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Russia’s Silent Submarine Threat Is Raising New Alarms Across NATO · USA Daily News

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: A new undersea challenge is forcing NATO to look more
• 0:03
  Speaker 1: carefully toward the Arctic and North Atlantic, where Russia is
• 0:07
  Speaker 1: expanding and modernizing a submarine force that retired NATO Commander
• 0:11
  Speaker 1: General Philip Breedlove warns could become increasingly difficult to detect.
• 0:16
  Speaker 1: The concern is not simply that Moscow is building more
• 0:19
  Speaker 1: nuclear-powered submarines, but that newer vessels are designed with greater
• 0:23
  Speaker 1: acoustic stealth, making an already difficult threat harder to monitor.
• 0:28
  Speaker 1: Beneath the surface of the northern seas, submarines can move
• 0:31
  Speaker 1: without the visibility associated with aircraft, tanks, or surface warships,
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  Speaker 1: creating a strategic problem that depends heavily on the ability
• 0:40
  Speaker 1: of NATO forces to locate, identify, and track them before
• 0:44
  Speaker 1: they approach critical areas. Breedlove, who previously served as NATO
• 0:49
  Speaker 1: Supreme Allied Commander Europe and as Commander of U.S. European Command.
• 0:54
  Speaker 1: says submarines remain among the most challenging military threats because
• 0:59
  Speaker 1: they can operate covertly and potentially move within striking distance
• 1:03
  Speaker 1: of countries along the Atlantic. The warning comes as Russia
• 1:06
  Speaker 1: strengthens its military infrastructure on the Kola Peninsula and across
• 1:10
  Speaker 1: its Arctic coastline, an area that has become increasingly important
• 1:15
  Speaker 1: to Moscow for both military positioning and control of northern
• 1:19
  Speaker 1: maritime routes. NATO's Allied Joint Force Command Brunson has described
• 1:23
  Speaker 1: the growing Russian submarine presence as serious, emphasizing that the
• 1:28
  Speaker 1: alliance is closely watching developments beneath the waves. The concern
• 1:32
  Speaker 1: is particularly focused on Russia's newer nuclear-powered guided missile submarines,
• 1:37
  Speaker 1: including vessels from the Yazan-M class. These submarines are designed
• 1:42
  Speaker 1: for long-range strike missions and can carry cruise missiles, anti-ship weapons,
• 1:46
  Speaker 1: and other advanced systems, giving them the ability to threaten
• 1:50
  Speaker 1: targets far beyond the waters immediately surrounding Russia. Their significance
• 1:55
  Speaker 1: comes from the combination of mobility, endurance, stealth, and firepower.
• 2:00
  Speaker 1: A submarine does not need to appear near an enemy
• 2:03
  Speaker 1: coastline to create a strategic problem. The uncertainty over where
• 2:07
  Speaker 1: it is operating can itself force military planners to devote ships, aircraft, sensors,
• 2:12
  Speaker 1: and personnel to surveillance. That means even a submarine that
• 2:16
  Speaker 1: never launches a weapon can impose costs on an adversary
• 2:20
  Speaker 1: simply by remaining difficult to locate. NATO has spent decades
• 2:24
  Speaker 1: developing methods for tracking Russian submarines, but technological improvements on
• 2:29
  Speaker 1: either side create an ongoing contest between detection and concealment.
• 2:34
  Speaker 1: If Russian vessels become quieter, existing surveillance systems may have
• 2:38
  Speaker 1: to work harder to identify them, while NATO may need
• 2:42
  Speaker 1: to increase the number and sophistication of patrols across an
• 2:45
  Speaker 1: enormous maritime area. The Arctic makes that challenge even more
• 2:50
  Speaker 1: complicated because weather, darkness, ice, distance, and geography can all
• 2:55
  Speaker 1: affect military operations. Russia's strategic position on the Kola Peninsula
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  Speaker 1: gives its northern fleet access to the Arctic and the
• 3:03
  Speaker 1: North Atlantic. while the Greenland-Iceland United Kingdom, or GIUK. GAP
• 3:08
  Speaker 1: represents a crucial maritime gateway between northern waters and the Atlantic.
• 3:13
  Speaker 1: Breedlove has described that corridor as strategically important because Russian
• 3:17
  Speaker 1: naval forces moving from their northern bases toward the Atlantic
• 3:21
  Speaker 1: would have to pass through or around this broader region.
• 3:24
  Speaker 1: For NATO, that makes surveillance of the northern approaches an
• 3:28
  Speaker 1: important part of protecting North America and Europe. The issue
• 3:32
  Speaker 1: is therefore larger than one class of submarine or one
• 3:35
  Speaker 1: Russian naval deployment. It is about whether the alliance can
• 3:39
  Speaker 1: maintain sufficient awareness of what is happening beneath the surface
• 3:42
  Speaker 1: at a time when Russia is improving its capabilities and
• 3:45
  Speaker 1: the Arctic itself is becoming more accessible. The strategic environment
• 3:50
  Speaker 1: is changing quickly, and the silent nature of submarine warfare
• 3:54
  Speaker 1: makes that change particularly difficult to see. A visible military
• 3:58
  Speaker 1: buildup can be photographed and tracked. But a quieter submarine
• 4:02
  Speaker 1: can disappear beneath the ocean and leave analysts working with
• 4:05
  Speaker 1: incomplete information. That uncertainty is precisely what makes the latest
• 4:10
  Speaker 1: warning so significant. NATO is not being told that an
• 4:13
  Speaker 1: attack is imminent. Instead, the alliance is being warned that
• 4:18
  Speaker 1: the balance between concealment and detection may be shifting and
• 4:22
  Speaker 1: that failing to adapt could create vulnerabilities in waters that
• 4:25
  Speaker 1: are essential to the security of both Europe and North America.
• 4:29
  Speaker 1: Russia's submarine modernization is therefore becoming part of a much
• 4:33
  Speaker 1: wider contest over the Arctic, the Atlantic, and the future
• 4:37
  Speaker 1: ability of NATO to control the approaches to its own territory.
