs calling for a Pacific Defense Act.
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I think it threads the needle in ways that really smart between not actually
25:51
committing us to too much more in ways that might appeal to those restrainers,
25:57
but also being forward leaning and actually doing things that bolster our
26:01
security and the security of our allies and partners.
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So talk to us about what the specific security or
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defense pact would actually look like.
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>> Ely Ratner: Yeah, happy to, happy to do that.
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And this is all building upon the earlier part of our conversation about
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the trends of greater strategic alignment between the United States and
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some of its core partners vis a vis the China challenge, and
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then that growing intra Asian cooperation as well.
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And thinking about as we were doing that building of networks,
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that building of webs, that lattice work.
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How do we think about that in terms of a longer term strategy?
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And it's my view that the Biden administration was a really important
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period in terms of generating momentum in that regard, but
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that the existing panoply of informal organizations is not going to
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be sufficient in the long term for true combat credible deterrence
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because it is Important it is bringing our allies together.
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In terms of the current mechanisms.
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We do have some cooperative product projects, but when you come,
27:14
when it comes to no kidding, military operations and exercises, it isn't.
27:20
It lacks the formality that you need to actually do no kidding, command and
27:25
control, no kidding military planning, operations and exercises, et cetera.
27:31
So to truly achieve what we're going to need in terms of that whole being greater
27:36
than the sum of the parts, we need more formal military mechanisms.
27:41
It can't just be a sort of a pickup game that happens every once in a while.
27:45
So the proposal that I put forward in Foreign affairs said, look,
27:49
we need to move in this direction.
27:52
The military challenge from China is sufficient that it's going to require more
27:56
focused deterrent power from allies and partners.
27:59
And if you look historically, there have been both conceptual and
28:04
real efforts to try to build some kind of collective defense or
28:08
multilateral security organization in the past.
28:11
But it all, it has always stumbled over the fact that it's a very big region,
28:16
you've got a lot of different kinds of partners with
28:19
different kinds of interests, and
28:21
a pan regional organization like NATO doesn't make sense in the Indo Pacific.
28:25
So one of the important parts of the proposal that I put forward,
28:29
it is limited on at least starting with the core group of Australia, Japan,
28:34
Philippines and the United States as that set of countries that is most aligned
28:40
on the challenge and most cooperatively working together already and
28:44
most prepared to be moving forward in a collective defense arrangement.
28:49
So that's the proposal so far.
28:52
I also think, you know, one aspect of this that we haven't talked about so
28:57
far that we did hear from Secretary Hegseth in Singapore has been a call for
29:01
US Allies and partners to do more in these relationships.
29:05
That the context has changed, the military is balance has changed, and
29:09
it's not going to work anymore to have a region essentially configured such that
29:14
the United States is the primary defender of our allies and partners.
29:18
We need to be doing that more together.
29:20
They need to be stepping up more.
29:22
And that is a, I think, a shared view on both sides of the aisle.
29:26
I don't think that's just.
29:27
And frankly, among the American people and public opinion polling, they like
29:30
alliances, but they want the allies to be contributing more in the strategic and
29:34
political environment is calling for that.
29:36
So as they're stepping up too, as they're working more with each other and as we're
29:42
all more aligned on China, I think it creates the context for an actual viable
29:46
collective defense arrangement that hasn't been necessarily possible historically.
29:53
>> Elizabeth Economy: So One of the things that surprised me when I, when as I was
29:56
reading through, you know, and then you address it a little bit later is I think,
30:00
what about South Korea, you know, or how to bring in Vietnam?
30:03
I mean, there are clearly other, you know, allies and
30:07
partners that, you know, we'd want to have included in some form.
30:12
Is it a matter of sequencing where you're starting with, you know, these four and
30:17
then you would imagine bringing others in as time goes on, or are there sort of
30:21
tangential ways that they can be aligned with, if not formally in the organization?
30:27
>> Ely Ratner: Well, I would say yes to all of those things.
30:30
So first thing to say again is that this is not the proposal,
30:35
is not that this is the end all and be all of security cooperation in the region and
30:40
everyone else be damned, that US Alliances with Korea, cooperation with Korea and
30:46
Japan in the Quad Aukus, all of those other configurations could still continue.
