Latest / Beyond The Horizon / Mega Edition: The OIG Report Into The Death And Circumstances Of Epstein's Death (Part 7) (6/14/26)
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: One, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. We're gonna
- 0:05pick up where we left off with the last episode
- 0:08and we're going to continue looking at the OIG report
- 0:12into the circumstances surrounding Jeffrey Epstein's death. And in our
- 0:17last episode, we were talking about the discovery of the
- 0:20security camera system recording issues. So let's pick right up
- 0:25with Section B response on August eighth and ninth to
- 0:30discovery of the recording failure. On August eighth, following discovery
- 0:36of the recording failure, Company one Service records reflect that
- 0:40the electronics technician contacted a Company one technical support representative,
- 0:45who ultimately determined that two hard drives within DVR two
- 0:50had failed. According to the electronics technician and the Company
- 0:54one Service request record, the Company one representative informed the
- 0:59electronics technician that the two drives needed to be replaced
- 1:03and that DVR two needed to be rebuilt in order
- 1:07for the cameras to record again. The electronics technician told
- 1:11the OIG that he informed a Company one technician that
- 1:15he had to obtain the drives from mcc New York's
- 1:18computer services manager. The electronics technician further stated that he
- 1:25left the institution at the end of his shift and
- 1:28did not obtain the hard drives and did not continue
- 1:30to work on the matter. The electronics technician told the
- 1:34OIG he had no idea why he did not stay
- 1:37at the facility to resolve the problem that day, but
- 1:40he noted for the OIG that he had not historically
- 1:44been required to stay after his shift ended to work
- 1:48on such matters, and even if he had begun working
- 1:51on the DVR that day, he would not have completed
- 1:54the work on August eighth due to the time it
- 1:57takes for the rebuilding process. The OIG found that the
- 2:02electronics technicians immediate supervisor, the facility manager, was on leave
- 2:07that week and therefore was not told on August eight
- 2:11about the DVR recording failure. The facility manager confirmed that
- 2:15he did not learn about the camera's problem until days
- 2:18after Epstein's death. The electronics technician told the OIG that
- 2:23he did not report the problem to the lock and
- 2:26security supervisor, who was the acting facility manager in the
- 2:30facility manager's absence. The SIS lieutenant told the OIG that
- 2:35after the electronics technician had examined the system on August eight,
- 2:40the electronics technician informed her that the cameras were not
- 2:43recording and said, I'm going to stay and do overtime tonight.
- 2:48Based on his comment, the SIS Lieutenant assumed that the
- 2:51electronics technician would remain at the institution after his shift
- 2:55ended that day to correct the issue. The electronics technician
- 3:00told the OIG there must have been some sort of
- 3:03miscommunication because he did not say he was going to
- 3:05work overtime and resolved the problem that same evening since
- 3:09he knew the problem could not be fixed in one evening.
- 3:13The electronics technician told the OIG that in hindsight, he
- 3:17should have stated at the institution to be in work
- 3:19on the problem that same day. The Sis Lieutenant told
- 3:23the OIG that she verbally informed the captain on August
- 3:27eight that the cameras were down, but BOP records reflect
- 3:31that the captain left the institution before the malfunction was discovered.
- 3:36The captain told the OIG that he did not learn
- 3:39about the DVR recording issue until after Epstein's death on
- 3:43August tenth, when he asked to see video related to
- 3:46the Epstein incident. Associated ward I confirmed she was with
- 3:50the SIS Lieutenant on August eighth when the camera problem
- 3:54was discovered, but she told the OIG she only knew
- 3:58video could not be replayed. She did not know the
- 4:01recording system for certain cameras was down. She could see
- 4:05live video from the cameras on the date and therefore
- 4:08assumed that they were recording. According to the electronics technician,
- 4:13after he reported the work on August ninth, twenty nineteen,
- 4:16and attended to other matters throughout the day, the electronics
- 4:20technician obtained the replacement hard drives and attempted to perform
- 4:24the repair sometime late in the day. However, the electronics
- 4:29technician told the OIG that no SIS staff were present
- 4:33at the time to give him access to the room
- 4:36in which the DVR room was located, so he requested
- 4:39access from the only other individual who had a key
- 4:42to the space, Correctional Officer Number four. According to the
- 4:46electronics technician, Correctional Officer number four denied a access to
- 4:51the room because CO four shift was ending at four
- 4:54pm and CO four was unable to stay to accompany
- 4:58him in the space while the the electronics technician performed
- 5:01the work. According to the electronics technician, CO four said
- 5:06he would be at the institution the following day to
- 5:09provide the electronics technician access to the room, so the
- 5:13electronics technician decided to postpone the repair until the following day.