• 4:41
  Speaker 1: The challenge begins beneath the surface, where the most important
• 4:44
  Speaker 1: movements may be the ones nobody can immediately see. At
• 4:48
  Speaker 1: the center of the concern are Russia's newer Yazan-M-class nuclear-powered submarines,
• 4:53
  Speaker 1: which represent a significant evolution in Moscow's undersea capabilities, and
• 4:58
  Speaker 1: are designed to combine stealth with long-range offensive power. According
• 5:02
  Speaker 1: to information cited in the report, these vessels incorporate advanced
• 5:06
  Speaker 1: acoustic quieting and sonar technology, allowing them to operate with
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  Speaker 1: a reduced acoustic signature compared with older generations of submarines.
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  Speaker 1: That matters because underwater warfare depends heavily on sound. Unlike
• 5:20
  Speaker 1: aircraft operating in open airspace or ships visible through radar
• 5:24
  Speaker 1: and satellites, Submarines spend much of their time hidden beneath
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  Speaker 1: the surface, where detecting them often depends on sophisticated sonar
• 5:33
  Speaker 1: networks and the ability to distinguish a submarine from the
• 5:36
  Speaker 1: enormous amount of natural and mechanical noise present in the ocean.
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  Speaker 1: Every improvement in reducing a vessel's noise can therefore complicate
• 5:44
  Speaker 1: the job of the forces attempting to find it. The
• 5:47
  Speaker 1: Yasen-M design is particularly significant because it is not simply
• 5:51
  Speaker 1: intended to patrol or defend Russian waters. The submarines are
• 5:55
  Speaker 1: built around a broad range of missions that can include
• 5:58
  Speaker 1: attacking surface ships, striking land targets, and threatening naval forces
• 6:02
  Speaker 1: over considerable distances. The U.S. Naval Institute has reported that
• 6:07
  Speaker 1: the approximately 13,800-ton submarines can carry long-range cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles,
• 6:14
  Speaker 1: and hypersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. That combination gives the vessels
• 6:19
  Speaker 1: considerable flexibility. A submarine could remain hidden while holding distant
• 6:24
  Speaker 1: targets at risk, potentially forcing an opponent to spend enormous
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  Speaker 1: resources searching for it. Russian officials have emphasized the stealth
• 6:32
  Speaker 1: of the class, portraying the submarines as capable of carrying
• 6:36
  Speaker 1: out naval missions while remaining extremely difficult to detect. The
• 6:40
  Speaker 1: language surrounding these vessels is part military capability and part
• 6:44
  Speaker 1: strategic messaging, but the underlying issue remains real. The quieter
• 6:49
  Speaker 1: a submarine becomes, the more demanding the surveillance problem becomes
• 6:54
  Speaker 1: for its opponent. Retired General Breedlove has acknowledged that NATO
• 6:58
  Speaker 1: has developed effective methods for monitoring Russian submarine activity in
• 7:02
  Speaker 1: the past, but he argues that any increase in stealth
• 7:05
  Speaker 1: or noise suppression requires the alliance to adapt. That adaptation
• 7:10
  Speaker 1: could involve more patrol aircraft, improved underwater sensors, additional surface ships,
• 7:15
  Speaker 1: better coordination among allied navies, and expanded use of advanced
• 7:20
  Speaker 1: surveillance technologies. None of those measures is simple. The North
• 7:24
  Speaker 1: Atlantic covers an enormous area, and the Arctic introduces conditions
• 7:28
  Speaker 1: that can make detection and tracking particularly difficult. The alliance
• 7:33
  Speaker 1: must therefore decide not only how to find Russian submarines,
• 7:37
  Speaker 1: but where to concentrate limited resources and how to maintain
• 7:40
  Speaker 1: coverage over long periods. The problem becomes more serious because
• 7:45
  Speaker 1: Russia is not operating its submarine program in isolation. Moscow
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  Speaker 1: is simultaneously upgrading bases, ports, airfields, and radar facilities along
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  Speaker 1: the Arctic coastline. A stronger network of supporting infrastructure can
• 7:59
  Speaker 1: make it easier for submarines to deploy, resupply, communicate, and
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  Speaker 1: operate from protected northern waters. The Kola Peninsula is particularly
• 8:09
  Speaker 1: important because it has long served as a major base
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  Speaker 1: for Russia's northern fleet. From there, Russian naval forces have
• 8:16
  Speaker 1: access to strategic waters extending toward the Arctic and Atlantic.
• 8:21
  Speaker 1: The peninsula also sits near routes that connect Russia's northern
• 8:25
  Speaker 1: military installations to the wider maritime environment. When submarines are
• 8:29
  Speaker 1: combined with coastal radar, aircraft, surface ships, and other military assets,
• 8:35
  Speaker 1: The result is a layered military posture rather than a
• 8:38
  Speaker 1: single isolated weapon system. That is one reason NATO officials
• 8:42
  Speaker 1: are paying close attention to the region. The alliance must
• 8:46
  Speaker 1: consider the possibility that Russia could use its northern bases
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  Speaker 1: as protected operating areas from which submarines can move into
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  Speaker 1: the broader Atlantic. A vessel that leaves port may quickly
• 8:57
  Speaker 1: become difficult to track, particularly if it is quieter than
• 9:01
  Speaker 1: previous generations. That creates uncertainty for NATO commanders and demands
• 9:06
  Speaker 1: a persistent surveillance effort rather than occasional monitoring. The strategic
• 9:10
  Speaker 1: contest is therefore not simply about whether one submarine can
• 9:14
  Speaker 1: be detected. It is about whether NATO can maintain enough
• 9:17
  Speaker 1: awareness across a vast area to prevent Russian forces from
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  Speaker 1: gaining an advantage through concealment. Russia's investment in quieter submarines
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  Speaker 1: suggests that Moscow understands how valuable that advantage can be.
