Latest / The Bitcoin Way Podcast / Is Multisig Better Than Singlesig for Bitcoin Self-Custody? | Bitcoin Banter
Transcript
- 0:00What most people want to know though is should I be doing a single SIG plus Fastpray? Should I be doing a multi-SIG?
- 0:06Some people say that the single SIG is a more fragile setup. I would say that it's just more final.
- 0:10Multi-SIG means that you are using different signers, different private keys if you choose to.
- 0:17Who are the types of people who should be thinking about the different setups and what are the final factors they need to weigh?
- 0:23If the hardware wallet that has your seed gets destroyed, that doesn't mean that you lose your Bitcoin.
- 0:28I think if you are a true Bitcoiner, you will end up learning both and most likely are going to use both. And that's where I basically disagree with you.
- 0:43About 70% of Bitcoin is secured in a single signature setup, one key that can move the entire stack. Is this sufficient or should you consider a multi-sig setup? What are the trade-offs?
- 0:54Hey everyone, welcome to another episode of Bitcoin Banter. I have Bert and Kyle here with me and we are going to dive deep into how you need to think about securing your Bitcoin. But first, be sure you smash that like button, subscribe to the channel. We'd really appreciate that. Alrighty guys, before we jump into the details of the setups, let's talk a little bit about single SIG specifically. Kyle, I'm going to let you kick this off. Can you explain what single SIG is? First of all, what does it mean to have a one signature signing your transactions? What should people think about? And then we'll get into the hardware and all these other things as well.
- 1:24Sure, yeah. So every Bitcoin wallet has a private key and a public key. And so that private key that signs transactions so that they can be broadcast to the network needs to be signed by something. So if you have a single-state setup, for example, then it only requires one signature or in the case of a key, one key in order to sign and broadcast that transaction.
- 1:48so from the perspective of let's say if you have a situation where your seed is compromised
- 1:55your key is in the hands of somebody that isn't yourself
- 1:58that means that they have total finality over being able to send that transaction to themselves let's say
- 2:05and that means that you could lose all your funds
- 2:07so there are obviously some trade-offs there that we're going to discuss
- 2:11and some different setups that you can do for example with multi-sig
- 2:15maybe Bert you can describe that
- 2:17Yeah, we can dive straight into the...
- 2:20We have a lot of back and forth here. Why don't you talk a little bit about multisig, Bert?
- 2:24Yeah, so multisig means that you are using different signers, different private keys, if you choose to.
- 2:32You don't have to. You can still use a single signer, a single device to sign off.
- 2:38You can even choose to sign with your mobile phone or other things.
- 2:44but what the Bitcoin way really looks at
- 2:48and that's for both single SIG as multi SIG
- 2:51is that we are using devices
- 2:54that always remain offline
- 2:56and are never connected to the internet.
- 2:59So in the case of single SIG
- 3:01which Kyle was just explaining
- 3:02you have a device that's never connected to the internet
- 3:04and we actually use an additional layer on top of it
- 3:08which is called a passphrase.
- 3:10That's the only single SIG that we support.
- 3:12We don't do naked single SIG in any fashion, as we would call that.
- 3:17And with multi SIG, it's a very similar approach.
- 3:20We say, okay, you can have multiple keys, depending on, of course, what kind of client you are.
- 3:26If you're an individual, you can decide to have, let's say, two out of three, it's called.
- 3:31So you have three keys, and you need two of those three keys to actually sign a transaction.
- 3:37But when we, for example, support a little bit larger business,
- 3:41where you have five people in the business holding keys,
- 3:44you can do a three out of five.
- 3:46So we offer multiple solutions
- 3:48depending on the person specific.
- 3:51But if we look in our client base,
- 3:53most of our clients are individuals.
- 3:56And then again, looking at single SIG passphrase
- 3:59makes most sense in our specific direction.
- 4:04But we of course also support multi-SIG
- 4:07where in general, it's a two out of three.
- 4:10and this two out of three has some trade-offs
- 4:14with regards to the single-seek passphrase.
- 4:18And I think that's the most interesting to start
- 4:20to look at where these trade-offs are.
- 4:24And I think I'll bump it back to you, Kyle,
- 4:26where you think that single-seek passphrase
- 4:29makes a lot of sense for most individuals.
- 4:33Real quick, Kyle, because this is, I think,
- 4:35a very important topic.
- 4:36The pushback from many when we talk about single SIG versus multi SIG is that single SIG inherently means a single point of failure is effectively, I think, the argument that a lot of people make. I could explain why I reject that notion, but that's probably the biggest criticism that most people would have. What is your take on single SIG? Why is it something that you believe is sufficient? And what are the parameters required for it to be sufficient for like a client of the Bitcoin way, for example?