- 5:18The electronics technician said his decision was influenced by the
- 5:22fact that he had historically been told by mcc New
- 5:25York supervisors that such matters did not have to be
- 5:28attended to until the following day, and even if he
- 5:32had replaced the hard drives that day, the rebuilding process
- 5:36would have taken twenty four hours to complete and would
- 5:39therefore not have finished until the following day anyway. Part c.
- 5:45Shoe Camera locations and operational status on August tenth. The
- 5:50electronics technician arrived at the institution around six am on
- 5:54August tenth, twenty nineteen, and shortly thereafter, before he could
- 5:59begin working on the DVR system, he heard the staff
- 6:02body alarm sound, and he reported to the shoe to assist.
- 6:07Later that day, he asked to pull potential video from
- 6:10cameras located in and around the shoe. The electronics technician
- 6:15eventually determined that most of the cameras in the shoe
- 6:19area were assigned to record to DVR two, while the
- 6:23cameras assigned to DVR two were providing live video streams
- 6:27on August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen. No recordings from
- 6:31those cameras were available due to the DVR two hard
- 6:34drive issue, which the FBI later determined had occurred on
- 6:38July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen. Among the cameras whose video
- 6:43was not recorded was the camera at the end of
- 6:46L Tier, the shoe tier in which Epstein was housed.
- 6:50Only two cameras in the vicinity of the shoe area
- 6:53were recording to DVR one at the time of Epstein's death.
- 6:57One camera was located on the upper level edge rants
- 7:00to the ten South Unit, a housing unit adjacent to
- 7:04the shoe, near the door mcc new York staff referred
- 7:07to as the forty six door. That camera captured video
- 7:12of a large part of the common area of the shoe,
- 7:15including the shoe officer's station, and portions of the stairways
- 7:19leading to the different shoe tiers, including the tier containing
- 7:23Epstein's cell. Thus, anyone entering or attempting to enter the
- 7:27L Tier from the common area of the shoe on
- 7:30August ninth and tenth would have been picked up by
- 7:33the video recorded by that camera. Epstein cell door, however,
- 7:38was not in the camera's field of view. The other
- 7:40camera that was recording was located in one of the
- 7:45ninth floors two elevator bays and provided video of the
- 7:48ninth floor fire exit and two of the floors four elevators.
- 7:53The available video showed that at approximately seven to forty
- 7:56nine pm on August ninth, Epstein was a scorded toward
- 8:00the L Tier stairway by an individual believed to be
- 8:04the evening watch shoe officer in charge. At approximately ten
- 8:08thirty nine PM, and unidentified COO appeared to walk up
- 8:12the L Tier stairway and then reappeared within view of
- 8:15the camera at ten forty one pm. This is believed
- 8:19to be the last time anyone entered El Tier before
- 8:22approximately six thirty am on August tenth. Between approximately ten
- 8:27forty pm on August ninth and just before six thirty
- 8:31am on August tenth, the OIG did not observe on
- 8:35the recorded video any COO or other individual enter any
- 8:40of the shoe tiers, which is consistent with co Tovin
- 8:44Noel and material handler Michael Thomas's admissions to the OIG
- 8:48that the shoe rounds and counts were not conducted during
- 8:52that timeframe. At approximately six twenty eight am, an unidentified
- 8:57officer was observed on the L Tier stairway, presumably to
- 9:01deliver breakfast food trays. Between six twenty eight am and
- 9:05six thirty two am, an unidentified officer believed to be Noel,
- 9:10moved back and forth several times between the L Tier
- 9:14stairway and the shoe officer's station. At approximately six thirty
- 9:18three am, additional officers entered the Shoe and ascended the
- 9:22El Tier stairway, presumably after Noel activated her body alarm
- 9:27when Epstein was discovered hanged in his cell. As noted above,
- 9:32the camera at the end of the El Tier was
- 9:34providing a live video feed at the time of Epstein's death,
- 9:38but the video was not being recorded. The electronics technician
- 9:42told the OIG that certain mcc New York personnel, including
- 9:47the Control Center SIS personnel, but Warden, most lieutenants, and
- 9:52the electronics technician, had access to the live video feed
- 9:55of the institution's security cameras. He explained that to view
- 10:00the live video feed of a particular camera, an employee
- 10:04with access would need to key in the specific camera
- 10:07into the security camera system to call up the live
- 10:10feed with terms conditions eighting plus. The correctional Systems officer
- 10:15who was working at the control center on August tenth
- 10:18from twelve am to eight am, and the morning watch
- 10:21operations lieutenant both told the OIG that the only live
- 10:25feed from the shoe on their screens was video from
- 10:28the cameras showing the shoe's common area, and they did
- 10:32not perceive a need to take the necessary steps to
- 10:35see the live feed from the shoe el tier from
- 10:38either of their duty stations. On the evening Epstein died.
