Latest / The Epstein Chronicles / Mega Edition: Ron Wyden’s Report on Wall Street and Jeffrey Epstein (Part 5-10) (10/19/26)

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Mega Edition: Ron Wyden’s Report on Wall Street and Jeffrey Epstein (Part 5-10) (10/19/26) · The Epstein Chronicles

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: What's up everyone and welcome to another episode of the
• 0:03
  Speaker 1: Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're getting right back to
• 0:06
  Speaker 1: the Ron Wyden report about Jeffrey Epstein and Wall Street.
• 0:11
  Speaker 1: After Epstein's release from prison, JPMC's private bank included Epstein
• 0:16
  Speaker 1: in February 2011 briefing as one of the potential clients
• 0:20
  Speaker 1: to target going forward. In May of 2012, a market
• 0:24
  Speaker 1: review of ultra high net worth clients showed Epstein as
• 0:28
  Speaker 1: the number eight of the team's top 20 clients by revenue,
• 0:32
  Speaker 1: with Epstein's accounts pulling in more than $ 1. 6 million in
• 0:35
  Speaker 1: revenue that year alone. Similarly, a 2013 JPMC report related
• 0:42
  Speaker 1: to ultra-high net worth individuals ranked Epstein second with revenue
• 0:46
  Speaker 1: of $ 1. 3 million in the first six months of 2013
• 0:50
  Speaker 1: and $ 1. 287 million in the same period in 2012. Coming
• 0:56
  Speaker 1: from his accounts, JPMC appears to have earned over $ 8. 1
• 1:01
  Speaker 1: million in fees alone from Epstein between 2009 and 2014.
• 1:06
  Speaker 1: These figures indicate that Epstein likely represented a critical share
• 1:10
  Speaker 1: of the book of business for several senior private bankers
• 1:14
  Speaker 1: at JPMC, including Paul Morris and Mary Casey. For example,
• 1:19
  Speaker 1: in 2010, JPMC banker Paul Morris ranked Epstein among his
• 1:24
  Speaker 1: largest clients with a net worth of $ 500 million. As
• 1:29
  Speaker 1: a major client of JPMC, Epstein enjoyed direct access to
• 1:32
  Speaker 1: JPMC executives, including senior members of JPMC's operating committee. Internal
• 1:39
  Speaker 1: JPMC correspondence and due diligence reports indicate that senior management
• 1:44
  Speaker 1: is aware of the relationship with Jeffrey and that major
• 1:48
  Speaker 1: decisions related to Epstein's accounts were overseen by Jess Staley,
• 1:52
  Speaker 1: former CEO of Asset Management Investment Bank. Mary Erdos, current
• 1:57
  Speaker 1: CEO of Asset and Wealth Management, John Duffy, former CEO
• 2:01
  Speaker 1: of the private bank, and Stephen Cutler, former general counsel. Additionally,
• 2:06
  Speaker 1: Epstein's relationship with managers for these accounts were Mary Casey,
• 2:10
  Speaker 1: current vice chair of JPMC's private bank, Paul Morris, former
• 2:15
  Speaker 1: JPMC banker, who Epstein followed to Deutsche Bank, and Justin Nelson,
• 2:19
  Speaker 1: current head of Asset Management for JPMC, private bank. None
• 2:24
  Speaker 1: of these executives have criminal charges for their actions enabling Epstein,
• 2:29
  Speaker 1: and many of them are still employed as high-ranking executives
• 2:32
  Speaker 1: at JPMC. B. Top JPMC executives joked about Epstein's penchant
• 2:39
  Speaker 1: for nymphettes. An alarming email between high-ranking JPMC executives suggests
• 2:45
  Speaker 1: that they were personally familiar with the pervasive and inappropriate
• 2:49
  Speaker 1: presence of young women and girls at Epstein's home in
• 2:53
  Speaker 1: the USVI. One exchange between David Brigstock, then JPMC's chief
• 2:59
  Speaker 1: financial officer for asset and wealth management, and Mary Erdos,
• 3:03
  Speaker 1: then CEO for asset and wealth management, is particularly illuminating.
• 3:08
  Speaker 1: In September of 2012, Bergstock emailed Erdos describing the house
• 3:13
  Speaker 1: of another ultra-wealthy client and how compared to Epstein's, Bergstock
• 3:17
  Speaker 1: said the house was the size of the Union Club.
• 3:21
  Speaker 1: In fact, it used to be a club. reminded me
• 3:24
  Speaker 1: of J.E. 's house, except it was more tasteful and
• 3:27
  Speaker 1: fewer nymphets. More like the frick. Art was fabulous. Erdos
• 3:31
  Speaker 1: simply responded, wow, these messages suggest that top JPMC bankers
• 3:36
  Speaker 1: were not only aware of the presence of young women
• 3:38
  Speaker 1: or girls at Epstein's home, but the bank leaders had
• 3:42
  Speaker 1: witnessed the situation firsthand. C. Top JPMC executive Jess Staley
• 3:48
  Speaker 1: knew of the danger that Epstein presented. Jess Staley said,
• 3:52
  Speaker 1: the former CEO of JPMC's investment bank, maintained a close
• 3:56
  Speaker 1: personal friendship with Epstein. Between 2008 and 2012, Staley exchanged
• 4:02
  Speaker 1: more than 1,200 emails with Epstein from his JPMC email accounts.
• 4:07
  Speaker 1: Staley also was a frequent visitor to Epstein's townhouse in
• 4:10
  Speaker 1: New York, Epstein's private island in the USVI, and ranch
• 4:14
  Speaker 1: in New Mexico. Staley often exchanged personal messages with Epstein,
• 4:19
  Speaker 1: were highly inappropriate, and suggested he was intimately aware of women,
• 4:23
  Speaker 1: or girls, Epstein recruited. For example, in one email in
• 4:27
  Speaker 1: July of 2010, Staley sent to Epstein saying, That was fun.
• 4:32
  Speaker 1: Say hello to Snow White. The exchange occurred just weeks
• 4:36
  Speaker 1: before Epstein emailed the potential victim of his trafficking scheme
• 4:40
  Speaker 1: to tell her that he wanted to take pictures of
• 4:42
  Speaker 1: her in the Snow White costume. A 2009 email from
• 4:47
  Speaker 1: Staley to Epstein suggested that he was aware of the danger,
• 4:50
  Speaker 1: of maintaining written correspondence with Epstein. At the time, Epstein
• 4:54
  Speaker 1: had just finished serving a prison sentence for pleading to
• 4:57
  Speaker 1: soliciting underage prostitutes and was the target of a federal
• 5:01
  Speaker 1: criminal investigation for human trafficking. Regardless, Staley expressed his desire
• 5:06
  Speaker 1: to give Epstein a long, heartfelt hug. Despite Staley being
• 5:12
  Speaker 1: compromised by Epstein, Staley's personal relationship to Epstein was central
• 5:16
  Speaker 1: to maintaining Epstein's relationship with JPMG. Staley was heavily involved
• 5:23
  Speaker 1: in decisions to retain Epstein as a client, even though
• 5:26
  Speaker 1: he was personally compromised by Epstein. An internal 2011 JPMC
• 5:31
  Speaker 1: due diligence review noted that Epstein's felony conviction in 2008
• 5:36
  Speaker 1: for solicitation of underage prostitutes, Jess Staley conferred with Stephen
• 5:40
  Speaker 1: Cutler and the decision was made to keep Epstein as
• 5:43
  Speaker 1: a PB client. This conflict of interest constitutes colossal compliance
• 5:48
  Speaker 1: failure that imperiled JPMC's decision-making. D. Top compliance executives repeatedly
• 5:55
  Speaker 1: tried to kick Epstein out over human trafficking concerns but
• 5:59
  Speaker 1: were overruled by senior JPMC leadership. Unsealed internal JPMC emails
• 6:06
  Speaker 1: indicate that JPMC's former top compliance and AML executive, William Langford,
• 6:12
  Speaker 1: tried for years to terminate Epstein over human trafficking concerns
• 6:16
  Speaker 1: but was overruled by senior JPMC leadership including General Counsel
• 6:21
  Speaker 1: Steve Cutler. As General Counsel, Cutler was a member of
• 6:25
  Speaker 1: JPMC's operating committee and reported directly to CEO Jamie Dimon.
