Latest / Eye Spy: The Intelligence History Podcast / The President's Kill List
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome to EyeSpy, the Intelligence History Podcast.
- 0:08I'm your host, Krystel von Kumberg.
- 0:12Every few weeks, I'm going to be interviewing historians, practitioners and scholars in
- 0:16the field of intelligence to explore some aspects of the past and what it can tell us
- 0:21about the present and future of intelligence studies.
- 0:25Dr. Luca Trenta is an associate professor in international relations at Swansea University
- 0:32in Wales.
- 0:33He has written on the subject of covert action and assassination as tools of foreign policy,
- 0:39having published several articles in international relations, intelligence studies and international
- 0:44law journals, including works on the Ford administration and the development of the
- 0:49US ban on assassination, on the Obama administration's use of targeted killing and on the international
- 0:55adoption of an expanded notion of imminence to justify uses of forces and self-defense.
- 1:01He has also published articles on US foreign policy and presidential decision-making in
- 1:05the European Journal of International Security and Journal of Intelligence History.
- 1:10He is also the host of the Out of the Shadows Project Podcast.
- 1:14Today, we are going to be discussing Luca Trenta's latest book, The President's Kill
- 1:21List, Assassination and US Foreign Policy Since 1945, reflecting on the US government's
- 1:27involvement in the assassination of foreign officials from the early Cold War to the present.
- 1:32It's such an honor to have you here today.
- 1:34Thank you for joining us on I Spy, the intelligence history podcast.
- 1:38Welcome.
- 1:39Luca Trenta Thank you for having me.
- 1:40I've been following the early episodes of the podcast.
- 1:43I'm looking forward to this.
- 1:44Dr. Luca Trenta Thank you very much.
- 1:48So firstly, I wanted to ask you about the most notable direct and indirect methods the
- 1:53US government has employed in assassination plots since 1945 and how these methods have
- 1:59evolved from the Cold War to the post 9-11 era.
- 2:04And what recently declassified archival material did you find most useful when piecing together
- 2:09this history?
- 2:10Luca Trenta Yeah, that is a very good question.
- 2:13I think my views have marginally evolved since I published the book.
- 2:18So in the book, I argue that the methods of assassination can be understood along a continuum,
- 2:25basically, from more direct to, of course, less direct.
- 2:30But I think we can further complicate the picture a little bit and think about two main
- 2:35dimensions.
- 2:36So one is the methods, that is, what weapon is being used to conduct the assassination?
- 2:42Is it poison?
- 2:44Is it a firearm?
- 2:45Is it aerial bombing?
- 2:47And so on.
- 2:49And the second dimension has to do with who are the actors involved in this assassination
- 2:54operation?
- 2:55So are US forces or US personnel involved directly in the assassination operation?
- 3:02Or are they sort of outsourcing the assassination to local actors or proxies, regional allies?
- 3:11And so on.
- 3:12So I think we can understand assassination as being more direct when there is a direct
- 3:18involvement of US forces, either, for example, via aerial bombing by the US Air Force, or
- 3:28at the same time by operations such as the delivery of poison.
- 3:33We have a few examples in which poison is directly delivered from the CIA to the chief
- 3:39of station, for example, in Congo, with the assumption that the chief of station will
- 3:43give it to a single individual to poison the foreign official, in this case, Patrice Lumumba.
- 3:50But it has to be said that these type of direct assassinations are fairly rare.
- 3:56Yes, of course, we have many episodes with Fidel Castro of delivery of poison and development
- 4:04of other exotic methods of assassination, say, explosive SIDARS and all these sorts
- 4:09of things.
- 4:10But I think more often the United States provides support, sometimes training, sometimes weapons,
- 4:20sometimes a more diffuse system of incentives to certain local actors for them to carry
- 4:28out the assassination.
- 4:29And in the last minute, the United States either refuses to save the foreign official
- 4:36or foreign leader in question or actively participates in the demise of such a foreign
- 4:43official.
- 4:44To give a couple of examples, in the case of General René Schneider of Chile, the CIA
- 4:51was in contact for a very long time with many of the people who eventually carried out the
- 4:57assassination.
- 4:58It provided support, it provided weapons, and according to some accounts, some of those
- 5:03weapons were at least present at the scene of the Schneider kidnapping that turned into
- 5:08a killing.