- 5:06Yeah so regarding as Bert mentioned the differences in the multi and I explained a little bit about the single ultimately the backups that you do for your signers whether you in a single or a multi setup there needs to be proper redundancy and backing up of those seeds and also so that they not compromised in the sense that you don take a picture of them or put them online or store them on a cloud
- 5:33So those are all the commonalities that regardless of your setup, you need to make sure that you keep your seed in a very secure, you have to keep it in a secure manner.
- 5:45With regard to the passphrase, this is just an extra layer of security.
- 5:50So for example, if I have my seed phrase and I decide to leave it in a safe, maybe I want to keep it redundant.
- 5:57I want to have another copy with someone else or in a bank or something like that.
- 6:02if I choose to do that and for whatever reason someone gets their hands on those seed phrases,
- 6:08then if I don't have a passphrase, then automatically they can take ownership of those funds.
- 6:14And I could not have a clue.
- 6:16And then when I tried to go back and receive my funds, they're not there anymore.
- 6:20So the passphrase is a very easy way to add an extra word on top of your, let's say, your 24-word seed phrase.
- 6:27and that way if someone were to be able to get access to your 24 words
- 6:34then they will not be able to actually access your funds
- 6:37because they also need the passphrase.
- 6:39Now obviously the only way that this works
- 6:41is if you keep your passphrase separate from your 24 words.
- 6:44If you keep them in the same place then it beats the purpose.
- 6:47So it's very important from that perspective
- 6:49that you manage your different parts of your setup correctly
- 6:54otherwise you end up with maybe a less secure setup
- 6:57than it should be.
- 6:58The other thing also with the passphrase is that just because you came up with a couple
- 7:02of words or stuff from your head does not mean that it's actually a secure passphrase.
- 7:09So in the event, let's say your 24 words are compromised and you do have a passphrase,
- 7:13yes, you might have some protection.
- 7:15But if your word is, let's say, a password 123 or something like that, that can be easily
- 7:19cracked.
- 7:20And therefore, you don't really have much security on top of that with your passphrase.
- 7:24So when it comes to generating your passphrase, just like with generating your seed, you want to have sufficient entropy, you also want to do that with the passphrase, so that you have enough security for the passphrase as well.
- 7:37So those two together, you can think of it almost like a multi-sig in the sense where you need both the 24-word C phrase and the passphrase together in order to sign. Even though it is still a single-sig setup, it does give you a little bit of that functionality where it's not just, oh, I have the 24 words, now I can just move the fonts. You also need that extra piece, but that also requires more responsibility that you actually, not only are you taking care of your 24 words, but you also need your passphrase.
- 8:06if you lose your passphrase
- 8:07then you basically lose access to
- 8:09getting to your funds
- 8:11If you look at it specifically
- 8:13with the single-state passphrase that we
- 8:16always try to go through
- 8:17with our clients, is that there's a lot of redundancy
- 8:20both in the 24 words
- 8:21but also a lot of redundancy in the
- 8:24passphrase itself, so yes
- 8:25there is a physical segregated
- 8:27storage that we
- 8:29basically really try to
- 8:31make clear to our clients that they
- 8:33need a physical separate location
- 8:35but we also have this passphrase in another location
- 8:39very well secured.
- 8:41And again, coming back to the entropy level of the passphrase,
- 8:45we generated it in such a way that it's proven high entropy.
- 8:50So we're not at risk at basically having this passphrase easily guessed
- 8:57if your 24 words are compromised.
- 8:59And directly combined with this comes the advantage
- 9:03in comparison with multisig,
- 9:04is that there is no descriptor, as it's called,
- 9:08so a description of the setup necessary to make this work.
- 9:14So if you have a multisig,
- 9:15you always need a description of how it's set up,
- 9:18and that reveals a lot of information if that is to be found.
- 9:21With the single-sig passphrase, that is not the case.
- 9:24There is no description necessary.
- 9:27It's just 24 words, and there is a passphrase.
- 9:29If someone finds either the 24 words, it's not a problem.
- 9:33If someone finds the passphrase, it's not a problem because it doesn't reveal anything about how much Bitcoin is in there.
- 9:40If someone finds a key in a multisig setup and this description, the descriptor is there and it's not properly protected, then the attacker will directly be able to open the descriptor and see how much Bitcoin is in there.
- 9:53So it's very likely in this scenario, if someone finds this and finds the descriptor and there's a lot of Bitcoin there, they will not leave until they have that Bitcoin.
- 10:01So the main disadvantage of multisig is the descriptor in and by itself.
- 10:08It's an additional thing you have to protect.
- 10:10It's an additional thing that actually gives you less privacy in that sense,
- 10:15depending on where you keep that descriptor.
- 10:18And the single passphrase doesn reveal anything about what is in there if you have either one of those components revealed So would it be fair to say this Under normal operating circumstances
- 10:32you've got a desktop wallet on your computer
- 10:35where you're going to initiate,
- 10:37sending, receiving Bitcoin.