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  Speaker 1: A submarine that is difficult to find can force an
• 9:32
  Speaker 1: opponent to behave, as though it might be nearby even
• 9:35
  Speaker 1: when its precise location is unknown. That uncertainty can shape
• 9:39
  Speaker 1: military planning, increase costs, and complicate decisions. For NATO, the
• 9:45
  Speaker 1: answer cannot be based on panic. The geography of the
• 9:48
  Speaker 1: Arctic is becoming one of the most important pieces of
• 9:51
  Speaker 1: this emerging security puzzle because climate change, military modernization, and
• 9:56
  Speaker 1: commercial competition are converging in the same region. For decades,
• 10:01
  Speaker 1: the Arctic was treated as one of the most remote
• 10:04
  Speaker 1: and difficult environments on Earth, but declining sea ice is
• 10:07
  Speaker 1: opening routes that were previously much harder to navigate. That
• 10:11
  Speaker 1: transformation has economic consequences as well as military ones. The
• 10:17
  Speaker 1: northern sea route along Russia's Arctic coast offers the possibility
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  Speaker 1: of shorter maritime connections between Europe and Asia, potentially reducing
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  Speaker 1: travel time for certain commercial voyages compared with traditional routes
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  Speaker 1: through the Suez Canal. Russia sees the opening of these
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  Speaker 1: northern waters as an economic opportunity and has invested heavily
• 10:37
  Speaker 1: in infrastructure intended to strengthen its ability to control and
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  Speaker 1: support activity along the route. but economic access and military
• 10:45
  Speaker 1: power are becoming increasingly connected. Ports, airfields, radar stations, and
• 10:51
  Speaker 1: other infrastructure can support commercial traffic while also providing strategic
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  Speaker 1: advantages to a country seeking a stronger presence in the region.
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  Speaker 1: Breedlove argues that Russia wants greater control over northern waters
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  Speaker 1: because of both their economic value and their military importance.
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  Speaker 1: That creates a complicated environment for NATO, whose members include
• 11:13
  Speaker 1: several Arctic nations and whose northern security depends on maintaining
• 11:18
  Speaker 1: access to the North Atlantic. The Arctic is no longer
• 11:21
  Speaker 1: simply an isolated frozen frontier. It is increasingly a corridor
• 11:26
  Speaker 1: connecting Europe, North America, and Asia, and the military significance
• 11:30
  Speaker 1: of that corridor is growing alongside commercial interest. The GIK
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  Speaker 1: gap sits at the center of this strategic picture. The
• 11:38
  Speaker 1: term refers to the maritime area between Greenland, Iceland, and
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  Speaker 1: the United Kingdom, a geographic gateway that has historically played
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  Speaker 1: a major role in monitoring naval movements between the Arctic
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  Speaker 1: and the Atlantic. During the Cold War, NATO invested heavily
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  Speaker 1: in watching Soviet submarines moving through northern waters, recognizing that
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  Speaker 1: undersea forces could threaten shipping lanes and potentially approach North
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  Speaker 1: America or European targets. Today, the same geography has regained
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  Speaker 1: importance as Russia rebuilds and modernizes its northern naval capabilities.
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  Speaker 1: If Russian submarines can leave their northern bases and pass
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  Speaker 1: into the Atlantic while remaining difficult to detect, NATO faces
• 12:21
  Speaker 1: a surveillance challenge that extends far beyond the Arctic itself.
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  Speaker 1: The alliance must monitor the approaches, identify possible submarine routes,
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  Speaker 1: and maintain the ability to respond if a vessel moves
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  Speaker 1: toward areas considered strategically sensitive. That is why northern European
• 12:38
  Speaker 1: countries are increasing their attention to Arctic defense. NATO launched
• 12:43
  Speaker 1: Arctic Sentry in February 2026, a multi-domain initiative led by
• 12:48
  Speaker 1: Joint Force Command Norfolk intended to improve coordination among allied land, air,
• 12:53
  Speaker 1: and maritime forces across the Arctic and high north. In June,
• 12:58
  Speaker 1: the alliance also strengthened its northeastern posture through Forward Land
• 13:03
  Speaker 1: Forces Finland, a Swedish-led multinational force hosted by Finland. These
• 13:08
  Speaker 1: initiatives demonstrate that NATO is not treating the Arctic as
• 13:12
  Speaker 1: a distant secondary theater. Instead, the region is becoming part
• 13:16
  Speaker 1: of a broader effort to strengthen the alliance's northern flank.
• 13:20
  Speaker 1: Russia's military expansion is one reason for that shift. Moscow
• 13:25
  Speaker 1: has been upgrading facilities along its Arctic coast and maintaining
• 13:28
  Speaker 1: a substantial military presence on the Kola Peninsula. From Russia's perspective,
• 13:34
  Speaker 1: these measures can be presented as protection of its territory,
• 13:38
  Speaker 1: economic interests, and northern maritime routes. From NATO's perspective, however,
• 13:43
  Speaker 1: the same infrastructure can support military operations that extend toward
• 13:47
  Speaker 1: allied waters. That creates the classic security dilemma in which
• 13:51
  Speaker 1: one side's defensive preparations are interpreted by the other side
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  Speaker 1: as potential offensive preparations. Moscow has already objected to increased
• 14:00
  Speaker 1: Western military activity in the far north. Russian Foreign Minister
• 14:04
  Speaker 1: Sergey Lavrov has warned that growing Western military activity could
• 14:08
  Speaker 1: pose a direct threat to Russia and increase the risk
• 14:11
  Speaker 1: of incidents that might escalate into confrontation. NATO, meanwhile, argues
• 14:16
  Speaker 1: that its increased activity is necessary because Russia is expanding
• 14:21
  Speaker 1: its own military capabilities. The result is a cycle of
• 14:24
  Speaker 1: action and reaction in a region where mistakes can have
• 14:28
  Speaker 1: serious consequences. A submarine operating silently beneath the ocean may
• 14:33
  Speaker 1: not be visible to the public, but its presence can
• 14:36
  Speaker 1: influence the calculations of governments thousands of miles away. The
• 14:40
  Speaker 1: Arctic is therefore becoming a test of whether NATO and
• 14:43
  Speaker 1: Russia can compete militarily without allowing competition to turn into confrontation.
• 14:48
  Speaker 1: The more valuable the region becomes, the more important it
• 14:51
  Speaker 1: will be for both sides to maintain reliable communication, clear rules,
• 14:55
  Speaker 1: and effective surveillance. The military significance of Russia's quieter submarines
• 15:01
  Speaker 1: becomes even clearer when considering the kind of weapons they
• 15:04
  Speaker 1: can carry and the distances over which those weapons can operate.
