Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 012 - Air Policy Too Cautious
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Section eleven Vietnam The Advisory Years to nineteen sixty five
- 0:04Speaker 1: by Robert Foutrell and Martin Blumensen. This is a LibriVox recording.
- 0:08Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
- 0:11Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot work recording
- 0:15Speaker 1: by Tatiana Chichilla, Columbus, Ohio, Chapter eleven, Air Policy too
- 0:21Speaker 1: Cautious During a conversation with President Kennedy a November nineteen
- 0:25Speaker 1: sixty one, Secretary of Defense Macnamara had volunteered to look
- 0:29Speaker 1: after the Vietnam War. To do this, he set up
- 0:32Speaker 1: monthly conferences in Hawaii or Saigon. There, he and a
- 0:35Speaker 1: joint chiefs of Staff member, usually the chairman, met with
- 0:38Speaker 1: the Commander in chief Pacific Command, the Ambassador to Vietnam,
- 0:41Speaker 1: and various component and unified commanders. The conferees discussed problems,
- 0:46Speaker 1: courses of action, and progress. They traded views, reports and briefings,
- 0:50Speaker 1: and kept each other current on events in Southeast Asia
- 0:52Speaker 1: and in Washington. Secretary Macnamara often settled things on the spot,
- 0:56Speaker 1: excepting or rejecting subordinate suggestions. A case in point was
- 1:00Speaker 1: the first Secretary of Defense Conference held on December sixteenth,
- 1:04Speaker 1: nineteen sixty one, in Hawaii. Mister Macnamara opened the meeting
- 1:07Speaker 1: by stressing that the President did not desire to introduce
- 1:10Speaker 1: American combat troops openly into Vietnam at that time. The
- 1:14Speaker 1: Secretary conveyed his concern over the danger of alienating the
- 1:17Speaker 1: Vietnamese people by careless bombing. The army has a particularly
- 1:20Speaker 1: important role to play, he said. While naval and air
- 1:23Speaker 1: support operations are desirable, they won't be too effective and
- 1:26Speaker 1: we should not think they will win the war. Macnamara
- 1:29Speaker 1: wanted the C one twenty threes in Vietnam used not
- 1:31Speaker 1: for taxi service, but for tactical airlift in support of
- 1:34Speaker 1: the combat effort, to include drops of material and Vietnamese troops.
- 1:38Speaker 1: His one objective in Vietnam was to quote to win
- 1:41Speaker 1: this battle. A chief order of business was the sink
- 1:45Speaker 1: Pack Plan to guide the Vietnamese armed forces in a
- 1:47Speaker 1: field campaign against the insurgents. The operations projected were in
- 1:51Speaker 1: terms of task forces. Three or four battalions of infantry
- 1:54Speaker 1: with supporting artillery and logistic units would attack Viet Kong bases,
- 1:58Speaker 1: cut lines of communication and clear and hold ground gained.
- 2:02Speaker 1: No one knew what resources President DM would give to
- 2:04Speaker 1: this program. If DM refused to take American advice, JCS
- 2:08Speaker 1: Chairman Lemnitzer pointed out, the United States would be in
- 2:11Speaker 1: a bad fix. Mister macnamara brushed the society and brusquely
- 2:15Speaker 1: told his followers to get on with their jobs. General O'Donnell,
- 2:18Speaker 1: PACAF commander in chief, was impressed with MacNamara's extremely strong
- 2:22Speaker 1: statements of American determination to keep Vietnam from falling to
- 2:26Speaker 1: the Communists, but it soon became evident to him that
- 2:29Speaker 1: strong talk did not necessarily mean strong action. The United
- 2:32Speaker 1: States had chosen i prudent, perhaps too prudent, coarse, and
- 2:36Speaker 1: with accenting ground rather than air action. O'Donnell said that
- 2:39Speaker 1: he personally deplored over control from the Washington level, but
- 2:42Speaker 1: as a soldier, would comply with the spirit of the
- 2:44Speaker 1: policy to be ultra cautious. Admiral phelp sink Pack likewise
- 2:49Speaker 1: believed that policies curbing air power were scarcely in the
- 2:52Speaker 1: best American interest. General le May Air Force Chief, was
- 2:55Speaker 1: also impatient with our own military rules to handicap ourselves,
- 2:59Speaker 1: and he later reminisced if Khrushchev had been running it
- 3:03Speaker 1: the war. He couldn't have done better as far as
- 3:05Speaker 1: handicapping us by what we did to ourselves all through
- 3:08Speaker 1: the thing, from start to finish. In January nineteen sixty two,
- 3:12Speaker 1: US Air Force planners felt sure they had solved the
- 3:14Speaker 1: problem of creating a clear, realistic, jointly agreed concept for
- 3:18Speaker 1: the elimination of Vietcong influence. Their idea called for a
- 3:21Speaker 1: quick reaction force of Vietnamese airborne troops lifted and supported
- 3:25Speaker 1: by US or Vietnamese transport and strike aircraft. All would
- 3:28Speaker 1: respond to radio calls from villages under Communist attack, thus
- 3:32Speaker 1: supplying the missing ingredient of truly effective action in South Vietnam.