- 10:38You've got your signing device,
- 10:39your hardware wallet.
- 10:40Under normal operating circumstances,
- 10:43the only thing you need is your key
- 10:47and your passphrase.
- 10:48So the sign device and your passphrase to send in a single SIG
- 10:52And in a multi-SIG, under normal operating circumstances, you need two of those keys
- 10:57The question then becomes, what about recovery?
- 11:01I lost my device, I can't find something, I have to rebuild my wallet from scratch
- 11:07Is that when the descriptor, for example, all of these backups, the redundancy that you've built into your setup
- 11:14That's when all of that really begins to matter, is that correct?
- 11:17Yes, that's correct
- 11:18and indeed you have a bit more surface,
- 11:22let's say with the multisig.
- 11:23You need to protect three keys.
- 11:27But if you look at single-sig passphrase
- 11:28with a sufficient redundancy,
- 11:31it's not that much different
- 11:33in the number of locations that you physically need
- 11:36and how to protect it.
- 11:39So it's purely a trade-off.
- 11:40And then as you're saying with multisig specifically,
- 11:43you need to have two signatures.
- 11:47and then what a lot of people do is they use multisig in that sense wrong.
- 11:51What they do is they bring the signers to the location where they want to sign
- 11:55and then they sign it off.
- 11:57That's of course, again, that's not what you want.
- 11:59If you want to really do proper multisig,
- 12:01you sign the transaction at where signer location one is
- 12:05and then you bring your partially signed Bitcoin transaction
- 12:10to the other location and you sign the second part there.
- 12:14The reason for this is that there's no single point
- 12:17where indeed the signatures happen
- 12:18that there could be some problem.
- 12:20And that's a main advantage of Multisig.
- 12:24But again, coming back to what you were saying
- 12:26with regards to the backup surface,
- 12:28there needs to be a descriptor there
- 12:30properly secured on multiple locations.
- 12:33And if you don't do that well,
- 12:35it will reveal actually what is in that setup.
- 12:38So yeah, it's trade-offs.
- 12:40There is no optimal in this case.
- 12:42it's something that you can learn both and you can have a preference with and that's what we see more and more these days is that people want to learn both and then make a decision on what they like the most.
- 12:54Yeah, I think that's the important thing is people need to make a decision, an educated decision based on understanding of what exactly the trade-offs are.
- 13:02So on the case for a single SIG, and by the way, I'm just going to say when we talk about single SIG, assume that it's a passphrase because 100% of our clients set up on single SIG.
- 13:12have a passphrase, period. High entropy
- 13:14passphrase too. We teach
- 13:16them how to store and secure that
- 13:18properly. So all of that is
- 13:20assumed anytime we talk about single sig.
- 13:22So Kyle, we've got
- 13:24the case for one key.
- 13:26Redundant backups solve for losing
- 13:28it. So
- 13:30getting your words into steel, we can talk about backups
- 13:33put in more than one location. Are there
- 13:34things that you, in working with
- 13:36clients, you would advise on when it comes to
- 13:38backups? Well, I think redundancy
- 13:40is the biggest thing. So
- 13:42So let's say if you have your 24 words on a paper and there's a fire or water or something like that, obviously it's going to get destroyed.
- 13:50So we always recommend a metal backup so that regardless of the elements, whether it's time, water, fire, your seed is always going to be recoverable.
- 14:01The other side is redundancy from the perspective that, okay, maybe you have two copies, two metal backups and you're safe in your house.
- 14:08but really that's only one because if something happens then they're both destroyed so it could also be a good option to have other places that you can store it. The other thing is that from a signer perspective we think about the hardware wallets if the hardware wallet that has your seed gets destroyed that doesn't mean that you lose your Bitcoin as long as you have your backup phrase your recovery phrase your seed phrase and your pass phrase you would still be able to recover them.
- 14:38So in the event, let's say your device breaks, you can get another device and you can put those 24 words in. And so as a backup option as well, you could, for example, have a backup device for your hardware, and you can give that to a trusted person. Now you don't give them, for example, the passphrase, so that in the event that your device breaks, you have another one backed up. And you also have the peace of mind that they can't just log into your device, they need your, you know, your pin code and all this other stuff to get in.
- 15:08they also need your passphrase so they cannot just take your funds if they wanted to So that is also another option And then obviously with the passphrase that gives you that extra security if somebody finds it whether that someone that you give it to or if it in one of your locations But the redundancy is the biggest thing So I wouldn say that some people say that the single Sega is a more fragile setup I would say that it just more final and then it up to you how you want to secure that in terms of redundant backups and things like that
- 15:43And also making it easier for your heirs
- 15:47and people that are your beneficiaries
- 15:49that they can be able to understand
- 15:51how do they access the funds.
