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War in Ukraine: Doubts Cast on Russia’s Claim of Victory in Kostiantynivka · Im Krisenmodus

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Die Übersetzung von Jans Stimme vom Deutschen ins Englische wurde mit einer KI erstellt.
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At the beginning of July, Russia announces a major military success.
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The strategically important city of Kostyantinivka in the Donetsk region has
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been completely captured.
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Ukraine's general staff disputes the claim.
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Analysts at the US-based Institute for the Study of War also see no evidence
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that Russia has gained full control of the city.
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Almost three months later, I'm sitting in an unremarkable house on a side in Kramatorsk.
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In front of me, two Ukrainian soldiers are tracking the flight of a large drone on a monitor.
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The images show Kostiantynivka, burned out houses, destroyed rooftops, empty streets.
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The drone hovers over a building and drops its payload.
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It's delivering supplies to Ukrainian soldiers, in a city Russia declared captured long ago.
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One of the men goes by the call sign, He commands a drone unit in the 28th Separate Mechanized Brigade.
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His unit supplies Ukrainian positions in Kostiantinivka with food,
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ammunition and medicine.
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I confront him with Russia's announcement of victory.
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Of course the Russians have superior numbers. They are a formidable opponent,
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and they must not be underestimated.
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We don't underestimate them, but we are putting up strong resistance.
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How can Russia declare a city captured when Ukrainian soldiers are still fighting
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there and receiving supplies?
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What does it actually mean to control a city in this war? And what has the Ukrainian
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operation codenamed Vivaldi changed on the front line?
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That's what this episode is about.
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In Crisis Mode, the podcast from Conflict Zones with Jan Jessen.
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Hello, I'm Jan Jessen, Political Editor-in-Chief and War and Crisis Reporter for Funker Media Group.
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Kramatorsk has changed dramatically since my last visit in the spring.
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The city has now become a fortress. Barbed wire and concrete anti-tank obstacles line the streets.
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Net tunnels have been erected over major roads to protect against incoming kamikaze drones.
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Russian glide bombs have hit buildings in several locations.
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Just a few days before my visit, one exploded in a residential neighbourhood,
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destroying the Church of St. John the Baptist.
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Small kamikaze drones are now flying over Kramatorsk too.
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We've already reported on this threat in our episode about Kursen.
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We'll link to that episode in the show notes. These drones sound a bit like
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mosquitoes turned up to an unbearable volume.
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It's a nerve-wracking noise, and it makes working in Kramatorsk considerably more difficult.
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Kramatorsk und nahe Slovyansk formen das Herz der Ukraine fortifieden Beldung in der Donetskregion.
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Drushkivka and Kostyantinivka are also part of this chain of cities.
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About one-fifth of the Donetsk region remains under Ukrainian control.
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Capturing the entire region is one of Russia's most important war aims.
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This year, Russia intended to break through along several axes.
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To help you picture the situation, Slovyansk lies to the north,
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with Kramatorsk below it, then Drushkivka, and farther south, Kostyantinivka.
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Russian forces are attacking Kostyantinivka directly. At the same time,
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they are trying to bypass the entire fortified belt, advancing from Lyman in
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the northeast and from Dobropilya in the southwest.
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The aim is a pincer movement. Russian troops want to cut Ukrainian supply routes
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and gradually encircle the major cities.
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So far, this plan has not succeeded.
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In the north, Ukrainian forces have even managed to push back the Russian advance.
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We'll come back to that in more detail shortly. Kostyantinivka has now been
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heavily destroyed and is the scene of fierce fighting.
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Small Russian units are infiltrating the city, but Ukrainian soldiers are still
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holding positions there too.
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At the beginning of July, the Russian military and President Vladimir Putin
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declared the city fully captured.
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Yet almost three months later, Ukrainian soldiers are still fighting there.
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Hordyi's unit supplies them from the air. Large drones carry food,
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water, ammunition and medicine to the front lines.
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When Russian soldiers get too close to Ukrainian positions, these drones are
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also used to attack them. Every flight is a risk.