30:53
So this is not again, at the expense of other relationships and
30:58
partnerships and whatnot.
31:00
But the Korea question, the South Korea question is a really good one.
31:03
I think.
31:04
You're not alone.
31:05
It's the question I get most frequently from a perspective of the membership
31:09
question.
31:11
And the answer is, look, it's a decision for Seoul.
31:13
It's not a decision for Washington and South Korea's even, even prior to
31:18
the election they've just had that has brought in a more progressive government,
31:22
even under conservative, national security minded,
31:25
what some would consider hawkish, defense oriented governments.
31:29
In Seoul, their focus has been almost squarely on North Korea and
31:33
they have been hesitant to be engaging in what regional security cooperation that
31:39
distracts them from that or takes a sharper position at times against China.
31:45
So that was something we tried to advance during the Biden administration to draw
31:49
and work with South Korea in other parts of the region.
31:53
Their own national security strategy called for
31:55
that themselves to be doing more in Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands.
31:59
But those efforts are very nascent.
32:02
They have a vibrant defense industrial base.
32:05
They're active on security cooperation, but
32:07
from an operational perspective with their military, they have yet
32:11
to be a really robust partner in the South China Sea or the East China Sea.
32:16
So they would have to reorient their national defense and security strategy in
32:20
a pretty significant way away from that singular focus on North Korea.
32:25
And they would also have to be willing to work with Japan and
32:28
cooperate with Japan more than they have to date.
32:31
So my answer would be the door is absolutely open.
32:34
They would make a splendid contribution, but I'm not.
32:37
I'm not sure they're ready to walk through that door.
32:40
And there are others like New Zealand, who potentially, over time,
32:44
might be interested in, in joining an organization like this.
32:48
And then I think the way that you described it is right, that for
32:52
other countries, whether it's India or Vietnam, there could be
32:56
opportunities to plug in in various ways as we have informal observers or
33:01
other types of participants and regional organizations.
33:05
But I think as it stands now, a country like India or
33:09
Vietnam is not going to be willing to join a security pact, period,
33:15
much less one that is quite focused on, on the China challenge.
33:20
But that's okay.
33:21
And I think waiting for all of the stars to align of every US Ally and
33:26
partner in the region is going to leave us waiting for Godot here.
33:30
So I think it's important that we, you know,
33:33
move forward with a ready constellation.
33:36
And frankly, if you look at the combination of Australia and Japan and
33:39
the Philippines, I think you get a lot of the way that you need to go.
33:44
Again, if we're talking about the practicalities of deterrence in
33:48
the western Pacific, that set of countries provides a very strong foundation.
33:54
>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah, no, I thought it was an exciting idea.
33:56
Another thing that struck me, it reminded me a little bit of that moment
34:01
in the Biden administration where there seemed to be a push for
34:05
closer coordination between our Asian allies and partners and NATO.
34:10
And, and then it seemed as though it didn't get quite the formal
34:15
construct that maybe we were hoping for.
34:19
But I guess I'm asking, do you see the potential then for
34:23
involvement from European allies and partners in this construct, as you say,
34:27
not, not immediately, not initially, but would you see that as a,
34:31
as a positive, or would it be something that you think would trigger China in
34:36
a way that would be more dangerous than not?
34:39
How do you think about that, you know, sort of bridge from, from the Indo Pacific
34:44
to Europe and the kind of coordination and cooperation that might be useful?
34:51
>> Ely Ratner: Yeah, so those are Two really important questions.
34:54
And let me answer specifically as it relates to the pac, but I want to broaden
34:58
that out a little bit because I think it's an important question strategically.
35:03
I agree with the Trump administration's general focus vis a vis Europe.
35:10
To say Europe you got to,
35:12
you should be focused primarily on Europe in terms of a defense partner
35:17
that is not at the exclusion of cooperation in the Indo Pacific.
35:21
But I think the it is important for
35:23
the Europeans to be playing a much more significant role on the continent.
35:28
And right now, conceiving of European powers playing a really significant
35:34
operational role in the Indo Pacific in a sort of a planning perspective,
35:39
I think is probably a bridge too far.
35:42
So I would say I think that's important to look at down the road.
35:46
It's not something that I would reach for right this minute more broadly to
35:51
sort of caveat further what I just said about Europe's role.