- 15:53I think that's a big topic with multi-SIG also.
- 15:56It's a little bit more difficult
- 15:57because there are more things
- 15:58that you have to leave information for the future
- 16:03so that they can get that information.
- 16:05Maybe Bert, you want to talk about the inheritance process?
- 16:09Yeah, I think the inheritance process here is where we are,
- 16:13in that sense, critical as the Bitcoin way
- 16:16and where we really differentiate.
- 16:19Because we have standardized inheritance protocols
- 16:22that we go through with our clients.
- 16:25and these protocols are then secured, heavily secured in a digital vault
- 16:31that only can be unlocked by the next in line after a time lock.
- 16:37So the reason we do this is that all our clients have the decision
- 16:41that they don't have to do that, but they can decide to be fully in control
- 16:46of their funds as long as they are alive.
- 16:49And only at the moment, if something happens, the next in line,
- 16:53that's the beneficiaries in this case, can contact us
- 16:57and we will go through this unlocking of the time block process
- 17:00and then reveal the critical parts that are necessary
- 17:04to basically rebuild the setup
- 17:08and basically take over the vault for the next in line.
- 17:12Now, where does that differentiate with many others
- 17:15is that we are not a third party holding any information
- 17:21with regards to your setup.
- 17:24We've decided to not do that at all
- 17:27because we don't want any information
- 17:30about our clients in general.
- 17:32Yes, there is a piece of information
- 17:34that the beneficiaries have how to contact us
- 17:37and they can be in direct contact with us
- 17:39via a secured channel.
- 17:43But we have decided to not hold any client data
- 17:48in any fashion.
- 17:49and we teach people how to not do that.
- 17:53And the reason for this is that if you look in every future scenario
- 17:57where honeypots are basically created,
- 18:01either governments or bad actors will find these pieces of information
- 18:07to basically rug pull these clients, is my opinion.
- 18:11And therefore, if you look at either single-sig or multi-sig,
- 18:16it doesn't really matter if you have these pieces of information all owned by yourself
- 18:24the problem is the next in line
- 18:27how are they going to be able to get to those funds
- 18:30and are you able to train them properly
- 18:32and who's holding their hands if something happens to you
- 18:37and then many people decide to trust the third party
- 18:41with some critical information about you
- 18:43maybe even having a descriptor for example
- 18:46basically knowing the funds
- 18:48which is a honeypot that both governments
- 18:51and bad actors would love to have
- 18:52which in my opinion is a huge risk.
- 18:55So just going back to our approach
- 18:58our beneficiaries
- 19:00are people that are our clients
- 19:03we don't hold data
- 19:04and we are there if something happens
- 19:08but we teach people how to do it properly
- 19:11so they are in full control
- 19:12without any risk with regards to third parties.
- 19:16Okay, so Kyle was talking about the backup redundancy planning for like a single SIG setup and geographical dispersion, multiple stamped plates with your seed phrase, those kinds of things. Obviously, we talked a little bit about passphrase security. How do you guys think about backups and redundancy in a multi SIG?
- 19:36so Bert for example you gave the example
- 19:38of signing with one device
- 19:40in one location and then moving to the location
- 19:42of another device
- 19:43do you think about having redundancy of all
- 19:46three, let's say it's a two of three multi
- 19:48SIG, do you have six
- 19:50different places where you have these keys
- 19:52and so there are two places you could sign the
- 19:54first transaction if you wanted to and then two
- 19:56places you could sign the second transaction
- 19:58we could go
- 20:00very deep of course in our own inheritance
- 20:02protocol and how we do it in standard
- 20:04I don't think this is the right
- 20:06stage to do that because it revealed quite a bit about how we exactly
- 20:11put our protocols together. But if you just look at
- 20:17multisig, there's a lot of different types of multisigs. A lot of people are now also talking about
- 20:22Taproot Miniscript with different policies, with time locks, and a lot of different options.
- 20:27We are still using, let's say, a classic multisig with two out of three in general.
- 20:35because the platforms that are currently using these more advanced features
- 20:40are not really interoperable that well.
- 20:44So the risk you have as soon as you move into that direction
- 20:48is you get vendor lockers.
- 20:49and your future cost plus your future data is involved in that vendor login process.
- 20:56So we have decided to stay on a classic two out of three multisig,
- 21:02which works on many platforms, fully open source, never being dependent on anyone.
- 21:09So whatever happens in the future, you have no risk at all with regards to your setup
- 21:14because it will always work.
- 21:15There's always sufficient open source software available
- 21:18to basically work with this setup.
- 21:22And if we look at this two out of three,
- 21:25coming back to your question with regards to backups,
- 21:28six locations, no, you need two out of three keys.
- 21:33So in general, if you are able to have
- 21:36three proper segregated locations,
- 21:38that should be sufficient.