- 10:43The warden, who was not scheduled to work on August tenth,
- 10:47twenty nineteen, arrived at the institution later that morning after
- 10:51being notified of Epstein's death and was informed that most
- 10:55of the cameras in the shoe were not recording. He
- 10:58told the OIG that when the SIS lieutenant arrived at
- 11:02the facility that morning, he informed her that the shoe
- 11:05cameras had not been recording, and the SIS lieutenant explained
- 11:10that the hard drive issue had been detected on August eight.
- 11:14He told the OIG that prior to August tenth, he
- 11:18was unaware that the DVR two issue had been detected
- 11:21on August eighth, and that approximately half of the facility's cameras,
- 11:26and in particular, the cameras in the shoe, were found
- 11:30to not be recording on that date. The electronics technician
- 11:34told the OIG that the warden had instructed electronics technician
- 11:38to try and recover any potential shoe video and that
- 11:42may have been recorded by the cameras assigned to the
- 11:45malfunctioning DVR two system, but the electronics technician was unable
- 11:50to find anything. The electronics technician further said that the
- 11:54warden wanted to have the facilities cameras recording again as
- 11:59soon as possible, so he instructed the electronics technician to
- 12:03begin repairing DVR number two. Part D FBI forensic analysis
- 12:09of the DVR system. FBI evidence documents revealed that on
- 12:14August tenth, twenty nineteen, the FBI seized all our drives
- 12:18contained within the DVR two system. On August fourteenth, twenty nineteen,
- 12:23the FBI returned to mcc New York and seized additional
- 12:27DVR two components. On August fifteenth, twenty nineteen, the FBI
- 12:33sees the entire DVR one system. The FBI's Digital Forensic
- 12:37Analysis Unit in Quantico, Virginia, received mcc new York's DVR
- 12:42system on August sixteenth, twenty nineteen, and began to conduct
- 12:47a forensic analysis of the system. According to FBI forensic reports,
- 12:53DVR two did not start successfully. The Digital Forensic Analysis
- 12:58Unit found that the system contained three faulty hard drives.
- 13:02The FBI forensic report states that the three drives were
- 13:05repaired by an FBI Advanced Data Recovery Specialist, but the
- 13:10DVRs were never able to be assembled successfully. The forensic
- 13:14report further state that an FBI computer scientist and the
- 13:18company's one technician reviewed the DVR two controller logs and
- 13:23found that there had previously been catastrophic disc failures and
- 13:27no recordings would have been available after July twenty ninth,
- 13:31twenty nineteen. When the OIG asked the electronics technician about
- 13:36his findings by the FBI, he told the OIG he
- 13:40was unaware that cameras were not recording to DVR two
- 13:43between July twenty ninth and August eighth of twenty nineteen.