- 3:36Speaker 1: This simple and direct reaction to overt enemy assaults on
- 3:39Speaker 1: villages would entail nine Vietnamese battalions of paratroopers, ten C
- 3:43Speaker 1: one twenty threes, forty T twenty eights, and eighty E
- 3:46Speaker 1: thirty four helicopters split among several locations. The force would
- 3:50Speaker 1: be on twenty four hour alert, quick to react to
- 3:52Speaker 1: calls for help from communications teams and villages. Since farm
- 3:56Speaker 1: Gate was to take part in the program, precise targeting
- 3:58Speaker 1: was a must. Gorilla warfare blurred distinctions the insurgents disguised
- 4:03Speaker 1: themselves as civilians, found shelter among the populace, and depended
- 4:06Speaker 1: on innocent inhabitants for food and other items. President Dia
- 4:10Speaker 1: emphatically insisted that his airmen exercised utmost care to avoid
- 4:13Speaker 1: angering the people by injuring innocence. Carelessness during an air
- 4:17Speaker 1: strike could lead to a prison sentence. Thirteenth Air Force
- 4:20Speaker 1: asked PACAF to lay down rules of engagement for farm Gate,
- 4:24Speaker 1: and the request was referred to sink Pack for resolution.
- 4:27Speaker 1: Admiral Felt stressed caution the French foreign Legion in Indo
- 4:31Speaker 1: China had tried to work free of restraints, hamstringing operations
- 4:34Speaker 1: on the basis that the native people knew that innocent
- 4:36Speaker 1: and guilty would suffer alike if they harbored Viet Min members.
- 4:40Speaker 1: The French command had rejected this view and quote more
- 4:42Speaker 1: temperate policies for using air power prevailed, although many tragic
- 4:46Speaker 1: errors in target designation continued to be made until the
- 4:49Speaker 1: end of the war. According to Feldt, a realistic policy
- 4:53Speaker 1: pivoted on good air ground communications and on being as
- 4:56Speaker 1: careful as possible when shooting things up around friendly forces.
- 4:59Speaker 1: Farmer Our Gate bombs hit a Cambodian village by accident
- 5:02Speaker 1: on January twenty first, nineteen sixty two, killing several civilians.