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Hordyi says many of their drones are shot down. Sometimes rain and fog provide
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the most effective protection from Russian air defenses.
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In good visibility, he says, flying without being detected is almost impossible.
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Even so, his unit tries to keep the position supplied at all times.
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Something else interesting happened while we were talking to Hordyi.
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As we discussed kamikaze drones, we suddenly heard machine gun fire not far away.
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Ukrainian units were trying to shoot down incoming drones over Kramatorsk.
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That too has now become part of everyday life in the city.
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Naturally, we can't independently verify every detail of his account.
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For journalists like us, getting into Kostyantinivka is currently impossible.
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You would have to cover around 20, 25 or even 30 km on foot.
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And the chances of arriving in anything resembling one piece are relatively slim.
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At this point, it's simply no longer possible for us to get there.
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However, Hordi's central claim is also supported by outside observers.
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The Institute for the Study of War says there is no evidence that Russia has
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fully captured Kostyantinivka.
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At another position in Kramatorsk, I meet another Ukrainian officer. His callsign is Vudi.
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He is deputy company commander in the 39th Separate Drone Battalion.
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Vudi's unit has a different role from Hordi's team. It does not directly supply
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Ukrainian positions in Kostyantinivka.
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Instead, its medium-range drones attack Russian supply lines.
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Unmanned ground vehicles also transport ammunition, water and food to areas
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that are now almost impossible for people or conventional vehicles to reach.
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These ground robots also help evacuate the wounded and recover fallen soldiers.
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We've talked about this several times on the podcast already.
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Getting into these positions has become extremely difficult.
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The so-called kill zone now extends 40 kilometers and in some places 50 kilometers,
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meaning an area where drones are operating everywhere.
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Getting wounded soldiers out of there is incredibly difficult.
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If you send people in to do the job, you need at least two people to evacuate
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one wounded soldier, usually three or four.
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That means that rescuing a single casualty can suddenly put another three,
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four or five people in mortal danger. That's...
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We started doing this in April. Back then, we had just one small ground robot.
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I took it on a mission to Kostianti Nivka.
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After that, we built up the unit step by step. By now, it's almost the size
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of a company. Today, the job is much more difficult.
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Back then the threat was considerably lower, and getting into Kostiantinivka
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was still relatively straightforward.
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Today a single mission from Kramatorsk to Drushkivka can take 8,
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9 or even 10 hours, sometimes a whole day, and that's a distance of only about 7km.
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We constantly have to stop and wait.
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The road might be mined before we even set off.
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Then we have to wait until it's
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been cleared, because we can't do that ourselves. It's pretty difficult.
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Wir.
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Warten, aber es ist sehr schwierig. 7 km in, um 10 Stunden. Under normalen Konditionen,
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das wäre ein sehr kurzer Drei. 7 km könnte 10 Minuten dauern.
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Aber unter den Konditionen über diese Frontline, das gleiche Reise kann einen ganzen Tag dauern.
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Drones monitorieren die Straßen. Other Drones attacken Fahrzeuge.
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Routes können gebraucht werden.
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Wieder und wieder, Soldaten müssen und warten und warten. Ein Roboter in der
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Bühne nicht die Gefahr, natürlich.
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But it changes who is exposed to them.
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If the robot is hit, equipment is lost.
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If a person is inside a vehicle, the same mission can cost them their life.
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But drones don't just determine how Ukrainian soldiers are supplied.
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They are also key to the counteroffensive taking place farther north.
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Its codename is Vivaldi.
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You may have read a little about it already. It was a very, very interesting
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operation that began back in the spring and was kept completely secret.
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Just think about what that means. The operation was carried out by Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps.
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Several brigades were involved, that is, tens of thousands of soldiers,
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and yet the Ukrainians managed to keep the operation secret well into the autumn.
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That's a remarkable achievement, and it took the international community by surprise as well.
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Um zu verstehen, ich spreche mit Dr. Gustav Gressel, ein Militärer der National
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Defense Academy in Vienna.