35:55
I do think the we have seen reporting that the Trump administration has been
36:00
really skeptical of the value of Europe at all participating in the Indo Pacific.
36:06
And I think they just need to be more flexible in that regard.
36:09
And I think we're seeing some of that already.
36:10
And in fact, Secretary Hegseth was asked about this out in Singapore during
36:15
the Shangri La dialogue, and he gave a much more nuanced answer about, well,
36:19
there probably are some opportunities where Europe could make important
36:23
contributions that was less ideologically rigid than some of
36:26
the earlier statements that we had heard.
36:29
So I think that's really good because again, I don't think that Europe's
36:33
going to have in the short term a really big war fighting role in the Indo Pacific.
36:38
But absolutely they have a role to play in strengthening Taiwan's defense and
36:43
resilience.
36:44
So there are unique capabilities that they can be providing to Taiwan to
36:48
strengthen deterrence across the Taiwan Strait.
36:52
They can also be engaging in operational activity like Taiwan Strait transits,
36:56
freedom of navigation operations.
36:58
>> Elizabeth Economy: Why wouldn't we want them doing that, right?
37:01
I mean, is the press- >> Ely Ratner: Exactly.
37:03
No, I mean, I mean, the argument is some folks say that's
37:06
drawing away from the work they need to be doing in Europe.
37:09
But I think we can, I think we can do both if it's, if it's sufficiently measured.
37:14
Because I think the issue here is a little bit from Europe goes a really long way in
37:18
the Indo Pacific.
37:20
And then there are areas like the Pacific Islands, the French are a resident power
37:25
there, that, that Europe can play an important role as well,
37:28
not to mention sort of in the exercise space as well,
37:32
where we've seen European powers operating with the United States and
37:36
others in a collective fashion that has deterrence power.
37:40
So again, I think there are meaningful, properly scaled contributions
37:44
that Europe can and should be making to the Indo Pacific.
37:48
And also it's not Washington's role or
37:51
ability to tell Europe what they can and can't do.
37:54
So the other thing that happened out in Shangri La is we had President Macron
37:59
there giving the keynote that had elements of strategic autonomy and,
38:03
and Europe as an alternative power to the United States and Asia.
38:07
And that is not in America's interest to have Europe be a straight up
38:12
competitor in Asia.
38:14
And in many ways we want to be cooperating with Europe as it relates to
38:18
the China challenge.
38:20
So it's not if they're going to be doing it anyway,
38:22
we ought to be coordinating and cooperating as they do it.
38:26
>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah, 100%.
38:27
So let me ask you one last question here and have you previewed or
38:31
did you preview this idea with any of your allies and partners in the region?
38:37
Like, had the Australians or the Japanese or
38:39
the Filipinos actually heard this idea from you before?
38:43
And if so, what did they say?
38:45
Or maybe you've, you've heard from them since the article was published.
38:48
So I'm just curious, what is the regional reaction?
38:54
>> Ely Ratner: It's been interesting.
38:55
You know, a lot of it is very quietly behind closed doors.
39:01
I can't say this in public, but you're right, absolutely, we have to do this.
39:06
Others are saying, you know, thank you for opening up this debate, which frankly,
39:10
was the purpose of the article.
39:12
The article was not to hand over a blueprint, go ahead and do this.
39:15
It was to generate a discussion about an idea that has been
39:20
batted around for a long time.
39:23
And this was an argument for why the time may have come and
39:26
we ought to have a serious discussion about this.
39:28
So I've heard from a lot of quarters in the U.S. government, in the U.S.
39:34
military, among our allies and partners that are very encouraging.
39:40
At the same time, political leaders in Canberra and
39:43
elsewhere are dealing with some of those economic and political tensions.
39:48
And it's hard for them to lean forward right now and say, you know, now's
39:53
the time that we need to do something really ambitious with the United States.
39:57
So aligning the politics to actually do something like this will
40:02
take a lot of leadership and the right sort of political moment.
40:08
But at the same time, one of the things that is embedded in
40:12
the article is the point that a lot of the foundation for
40:16
something like this, the pieces are already being built.
40:21
And so this is to say, let's accelerate, let's keep going, let's be focused.