- 13:47Neither the warden nor the sis lieutenant was aware the
- 13:51cameras assigned to DVR two had not been recording since
- 13:55July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen. The company won technician could
- 14:00not recall working with the electronics technician on any DVR
- 14:04issues prior to August eighth, twenty nineteen, but he said
- 14:08that if the entire DVR two server went down on
- 14:12July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, no video would have been
- 14:16able to have been retrieved from that point forward from
- 14:20any of the cameras recording to DVR two. All right, folks,
- 14:24that's gonna bring chapter six to its conclusion. In our
- 14:27next episode, we're gonna pick up with the OIG report,
- 14:31and that's going to be with Chapter seven conclusions and recommendations.
- 14:37And then once we have this whole entire OIG report
- 14:40added to the catalog without my commentary, then I'm gonna
- 14:43go back and we're gonna go through certain parts of
- 14:46it again, but with added commentary, because it's taking everything
- 14:50in my power not to have my aapp running while
- 14:53I'm reading through this. All right, folks, All of the
- 14:56information that goes with this episode can be found in
- 14:59the descript as for me. And then Welcome back to
- 15:02the Epstein Chronicles. We're going to pick right back up
- 15:07with that OIG report, and in this episode, we're going
- 15:10to start looking at Chapter seven Conclusions and Recommendations, Part
- 15:16one Conclusions. Our investigation and review of the Federal Bureau
- 15:21of Prisons custody care and supervision of Jeffrey Epstein identified
- 15:27numerous and serious failures by employees of the Metropolitan Correctional
- 15:32Center located in New York, New York MCC New York,
- 15:36including falsifying BOP records relating to inmate counts, en rounds,
- 15:41and multiple violations of MCC New York and BOP policies
- 15:46and procedures which compromised Epstein's safety, the safety of other inmates,
- 15:51and the security of the institution. Specifically, we found that
- 15:57MCC New York staff failed to undertake the z or
- 16:00acquired measures designed to make sure that, among other things,
- 16:04Epstein and other inmates were accounted for and safe, such
- 16:08as conducting inmate counts and thirty minute rounds, searching inmate cells,
- 16:13and ensuring adequate supervision of the Special Housing unit, and
- 16:18the functionality of MCC New York's security camera system. We
- 16:23further found that multiple BOP employees submitted false documents claiming
- 16:28that they had performed the required counts n rounds, and
- 16:32that several MCC new York staff members lacked candor when
- 16:36questioned by the Office of the Inspector General about their actions.
- 16:41Two MCC New York employees, Touvin Owell and Michael Thomas,
- 16:44were charged criminally with falsifying BOP records relating to their
- 16:49conducting inmate counts and rounds. The US Attorney's Office for
- 16:53the Southern District of New York subsequently entered into deferred
- 16:57prosecution agreements with Noel and Tom Thomas, and the court
- 17:01dismissed all charges against them. After Noel and Thomas successfully
- 17:05fulfilled the terms of their agreements. Prosecution was declined by
- 17:10the US Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New
- 17:13York for other MCC New York employees assigned to the
- 17:16shoe on August nineth and tenth, twenty nineteen, who the
- 17:20OIG found also created, certified, and submitted false documentation regarding
- 17:26inmate counts and rounds on the day before and the
- 17:29day of Epstein's death. The OIG also found that the
- 17:33mcc new York staff failed to carry out the psychology
- 17:37departments directive that Epstein be assigned to cellmate, and that
- 17:41an mcc new York supervisor allowed Epstein to make an
- 17:44unmonitored phone call the evening before his death. The OIG
- 17:49determined that the combination of these and other failures led
- 17:53to Epstein being alone and unmonitored in his cell with
- 17:57an excessive amount of bed linens from approximately ten pm
- 18:01on August ninth until he was discovered hanged in his
- 18:04cell at approximately six thirty am the following day. Additionally,
- 18:09the OIG found that staffing shortages, a persistent issue for
- 18:13the BOP, compromised the ability of mcc new York staff
- 18:18to adequately supervise inmates, as detailed below. We make a
- 18:23number of recommendations to the BOP to address the serious
- 18:27issues we identified during our investigation and review. While the
- 18:32OIG determined that mcc new York staff committed significant violations
- 18:37of BOP and mcc new York policies and falsified records
- 18:42relating to their conducting inmate counts and rounds, the OIG
- 18:46did not uncover evidence that contradicted the FBI's determination regarding
- 18:53the absence of criminality in connection with how Epstein died.