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Gressel doesn't describe Vivaldi as a major Ukrainian offensive designed to
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force a deep breakthrough.
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He says it is a limited attack with a broader defensive purpose.
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In my view, Vivaldi has operational significance, but it's not an operational level offensive.
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It's essentially a tactical offensive with an operational, defensive objective.
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If we look back to the spring, the Russians were trying to encircle Ukraine's
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fortified defensive belt with two pincer movements.
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The idea wasn't to capture it head-on, but to surround it.
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One thrust aimed to advance from the Lyman area towards the Oskil River,
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while the other pushed north from Dobropilya.
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In the south around Dobropilya, Russian military pressure was significantly
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greater than in the north.
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The Russians were more successful there in supplying their spearheads.
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In the north, it was more difficult because several smaller rivers and streams
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channeled Russian movements along certain routes.
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The Ukrainians were more successful there in thinning out those attacking forces.
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That's why the Ukrainians launched a counteroffensive in the north to eliminate the Russian salient.
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Vivaldi, then, is a tactical attack with a broader defensive impact.
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In effect, it has already achieved an operational objective.
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Ukrainian forces are aiming to push back the Russian salient near Lyman.
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They have now succeeded in doing so.
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The goal is to protect supply routes to Slovyansk and Kramatorsk,
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while disrupting the northern flank of Russia's planned Pinsa movement.
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A key role in this operation has been played by the 60th separate Inhulets mechanized
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brigade, Teil der 3. Armee Korps, die in dieser Region aktiviert ist.
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In late September, I meet the brigade's commander, Major Dimitro Rohoziuk,
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in a bombed-out school building in Izium.
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His brigade's initial task was to halt the Russian advance. That was the first
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phase of Operation Vivaldi.
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The name, of course, is no coincidence. Antonio Vivaldi's best-known work is
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The Four Seasons, and this Operation II is divided into several phases.
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For operational security reasons,
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however, the commander won't reveal anything about the fourth phase.
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According to Major Rohoziuk, Russia's offensive was aimed at capturing Lyman,
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reaching Sviatohirsk, and advancing towards the road linking Kharkiv and Slovyansk.
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I'll come back to Sviatohirsk in a moment because this town is also a case in
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point when it comes to Russian disinformation.
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In early September, Putin had already declared that Russian forces had captured Sviatohirsk.
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Naturally, I asked the Major what truth there was to that claim.
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His answer was unequivocal.
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Ihr müsst verstehen, dass es in meinen Augen ist, weil ich verstehe,
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weil ich verstehe, weil ich es völlig absurd ist, weil ich weiß,
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wie unsere Truppen sind.
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Svyatohirsk hat in der Rear-Area von der 60th Brigade all along und wir haben
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unsere Defensive Lines da gehalten. Als vorhin als ein Jahr ago,
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ich war durch alle diese Stadt und ich bin da schon mal zurückgegangen.
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Über den Kursen dieses Jahr.
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Sviatohirsk und die Bereiche von Yarova und Drobishev sind behind die 60 Brigade's positions.
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Es ist möglich, dass unsere Sicherheitsmeasures misleid die enemy.
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Wir haben nicht nur wie stabil die Situation da eigentlich war,
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oder dass isoliert die Russische Infiltration nicht die Gefängnisse der 60 Brigade,
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oder die 3rd Army Corps als ein.
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Das ist genau das, was das so absurd ist.
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Wie können Sie darüber reden, wenn unsere Forces in dieser Sektor Ich kann es
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sagen, dass die Verlangen des Einwohnern des Einwohnern, die sehr wichtig sind,
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wenn in diesem Moment, die unsere Reichweite sind im Krieg des Anstums.
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Rohoziuk does not deny that small Russian units are trying to infiltrate Ukrainian
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lines. But he makes a more precise point.
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The presence of individual soldiers or small groups does not mean that Russia
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has military control over a town.
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This, incidentally, is another tactic Russian forces have been using more and
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more frequently lately, or at least more frequently this year.
