Latest / ACLED Audio / WEBINAR: Israel and the Gulf: How has the war affected regional security?

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WEBINAR: Israel and the Gulf: How has the war affected regional security? · ACLED Audio

• 0:06
  SPEAKER_01: Welcome everyone.
• 0:06
  SPEAKER_01: Good afternoon.
• 0:08
  SPEAKER_01: My name is Daniel Rayakelli, and I'm Activist Associate Analysis Manager.
• 0:13
  SPEAKER_01: And I'm really thrilled to welcome you all to what is and has become increasingly a very timely discussion, which we wanted to understand that the fallout of the war in Iran and cases across the Middle East, and that's become much more relevant with recent events, right?
• 0:32
  SPEAKER_01: This is a conflict that we have followed very closely at Acclate, the intervention, the war in Iran, and then the subsequent fallout.
• 0:40
  SPEAKER_01: We've been producing daily data to inform decision making, and we've really engaged in what I think can fairly be described as an all-team effort to analyze the multiple angles, the multiple actors involved, the states regionally, globally, locally, and also the potential scenarios ahead of us.
• 0:58
  SPEAKER_01: And we had originally thought of this webinar as an opportunity for Tesla to take stock of the war, where we are right now, particularly with the timing of the US or an MOU.
• 1:10
  SPEAKER_01: And thinking especially of two key players or sets of players, right?
• 1:16
  SPEAKER_01: Israel on one side and the Gulf countries on the other.
• 1:19
  SPEAKER_01: Now, of course, this conversation has become all the more relevant with the recent escalation of hostilities.
• 1:25
  SPEAKER_01: So as many, if not all of you will know, following attacks on free tankers in the street of Romans on Tuesday, US tribes output um Iran uh for two consecutive days now, and Iran has retaliated against locations across the Gulf.
• 1:42
  SPEAKER_01: Um, President Donald Trump announced that the interim agreement with the MOU is over and was rather dismissive of the value of further talks with Iranian officials.
• 1:52
  SPEAKER_01: And meanwhile, Iran's top negotiators also reiterated the intention to open her mode only under Iranian arrangements and not to succumb to military pressure.
• 2:03
  SPEAKER_01: So basically, a lot of this underscores and highlights some of the premises that brought us to organize the webinar in the first place, which are that, in effect, this US and Iran and OU was always quite a fragile arrangement.
• 2:26
  SPEAKER_01: One of the key objectives.
• 2:27
  SPEAKER_01: And more importantly, um they're really broadly left open quite important strategic dilemmas in many of the actors involved in the conflict.
• 2:38
  SPEAKER_01: And some of these results are especially important for Israel and the Gulf countries.
• 2:43
  SPEAKER_01: And uh to that effect, I'm really thrilled to be joined today by Cherwan Ali, who is active at Middle East Research Manager, and by Nasta Khulur, who is our Middle East assistant research manager, both of whom are experts on the conflict in the region, but have also really been at the forefront of our efforts as an organization to produce and analyze data on this form.
• 3:06
  SPEAKER_01: And um, what we're going to do now in the webinar for the rest of the hour that we have together is that I will give the presenters some time to answer some broad framing questions.
• 3:18
  SPEAKER_01: Um, and then we'll open the discussion to you, to the audience.
• 3:21
  SPEAKER_01: So if and when you want to make um any comments or or pose a question, there is a function with a QA function where you can type your question.
• 3:32
  SPEAKER_01: And um I will be receiving all of those.
• 3:35
  SPEAKER_01: And when our two presenters have um have finished their turn, which will be um 15 to 20 minutes each, we'll open it up and and I'll pass questions on to them for them to consider.
• 3:49
  SPEAKER_01: Um so without further ado, we can start with uh with Chairwan.
• 3:53
  SPEAKER_01: Um Chairwan, you're going to be uh telling us a little bit about the Gulf countries who, of course, didn't start this war, didn't want it, and have worn some of the more sort of serious economic and political costs, right?
• 4:06
  SPEAKER_01: Um and I think more importantly, it's really forced them to uh face questions about their own core questions about their security uh that especially the only the elite resolved much later war.
• 4:18
  SPEAKER_01: So could you could you walk us a bit through what some of those key security dilemmas are?
• 4:23
  SPEAKER_01: Um how were Gulf states seeking to regain some semblance of stability, peaceful coexistence with Iran and to deter further Indian attacks?
• 4:33
  SPEAKER_01: And well, basically the I think I think the question that we all have in mind, how far can diplomacy go, right?
• 4:38
  SPEAKER_01: Seeing especially as as the MOU already seems to have collapse or began to collapse altogether.
• 4:46
  SPEAKER_02: Yes, yes, thank you very much for the introduction, Daniel.
• 4:49
  SPEAKER_02: Sorry.
• 4:51
  SPEAKER_02: Um can we switch the slides, please?
• 4:56
  SPEAKER_02: Uh yes, uh thank you.
• 4:58
  SPEAKER_02: Uh and yes, just as you've said, the Gulf did not ask for this war or support it in particular for the obvious reason that they always knew that um they will be immediately targeted by Iran, if nothing uh else except for just attacking US bases there.
• 5:17
  SPEAKER_02: But uh the war from the first day saw significant escalation that never happened before, where not only US bases were attacked, which was uh the most common scenario for this uh for a war like that to happen.
• 5:33
  SPEAKER_02: But um the Gulf, the Gulf governments, uh the Gulf states themselves were attacked.
• 5:38
  SPEAKER_02: Their infrastructures, their ports, their airports, their uh uh economic uh infrastructure like data centers or commercial districts, uh, their oil installation, their liquid uh gas facilities, all of these were attacked at work and during the war.
• 5:55
  SPEAKER_02: So this is really the worst case scenario come to life very quickly.
• 6:00
  SPEAKER_02: Um this conflict is the most serious for the Gulf states since 1991 when Kuwait was invaded and annexed by Iraq.
• 6:09
  SPEAKER_02: Um, so it's the most serious war in over three decades.
• 6:13
  SPEAKER_02: And it's quite a shock for the Gulf, and it's quite um already quite damaged to the reputation as a safe haven in the surbillion, since they managed to successfully, you know, avoid fallback from the uh 2003 invasion of uh Iraq, for example, and all the conflicts that rose out of the Arab Spring protests.