• 6:30
  Speaker 1: Cutler was personally responsible for approving decisions to keep Epstein
• 6:35
  Speaker 1: on as a client. In a 2023 deposition, CEO Jamie
• 6:39
  Speaker 1: Dimon noted that the General Counsel at the time, Cutler,
• 6:43
  Speaker 1: was the ultimate decider on decisions related to keeping Epstein
• 6:46
  Speaker 1: as a client. According to a released email, It appears
• 6:50
  Speaker 1: that in 2011, JPMC's AML team made a request to
• 6:54
  Speaker 1: the private bank to exit the Epstein relationship over concerns
• 6:59
  Speaker 1: of human trafficking. This email also noted that Epstein was
• 7:02
  Speaker 1: a close personal associate of investment banking CEO Jess Staley,
• 7:07
  Speaker 1: and that decisions to keep Epstein in the bank were
• 7:09
  Speaker 1: all due to Jess Staley's personal relationship with Epstein. The
• 7:14
  Speaker 1: email noted that Epstein said, and his $ 212 million held
• 7:18
  Speaker 1: at JPMC as a reason the private bank was hesitant
• 7:21
  Speaker 1: to kick Epstein out as a client. This follows an
• 7:25
  Speaker 1: earlier 2010 exchange where compliance personnel described Epstein as scum
• 7:30
  Speaker 1: and noted that keeping him on as a client will
• 7:32
  Speaker 1: undermine JPMC's human trafficking initiative. In response, top compliance executive
• 7:38
  Speaker 1: William Lankford replied that he had no patience for this.
• 7:42
  Speaker 1: This view was echoed by Lankford's deputies in the AML
• 7:45
  Speaker 1: department In a 2010 email, compliance official Marianne Williamson noted
• 7:50
  Speaker 1: that Epstein was approved to stay after his criminal conviction
• 7:54
  Speaker 1: by Steve Cutler, and that banking Epstein, a known child sleaze,
• 7:58
  Speaker 1: was contrary to their anti-human trafficking efforts. E. Top JPMC
• 8:03
  Speaker 1: executive Mary Erdos was in constant contact with Jeffrey Epstein.
• 8:08
  Speaker 1: In the aftermath of Epstein's death, JPMorgan Chase has attempted
• 8:12
  Speaker 1: to frame the shortcomings of the bank regarding Epstein as
• 8:15
  Speaker 1: isolated and to Jess Daly's behavior. On October 10, 2025,
• 8:20
  Speaker 1: in response to an inquiry from Senator Wyden, JPMC wrote
• 8:24
  Speaker 1: that with the exception of Jess Daly, JPMC's executives acted
• 8:28
  Speaker 1: with integrity with regard to the handling of Epstein's accounts. However,
• 8:33
  Speaker 1: this statement is inconsistent with the information disclosed in recently
• 8:37
  Speaker 1: unsealed records, which show that several JPMC executives reporting directly
• 8:42
  Speaker 1: to CEO Jamie Dimon closely supervise the bank's relationship with Epstein.
• 8:48
  Speaker 1: For example, emails indicate that Mary Erdos maintained regular contact
• 8:52
  Speaker 1: with Epstein and kept close tabs on him while he
• 8:55
  Speaker 1: was a client at the bank. Many of these communications
• 8:58
  Speaker 1: were personal in nature and reflect a close relationship between
• 9:02
  Speaker 1: Erdos and Epstein. For example, in 2006, Erdos corresponded with
• 9:07
  Speaker 1: an ultra-high net worth client of JPMC who was seeking
• 9:11
  Speaker 1: her help in lining up a meeting with Epstein. Erdos
• 9:15
  Speaker 1: has also acknowledged that during this time JPMC was also
• 9:18
  Speaker 1: aware of Epstein's criminal behavior. In litigation brought by the U.S.
• 9:22
  Speaker 1: Virgin Islands against JPMC, court filings state that Mary Erdos
• 9:27
  Speaker 1: admitted in her deposition that JPMorgan was aware by 2006
• 9:32
  Speaker 1: that Epstein was accused of paying cash to have underage
• 9:36
  Speaker 1: girls and young women brought to his home. An unsealed
• 9:39
  Speaker 1: document from JPMC also identified dozens of emails between 2010
• 9:45
  Speaker 1: and 2011 where Epstein and Erdos were in regular contact
• 9:49
  Speaker 1: and discussed numerous business initiatives. Among the things Erdos and
• 9:53
  Speaker 1: Epstein worked on together was a multi-million dollar settlement for
• 9:57
  Speaker 1: Epstein and a series of potentially large projects for Bill Gates.
• 10:01
  Speaker 1: In a July 10, 2011 email, Epstein writes to Erdos,
• 10:05
  Speaker 1: There are 21 million reasons I'd like to know when
• 10:08
  Speaker 1: you return. A few hours later, Erdos replies that she's
• 10:11
  Speaker 1: traveling to Europe but available to talk, to which Epstein
• 10:15
  Speaker 1: immediately replied, Can we speak today? Similarly, On May 24th, 2011,
• 10:22
  Speaker 1: after Epstein had requested Erdos attend a meeting with him,
• 10:25
  Speaker 1: Erdos replied apologetically that she was unavailable because she was
• 10:29
  Speaker 1: in an operating committee meeting with JPMC CEO Jamie Dimon.
• 10:35
  Speaker 1: I'm so sorry, but I am just seeing this. Having
• 10:38
  Speaker 1: been in all day OC with Jamie, I hope the
• 10:40
  Speaker 1: meeting went well. I'm anxious to hear. In addition to
• 10:44
  Speaker 1: the constant access, Epstein appeared to have Erdos Some of
• 10:48
  Speaker 1: Epstein's contact with Erdos appears unprofessional and inappropriate. On August 2, 2011,
• 10:54
  Speaker 1: Erdos' administrative assistant sent Erdos a note saying that Epstein
• 10:58
  Speaker 1: called from Paris. He thought you'd appreciate that he just
• 11:01
  Speaker 1: got out of the pool at the Ritz. Unsealed documents
• 11:05
  Speaker 1: also reveal that Epstein contacted Erdos so often with requests
• 11:09
  Speaker 1: that Jeff Staley in 2011 had to tell Epstein to
• 11:12
  Speaker 1: stop pushing Erdos. In response to Staley's directive, Epstein responds
• 11:16
  Speaker 1: to Staley, Unmerry Erdos, I will ease off. I thought
• 11:20
  Speaker 1: I was following the plan. Erdos, however, still seemed keenly
• 11:23
  Speaker 1: interested in continuing to nurture the relationship with Epstein, including
• 11:28
  Speaker 1: a January 20, 2012 email to Epstein to wish him
• 11:32
  Speaker 1: a happy birthday. Erdos, not sure where you're celebrating it,
• 11:36
  Speaker 1: but I hope you have a terrific birthday. Epstein replies, thanks,
• 11:40
  Speaker 1: Boris said you were terrific. Erdos replies, was also intimately
• 11:44
  Speaker 1: involved in deliberations related to Epstein purported work on behalf
• 11:48
  Speaker 1: of billionaire Leon Black. In July 2012 email, Erdos forwarded
• 11:53
  Speaker 1: a note from JPMC CEO of a private bank, John Duffy,
• 11:57
  Speaker 1: to Jess Staley, seemingly incredulous at Epstein's role as an
• 12:01
  Speaker 1: intermediary for Black. In addition to the recent released emails,
• 12:06
  Speaker 1: internal due diligence reports prepared by JPMC make clear that
• 12:10
  Speaker 1: Erdos was closely involved in managing the bank's relationship with Epstein.