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They send in small infiltration teams, essentially suicide squads or one-way missions.
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Their sole purpose is often to pose somewhere with a Russian flag.
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A Russian drone films a soldier standing there, waving the flag.
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Then he quickly rolls it up and tries to get out, assuming he makes it out alive.
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The Russians use this footage to claim military successes on the battlefield
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that, in reality, never happened on anything like the scale they suggest.
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As I said, Ukraine's counter-offensive in this area was a very,
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very large operation, und es bleibt für Monate gegründet.
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Preparations for Operation Vivaldi began as early as the spring.
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It was only in early September that the first details of the operation began to emerge.
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At the time of our conversation, Rochosiuk says Ukrainian forces have brought
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more than 125 square kilometers under their control.
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By the end of the third phase, that figure, according to the Ukrainian side,
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has risen to more than 170 square kilometers.
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As always, the precise extent of the territorial gains and Russian losses cannot
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be fully independently verified.
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But the course of the front line does show that Ukraine has managed to push
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back the Russian salient in this sector.
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All publicly available maps tell the same story, including those published by
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the Institute for the Study of War and Deep State, a Ukrainian open source intelligence project.
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Und hier ist ein wichtiger Punkt. Even Russian-Military-Bloggers,
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die normalerweise ein starkes-Russisch-Russien-Line, sagen, dass Ukraine hat
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eine Successful Counteroffensive in diesem Bereich gemacht. Das hat sich in
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den letzten Wochen verletzt.
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Sie sind in den Armen über die Ukraine-Offensive, über Ukraine's capabilities,
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und über alles, über wie tief sie fühlen,
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sie haben sich selbst verletzt von ihren eigenen Leidenschaft.
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Aber was erinnert ist, dass nicht nur die Ukraine-Förse sind auf die Offensive,
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sondern nur die Positionen, wie sie für vieles Jahr gemacht haben.
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Was wirklich wichtig ist, wie sie vorbereiteten für die Attacken haben.
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According zu Gustav Gressel, die Ukraine-Unitär erst brauchen zu erstellen local
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superiority in der Drone War.
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Only then can tanks and mechanized infantry advance.
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Preparations for the offensive probably began in March, with the first attacks taking place in May.
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A crucial part of the operation was establishing local superiority in the drone war.
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That meant systematically degrading Russia's ability to operate drones in this
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sector through electronic warfare and reconnaissance, essentially boxing the
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Russian units into a corner, identifying their positions and then systematically
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destroying their capabilities.
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This also shows just how much preparation time is needed for a mechanized assault.
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The Ukrainians did attack with mechanized forces, but those forces were only
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deployed once the drone situation had been prepared accordingly.
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So, for everyone now shouting, main battle tanks are back, mobile warfare,
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blitzkrieg, maneuver warfare, hooray!
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Well, it's not that simple. Of course, main battle tanks have value.
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And of course, you need mechanized infantry to carry out attacks like this.
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But these forces can only operate effectively as combat formations when they
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are integrated with drone units.
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They also need to be coordinated through digital command and control systems
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alongside electronic warfare and electronic intelligence.
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And all of this has to happen at lower levels of command too,
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not just at core level or above, as is often the case in European armies,
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but right down to the smallest tactical units.
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That's how you establish drone superiority. und nur dann kann man attacken.
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Tanks and infantry, then, are not disappearing from the battlefield,
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but they can no longer be used effectively if enemy drones are constantly hovering overhead.
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We've talked several times on this podcast about how warfare has changed in
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recent years and about the huge role drones now play.
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We can also add links to other episodes in the show notes where we explore this subject in more detail.
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In the case of Operation Vivaldi, Untertitelung des ZDF.
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Die Ukraine hat sich in den USA gelegt, dass die Russen in den USA gelegt,
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die in den USA gelegt wurden, die in den USA gelegt wurden.
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Das ist genau das die Ukrainien in den USA während Operation Vivaldi.
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Sie hat auch die Verlust und Verlust hinter den Russen gelegt,
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durch die Russen gelegt wurden.