- 5:06Speaker 1: The incident raised at the highest level of the U
- 5:08Speaker 1: S government the question of how to select targets without
- 5:10Speaker 1: imperiling innocent people. To guide the discussion expected of the
- 5:14Speaker 1: next conference attended by the Secretary of Defense, PACAF offered,
- 5:18Speaker 1: we must exercise the greatest possible control and discretion to
- 5:22Speaker 1: assure that we achieve our objectives without undue or unnecessary
- 5:25Speaker 1: alienation of the civilian populace. If we are to avoid
- 5:28Speaker 1: the imposition of highly limiting controls on the application of
- 5:31Speaker 1: farm gate, we must make every effort to avoid another incident,
- 5:34Speaker 1: and in addition, demonstrate the effectiveness of our control and
- 5:38Speaker 1: ability to discriminate and the selection and designation of targets,
- 5:42Speaker 1: as well as the conduct of air strikes. At the
- 5:44Speaker 1: February conference, General anthus depicted targeting and control of air
- 5:48Speaker 1: strikes as oriented to protect the lives and property of
- 5:50Speaker 1: friendly civilians. He said that all ground force requests for
- 5:53Speaker 1: close air support or interdiction were carefully verified as justifiable
- 5:57Speaker 1: before being met. Air force personnel screwedized every strike request
- 6:01Speaker 1: and had recently denied too. Once a daylight strike was approved,
- 6:04Speaker 1: a Vietnamese forward air controller directed it anthus knew of
- 6:07Speaker 1: no attacks on friendly people. Defense Secretary Macnamara answered the
- 6:11Speaker 1: second Advon Commander by spelling out guidelines. Air Force personnel
- 6:15Speaker 1: were not to engage in strikes on Cambodian territory. They
- 6:18Speaker 1: were to balance risk against gain. For example, a mission
- 6:21Speaker 1: was probably unacceptable if eight Americans were training a single Vietnamese,
- 6:25Speaker 1: or if there was a chance of killing innocent people
- 6:27Speaker 1: to get a few viet Cong. By reason of this policy,
- 6:30Speaker 1: more than half of the T twenty eighths flying strike
- 6:32Speaker 1: missions in nineteen sixty two returned to the base with
- 6:34Speaker 1: unused ordinance. One US Air Force forward controller had seen
- 6:38Speaker 1: Vietnamese troops after an engagement quote put sixty artillery rounds
- 6:42Speaker 1: into a village for no apparent reason and kill women
- 6:44Speaker 1: and children end quote. Yet he knew of no instance
- 6:47Speaker 1: when we indiscriminately went into any area and just for
- 6:49Speaker 1: the heck of it, bombed and straight. In contrast, armed
- 6:52Speaker 1: helicopters seemed almost free of the rules of engagement. These
- 6:55Speaker 1: craft had no rigid target selection, no radar control for
- 6:58Speaker 1: target location and no fourikward air controllers to monitor their firing.
- 7:02Speaker 1: During the night of March first, nineteen sixty two, the
- 7:05Speaker 1: Vietcong stormed an outpost about thirty miles north of Saigon.
- 7:09Speaker 1: The call for help flash to the Air Operation Center.
- 7:11Speaker 1: Thus to farm Gate, an SC forty seven flare ship
- 7:14Speaker 1: and two T twenty eights carrying napalm rockets and a
- 7:17Speaker 1: fifty kal machine gun scrambled with radar at tanson Nee
- 7:20Speaker 1: vectoring them to the scene. Under the light of the
- 7:22Speaker 1: blossoming flares, the T twenty eighth pummeled the enemy he
- 7:25Speaker 1: broke off the assault in the outpost held. Five Communist
- 7:28Speaker 1: bodies were found the following day, along with evidence that
- 7:31Speaker 1: Moore had been wounded. On March third, eleven Corps asked
- 7:34Speaker 1: for an immediate strike on a Vietcong meeting near a
- 7:36Speaker 1: village one hundred five miles northeast of Saigon. After clearance
- 7:40Speaker 1: by field command, the Air Operation Center sent one B
- 7:42Speaker 1: twenty six and two eighty six's loaded with napalm fragmentation bombs, rockets,
- 7:47Speaker 1: fifty kl machine guns, and twenty millimeters cannon. The aircraft
- 7:51Speaker 1: arrived to find the Vietcong in the midst of a
- 7:53Speaker 1: training exercise. The strike killed twelve. At times, coordination failures
- 7:57Speaker 1: hurt operations. On March second, for example, eleven US Army
- 8:01Speaker 1: helicopters lifted and landed four ranger companies, a reconnaissance company,
- 8:05Speaker 1: and a platoon of one hundred five millimeter howitzers in
- 8:07Speaker 1: the vin Bin area to encircle a Vietcong village. The
- 8:10Speaker 1: Vietnamese and farm gate gave air cover with two T
- 8:13Speaker 1: twenty eights and two L nineteens, but the ground units
- 8:16Speaker 1: were in the wrong places and air ground communications were absent.