- 5:11A similar picture emerges, for example, with South Vietnam, in which the US again was for
- 5:17a long time in contact with the generals who carried out the eventual assassination.
- 5:23Of course, they did not need the weapons because they were South Vietnamese generals.
- 5:27They had plenty of weapons at their disposal.
- 5:30But the United States gave them a system of incentive to carry out the regime change and
- 5:37then basically turned a blind eye when a request to save Diem, the leader of South Vietnam,
- 5:43reached the United States.
- 5:46As to your second question regarding what type of sources have been particularly helpful,
- 5:54I have to say that the research in assassination is quite difficult.
- 5:59Very rarely discussions of assassinations among policymakers are put on paper.
- 6:05If they are put to paper, they are sometimes redacted or the documents themselves are destroyed.
- 6:11For example, we have a case in which the State Department ordered a consul in the Dominican
- 6:17Republic to destroy all the documents that had to do with the assassination of Rafael
- 6:22Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic at the time.
- 6:26So the historical record is relatively scarce.
- 6:30But I think there are some interesting collections and some that are at least so far not particularly
- 6:37well explored.
- 6:38So one option is, of course, the JFK assassination records, which we tend to assume primarily
- 6:45deal with the assassination of JFK himself, but actually contain a lot of material of
- 6:51what was going on around the same time and also about the assassination of other foreign
- 6:57leaders and officials, including Trujillo, Castro and Diem of Vietnam.
- 7:06Presidential libraries, of course, are quite helpful, although, again, it is difficult
- 7:12to find the smoking gun document that one would always want to find and so on.
- 7:18And I have to say that, of course, as many of your listeners will know, the closer you
- 7:23come to the present time, the less archival material there is.
- 7:27But the Clinton Library, for example, has done some good work in terms of starting to
- 7:32declassify and digitize a few documents.
- 7:35And there were some interesting snippets that I found in there for my research, for example,
- 7:40around Bin Laden and around the confrontation between the United States and Saddam Hussein
- 7:47in the 1990s.
- 7:48Absolutely fascinating.
- 7:52And how has the language used in the decision-making process surrounding assassinations, such as
- 8:01you mentioned in the book, the use of euphemisms, innuendos and denials, how has this shaped
- 8:06public and political discourse on US foreign policy?
- 8:11I think it's interesting because, to my mind, the language has changed, in part because
- 8:17the audience has changed.
- 8:19So during the Cold War, discussion of assassinations would remain primarily within the confines
- 8:28of the executive, so within special groups or discussions among policymakers.
- 8:35And in these groups, there would be a tendency to either use euphemisms and innuendos, or
- 8:41maybe, which is an option that we should consider, the discussion that was actually taking place
- 8:48was more explicit, but what we have in terms of minutes and so on has done some work in
- 8:54terms of removing problematic or controversial language and so on.
- 9:00So in this early phase, I think, the audience is primarily internal, so there is no congressional
- 9:06oversight, there is no public awareness or involvement in these discussions at all.
- 9:13And I think, to be honest, even then, there are a few exceptions to this use of euphemisms,
- 9:20innuendos and so on.
- 9:22We have a few foreign officials that are quite explicit in their use of assassination.
- 9:29So for example, Harry Dearborn, who was for some time both Consul and CIA Chief of Station
- 9:38in the Dominican Republic, sends back to the State Department and allegedly to the White
- 9:43House quite a few telegrams that are very explicit in terms of how assassination is
- 9:48actually the moral option when it comes to somebody like Rafael Trujillo, and that we
- 9:55should treat Rafael Trujillo like a vampire.
- 9:58The only way to get rid of a vampire is to draw a stick through his heart, which again
- 10:03is as explicit a call for assassination as you can probably encounter in the historical
- 10:09record.
- 10:10At other times, the situation is, or the references are very vague.
- 10:14There is a famous example in which John Kennedy is present at a meeting in which somebody
- 10:19makes reference, for example, to the Shrine of Hemingway.
- 10:24And that's all you get in the historical record.
- 10:27So there is no explanation as to what this refers to.
- 10:31Many, many years later, somebody who was in the CIA and was an assistant to the CIA Director
- 10:36John McCone actually explained what it meant.
