Latest / Eye Spy: The Intelligence History Podcast / Watching The Watchers
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome to EyeSpy, the Intelligence History Podcast.
- 0:08I'm your host, Krystel von Kumberg.
- 0:12Every few weeks, I'm going to be interviewing historians, practitioners and scholars in
- 0:16the field of intelligence to explore some aspect of the past and what it can tell us
- 0:21about the present and future of intelligence studies.
- 0:28Joining us today is Dr. Henry Thompson, Associate Professor in the School of Politics and Global
- 0:33Studies at Arizona State University.
- 0:37In his new book, Watching the Watchers, Communist Elites to Secret Police and Social Order in
- 0:41Cold War Europe, he outlines a new theoretical and empirical framework exploring how authoritarian
- 0:47regimes in Central and Eastern Europe manage their secret police forces, delving into the
- 0:52specific dynamics of elite cohesion and coercive capacity in socialist dictatorships from 1945
- 0:57to 1989.
- 1:01Thank you for joining us on EyeSpy, the Intelligence History Podcast.
- 1:06It's such an honor to have you here today.
- 1:09So your book, Watching the Watchers, makes several significant contributions, including
- 1:14a theoretical framework linking elite cohesion to coercive capacity and social order, enriching
- 1:20today's theoretical discourse on authoritarian regimes.
- 1:23Could you begin by unpacking your research process and what initially inspired you to
- 1:29write this book?
- 1:30Sure, of course.
- 1:31Thank you for having me.
- 1:33This is a lot of fun and I'm looking forward to the conversation.
- 1:37So this book is my second book project and it really emerged from my interest in authoritarian
- 1:44regimes.
- 1:45I have been studying transitions to democracy and authoritarian governments for a while.
- 1:53My first book was actually about food policy under dictatorship and how dictatorships try
- 1:58and weigh up the different interests, competing interests of food consumers versus food producers
- 2:04to try and buy off these different groups in society and stay in power.
- 2:09As I was researching that book, I became more interested rather than being interested in
- 2:14agriculture and food, which was something that I was interested in when I first started
- 2:19that book, I became more interested actually in authoritarian governance as a political
- 2:23phenomenon and the different problems associated with it.
- 2:26And that led me pretty naturally, I think, to want to study repression and coercion.
- 2:33And I also am a Germanist.
- 2:36So my first degree was in German literature.
- 2:38I lived in Berlin for several years.
- 2:40I did a master's degree in international relations in Berlin and became kind of fascinated with
- 2:45the East German regime and with the Stasi while I was over there as a student.
- 2:51So when I would have visitors, I would take them to the Stasi, former Stasi prison out
- 2:56in Hohenschönhausen.
- 2:58I would take them to visit the old section to the Berlin Wall and the museum along the
- 3:02Berlin Wall.
- 3:05I had this slightly, slightly, I guess, personal story about the Stasi, which is that I used
- 3:11to attend a sports club or be a member of a sports club, which is the former Stasi sports
- 3:18club that's now known as SC Berlin, but it used to be known as Dynamo Berlin, which was
- 3:24the Stasi affiliated sports club.
- 3:26And so I used to go out there and train a lot.
- 3:29And I always had this weird feeling going out there knowing that this club used to be
- 3:34sort of managed by the Stasi.
- 3:37So I had this fascination with repression and coercion, and I knew a bit about the Stasi
- 3:43and repression in East Germany.
- 3:45And so it was actually maybe whatever, seven or eight years ago when I was a postdoc, but
- 3:50I thought, okay, now you're finishing this book about food policy under dictatorship
- 3:56and you want to look at different aspects of dictatorship.
- 3:59Why don't you try and study East Germany and see what data you can find?
- 4:02And so that was when I first started this journey of trying to find data on East Germany,
- 4:09trying to find data on the Stasi and just to see what I could find.
- 4:13And quite quickly, it became clear that there was a lot of data on East Germany.
- 4:19And I wrote a couple of papers on East Germany, one actually about food policy in East Germany,
- 4:25about how they tried to manipulate basic food supplies after this uprising in the early
- 4:321950s to try and basically distribute resources to areas that had been more restive.
- 4:40And I wrote another paper about the determinants of that uprising itself in the early 1950s.
- 4:46And I discovered that even at the sub-national level, there were a lot of data on the Stasi
- 4:50and East Germany because after the transition to democracy, they'd set up this research
- 4:55center that managed the Stasi archive and they had historians working there.
- 4:59As you well know, they'd have just been putting out a ton of data and a ton of research reports.
- 5:04So I thought, okay, this is really interesting.
- 5:08Maybe I'll write a book about the Stasi.
- 5:10And so then I started to research the Stasi and I kind of realized that the historians
- 5:15had already written a tremendous amount about the Stasi and I wasn't clear exactly whether
- 5:21I could make any sort of an independent original contribution there.
- 5:27And so I then at some point during this process, I was reading about the communist regimes
- 5:33in Eastern Europe and about their secret police.