- 21:41And that's very similar, actually,
- 21:44to single-sig passphrase,
- 21:46where you also would like to have three segregated locations
- 21:51for your physical parts.
- 21:53Would it be fair to say that a single SIG plus passphrase
- 21:57would maybe minus some of the entropy
- 22:01be effectively equivalent to a two of two multisig?
- 22:05Is that basically what it amounts to?
- 22:08Yeah, for explanation purposes, I understand that.
- 22:11We always say, ah, it looks like a two.
- 22:13but multisig as we just explained in the basis means it's still fundamentally different.
- 22:21A single sig passphrase is a single signature and that's also where this very niche risk comes in.
- 22:30It's where you say, oh my god, my signer is actually compromised and every transaction I send out,
- 22:37it reveals a little bit about my private key and at some point the attacker has my full private key
- 22:42and I lose all my Bitcoin because of this single device
- 22:46being compromised in some kind of way.
- 22:49And this is also where we think air-gapped is very important.
- 22:54We see more and more attack factors
- 22:55where indeed devices are plugged into an internet-connected computer
- 22:59or are connected over Bluetooth, and they are updatable.
- 23:03They're updatable by you in this very easy fashion,
- 23:06so it's very likely that an attacker might also be able to update
- 23:09with you in the loop this device
- 23:11while you think you're using the right thing.
- 23:13So if you look at this attack factor on the single SIG,
- 23:18it's there in the niche situation
- 23:21where you are actually using a device
- 23:24which might run malicious software
- 23:26and doing these signatures, revealing something about your privacy.
- 23:31This is a theoretical attack that we have not seen in the wild,
- 23:35just to be clear.
- 23:37So a lot of people are talking about this attack as if like,
- 23:40oh, you never want to do this because it might reveal in the nonsense called this little part of the signature.
- 23:47It might reveal and then you would lose all the time.
- 23:50Yes, might be.
- 23:52Never happened.
- 23:53If you know what software your device is running, what's the risk?
- 23:58What's the real risk here?
- 24:00and I think that's in that sense,
- 24:04I don't want to feed the haters too much,
- 24:12but I think to go directly to Multisig for everyone
- 24:17defeats the general purpose of Bitcoin
- 24:22where you can relatively easily control private keys fully yourself
- 24:26and be able to sign transactions
- 24:29while saying, nah, that's now out of the question
- 24:33because of this theoretical attack factor.
- 24:36It's so far out.
- 24:38And I think it's overblown.
- 24:40Okay, so you touched a little bit on hardware.
- 24:43We talk about AirGapped a lot, Kyle.
- 24:45Now I want you to talk a little bit about hardware.
- 24:48We're going to keep this generic,
- 24:49no brand names or anything,
- 24:52but different signing devices,
- 24:54different hardware wallets,
- 24:54whatever you want to call them,
- 24:55they operate under very different security paradigms
- 25:01in terms of how do they protect
- 25:02or think about protecting your private key.
- 25:06Could you explain what those options are
- 25:08what the compromises they're making
- 25:10and to what extent you think it matters?
- 25:12Yeah, I think first of all
- 25:13as Bert was saying
- 25:15with the multi-sig setup
- 25:16there's three different signers
- 25:18so that gives you a great opportunity
- 25:20to have not the same vendor
- 25:22for each of those signers
- 25:24So you could have a multi-vendor multi-sig where each of the three devices come from three different manufacturers.
- 25:29And those three manufacturers of this hardware wallet have different methods of how they secure the seed.
- 25:38And so, for example, you can have a stateless device where you need to put the 24 words in every single time.
- 25:45And then when you turn off the device, there's nothing there.
- 25:48So if for whatever reason someone gets access to that device there nothing they can do with it because there nothing in there There no 24 words There no trace So that whenever you turn it on again you have to put those 24 words again Now perhaps a trade off with that is that you need to have your 24 words every time you want to do a signing transaction you need to put it in the device
- 26:08Obviously you need to make sure there's no cameras,
- 26:10there's no people watching you, that sort of thing.
- 26:13There's another method where the device has
- 26:16a dedicated security chip inside
- 26:19so that in the event that somebody tries to tamper with it
- 26:22or get into it, they cannot take the seed out.
- 26:25The seed lives in that dedicated chip
- 26:27and then there's no way for someone to take it out.
- 26:29And if they try, there's tamper resistant ways.
- 26:32So to basically brick the device
- 26:33and then the seed is wiped out
- 26:35if somebody tries to get in there.
- 26:38And then there's other manufacturers
- 26:40that have devices where there's a piece of the seed
- 26:44that's on the device.
- 26:45And there's a, or in a sense that it's a scrambled way
- 26:49of holding the seed or the private key material
- 26:52where it's not just on the device,
- 26:54that also relies on, for example, another server.
- 26:57And that also brings the question
- 26:58whether you can run that server yourself
- 27:00and other things like that, not to get too deep.