• 12:15
  Speaker 1: A February 9, 2013, due diligence report on Epstein initiated
• 12:20
  Speaker 1: by JPMC's private banking division noted that Epstein's total assets
• 12:25
  Speaker 1: over $ 100 million. Both Mary Erdos and John Duffy are
• 12:28
  Speaker 1: aware of the relationship. All right, folks, we're going to
• 12:32
  Speaker 1: wrap up right here. And in the next episode dealing
• 12:34
  Speaker 1: with the topic, we're going to pick up with F.
• 12:37
  Speaker 1: Emails show JPMC private bankers withheld information on Epstein Suspicious
• 12:42
  Speaker 1: Activity from JPMC's Compliance Department. All the information that goes
• 12:47
  Speaker 1: with this episode can be found in the description box.
• 12:51
  Speaker 1: What's up everyone and welcome back to another episode of
• 12:54
  Speaker 1: the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're getting right back
• 12:57
  Speaker 1: to this Ron Wyden financial report on Jeffrey Epstein. F.
• 13:03
  Speaker 1: Emails show JPMC private bankers withheld information on Epstein's suspicious
• 13:08
  Speaker 1: activity from JPMC's Compliance Department. On July 18, 2013, compliance
• 13:15
  Speaker 1: executive Mary Ann Ryan emailed DeLuca with the subject line
• 13:19
  Speaker 1: Epstein More Info Found and flagged that the bank had
• 13:22
  Speaker 1: identified another $ 800, 000 in previously unreported cash withdrawals from Epstein's
• 13:28
  Speaker 1: accounts from 2009 and 2013. Philip DeLuca, a JPMC managing
• 13:35
  Speaker 1: director from the bank's compliance department, indicated in his response
• 13:39
  Speaker 1: that these transactions were would have been reported through SARS.
• 13:43
  Speaker 1: And Ryan responded, yes, issue is, Epstein never really stopped
• 13:47
  Speaker 1: the large cash withdrawals. DeLuca succinctly wrote back, shouldn't the
• 13:52
  Speaker 1: business have been telling us this? Gee, the former CEO, JPMC, U.S.
• 13:58
  Speaker 1: private bank, John Duffy, counseled Epstein on how to execute
• 14:01
  Speaker 1: suspicious cash withdrawals to avoid reporting requirements. Unsealed records include
• 14:07
  Speaker 1: internal JPMC emails, documenting top JPMC executive John Duffy's involvement
• 14:14
  Speaker 1: in Epstein's transactions. Duffy, at the time, was the CEO
• 14:18
  Speaker 1: of JPMC's U.S. private bank and was aware of Epstein's
• 14:22
  Speaker 1: habit of withdrawing unusually large amounts of cash. In a
• 14:26
  Speaker 1: series of March 2012 emails, Duffy corresponded with Bonnie Perry,
• 14:31
  Speaker 1: a JPMC risk management executive, regarding Epstein's cash withdrawal activity.
• 14:37
  Speaker 1: In these emails, Duffy stated that he personally asked Epstein
• 14:40
  Speaker 1: to stop withdrawing so much cash from accounts in his
• 14:43
  Speaker 1: own name and asked instead to do it from his
• 14:46
  Speaker 1: aviation accounts. After Perry flagged $ 160, 000 in cash withdrawals by
• 14:52
  Speaker 1: Epstein from August 2011 through August 2012 to allegedly pay
• 14:57
  Speaker 1: for jet fuel expenses, Duffy responded, this is a better
• 15:00
  Speaker 1: pattern than I thought. I'd ask him to withdraw his
• 15:03
  Speaker 1: cash from his aviation account for these payments. Duffy also
• 15:07
  Speaker 1: suggested following up with Harry Beller, Epstein's accountant, who we know,
• 15:11
  Speaker 1: to follow up on Epstein's suspicious withdrawals of cash. However,
• 15:15
  Speaker 1: in 2013, Marianne Ryan, a JPMC VP for Compliance Investigations
• 15:21
  Speaker 1: reviewing Epstein's activity, noted that traveling abroad to pay for
• 15:25
  Speaker 1: fuel is not normal business practice. She also noted that
• 15:29
  Speaker 1: Epstein has been known to pay cash for his massages,
• 15:33
  Speaker 1: but only minors are the issue and we have no proof.
• 15:36
  Speaker 1: The compliance executives also pointed out that it was unusual
• 15:40
  Speaker 1: for Epstein to withdraw so much cash to pay for
• 15:42
  Speaker 1: jet fuel, especially because Epstein maintains multiple homes and likely
• 15:47
  Speaker 1: is not always leaving the country from New York where
• 15:50
  Speaker 1: the cash is being withdrawn. Despite this internal documentation of
• 15:55
  Speaker 1: suspicious activity, JPMC did not file a contemporaneous suspicious activity report. H.
• 16:02
  Speaker 1: JPMC executives were aware of risks posed by Glenn Maxwell's
• 16:06
  Speaker 1: close ties to Epstein. Internal JPMC emails include evidence that
• 16:11
  Speaker 1: senior JPMC executives were aware of potentially significant risks arising
• 16:17
  Speaker 1: from Maxwell's close ties to Epstein. Maxwell maintained accounts exceeding
• 16:21
  Speaker 1: $ 10 million at JPMC, and her accounts were included by
• 16:25
  Speaker 1: JPMC bankers in the Epstein relationship. According to the emails
• 16:30
  Speaker 1: in August of 2011, Maxwell sought to open an account
• 16:34
  Speaker 1: for a new entity that would be involved in the
• 16:36
  Speaker 1: personal recruitment business. A senior compliance executive expressed concern that
• 16:41
  Speaker 1: this could be linked to potential human trafficking tied to Epstein.
• 16:45
  Speaker 1: The compliance executive stated that he had trouble seeing why
• 16:49
  Speaker 1: they would do more business with Maxwell, especially if this
• 16:52
  Speaker 1: personnel recruitment is tied to Jeffrey. 9. After forcing him
• 16:57
  Speaker 1: from the bank, JPMC continued activity with Epstein and delayed
• 17:01
  Speaker 1: reporting of his suspicious activity to the U.S. Treasury Department.
• 17:06
  Speaker 1: In response to inquiries from Senator Wyden, JPMC emphasized that
• 17:10
  Speaker 1: it ended its relationship with Epstein when they fired him
• 17:13
  Speaker 1: as a client of the bank in 2013. However, according
• 17:18
  Speaker 1: to unsealed documents, JPMC continued to eagerly work with Epstein
• 17:23
  Speaker 1: after exiting his accounts in order to gain access to
• 17:26
  Speaker 1: Leon Black and other billionaires. According to records, in August
• 17:30
  Speaker 1: of 2013, Mary Erdos and other senior JPMC executives blessed
• 17:36
  Speaker 1: efforts to continue working with Epstein even after he was
• 17:40
  Speaker 1: asked to leave the bank. Emails show that Erdos signed
• 17:43
  Speaker 1: off on working with Epstein on matters related to billionaire
• 17:46
  Speaker 1: Leon Black, even as they were in the process of
• 17:49
  Speaker 1: ending Epstein's client relationship. On August 14, 2013, JPMC executive
• 17:52
  Speaker 1: John Duffy indicated emailed Erdos and indicated that Epstein would
• 17:58
  Speaker 1: be Leon's primary advisor, and that he told Epstein that
• 18:02
  Speaker 1: he would work with him as long as it was
• 18:04
  Speaker 1: through the client accounts. JE entities would not be acceptable.