- 8:19Speaker 1: Although the two strike aircraft and two liaison planes were
- 8:22Speaker 1: overhead and available, they could deliver no supporting fire. The
- 8:25Speaker 1: ground troops killed one Vietcong and captured thirty three suspects,
- 8:29Speaker 1: while laps's in coordination and communications marred some operations. Results
- 8:33Speaker 1: in general infused mild optimism. On March fourth, of Vietnamese
- 8:37Speaker 1: L nineteen, serving with an Army task force, spied a
- 8:39Speaker 1: company of Viet Kong fifty to seventy men. They were
- 8:42Speaker 1: situated near the bend of a river about thirty miles
- 8:45Speaker 1: northeast of Tansannut. Vietnamese eighty six was scrambled within fifteen minutes,
- 8:49Speaker 1: armed solely with twenty millimeters cannon, since the planes were
- 8:52Speaker 1: forbidden to carry bombs, asked to assist, farm Gate flew
- 8:55Speaker 1: a series of strikes. Vietnamese reports the next day claimed
- 8:58Speaker 1: fifty to sixty Vietcong dead. A US adviser put the
- 9:01Speaker 1: figure at twenty five. As Maag told Defense Secretary Macnamara
- 9:05Speaker 1: on February nineteenth, nineteen sixty two, South Vietnam had earlier
- 9:09Speaker 1: been described as a country going down a steep slope
- 9:11Speaker 1: to disaster. We can't say that the direction has been reversed,
- 9:14Speaker 1: but for the moment, the slope has leveled out a bit.
- 9:16Speaker 1: For farm Gate personnel, the slope still seemed to be downhill.
- 9:19Speaker 1: Their tasks were largely routine and morale sagged. Being specially chosen,
- 9:23Speaker 1: highly motivated survivors of rigorous training and selection, they expected
- 9:27Speaker 1: to work with friendly guerrillas fighting behind enemy lines. But
- 9:30Speaker 1: apart from a few challenging Special Forces missions, they performed
- 9:33Speaker 1: close air support, airlift, medical evacuation, and psychological warfare, not
- 9:38Speaker 1: at all what they had volunteered to do. The rules
- 9:40Speaker 1: of engagement stymied. These men carry Vietnamese insignia and a
- 9:44Speaker 1: Vietnamese airmen and do nothing that the Vietnamese Air Force
- 9:47Speaker 1: can do itself. A chance to tackle something more exacting
- 9:50Speaker 1: in psychological warfare had arisen in December nineteen sixty one
- 9:54Speaker 1: because certain areas controlled by the Vietcong were open only
- 9:56Speaker 1: to counter propaganda by air. Second Advon turned Farm Date
- 10:00Speaker 1: for a testing loud speaker in leaflet operations. Targets embraced
- 10:04Speaker 1: the town of Van meethwat Plekoup, and Kontomb, along with
- 10:07Speaker 1: the villages of pull A Clang and Pola Krong. Farm
- 10:10Speaker 1: Gate planes carried out the broadcast in leaflet flights to
- 10:13Speaker 1: stave off starvation Pola ay Krong, the aircraft dropped rice
- 10:16Speaker 1: and salt. Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, US Air Force
- 10:20Speaker 1: counter insurgency specialist, questioned the rationale of the tests. He
- 10:24Speaker 1: suggested that unless technical experts knew precisely what they wished
- 10:27Speaker 1: to achieve, probably nothing could be accomplished. On January thirtieth,
- 10:31Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two, Second Advon put in for three officers,
- 10:34Speaker 1: two specialists and one clerk, all well versed in military, political, economic,
- 10:38Speaker 1: psychological aspects of this type of warfare. They would develop,
- 10:42Speaker 1: test and conduct operations in the ideal environment of South Vietnam.
- 10:46Speaker 1: Missions suggested were dropping leaflets, food, and clothing. Unfortunately, no
- 10:49Speaker 1: psychological warfare specialists were on hand. There had been several
- 10:53Speaker 1: hundred trained officers in the early nineteen fifties, but the
- 10:55Speaker 1: Air Force had inactivated psychological warfare units in nineteen fifty eight.