- 18:57All MCC new York staff members who were interviewed by
- 19:01the OIG said that they did not know of any
- 19:03information suggesting that Epstein's cause of death was something other
- 19:07than suicide. Likewise, none of the interviewed inmates provided any
- 19:12credible information that Epstein's cause of death was something other
- 19:16than suicide. As detailed in Chapter four of this report,
- 19:20the Shoe was a housing unit within the MCC New
- 19:23York where inmates were securely separated from the general inmate
- 19:27population and kept locked in their cells for approximately twenty
- 19:32three hours a day to ensure their own safety as
- 19:35well as the safety of staff and other inmates. Access
- 19:38to the Shoe was controlled by multiple locked doors. The
- 19:42primary entrance to the shoe, main exterior entry door, was
- 19:46opened remotely by a staff member in mcc new York's
- 19:49centralized control center. Additionally, there was a second locked door
- 19:54at the main entrance main interior entry door, which could
- 19:57be opened only with the key held by a limited
- 20:00number of correctional officers while on duty. Within the Shoe,
- 20:05the entrance to each tier could be accessed only via
- 20:08a single locked door at the top or bottom of
- 20:11the staircase leading to the individual tier. Keys to open
- 20:15the locked tier doors were available only to a limited
- 20:18number of cos while on duty. Each tier had eight cells,
- 20:22each of which could house either one or two inmates.
- 20:26Each individual cell, which was made of cement and metal,
- 20:29could be accessed only through a single locked door, to
- 20:32which only a limited number of cos had keys while
- 20:35on duty. The Shoe cell doors were made of solid
- 20:39metal with a small glass window and small locked slots
- 20:42that correctional staff used to handcuff inmates and provide food
- 20:47and toilet trees two inmates as a further security measure.
- 20:51During each shift, a limited number of the coos had
- 20:54keys while on duty. While BOP policy in practice require
- 20:59that all shoe in makes be locked in their cells overnight,
- 21:02the OIG found no evidence indicating that the door to
- 21:05Epstein's cell, or any other cell in the shoe tier
- 21:08in which Epstein was housed, was unlocked on the evening
- 21:11of August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen, after Shoe staff
- 21:15locked Epstein in his cell at approximately eight pm. Shoe
- 21:19staff told the OIG that at approximately eight pm on
- 21:22August ninth, all shoe inmates were locked in their cells
- 21:26for the evening, and that there was no indication that
- 21:29any of the other inmates could have gotten out of
- 21:31their cells. Epstein did not have a cell mate after
- 21:35inmate Iree was transferred out of mcc New York on
- 21:38August ninth, and therefore Epstein was alone in his cell
- 21:41the evening of August ninth and tenth. The door to
- 21:45Epstein's cell was visible from the shoe officer's station, and
- 21:48co Tove Noel and material handler Michael Thomas told the
- 21:52OIG that no one entered or exited epstein cell during
- 21:56their shift on August tenth. Both of them further described,
- 22:00I'm delivering breakfast to the el tier at about six
- 22:02thirty am on August tenth, and al Noel unlocked the
- 22:06door to the el tier. Thomas entered the el tier
- 22:09and called for Epstein, and then Thomas unlocked a cell
- 22:12door when Epstein failed to respond. Additionally, the three inmates
- 22:17who were housed in the same shoe tier as Epstein
- 22:20on August ninth and tenth, who had a direct line
- 22:22of sight to the door of epstein cell from their cells,
- 22:26stated that no one entered or exited epstein cell after
- 22:30the shoe staff returned Epstein to is cell on the
- 22:33evening of August ninth, which is consistent with the security
- 22:37measures in place within the MCC New York Shoe. Further,
- 22:42the OIG analyzed the available recorded video of the shoe,
- 22:46which was limited to the common area of the shoe,
- 22:49including the shoe officer's station. Due to the mcc New
- 22:52York security camera systems video recording issues that we detailed
- 22:57in chapter six, the OIG is annownalysis of the recorded
- 23:01video did not identify any CEOs other than those assigned
- 23:05to the shoe during that time frame or had a
- 23:08specific reason for visiting the shoe, or other individuals present
- 23:13in the common area of the shoe approach any of
- 23:16the shoe tiers, including the L tier where Epstein was housed,