- 5:35I stumbled across Anne Applebaum's book, Iron Curtain.
- 5:39I don't know if you know it, but it's kind of like a pop or crossover academic trade
- 5:46press book about the imposition of communist rule in that region.
- 5:51And she has some sections where she would discuss the relative size and the activities
- 5:54of the different secret police agencies just for this short snippet of time before Stalin
- 5:59died, I think.
- 6:00And I thought, oh, that's really interesting.
- 6:03I wonder where she's getting those data from.
- 6:04So I looked at the bibliography and I found that there were these base studies that have
- 6:10been published as this handbook that had comparative data on the size of the agencies.
- 6:17And it wasn't for all of the cases in Eastern Europe.
- 6:20It was maybe for three or four.
- 6:22But I thought it was maybe a start, and that's how I got the idea to do this comparative
- 6:27study, which I ended up writing, which is to not just be about East Germany, but to
- 6:31compare East Germany to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
- 6:38And so I started this quite involved and long process of trying to gather a comparative
- 6:43data set on those agencies, how big they were, the type of activities that they did.
- 6:52And then I began to gather related data sets as well.
- 6:55But it's kind of, I guess, this story about a theoretical interest in authoritarian regimes
- 7:01combined with my regional expertise or the experience of having lived in post-communist
- 7:07East Berlin that really got me interested in studying these agencies.
- 7:13So you use this mix of qualitative and quantitative evidence in your book.
- 7:20And I'm wondering what challenges did you encounter when selecting your research methods
- 7:25and approaching this history?
- 7:28And how did you overcome these?
- 7:30Yeah, so the book is comparative and the kind of basic setup is really a most similar cases
- 7:40design.
- 7:41So you have these very similar, six very similar communist regimes that are all set up at the
- 7:47same time under heavy Soviet influence, as you well know.
- 7:52And they have very similar secret police agencies that are all modeled on the NKVD.
- 7:58And then after 1953, they diverge.
- 8:01They all look very similar and are doing very similar things before 1953.
- 8:06And then after Stalin dies, they diverge.
- 8:09And so I have this really interesting for comparative politics scholar, really interesting
- 8:14puzzle where we have these very similar cases, why they end up so different.
- 8:19And that's a really compelling research design.
- 8:23And as you said before, my explanation for it is the way that Stalin's death affected
- 8:28each of these regimes.
- 8:30So where Stalin's death caused a transition in the leadership, these elite coalitions
- 8:37were disrupted.
- 8:38They could no longer trust each other.
- 8:40They could no longer trust their secret police and they shrank the size of the secret police
- 8:45to keep it under control.
- 8:47But in East Germany and Romania, where the Stalinist coalitions were not disrupted in
- 8:531953, they continued to trust their secret police.
- 8:56They continued to see them as having this massive role in the regime.
- 9:00And they grew their secret police agencies basically for the duration of communist rule.
- 9:06And so in the book, it appears as this really nice comparative research design where you
- 9:11have these very similar cases with different outcomes.
- 9:14And not only that, they're very similar and then they diverge.
- 9:17So there's this kind of interesting, what I call a difference in difference type phenomenon,
- 9:23which I have obviously from more quantitative approach in political science or social science
- 9:29more generally.
- 9:30But that didn't emerge before I started the book, that emerged as time went on.
- 9:38And so first of all, it was quite challenging to gather comparative data on these cases
- 9:45in the first place.
- 9:46So the East German case, there were lots of data.
- 9:49The Polish case, there were lots of data.
- 9:51The Czechoslovak case, there were lots of data.
- 9:54But the Hungarian case, I had to really dig and to contact researchers in Hungary that
- 9:59eventually provided me the data.
- 10:01And Bulgaria and Romania, there's just not a lot of data on those countries.
- 10:06And so I had to just cobble things together.
- 10:08It took me a long time reading a lot of secondary sources in English and in German to try and
- 10:13get all the data I could on Bulgaria and Romania.
- 10:17And then after I collected this data, it took me a long time to make sense of what was going
- 10:21on, to be perfectly honest.
- 10:23And even I was very surprised at this divergence, and I wasn't, from the outset of the project,
- 10:31even clear that I wanted to study this divergence in 1953 because I didn't actually know that
- 10:37it had occurred.
- 10:38And so it was only after collecting this data and doing a lot of descriptive analysis that
- 10:42I was able to even identify this really important story of divergence after 1953 that I try
- 10:50and explain in the book.
- 10:52And so then I had a basic story based on very simple indicators of how big the agencies
- 10:59were, how many offices they employed, and how many secret informants they had registered
- 11:03with each national agency.
- 11:05What I basically could show was that in the cases where there'd been a more profound disruptive
- 11:11transition after Stalin's death, those indicators diverged so that the more stable regimes had
- 11:18much larger agencies, whereas the destabilized regimes had much more agencies.
- 11:23But I couldn't really tell you essentially why.