- 10:39And it was a reference to exploiting Castro's passion for Hemingway, who had just died.
- 10:47And Castro had visited his shrine, his former house and shrine in Cuba without a personal
- 10:53security detail.
- 10:55So the idea of exploiting the shrine of Hemingway, which is very obscure if one only looks at
- 11:01the historical record, then becomes more explicit.
- 11:03And it is a way of saying if he goes there, we can kill him because he's going there alone.
- 11:11The argument that I make in the book is that the situation changes in the 1970s, both in
- 11:16terms of language and in terms of audience, because of course, after the Yux Ryan Amendment,
- 11:23after the congressional investigations, after the need to report covert operations to Congress,
- 11:30and after the establishment of an executive order, which in part prohibited assassination,
- 11:37the US government cannot be seen as advocating for assassination.
- 11:43So assassination becomes even more scarce, so to say, in the language of policymaking.
- 11:51But at the same time, an effort is made, initially only internally, but progressively with Congress
- 11:57and with the public, to create exceptions to this prohibition on assassination.
- 12:03And in order to do this, each administration has to develop legal arguments and legal opinions
- 12:09that suggest that a certain type of operation might appear as an assassination attempt,
- 12:16but is actually something else.
- 12:18And we can go into a discussion of what these legal arguments are.
- 12:21But I think it is important here that it is at this point that the language, at least
- 12:26surrounding assassination, goes public.
- 12:30Because these legal justifications, while they're not public, they still seep into the
- 12:35press and get discussed in Congress and eventually among intellectuals and experts and the general
- 12:44public.
- 12:48And backtracking a little on what you were saying, what were the origins and motivations
- 12:53behind this ban on assassination in 1975?
- 12:58And how does this contribute to our understanding of prohibition and assassination as a norm?
- 13:04And to what extent did this norm reshape the US government's approach to handling foreign
- 13:09officials' deemed threats?
- 13:12So there are a few uncontroversial elements there and some controversial elements.
- 13:17I'll start with the uncontroversial ones.
- 13:20The origins of the ban really can be found in the mid-1970s congressional inquiries of
- 13:27the intelligence community.
- 13:29There are a few media stories that point to CIA scandals.
- 13:35At the time, the Ford administration is in power.
- 13:39Ford decides to establish a presidential commission chaired by his vice president, Nelson Rockefeller,
- 13:46to investigate the intelligence community.
- 13:50And to make a long story short, the report that is published by the Rockefeller commission
- 13:55is considered to be somewhat of a cover-up because it has been changed quite radically
- 14:00by the White House itself.
- 14:03And a chapter in particular that was dealing with assassination has been completely removed.
- 14:09By the time the Rockefeller commission report is published, Congress has already started
- 14:14its own investigations.
- 14:16And in particular in the Senate, we have an investigative committee chaired by Frank Church,
- 14:22who is a senator from Idaho, and that's why it's called the Church Committee.
- 14:27And one of the first things the Church Committee does is explore precisely the US government
- 14:32involvement in assassination.
- 14:35And they publish an interim report on assassination, which is fully available online, and some
- 14:41addenda in a separate document that very often go and to be ignored, so to say.
- 14:48In the interim report, the Church Committee recommended the establishment of a statute
- 14:53or a law that would prohibit assassination as a federal policy.
- 14:59They give some precise indication as to what assassination means, who would be protected,
- 15:05under what circumstances, and so on.
- 15:07And certain elements in the Ford administration, for example, Attorney General Levi, are actually
- 15:12quite in favor of this.
- 15:14They argue that it's actually a good thing to have more precision and more accountability
- 15:22in such a controversial realm as assassination.
- 15:25But other figures in the administration are very much against this.
- 15:29Kissinger is certainly against it.
- 15:31And Ford quite a few times expresses his opposition to Congress legislating over the intelligence
- 15:38community because it would constrain the power of the presidency.
- 15:43So the response of the Ford administration is to prevent a congressional legislation
- 15:49and instead publish an executive order.
- 15:52The executive order 11905, which again can be read online, is supposed to constrain the
- 15:59activities of the intelligence community or to reform them.