• 6:33
  SPEAKER_02: Uh, more or less, they exited all of these uh regional crises uh very little touched or not at all.
• 6:40
  SPEAKER_02: But now they're uh right in the center of all of it.
• 6:45
  SPEAKER_02: And uh, because of this war, we also all six countries are now in a new phase of relations with Iran that really has no modern equivalent.
• 6:55
  SPEAKER_02: And uh we are still in the formative period, and it's still very unclear where will uh current events really lead us down the road.
• 7:07
  SPEAKER_02: Um to give a bit of historical background, um, Iran was always a strategic threat to the Gulf.
• 7:14
  SPEAKER_02: This is not new, it's been going on for decades and most of the modern period.
• 7:17
  SPEAKER_02: And indeed, if you look at history, any kind of centralized imperial power in the Iranian plateau would always attempt to uh expand its influence and sovereignty over the Gulf, both sides of it.
• 7:30
  SPEAKER_02: Uh in the modern period, um, each of the Gulf states has uh enters in some sort of the conflict with Iran or another.
• 7:38
  SPEAKER_02: For example, Bahrain um had a sovereignty dispute, and Iran only recognizes its independence in the mid-70s.
• 7:45
  SPEAKER_02: And before then it claimed it as an Iranian province.
• 7:48
  SPEAKER_02: Uh, with the UAE, it still has a territorial dispute.
• 7:52
  SPEAKER_02: Three islands in the Persian Gulf are claimed by both sides, and right now are controlled by Iran, also since the 1970s.
• 8:00
  SPEAKER_02: Um, also, again, in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, there's always been accusation that Iran funds uh Shiite Islamist opposition in these countries.
• 8:10
  SPEAKER_02: Uh, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait each has sizable Shiite populations.
• 8:13
  SPEAKER_02: Bahrain is majority Shiites, actually.
• 8:17
  SPEAKER_02: And uh there's always been accusations uh by Gulf governments, you know, periodically that Iran foments uh opposition against the governments in these countries.
• 8:29
  SPEAKER_02: So there's always been tensions.
• 8:30
  SPEAKER_02: And at the same time, there always been um a very uh uh directed effort by the Gulf to maintain a balance with Iran where um they can coexist, so without threat of military violence, because for the Gulf, it's very important to have security and just peace.
• 8:49
  SPEAKER_02: It's very important for the economic model to sustain itself.
• 8:53
  SPEAKER_02: They cannot be attacked, they cannot afford to be attacked, at least not consistently and over a long period of time, since it really damages the very fundamentals of what they're trying to do.
• 9:05
  SPEAKER_02: Um the war also saw not only direct um attacks by Iran on the Gulf, they also saw for the first uh time, perhaps in the modern period of least, direct attacks by Gulf states against Iran.
• 9:20
  SPEAKER_02: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE all uh conducted air strikes on Iranian targets and different points in the active phase of the war, so between February 28th and April 8th, uh, when the ceasefire was agreed upon between the US, Israel, and Iran.
• 9:40
  SPEAKER_02: And these strikes are interesting for a variety of reasons.
• 9:45
  SPEAKER_02: Neither Iran nor the uh the involved uh Gulf faiths admitted to them happening.
• 9:52
  SPEAKER_02: We actually only found out about them through uh reports by repeatable organizations uh after the ceasefire and quite some weeks after that.
• 10:02
  SPEAKER_02: And uh which shows again that the Gulf Israeli has a very conservative approach towards Iran in general, when you know it both direct relations between them and rather always de-escalates.
• 10:14
  SPEAKER_02: But all of these, all of this is to say is um whatever status quo that existed before February 28th is no more.
• 10:23
  SPEAKER_02: We're in a new era and the era is still very unclear.
• 10:27
  SPEAKER_02: Are we gonna see more direct conflict with Iran?
• 10:30
  SPEAKER_02: Are we gonna go back to some sort of uh details or um another status quo where they can coexist in a cold, sort of a cold peace, which seems um unlikely in the short term, but maybe more likely in the long term.
• 10:48
  SPEAKER_02: As also it's important for Iran also to have uh relatively peaceful relations with its Gulf neighbors for a variety of reasons I'll touch upon later on, I'll touch upon later in this uh webinar.
• 11:01
  SPEAKER_02: Um so yeah, can you go on to the next slide, please?
• 11:05
  SPEAKER_02: Yeah, thank you.
• 11:07
  SPEAKER_02: In terms of actual impact on the Gulf states, in terms of you know variables we can measure.
• 11:13
  SPEAKER_02: Accolid records 831 attacks by Iranian forces or poor Iran militias based in Iraq, uh targeting uh the Gulf countries from uh February 28th to July 1st only.
• 11:28
  SPEAKER_02: Since then there have been more attacks, of course, including right now.
• 11:31
  SPEAKER_02: Um, about 51 of these attacks took place after April 8th when the ceasefire uh went into effect.
• 11:40
  SPEAKER_02: Um it should be noted that these numbers are uh significant underestimate of the actual number of um projectiles launched by Iran towards the Gulf.
• 11:51
  SPEAKER_02: And this is due to the way Accolid collects its data and the methodology we follow.
• 11:56
  SPEAKER_02: Now, for example, we uh since uh location is a variable, we tend to aggregate um attacks that happen with no um attacks or interception attack that happen with no clear uh idea of where the location is uh into one event.
• 12:16
  SPEAKER_02: So often you see, you know, maybe 10 missiles and 30 drones launch and intercept it coded into a single event.
• 12:25
  SPEAKER_02: But the number is much, much higher.
• 12:28
  SPEAKER_02: And to give and to give you another example, the UAE alone uh was targeted with over 2,000 drones throughout the active phase of the war, uh, not counting missiles, those sequel crews.
• 12:44
  SPEAKER_02: Um the most targeted countries were were the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain.
• 12:50
  SPEAKER_02: Saudi Arabia was also extremely targeted, but um perhaps a bit less than the others.
• 12:56
  SPEAKER_02: Uh Qatar was targeted much less, and for over for a period of nine days during the active phase of the war was not targeted at all.