40:27
And as we build our cooperative elements out in the Indo Pacific,
40:31
whether it's new command and control efforts in Japan or
40:35
in the Philippines, or new intelligence sharing mechanisms.
40:39
Or maritime domain awareness operations, that we think about how to ensure that we
40:44
are either including or can include this constellation of partners.
40:48
And so the foundation, the defense establishments, can continue moving
40:53
forward on this without necessarily political leaders putting up a,
40:57
a big banner.
40:58
And frankly, also, the amount of work that needs to be done between now and
41:03
the actual rollout of an initiative like this means that, in practice.
41:08
It could be something that happens subsequent to
41:11
Donald Trump's second term as it relates to the calendar.
41:14
So maybe that would open up political imagination for people as well.
41:19
But I recognize the challenging political environment.
41:22
That's something that people always say,
41:25
how could you be proposing something like this at a time where
41:29
the Trump administration is so hostile to our alliances?
41:33
And the response to that in part is, look at what's actually happening
41:37
in the Indo-Pacific, which is a story of continuity and moving forward.
41:42
And also, yeah, we got to figure out how we're gonna work on to align the economic
41:47
piece with the security piece.
41:49
So recognize the challenges.
41:51
But I think the need for it is so great.
41:53
And the sort of megatrends that are bigger than the Trump administration
41:57
are driving us toward this anyway.
41:59
>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah and I mean, I think again,
42:01
one of the really smart things in the article is that it doesn't call out for
42:06
a huge new investment of US Military resources and funding.
42:10
That's not the centerpiece of your argument, right?
42:13
What it really is about is coordination, working together, aligning, command and
42:18
control, doing these kinds of things.
42:21
And so to the, you're not saying we need to be spending more,
42:25
as the centerpiece of this new Pacific defense pact.
42:28
And I think that's got to be an appealing element for the Trump administration.
42:33
But as you say.
42:34
>> Ely Ratner: Not only that.
42:34
Let me, let me just build on that for two seconds because it's worth saying one more
42:38
thing about this, which is from the allies perspective,
42:41
they already have a treaty with the United States.
42:43
They already have a defense treaty with Donald Trump's United States.
42:48
And so that already exists what we're talking about here.
42:51
The real novel innovation here is actually the intra Asian connections and
42:56
formalizing mutual obligation between the partners.
43:00
And in many ways that's something that should be an attract,
43:03
that should be even more attractive in an environment where there are questions
43:07
about where the United States might come down on some of these issues.
43:11
So the, the big leap is between the Asian partners.
43:14
And exactly as you're right, exactly as you're describing from the US perspective,
43:20
there are no new obligations or spending.
43:22
>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah, okay, so I always end with a couple of quick
43:25
questions just to get your, your thoughts and your input so
43:29
that our listeners can take away some additional piece of advice.
43:33
So when you think about the China space and what article or
43:38
book would you recommend to our listeners?
43:41
What should they read to get maybe more up to
43:44
speed on the kinds of issues that you're talking about?
43:49
>> Ely Ratner: Well, maybe I'll give you a book that was instructive to me as
43:53
I've been coming up through the field and it's not one about sort of the guns and
43:57
bombs of the PLA.
43:58
But I really enjoyed Evan Osnos's book Age of Ambition,
44:03
which is now maybe 10 plus years old, if not quite a bit older than that,
44:09
which was I think, just really interesting to hear about the people in China.
44:15
And how they're experiencing all the different forces that are driving through
44:19
that country.
44:20
Having lived there myself and traveled extensively around the country.
44:25
Even though the writing that I do and the work that I do is often at the national
44:29
level and the geopolitical level and about big structural forces.
44:34
Understanding what life in reality looks like on the ground in that country
44:39
at an individual level, I think, is really important and super interesting.
44:45
So that is something that has always stuck with me and
44:49
I always enjoy those kinds of books.
44:52
>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah, it was a great book and
44:53
was of course a national Book Award winning.
44:55
>> Ely Ratner: Right, so it's not just me, I guess.
44:56
Yeah, so and he's sort of a good writer too, that guy.
44:59
I don't know if anyone heard of him.
45:01
>> Elizabeth Economy: And so that you and millions of other people would.
45:03
>> Ely Ratner: Yes, so maybe all your viewers have already read it, but if not,
45:08
go to your local library.