- 16:02But it doesn't give much of an indication that the international community has done
- 16:06anything bad in the previous decades.
- 16:11And it does contain a general ban on assassination, a general prohibition that does not actually
- 16:17specify who is protected, in what conditions, what we mean by assassination, and so on.
- 16:25So what I argue, and this is the more controversial bit, is that this ban is basically left vague
- 16:32on purpose to permit an administration that would follow the Ford administration to reinterpret
- 16:40it if necessary in a manner that would permit them to pursue their preferred policy option.
- 16:48So to a certain extent, it is a norm because it is a prohibition enshrined in an executive
- 16:53order.
- 16:54But it is one that is left very vague to give the possibility of reshaping its meaning,
- 17:03reshaping its remit, and at times challenging whether we should have a prohibition at all.
- 17:11And could you elaborate a little on the efforts by various administrations to weaken or circumvent
- 17:17the ban on assassination?
- 17:19How did legal interpretations and policy adjustments allow for the continuation of targeted killing
- 17:24under new guises, as you were hinting to?
- 17:28Yeah, so as far as I can tell, I did not find any example of the Carter administration considering
- 17:35assassination as an available foreign policy option during the Carter presidency.
- 17:42The situation in my mind changes somewhat with the Reagan administration.
- 17:47Reagan comes to power with a willingness to take the fight to the Soviet Union to revamp
- 17:51the intelligence community.
- 17:53And one of the first things they do is publish a new executive order, which does reconfirm
- 17:59the existence of a prohibition on assassination.
- 18:03But at the same time, you have a series of episodes or controversies in which the argument
- 18:11can be made, and plenty of people make it, that the United States is exposing itself
- 18:17once again to the risk of being involved in assassination.
- 18:22And every time through legal opinions, through political precedents, through arguments, the
- 18:29Reagan administration sort of rejects these accusations and actually argue that what they
- 18:34are doing is something different.
- 18:38And I've made the point in my book that there are quite a few ways in which the administration
- 18:44does so.
- 18:46First of all, I think it reshapes or at least in their mind, clarify the remit of the ban.
- 18:56So with the situations in which the prohibition on assassination applies.
- 19:00And what they argue is basically that the ban does not apply in counterterrorism.
- 19:06So counterterrorism operations are removed from the remit of the ban and so from the
- 19:13remit of the prohibition on assassination.
- 19:17There is then a second set of argument that has to do with intent.
- 19:22CIA Director William Casey will play very often on this intent argument.
- 19:30For example, when there are accusations that the weapons that the Reagan administration
- 19:35is supplying to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan are assassination weapons because there is
- 19:43sniper rifles and so on.
- 19:46Casey and his legal advisors play on an intent argument to say what we are doing is providing
- 19:54them with rifles.
- 19:55What they do with the rifles is up to them.
- 19:58So it is not our intent to assassinate anyone.
- 20:01What we are doing is simply providing weapons.
- 20:06At some other times when the case of the famous murder manual that the CIA printed for the
- 20:16Contras in Nicaragua, this was a manual on how to conduct guerrilla warfare.
- 20:24And in one section, it included a recommendation that maybe certain political figures of the
- 20:29Sandinista government in Nicaragua should have been neutralized.
- 20:33And of course neutralized is another euphemism for assassination.
- 20:38And again, the administration argues that this is not the intent of the administration,
- 20:43that the administration did not have full control on the production on the manual so
- 20:48it cannot be accused of trying to cause assassination or be involved in assassination.
- 20:57And the second argument that is made at the time is that the ban on assassination has
- 21:01nothing to do with the Contras because the ban on assassination only protects heads of
- 21:07state.
- 21:10The problem that I find with this is that when it comes to a confrontation with the
- 21:13head of state, that is Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, the Reagan administration that had
- 21:20just argued that the ban on assassination only protects heads of state, again forgets
- 21:25about the ban on assassination and comes up with an additional justification.
- 21:32The additional justification is in part that any action covert or overtaken in self-defense
- 21:40cannot amount to assassination.
- 21:43And the other part of this legal argumentation, which is developed by Abraham Soffeyer, who
- 21:49is a legal advisor at the time, is basically that if the US targets a legitimate command
- 21:57and control building and a foreign leader happens to be in this command and control
- 22:05building, the foreign leader is not protected, does not have immunity against any attack
- 22:12because it was not the intent of the United States to kill the foreign leader.