- 27:02But there are, as I mentioned,
- 27:04these are just three examples.
- 27:06There are other examples out there,
- 27:07but those are effectively these different philosophies
- 27:10that when you think about, let's say,
- 27:12if one of those devices or one of those philosophies
- 27:14had a flaw, well, you have two devices already
- 27:18that you can use in your setup
- 27:19where you can still sign transactions
- 27:21and not have to worry about any issues.
- 27:24So I think as Bert mentioned, first of all, besides whichever brand name you choose, air gap is always extremely important because you do not want to, you want to basically minimize the attack surface for your seed material, your key material, that it doesn't touch any device that is internet connected.
- 27:44So if you keep it offline and you sign the transactions offline and then you bring that transaction through a USB stick, for example, back into your computer while your key material never touched your computer and therefore it is safe. And then the other aspect I would also say across all the devices is the proof that it's genuine so that when you receive this device, you can verify that it wasn't tampered with during shipping. That sort of thing is also very important.
- 28:08Fantastic. Okay, so this is another question. And by the way, at the end, I want to kind of round this out when we wrap up on who are the types of people who should be thinking about the different setups and what are the final factors they need to weigh. I do want to, because we're talking about the security of seed phrases, security of your private keys, how are those generated?
- 28:30there's been a lot of stir lately
- 28:32about should you be rolling the dice
- 28:34should you be relying on a random
- 28:36number generator, how is that entropy
- 28:38created, could, I don't
- 28:40care who takes this one
- 28:41I have it here in the back
- 28:44so maybe I'll just show some stuff
- 28:46that maybe makes it a bit more physical
- 28:48right? You're welcome to get anything
- 28:50your background is showing right now
- 28:52so just make, yeah, okay, there you go
- 28:53so that's what I'm saying, so if you look at this
- 28:56this is, it's called seed shuffle
- 28:58you know, it's just like old
- 28:59and then create a new 2048 words that actually exist for these private keys.
- 29:04You just grab one out, you have the word, and you write this word down,
- 29:10and then you start shaking again like crazy, and then grab the next word
- 29:13until you have your entire seed basically grabbed.
- 29:1723 words, for example, and the 24th is calculated by a device,
- 29:22because that's the point where it's called the checksum,
- 29:25and that basically checks if it's fully valid,
- 29:28and then creates a word at the end.
- 29:31And that end word is critical to have calculated.
- 29:35So that way you can also manually do that.
- 29:37But in general, you do that with devices.
- 29:39So that's one way to do it.
- 29:41But at the Bitcoin way...
- 29:42Bert, real quick.
- 29:43If you do it that way,
- 29:46is it on you to go count and make sure that you have...
- 29:50What is it?
- 29:512048 distinct words in there?
- 29:53Yeah, yeah.
- 29:53So when you get the sheets in,
- 29:55so you can do this with either these carton ones,
- 29:59but we also have them in 3D printed.
- 30:01I'll have it here. It looks like this.
- 30:03You have the 3D printed words.
- 30:05It's like actual pills.
- 30:07It's called Seed Pills and Tropia Kit.
- 30:09A lot of people are ordering those also.
- 30:12Really nice.
- 30:14But we resort mostly at the moment with the Bitcoin way,
- 30:19we resort mostly to these kind of things,
- 30:21which are just dice rolls.
- 30:24And dice, there's multiple ways to go about it.
- 30:29So multiple devices do it in different ways.
- 30:32But as you can see now here, it's all generated entropy
- 30:39outside of any device.
- 30:40So if you use the seed pills or the sheet shuffle,
- 30:43these paper words, or these dice,
- 30:45you're doing that in physical reality
- 30:47and create this entropy of this seed fully offline,
- 30:53fully outside of any device.
- 30:55Now, there's one trade-off difference
- 30:57between these two factors,
- 30:58where this is two times 16-sided dice
- 31:01and an eight-sided dice,
- 31:03versus 10 with different sizes, six-sided dice.
- 31:08With this one you put it in the device the outcome of like 100 dice rolls and that will give you the words It a very linear calculation very easily verifiable So there no real risk there as long as you
- 31:23know what firmware you're running on the device.
- 31:27With this one, you just put the outcome of the dice rolls 23
- 31:31times, and that's literally the word.
- 31:33So 16, 16, and 8, the outcome of every roll
- 31:38is an exact word out of the 2048 word list.
- 31:41And that just generates these 23 words.
- 31:44So there's multiple ways to do this.
- 31:47And we, in general, teach people, especially with a multisake,
- 31:50to do it in multiple ways because you might want
- 31:54to use these different entropy sources
- 31:56and also learn a bit about how these words that everyone
- 31:59knows as their private key are actually generated,
- 32:02and we always do it offline.
- 32:05Kyle, do we need casino grade dice to do this?