- 11:27I mean, I had a story about why.
- 11:30And I couldn't tell you whether that mattered for any sort of outcome on the ground in terms
- 11:35of repression or how people resisted or opposed these regimes.
- 11:39I couldn't tell you about the mechanisms that linked this elite transition to the size of
- 11:44the agencies.
- 11:45I had to do a lot more work to cobble together more information from different sources to
- 11:51tell that story in more detail.
- 11:53And so what I did was on the one hand, I gathered some more quantitative data on the people
- 11:59who were running the agencies and on other ministerial and polar bureau elites in these
- 12:05countries.
- 12:06And then I did a couple of case studies, one of East Germany and one of Poland, where East
- 12:11Germany is a case that did not experience the post Stalin's transition, Poland is one
- 12:15that did, to really tease out exactly what happened in these cases, why they shrank the
- 12:20secret police agencies, what the consequences were for social disorder in the countries
- 12:26and repression and all these things.
- 12:27And so in the end, it was a case of collecting a lot of data, finding really interesting
- 12:34variation and having a preliminary hypothesis and then just collecting a lot more qualitative
- 12:44and some quantitative data to try and triangulate to establish exactly what had happened and
- 12:50tease out the kind of mechanisms that led these communist elites to deal with their
- 12:57secret police in very, very different ways.
- 13:01So focusing on your comparative case studies of Poland and East Germany, when drawing these
- 13:09causal connections between elite cohesion and coercive capacity, what methodological
- 13:15considerations did you have to take into account?
- 13:18And how did you ensure that the divergent paths of these two countries were primarily
- 13:22influenced by elite cohesion rather than other external or internal factors?
- 13:28Good question.
- 13:31So my basic methodology for the book as a whole was this difference and difference sort
- 13:40of approach where you have very similar cases that diverge and we see very similar outcomes
- 13:45then very different outcomes.
- 13:46And so the role of the qualitative historical analysis was really to identify the sort of
- 13:55weak points in that quantitative or difference and difference approach and to give the reader
- 14:02a lot more detail.
- 14:04So and the key things are to establish, I thought to establish were, were these regimes
- 14:09really very similar before Stalin's death or were they actually different?
- 14:14And then when Stalin died, those differences just sort of emerged because that's an alternative
- 14:19hypothesis is that this divergence after Stalin's death is not caused by Stalin's death.
- 14:25It's actually a pre-existing difference that had already been going on.
- 14:31And then the second thing I wanted to establish was, was Stalin's death actually like a sort
- 14:37of a shock to these regimes or had they already been working towards these differences for
- 14:45many years?
- 14:47And so what I did find was that these agencies, these secret police agencies did do similar
- 14:57things before Stalin's death.
- 14:58They had a similar role and all of these regimes, whether it's Poland and East Germany or Czechoslovakia
- 15:03and Bulgaria, there was a Stalinist mode of coercion and repression that was being followed
- 15:12in each of these cases.
- 15:14And that mode of repression was to build the secret police to be relatively large.
- 15:19In Poland, we had an extremely large secret police agency before 1953.
- 15:23It was the largest in the region, much larger than the East German secret police that was
- 15:28only still by 1953 really being getting on its feet because the Soviets were still a
- 15:34little more distrustful of the Germans in the immediate post-war period and didn't necessarily
- 15:39want to let even the East German communists have as much of an independent secret police
- 15:45agency.
- 15:46So before Stalin's death, these are relatively similar institutions.
- 15:50The Polish institution is bigger, but they're trying to do the same thing.
- 15:54They're trying to crack down on dissent against these regimes.
- 15:59These are new communist regimes and mostly they feel threatened from the left, to be
- 16:04perfectly honest.
- 16:05There's a lot of propaganda and a lot of talk about Western provocateurs, capitalist spies
- 16:12from the CIA, all these sorts of things.
- 16:16But what they actually are primarily involved with is to actually suppress social Democrats,
- 16:22for example, and to force prominent social Democrats into these political alliances with
- 16:28the communists who are the Soviets favored intermediaries or agents in these countries.
- 16:36And then there's also a lot of, I don't know what the correct term for it would be today,
- 16:42but they would maybe even cast as a type of counterterrorism.
- 16:45So in Poland, you had a lot of Polish nationalists and even Ukrainian nationalists who were very,
- 16:51very hostile towards this new communist government and towards the Soviet Union.
- 16:56And the secret police were being used to crack down on them.
- 16:59And in East Germany, you actually didn't have a lot of Nazis left over after the war.
- 17:07But there was a lot of fear from the Soviets and the East Germans that, for example, young
- 17:13Germans who had been radicalized by the Nazis and the Hitler youth, et cetera, were going
- 17:17to organize partisan or terrorist activity against the East German government, which
- 17:22there wasn't a lot of that, but they were really going after that sort of thing.
- 17:26So even small signs of that, they would persecute very severely.
