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The OIG Report Into Jeffrey Epstein's Death: Background On Security Cameras (Chapter 6) (Part 2) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

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Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
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We're going to pick up where we left off with
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the last episode and we're going to continue looking at
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the OIG report into the circumstances surrounding Jeffrey Epstein's death.
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And in our last episode, we were talking about the
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discovery of the security camera system recording issues. So let's
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pick right up with Section B response on August eighth
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and ninth to discovery of the recording failure. On August eighth,
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following discovery of the recording failure, Company one Service records
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reflect that the electronics technician contacted a Company one technical
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support representative who ultimately determined that two hard drives within
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DVR two had failed. According to the electronics technician and
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the Company one Service request record, the Company one representative
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informed the election letronics technician that the two drives needed
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to be replaced and that DVR two needed to be
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rebuilt in order for the cameras to record again. The
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electronics technician told the OIG that he informed a Company
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one technician that he had to obtain the drives from
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mcc New York's computer services manager. The electronics technician further
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stated that he left the institution at the end of
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his shift and did not obtain the hard drives and
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did not continue to work on the matter. The electronics
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technician told the OIG he had no idea why he
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did not stay at the facility to resolve the problem
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that day, but he noted for the OIG that he
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had not historically been required to stay after his shift
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ended to work on such matters, and even if he
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had begun working on the DVR that day, he would
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not have completed the work on August eighth due to
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the time it takes for the rebuilding process. The OIG
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found that the electronics technicians immediate supervisor, the facility manager,
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was on leave that week and therefore was not told
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on August eight about the DVR recording failure. The facility
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manager confirmed that he did not learn about the camera's
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problem until days after Epstein's death. The electronics technician told
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the OIG that he did not report the problem to
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the lock and security supervisor, who was the acting facility
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manager in the facility manager's absence. The SIS lieutenant told
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the OIG that after the electronics technician had examined the
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system on August eight, the electronics technician informed her that
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the cameras were not recording and said, I'm going to
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stay and do overtime tonight. Based on his comment, the
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SIS Lieutenant assumed that the electronics technician would remain at
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the institution after his shift ended that day to correct
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the issue. The electronics technician told the OIG there must
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have been some sort of miscommunication because he did not
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say he was going to work overtime and resolved the
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problem that same evening since he knew the problem could
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not be fixed in one evening. The electronics technician told
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the OIG that in hindsight, he should have stayed at
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the institution to begin work on the problem that same day.
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The Sis Lieutenant told the OIG that she verbally informed
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the captain on August eighth that the cameras were down,
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but BOP records reflect that the captain left the institution
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before the malfunction was discovered. The captain told the OIG
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that he did not learn about the DVR recording issue
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until after Epstein's death on August tenth, when he asked
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to see video related to the Epstein incident. Associated ward
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I confirmed she was with the Sis Lieutenant on August eighth,
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when the camera problem was discovered, but she told the
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OIG she only knew video could not be replaced. She
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did not know the recording system for certain cameras was down.
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She could see live video from the cameras on the
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date and therefore assumed that they were recording. According to
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the electronics technician, after he reported the work on August ninth,
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twenty nineteen, and attended to other matters throughout the day,
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the electronics technician obtained the replacement hard drives and attempted
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to perform the repair sometime late in the day. However,
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the electronics technician told the OIG that no SIS staff
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were present at the time to give him access to
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the room in which the DVR room was located, so
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he requested access from the only other individual who had
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a key to the space, Correctional Officer Number four. According
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to the electronics technician, Correctional Officer number four denied a
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access to the room because CO four shift was ending
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at four pm and CO four was unable to stay
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to accompany him in the space while the electronics technician
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performed the work. According to the electronics technician, CO four
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said he would be at the institution the following day
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to provide the electronics technician access to the room, so
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the electronics technician decided to postpone the repair until the
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following day. The electronics technician said his decision was influenced
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by the fact that he had historically been told by
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mcc New York supervisors that such matters did not have
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to be attended to until the following day, and even
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if he had replaced the hard drives that day, the
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rebuilding process would have taken twenty four hours to complete
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and would therefore not have finished until the following day anyway.
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Part c. Shoe Camera locations and operational status on August tenth.
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The electronics technician arrived at the institution around six am
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on August tenth, twenty nineteen, and shortly thereafter, before he
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could begin working on the DVR system, he heard the
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staff body alarm sound, and he reported to the shoe
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to assist. Later that day, he asked to pull potential
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video from cameras located in and around the shoe. The
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electronics technician eventually determined that most of the cameras in
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the shoe area were assigned to record to DVR two,
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while the cameras assigned to DVR two were providing live
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video streams on August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen. No
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recordings from those cameras were available due to the DVR
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two hard drive issue, which the FBI later determined had
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occurred on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen. Among the cameras
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whose video was not recorded was the camera at the
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end of El Tier, the shoe tier in which Epstein
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was housed. Only two cameras in the vicinity of the
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shoe area were recording to DVR one at the time
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of Epstein's death. One camera was located on the upper
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level entrance to the ten South Unit, a housing unit
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adjacent to the shoe, near the door mcc new York
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staff referred to as the forty six door. That camera
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captured video of a large part of the common area
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of the shoe, including the shoe officer's station, and portions
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of the stairways leading to the different shoe tiers, including
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the tier containing Epstein's cell. Thus, anyone entering or attempting
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to enter the l Tier from the common area of
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the shoe on August ninth and tenth would have been
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picked up by the video recorded by that camera. Epstein
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cell door, however, was not in the camera's field of view.