- 32:07Yes, I think it's been proven that certain dice that are in one of these board games, they're gamed.
- 32:16So you can actually know what the outcome will be.
- 32:21So it's best to avoid having any issues.
- 32:25Obviously, if you're doing this, you're probably trying to secure some amount of money.
- 32:30So it's worth it to get some good casino grade dice and do it properly.
- 32:34One thing Bert didn't mention, I think it's worth mentioning, is I've heard online that people say, well, there's been more situations where people have lost money using dice than using a hardware device to generate the seed.
- 32:51However, this is only in the case, let's say you're not doing it correctly.
- 32:55There has to be a correct procedure in how you generate your entropy, let's say, with the dice roll.
- 33:01So for example, if you use five dice rolls, unfortunately, yeah, it's easy for you, but that's not actually good entropy. You need to take the time to do at least 100 dice rolls to get the 256 bit entropy. That is actually what makes your seed secure. And that's obviously what these devices should be doing.
- 33:20but in order to have full security
- 33:23and full confidence in your setup
- 33:25better not even to worry about
- 33:26the random number generation
- 33:29of any of these devices
- 33:30and actually like Bert said
- 33:32do it manually
- 33:33you can see it with your own eyes
- 33:34you are creating that entropy
- 33:36but keep in mind that
- 33:39you need to generate them properly
- 33:41if you do it wrong
- 33:42if you don't do enough of these roles
- 33:44you're not generating enough entropy
- 33:46and therefore you could actually be creating a weak seed
- 33:49which is obviously not what you want.
- 33:52I'd love to come back to the casino grade dice point
- 33:55actually here.
- 33:56Yes, the distributors that we cooperate with
- 33:59the Bitcoin way and in general we advise indeed
- 34:02to go with casino grade dice
- 34:04but who says that these casino grade dice
- 34:07have the perfect entropy and are also not?
- 34:09So you have these Bitcoiners
- 34:11go into crazy research on the entropy difference
- 34:14between this normal dice that are proper quality
- 34:18but with two different sizes
- 34:20and then versus casino grade dice
- 34:21and what's the entropy difference?
- 34:23And you can't really measure the difference.
- 34:26And then the fun part starts is,
- 34:27yes, you might want to have casino grade dice.
- 34:30Yes, of course, that's nice.
- 34:32But you can also use this one
- 34:33and you can also use the 16, 16, 8.
- 34:36And then if you go into multi-sig,
- 34:37then you have all these different parts.
- 34:39But just to come back to that very tiny difference,
- 34:42so maybe it's 253 bit instead of 256 bit
- 34:46or whatever the hell comes out of this super niche topic
- 34:50of casino-grade dice,
- 34:51we're talking about a passphrase that we in general generate
- 34:54with the single SIG passphrase of 128-bit
- 34:57that we put over it, always.
- 34:59So that's insanely much higher than the private key itself.
- 35:03Multisig, you're combining multiple keys
- 35:06with around 200-and-something-bit entropy.
- 35:12So what does that bring?
- 35:13again, a private key in total that has
- 35:16more than... One thing I'll add here before we move on to the next
- 35:21subject is let's say you have
- 35:24the dice rolls and you're writing them on a piece of paper, you have 100
- 35:28numbers, random numbers you just generated and then you go ahead and put that into
- 35:33your device to generate the 24 words.
- 35:36It's very important that when you finish that setup and you have at the end of it, you have your 24
- 35:40and you're done that your 100 numbers, as Bert said, because of the way that this can be calculated, somebody can use those numbers to generate your seed phrase. So it's very important that when you finish that process, that you get rid of that 100 numbers because they're basically as sensitive as when you're doing the seed. So basically, when you're doing the seed, or when you're managing any key material, same process, don't have any cameras and stuff in the room.
- 36:10Maybe even any of these devices, Alexa's and things like that.
- 36:14Basically minimize the attack factors, minimize the...
- 36:17Don't have your phones and stuff like that.
- 36:19And then also when you're finished, take those hundred numbers and destroy them
- 36:23because those are also very sensitive Yeah and if you not able to destroy that properly so that means basically throwing them into the fire just use them and put them
- 36:35with your freaking words
- 36:37and treat them like your words,
- 36:38at least, because they are
- 36:40literally your 24 words.
- 36:43Alrighty, guys, we've covered a lot of ground.
- 36:44I think at the end of the day, hopefully people have really
- 36:46learned a lot from everything we've talked about.
- 36:49What most people
- 36:50want to know, though, is should I be
- 36:52doing a single SIG plus fast phrase?
- 36:54should I be doing a multi-sig?
- 36:56How should I approach this?
- 36:58The way my little tiny brain works is
- 37:01if you're less technical, you're new at this,
- 37:02you've never done it before,
- 37:04maybe single-sig plus password is a good place to start,
- 37:07fewer moving parts.