• 15:08
  Speaker 1: Modern nuclear-powered guided missile submarines are designed to give commanders
• 15:12
  Speaker 1: an option that is difficult for an opponent to neutralize
• 15:15
  Speaker 1: before an attack begins. A surface warship can be detected
• 15:19
  Speaker 1: through multiple forms of surveillance, while an aircraft creates an
• 15:23
  Speaker 1: observable presence in the sky. A submarine can remain hidden
• 15:27
  Speaker 1: underwater and potentially launch weapons without revealing its position until
• 15:31
  Speaker 1: after the attack has begun. That characteristic has made submarines
• 15:35
  Speaker 1: central to strategic planning for decades, and improvements in stealth
• 15:39
  Speaker 1: can increase their value. The Yasen-M class is particularly concerning
• 15:44
  Speaker 1: to NATO because the vessels are designed to carry several
• 15:46
  Speaker 1: types of missiles, including long-range cruise missiles and anti-ship weapons.
• 15:51
  Speaker 1: Reports cited by Fox News indicate that these submarines can
• 15:55
  Speaker 1: carry missiles capable of reaching targets hundreds of miles away,
• 15:59
  Speaker 1: while their arsenal also includes advanced anti-ship capabilities. That means
• 16:04
  Speaker 1: a submarine does not necessarily need to approach a coastline
• 16:07
  Speaker 1: directly to threaten military or infrastructure targets. It can operate
• 16:12
  Speaker 1: from a distant area while retaining the ability to strike.
• 16:15
  Speaker 1: Hypersonic weapons add another layer to the challenge because their
• 16:18
  Speaker 1: speed and maneuverability can reduce the amount of time available
• 16:22
  Speaker 1: for defensive systems to detect, identify, and respond to an
• 16:26
  Speaker 1: incoming attack. The combination of stealth and long-range weapons, is
• 16:30
  Speaker 1: therefore more important than either characteristic alone. A missile system
• 16:35
  Speaker 1: can be dangerous, but if the platform carrying it is
• 16:38
  Speaker 1: easy to locate, an opponent may have opportunities to track
• 16:42
  Speaker 1: or neutralize the platform. A stealthy platform carrying long-range weapons
• 16:47
  Speaker 1: presents a different problem because the defender may not know
• 16:50
  Speaker 1: where the threat is until the weapon is already moving
• 16:53
  Speaker 1: toward its target. That is why Breedlove says the possibility
• 16:57
  Speaker 1: of quieter Russian submarines is a problem for NATO. The
• 17:00
  Speaker 1: alliance's existing undersea surveillance capabilities remain substantial, but they are
• 17:05
  Speaker 1: not designed around the assumption that the opponent will stand
• 17:08
  Speaker 1: still or use older technology forever. Military competition is a
• 17:13
  Speaker 1: continuous contest in which improvements on one side force changes
• 17:17
  Speaker 1: on the other. Russia seeks to make its submarines harder
• 17:20
  Speaker 1: to hear. while NATO seeks to make its sensors more
• 17:23
  Speaker 1: capable of detecting them. Russia can alter patrol patterns, use geography,
• 17:28
  Speaker 1: and exploit environmental conditions, while NATO can expand surveillance and
• 17:33
  Speaker 1: improve cooperation among member states. The contest is not necessarily
• 17:37
  Speaker 1: visible to the public, but it is taking place continuously.
• 17:41
  Speaker 1: Another concern is the possibility of Russian submarines operating farther
• 17:46
  Speaker 1: into the Atlantic. Breedlove warned that submarines could potentially move
• 17:50
  Speaker 1: close enough to the coastlines of the United States or
• 17:53
  Speaker 1: NATO allies to create serious missile threats. That does not
• 17:57
  Speaker 1: mean such an attack is underway or inevitable. It means
• 18:00
  Speaker 1: that the strategic reach of a nuclear-powered submarine allows Russia
• 18:04
  Speaker 1: to create risk far from its own coastline. For NATO planners,
• 18:09
  Speaker 1: this makes the Atlantic a security space rather than merely
• 18:12
  Speaker 1: a transportation corridor. Undersea cables, shipping routes, naval bases, and
• 18:17
  Speaker 1: coastal infrastructure all depend on the stability of the maritime environment.
• 18:23
  Speaker 1: A submarine capable of operating undetected in that space can
• 18:26
  Speaker 1: create uncertainty around all of those assets. The same concern
• 18:30
  Speaker 1: applies to military communications and surveillance networks. Modern economies and
• 18:36
  Speaker 1: militaries depend heavily on undersea infrastructure, including communication cables that
• 18:41
  Speaker 1: carry enormous volumes of data between continents. While the article
• 18:45
  Speaker 1: focuses primarily on missile and naval threats, the broader undersea
• 18:50
  Speaker 1: environment includes many strategic assets that can be vulnerable to
• 18:54
  Speaker 1: interference or disruption. Russia's growing maritime presence therefore matters in
• 18:59
  Speaker 1: multiple dimensions. It is not only about conventional warfare. It
• 19:04
  Speaker 1: is also about the ability to operate beneath the surface
• 19:07
  Speaker 1: in ways that could complicate NATO's economic and military security.