• 13:06
  SPEAKER_02: And then Oman was targeted the least, and indeed uh Iran declined, um did not claim responsibility for the attacks in Oman specifically, and in fact accused Israel having conducted some of them.
• 13:22
  SPEAKER_02: So Oman here is the outliner.
• 13:25
  SPEAKER_02: In terms of fatality, we also called at least 37 fatalities due to these attacks uh and uh hundreds of uh injuries between uh you know uh mild to severe.
• 13:40
  SPEAKER_02: Again, uh UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain saw the bulk of these.
• 13:46
  SPEAKER_02: Um, but there were other casualties recorded in all six countries.
• 13:53
  SPEAKER_02: So the targeting of the Gulf was not really uh unexpected.
• 13:57
  SPEAKER_02: Again, they all they all knew they would be attacked uh if a direct war between the US and Iran was ever to happen.
• 14:05
  SPEAKER_02: But perhaps what came as a surprise were in the intensities of the intensity of these attacks and the scope of them.
• 14:12
  SPEAKER_02: From day one, which was which was uh actually the day that we saw the most attacks, um also some targets in the Gulf were chosen by Iran.
• 14:25
  SPEAKER_02: For example, like I said, uh not only US bases and uh also um bases belonged to these countries or bases staffed by other foreign forces, but also um various war assets, including assets used for defensive purposes like radar to detect incoming drones and missiles, um, and very quickly ports, hotels, um, airports, all sorts of facilities.
• 14:56
  SPEAKER_02: Um, it was always assumed that Iran, if such a scenario was to happen, that Iran will gradually increase the scope of their targeting and only target, you know, for clear strategic purposes to signal maybe red lines or something like that.
• 15:12
  SPEAKER_02: But that did not happen.
• 15:14
  SPEAKER_02: Uh it did happen later on, but um, in the same time, we also saw these kind of indiscriminate attacks with waves of drones, especially, um, being launched on a daily basis in an attempt to overwhelm defenses.
• 15:29
  SPEAKER_02: So this was a very important escalation and something that uh all the Gulf states took note.
• 15:35
  SPEAKER_02: And uh some of the more very um uh high profile attacks included um the attacks against Fatar's Las Lafan uh industrial city, which was which was very, very uh uh important escalation, and then also attacks against uh Saudi uh salatians in Yenba on the Red Sea, which was again an signaling by Iran just how much they're willing to push limits and uh and uh drag the Gulf states into this war.
• 16:13
  SPEAKER_02: Um equally very uh notable were attacks on desalination plants and um attack, Iranian attacks on these plants in Kuwait and Bahrain, and these attacks were themselves in retaliation for Israeli attacks on similar plants inside Iran, uh were extremely dangerous as they can paralyze local society.
• 16:34
  SPEAKER_02: Between 70 to 90 percent of all drinking water comes from such plants uh in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia uh only, for example.
• 16:44
  SPEAKER_02: Other than that, um, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz uh is again another uh major um event in the war with the far-reaching economic consequence for all six Gulf states, but to variable extents.
• 17:00
  SPEAKER_02: So all six were received some damage from the uh violence in the international waters in the Persian Gulf.
• 17:09
  SPEAKER_02: Um countries like Saudi Arabia and UAE managed to counter uh most of this damage by exporting their hydrocarbons through alternative methods.
• 17:20
  SPEAKER_02: So the UE has um ports overlooking the Gulf of Oman, so they can just um use that to export oil away um from this from the Strait of Hormuz.
• 17:32
  SPEAKER_02: Uh Saudi Arabia, of course, has its famous east-west pipeline that got activated when the war started, uh, and uh through which they managed to export their oil through their ports on the Red Sea.
• 17:45
  SPEAKER_02: Umman, of course, uh also most of its uh coastline is on the Gulf of Oman, so it doesn't really need the Strait of Ormonds.
• 17:54
  SPEAKER_02: Um, it wasn't impacted in that way.
• 17:57
  SPEAKER_02: However, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, they have no alternative to the to the strait.
• 18:03
  SPEAKER_02: So their economies were the most heavily impacted by its closure.
• 18:08
  SPEAKER_02: And not to mention in attacks on actual oil infrastructures inside these countries' territories.
• 18:15
  SPEAKER_02: That being said, even the alternative routes are susceptible to Iranian attacks.
• 18:20
  SPEAKER_02: And indeed, there were Iranian attacks on uh MRAT ports on the uh Gulf of Oran, and uh at least two incidents where Iranian forces or uh pro-Iran militias in Iraq managed to target uh the Yanbu uh port of Saudi Arabia on the Red Sea throughout the active uh during the active phase of the war.
• 18:44
  SPEAKER_02: So as uh so again, there seems to be really no escape for the goal from having uh to be at the uh to be from suffering vulnerabilities to disruptions from Iran.
• 18:59
  SPEAKER_02: Um in terms of oil production in general, um as I mentioned, um uh Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain were the most damaged.
• 19:11
  SPEAKER_02: For example, as of July, Kuwait's GTP is projected to contract by 13% for the rest of 2026, which is uh quite a significant decrease in terms relatively speaking to the historical growth of the Gulf region.
• 19:27
  SPEAKER_02: Uh Bahrain, which already is suffering for some years now from a larger and larger government uh budget deficit, uh, took a really major hit since about at least 70% of its government revenues come from its exports to the Gulf.
• 19:46
  SPEAKER_02: Um the the uh Raslafan uh attack, which I mentioned already in Qatar, also was a significant hit for that country.
• 19:57
  SPEAKER_02: It is one of the the that industrial city, that industrial region there.
• 20:01
  SPEAKER_02: It's one of the largest in the world for the production of liquid natural gas.
• 20:06
  SPEAKER_02: Um it got hit more than once.
• 20:09
  SPEAKER_02: And um and production was at least affected, was project was at the time of the attack.
• 20:16
  SPEAKER_02: The disruption was projected to last for several weeks in terms of production due to these attacks.
• 20:23
  SPEAKER_02: So that's quite a lot of money lost for Qatar.
• 20:27
  SPEAKER_02: Um otherwise, we had you know, inflation rose, um tourism took a major hit, uh, their international reputation took a major hit, all of these, uh all of these influencing you know, prospect of long-term foreign investment.