- 37:08If you're more technical, you've been around the block,
- 37:10you've been in Bitcoin longer,
- 37:11or maybe you have some experience
- 37:12sending air gap transactions,
- 37:14maybe multi-sig works.
- 37:16Bert, what do you think?
- 37:18Yeah, I think if you are a true Bitcoiner,
- 37:21you will end up learning both.
- 37:23and most likely are going to use both.
- 37:26And that's where I basically disagree with you.
- 37:30I think that people that are really interested
- 37:31in being sovereign and understanding Bitcoin,
- 37:35not wanting to be dependent on a third party,
- 37:37is that they go through this process
- 37:39and indeed maybe they start off
- 37:41with the single SIG passphrase direction.
- 37:43But I expect, and I already see also with our clients,
- 37:48most of them are moving through multisig also
- 37:51because they want to at least understand
- 37:54and in general keep a part of their stack in the multisig
- 37:58and a part of their stack in the single-sig passphrase.
- 38:00So I expect over the long term,
- 38:02more and more people going to be agnostic to this
- 38:05and not having this golden setup where everything is in.
- 38:10No, it's going to be spread over the parts and components
- 38:15because the single-sig passphrase in general
- 38:17is of course a component of the multisig.
- 38:21Kyle, what do you think?
- 38:23My opinion is that
- 38:24in general, you should
- 38:27go with what you're comfortable with, what you know
- 38:29you can actually do properly
- 38:31because if you think about it
- 38:33simply, a well-run single
- 38:35SIG setup is better than a badly run
- 38:37multi-SIG setup. So if you
- 38:39don't feel comfortable with three different signers
- 38:41and maybe you just start with a single SIG
- 38:43and then maybe in the future you can always
- 38:45move into multi-SIG, I think also
- 38:47as Bert was saying, it's not like
- 38:49you have to do one or the other.
- 38:51Maybe you have both. Maybe you have a system for some of your funds on the multi-sig and then you have some for single-sig and you use them in a different way. So I think it's important that you practice and that you get comfortable with signing, whether it's single-sig, multi-sig. Also, multi-sig is a great way to get involved with, let's say, if you have a company or someone who you want to get involved with Bitcoin that you trust, you can make a multi-sig with them and then understand how that process works.
- 39:21before you really dive in and then move a lot of funds.
- 39:25So I think at the end of the day,
- 39:26it's more about actually getting experience with this
- 39:29and not just jumping in,
- 39:30let me throw all my money in this new setup.
- 39:32First, understand how it works
- 39:33and you should be able to back all these things up properly
- 39:36and understand how all these different components work
- 39:39and worst case scenario,
- 39:41be able to really understand what it is that you have set up.
- 39:46Because even if it's a single SIG
- 39:48and you don't really understand what you're doing,
- 39:49that's also not a good place to be in.
- 39:52So you always want to understand what you're doing
- 39:54and have the experience of actually going through the process
- 39:59before you start moving all your funds around
- 40:02whether it's a single SIG or a multi-SIG.
- 40:04Obviously the most important thing with Bitcoin
- 40:06is that you have sovereignty
- 40:08so you have self-custody over your funds
- 40:11but that also requires responsibility
- 40:14so you need to be able to have that responsibility
- 40:16and know what you're doing.
- 40:19I think that's well said. Probably a good place for us to wrap up. I think one thing I think we'd all agree on is that being your own bank, cybersecurity generally is a practice. It's not a one-time set it and forget it exercise. And I think that's maybe what you're both sort of alluding to is like you want to continue learning your skills, refining the process that you go through, practicing. All of these things matter regardless of which setup. Obviously, the big thing for us at the Bitcoin Way is you need to be the one in control of your keys.
- 40:49You need to be the one taking responsibility
- 40:51Putting in the proof of work to figure it out
- 40:53We hope to support you
- 40:54Gentlemen, any final parting thoughts
- 40:57Before we hop off here?
- 40:59All good?
- 41:00All good
- 41:01Perfect, thank you
- 41:03Hey, thank you guys so much
- 41:04It's always fun doing these chats
- 41:05We can dive a little bit deeper, get pretty technical
- 41:07But I really appreciate you guys
- 41:09For everyone who tuned in
- 41:10Make sure you go schedule some time with our team
- 41:12You can go to thebitcoinway.com slash podcast
- 41:15You can learn from gentlemen like Bert and Kyle here
- 41:18and the rest of our team,
- 41:19how we can help train you
- 41:20to do all of these things
- 41:21that we've been talking about
- 41:22and help you make an informed decision
- 41:24as to what you think is best.
- 41:26Again, that's the Bitcoinway.com podcast.
- 41:28Until next time, guys,
- 41:30we'll catch up again soon.
- 41:33Cheers.
- 41:33Thanks, Michael.