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12 - The Prince - Machiavelli · The Philosophy Insights Collection

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Chapter twenty are fortresses and many other things to which princes often resort, advantageous
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or hurtful. One. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state,
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have disarmed their subjects. Others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions.
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Others have fostered enmities against themselves. Others have laid themselves out to gain
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over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their governments. Some have built
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fortresses, some have overthrown and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a
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final judgment on all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states
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in which a decision has to be made, Nevertheless, I will speak as
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comprehensively as the matter of itself. Will admit. Two, there never was
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a new prince who has disarmed his subjects. Rather, when he has found
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them disarmed, he has always armed them, Because by arming them those arms
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become yours. Those men who were distrusted become faithful, and those who were
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faithful are kept so and your subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects
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cannot be armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the
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others can be handled more freely, And this difference in their temperament, which
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they quite understand, makes the former your dependence, and the latter, considering
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it to be a necessity that those who have the most danger and service should
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have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you
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at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or
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for want of loyalty, and either of these onions breeds hatred against you.
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And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you should turn to mercenaries,
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which are of the character already shown. Even if they should be good,
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they would not be sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects.
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Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality
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has always distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a prince
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acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old one,
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then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those
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who have been his adherents in acquiring it, And these, again, with
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time and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate, and matters should be
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managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be
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your own soldiers, who in your old state were living near you. Three
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our forefathers, those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed to say that it
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was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by fortresses. And with this
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idea they fostered quarrels in some of their tributary towns so as to keep possession
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of them the more easily. This may have been well enough in those times
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when Italy was in a way balanced, but I do not believe that it
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can be accepted as a precept for today, because I do not believe that
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factions can ever be of use. Rather, it is certain that when the
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enemy comes upon you in divided cities, you are quickly lost, because the
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weakest party will always assist the outside forces, and the other will not be
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able to resist. The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the
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above reasons, fostered the Gath and Ghibelin factions in their tributary cities. And
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although they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes
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among them, so that the citizens distracted by their differences should not unite against
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them, which as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected,
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because after the route at Valia, one party at once took courage and seized
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the state. Such methods argue therefore weakness in the prince, because these factions
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will never be permitted in a vigorous principality. Such methods for enabling one the
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more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace. But if
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war comes, this policy proves fallacious. Four. Without doubt, princes become
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great when they overcome the difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and
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and therefore fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great,
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who has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes enemies
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to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may have the
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opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a
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ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason, many consider that the
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wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster some
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animosity against himself, so that having crushed it, his renown may rise higher.
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Five Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance in
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those men who, in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among those
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who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolpho Petrucci, Prince of sis Sienna,
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ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by others. But
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on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies so much with the
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individual. I will only say this that those men who, at the commencements
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of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of a description to need
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assistance to support themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease,
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and they will be tightly held to serve the Prince with fidelity, inasmuch as
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they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad
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impression which he had formed of them. And thus the Prince always extracts more
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profit from them than from those who, serving him in too much security,
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may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not
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fail to warn a prince who, by means of secret favors, has acquired
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a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which induced those to
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favor him who did so. And if it be not a natural affection toward
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him, but only discontent with their government, then he will only keep them
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friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy them.
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And weighing well the reasons for this, in those examples which can be
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taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is easier for
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the prince to make friends of those men who were contented under their former government,
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and are therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with
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it, were favorable to him and encouraged him to seize it. Six.
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It has been accustomed with princes, in order to hold their states more securely,
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to build fortresses that they may serve as a brighter and bit to those
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who might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge from
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a first attack. I praise this system because it has been made use of
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formerly. Notwithstanding that Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times has been seen to demolish
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two fortresses in Sitta di Castello, that he might keep that state. Guido
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Ubaldo, Duke of Verbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had
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been driven by sees ri Bolgia raised to the foundations all the fortresses in that
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province, and considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it.
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The bent Vogueli, returning to Bologna, came to a similar decision.
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Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances. If they do
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you good in one way, they injure you in another. And this question
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can be reasoned. Thus, the prince who has more to fear from the
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people than from foreigners, ought to build fortresses. But he who has more
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to fear from foreigners than from the people, ought to leave them alone.
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The Castle of Milan, built by Francesco Ciborza, has made and will make,
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more trouble for the House of Saborza than any other disorder in the state.
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For this reason, the best possible fortress is not to be hated by
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the people, because although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not
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save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners
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to assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been
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seen in our times that such fortresses have been used to any prince, unless
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to the Countess of Forli when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed,
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for by that means she was able to withstand the popular attack and wait
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for assistance from Milan, and thus recover her state. And the posture of
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affairs was such at that time that the foreigners could not assist the people.
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But fortresses were of little value to her afterwards, when Caesaribolga attacked her,
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and when the people her enemy, were allied with the foreigners. Therefore,
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it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to
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have been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these
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things considered, then I shall praise him who builds fortresses, as well as
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him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them,
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cares little about being hated by the people. Chapter twenty one. How a
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prince should conduct himself so as to gain renown. Nothing makes a prince so
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much esteemed as great enterprises, and setting a fine example, we have in
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our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of Spain. He can almost
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be called a new prince, because he has risen by fame and glory,
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from being an insignificant king to being the foremost king. In Christendom. And
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if you will consider his deeds, you will find them all great deeds,
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and some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign he attacked Grenada,
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and this enterprise was the foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly
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at first, and without any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds
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of the barons of Castile occupied in thinking of the war, and not anticipating
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any innovations. Thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring
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power and authority over them. He was able, with the money of the
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Church and the the people, to sustain his armies, and by that long
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war, to lay the foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him.