• 18:09
  Speaker 1: That's okay, right? Erdos responded yes. Duffy went even further,
• 18:14
  Speaker 1: describing the hold Epstein had over Black, telling Erdos that
• 18:17
  Speaker 1: Epstein maintains he'll become Leon's primary advisor and will be
• 18:21
  Speaker 1: calling all the shots. Similarly, in August of 2013, a
• 18:26
  Speaker 1: chain of emails between Erdos, Duffy, and JPMC banker Justin
• 18:30
  Speaker 1: Nelson discussed how to handle an inquiry from Leon Black's
• 18:34
  Speaker 1: family office which originated from a referral by Epstein. These
• 18:39
  Speaker 1: emails suggest that JPMC understood that even though Epstein could
• 18:42
  Speaker 1: no longer be a direct client of JPMC, he had
• 18:46
  Speaker 1: a valuable long-standing relationship with Leon Black. The email chain
• 18:51
  Speaker 1: also references the dubious estate planning Epstein provided Black, yet
• 18:55
  Speaker 1: instead of scrutinizing the relationship or cutting off the Epstein
• 18:58
  Speaker 1: ties altogether, Duffy simply ends the email with more to come. Furthermore,
• 19:04
  Speaker 1: in the months and years after JPMC formally ended its
• 19:08
  Speaker 1: client relationship with Epstein, JPMC banker Justin Nelson continued to
• 19:13
  Speaker 1: seek out meetings and phone calls with Epstein to get
• 19:16
  Speaker 1: himself landing additional business with Leon Black. In 2014, Nelson
• 19:21
  Speaker 1: began emailing Epstein's assistant, to find the time to meet
• 19:25
  Speaker 1: with Epstein to discuss Leon B. 's family office. Other
• 19:29
  Speaker 1: emails in 2014 indicate that Nelson was involved in business
• 19:33
  Speaker 1: development efforts and that he was struggling to get going
• 19:36
  Speaker 1: and remarked to a colleague, maybe I should go see J.E.
• 19:41
  Speaker 1: In May of 2015 email, Nelson was even more direct
• 19:44
  Speaker 1: with Epstein about his desire to do business with Leon
• 19:47
  Speaker 1: Black through Epstein. Nelson wrote to Epstein, Jeffrey just wanted
• 19:51
  Speaker 1: to follow up a line of credit for Leon at JPM.
• 19:55
  Speaker 1: Nelson met with Epstein at his New York townhouse at
• 19:58
  Speaker 1: least six times between 2014 and 2018, and even visited
• 20:02
  Speaker 1: Epstein at his ranch in New Mexico. Nelson remains employed
• 20:07
  Speaker 1: as a managing director at and head of asset management
• 20:10
  Speaker 1: and financial principal coverage team for J.P. Morgan Private Bank
• 20:14
  Speaker 1: in Connecticut. Former JPMC banker Paul Barrett also met with
• 20:19
  Speaker 1: Epstein numerous times in 2014 and beyond in pursuit of
• 20:23
  Speaker 1: business with Leon Black. On August 13, 2014, Epstein emailed Barrett,
• 20:29
  Speaker 1: We are set now for Leon 10 million was wired yesterday,
• 20:32
  Speaker 1: to which Barrett replied to Epstein, Do you want to
• 20:35
  Speaker 1: meet Leon together? Another email suggests that Epstein believed Barrett
• 20:39
  Speaker 1: was so eager to work with Leon Black that he'd
• 20:41
  Speaker 1: take directions from Epstein on the matter. In an email
• 20:44
  Speaker 1: from Epstein to the head of Leon Black's family office,
• 20:47
  Speaker 1: Epstein writes, In addition to Black, JPMC bankers also sought
• 20:54
  Speaker 1: to work with Epstein in pursuit of business with Microsoft
• 20:58
  Speaker 1: founder Bill Gates. According to Unsealed Records, Epstein met numerous
• 21:04
  Speaker 1: times with Jess Daly and Mary Erdos as part of
• 21:06
  Speaker 1: an effort to establish a major donor-advised fund for Bill
• 21:10
  Speaker 1: and Melinda Gates Foundation. JPMC profited heavily from Epstein's close
• 21:16
  Speaker 1: personal ties to hedge fund manager Glenn Dubin, the founder
• 21:19
  Speaker 1: of Highbridge Capital. Epstein introduced JPMC executive Jess Daly to
• 21:24
  Speaker 1: Glenn Dubin and appears to have facilitated the sale of
• 21:28
  Speaker 1: a controlling stake in Highbridge to JPMC in 2004. Shortly after,
• 21:34
  Speaker 1: JPMC acquired Hybridge. Hybridge assets under management more than quintupled
• 21:40
  Speaker 1: in value. JPMC paid Epstein a $ 15 million fee for
• 21:44
  Speaker 1: introducing JPMC to Dubin and helping broker the Hybridge deal.
• 21:49
  Speaker 1: SARs filed by JPMC also identify numerous transactions between Epstein
• 21:54
  Speaker 1: and the Dubin family, though the details of those transactions
• 21:57
  Speaker 1: remain confidential. Epstein was known to be very close to
• 22:02
  Speaker 1: the Dubin family and his wife, the Dubins, and was
• 22:05
  Speaker 1: a godfather to Dubin's children. Epstein also named Dubin's wife,
• 22:10
  Speaker 1: Eva Anderson Dubin, as the beneficiary of his estate, a
• 22:14
  Speaker 1: bequest she later requested. According to Epstein's pilot logs that
• 22:19
  Speaker 1: have previously been made public, one or both of the
• 22:21
  Speaker 1: Dubins flew on Epstein's planes at least 18 times, with
• 22:25
  Speaker 1: Ghislaine Maxwell accompanying the Dubins at least 13 of those flights.
• 22:30
  Speaker 1: Even after Epstein went to jail for underage prostitution, the
• 22:33
  Speaker 1: Dubins hosted Epstein in their home for a Thanksgiving holiday.
• 22:37
  Speaker 1: Before the holiday, Eva Anderson Dubin wrote to Epstein's probation
• 22:41
  Speaker 1: officer that she was 100% comfortable with Epstein around their children.
• 22:46
  Speaker 1: These ongoing relationships Epstein maintained with billionaires created an incentive
• 22:51
  Speaker 1: for JPMC to intentionally delay reporting the full extent of
• 22:55
  Speaker 1: Epstein's suspicious transactions to the U.S. government to protect Epstein
• 22:59
  Speaker 1: as a source of referrals to for business with other
• 23:03
  Speaker 1: ultra-wealthy individuals. The reasoning for JPMC's six-year delay in reporting
• 23:08
  Speaker 1: Epstein's transactions merits full investigation. Part 10. Deutsche Bank executives
• 23:14
  Speaker 1: turned a blind eye to Epstein's suspicious financial transactions. After
• 23:20
  Speaker 1: being forced to exit JPMC in 2013, Epstein transferred most
• 23:25
  Speaker 1: of his assets to Deutsche Bank. which became his primary
• 23:29
  Speaker 1: bank until his death in federal custody in 2019. Evidence
• 23:33
  Speaker 1: suggests that Deutsche Bank turned a blind eye to Epstein's
• 23:36
  Speaker 1: suspicious financial transactions, failing to report Epstein's trafficking activity to authorities.