• 20:42
  SPEAKER_02: So, really, the economic uh price that all the Gulf countries have to pay is quite major and severe, and one of the largest during you know in their history.
• 20:53
  SPEAKER_02: So, in terms of the wartime behavior, all Gulf countries were very uh were on the defensive.
• 20:59
  SPEAKER_02: Um, indeed, um all the investment they made over the past three decades in um in uh integrating themselves in the American defense umbrella finally paid off, and they managed to intercept the vast majority of attacks.
• 21:15
  SPEAKER_02: Other allies, including the British and other forces, uh regional and international, also came to their aid and helped in defense.
• 21:27
  SPEAKER_02: Um, like I mentioned, as the attacks increased and their severity increased, some countries went on the offensive, UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia conducted each at least one attack directly on Iran.
• 21:39
  SPEAKER_02: Uh again, these were uh attacks that were um uh coordinated with Iran uh beforehand, where they signaled the attacks before they happened.
• 21:51
  SPEAKER_02: And and they were mostly done to just signal red flags or limits for these countries by telling Iran, well, this this is the limit.
• 21:59
  SPEAKER_02: If you attack here against we'll attack again, and you're not just gonna take it.
• 22:03
  SPEAKER_02: And these were done usually in response to very significant.
• 22:06
  SPEAKER_02: Attacks.
• 22:09
  SPEAKER_02: In terms of coordination between themselves, this was not easily done.
• 22:15
  SPEAKER_02: Early on in the war, there uh in the war, there were a lot of reports about um uh disagreements internally with within the Gulf states, the six Gulf states, how to respond to Iran.
• 22:25
  SPEAKER_02: Countries like the UAE were reported to be more aggressive, they wanted more direct attacks against Iran, they more wanted to more um to do more to signal their ability to actually um hitch back uh more clearly.
• 22:39
  SPEAKER_02: Others like Qatar or Oman were more conservative and they uh they fur uh they favored diplomacy or de-escalation with the other countries kind of in the middle or wavering.
• 22:50
  SPEAKER_02: And in the end, um there was really no, aside from diplomatic uh you know uh declarations, there were very little coordination in terms of how to respond to the Iranian fighting militarily.
• 23:03
  SPEAKER_02: Um otherwise, um yeah, can you go on actually with the slides, please?
• 23:14
  SPEAKER_02: Yes, this is just uh uh basic graph using our data to show you the intensity of the attacks.
• 23:20
  SPEAKER_02: I can as you can see after the ceasefire attacks dropped significantly.
• 23:25
  SPEAKER_02: And uh and the the most intense days were the very first days of the war.
• 23:30
  SPEAKER_02: And now we can see already the current kind of uh um cycle we have, which is almost on a weekly basis.
• 23:37
  SPEAKER_02: You see Iranian attacks in the Gulf, maybe in the against commercial shippings, being retaliated by the U by the US by direct threats on Iran, and then Iran would retaliate by hitting the Gulf.
• 23:50
  SPEAKER_02: And uh this is where we are currently, and we are currently in another cycle, the most severe probably since the start of a ceasefire in April.
• 23:58
  SPEAKER_02: This will continue.
• 23:59
  SPEAKER_02: We don't know.
• 24:00
  SPEAKER_02: Maybe they will de-escalate, maybe we'll see a resumption of limited, uh more, you know, uh limited conflict similar to the active phase of the war, but for less days, because uh both sides still wanna um don't don't want to return to a very disruptive uh war like in the first uh month of the current conflict.
• 24:24
  SPEAKER_02: Can you go ahead uh and move on to the next uh yes?
• 24:30
  SPEAKER_02: Thank you.
• 24:31
  SPEAKER_02: So, in terms of prospects uh and where the Gulf stands right now, so uh despite all these hostilities, the Gulf states do uh want a long-term peaceful coexistence with Iran in one form or another, uh if not just for pure pragmatic reasons.
• 24:50
  SPEAKER_02: They are neighbors, um, whatever happens in Iran can like affect them.
• 24:54
  SPEAKER_02: Um they cannot really just you know declare war and you know and pull out like the US or Israel can when you know there's some sort of geop uh when there's geographic um as you know with other countries in between.
• 25:07
  SPEAKER_02: Um they're very susceptible to Iranian threats, and they know that they can build as many defenses as they want, but you know, they cannot hold off Iranian attacks forever.
• 25:18
  SPEAKER_02: And um already we see some you know uh some attempts to uh build at least some channels with Iran.
• 25:27
  SPEAKER_02: For example, uh June 28th, uh Abu Dhabi and Tehran fights were established.
• 25:34
  SPEAKER_02: Um uh countries like Qatar and Oman never uh closed diplomatic channel, even throughout the most active part of the war.
• 25:42
  SPEAKER_02: Um, for uh Khamenei's funeral, uh Saudi Arab uh Saudi Arabia, Qatar um sent uh another country sent um representatives for the funeral, which is uh quite uh um an attempt to re-establish some sort of uh channels.
• 26:02
  SPEAKER_02: Of course, they were the very next day they were met with attacks on their ships.
• 26:05
  SPEAKER_02: So uh these things uh don't always work out.
• 26:10
  SPEAKER_02: Um yeah, and I think in the right now we are it's very hard to predict what's gonna happen.
• 26:18
  SPEAKER_02: Uh it is, of course, both I think both Iran and the US want a permanent kind of deal to kind of close this uh conflict.
• 26:28
  SPEAKER_02: But um the main issue for the Gulf is right now is the state of hormones.
• 26:34
  SPEAKER_02: Iran is very clear that this is its strongest uh negotiation uh card and will not let it go.
• 26:41
  SPEAKER_02: And so far it's been very clear that it's it will it wants uh if if not to impose tolls or taxes on ships fastened through, to at least have a recognition from uh regional and international that Iran has uh sovereign rights over the straits, which uh all uh Gulf other Gulf countries are obviously will cannot accept.
• 27:05
  SPEAKER_02: Um, how will this go?