- 23:20between approximately ten forty pm on August ninth and approximately
- 23:24six thirty am on August tenth. In some the OIG's
- 23:29investigation did not find any evidence that anyone was present
- 23:34in the L Tier during that time frame other than
- 23:37the inmates who were locked in their assigned cells on
- 23:40that tier of the shoe. We also noted that the
- 23:44surveillance cameras in the L Tier as shown in the
- 23:47photograph in Figure six. Pot seven was in plain view
- 23:51of the inmates, and therefore the inmates would have been
- 23:53aware that any hallway movements, including into or out of
- 23:58Epstein's cell, were being livest and could be monitored, even
- 24:02if unbeknownst to them, the digital video recording system was
- 24:06not recording the live stream at the time. As the
- 24:09OIG is noted in numerous prior reports regarding the goop's
- 24:14camera system, BOP staff and inmates are aware of where
- 24:18prison cameras are located, and often engage in wrongdoing in
- 24:22locations where they know cameras are not located. Additionally, the
- 24:27OIG did not observe on the recorded video of the
- 24:30Shoe common area that Noel and Thomas, who were seated
- 24:34at the desk at the Shoe Officer's station immediately outside
- 24:38the L tier during that time period, at any time,
- 24:41rose from their seats or approached the L tier. We
- 24:45additionally found that Thomas and Noel's reaction on the morning
- 24:48of August tenth, upon finding Epstein hanging in his cell,
- 24:52as described to us by Thomas, Noel, the responding lieutenant,
- 24:56and inmates, was consistent with their being unaware of any
- 25:00potential harm to Epstein prior to Thomas entering Epstein's cell
- 25:04at about six thirty am on August tenth. We further
- 25:08noted that Epstein had previously been placed on suicide watch
- 25:12and psychological observation due to the events of July twenty third,
- 25:16twenty nineteen, that numerous newses made from prison bed sheets
- 25:21were found in his cell on the morning of August tenth,
- 25:24and that he had signed a new last will and
- 25:26testament on August eighth, two days before he died. No
- 25:30weapons were recovered from Epstein's cell after his death. Additionally,
- 25:34the inmates who were interviewed consistently reported that on the
- 25:38evening Epstein died, the Shoe staff did not systematically conduct
- 25:42or required rounds and counts, which was one of the
- 25:45primary mechanisms for the Shoe staff to ensure the safety
- 25:49and security of inmates housed in the Shoe. As a result,
- 25:53Epstein was unmonitored and locked alone in his cell for
- 25:57hours with an excess amount of linens, which provided an
- 26:01opportunity for him to commit suicide. Finally, the medical examiner
- 26:06who performed the autopsy detailed for the OIG why Epstein's
- 26:10injuries were more consistent with and indicative of a suicide
- 26:14by hanging rather than homicide by strangulation. The medical examiner
- 26:19also told the OIG that the ligature furrow was too
- 26:23broad to have been caused by electrical cord of the
- 26:26medical device in Epstein's cell, and the blood toxicology tests
- 26:30revealed no medications or legal substances were in Epstein's system.
- 26:35The medical examiner also noted the absence of debris under
- 26:39Epstein's fingernails, marks on his hands, contusions to his knuckles,
- 26:43or bruises on his body that would have indicated Epstein
- 26:47had been in a struggle, which would have been expected
- 26:50if Epstein's death had been a homicide by strangulation. This
- 26:55is not the first time that the OIG has found
- 26:57significant job performance and management failures on the part of
- 27:01BOP personnel and widespread disregard of BOP policies that are
- 27:06designed to ensure that inmates are safe, secure, and in
- 27:09good health. For instance, the OIG's December twenty twenty two
- 27:14investigation and review of the GOP's handling of the transfer
- 27:18of James Whitey Bulger identified serious job performance and management
- 27:22failures at multiple levels within the BOP. Similar to the
- 27:27Bulger report, the numerous and serious transgressions that occurred in
- 27:31this matter came to light largely because they involved a
- 27:34high profile inmate. The fact that serious deficiencies occurred in
- 27:39connection with high profile inmates like Epstein and Bulger is
- 27:43especially concerning given that the BOP would presumably take particular
- 27:48care in handling the custody in care of such inmates. Regrettably,
- 27:53the OIG has encountered similar issues on many other occasions.