• 23:42
  Speaker 1: According to SARS, reviewed in camera by Finance Committee investigators
• 23:46
  Speaker 1: after Epstein's arrest on federal sex trafficking charges in 2019,
• 23:51
  Speaker 1: Deutsche Bank retroactively flagged more than $ 250 million worth of
• 23:56
  Speaker 1: suspicious wire transfers flowing in and out of Epstein's accounts.
• 24:00
  Speaker 1: For example, in one 2019 filing, Deutsche Bank flagged 1,140
• 24:06
  Speaker 1: wire transfers between 2013 and 2019, totaling 147 million. These
• 24:13
  Speaker 1: transactions included concerning red flags including payments to women in
• 24:17
  Speaker 1: Russia and other parts of Eastern Europe and extensive dealings
• 24:21
  Speaker 1: with questionable modeling agencies. These suspicious transactions were flagged after
• 24:26
  Speaker 1: Epstein was arrested on federal sex trafficking charges, but Epstein
• 24:29
  Speaker 1: managed to conduct business at Deutsche Bank for almost six
• 24:32
  Speaker 1: years without real-time SAR filing in compliance with federal law.
• 24:38
  Speaker 1: While there has been no enforcement action in the federal
• 24:40
  Speaker 1: level against Deutsche Bank in relation to Jeffrey Epstein, Deutsche
• 24:44
  Speaker 1: Bank paid a $ 150 million fine to the New York
• 24:47
  Speaker 1: Department of Financial Services as part of consent order for
• 24:51
  Speaker 1: significant compliance failures in connection with the bank's relationship with
• 24:55
  Speaker 1: with Jeffrey Epstein. The consent order noted that despite Epstein's
• 25:00
  Speaker 1: criminal history and prior involvement with underage girls, Deutsche Bank
• 25:04
  Speaker 1: failed to detect or prevent millions of dollars in suspicious transactions.
• 25:10
  Speaker 1: It strains credibility to claim that such a sophisticated global
• 25:13
  Speaker 1: financial institution failed to detect these suspicious transactions. It's beyond dispute, however,
• 25:20
  Speaker 1: that Deutsche Bank failed to prevent them and failed to
• 25:23
  Speaker 1: report them. All right, folks, we're going to wrap up
• 25:25
  Speaker 1: right here. And in the next episode dealing with the topic,
• 25:27
  Speaker 1: we're going to pick up where we left off. All
• 25:30
  Speaker 1: the information that goes with this episode can be found
• 25:33
  Speaker 1: in the description box. What's up, everyone? And welcome to
• 25:37
  Speaker 1: another episode of the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're
• 25:41
  Speaker 1: picking up where we left off with the Ron Wyden
• 25:43
  Speaker 1: report on Jeffrey Epstein and Wall Street. The transactions Deutsche
• 25:49
  Speaker 1: Bank failed to flag in a timely manner include the
• 25:52
  Speaker 1: withdrawal of more than $ 800, 000 in cash over a four-year period,
• 25:56
  Speaker 1: payments directly to women in Russia and throughout Eastern Europe,
• 26:00
  Speaker 1: and more than $ 7 million in private settlements with potential
• 26:03
  Speaker 1: victims of his trafficking scheme. It appears that key members
• 26:07
  Speaker 1: of Epstein's team wired money to young women in Russia
• 26:10
  Speaker 1: and Eastern Europe to pay for hotel expenses, tuition, and rent.
• 26:15
  Speaker 1: The risks associated with his activity include should have been
• 26:18
  Speaker 1: obvious to Deutsche Bank, relationship managers, and compliance personnel. For example,
• 26:24
  Speaker 1: Darren Indyk, Epstein's longtime attorney, had authority to withdraw cash
• 26:28
  Speaker 1: on Epstein's behalf and was identified in the NYDFS settlement
• 26:32
  Speaker 1: as attorney number one. Indyk made 97 different cash transactions
• 26:37
  Speaker 1: on Epstein's behalf between 2013 and 2017, withdrawing $ 200, 000 in
• 26:39
  Speaker 1: cash from Epstein's accounts every year. On multiple occasions, Indyk
• 26:48
  Speaker 1: asked Deutsche Bank how he could withdraw cash from Epstein's
• 26:51
  Speaker 1: accounts without triggering an alert with the government. According to
• 26:55
  Speaker 1: an internal Deutsche Bank email in 2014, Indyk scared bank
• 27:01
  Speaker 1: employees how often they could come in to withdraw cash
• 27:05
  Speaker 1: without creating some sort of alert. Also asking, is it
• 27:09
  Speaker 1: once a week, twice a week, once every other week?
• 27:12
  Speaker 1: The NYDFS consent order indicates that Deutsche Bank claims it
• 27:16
  Speaker 1: has no record of a response to Indyk's inquiry. In 2017,
• 27:21
  Speaker 1: Indyk again asked bankers at Deutsche Bank how much he
• 27:24
  Speaker 1: could withdraw cash on Epstein's behalf without alerting the government.
• 27:29
  Speaker 1: On this occasion, members of Deutsche Bank's AML team advised
• 27:32
  Speaker 1: Indyk that his structuring of cash withdrawals to avoid filing
• 27:36
  Speaker 1: reports with the Treasury Department was unacceptable. In one email
• 27:40
  Speaker 1: between Deutsche Bank compliance executives, they suggested that the bank
• 27:44
  Speaker 1: should restrict Indyk's ability to cash any checks, and that
• 27:47
  Speaker 1: the bank should consider whether to exit the relationship. However,
• 27:53
  Speaker 1: it appears Deutsche Bank ultimately took no action and allowed
• 27:56
  Speaker 1: Indyk to continue withdrawing cash from Epstein's accounts at an
• 28:00
  Speaker 1: alarming rate. Specifically, shortly after this, Indyk withdrew $ 100, 000 from
• 28:05
  Speaker 1: the Deutsche Bank branch next to Epstein's New York townhouse,
• 28:09
  Speaker 1: claiming it was for tipping and household expenses. Other evidence
• 28:13
  Speaker 1: indicates that senior Deutsche Bank executives were aware of the
• 28:17
  Speaker 1: risk Epstein posed, but deliberately limited written records of discussions
• 28:21
  Speaker 1: related to risks arising from the Epstein relationship. For example,
• 28:26
  Speaker 1: in 2015, members of Deutsche Bank's America's Reputational Risk Committee
• 28:31
  Speaker 1: met to discuss the Epstein relationship in response to damaging
• 28:35
  Speaker 1: new reports and litigation from victims of Epstein sex trafficking.
• 28:40
  Speaker 1: Deutsche Bank's policies and procedures required that minutes be kept
• 28:43
  Speaker 1: at these meetings, but Deutsche Bank claimed to the NYDFS
• 28:48
  Speaker 1: that no recorded minutes exist from this particular meeting. A
• 28:52
  Speaker 1: significant element of Deutsche Bank's mishandling of Epstein's accounts was
• 28:56
  Speaker 1: the role played by banker Paul Morris, Epstein's longtime relationship
• 29:01
  Speaker 1: manager at Deutsche Bank. Prior to joining Deutsche Bank, Morris
• 29:05
  Speaker 1: served as Epstein's relationship manager at JPMC and was an
• 29:09
  Speaker 1: integral part of the team that covered Epstein's accounts there
• 29:13
  Speaker 1: for a decade. Morris appears more than 13,000 times in
• 29:17
  Speaker 1: the DOJ's Epstein Files Library, and JPMC due diligence reviews
• 29:22
  Speaker 1: identify Morris as Epstein's primary point of contact at JPMC.