• 27:07
  SPEAKER_02: Um, where we're gonna go again from there, it's hard to say unless uh a deal is signed, um something more permanent to really um something uh multilateral to discuss uh to determine the status of the strait in a way that guarantees freedom of uh navigation and also essay for the Gulf countries on what's happening to the straits.
• 27:35
  SPEAKER_02: Um so uh and then the war and finding uh uh international solution for the Strait of Hormos that allows the Gulf to uh achieve uh to keep using it without having to answer to Iran every time they do.
• 27:51
  SPEAKER_02: And uh in the long run, it's also about we uh they will also attempt to re-establish some sort of uh equilibrium with Iran.
• 28:00
  SPEAKER_02: Uh how they'll go about doing that is hard to say.
• 28:03
  SPEAKER_02: Um there's too many unknowns at the moment, there's too many known unknowns and unknown unknowns.
• 28:10
  SPEAKER_02: And until we get more clarity about the future and about the immediate future and about um how this conflict will wrap up, at least officially, I think most of Sesura will take a conservative approach uh and wait and see how things will play out while falling for the escalation and uh more diplomatic solution so that they want to be targeted by Iran again.
• 28:36
  SPEAKER_02: And I think uh that's it for me in terms of a kind of an overall um summary of where we the current situation and where we stand.
• 28:45
  SPEAKER_02: And um, yeah, and hopefully in QA I can answer more specific questions about um each kind each of the Gulf countries or where we go from now.
• 28:55
  SPEAKER_01: Many, many thanks, Joan, uh Sarah, for for the good intervention.
• 28:58
  SPEAKER_01: Just a reminder for the audience, as Siwan said, that there is there will be time for for questions.
• 29:03
  SPEAKER_01: So if you do have them, please do um type them.
• 29:08
  SPEAKER_01: There is a tool, if you see below the screen, it's a little menu, there's an icon called QA.
• 29:15
  SPEAKER_01: Uh you can type your questions there and they will get to us, and and we'll do our best to get through as many as we can.
• 29:22
  SPEAKER_01: Um so don't wait till the end.
• 29:24
  SPEAKER_01: Do do drop them as as soon as you think of them.
• 29:27
  SPEAKER_01: And um, while the questions come, and we have a chance to come back to Sherwin, and for for whom I'm sure there will be some questions.
• 29:36
  SPEAKER_01: Um Nasser, now um I'd like to hear a bit from you.
• 29:40
  SPEAKER_01: Um a crucial variable uh in this conflict has been Israel's approach, Israel's role in general, right?
• 29:49
  SPEAKER_01: Um and in contrast to the Gulf countries who didn't want the war, Israel's influence appears to have been quite crucial to starting it, um, aside from their participation directly from the beginning, right?
• 30:01
  SPEAKER_01: So um, you know, the MOU we knew had done little to sort of fulfill the outcomes that seemed to have been in the Israeli government's foremind.
• 30:15
  SPEAKER_01: Um could you speak a little bit to first, how did we get to the point where Israel's preferred option was an open war against Iran?
• 30:23
  SPEAKER_01: Um what choices does Israel face now?
• 30:26
  SPEAKER_01: What are some of those big and resolved objectives and dilemmas at this phase of the war and in light again of the collapse of the MOU and ceasefire?
• 30:36
  SPEAKER_01: Um, how will Israel likely respond?
• 30:41
  SPEAKER_00: Um Thank you, Daniel.
• 30:42
  SPEAKER_00: Uh can we move on to the next slide, please?
• 30:46
  SPEAKER_00: Uh yeah, so uh um before discussing actually the outcomes of the war and how it has shaped Israel positions and uh the threat perceptions, I think it's important to shed uh light on why Israel saw this war on uh February as a moment of opportunity in which Israel believed that Iran and the wider access of resistance had had been weakened.
• 31:17
  SPEAKER_00: So uh so those Iran-allied groups were once seen as Iran's forward defense line and as a ring of fire surrounding Israel and as a deterrence tool uh from uh against Israel from attacking Iran.
• 31:35
  SPEAKER_00: This situation has totally changed after October 7.
• 31:38
  SPEAKER_00: Um had been forced to accept the November uh ceasefire after losing much of its capability and um the leadership.
• 31:49
  SPEAKER_00: Uh the Syria regime collapsed, Hamas and the PIG um were under heavy pressure in uh in the war in Gaza, the Hawaii also were being heavily targeted by the US and Israel during the war and since October 7.
• 32:06
  SPEAKER_00: And also at the same time, um Iran and Israel had already started after October 7 uh to exchange fire and to exercise fire and testing each other's will and capabilities.
• 32:22
  SPEAKER_00: So um I think the the major turning point uh was uh the June 2005 war when Israel carried out over than uh 430 strikes in Iran and damaged part of its military capabilities, including air defenses, uh missile capability, and it was supported of course by the US, which attacked Israel's nuclear facilities, including in Asfahan, Natanz and Ford.
• 32:53
  SPEAKER_00: Um and actually that's for this uh will this war give uh both Israel and the US uh a sense that Iranian regime had been weakened.
• 33:08
  SPEAKER_00: Um and this perception was also reinforced by the Iran uh by the uh Iranian uprising and the wave of protests that started on December 2025, and uh the eroding legitimacy of the uh Iranian regime after killing um uh protesters.
• 33:32
  SPEAKER_00: Um also this war was uh uh uh shaped by the the Israeli domestic politics and also by Netanyahu's own framing of the the threat.
• 33:42
  SPEAKER_00: Uh Netanyahu presented uh the latest campaign as necessary to achieve uh three objectives uh tabling the the Iranian regime, uh destroying the nuclear project, and also destroying the uh ballistic missiles project.
• 34:00
  SPEAKER_00: Um but actually the last two goals that Litanyo had already claimed, achieving them after the 12 day war in June 2025, uh the nuclear and missile threat, he said that he was he had been dealt with them and these threats is over.
• 34:21
  SPEAKER_00: And uh recent reports actually also talked that Netanyahu uh uh wanted the intelligence in Israel to support his claim that Iran's nuclear program had been completely destroyed before the current uh or the the the latest escalations.
• 34:40
  SPEAKER_00: So the latest actually air and um air and uh targeted campaign in February needed a different political logic for Netanyahu, and and I think this is where the regime uh change became more central in the public messaging and um especially after uh the killing of the uh leadership in Iran in the opening uh strikes.