- 27:57For example, the OIG is investigation numerous allegations related to
- 28:02the falsification of a official GOP documentation concerning inmate counts
- 28:08and rounds, several of which have resulted in criminal prosecution.
- 28:12The OIG currently has two open investigations into allegations of
- 28:16falsified inmate count and round documentation, each involving an inmate
- 28:21death by suicide and homicide or escape from a GOOP facility.
- 28:27This investigation and review also revealed the direct impact of
- 28:31insufficient staffing levels on inmate safety. Witnesses repeatedly told the
- 28:36OIG that counts, round cell searches, and other methods of
- 28:40inmate accountability were not undertaken because correctional staff were working
- 28:46multiple shifts, including one staff member who worked twenty four
- 28:50hours straight, and were tired and overwhelmed with the duties.
- 28:54As discussed in greater detail in our recommendations, the OIG
- 28:58is repeatedly found the need for BOP to address staffing shortages.
- 29:03Most recently, in March of twenty twenty three, the OIG
- 29:07found that the coronavirus disease twenty nineteen pandemic accelerated the
- 29:12effects of pre existing BOP medical and non medical staffing
- 29:16shortages and issue the OIG as identified as a concern
- 29:20for the BOP since at least twenty fifteen. Further, the
- 29:25OIG has repeatedly found that BOP personnel have not consistently
- 29:30been attentive to the needs of inmates at risk for suicide.
- 29:33In this investigation, that inattention manifested in the failure of
- 29:38mcc New York staff and supervisors to ensure that Epstein
- 29:42was assigned to cellmate as required by mcc new York
- 29:46Psychology Department directive issued after July twenty three, twenty nineteen,
- 29:52in which Epstein was discovered in his cell with an
- 29:55orange cloth around his neck. In March twenty twenty three's report,
- 29:59the OIG, he found that BOP psychology staff did not
- 30:02assess the suitability of a single cell assignment for five
- 30:06of the seven inmates who died by suicide while in
- 30:09COVID quarantine units between March twentieth and April twenty twenty one.
- 30:14The OIG's twenty seventeen report on the BOP's use of
- 30:18restrictive housing for inmates with mental illness also noted that
- 30:22single selling may present risk to inmate mental health, and
- 30:26both the recommendations from that report regarding the use of
- 30:30oversight of single selling remain open as of March of
- 30:34twenty twenty three. Lastly, as discussed in greater detail in
- 30:39the conclusions and recommendations that follow, the persistent deficiencies of
- 30:43the BOP security camera systems are well documented in long standing.
- 30:48The combination of negligence, misconduct, and outright job performance failure
- 30:53documented in this report all contributed to an environment in
- 30:56which arguably one of the most notorious inmates and us
- 31:00the BOP's custody, was provided the opportunity to take his
- 31:03own life, resulting in significant questions being asked about the
- 31:07circumstances of his death, how it could have been allowed
- 31:11to happen, and most importantly, depriving his numerous victims, many
- 31:15of whom were underage girls at the time of the
- 31:17alleged crimes, of their ability to seek justice through the
- 31:21criminal justice process. The fact that these failures have been
- 31:25reoccurring once at the BOP does not excuse them and
- 31:29gives additional urgency to the need for the Department of
- 31:32Justice and BOP leadership to address the chronic staffing, surveillance, security,
- 31:38and related problems plaguing the BP. The OIG is completed
- 31:43its investigation and is providing this report to the GOP
- 31:48for appropriate action. Unless otherwise noted. The OIG applies the
- 31:52preponderance of evidence standard in determining whether DOGA personnel have
- 31:57committed misconduct. RIT System Protection Board applies the same standard
- 32:03when reviewing a federal agency's decision to take adverse action
- 32:07against an employee based on such misconduct. C five USC
- 32:12Section seventy seven oh one C one B and five
- 32:15CFR Section twelve oh one dot fifty six B one
- 32:19Section two. All Right, folks, that's going to wrap up
- 32:22this episode here and in the next episode, we're gonna
- 32:26pick up on the recommendations. All of the information that
- 32:30goes with the episode can be found in the description box.