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Further, always using religion as a plea so as to undertake greater schemes,
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he devoted himself with pious cruelty, to driving out and clearing his kingdom
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of the moors. Nor could there be a more admirable example, nor one
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so rare. Under this same cloak, he assailed Africa, he came down
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on Italy, he was finally attacked France. And thus his achievements and designs
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have always been great, and have kept the minds of his people in suspense
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and admiration, and occupied with the issue of them, and his actions have
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risen in such a way one out of the other, that men have never
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been given time to work steadily against him. Again, it much assists a
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prince to set unusual examples in internal affairs, similar to those which are related
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of Messer Bernabo di Milano, who, when he had the opportunity by any
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one in civil life, doing such extraordinary thing, either good or bad,
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would take some method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be very much
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spoken about. And a prince ought, above all things, always endeavor in
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every action to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.
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The prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a
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downright enemy, that is to say, when without any reservation, he declares
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himself in favor of one party against another, which course will always be more
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advantageous than standing neutral, Because if two of your or powerful neighbors come to
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blows, they are of such a character that if one of them conquers,
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you either have to fear him or not. In either case it will always
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be more advantageous for you to declare yourself than make war strenuously, because if
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the first case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall
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a prey to the conqueror. To the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has
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been conquered. You will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to protect
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or to shelter you, because he who conquers does not want doubtful friends who
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will not aid him in time of trial, and he who loses will will
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not harbor you, because you did not willingly soard in hand court his fate.
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Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive the
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Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the Romans,
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exhorting them to remain neutral, and on the other hand, the Romans
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urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in the
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Council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to stand neutral.
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To this, the Roman legate answered, as for that which has been
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said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not to interfere
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in our war. Nothing can be more erroneous, because by not interfering,
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you will be left without favor or consideration the gurdon of the conqueror. Thus
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it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality,
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whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with arms
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and irresolute. Princes, to avoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path
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and are generally ruined. But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favor of
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one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although the
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victor may be powerful and have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted
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to him, and there is established a bond of amity. And men are
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never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories,
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after all, are never so complete that the victor must not show some
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regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself loses,
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you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able, he
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may aid you and become your companions on a fortune that may rise again.
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In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that
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you have no anxiety as to who may conquer so much. The more it
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is greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of one
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by the aid of another, who, if he had been wise, would
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have saved him, and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not
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do so with your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it
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is to be noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an
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alliance with one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, unless
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necessity compels him, as it is said above, because if he conquers,
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you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible,
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being in the discretion of anyone. The Venetians joined with France against the
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Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which cause their ruin, could have
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been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the Florentines,
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when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, than in such
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a case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favor one of
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the parties. Never let any government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe courses.
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Rather, let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, because
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it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one trouble without
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running into another. But prudence consists in knowing how to distinguish the character of
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troubles and for choice to take the lesser evil. A prince ought also to
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show himself a patron of the ability, and to honor the proficient in every
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art. At the same time, he should encourage his citizens to practice their
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callings peaceably, both in commerce and in agriculture, and in every other following,
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so that one should not be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest
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they be taken away from him, or another from opening up trade for fear
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of taxes. But the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do
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these things and designs in any way to honor his city or state. Further,
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he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles at convenient seasons of
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the year. And as every city is divided into guilds or into societies,
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he ought to hold such bodies in esteem and associate with them sometimes and show
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himself an example of courtesy and liberality. Nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty of
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his rank. For this he must never consent to abate in anything. Chapter
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twenty two, concerning the secretaries of princes. The choice of serpents is of
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no little importance to a prince, and they are good or not according to
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the discrimination of the prince. And the first opinion which one forms of a
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prince and of his understanding, is by observing the men who he has around
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him. And when they are capable and faithful, he may always be considered
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wise, because he has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them
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faithful. But when they are otherwise, one cannot form a good opinion of
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him, for the prime error which he has made in choosing them. There
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were none who knew Messer Antonio de Venophro as a servant of Pandolfo Petrucci,
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Prince of Sienna, who would not consider Pandolpho to be a very clever man
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in having Vanafro for his servant. Because there are three classes of intellects,
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one which comprehends by itself, another which appreciates what others have comprehended, and
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a third which neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others. The
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first is most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless.
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Therefore, it follows necessarily that if Pandolpho was not in the first rank,
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he was in the second. For whenever one has judgment to know good and
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bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have the
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initiative, yet he can recognize the good and bad in his servant, and
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the one can praise and the other correct. Thus the servants cannot hope to
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deceive him, and are kept honest. But to enable a prince to form
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an opinion of his servant, there is one test which never fails. When
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you see the servant thinking more of his own interests than of yours, and
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seeking inwardly his own profit in everything, such a man will never make a
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good servant, nor will you ever be able to trust him, because he
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who has the state of another in his hands, ought never to think of
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himself, but always of his prince, and never pay any attention to matters
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in which the prince is not concerned. On the other hand, to keep
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his servant honest, a prince ought to study him, honoring him, enriching
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him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with him the honors and cares, and
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at the same time let him see that he cannot stand alone, so that
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many honors may not make him desire more, many riches make him wish for
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more, and that many cares may make him dreadge chances. When therefore,
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servants and princes towards servants are thus disposed, they can trust each other.
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But when it is otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one
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or the other. End of Chapter twenty two of The Prince by Niccolo Macchiavelli.