• 19:11
  Speaker 1: This is why northern waters are attracting more attention from
• 19:14
  Speaker 1: defense officials. A submarine force does not need to attack
• 19:18
  Speaker 1: to influence behavior. The possibility that a vessel is operating
• 19:22
  Speaker 1: somewhere in the Atlantic can cause navies to divert aircraft,
• 19:25
  Speaker 1: deploy ships, activate sensors, and maintain patrols. Those activities consume fuel, personnel,
• 19:33
  Speaker 1: and equipment. They also require coordination among countries that may
• 19:37
  Speaker 1: have different national priorities. Russia can therefore impose a strategic
• 19:41
  Speaker 1: burden simply by maintaining a credible undersea capability. NATO's answer
• 19:46
  Speaker 1: will depend on whether the alliance can preserve enough awareness
• 19:49
  Speaker 1: to reduce the uncertainty. The objective is not to make
• 19:52
  Speaker 1: every Russian submarine permanently visible, which is unrealistic. NATO's response
• 19:58
  Speaker 1: to Russia's growing northern submarine capability is already taking shape
• 20:02
  Speaker 1: through a combination of surveillance, military deployments and greater cooperation
• 20:07
  Speaker 1: across the Alliance, but officials face the difficult task of
• 20:11
  Speaker 1: balancing deterrence with the need to avoid unnecessary escalation. The
• 20:16
  Speaker 1: launch of Arctic Sentry earlier this year illustrates how seriously
• 20:20
  Speaker 1: NATO now views the High North. The initiative brings together
• 20:24
  Speaker 1: multiple military domains, including land, air, and maritime capabilities, with
• 20:30
  Speaker 1: the goal of improving coordination across a region where distance
• 20:34
  Speaker 1: and harsh conditions can make operations especially difficult. the importance
• 20:39
  Speaker 1: of that coordination cannot be overstated. Tracking a submarine is
• 20:43
  Speaker 1: rarely the responsibility of one ship or one country. It
• 20:47
  Speaker 1: can require information collected from aircraft, surface vessels, underwater sensors, satellites,
• 20:53
  Speaker 1: and intelligence organizations, with data shared across national boundaries. A
• 20:59
  Speaker 1: Russian submarine moving from the Kola Peninsula toward the Atlantic
• 21:02
  Speaker 1: could cross areas involving several NATO members, meaning that surveillance
• 21:06
  Speaker 1: must continue as the vessel moves through different maritime zones.
• 21:11
  Speaker 1: The alliance, therefore, needs a common picture of what is
• 21:13
  Speaker 1: happening beneath the surface. That is easier said than done.
• 21:17
  Speaker 1: Countries maintain different naval forces, sensor systems, and operational procedures,
• 21:22
  Speaker 1: and the Arctic environment can interfere with communications and complicate logistics.
• 21:28
  Speaker 1: NATO has to coordinate these capabilities while ensuring that individual
• 21:32
  Speaker 1: members understand what other countries are seeing. The deployment of
• 21:36
  Speaker 1: forward land forces Finland adds another component to the broader
• 21:40
  Speaker 1: northern defense posture, reinforcing NATO's northeastern flank while demonstrating that
• 21:45
  Speaker 1: the alliance is thinking about Arctic security as a multi-domain challenge.
• 21:50
  Speaker 1: Russia's response is likely to remain closely connected to its
• 21:54
  Speaker 1: own perception of NATO activity. Moscow has already criticized increased
• 21:59
  Speaker 1: Western military operations in the far north, warning that the
• 22:03
  Speaker 1: buildup could create risks of confrontation. That means NATO must
• 22:07
  Speaker 1: communicate the purpose of its defensive measures while maintaining credible capabilities.
• 22:12
  Speaker 1: Deterrence works partly through uncertainty for the opponent, but excessive
• 22:16
  Speaker 1: ambiguity can also increase the risk of misunderstanding. The alliance
• 22:21
  Speaker 1: therefore faces a delicate balance it must make clear that
• 22:25
  Speaker 1: Russian military movements are being watched while avoiding actions that
• 22:29
  Speaker 1: could be interpreted as preparations for an offensive campaign. The
• 22:33
  Speaker 1: same challenge applies to Russia. Moscow can argue that it
• 22:36
  Speaker 1: is protecting its Arctic territory and commercial interests, but deployments
• 22:41
  Speaker 1: that appear increasingly aggressive may prompt additional NATO responses, creating
• 22:46
  Speaker 1: a cycle that neither side necessarily wants. The Arctic could
• 22:50
  Speaker 1: become more heavily militarized even without either side deliberately seeking
• 22:53
  Speaker 1: a direct confrontation. The growing value of the Northern Sea
• 22:57
  Speaker 1: Route adds another layer to this competition. As ice conditions change,
• 23:02
  Speaker 1: the route can provide commercial opportunities for ships traveling between
• 23:06
  Speaker 1: Europe and Asia. Russia has a geographic advantage because the
• 23:09
  Speaker 1: route runs along its northern coastline and Moscow has invested
• 23:13
  Speaker 1: in infrastructure that strengthens its ability to monitor and regulate
• 23:17
  Speaker 1: activity there. From Russia's perspective, controlling the route can support
• 23:22
  Speaker 1: economic development and national security. From the perspective of other countries, however,
• 23:27
  Speaker 1: excessive Russian control could create concerns about freedom of navigation
• 23:32
  Speaker 1: and access to an increasingly important maritime corridor. Military power
• 23:37
  Speaker 1: can reinforce economic influence, because bases and patrols can support
• 23:41
  Speaker 1: both security operations and control of surrounding waters. The result
• 23:46
  Speaker 1: is a region where commercial interests and military strategy increasingly overlap.
• 23:51
  Speaker 1: NATO has to account for that reality while preparing for
• 23:54
  Speaker 1: a future in which the Arctic may become more accessible
• 23:58
  Speaker 1: and more contested. Breedlove's warning about quieter submarines fits into
• 24:02
  Speaker 1: that broader transformation. The threat is not necessarily immediate, but
• 24:07
  Speaker 1: the underlying trend is significant. Russia is developing vessels that
• 24:11
  Speaker 1: are intended to be harder to detect, while simultaneously improving
• 24:15
  Speaker 1: the infrastructure from which those vessels can operate. NATO is
• 24:19
  Speaker 1: responding by strengthening its northern posture and improving coordination. The
• 24:24
  Speaker 1: result is an undersea competition that may remain largely invisible
• 24:28
  Speaker 1: to the public while consuming significant resources behind the scenes.
• 24:32
  Speaker 1: The public sees photographs of warships, aircraft, and military exercises,
• 24:37
  Speaker 1: but much of the most important activity occurs below the surface.
• 24:41
  Speaker 1: Submarines can spend long periods operating without being observed, and
• 24:45
  Speaker 1: the ability to locate them can depend on information gathered
• 24:48
  Speaker 1: from many different sources. That creates a unique strategic environment
• 24:53
  Speaker 1: in which knowledge itself becomes a form of military power.