- 22:17They were simply bombing a building.
- 22:19And if the leader happened to be in the building, then that was a stroke of good luck as opposed
- 22:27to an attempt to assassinate.
- 22:31And then if this has to do with more direct assassination attempts, later on in the H.W.
- 22:36Bush administration, you have the development of an additional argument that basically permits
- 22:41the CIA to become more directly involved in coup plotting, as long as there is no specific
- 22:49demonstration of intent or no explicit directive given by the CIA to the coup plotters that
- 22:57they intend to assassinate somebody.
- 23:00But again, this is very unlikely.
- 23:02If you are the CIA and you are supporting somebody aiming to overthrow a foreign government,
- 23:10first of all, it's unlikely that you will put in writing anything whatsoever.
- 23:14And it's even more unlikely that it will put in writing a request to assassinate a specific
- 23:19foreign leader.
- 23:20So to a certain extent, it's an implausible argument to make, but one that is made in
- 23:27order to expand the powers of the CIA.
- 23:33And how has congressional oversight and involvement in assassination plots fluctuated over the
- 23:40decades?
- 23:42To what extent have legal reviews and political debates shaped or constrained the use of assassination
- 23:48as a tool of U.S. foreign policy?
- 23:50Now, I have to say the role of Congress was one of the surprises of doing research, especially
- 23:57on more recent decades.
- 24:00It was quite predictable in the early Cold War.
- 24:03There is this general consensus, although part of my research is challenging this consensus,
- 24:08that Congress was largely uninvolved in oversight of the intelligence community in the early
- 24:13Cold War.
- 24:14Basically, it was turning a blind eye to what the CIA was doing.
- 24:18And in the realm of assassination, this is actually quite correct.
- 24:23As we said earlier, the situation changes in the 1970s and 1980s.
- 24:28What I found somewhat surprising is that by the 1980s, assassination and the ban on assassination
- 24:35become very much a partisan thing, becomes something to be used in blame shifting.
- 24:43So when the Reagan administration is in power, for example, plenty of Congress people criticize
- 24:50administration for trying to assassinate foreign leaders.
- 24:55Later on, when the H.W. Bush administration is in power, and actually the administration
- 24:59does not go all out in support of a coup against Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega, then all
- 25:07of a sudden Congress is criticizing the administration for not being aggressive enough.
- 25:13So it is Congress that is almost pushing the administration to do more.
- 25:18And the same thing happens again when the Clinton administration is in power in both
- 25:22the confrontation with Saddam Hussein and the early confrontation with Osama bin Laden.
- 25:29Congress is very often blaming the administration for not doing enough and challenging whether
- 25:35a ban on assassination is actually a good thing.
- 25:39So the argument emerges, why should we carpet bomb a certain area when we could actually
- 25:46just take out a single individual?
- 25:50Why should we run the risk of going to war with Iraq when we could achieve the same goal
- 25:56by killing Saddam Hussein?
- 25:59So Congress actually becomes part of the rounds of what I call, I mean, not only I, plenty
- 26:06of international relations scholars call contestation of the ban on assassination.
- 26:12That is, there is a contest, a challenge as to what the ban on assassination means, what
- 26:18it permits US policymakers to do and what it actually, what it is actually prohibiting.
- 26:28And what shifts did you observe between the pre-911 and post-911 eras, particularly in
- 26:36terms of how the presidential kill list has been justified or legitimized?
- 26:42So there is an existing conventional wisdom that suggests that the US government was doing
- 26:49an assassination in the 1950s and 60s.
- 26:52And then with the ban on assassination, it completely stopped doing them until after
- 26:58911, when all of a sudden everything changed, the gloves came off and the US restarted playing
- 27:05the game of assassination, so to say.
- 27:08This is the argument I try to challenge in my book, what I try to say is that there is
- 27:13actually a great deal of continuity, both in terms of practice and in terms of effort
- 27:18to legitimate the use of assassination throughout the 1980s, 1990s and before 911.
- 27:24But at the same time, one has to admit that 911 does change a lot of things.