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Diese wurden transportiert hinter enemy Lines by large drones.
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Equipped with heavy machine guns, the ground robots could then suddenly become
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active behind Russian lines and open fire.
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Gressel describes this as an entirely new form of combined arms warfare.
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Traditional tanks, mechanized infantry and artillery are now integrated with
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reconnaissance drones, attack drones, ground robots, electronic warfare and
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digital command and control systems,
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another member of the 60th brigade describes how the ukrainian side views the state of its opponent,
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his call sign is akhmet akhmet is a battle captain an officer responsible for
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coordinating combat operations,
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he manages cooperation between the battalions and the various units he also
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checks whether the brigade commander's orders are being und ich habe,
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ihn mit ihm, auch in Izyum, ich frage ihn über die Russische 20th Armee,
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die seine Brigade ist gegenwärtig.
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Sie können uns noch ein, wie sagen wir es sagen, eine Stabilität.
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Aber die 20-Jährigen ist unbeziehungsweise.
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Die 20-Jährigen hat sich als eine maximale kaltige Arme.
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Sie können noch ein bisschen aufwärts sein, aber die Gegend ist, die,
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20-Jährigen hat sich selbst zu verletzt. Die 20-Jährigen hat sich selbst zu
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sein, dass sie sich selbst verletzt hat, dass sie ihre eigenen Soldaten haben.
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Sie haben einfach nur ihre eigenen Männern.
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I don't know how else to put it. To me, it looked as though the 20th Army hadn't
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planned anything at all.
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They just sent men forward to plug gaps. Their main task seemed to be preventing
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their own troops from retreating.
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They're sitting there hungry and dehydrated. They keep asking for food and water to be brought to them.
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But nothing arrives. And yet they remain in their positions,
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in some cases still trying to carry out their orders.
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Aber sie trotzdem, wie sie, sie versuchen es zu sehen, und sie versuchen sogar
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sogar zu diese Aufgabe zu stellen.
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Achmed describes Russian forces from the perspective of a Ukrainian officer.
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Naturally, his language is harsh.
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But he also makes it clear that an exhausted enemy is not necessarily a defeated
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one. Russian units can still put up resistance.
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Another thing I found striking in our conversation was that the Russians apparently
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haven't really changed their tactics.
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We're talking about what are known as human wave attacks. A grim term,
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but one that is widely used to describe this approach.
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»Large numbers of soldiers are sent towards Ukrainian positions.
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Regardless of how many are killed, the hope is that one or two will make it
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through, or that Ukrainian positions will eventually run out of ammunition or
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suffer weapons failures.
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We've seen this pattern in one form or another since the beginning of the war in Ukraine.
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We saw it in Bakhmut, in Avdivka, and in many other towns, where Russia has
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been willing to sustain enormous losses to achieve its objectives.
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Und es scheint es zu sein zu haben, um Leiman zu sein.
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Auf einem Punkt, Achmet's observations sind die Zusammenarbeit mit Gressel's analysis.
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Gressel also believes that Russian units in der Norden Sektor waren weniger
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als die further south, um Dobropylia zu sein.
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Die Ukrainian forces apparently found a gap zwischen den reporteden Strenzen
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der Russian Formationen und den numberen Soldaten eigentlich fit für combat.
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Sie waren able zu exploit das Weakness in der Counteroffensive.
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So far, we've been talking about territorial gains, supply routes and military
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control, but the same places commanders discuss on their maps are still home to civilians.
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The transition from ground robots to these people is more direct than it might first appear.
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The same robots that carry water and ammunition to the front can bring back
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wounded soldiers or recover the dead on their return journey.
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In one widely reported case, the 60th Inhulets Brigade also used a ground robot
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to evacuate an elderly woman from a contested area.
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Natalia Bahri heads the Civil-Military Cooperation Department of the 60th Inhulets Brigade.
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Her team stays in contact with people who have remained in areas affected by the fighting.
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They try to organise evacuations from Sviatohirsk, Leimann, Stavki and other settlements.