• 35:11
  SPEAKER_00: From the outcomes uh of the war, uh I think the war can can be seen as an Israeli and American military and tactical success.
• 35:20
  SPEAKER_00: Israel and the US attacked Iran heavily, they targeted over um 3,000 strikes and hitting more than 600 locations across the country, they killed political and military leadership, they damaged nuclear-related sites and killed scientists, um, they targeted missile capabilities, rocket launchers, air defenses, and also other infrastructure linked to the Iranian regime and to the security forces um in Iran.
• 35:54
  SPEAKER_00: Um but strategically, the outcomes was much less clear and uncertain for Israel and also uh the US.
• 36:10
  SPEAKER_00: So um Iran was not defeated, um the regime has survived, and more hardline elements now appear to have a greater influence over uh the decision making in Iran.
• 36:25
  SPEAKER_00: So, in my opinion, this is the main point now for Israel.
• 36:29
  SPEAKER_00: The war exposed um a major gap between what Israel can achieve militarily and also what can turn into a political and strategic uh goals.
• 36:40
  SPEAKER_00: For now, in many ways, I believe that Israel's third perceptions toward Iran has intensified after the war.
• 36:48
  SPEAKER_00: Uh and also its options for what comes next have become more limited and also uh um more complicated.
• 36:59
  SPEAKER_00: Uh can we move to the next slide, please?
• 37:04
  SPEAKER_00: Um for Israel, the Iran's ballistic missiles capability have always been one of the main threats or main um threat perceptions for them.
• 37:14
  SPEAKER_00: So uh this was also one of the reasons Israel strongly opposed the 2015 nuclear deal uh with Obama administrations.
• 37:24
  SPEAKER_00: Uh from Israeli perspective, the deal focused mainly on the nuclear file, but it did not deal with with the Iranian missile capabilities and also its regional uh influence.
• 37:36
  SPEAKER_00: I think the missile issue has become now even more important after after the war.
• 37:42
  SPEAKER_00: Iran uh targeted Israel with with more than 500 strikes during the war.
• 37:49
  SPEAKER_00: Um at the beginning of the war, Israel said that Iran had around 2,500 ballistic missiles.
• 37:57
  SPEAKER_00: During the war, Israel also said that around 60% of the Iran's rocket launchers had been destroyed or uh neutralized.
• 38:08
  SPEAKER_00: Uh but even with these claims, Iran continued to fire missiles through the war.
• 38:13
  SPEAKER_00: Um, and I think this is uh the key point now for Israel.
• 38:18
  SPEAKER_00: Uh the war showed that even after a major campaign, Iran uh still able to absorb the damage and also continue to fire.
• 38:29
  SPEAKER_00: Uh next slide, please.
• 38:32
  SPEAKER_00: Um data shows also that uh uh Iran's missiles targeted also a sensitive locations in Israel, disrupted civilians' lives, and also uh put real pressure on uh Israeli air defenses.
• 38:51
  SPEAKER_00: Most of the attacks affected uh major civilian centers, especially in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, where much of the Israel's population is concentrated.
• 39:03
  SPEAKER_00: Also, uh missiles reached the north and the south, and some targeted also uh strategic locations, including military bases and economic sites.
• 39:14
  SPEAKER_00: Um, one of the attacks reached the Mona in the south, where Israel nuclear facilities are also located.
• 39:22
  SPEAKER_00: So there was also a pattern in how Iran has responded during the escalation or the war.
• 39:31
  SPEAKER_00: Um, for example, when Israel targeted energy or economic facilities in Iran, Iran appeared to respond also by targeted similar type of sites in Israel.
• 39:41
  SPEAKER_00: Also, this included the attacks linked to the MONA and energy facilities in Haifa after US and Israel attacks similar type of targeted in all targets in uh in Iran.
• 39:53
  SPEAKER_00: So for Israel, the missile threat is not only about the number of attacks or the level of destruction, but also it's about uh actually what Iran is trying to signal and what kind of target it can fit from now and also in the future.
• 40:13
  SPEAKER_00: Another point is that Iran now also understands the value of these capabilities.
• 40:19
  SPEAKER_00: Um and after the war, um I think um Iran will continue developing and producing um these capabilities because they give Tehran a way to pressure Israel directly and also to to deter future uh uh round of escalation or attacks by Israel or or the US.
• 40:43
  SPEAKER_00: Can we move to the next slide, please?
• 40:47
  SPEAKER_00: The second uh point regarding uh Israel uh uh threat perceptions after the war um it's uh around the unity of the fronts or um Iran's proxy of networks, or what call also the access of resistance.
• 41:05
  SPEAKER_00: Um I don't think that the war showed a fully coordinated access of resistance attacks on Israel.
• 41:13
  SPEAKER_00: Uh we didn't see all Iranian backed groups acting together under one clear military plan, but even uh that partial coordination was enough for Israel to deepen its concerns around these groups and also the Iranian supports.
• 41:30
  SPEAKER_00: From Israeli perspectives, also Iran still has a regional network that it can use to pressure Israel and distract it in many different fronts.
• 41:44
  SPEAKER_00: Hezbollah um was the clearest example during this war.
• 41:49
  SPEAKER_00: Uh Hezbollah joined the fighting on the 2nd of March in support of Iran, um, and it its role was important because um because it helped Iran and uh to disrupt the life in the north of Israel and imposed cost also on Israeli forces during the ground offensive uh in southern Lebanon.
• 42:14
  SPEAKER_00: Um Iran also played a central role in rebuilding Hezbollah after the ceasefire.
• 42:19
  SPEAKER_00: It continued to provide money for Hezbollah and to develop its open of arsenals.
• 42:26
  SPEAKER_00: I also think that uh the change in Hezbollah tactics during the latest round of escalation and the war also showed an Iranian intervention because several uh uh IRGC sales were killed during the first week of the war and uh in Lebanon.
• 42:44
  SPEAKER_00: And also in some uh attacks, there appeared to be a coordination uh in the timing between Iran and Hezbollah.
• 42:54
  SPEAKER_00: So uh Lebanon has also become important in Iran negotiation with the Israel.