• 24:57
  Speaker 1: The warning from Breedlove also reflects a larger debate about
• 25:00
  Speaker 1: Russia's military strategy and the way Moscow uses advanced weapons
• 25:05
  Speaker 1: programs to demonstrate strength, deter opponents, and shape international perceptions.
• 25:10
  Speaker 1: Breedlove argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin has used announcements
• 25:14
  Speaker 1: about new weapons and military capabilities as a way to
• 25:18
  Speaker 1: create uncertainty and signal that Russia possesses systems that NATO
• 25:22
  Speaker 1: must take seriously. That does not mean every Russian weapons
• 25:26
  Speaker 1: announcement should be dismissed as propaganda. Military programs can have
• 25:30
  Speaker 1: real capabilities while also serving political purposes. The Yasen-M submarines
• 25:35
  Speaker 1: are an example of that combination. They are real vessels
• 25:39
  Speaker 1: entering or being developed for Russia's fleet, and their acoustic
• 25:42
  Speaker 1: and missile capabilities create legitimate planning concerns for NATO. At
• 25:47
  Speaker 1: the same time, public statements describing them as effectively invisible
• 25:51
  Speaker 1: are part of a broader strategic message intended to demonstrate
• 25:55
  Speaker 1: Russian technological progress and challenge Western confidence. For NATO, the
• 26:00
  Speaker 1: correct response is neither complacency nor alarmism. It is careful assessment.
• 26:06
  Speaker 1: Military planners have to determine what the submarines can actually do,
• 26:10
  Speaker 1: how many are available, where they are likely to operate,
• 26:13
  Speaker 1: and what supporting infrastructure Russia has built around them. They
• 26:17
  Speaker 1: also have to compare Russian capabilities with NATO's existing detection
• 26:21
  Speaker 1: and response systems. That process is difficult because much of
• 26:25
  Speaker 1: the relevant information is classified, incomplete, or deliberately obscured. Russia
• 26:31
  Speaker 1: has incentives to exaggerate some capabilities and conceal others, while
• 26:35
  Speaker 1: NATO has incentives to avoid revealing how effectively it can
• 26:38
  Speaker 1: monitor Russian activity. The result is an environment where public
• 26:42
  Speaker 1: statements provide only part of the picture. What can be
• 26:46
  Speaker 1: said publicly is that Russia has continued modernizing its northern
• 26:49
  Speaker 1: fleet and investing in Arctic military infrastructure. The Kola Peninsula
• 26:54
  Speaker 1: remains a major strategic hub, and Russia's northern coastline includes
• 26:59
  Speaker 1: a network of facilities that support military operations. The alliance
• 27:03
  Speaker 1: therefore has to assume that Russian naval forces could operate
• 27:07
  Speaker 1: from protected northern waters and potentially move into the Atlantic.
• 27:11
  Speaker 1: The GIEK gap becomes important in this context because it
• 27:15
  Speaker 1: represents one of the major geographic routes through which Russian
• 27:18
  Speaker 1: naval forces can transition between northern bases and the Atlantic.
• 27:23
  Speaker 1: NATO has long recognized the strategic value of this region
• 27:27
  Speaker 1: And the renewed focus on Russian submarines is bringing old
• 27:30
  Speaker 1: Cold War geography into a new technological era. During the
• 27:34
  Speaker 1: Cold War, NATO and the Soviet Union invested heavily in
• 27:38
  Speaker 1: anti-submarine warfare because both sides understood that undersea forces could
• 27:43
  Speaker 1: alter the strategic balance. Today, the technology is more advanced,
• 27:47
  Speaker 1: but the fundamental problem remains similar. One side wants to
• 27:51
  Speaker 1: move without being detected, while the other wants to find
• 27:55
  Speaker 1: and track those movements. The difference is that modern submarines
• 27:59
  Speaker 1: can carry more sophisticated weapons and operate within a far
• 28:02
  Speaker 1: more interconnected global environment. The stakes therefore extend beyond traditional
• 28:07
  Speaker 1: naval warfare. A Russian submarine operating in the Atlantic could
• 28:11
  Speaker 1: potentially threaten military targets, surface ships, or coastal infrastructure, while
• 28:17
  Speaker 1: the mere possibility of its presence could affect commercial shipping
• 28:21
  Speaker 1: and naval deployments. NATO must also consider the role of China,
• 28:25
  Speaker 1: which Breedlove identified as another country developing advanced naval capabilities.
• 28:31
  Speaker 1: The broader trend is that major powers are investing in
• 28:34
  Speaker 1: undersea systems because submarines offer a combination of stealth, endurance,
• 28:39
  Speaker 1: and striking power that is difficult to replicate with other platforms.
• 28:43
  Speaker 1: This creates a long-term challenge for the United States and
• 28:46
  Speaker 1: its allies. Maintaining an effective undersea advantage requires constant investment
• 28:51
  Speaker 1: because detection technologies must evolve alongside submarine design. Sensors need
• 28:57
  Speaker 1: to become more sensitive, data analysis more sophisticated, and allied
• 29:01
  Speaker 1: coordination more seamless. The competition can become expensive because oceans
• 29:06
  Speaker 1: are enormous and surveillance requires persistent coverage. Yet failing to
• 29:11
  Speaker 1: invest could be even more costly if an adversary gains
• 29:14
  Speaker 1: the ability to operate with greater freedom near critical sea lanes.
• 29:18
  Speaker 1: That is the strategic dilemma NATO now faces in the north.
• 29:23
  Speaker 1: Russia's quieter submarines may not represent an immediate attack threat,
• 29:27
  Speaker 1: but they represent a capability that can reduce warning time
• 29:31
  Speaker 1: and increase uncertainty. In military planning, uncertainty is itself dangerous
• 29:36
  Speaker 1: because decision-makers must prepare for possibilities rather than confirmed events.
• 29:42
  Speaker 1: If NATO cannot confidently determine where a submarine is operating,
• 29:46
  Speaker 1: it may have to assume a wider range of possibilities
• 29:48
  Speaker 1: and deploy additional forces accordingly. That can stretch resources and
• 29:53
  Speaker 1: create opportunities for mistakes. The answer is to improve the
• 29:56
  Speaker 1: ability to distinguish genuine threats from routine activity. The possibility
• 30:01
  Speaker 1: of a stronger Russian undersea presence also raises questions about
• 30:05
  Speaker 1: the security of North America itself. Because the Atlantic is
• 30:09
  Speaker 1: not an isolated European theater, but a maritime bridge connecting
• 30:13
  Speaker 1: the United States and Canada with their allies across Europe.