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Natalia tells me about people who have already been evacuated once,
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only to return when the situation temporarily calms down.
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One family returns and ends up living in a basement, surviving on whatever food
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supplies they have left.
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Ukrainian soldiers stumble across them by chance and eventually manage to get them out.
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This family had already been evacuated once, back in 2022. Then the situation
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improved and they returned home.
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Wenn Things deteriorated Again, they decided to stay Anyway.
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They were living in a basement, surviving on whatever supplies they had left.
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They had no intention of leaving again. Our soldiers came across them by chance,
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while carrying out a mission in the area. We offered to evacuate them.
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Later I spoke to them at the evacuation point in Slovyansk.
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I asked them, why? You're putting yourselves in danger. You could die. Do you realize that?
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I got the answer we hear so often. We came back home. This is our home.
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This is our home. From the outside, it can be hard to understand why anyone
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would return to a largely destroyed town with no electricity,
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no reliable water supply and the constant threat of further attacks.
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But for the people who live there, it's about more than just a building.
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It's about the life they had before, their possessions, their memories and sometimes
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the only place where they still feel they belong.
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This is something we've come back to time and again on this podcast when discussing
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the war in Ukraine, the sheer absurdity of civilians still living in towns where
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fighting is taking place, in some cases right on the ground around them.
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I think of Chasiv Yar and Bakhmut, where people were still trying to make some
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kind of life for themselves, or Kherson, where I was just recently,
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and where you really have to ask yourself, what kind of life is this?
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And yet people don't want to leave. Some even return to towns and villages that
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have been almost completely destroyed.
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Natalia says that families with children, too, repeatedly refuse evacuation.
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One of these encounters, and this is the tragic reality of this war, ends in death.
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Recently, one of our units was operating in the area. The soldiers went into
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a basement and found a family there with a child.
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They said, we're moving on, come with us, we'll get you out of here.
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Die Familie hat gesagt, nein. Nachher, die Soldaten wiedergekommen sind.
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Once mehr, sie sagten, wir nehmen Sie mit uns.
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Und wieder, die Familie hat gesagt, nein, es gibt keine 필요, wir machen.
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Die dritte Mal, die Familie hat endlich geregelt, aber wenn die Soldaten zurückgekommen
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sind, sie waren tot, dass sie es. All die da waren, waren ihre Böse.
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Natalia doesn't name the place. She simply refers to it as a death zone.
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This story shows why terms like captured, held and liberated are not enough
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on their own to describe the reality facing people on the ground.
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A place can be retaken militarily and still remain deadly.
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One particularly striking example is Kherson in southern Ukraine, where I go quite oft.
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For me, the city has become a focal point of this war, a symbol of what it means.
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Kursen was liberated in late 2022, after months of Russian occupation.
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Since then, the city has been under constant Russian fire.
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From the other side of the Dnipro River, Russian forces attack with artillery,
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mortars, snipers, tanks and drones.
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And yet people stay, even though life.
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Natalia says Russia has, in
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some cases, even stepped up its attacks on places that have been retaken.
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Civilians hear that a town or city has been liberated and believe they can return home.
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But once they get there, they are still exposed to drones, artillery and guided bombs.
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We control this area. But some civilians hear that and decide to return home.
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And that's exactly the problem. Liberating an area doesn't mean it's immediately
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safe. On the contrary, the enemy often turns even more of its attention to that place.
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It steps up its attacks with guided bombs, drones and other weapons.
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Some people hear that a village or town has been liberated and believe that
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now is the right time to go back.
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We keep explaining to them. Just because a place has been liberated doesn't
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mean it's safe to return." According to Natalia's figures at the time,
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in late September, 272 people were still living in Sviatohirsk.
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Around 240 of them were staying in the area around the Lavra monastery.
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There was no regular electricity supply. Some people got their water from private wells.
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A few small shops were still open, but normal urban life was no longer possible.
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In early September, Putin declared that Sviatohirsk had been captured.
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Everyone I spoke to told me the same thing. That was complete bullshit.