- 17:31So I was able to establish using the qualitative analysis that, yes, although the Polish, for
- 17:38example, the Polish secret police were quite a lot bigger than the East German secret police
- 17:42before 1953, they were doing similar things.
- 17:45And then I was able to use similar qualitative evidence to show that after 1953, after this
- 17:51big shock of Stalin's death, they started doing quite different things.
- 17:56So Stalin dies in March 1953, and it's a big shock to these governments across the whole
- 18:03region.
- 18:05The difference is not whether some countries are shocked by Stalin's death and their politics
- 18:10are changed.
- 18:11Politics is changed everywhere in Eastern Europe after Stalin's death.
- 18:14The question is just to what degree.
- 18:16And so using the qualitative evidence, I was able to tease out exactly what it meant to
- 18:21have a post Stalinist transition like you did in Poland or not have one like you did
- 18:25in East Germany.
- 18:27And so in Poland, you had a transition from a group around a leader called Beirut, who
- 18:34was an old school Stalinist.
- 18:36He'd spent the war in Moscow.
- 18:38He believed very strongly in Stalin's mode of repression, Stalin's economic policies,
- 18:45agricultural collectivization, heavy industry, all these things.
- 18:49And he was replaced by a reformer, Gomuika, who was in his own way a communist and yet
- 18:55somehow a liberal.
- 18:57And a lot of that showed itself in being a bit more of a Polish nationalist in a way
- 19:01which the Soviets were willing to tolerate just, only just.
- 19:07And Gomuika had some reformist tendencies related to agriculture and heavy industry.
- 19:12He tried to rebalance the economy a little bit away from heavy industry and forced collectivization
- 19:18of the farms to try and basically allow living standards to rise a little bit.
- 19:23And that's what a post-Stalinist transition looked like.
- 19:26It also looked like becoming honestly more fearful of the secret police.
- 19:31Gomuika had himself been imprisoned and interrogated and beaten by the secret police because he
- 19:36was an intraparty rival of Beirut before the transition.
- 19:42And so it's really interesting to tease out these really fine differences that for many
- 19:47political scientists, if you look at like across national data set, they would say this
- 19:52is complete regime continuity.
- 19:54You had someone from the same ruling coalition of the Polish United Workers Party taking
- 19:59power from another one.
- 20:00But actually that masks so much politics going on under the surface and also how they relate
- 20:06to the secret police.
- 20:08And if you compare that to East Germany, where the leader, Walter Ulbricht, was able to hold
- 20:17on to power, Ulbricht was a Stalinist just like Beirut.
- 20:21There was no reformer came in and took over from Ulbricht.
- 20:25There almost was, but then there wasn't.
- 20:28And so Ulbricht didn't want to show weakness.
- 20:31He didn't want to deviate from his Stalinist policies, whether it related to the economy
- 20:36or whether it related to the secret police.
- 20:38And not only did he not want to deviate from his policies that basically advocated a large
- 20:45secret police agency, he was perfectly comfortable with his secret police leadership.
- 20:49He trusted these people like Eric Milke, who ends up leading the East German secret police
- 20:54for another 30 years after this.
- 20:57He trusts these people.
- 20:59He clearly knows what their role within the regime is supposed to be, and he's perfectly
- 21:03comfortable for them to keep doing it.
- 21:05And so it's these shifts that are quite profound within the ruling coalition about whether
- 21:11they trust the secret police, the role that they see for the secret police going forward
- 21:15that for me explain why in East Germany, the Stasi grew to become this enormous surveillance
- 21:21apparatus.
- 21:22And we essentially saw no dissent in East Germany for the rest of the regime.
- 21:27Whereas in Poland, the secret police went from being much bigger to the Stasi to being
- 21:32far, far smaller, despite Poland having a much bigger population.
- 21:37When we see recurrent instances of dissent, mass revolts against the communist regime
- 21:43in the late 60s throughout the 1970s and then obviously into the 1980s with solidarity and
- 21:48et cetera.
- 21:49And my explanation for that is simply that after this regime was destabilized in 1953,
- 21:56after Stalin's death, they couldn't trust the secret police.
- 21:59They couldn't work out how to construct a really adequate coercive apparatus, including
- 22:04the secret police, because they couldn't, how here the elites could not agree and cooperate
- 22:10about the role for the secret police in the regime.
- 22:13And so they kept them very small to make sure that they weren't a threat to them.
- 22:20That's really interesting.
- 22:21And I'm just wondering by ruling elites, do you mean the main political figure and their
- 22:29entourage or like close political circle?
- 22:32Does that look very different in these countries post-Stalinism?
- 22:37That's a great question.
- 22:39So yeah, essentially what I mean is the party leader, because in these particular regimes,
- 22:46they all follow this Leninist notion of democratic centralism, where the party is taken to represent
- 22:51the interests of the working class and therefore the political legitimacy and power in the
- 22:56country.
- 22:57So the party leader, the center of the polar bureau has this leading role to sort of decisions
- 23:03flow downward from that one person.