- 11:00Speaker 1: Armgate nonetheless flew seven missions from December fourteenth, nineteen sixty one,
- 11:04Speaker 1: to February eleventh, nineteen sixty two, dropping leaflets and making
- 11:08Speaker 1: aerial broadcasts. The initial flights impressed Vietnamese villagers, but speaker
- 11:12Speaker 1: quality was marginal. For the messages to be heard from
- 11:14Speaker 1: the speakers in the belly of the SC forty seven,
- 11:17Speaker 1: the run over the target needed to be at six
- 11:19Speaker 1: hundred feet at an airspeed of one hundred knots or less.
- 11:21Speaker 1: Even then, the message could not exceed sixty seconds. The
- 11:24Speaker 1: speakers were later mounted on a rack in the plane's door.
- 11:27Speaker 1: This let the aircraft circle an area while a crewman
- 11:29Speaker 1: aimed the speakers at a specific spot. Still, the run
- 11:32Speaker 1: had to be a dangerously low five hundred feet. On
- 11:35Speaker 1: February eleventh, the SC forty seven took off in good
- 11:38Speaker 1: weather for a routine leaflet mission south of d Loot.
- 11:41Speaker 1: The aircraft crashed for reasons unknown, killing eight Americans, six
- 11:44Speaker 1: Air Force and two Army, plus one Vietnamese. This flight
- 11:47Speaker 1: was portrayed without success, as an attempt to train the
- 11:49Speaker 1: lone Vietnamese aboard. Pressing Congressional reports characterized as fiction the
- 11:54Speaker 1: labeling of American missions as solely in the transportation and
- 11:57Speaker 1: training of Vietnamese units. During the Third Secretary Defense Conference
- 12:00Speaker 1: in Hawaii in February, mister McNamara said he wanted the
- 12:04Speaker 1: Vietnamese to take over the psychological warfare operations as soon
- 12:07Speaker 1: as they could equip their C forty sevens with speakers.
- 12:10Speaker 1: Admiral Felt sink Pack remarked that although US personnel engaged
- 12:14Speaker 1: in combat from time to time, this was purely incidental
- 12:17Speaker 1: to their training missions. He deemed these combat ventures as
- 12:19Speaker 1: nothing more than support operations and said this should be
- 12:23Speaker 1: fixed in the minds of the pilots and other US personnel.
- 12:25Speaker 1: Mister McNamara then ordered action to eliminate references to US
- 12:29Speaker 1: activities as combat operations. They are to be spoken of
- 12:32Speaker 1: and reported as training or support activities, regardless of the
- 12:35Speaker 1: fact that incidental combat may be involved. To inquiries from
- 12:39Speaker 1: the press, McNamara's office underscored the US role as limited
- 12:42Speaker 1: to advice, logistics, and training. United Press International published the
- 12:47Speaker 1: Essence of the farm Gate combat story on March ninth,
- 12:50Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two, reporting that US airmen for two months
- 12:53Speaker 1: had taken a direct part in attacks and that Vietnamese
- 12:55Speaker 1: had acted as co pilots on these flights. According to
- 12:58Speaker 1: the official explanation, the story added, this was an emergency
- 13:01Speaker 1: measure until the Vietnamese Air Force could be trained. General Anthus,
- 13:05Speaker 1: second Advon Commander commented on the story's origin. Due to
- 13:09Speaker 1: the joint USAF VNAF status of farm Gate and the
- 13:12Speaker 1: large number of people of both nationalities involved, it is
- 13:15Speaker 1: extremely difficult to maintain strict secrecy concerning this operation. This
- 13:19Speaker 1: situation bred difficulties regarding the amenities of life in the
- 13:22Speaker 1: field for Americans. The first U. S Air Force arrivals
- 13:26Speaker 1: had been hurried to South Vietnam to operate under wartime conditions.
- 13:29Speaker 1: They and their successors over several years were bound by
- 13:32Speaker 1: peacetime directives and procedures. These strictures were rendered more onerous
- 13:36Speaker 1: by Secretary MacNamara's decentralizing decision making at the highest defense levels.