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In Kostyantinivka, at least, Russian soldiers are present in the city,
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even though they haven't captured it entirely.
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But in Sviatohirsk, the front line is still 30 or 40 kilometers away.
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No Russian soldier has set foot in the city for years.
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It's a rear area for the 60th Brigade. So the claim is completely bonkers.
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But it also suggests that Putin may be receiving false information about what
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is actually happening on the front.
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These figures can change quickly, but they show something that military maps cannot capture.
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A map shows which army controls a place. It doesn't tell you whether water comes out of the tap.
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Es zeigt sich nicht, ob eine Ambulanz kann durch die Straße gehen.
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Es zeigt sich nicht, wie viele Fälle sagen, bevor es endlich zu bevacuert.
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Russia's claims to have captured Kostyantinivka and Sviatohirska simply false,
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and that carries a certain risk.
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If I believe I'm succeeding on the battlefield, that perception may also affect
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my willingness to negotiate.
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Gustav Gressel shares this assessment.
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Er sieht diese Russische falsche
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Claims als ein Risiko für politische und militärische Decision-Making.
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Die Implicationen von diesen disinformationen für Negotiations sind ein wichtiges
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Problem. Putin believes er hat die upper Hand bei einem gewissen Margin.
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Throughout dieser Krieg, Putin hat sich überrascht, die Ukraine's willingness,
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und ability zu resistieren.
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Die Terror-Attacks auf Kyiv, die auch, um die Ukraine zu tun,
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und break its will to fight, are based on a false assumption about Ukrainian
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domestic politics and the determination
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of Ukrainians to defend their country's existence as a state.
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These miscalculations are what make the war drag on, or more precisely,
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they help explain why it was launched in the first place as a completely futile undertaking.
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But all of that gets drowned out by the fascists here, clamoring for peace.
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Aber das geht ja im Friedensgegröle der Faschisten hier unter.
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Russland hat Kostyan-Tenivka geimpft.
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Sie hat Svyatohirska geimpft. Aber die ukrainischen Soldaten,
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die ich mit gesprochen habe, beschreiben eine sehr andere Realität.
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Die russischen Unen sind in Kostyan-Tenivka geimpft. Aber ukrainische Soldaten
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sind noch immer auf die Position. Sie sind von Dronen geimpft.
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Die Stadt ist stark contestiert, aber es ist nicht unter russischem Kontrolle.
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Und Sviatohirska, wie ich sagte, ist rund 30 km von der Front Line. Es ist einfach absurd.
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Natürlich, das ist nichts von dem Gefahr hat.
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Kosty Antonivka liegt in den Ruinen. Russische Pressure continues.
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Und wenn eine Militär-Line holds oder eine Stadt ist retaken,
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das nicht die Menschen da sind, die da sind, sind sie sicher.
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Vielleicht ist das die wichtigste Lehre von dieser trip. Words wie Captured,
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Held und Liberated sound, als wenn sie eine klar-cut Situation beschreiben.
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Aber auf der Grund, sie oft beschreiben nur eine Moment in einem Situation,
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das immer noch immer verändert wird.
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Eine Stadt kann nicht fallen, und es kann weiterhin werden, und es kann immer
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noch nie werden, nachdem es sich verletzt.
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A road may be open on the map, but a journey of just 7 km can still take an entire day.
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A village may have been liberated, while its residents are still living in basements.
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And a victory announcement tells us nothing about whether someone can actually return home.
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What would you like to know from the people who remain in places like these,
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where the fighting is still going on?
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And how can the media report military successes without losing sight of what
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they mean for the civilian population?
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I'd love to hear your thoughts. Write to me and let me know.
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That's it for today's episode of our podcast. This podcast was produced by Alexander Baumeister.
32:51
He's also a journalist and works for a radio station belonging to the Funky Media Group.
32:56
If you enjoyed this episode, please like and follow the podcast.
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It really helps more people discover our work. And if you have an idea for a
33:04
future episode, I'd love to hear from you.
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Until next time, bye-bye.