- 27:31911 changes a lot in terms of the technologies available, the finances available, in the
- 27:40sense that both financial, legal, moral, political constraints almost fall by the wayside.
- 27:50So it creates a great window of opportunity for things that had been perhaps on the margins
- 27:56before and then become front and center.
- 28:01So there is, of course, a debate about killing Bin Laden before 911.
- 28:07The legal precedents have already been set.
- 28:10There is some experimentation with drones, for example, with weaponizing the predator.
- 28:16But this becomes official policy after 911 and in the framework of the global war on
- 28:23terror of the Bush administration.
- 28:26It has to be said that while targeted killings as a practice becomes very prominent in the
- 28:34Bush administration, initially not so much by drones, but by special forces and other
- 28:41projects, there isn't really an effort to justify this on the part of the Bush administration.
- 28:49When the first drone strike outside of an active battlefield is carried out in Yemen
- 28:53in 2002 and the UN criticizes the Bush administration because this is an extrajudicial killing,
- 29:02the Bush administration simply says, well, this is a new war.
- 29:07This is the power of the president.
- 29:09The president has given us these powers.
- 29:11We're using them.
- 29:12So there isn't really an effort of justifying this new policy through the language of the
- 29:16law, let alone the language of international law.
- 29:21This I argue only happens with the Obama administration.
- 29:25Obama comes to power with a somewhat contradictory ambition of escalating targeted killings while
- 29:33growing down the framework of the global war on terror.
- 29:37And this I have argued creates a contradiction.
- 29:40How do you continue an aggressive counterterrorism policy while at the same time abandoning the
- 29:47Bush administration expansive view of the powers of the presidency or the global war
- 29:52on terror framework?
- 29:54What the administration does, especially when it comes to targeting US citizens like Anwar
- 29:59al-Awlaki is to develop or try and develop justifications that build on the language
- 30:06of international law.
- 30:08And in my reading, go back to precedents set in the Reagan era regarding counterterrorism
- 30:15and the legitimacy of targeting terrorists, especially in self-defense.
- 30:20The innovation brought by the Obama administration, I think it's an even more expansive notion
- 30:25of self-defense.
- 30:26So self-defense stops being something that you can do either after an attack or to preempt
- 30:33an immediate attack and becomes almost something that is outside of time and space.
- 30:40Self-defense becomes expanded and the idea of an imminent threat becomes expanded to
- 30:45cover such a long time that you can basically target the terrorists at any point.
- 30:53And focusing on a more modern example, the assassination of Khazem Soleimani in 2020
- 31:01marked a highly controversial moment in US foreign policy.
- 31:04How does this event reflect both continuities and departures in US approaches to assassination?
- 31:11And what would you say are the key geopolitical consequences?
- 31:16I think that the Soleimani assassination was a great escalation in the conduct of US targeted
- 31:26killings and assassination policy, depending on how we want to call it.
- 31:31There are the elements of continuity.
- 31:33I think the elements of continuity have to do with the fact that both the infrastructure,
- 31:38so the human intelligence, signal intelligence, drone strikes and so on that have previously
- 31:46been used only against non-state actors are for the first time used against a state official.
- 31:53A second element of continuity is that at least initially, I think, and to be honest,
- 31:58somewhat unconvincingly, members of the Trump administration make the argument that the
- 32:05assassination, the killing of Soleimani was done because Soleimani posed an imminent threat,
- 32:11which again is the same refrain going back to self-defense, the Reagan administration,
- 32:16the Obama administration.
- 32:18So we took out Soleimani because it was planning imminent attacks on the United States.
- 32:25And so that's what we needed to do.
- 32:28But very quickly, like in the space of hours, this argument starts to crumble because other
- 32:36members of the Trump administration or friends of the administration like Lindsey Graham
- 32:41actually proposed completely different arguments that have nothing to do with the imminence
- 32:46of the threat that Soleimani posed.
- 32:48And I think evidence emerges that actually there was no imminent threat.
- 32:54So the argument kind of falls by the wayside.
- 32:58So I think that is somewhat of an element of discontinuity, I guess, the speed with
- 33:02which the administration abandoned any effort to justify through the language of international
- 33:08law the killing of Soleimani and moved to a position of saying, yeah, Soleimani was
- 33:13a bad guy.
- 33:14We took him out.