- 13:41Speaker 1: Freshly arrived officers and airmen had their earliest brush with
- 13:43Speaker 1: Vietnam at an airfield that was not a US Air
- 13:46Speaker 1: Force base, at a military or civil Vietnamese base. The
- 13:49Speaker 1: Air Force was a tenant because the US government adhered
- 13:52Speaker 1: to Article eighteen of the Geneva Agreement forbidding new military
- 13:55Speaker 1: installations in South Vietnam. The physical layout of Vietnamese bases
- 13:59Speaker 1: was crude. At some the main roads crossed runways, and
- 14:02Speaker 1: at others the roads sliced through military areas next to
- 14:05Speaker 1: the runways. Many fields wanted fences. Not until nineteen sixty
- 14:09Speaker 1: five were their revetments to shelter aircraft tansan note. The
- 14:13Speaker 1: Saigon Airfield was an international facility run by the Vietnamese
- 14:16Speaker 1: Department of Civil Aviation. The Vietnamese Air Force was a
- 14:19Speaker 1: tenant located in the southwest part of the field. The U.
- 14:22Speaker 1: S Air Force was supposed to approach the Department of
- 14:24Speaker 1: Civil Aviation through the Vietnamese Air Force. In practice, however,
- 14:28Speaker 1: the Americans made contacts with the government's civil aviation personnel
- 14:31Speaker 1: who could give help and support. The Air Force borrowed
- 14:34Speaker 1: one side of a hangar and an officer for the
- 14:36Speaker 1: flight line. An arbitrary announcement solved flight control. Any U
- 14:40Speaker 1: S Air Force aircraft operating at Tansan Note would be
- 14:42Speaker 1: under second ADVON authority and would file its flight plan
- 14:45Speaker 1: with base operations. The Army and m AA G cooperated
- 14:48Speaker 1: in filing flight plans and juggling parking space. Space was
- 14:52Speaker 1: so scarce that the alert pad blocked the flow of
- 14:54Speaker 1: planes taxiing for take off, but the civilian authorities were
- 14:57Speaker 1: understanding and helpful. Bienvoi was about ten miles from the
- 15:01Speaker 1: outskirts of Saigon. This airfield's chief problem, aside from limited runways,
- 15:05Speaker 1: was security. The field was garrisoned by a battalion of
- 15:08Speaker 1: regular infantry, reinforced by a rifle company, two mortar companies,
- 15:11Speaker 1: four armored cars, and two hundred five millimeter howitzers. A
- 15:15Speaker 1: company of rangers provided distant patrols, and a sixty man
- 15:18Speaker 1: Vietnamese Air Force Police detachment gave interior security. Farm Gate
- 15:22Speaker 1: formed twelve fifteen man combat teams, each with at least
- 15:25Speaker 1: one Browning automatic rifle, and fused them into base defence plans.
- 15:29Speaker 1: The flight line area was the final defensive position in
- 15:32Speaker 1: general US Air Force personnel coped with the poor facilities,
- 15:35Speaker 1: but the supply picture was bleak. Paperwork was sketchy on
- 15:38Speaker 1: the stocks prepositioned in South Vietnam. Before the Air Force
- 15:41Speaker 1: build up, Most pol came through the Port of Saigon
- 15:44Speaker 1: and was distributed commercially, a system vulnerable to interruption and blackmail.
- 15:48Speaker 1: There were no on hand reserves of electric generators, portable buildings, bulldozers,
- 15:52Speaker 1: crash fire fighting equipment, graters, or construction equipment. Due to
- 15:56Speaker 1: the distance, expendable items trickled in from the United States
- 15:59Speaker 1: through Clark. Large items coming by ship took sixty days.
- 16:02Speaker 1: The supply problems had a number of offshoots. In late
- 16:05Speaker 1: February nineteen sixty two, for example, second ad Von requested
- 16:08Speaker 1: the removal of grass and the renovation of fencing and
- 16:11Speaker 1: lighting at the transmitter site. There was no action until
- 16:13Speaker 1: a grass fire nearly destroyed antenna's cables and the building itself.