• 29:27
  Speaker 1: Internal JPMC correspondence unsealed in federal court also includes email
• 29:32
  Speaker 1: from Morris stating that Epstein was his largest client. When
• 29:37
  Speaker 1: Epstein was forced to exit JPMC, Morris was responsible for
• 29:41
  Speaker 1: bringing Epstein's accounts to Deutsche Bank and oversaw the onboarding
• 29:45
  Speaker 1: of Epstein as a client due to his history with
• 29:48
  Speaker 1: Epstein at JPMC Morris was aware of Epstein's criminal history
• 29:52
  Speaker 1: and the troubling patterns of suspicious transactions that resulted in
• 29:56
  Speaker 1: Epstein's termination from JPMC as a client Instead of proceeding
• 30:01
  Speaker 1: with caution onboarding Epstein as a client, Morris aggressively recruited
• 30:05
  Speaker 1: Epstein to Deutsche Bank and was celebrated for landing Epstein.
• 30:10
  Speaker 1: Morris is featured as Relationship Manager 1 in Deutsche Bank's
• 30:14
  Speaker 1: consent order with the NYDFS. In April 2013, while he
• 30:19
  Speaker 1: was trying to bring Epstein on as a client, Morris
• 30:21
  Speaker 1: emailed senior leaders at Deutsche Bank, noting how lucrative the
• 30:25
  Speaker 1: relationship with Epstein could be, and stating that the estimated
• 30:29
  Speaker 1: flows of 100 to 300 million over time, possibly more,
• 30:33
  Speaker 1: with revenue of 2 to 4 million annually over time.
• 30:37
  Speaker 1: A few months later, in September of 2013, after a
• 30:40
  Speaker 1: series of meetings and calls with Epstein, Morris belatedly emailed
• 30:44
  Speaker 1: Deutsche Bank's co-head of wealth management, Chip Packard, that Epstein,
• 30:49
  Speaker 1: sending over about 200 million from JP, told him Friday.
• 30:53
  Speaker 1: In response, Packard enthusiastically replies, Great news. Congrats, Paul. Bringing
• 30:59
  Speaker 1: Epstein to Deutsche Bank as a client was enthusiastically celebrated
• 31:03
  Speaker 1: by Deutsche Bank's management. Shortly after Epstein's arrival, the deal
• 31:08
  Speaker 1: was featured as part of a series of success stories
• 31:11
  Speaker 1: for a meeting of managing directors in Deutsche Bank's private
• 31:14
  Speaker 1: banking operation. The slide deck that Morris prepared discussing Epstein
• 31:19
  Speaker 1: noted that Epstein was a billionaire entrepreneur who was one
• 31:22
  Speaker 1: of the largest brokerage clients at J.P. Morgan and had
• 31:26
  Speaker 1: multiple relationships across the street. Morris also noted that he
• 31:30
  Speaker 1: had a strong existing relationship with Epstein, and his deep
• 31:33
  Speaker 1: relationship was the product of frequent dialogue with Epstein and
• 31:37
  Speaker 1: his office. Morris had an incentive to protect Epstein from
• 31:41
  Speaker 1: oversight and investigation because of the amount of business he
• 31:44
  Speaker 1: brought Morris. Epstein was far and away Morris' largest client.
• 31:49
  Speaker 1: A 2014 list of Deutsche Bank 50 largest private banking
• 31:53
  Speaker 1: clients listed Epstein via his entity Southern Financial at 47%.
• 31:58
  Speaker 1: with $ 296 million, and that Morris was the relationship manager.
• 32:04
  Speaker 1: Epstein was the only client that Morris had on that list.
• 32:07
  Speaker 1: By 2016, Stuart Oldfield became Epstein's relationship manager at Deutsche Bank.
• 32:13
  Speaker 1: Oldfield appears more than 10,000 times in the DOJ's Epstein
• 32:18
  Speaker 1: file library and is relationship manager, too, in the consent
• 32:21
  Speaker 1: order with the NYDFS. In that capacity, Oldfield was personally
• 32:26
  Speaker 1: aware of the suspicious movement of cash out of Epstein's
• 32:30
  Speaker 1: accounts by Epstein and his associates Darren Indyk and Richard Kahn.
• 32:35
  Speaker 1: For example, in 2017, compliance executives held a meeting with
• 32:39
  Speaker 1: Oldfield to discuss indicts concerning withdrawals of cash from Epstein's accounts.
• 32:45
  Speaker 1: In 2018, Oldfield was made aware of suspicious payments to
• 32:49
  Speaker 1: women in Eastern Europe through Russian banks and that Epstein
• 32:52
  Speaker 1: was paying for the tuition of unrelated young women and girls.
• 32:58
  Speaker 1: In 2018, Deutsche Bank made the decision to terminate its
• 33:01
  Speaker 1: relationship with Epstein and exit him as a client. As
• 33:05
  Speaker 1: Epstein sought a new bank to park his assets, several
• 33:08
  Speaker 1: banks that were considering Epstein as a client asked Deutsche
• 33:11
  Speaker 1: Bank for referral letters regarding Epstein's suitability as a client.
• 33:15
  Speaker 1: Instead of letting the banks know about the high-risk nature
• 33:18
  Speaker 1: of his financial activity and the fact that he was
• 33:21
  Speaker 1: terminated over risk concerns, Deutsche Bank instead covered up for Epstein.
• 33:26
  Speaker 1: In one referral letter sent on official Deutsche Bank letterhead,
• 33:30
  Speaker 1: banker Stuart Oldfield noted that he was unaware of any
• 33:33
  Speaker 1: problems relating to the operation or use of the accounts.
• 33:38
  Speaker 1: Key Epstein aides facilitated Epstein's movement of cash and should
• 33:42
  Speaker 1: be investigated. Epstein relied on three longtime attorneys and accountants
• 33:47
  Speaker 1: to move cash at his behest, Darren Indyke, Richard Kahn,
• 33:51
  Speaker 1: and Harry Beller. Indyk, Kahn, and Beller served as financial
• 33:55
  Speaker 1: intermediaries for Epstein and had signatory authority or power of
• 33:59
  Speaker 1: attorney over Epstein's accounts at JPMC and Deutsche Bank. At
• 34:04
  Speaker 1: Epstein's direction, these three individuals executed thousands of suspicious cash
• 34:09
  Speaker 1: withdrawals and wire transfers, potentially in furtherance of human trafficking. Disturbingly,
• 34:15
  Speaker 1: federal prosecutors have never even questioned them in connection with
• 34:18
  Speaker 1: criminal investigations into Epstein or Maxwell. In their capacities as
• 34:23
  Speaker 1: Epstein's in-house attorney and accountant, respectively, Indyk and Kahn controlled
• 34:28
  Speaker 1: the movement of funds through Epstein's bank accounts and oversaw
• 34:31
  Speaker 1: virtually every aspect of the financial infrastructure that paid for
• 34:36
  Speaker 1: Epstein's sex trafficking activities. At Epstein's direction, Indyk and Kahn
• 34:41
  Speaker 1: structured hundreds of Epstein bank accounts, created the administered dozens
• 34:45
  Speaker 1: of corporate entities, regularly made large cash withdrawals on Epstein's behalf, and...