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The other camera that was recording was located in one
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of the ninth floors two elevator bays and provided video
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of the ninth floor fire exit and two of the
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floors four elevators. The available video showed that at approximately
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seven to forty nine pm on August ninth, Epstein was
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escorted toward the L Tier stairway by an individual believed
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to be the evening watch shoe officer in charge. At
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approximately ten thirty nine pm, and unidentified COO appeared to
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walk up the L Tier stairway and then reappeared within
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view of the camera at ten forty one pm. This
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is believed to be the last time anyone entered El
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Tier before approximately six thirty am on August tenth. Between
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approximately ten forty pm on August ninth and just before
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six thirty am on August tenth, the OIG did not
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observe on the recorded video any COO or other individual
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enter any of the shoe tiers, which is consistent with
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co Tovin Noel and material handler Michael Thomas's admissions to
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the OIG that the shoe rounds and counts were not
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conducted during that timeframe. At approximately six twenty eight am,
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an unidentified officer was observed on the l Tier stairway,
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presumably to deliver breakfast food trays. Between six twenty eight
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am and six thirty two am, an unidentified officer believed
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to be Noel, moved back and forth several times between
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the El Tier stairway and the shoe officer's station. At
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approximately six thirty three am, additional officers entered the Shoe
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and ascended the El Tier stairway, presumably after Noel activated
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her body alarm when Epstein was discovered hanged in his cell.
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As noted above, the camera at the end of the
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el Tier was providing a live video feed at the
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time of Epstein's death, but the video was not being recorded.
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The electronics technician told the OIG that certain mcc New
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York personnel, including the Control Center SIS personnel, the warden,
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most lieutenants, and the electronics technician, had access to the
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live video feed of the institution's security cameras. Explain that
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to view the live video feed of a particular camera,
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an employee with access would need to key in the
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specific camera into the security camera system to call up
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the live feed. The correctional systems officer, who was working
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at the control center on August tenth from twelve am
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to eight am, and the morning watch operations lieutenant both
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told the OIG that the only live feed from the
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shoe on their screens was video from the cameras showing
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the shoe's common area, and they did not perceive a
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need to take the necessary steps to see the live
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feed from the shoe el tier from either of their
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duty stations. On the evening Epstein died. The wharton, who
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was not scheduled to work on August tenth, twenty nineteen,
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arrived at the institution later that morning after being notified
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of Epstein's death and was informed that most of the
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cameras in the shoe were not recording. He told the
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OIG that when the SIS lieutenant arrived at the facility
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that morning, he informed her that the shoe cameras had
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not been recording, and the SIS lieutenant explained that the
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hard drive issue had been detected on August eighth. He
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told the OIG that prior to August tenth, he was
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unaware that the DVR two issue had been detected on
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August eighth, and that approximately half of the facility's cameras
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and in particular, the cameras in the shoe, were found
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to not be recording on that date. The electronics technician
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told the OIG that the warden had instructed electronics technician
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to try and recover any potential shoe video and that
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may have been recorded by the cameras assigned to the
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malfunctioning DVR two system, but the electronics technician was unable
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to find anything. The electronics technician further said that the
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warden wanted to have the facilities cameras recording again as
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soon as possible, so he instructed the electronics technician to
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begin repairing DVR number two. Part D FBI forensic analysis
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of the DVR system. FBI evidence documents revealed that on
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August tenth, twenty nineteen, the FBI seized all hard drives
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contained within the DVR two system. On August fourteenth, twenty nineteen,
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the FBI returned to mcc New York and seized additional
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DVR two components. On August fifteenth, twenty nineteen, the FBI
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sees the entire DVR one system. The FBI's Digital Forensic
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Analysis Unit in Quantico, Virginia, received mcc new York's DVR
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system on August sixteenth, twenty nineteen, and began to conduct
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a forensic analysis of the system. According to FBI forensic reports,
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DVR two did not start successfully. The Digital Forensic Analysis
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Unit found that the system contained three faulty hard drives.
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The FBI forensic report states that the three drives were
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repaired by an FBI Advanced Data Recovery Specialist, but the
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DVRs were never able to be assembled successfully. The forensic
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report further state that an FBI computer scientist and the
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company's one technician reviewed the DVR two controller logs and
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found that there had previously been catastrophic disc failures and
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no recordings would have been available after July twenty ninth,
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twenty nineteen. When the OIG asked the electronics technician about
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his findings by the FBI, he told the OIG he
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was unaware that cameras were not recording to DVR two
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between July twenty ninth and August eighth of twenty nineteen.
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Neither the warden nor the SIS Lieutenant was aware of
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the cameras assigned to DVR two had not been recording
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since July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen. The company won technician
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could not recall working with the electronics technician on any
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DVR issues prior to August eighth, twenty nineteen, but he
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said that if the entire DVR two server went down
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on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, no video would have
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been able to have been retrieved from that point forward
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from any of the cameras recording to DVR two. All Right, folks,
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that's gonna bring chapter six to its conclusion. In our
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next episode, we're gonna pick up with the OIG report,
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and that's going to be with Chapter seven conclusions and recommendations.
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And then once we have this whole entire OIG report
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added to the catalog without my commentary, then I'm gonna
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go back and we're gonna go through certain parts of
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it again, but with added commentary, because it's taking everything
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in my power not to have my app running while
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I'm reading through this. All right, folks, All of the
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information that goes with this episode can be found in
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the description box. As for me, I'll be back in
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a little bit