- 16:17Speaker 1: The grass was bulldozed the next day, but nothing was
- 16:19Speaker 1: done to fix the fences and lights. Thirteen Air Force
- 16:22Speaker 1: refused a March request for six hundred dollars to shelter
- 16:25Speaker 1: the TSC fifteen vans, in which the daytime temperatures of
- 16:28Speaker 1: the working areas rose to one hundred thirty degrees fahrenheit
- 16:32Speaker 1: thirteen suggested that the workers be moved to tents. Men
- 16:35Speaker 1: departing the United States for Vietnam duty, in many cases
- 16:38Speaker 1: did not know their destination in advance. Unable to bring
- 16:41Speaker 1: useful items with them, they often went to the nearest
- 16:43Speaker 1: town and bought minor things out of their own pockets.
- 16:46Speaker 1: MAAG was generous and shared its meager stocks. Informally, scrounging
- 16:50Speaker 1: was frequently resorted to short supplies, particularly of paper affected billeting, mess,
- 16:55Speaker 1: pay and mail. In the early days, the cramped quarters
- 16:58Speaker 1: were leaned to tents or quickly built Vietnamese style hutments.
- 17:02Speaker 1: Numerous rats and insects made it difficult to sleep. There
- 17:05Speaker 1: was no hot water, even after US Air Force personnel
- 17:07Speaker 1: had been in the country for a year. Offices were crowded,
- 17:10Speaker 1: and desks, chairs and tables were often improvised. After adjusting
- 17:14Speaker 1: to their quarters, the new arrivals faced hazards in the mess.
- 17:17Speaker 1: Baked goods and ices were sources of infection, unsanitary practices,
- 17:21Speaker 1: and local baking firms finally ended local procurement. There was
- 17:25Speaker 1: too little refrigeration space Under US control and ice freezers
- 17:28Speaker 1: for the field were not to be had. Locally hired
- 17:30Speaker 1: employees at snack bars and officers and service clubs were
- 17:33Speaker 1: poorly supervised. The outcome was a high sick rate. No
- 17:37Speaker 1: wonder that General le May, during his Vietnam visit in
- 17:39Speaker 1: April nineteen sixty two, found US Air Force aircraft to
- 17:42Speaker 1: be under utilized, lowered vitality and loss of energy among
- 17:46Speaker 1: the men grew out of chronic low level fevers, dysentery attacks,
- 17:49Speaker 1: and too few fresh fruits and vegetables. Medical detachments of
- 17:52Speaker 1: the U. S Army gave local area medical support. Hospitalization
- 17:56Speaker 1: became available in April eighteenth, nineteen sixty two, when its
- 18:00Speaker 1: eighth field hospital opened at Nautreng. Pay was erratic. Czechs
- 18:04Speaker 1: regularly arrived late and at times never, Men could not
- 18:07Speaker 1: meet mess bills and travel expenses. Emergency casual payments often
- 18:11Speaker 1: resulted in over payments. Mail service was primitive. Units outside
- 18:15Speaker 1: of Saigon received no regular deliveries and no arrangements existed
- 18:18Speaker 1: to buy stamps, cash money orders, or dispatch classified mail.
- 18:22Speaker 1: Mail came through Clark on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. The
- 18:25Speaker 1: US Army Post Office in Saigon was closed on Saturdays
- 18:28Speaker 1: and Sundays. Recipients of classified or registered mail were notified
- 18:32Speaker 1: informally and needed to make their own delivery arrangements. Aggravating
- 18:36Speaker 1: these problems were austere maintenance procedures, second Advon's unconventional organization,
- 18:41Speaker 1: adherence in Washington to peacetime practices and procurement and purchase,
- 18:45Speaker 1: and the general inability to forecast the number of Americans
- 18:48Speaker 1: committed to South Vietnam. Ironically, US Air Force personnel were
- 18:52Speaker 1: not in the jungle with guerrillas, but were for the
- 18:54Speaker 1: most part in or near metropolitan Saigon, a seaport and
- 18:57Speaker 1: industrial center of almost two million people in ninety ten
- 19:00Speaker 1: sixty two. There the Air Force engaged in routine tasks
- 19:03Speaker 1: and trained the Vietnamese Air Force, which began to expand
- 19:06Speaker 1: and fly more operational missions. End of chapter eleven. Recording
- 19:11Speaker 1: by Tatiana Chicilla, Columbus, Ohio.