- 23:06So yes, I code the transitions in the book is it's quite simple as the party leader replaced
- 23:13after Stalin's death.
- 23:14If they are, it's a post-Stalinist transition.
- 23:17If they're not, it's not.
- 23:18It's a Stalinist regime continues.
- 23:21But of course, there are more people associated, right?
- 23:23So in Poland, when Gamuika replaces Beirut, he also replaces many of the members of the
- 23:30polar bureau.
- 23:31And another key person is, of course, the minister of defense, because it's the cooperation
- 23:36among this group of elites, including the minister of defense, that allows them to control
- 23:41the secret police.
- 23:42And who as a dictator would you lean on to help you control your secret police?
- 23:47Probably they are the most threatening actor in your regime.
- 23:51Well, the first person you would call probably be the minister of defense because he controls
- 23:54the army.
- 23:55And if anyone can control a secret policeman, it's the army.
- 23:58And so the minister of defense is another central figure.
- 24:02And East Germany, what it's really interesting, because before Stalin's death, there were
- 24:06actually quite a few people who were sort of liberalizers within the East German Politburo.
- 24:12And when I say liberalizers, I mean, these are not liberal Democrats who wanted free
- 24:17and fair elections or anything like that.
- 24:20These are communists, but they might have wanted a little more freedom of expression.
- 24:24They might have been open to having some more small businesses, independent small businesses.
- 24:29They might have been open to having friendlier relations to the West, etc.
- 24:33What happens in East Germany is not only does the party leader not leave to make way for
- 24:39a liberalizer or a post-Stalinist leader, he purges all those people who have been exposed
- 24:44as liberalizers during this period of instability.
- 24:49Those people are purged and replaced with hardline Stalinists.
- 24:52His old loyalists, who he knows, are going to follow the Stalinist line.
- 24:57And so it is.
- 24:58It's this group of ministers, the party leader, the minister of defense, Politburo members.
- 25:04These are the elites that can work as a group to oversee and control the secret police.
- 25:11But they can only do that if they know and trust each other.
- 25:14And if there's this shock to that group, such that after Stalin's death, the party leader
- 25:20leaves, people are replaced, a, they no longer know each other as well, they haven't been
- 25:24in power as long, and b, they are no longer reading from the same rulebook.
- 25:29They don't have the same Stalinist view of the world that allows them to cooperate and
- 25:35control the secret police in the same relatively simple way that they could under Stalinism.
- 25:42And talking about purges, could you elaborate on how agency size and length of tenures of
- 25:48defense ministers and secret police chiefs can inform us about the dynamics of elite
- 25:54cohesion and coercive capacity in these countries?
- 25:58Right.
- 25:59So one of the arguments that I make in the book is that what elites do when they can't
- 26:08control their secret police is they are more likely to punish them because the secret police
- 26:14leaders are more likely to do things that are out of line with the preferences of the
- 26:18elite.
- 26:19And if you're a member of the ruling elite, whether it's a communist regime or a military
- 26:22regime or whatever, if your secret police chief starts to do things that you don't approve
- 26:27of, it's a major, major problem.
- 26:29And so basically what I predict is that, and what we observe is that in the Stalinist regimes,
- 26:36the secret police chief essentially does not step out of line.
- 26:38The secret police chief knows that they're all playing from the same Stalinist rulebook.
- 26:43He knows that if he deviates, he'll be quite quickly detected as deviation, be quickly
- 26:49detected and punished.
- 26:51So he doesn't do it in the first place, right?
- 26:53Any insubordination by the secret police in East Germany is basically deterred.
- 26:57That's my theory.
- 26:58And also in the other countries under Stalinism, they know, the secret police chiefs at this
- 27:03time know exactly their role in the regime.
- 27:07They know that if they step out of line, that they will be punished in some way in the Stalinist
- 27:12era, probably very harshly.
- 27:14There is a case in Hungary where the former secret police chief is actually himself, imprisoned
- 27:20by his successor and very brutally interrogated, et cetera, right?
- 27:24These things can go badly wrong.
- 27:26So under Stalinism, what I basically argue is that any insubordination will be deterred.
- 27:32But after the Stalinist transitions, I expect that the secret police chiefs are going to
- 27:38be punished more often for insubordination because the control of these individuals is
- 27:44no longer as great by the ruling elites.
- 27:47And so I simply collected the data on how long do these secret police chiefs serve in
- 27:52office in the countries where we have the Stalinist regimes continuing versus the countries
- 27:58where we have this transition.
- 28:00So I found out who are these guys, and they're all men, by the way.
- 28:05They're all men that lead these secret police agencies.
- 28:07Who are these guys?
- 28:10Were they members of the ruling party?
- 28:11What was their background?
- 28:13And when did they take office and when did they leave office?
- 28:17And what I find is that in the regimes where we have this post-Stalinist transition, those
- 28:22secret police chiefs have much shorter careers than in the other regimes.