45:10
And then the other, I would just say the other thing that I enjoy reading as
45:14
somebody who is not deeply steeped in economics,
45:16
is all the work coming out of the Rhodium Group and Dan Rosen.
45:20
I think they're doing some of the most interesting on the ground economic
45:24
analysis.
45:24
So much of what we read about the Chinese economy is coming from officialdom, and
45:28
I think they have a great job,
45:30
do a great job of sort of cutting through that with a different perspective.
45:33
So I consume all of their work every chance I get.
45:38
>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah, 100% and actually,
45:40
you had Dan on the podcast earlier this year.
45:44
Okay, if there's an issue that you think that we need to know more
45:50
about when it comes to China and we don't, what would that be?
45:54
>> Ely Ratner: Well, I would say one issue that I have been increasingly
45:59
interested in talking to allies and partners has been the role of
46:04
Chinese influence in democracies around the Indo Pacific.
46:10
It is interesting to me, having been the role that I was in before and
46:14
continuing some of those conversations with allies and partners.
46:17
It's really fascinating the degree to which, whether it's Australia,
46:23
Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, India, all of these leaders.
46:29
They're worried about the national security issues and
46:32
the external defense issues.
46:33
But they're also really worried about what's happening in their own politics in
46:37
terms of the ways in which parts of the Chinese system are affecting and
46:41
manipulating their media environment, their political environment.
46:45
And they're all going through it on a very individual basis, but
46:48
it's a pattern that's replicated throughout the region.
46:51
So I know that there are folks who have worked on this issue and
46:53
studied this issue.
46:54
But from a policy and strategy perspective, it feels to me like one that
46:59
merits a little bit more attention because of the really significant effect that
47:03
it's gonna have on not only our allies and partners, but on US interests as well.
47:08
>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah, I agree. I mean, some countries in the region,
47:11
like Australia, certainly Australia was really the canary in the coal mine,
47:15
I think, when it, comes to this issue.
47:17
But there are many others that are probably not have not mounted as
47:21
robust a research or defense effort as they probably need to.
47:26
Okay, one last question.
47:28
What do you think is the likelihood of a Nixon Mao sort of transformative moment
47:34
in the US China relationship between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump?
47:40
>> Ely Ratner: I would score it as relatively low, and
47:42
I don't think that's because of Donald Trump.
47:45
We may get something that is announced or looks or
47:49
pretends to be some very significant historic breakthrough.
47:53
But my personal perspective on these issues, Liz,
47:57
as is that the United States and China have competing visions of the future.
48:02
I don't think there is a lot of overlap in our Venn diagrams of our preferred
48:06
outcomes for the Indo Pacific.
48:08
And I think it's a challenge of competing interests that will need to be wrestled
48:12
out over time.
48:13
And I don't think at this point there is a grand strategic bargain to be struck.
48:18
So if one were announced or attempted,
48:21
I don't think it would sustain for very long.
48:24
And we're just gonna have to work through this period and
48:27
with the proposals we've been talking about today.
48:30
Try to find a way to thread the needle to maintain peace and stability through
48:35
a period that, from my perspective, will be a very contested environment that
48:40
in some ways, is separated from the personalities of the leaders themselves.
48:45
>> Elizabeth Economy: Well, Ely I can't thank you enough for taking the time to
48:50
speak with me today and for sharing really just a fascinating set of insights and
48:56
vision, I think, for the future of Indo-Pacific security.
49:01
I think you are always on the cutting edge when it comes to thinking about new ideas
49:06
for the United States and what we need to do to advance our regional security.
49:10
So really appreciate your ideas and your time and of course,
49:14
your service and look forward to the next administration when perhaps
49:19
you won't just be Assistant Secretary of Defense.
49:23
But who knows what role you might play in the next Democratic administration?
49:28
So thank you so much for joining us.
49:32
>> Ely Ratner: Yeah, thanks so much, Liz.
49:33
Great discussion.
49:34
>> Elizabeth Economy: So if you enjoyed this podcast and
49:36
want to hear more reasoned discourse and debate on China, I encourage you to
49:40
subscribe to China Considered via The Hoover Institution YouTube channel or
49:43
podcast platform of your choice.
49:45
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