• 30:17
  Speaker 1: For decades, the geographic separation provided by the ocean has
• 30:21
  Speaker 1: been one of the United States' greatest strategic advantages. But
• 30:25
  Speaker 1: submarines reduce the protective effect of distance because they can
• 30:29
  Speaker 1: cross enormous stretches of ocean without remaining visible to conventional surveillance.
• 30:34
  Speaker 1: A nuclear-powered submarine can travel long distances and remain at
• 30:38
  Speaker 1: sea for extended periods, giving it the endurance necessary to
• 30:42
  Speaker 1: operate far from its home base. If such a submarine
• 30:45
  Speaker 1: becomes harder to detect, the traditional assumption that the Atlantic
• 30:49
  Speaker 1: provides ample warning can become less reliable. That is why
• 30:53
  Speaker 1: Breedlove's warning focuses on the ability of submarines to reach
• 30:57
  Speaker 1: striking distance of American and allied coastlines. Again, this does
• 31:02
  Speaker 1: not mean an attack is imminent. It means the military
• 31:05
  Speaker 1: geography has changed enough that NATO must take the possibility seriously.
• 31:10
  Speaker 1: The alliance has to defend not only its land borders,
• 31:13
  Speaker 1: but also the maritime approaches connecting its members. Those approaches
• 31:18
  Speaker 1: include shipping routes, naval bases, communication infrastructure, and waters through
• 31:23
  Speaker 1: which military reinforcements would travel during a crisis. A submarine
• 31:27
  Speaker 1: capable of operating undetected can threaten each of these functions
• 31:31
  Speaker 1: indirectly or directly. In a major conflict, the Atlantic would
• 31:35
  Speaker 1: become a vital transportation corridor for moving troops, equipment, and
• 31:40
  Speaker 1: supplies between North America and Europe. Protecting that corridor would
• 31:44
  Speaker 1: require knowing where hostile submarines are operating. The challenge becomes
• 31:49
  Speaker 1: even more important because Russia does not need to deploy
• 31:52
  Speaker 1: dozens of submarines into the Atlantic to create a serious
• 31:55
  Speaker 1: planning problem. A smaller number of highly capable vessels could
• 31:59
  Speaker 1: force NATO to dedicate substantial resources to tracking them. This
• 32:04
  Speaker 1: is the logic behind sea denial. A country does not
• 32:07
  Speaker 1: necessarily need to control an ocean to make operating there
• 32:10
  Speaker 1: dangerous for an opponent. It may only need enough weapons
• 32:14
  Speaker 1: and platforms to create uncertainty and impose costs. Russia's guided
• 32:18
  Speaker 1: missile submarines can contribute to that strategy because they combine
• 32:22
  Speaker 1: stealth with long-range strike capabilities. NATO's task is therefore to
• 32:27
  Speaker 1: maintain freedom of movement for allied forces while denying Russia
• 32:31
  Speaker 1: the opportunity to operate freely in strategically important waters. The
• 32:35
  Speaker 1: GIEK gap is critical because it offers a geographic point
• 32:39
  Speaker 1: where northern naval movements can be monitored and potentially constrained.
• 32:43
  Speaker 1: But monitoring the gap does not solve the entire problem.
• 32:47
  Speaker 1: Submarines can use different routes, exploit environmental conditions, and operate
• 32:52
  Speaker 1: over large areas. NATO, therefore, needs a network rather than
• 32:55
  Speaker 1: a single barrier. Aircraft can search broad regions, surface vessels
• 33:00
  Speaker 1: can support tracking, underwater sensors can provide acoustic information, and
• 33:05
  Speaker 1: intelligence organizations can analyze patterns over time. Satellites can add
• 33:10
  Speaker 1: information about surface activity and infrastructure, even though they cannot
• 33:14
  Speaker 1: simply see every submarine beneath the ocean. The strength of
• 33:18
  Speaker 1: the alliance lies in combining these different capabilities. That requires
• 33:22
  Speaker 1: cooperation among countries that share a common security interest, but
• 33:27
  Speaker 1: may have different levels of naval capacity. The Arctic also
• 33:30
  Speaker 1: creates special demands because countries such as Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Canada,
• 33:38
  Speaker 1: and the United States have different geographic positions and responsibilities.
• 33:42
  Speaker 1: Their proximity to Russia makes northern European states particularly sensitive
• 33:47
  Speaker 1: to Russian military movements. while the United States and Canada
• 33:51
  Speaker 1: have an interest in protecting the approaches to North America.
• 33:55
  Speaker 1: The result is a shared security problem that crosses national boundaries.
• 33:59
  Speaker 1: Russia's military activity can therefore influence defense planning across an
• 34:04
  Speaker 1: enormous geographic area. Moscow's investment in Arctic bases, ports, and
• 34:09
  Speaker 1: radar systems adds to the concern because those facilities can
• 34:13
  Speaker 1: support a sustained military presence. At the same time, Russia's
• 34:17
  Speaker 1: leaders argue that increased NATO activity threatens Russian security. That
• 34:22
  Speaker 1: competing perception creates a dangerous feedback loop. NATO increases surveillance
• 34:27
  Speaker 1: because it sees Russian modernization as a threat. Russia sees
• 34:31
  Speaker 1: NATO surveillance and deployments as evidence that the alliance is
• 34:35
  Speaker 1: preparing for confrontation. Both sides then strengthen their capabilities. The
• 34:40
  Speaker 1: challenge for policymakers is to prevent that cycle from becoming self-reinforcing.
• 34:46
  Speaker 1: Strong defenses are necessary, but strong defenses also require clear
• 34:50
  Speaker 1: communication about their purpose. The goal should be to reduce
• 34:54
  Speaker 1: the likelihood that either side misinterprets routine military activity as
• 34:58
  Speaker 1: preparation for an attack. Russia's quieter nuclear-powered submarines are ultimately
• 35:04
  Speaker 1: part of a much larger transformation taking place across the
• 35:07
  Speaker 1: Arctic and North Atlantic, where military power, economic opportunity, and
• 35:13
  Speaker 1: strategic competition are increasingly converging. The immediate warning from Breedlove
• 35:18
  Speaker 1: is that NATO cannot assume its existing methods for tracking
• 35:21
  Speaker 1: Russian submarines will remain sufficient if Moscow continues improving acoustic stealth.