- 28:26And the canonical example of this is this chap, Erich Milchow, that I mentioned before,
- 28:31who led the Stasi for 30 years under both dictators of East Germany and only is actually
- 28:38removed in the very final months of the regime and at the end of the 1980s.
- 28:43Whereas if you compare that to the cases in Poland, the ministers of the interior, they
- 28:48are cycled out of office pretty frequently, including this notorious secret police chief,
- 28:56Milchow, who actually stages two attempted coups against the party leader.
- 29:01So that's the difference that I'm really trying to get at is if these elites don't trust their
- 29:06secret police chiefs, then they probably are going to be on a hair trigger about getting
- 29:11rid of them to try and make sure they keep them under control.
- 29:14So are we seeing those secret police chiefs being removed more often?
- 29:18And the answer is on average, yes, for this specific set of cases in Eastern Europe.
- 29:26So at the end of your book, you briefly touch on the applicability of your framework to
- 29:32regimes beyond Central and Eastern Europe, such as China.
- 29:36And as you reflect in the book, even though Stalinism was an institutional and ideological
- 29:42model distinct from that of Mao's China, cohesion among authoritarian elites could shed light
- 29:47on the Chinese coercive apparatus before and during the Cultural Revolution.
- 29:53Could you expand on this a little bit?
- 29:58Do you think that this approach can be used in different contexts?
- 30:04I would hope that if you could isolate the effects of elite cohesion from other factors
- 30:12and other cases, that you could identify similar dynamics.
- 30:17So I also think that the theory shouldn't only apply to secret police.
- 30:22I think it should also apply to militaries, for example.
- 30:25There's a huge literature on civil military relations under dictatorship.
- 30:29And one of the big ideas is that dictators keep their militaries weak because they fear
- 30:33them.
- 30:35Now the Soviet bloc did not have weak militaries.
- 30:40And I would argue that a big part of the reason is that because they had relatively strong
- 30:44elite cohesion.
- 30:46So because of these communist parties with these Leninist structures, they were able
- 30:52to coordinate and cooperate as elites to monitor their militaries, to control them, and therefore
- 30:58to grow them quite well.
- 30:59Whereas if you look at military regimes in the Middle East, for example, even in Latin
- 31:04America, or even party regimes like the Malaysian ruling party or maybe the Mexican ruling party,
- 31:11I don't think that their institutional basis of elite cohesion is as strong as what was
- 31:20set up in communist Eastern Europe and in Russia.
- 31:25You're more of an expert on Soviet politics than I am, Angelika, so I'd be interested
- 31:29in your thoughts on this.
- 31:31But it seems to me that it's quite a uniquely strong party system that the Soviet Union
- 31:38both set up internally and also is able to impose on Eastern Europe.
- 31:43And therefore that Leninist structure actually solved a lot of the principal agent problems
- 31:51with their secret police and with their militaries.
- 31:53And so they had very strong coercive institutions.
- 31:57So yeah, I think that these sorts of things play a role, but it's difficult to identify
- 32:04a shock to elite cohesion.
- 32:06Now, this case of Stalin is really nice because you've got really similar governments, all
- 32:12under strong Soviet influence.
- 32:14And then you have this unexpected shock, Stalin's death, and it's profound.
- 32:18I mean, Stalin, a lot of these dictators in Eastern Europe actually view themselves and
- 32:23present themselves as little Starlins.
- 32:25I mean, it's a profound shock to these regimes.
- 32:27I don't know whether you can find comparable shocks across other cases.
- 32:32It would be really interesting, for example, to take this analysis and expand it even for
- 32:39the shock of Stalin's death to more client states of the Soviet Union and to look at
- 32:43different outcomes across, for example, maybe Africa, maybe the Caribbean cases that had
- 32:49very close links to Soviet Russia.
- 32:53And that's kind of where we get to the Chinese case.
- 32:57I'm not a sinologist.
- 32:58I'm not really an expert on Chinese history.
- 33:02But I do know that Stalin's death and the rise of Khrushchev was also a profound shock
- 33:06to elite cohesion in China.
- 33:07I mean, Mao really became very fearful in the early 1960s of a revisionist, a Chinese
- 33:17Khrushchev, as he would say, right?
- 33:19As an individual who would come in and say, this centralization of power in one person
- 33:25under Mao.
- 33:26This very, it's not Stalinist, but there are some similarities, the economic development
- 33:31model, right?
- 33:32Collectivization of agriculture, very heavy emphasis on heavy industry rather than consumer
- 33:36goods production.
- 33:37There are quite a lot of parallels between Stalin's Russia and Mao's China.
- 33:42Mao did not want a Chinese Khrushchev coming along to disrupt his power.
- 33:48And there was, at the start of the 1960s, a period in which Mao's power was somewhat
- 33:55contested.
- 33:56So you can almost draw a parallel.
- 33:57When I say almost, I say that because I'm not a sinologist, I'd be interested if someone
- 34:02would come in and tell me whether I was right.