• 34:52
  Speaker 1: authorized thousands of suspicious wire transfers. According to bank records
• 34:57
  Speaker 1: unsealed in federal court, Indyk and Kahn were the subject
• 35:00
  Speaker 1: of numerous SARs filed with the U.S. Treasury Department. SARs
• 35:05
  Speaker 1: filed by JPMC noted that Darren Indyk controlled the movement
• 35:09
  Speaker 1: of Epstein's funds as signer of several of Epstein's accounts. Similarly,
• 35:14
  Speaker 1: SARs filed by JPMC also noted that Richard Kahn and
• 35:18
  Speaker 1: Kahn's company, HBRK Associates, Inc., had signatory authority over Epstein's
• 35:24
  Speaker 1: accounts at JPMC and other financial institutions. An expert report
• 35:29
  Speaker 1: revealed that a 2023 internal Know Your Customer profile of
• 35:33
  Speaker 1: Kahn by JPMC stated that Kahn was the primary actor
• 35:37
  Speaker 1: in moving of Epstein's funds and that Kahn potentially assisted
• 35:41
  Speaker 1: in facilitating the sex trafficking ring. Public reports also indicate
• 35:46
  Speaker 1: that Kahn may have given false statements to U.S. immigration
• 35:49
  Speaker 1: officials in support of a sham marriage designed to help
• 35:52
  Speaker 1: one of Epstein's girlfriends remain in the United States. Today,
• 35:56
  Speaker 1: Indyk and Kahn serve as co-executors of the Epstein estate
• 36:00
  Speaker 1: and beneficiaries of Epstein's 1953 trust. As co-executors of the estate,
• 36:06
  Speaker 1: Indyk and Kahn control Epstein's $ 100 million fortune and the
• 36:10
  Speaker 1: dissemination of all records in the state's possession. The estate
• 36:14
  Speaker 1: records include thousands of Epstein emails, bank documents, photographs, calendar items,
• 36:19
  Speaker 1: and flight logs. This leaves Zyndyck and Kahn in control
• 36:23
  Speaker 1: of potentially compromising information on powerful political figures and businessmen,
• 36:29
  Speaker 1: including documents that have already been made public, like President
• 36:32
  Speaker 1: Trump's birthday note to Epstein, and documents that may not
• 36:35
  Speaker 1: yet be public, but could reveal the identities of other
• 36:39
  Speaker 1: Epstein associates. The conduct of Harry Beller also merits further
• 36:43
  Speaker 1: DOJ scrutiny. Sars filed by JPMC Unsealed in federal court
• 36:48
  Speaker 1: revealed that Beller had power of attorney over Epstein's bank
• 36:51
  Speaker 1: accounts at JPMC and withdrew millions of dollars in cash
• 36:56
  Speaker 1: at Epstein's direction. Additionally, internal correspondence between JPMC employees detailed
• 37:03
  Speaker 1: how Beller cashed 20 checks, totaling $ 800, 000, from January 2007
• 37:08
  Speaker 1: through 2008. In 2013, JPMC compliance executives discussed Beller's withdrawals
• 37:15
  Speaker 1: of large amounts of cash on Epstein's behalf. The compliance
• 37:19
  Speaker 1: executives noted how further review identified more than $ 920, 000 in
• 37:24
  Speaker 1: cash withdrawals from Epstein's accounts between 2009 and 2013, all
• 37:31
  Speaker 1: conducted in New York by POA Harry Beller. All right, folks,
• 37:36
  Speaker 1: we're going to wrap up right here. And in the
• 37:37
  Speaker 1: next episode, we're going to pick up where we left off.
• 37:40
  Speaker 1: All the information that goes with this episode can be
• 37:43
  Speaker 1: found in the description box. What's up, everyone? And welcome
• 37:47
  Speaker 1: to another episode of of the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode,
• 37:51
  Speaker 1: we're going to pick up where we left off with
• 37:53
  Speaker 1: a Ron Wyden report into Jeffrey Epstein and his activities
• 37:58
  Speaker 1: on Wall Street. Obstruction from the Trump administration and congressional Republicans.
• 38:05
  Speaker 1: Over the course of this three-year investigation, Senator Wyden repeatedly
• 38:09
  Speaker 1: sought the cooperation of Trump administration and congressional Republicans. Instead,
• 38:14
  Speaker 1: the Trump administration actively obstructed and impeded Senator Wyden's investigation
• 38:20
  Speaker 1: by withholding Epstein-related bank records from the Finance Committee investigators
• 38:25
  Speaker 1: and Senate Republicans blocked the passage of legislation that would
• 38:28
  Speaker 1: compel the production of these records. A. Treasury Secretary Scott
• 38:34
  Speaker 1: Besant refused to produce Epstein financial records to the Senate
• 38:37
  Speaker 1: Financial Committee. As part of the investigation into the transactions
• 38:42
  Speaker 1: that financed Epstein's trafficking activity, Senator Wyden made multiple requests
• 38:47
  Speaker 1: of Treasury Secretary Scott Besant, asking him to produce the
• 38:51
  Speaker 1: Senate Finance Committee on a bipartisan basis copies of the
• 38:54
  Speaker 1: Epstein bank records currently housed at the U.S. Treasury Department.
• 39:00
  Speaker 1: The US Treasury Department's Epstein file includes SARS, currency transaction reports,
• 39:05
  Speaker 1: and other records filed by banks related to Epstein and
• 39:08
  Speaker 1: other individuals involved with this account. Finance Committee investigators conducted
• 39:13
  Speaker 1: an in-camera review of a portion of the US Treasury
• 39:16
  Speaker 1: Department Epstein file in 2024. Although a significant number of
• 39:21
  Speaker 1: these records have been made public through court proceedings and
• 39:24
  Speaker 1: serve as the basis for this report, the full set
• 39:27
  Speaker 1: of records would give additional insight into how U.S. financial
• 39:31
  Speaker 1: institutions turned a blind eye to the financing of Epstein's
• 39:34
  Speaker 1: criminal activity. Senator Wyden asked Secretary Besant for the U.S.
• 39:38
  Speaker 1: Treasury Department's Epstein files three times, on March 11, 2025,
• 39:42
  Speaker 1: June 16, 2025, and again on September 2, 2025. All
• 39:50
  Speaker 1: three times, Secretary Besant acknowledged receipt of the request, but
• 39:54
  Speaker 1: declined to provide the Senate Finance Committee copies of the U.S.
• 39:58
  Speaker 1: Treasury Department's Epstein file. For example, on April 30, 2025,
• 40:03
  Speaker 1: a Besant aide wrote to Senator Wyden acknowledging the request
• 40:07
  Speaker 1: but indicated that the U.S. Treasury Department would not provide
• 40:10
  Speaker 1: the documents. Once again, on July 2, 2025, The same
• 40:15
  Speaker 1: aid once again indicated that U.S. Treasury Department would not
• 40:19
  Speaker 1: cooperate with Senator Wyden's request. On January 22, 2026, the U.S.
• 40:25
  Speaker 1: Treasury Department again indicated it would not provide the documents
• 40:29
  Speaker 1: to the Senate Finance Committee, but had provided them to
• 40:32
  Speaker 1: the House Oversight Committee, which is led by Republicans. Secretary
• 40:36
  Speaker 1: Besant has made public statements misleading the public about the U.S.
• 40:40
  Speaker 1: Treasury Department's ability to investigate leads found in SARs including
• 40:45
  Speaker 1: misconduct by banks with relation to the handling of Epstein's accounts.