- 33:15So I think that is somewhat different.
- 33:19In terms of the repercussions, I think we have seen in recent months plenty of Iranian
- 33:26plots that have been foiled or successfully carried out against dissidents in the UK,
- 33:36in the US, at times using criminal elements like drug traffickers or the Health Angels
- 33:45motorcycle club in one occasion.
- 33:49And we have seen many allegedly alleged foiled plots against former members of the Trump
- 33:55administration.
- 33:56There was allegedly a plot against John Bolton, one against Mike Pompeo.
- 34:03And more recently, if some of the evidence is to be believed, there was some connection
- 34:07to Iran in one of the assassination attempts against President Trump in the campaign a
- 34:14couple of weeks ago.
- 34:16So there has certainly been an escalation in Iranian activities abroad.
- 34:20And we can see a recent investigation of Iranian uses of criminal elements for covert operations
- 34:26abroad clearly shows a spike after 2020, a radical spike.
- 34:31So we can connect.
- 34:32The two might not be causation, but certainly there is a correlation there, I think.
- 34:39And I think the second problem is that such an operation and sort of a certain disregard
- 34:47for international law does create international legal and political precedents.
- 34:55While it might be too simplistic to make the argument, one could say that other states
- 34:59looking at this might say, well, if the United States is doing it, I'll do the same thing.
- 35:07And if the reaction of the international community to these violations is one of silence, acceptance,
- 35:15or even triumph in certain cases, this can only worsen the situation and make assassination
- 35:23something that becomes progressively normalized in international politics.
- 35:29The recent strike that killed Hassan Nasrallah, regardless of the legalities of it, it was
- 35:37almost accepted at face value.
- 35:39And it is publicly described as an assassination without much of an effort at international
- 35:47legal justification.
- 35:49And similarly, without any major negative reaction by the international community.
- 35:56Regardless of the target, I think the normalization of assassination in international politics
- 36:00is in itself a problem.
- 36:03One that we are likely to confront and one that is likely to be exploited by actors we
- 36:10don't necessarily agree with.
- 36:13Absolutely.
- 36:16So what key takeaways would you like your readers to learn from your book?
- 36:22So the end of the previous answers was somewhat preachy.
- 36:25And I think I've already covered some points for this answer.
- 36:30But I guess it is two main points.
- 36:33One, that 9-11 changed a lot of things, but it did not change everything.
- 36:40There is a lot of continuity in US foreign policy when it comes to assassination.
- 36:46And we can only understand the speed and the scale of what happens after 9-11 if we have
- 36:53a good understanding of all the political precedents, the legal precedents, and the
- 36:58operations that went on before 9-11.
- 37:03So that would be my first recommended takeaway, the degree of continuity that we have in spite
- 37:11of what is the radical change of 9-11.
- 37:16And I think the second lesson that I would like people to take away from the book is
- 37:22that there is a lot of commentary, especially when it comes to Russia, Iran, that assassination
- 37:32is something only what we can call rogue states are doing in international politics, that
- 37:38only bad actors are doing in international politics.
- 37:43Russia is doing assassination.
- 37:44Russia would be doing assassination even without the example of the United States.
- 37:49The same applies to Iran.
- 37:52But we should also take into account that Western states have often used assassination
- 37:59and they've often tried to justify it and legitimize it in a manner that might have
- 38:04been disingenuous at times fraudulent and that other states might have taken advantage
- 38:13of France as historically engaged in assassination.
- 38:18The United States, Israel, other countries that are non-democratic but are still Western
- 38:24allies engage in assassination and we turn a blind eye towards them that we do not turn
- 38:31when Russia or Iran are conducting assassination.
- 38:36You can easily compare the international reaction and the United States reaction at the attempted
- 38:42assassinations conducted by Russia or at the assassinations conducted by Russia compared
- 38:47with the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi Arabia.
- 38:52The outcry was different.
- 38:54The legal, financial and political consequences were different.
- 38:58So I think this is my second takeaway that democracies are also part of the game of assassination
- 39:07and they are somewhat responsible for the legitimation of assassination as a tool in
- 39:12international politics.
- 39:15Fantastic points.
- 39:18Thank you so much for joining us.
- 39:22Thank you for having me.