• 43:01
  SPEAKER_00: So Iran tried to link Lebanon to the wider negotiation track and use it to push Washington to pressure Israel to stop its operation in Lebanon.
• 43:13
  SPEAKER_00: And this is actually, by the way, why Israel tried to separate Lebanon from the Iranian file through through joining or signing the agreement with the Lebanese states, despite um the fact that, I mean, uh maybe for it, the Israelis they don't believe or trust that the Lebanese state or the uh the Lebanese army can really disarm Hezbollah, or Prussia Hezbollah to disarm in Lebanon.
• 43:40
  SPEAKER_00: And also, actually, this is why Israel also watching or other fronts more closely now after the war.
• 43:49
  SPEAKER_00: For example, in the south, Israel is concerned about the threats toward the ILA and the possible houthian infiltration toward Iraq.
• 43:57
  SPEAKER_00: From the east, Israel is also concerned about Iran battle group in Iraq.
• 44:02
  SPEAKER_00: Uh, and regardless of the the the if they are realistic scenarios, but this is what is actually you know um uh circulated in the media or actually also uh the intelligence and the Israeli also military uh uh working um uh on the ground to achieve also uh as a plans.
• 44:28
  SPEAKER_00: The last point on how Israel sees uh the Iranian threat perceptions is about the nuclear issue.
• 44:35
  SPEAKER_00: For Israel the Iranian nuclear threat remains central um and this is also especially true for Netanyahu who has also built much of his Iran policy during the the last two decades around the idea that Iran is a nuclear or the Iranian nuclear program is um an existential threat to Israel.
• 45:05
  SPEAKER_00: Regarding the memorandum understanding uh I think uh uh now um I think Israel uh now sees the current escalation between the US and Iran as uh as working in its favor.
• 45:20
  SPEAKER_00: Israel sees the MUU signed between Iran and US um as an additional threat and also constrains its future steps and scenarios toward Iran.
• 45:32
  SPEAKER_00: So resuming the sanctions and keeping the military pressure on Iran is better than giving Iran time and space to recover even if this does not lead to a full war or an escalation with Iran.
• 45:47
  SPEAKER_00: The main concern for Israel of course is that the MU gives Iran economic relief and renewed oil exports and access to the frozen assets and also time to stabilize internally.
• 46:00
  SPEAKER_00: Israel also worried that Iran will use that this time to rebuild its military capability and keep supporting its allied groups.
• 46:13
  SPEAKER_00: Another concern regarding the MOU is Israel also fears that the MOU is limiting its freedom of action against Iran and in Lebanon and it also shows that Israel had little influence over the diplomatic tracks between the US and and Iran.
• 46:36
  SPEAKER_00: Now the question is what are Israel's options and what are the um future scenarios and what can Israel do?
• 46:47
  SPEAKER_00: Even if the MU is cancelled um I think Israel still has limited options against Iran.
• 46:55
  SPEAKER_00: For now I think the US is still not interested in returning to a full war with Iran Trump wants to to achieve his goal especially keeping the Strait of Hormuz open and also avoiding pressure on energy and oil prices before the midterm elections in the US I think also he is he wants to to move forward with the negotiation over the nuclear issues despite the overall disagreement and uncertainty about what's gonna happen in the future.
• 47:29
  SPEAKER_00: Also for the US the military option has already been tried and it did not achieve the political goals that it aimed for it also affected the US position in the Gulf as Sherwin mentioned especially with the Arab allies but I think much of what Israel can do will depend on Iran's behavior and on how the Iranian leadership deals with the diplomatic attacks.
• 47:59
  SPEAKER_00: So far Iran does not trust the US Tehran prefers to keep its leverage through the Strait of Hormuz rather than give concessions and also importantly Iran is also trying to act from a position of the strength with less patience toward the US Russia and this is actually a risk for future escalation.
• 48:23
  SPEAKER_00: So I think to be realistic we have three difficult options for Israel.
• 48:30
  SPEAKER_00: First the first option is relying on the US diplomatic track I think this is difficult for Israel because Israel does not trust the Iranian regime from Israel perspective Tehran will use the negotiation to build its capability and while the core issues remain unresolved and Iran will continue to show hostility toward Israel and continue support Hezbollah and other allied groups.
• 48:56
  SPEAKER_00: The second option also is about Israel maybe to contain Iran and I think this scenario is maybe Israel could avoid a major war and focus on um slowing Iran's recovery.
• 49:13
  SPEAKER_00: This could include intelligence operations, limited military actions and efforts to disrupt and shape Iran agreements with the US but Israeli strategy I think after October seventh becomes relied less on the containment than before.
• 49:34
  SPEAKER_00: So for this option also to work I think Iran would need to change its behavior toward Israel and the US and to make some compromises.
• 49:45
  SPEAKER_00: And the last and the third options that I see is um a bigger military campaign similar to what has happened recently.
• 49:54
  SPEAKER_00: Israel may consider another round of escalation or a war or targeting if it believes that Iran is rebuilding too quickly or if it thinks Iran is using the negotiation to restore dangerous capabilities.
• 50:27
  SPEAKER_00: And I think the current escalation in the Gulf seen by Israel and Netanyahu as a window of opportunity to convince the US to keep pressure on Iran but the bigger campaign of course will depend on whether Washington still wants to preserve the diplomatic track with Iran.
• 50:48
  SPEAKER_00: And if Israel acts alone against Iran it may not achieve its wider goals it may be able to reduce some of Iranian capabilities each time it attacks but I think it does not necessarily solve Israel main concerns regarding the Iranian threat toward Israel.
• 51:11
  SPEAKER_00: And my last word regarding these scenarios I think the second and the third scenario or options are still more likely and we could still see more surprises in the Middle East similar to what has happened during um this week.
• 51:32
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you.
• 51:32
  SPEAKER_01: This is a full man thank you very much there's a number of questions in the QA and we'll do our best to get through through as many as we can we won't get through all but don't worry because if if you have registered we can get back with some of the questions with answers later on.
• 51:53
  SPEAKER_01: Unfortunately we can't do that if if um you're finding anonymous anonymously um but I'm gonna start with a question that I think both of you could answer uh which is following from the NATO summit could you comment on how Israel and the Gulf states see growing US alignment with Turkey could you also speculate on Pakistan's role as mediator?