- 34:04You can almost draw a parallel between the post-Stalinist era in the Soviet Union and
- 34:10in Eastern Europe from 1953 through maybe the early 1960s to this era after the Great
- 34:17Leap Forward when Mao loses some authority over the Communist Party, especially this.
- 34:25There's a famous 7,000 cadres conference in, I think, 1962, where Mao was directly criticized
- 34:31by some other party elites and he has to step back from day-to-day policy making in favor
- 34:37of Lu Xiaoqi and Deng Xiaoping.
- 34:40Now the question is, did that have a similar effect on the coercive apparatus that we saw
- 34:46in the Soviet Union?
- 34:50I'm not entirely sure, I think that as Mao started to reassert his power over the Chinese
- 34:55Communist Party through the Cultural Revolution, what we saw was actually a lot of social disorder
- 35:02that suggests that the coercive institutions had been weakened during this period.
- 35:05There's a huge amount of social disorder under Mao in the late 1960s on the Cultural Revolution.
- 35:12The Ministry of Public Security is very weak.
- 35:15It's been purged at the start of the Cultural Revolution by Mao.
- 35:18The military is used later on to reestablish order, but for a long time there's kind of
- 35:23this chaos.
- 35:24And so to me the question is, is the reason why you saw so much such a vacuum in state
- 35:31power and coercion and such chaos erupt at the start of the Cultural Revolution, is that
- 35:37because of this moment, this period of a lack of elite cohesion in the early 1960s through
- 35:45the middle of the 1960s, that Mao after this contentious period felt that he could no longer
- 35:50trust some of the state institutions.
- 35:53And so he degraded the power of the Ministry of Public Security in order to weaken it so
- 35:58it wouldn't threaten him.
- 35:59And that's maybe a contributor to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.
- 36:04I think that the argument that I'm making, you can draw parallels to that case as well.
- 36:10I think probably to many different cases across different types of authoritarian regimes,
- 36:17where the basic prediction is that where you see a shock to the authority of a central
- 36:22ruling coalition or even one central ruler, that you should see them quite quickly become
- 36:29quite distrustful towards their coercive apparatus and their secret police and maybe the military
- 36:34intelligence agencies like that.
- 36:36And that you should see some sort of reform or you should see some sort of institutional
- 36:41manipulation to try and get control back over those institutions.
- 36:46I do think that this argument can travel into different contexts.
- 36:49I've been doing some work recently on the Nazi paramilitaries.
- 36:56And it's actually really interesting because as much as we think of the Nazi movement as
- 37:02being completely enthralled to Hitler, they had significant problems controlling the SA,
- 37:08the storm troopers in particular, in the early 1930s until they take control of the German
- 37:16government.
- 37:18And so these problems, the basic problem of authoritarian rule of creating and controlling
- 37:25these secret police agencies, it applies even to the people that we think of in history
- 37:30of having the most personal authority.
- 37:32I mean, what was the Nazi movement without Hitler?
- 37:35And yet Hitler had real problems controlling the SA.
- 37:39They had hundreds of thousands of members, the storm troopers.
- 37:42They were committing wanton violence.
- 37:45They had completely divergent goals from the Nazi party.
- 37:48The Nazi party wanted to win elections and take over control of the government by winning
- 37:51a majority in the parliament.
- 37:53The SA basically wanted a civil war and to stage a military coup against the German government.
- 37:59And Hitler had real problems reigning them in until actually after 1933, his final solution
- 38:06to the SA question was to have the leadership killed by the SS.
- 38:12And so in a way, that's sort of the ultimate evidence that he couldn't control the SA despite
- 38:17his personal authority over this movement.
- 38:20And so I think that this very profound fundamental problem that we had between the dictator and
- 38:27his secret police chiefs, it's even applicable.
- 38:30You know, I talk about elite cohesion, talk about Stalinism.
- 38:33Even Stalin didn't trust his secret police chiefs.
- 38:36He had them purged.
- 38:37And even Hitler didn't trust his secret police chiefs.
- 38:39And even Mao didn't trust their secret police chiefs.
- 38:41So I think there's something really fundamental and profound about this problem.
- 38:45And I think it's the central problem of authoritarian rule.
- 38:50And I think it's probably actually one of the central problems of democratic governance
- 38:54as well.
- 38:55It's kind of solved in most democracies, thankfully.
- 38:58And so what I hope is that this book is because of the research design, because of the cases,
- 39:03because we've had the declassification of all these archives that we can learn so much
- 39:07more about these secret police agencies and about the regimes that control them, that
- 39:11the book is a contribution to learning about what I think is really fundamental political
- 39:15problem that is really important.
- 39:18Absolutely.
- 39:19My last question is, what key points would you like your readers to take away from your
- 39:25book?
- 39:26The key point that I think that I would like readers to take away from the book is this
- 39:33relationship between the dictator, the ruling elite, and the secret police is probably the
- 39:38most important relationship and feature of authoritarian rule.