• 35:27
  Speaker 1: But the broader message is that the alliance is entering
• 35:30
  Speaker 1: an environment in which the northern seas will matter more
• 35:33
  Speaker 1: than they have in decades. Russia is modernizing its submarine fleet,
• 35:37
  Speaker 1: expanding military infrastructure on the Kola Peninsula and strengthening facilities
• 35:42
  Speaker 1: along its Arctic coastline. NATO is responding through initiatives such
• 35:46
  Speaker 1: as Arctic Sentry and the reinforcement of its northeastern flank.
• 35:50
  Speaker 1: Both sides recognize the strategic value of the region, and
• 35:54
  Speaker 1: both are preparing for a future in which the Arctic
• 35:56
  Speaker 1: is more accessible and more contested. The central question is
• 36:00
  Speaker 1: whether that competition can remain controlled. Russia wants to protect
• 36:05
  Speaker 1: and expand its influence over northern waters, including the Northern
• 36:08
  Speaker 1: Sea Route, while NATO wants to ensure that the Arctic
• 36:12
  Speaker 1: and North Atlantic remain secure and accessible to Allied forces
• 36:16
  Speaker 1: and commercial activity. Those objectives do not automatically lead to war,
• 36:21
  Speaker 1: but they create overlapping interests that can produce friction. The
• 36:25
  Speaker 1: presence of quieter submarines adds another layer because undersea movements
• 36:28
  Speaker 1: are difficult to observe and even more difficult for the
• 36:32
  Speaker 1: public to understand. A vessel can leave a Russian base,
• 36:36
  Speaker 1: move into northern waters and potentially travel toward the Atlantic
• 36:40
  Speaker 1: without generating the kind of visible evidence that would accompany
• 36:43
  Speaker 1: a surface deployment. That uncertainty is precisely why NATO is
• 36:47
  Speaker 1: emphasizing surveillance and coordination. The alliance needs to know what
• 36:51
  Speaker 1: is happening beneath the surface before a crisis develops, not
• 36:55
  Speaker 1: simply after a submarine launches a weapon. Detection provides decision-makers
• 37:00
  Speaker 1: with time, and time can be the difference between a
• 37:02
  Speaker 1: controlled response and a dangerous escalation. The coming years will
• 37:07
  Speaker 1: therefore be a test of NATO's ability to maintain an
• 37:10
  Speaker 1: effective undersea picture across a huge and increasingly important region.
• 37:15
  Speaker 1: That will require investment in sensors, patrol aircraft, naval platforms,
• 37:20
  Speaker 1: intelligence analysis, and secure communications. It will also require allied
• 37:25
  Speaker 1: countries to share information quickly and trust one another's assessments.
• 37:29
  Speaker 1: No single NATO member can monitor the entire Arctic and
• 37:33
  Speaker 1: North Atlantic alone. The scale of the geography makes cooperation essential.
• 37:38
  Speaker 1: Russia understands this challenge as well. Its submarine force benefits
• 37:43
  Speaker 1: from the protection of northern bases, while the country's geography
• 37:46
  Speaker 1: provides direct access to Arctic waters. Moscow can use that
• 37:50
  Speaker 1: position to maintain a persistent naval presence and to create
• 37:54
  Speaker 1: uncertainty about where its submarines may operate. NATO's geographic advantage
• 37:59
  Speaker 1: lies in the network of allied territories surrounding the North Atlantic. Iceland, Norway,
• 38:05
  Speaker 1: the United Kingdom, Denmark, Greenland, Canada, and the United States
• 38:10
  Speaker 1: create a strategic framework that can support surveillance and defense.
• 38:15
  Speaker 1: The effectiveness of that framework depends on whether the alliance
• 38:18
  Speaker 1: can coordinate its capabilities fast enough to keep pace with
• 38:22
  Speaker 1: Russian modernization. The stakes extend beyond military targets. The Arctic
• 38:27
  Speaker 1: is becoming an increasingly valuable commercial region as maritime access changes.
• 38:33
  Speaker 1: Shorter shipping routes between Europe and Asia could create economic benefits,
• 38:37
  Speaker 1: but those benefits also increase the strategic value of the
• 38:40
  Speaker 1: waters through which trade moves. Russia's desire to influence or
• 38:44
  Speaker 1: control northern routes therefore has economic and military dimensions at
• 38:49
  Speaker 1: the same time. If competition over those routes intensifies, the
• 38:53
  Speaker 1: Arctic could become one of the defining geopolitical theaters of
• 38:57
  Speaker 1: the coming decades. NATO's response will need to account for
• 39:00
  Speaker 1: that reality without turning every economic development into a military confrontation.
• 39:06
  Speaker 1: The most effective strategy may be one that combines credible
• 39:09
  Speaker 1: deterrence with clear rules and predictable communication. Russia must understand
• 39:14
  Speaker 1: that NATO can monitor and respond to threatening military movements
• 39:19
  Speaker 1: while NATO must avoid creating unnecessary opportunities for escalation. That
• 39:24
  Speaker 1: balance will become harder if submarine technology continues to advance.
• 39:29
  Speaker 1: The quieter Russian vessels become, the more difficult it will
• 39:32
  Speaker 1: be to maintain certainty about their movements. That is why
• 39:36
  Speaker 1: Breedlove's warning deserves attention even though it does not predict
• 39:39
  Speaker 1: an imminent attack. It identifies a capability trend that could
• 39:43
  Speaker 1: gradually alter the strategic balance. A submarine does not need
• 39:47
  Speaker 1: to fire a missile to influence a military calculation. Its
• 39:51
  Speaker 1: ability to remain hidden can force an opponent to spend resources,
• 39:55
  Speaker 1: change patrol patterns, and reconsider assumptions about the safety of
• 39:59
  Speaker 1: distant waters.