• 52:19
  SPEAKER_02: To start with you, Sherwan, maybe from the Gulf perspective and then we can go to NASA for this yeah I mean I'll take this as an opportunity to also say something about uh the Gulf um new security concerns and new security policy.
• 52:34
  SPEAKER_02: So right now um the current model where the the Gulf states relied on American um army for uh protection is has proved its limit and its cost.
• 52:46
  SPEAKER_02: So they are really interested in expanding these you know sources of uh um procurement of ammunition for defenses you know so they can continue intercepting any potential future attacks and also uh extend their network of alliances and Turkey is a very uh clear and uh example of that they already have very uh good relations with Qatar for example they came to their aid back uh about a decade ago when Qatar was put under siege by its neighbors and uh of course there's also a risk to that a cost to that because Turkey is another regional power in the Middle East so uh you don't want to if you were the Gulf you wouldn't want to like give them too much power so I mean you wouldn't want to have to worry about them if you had if you deal with Iran but uh we are seeing uh more uh outreach for the Gulf towards um other regional powers uh but also international powers from the region for example India uh China other states I think the India India has a diplomatic tour of the Gulf right now to discuss also some um uh trade deals and military uh alliance deals uh including you know about using AI for military defense so a lot of things are happening there of three point just if they should follow up on that um otherwise you know Saudi Arabia has defense facts with Pakistan um it has uh defense facts with Egypt and they activated some parts of them during the war um uh interestingly you know we might see also uh more um alignment uh not necessarily alignment but more you know very practical um uh kind of I give you give relationship with uh regional powers like Turkey or Israel too.
• 54:42
  SPEAKER_02: I mean uh news came out recently that uh Qatar and Saudi Arabia bought pieces and uh but parts of the Israeli defense systems for their own uh their own usage.
• 54:54
  SPEAKER_00: And um we are uh and um yeah so we will see more uh variety in terms of uh allies the Gulf will try to cultivate moving forward that doesn't mean they will you know rely less on the US necessarily but just use uh their relationship with the US and on top of that use other uh military alliances to make up for what the US can't provide them or for when the US is actually their relationship with the US is actually a drawback for example if they didn't have all these US uh bases in their in on their land they wouldn't have been targeted as severely by Iran in such a you know in a scenario such as the current one yeah I hope that answers the question Abitz um yeah yeah I agree with Sri Wan and I I also I I would add that um the outcomes of the recent war against Iran also created a new dynamics between the regional power in the Middle East including Israel Turkey and Iran Israel sees that Turkey now is trying to fill the gap in the Middle East um during the war for example it's uh the Erdogan and Turkey played a significant role to convince President Trump to stop the uh the calls to uh to attack Iran um uh and also for for for for Israel I think uh the main concern from Turkey it's uh the military capability that may uh uh the Turkey get from the US including the uh 35 um and which will also change the power the balance of power in the Middle East given that also Turkey is trying to fill the gap in Syria and in Lebanon and above that also um Turkey is also uh supporting uh based on the Iranian or the Israeli perspectives they're supporting Hamas and providing uh haven for them in Turkey and also politically and in the international uh domain they are supporting the two-state solutions and they are working against the in the the the Israeli interest in the region.
• 57:19
  SPEAKER_00: So I think this is another dimension that we can will keep see in the future not only between Israel and Iran but also between Israel and Turkey who as both have uh regional ambitions in Syria and in Lebanon and also in the Mediterranean thank you both we have time for for one more and I'll ask people to be very very brief so we can hear from both of you um there's a question here from um says what are the percentages of attacks we saw on civil and economic infrastructure versus military targets on the Gulf states so if we can start with Shawan then maybe we can have the same um question for for NASA as well on on Israel what's the comment on that malice very very briefly please yeah so this is a tricky question to answer because the vast majority of attacks were intercepted so they never reached the target and you can't tell for sure what they were targeting because the interception often happened you know very high up or just outside of territorial borders of the Gulf countries on the Gulf.
• 58:30
  SPEAKER_02: But based on uh what we have in terms of attacks that actually succeeded um I think the majority of attacks and again I encourage who addressed the question to reach out directly so they can you know um our data so they can take a look themselves.
• 58:47
  SPEAKER_02: Based on what we have most attacks to target military sites or joint civilian military sites.
• 58:55
  SPEAKER_02: And um but again this is dependent on how you define such a thing.
• 58:58
  SPEAKER_00: For example in Kuwait one of the most targeted sites repeatedly was the international airport in Kuwait City and that airport is you know obviously used for civilian uh commercial flights but the premise also includes a military base uh uh that is Kuwaiti but also includes the presence of American forces so when they attack the airport are they attacking the uh the civilian part are they attacking the military part is hard to say and uh so uh my answer is it depends on the definite how you define a military versus civilian and also um but based on what we have in terms of successful stripes um military sites are more targeted um yeah yeah actually yeah the opposite in Israel because I think is uh Iran attacks in Israel despite I don't have a precise figure or percentage of uh of uh to what extent economic uh uh targeted were targeted by Iran but I think majority of Iranian strikes were targeted the civilian populations in the center and Tel Aviv area and also Jerusalem area and also many were intercepted by the Israeli air defenses um if you were targeted um energy uh uh facilities uh in Haifa um and as I said also during the presentate the presentation uh severals were targeted also military positions and also strategic uh uh uh facilities in Israel thank you all unfortunately that is all the time we have today uh we have taken note all the questions that you submitted are are there and we'll do our best to to get back to you um I would like to first of all uh thank our our two presenters here oneser uh a pleasure thank you very very much for your insights um and then I would like to thank you all for for joining us for this conversation and would encourage you um if if you are interested in the topic which you are because you are here um to go and and check the the publications that ACLED have um have put our they are on our website on on this broader issue of the war in Iran and its consequences it's quite a wealth of knowledge and perspectives so I'm I'm sure you will find them interesting and uh stay tuned because there will be more to come.
• 1:01:26
  SPEAKER_01: Thank you very very much uh a very good afternoon or morning depending on where you are and see you next time.
• 1:01:34
  SPEAKER_03: Goodbye