- 39:44I think it's underappreciated.
- 39:45I think that there's been a lot of studies in the literature on authoritarian politics
- 39:50that look at parliaments, that look at parties, that look at redistribution, that look at
- 39:55all sorts of things.
- 39:56But because it's so hard to study the secret police, I don't think we've often been able
- 40:00to study the core of these regimes.
- 40:02So that's the first thing.
- 40:04And then the second thing I would like people to take away from the book is that the way
- 40:09the dictators are designing these agencies is not, in these cases at least, about the
- 40:16threats that they face.
- 40:17This is the other main thing that I'm pushing back on in the book is whether these secret
- 40:25police agencies could repress opposition was a secondary concern for these dictators.
- 40:34The primary concern was, can I control them?
- 40:39And you see this so starkly in Poland, where after 1956, Gmłodzka and these other reformist
- 40:46leaders, they didn't think they could control these secret police.
- 40:49They didn't trust them.
- 40:51So they shrank the secret police to become very small.
- 40:55What happens?
- 40:56They don't do this with impunity.
- 40:58The Polish government does not degrade its coercive apparatus without consequence.
- 41:04There is recurrent unrest in the late 1960s.
- 41:08There were big student protests in 1968 against the Polish regime and associated strikes and
- 41:14demonstrations, et cetera.
- 41:16Why couldn't they repress those and pick up that dissent the way that these Germans could?
- 41:22Well, for me, the simple response is because they didn't have the Stasi.
- 41:25They had the Polish secret police that were just a way smaller, less capable apparatus.
- 41:31Then in the 1970s in Poland, you have the first big wave of strikes along the Baltic
- 41:37coast among the shipbuilders.
- 41:40Why did this happen?
- 41:42How could workers be allowed to mobilize in this way to form their own strike committees
- 41:48in such overt opposition to the communist government?
- 41:51I would say again, because they didn't have the Stasi.
- 41:55They had their own secret police that were just way less capable.
- 41:58They didn't have the numbers of secret informants.
- 42:01They didn't have the numbers of officers.
- 42:02They didn't have the resources to infiltrate these workers' organizations and remove dissent,
- 42:09remove the dissenting individuals and put them in prison, have them under surveillance
- 42:13the way that the East Germans did.
- 42:15Then of course, the organization of the workers on the Baltic coast in Poland leads directly
- 42:20to the formation of Solidarity, the first independent labor union in the communist world.
- 42:27That leads almost inevitably in hindsight to the downfall of communism in Poland, to
- 42:32the total destabilization of this entire block.
- 42:36So the Polish regime made a decision to degrade its coercive apparatus.
- 42:45They never grew their secret police to be anywhere near the size and capability of the
- 42:49Stasi until the 1980s, after things had gotten out of control.
- 42:55Why did they make that decision?
- 42:56In my view, they made that decision because they were afraid of the secret police.
- 42:59They didn't think that they could control them.
- 43:02They didn't think they could trust them.
- 43:04They kept them small.
- 43:06That was a fatal error.
- 43:08So it's difficult to argue that the design of those institutions was driven by threats.
- 43:13If anything, they should have had a massive secret police apparatus starting in the 1970s
- 43:18because it was clear that they had really well organized widespread opposition.
- 43:23And the solution to that under a good old Stalinist sort of approach would be to infiltrate,
- 43:29to destroy these operations, these organizations, put people in prison, put them under surveillance,
- 43:35just degrade the opposition as the Stasi would have done.
- 43:39But they didn't do it.
- 43:41And so that's the other big point I want people to take away from the book is that you can't
- 43:46explain the design of these secret police agencies by looking at the type of threat
- 43:51that faces them.
- 43:53They are not a rational response to mass dissent, to eliminate mass dissent.
- 43:59They are the creation of elites that are fearful for their own position and really fear the
- 44:04secret police and take this principal agent problem very, very seriously.
- 44:08And that's how I explain the variation in these cases.
- 44:10And I think it's really important for the study of authoritarian politics to take that
- 44:16very seriously.
- 44:17Don't think that repression is an easy problem to solve for dictators.
- 44:22Yes, there's this so-called law of coercive responsiveness that when the state is threatened,
- 44:27it will respond through repression.
- 44:28Sure.
- 44:29But to what degree?
- 44:30Using what sort of institutions?
- 44:32The Polish regime was far less capable of responding to opposition than the East German
- 44:37regime or the Romanian regime because it had made these institutional decisions about how
- 44:41to build these secret police that had very little to do with the type of threat that
- 44:46they were facing.
- 44:48So yeah, I think those are the two main points in a slightly long-winded way.
- 44:54Those are the two main points that I hope people take away from the book.
- 44:58Very well put.
- 44:59Yeah.
- 45:00Thank you very much for joining me on I Spy, the intelligence history podcast.
- 45:06Thank you very much, Angelica, for having me.
- 45:08And I look forward to listening to more of your podcasts in the future.