• 40:51
  Speaker 1: In response to a question at a conference, Besant stated
• 40:54
  Speaker 1: that the Epstein bank records Senator Wyden requested were sitting
• 40:57
  Speaker 1: there at the U.S. Treasury Department and that the department's
• 41:01
  Speaker 1: job was only to collect them. Drawing a distinction without
• 41:05
  Speaker 1: any meaningful difference, Besant also stated that there were no
• 41:09
  Speaker 1: files per se, just hundreds of thousands of reports. Most significantly,
• 41:14
  Speaker 1: during the same appearance, Besant claimed, our job is simply
• 41:17
  Speaker 1: to collect the reports. This is untrue. The U.S. Treasury
• 41:21
  Speaker 1: Department and FinCEN regularly investigate and hold financial institutions for
• 41:26
  Speaker 1: violating the BSA by failing to file SARs and reporting
• 41:29
  Speaker 1: suspicious transactions in a timely manner. For example, the U.S.
• 41:33
  Speaker 1: Treasury Department recently fined TD Bank $ 1. 3 billion for compliance
• 41:38
  Speaker 1: failures arising from the failure of to identify and report
• 41:41
  Speaker 1: large transactions connected to transnational drug trafficking. Similarly, the U.S.
• 41:47
  Speaker 1: Treasury Department fined Capital One $ 390 million for the repeated
• 41:51
  Speaker 1: failure to flag suspicious transactions connected to a wide range
• 41:55
  Speaker 1: of criminal activity. In the past few months, Secretary Besant
• 41:59
  Speaker 1: has directed FinCEN to conduct a number of sweeping investigations
• 42:03
  Speaker 1: into alleged fraud in Minnesota. yet scoffs at the idea
• 42:07
  Speaker 1: of investigating the role that Wall Street banks played in
• 42:10
  Speaker 1: enabling Epstein's global sex trafficking for decades. B. Senate Republicans
• 42:16
  Speaker 1: block the passage of Senator Wyden's produce Epstein Treasury Records Act, PETRA.
• 42:23
  Speaker 1: In response to Secretary Besson's refusal to provide the U.S.
• 42:27
  Speaker 1: Treasury Department Epstein file to the Senate Finance Committee, Senator
• 42:31
  Speaker 1: Wyden introduced the Produce Epstein Treasury Act on September 9, 2025.
• 42:38
  Speaker 1: The legislation, which is supported by Epstein's victims, would require
• 42:41
  Speaker 1: the Treasury Secretary to do three things. One, produce copies
• 42:46
  Speaker 1: of all suspicious activity reports related to Jeffrey Epstein and
• 42:50
  Speaker 1: his co-conspirators, whether indicted or unindicted. to various congressional committees
• 42:55
  Speaker 1: on a bipartisan basis. Two, produce a list of financial
• 42:59
  Speaker 1: institutions that filed the Epstein-Sars, a list of all individuals
• 43:03
  Speaker 1: and entities flagged by the Sars, and the total dollar
• 43:06
  Speaker 1: value of the Epstein-Sars organized by financial institution. And three,
• 43:12
  Speaker 1: produce a report detailing all investigations conducted by any components
• 43:16
  Speaker 1: of the U.S. Treasury Department, including the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
• 43:21
  Speaker 1: into any violations of the Bank Secrecy Act or any
• 43:25
  Speaker 1: other federal law by financial institutions regarding the handling of
• 43:29
  Speaker 1: any accounts identified in the Epstein-Sars. Following the introduction of Petra,
• 43:34
  Speaker 1: Senator Wyden went on the Senate floor on March 3, 2026,
• 43:38
  Speaker 1: and asked for unanimous consent to pass the bill. In response,
• 43:43
  Speaker 1: Senator Mike Crapo, the Republican chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, objected,
• 43:48
  Speaker 1: blocking the passage of the legislation. Additionally, while chairman of
• 43:52
  Speaker 1: the Finance Committee, Senator Wyden actively sought a Republican counterpart
• 43:57
  Speaker 1: to join in pursuing subpoenas on the Epstein matter through
• 44:00
  Speaker 1: the committee on a bipartisan basis. In June of 2024,
• 44:04
  Speaker 1: Senator Wyden's office began outreach to the office of Senator
• 44:08
  Speaker 1: Marsha Blackburn, seeking her support for a bipartisan investigation of
• 44:12
  Speaker 1: Epstein's bank records, as Blackburn had long been an outspoken
• 44:16
  Speaker 1: proponent of increased transparency with relation to Jeffrey Epstein. However,
• 44:21
  Speaker 1: her office declined to support Senator Wyden's effort to subpoena
• 44:25
  Speaker 1: Epstein's bank records. Despite declining the opportunity to join Senator
• 44:29
  Speaker 1: Wyden in pursuing and strengthening his investigation, Senator Blackburn continued
• 44:34
  Speaker 1: to make repeated conspiratorial statements about the Epstein matter. For example,
• 44:40
  Speaker 1: in February of 2025, Senator Blackburn falsely claimed that her
• 44:44
  Speaker 1: efforts to crack the Epstein trafficking ring wide open had
• 44:47
  Speaker 1: been stonewalled by Democrats at every turn. Senator Blackburn in
• 44:51
  Speaker 1: July of 2025 also stated that she was hopeful we
• 44:55
  Speaker 1: can still uncover the information from the financial records to
• 44:59
  Speaker 1: assist law enforcement in locking up vile criminals. On nearly
• 45:03
  Speaker 1: a dozen occasions, Senator Blackburn has made statements calling for
• 45:07
  Speaker 1: the release of certain Epstein files or calling out Democrats
• 45:10
  Speaker 1: on the matter. These occurred on the Senate floor, Senate
• 45:13
  Speaker 1: Judiciary Committee proceedings, social media, or in letters to the
• 45:17
  Speaker 1: FBI and the IRS. Despite these statements, Senator Blackburn's actions
• 45:22
  Speaker 1: tell a different story. Senator Blackburn and her staff refused
• 45:26
  Speaker 1: to cooperate with Senator Wyden's investigation into the financing of
• 45:29
  Speaker 1: Epstein sex trafficking in any way. As early as June
• 45:33
  Speaker 1: of 2024, an investigator on Senator Wyden's staff contacted Senator
• 45:38
  Speaker 1: Blackburn's staff to discuss Senator Wyden's investigation into Epstein and
• 45:43
  Speaker 1: whether Senator Blackburn would support a Finance Committee subpoena. Senator
• 45:47
  Speaker 1: Wyden's investigators spoke to a senior member of Senator Blackburn's staff,
• 45:52
  Speaker 1: but Senator Blackburn's staff took no clear position. Senator Wyden's
• 45:56
  Speaker 1: office followed up with Senator Blackburn's staff again in July
• 46:00
  Speaker 1: of 2024 and again in December of 2024 and received
• 46:05
  Speaker 1: no response on her support. Senator Wyden's office also reached
• 46:10
  Speaker 1: out to Senator Blackburn's office on December 3rd, 2025 to
• 46:12
  Speaker 1: see if Senator Blackburn was would co-sponsor Senator Wyden's produce
• 46:18
  Speaker 1: Epstein Treasury Records Act, which would force the U.S. Treasury
• 46:22
  Speaker 1: Department to produce Epstein bank records to the Senate Finance Committee.
• 46:26
  Speaker 1: Senator Blackburn's office never responded. Wall Street banks and Jeffrey
• 46:31
  Speaker 1: Epstein's estate have paid $ 900 million to settle Epstein-related claims.
• 46:37
  Speaker 1: Despite the lack of enforcement action by federal prosecutors or
• 46:40
  Speaker 1: bank regulators against Epstein's co-conspirators and associates, Major banks and
• 46:45
  Speaker 1: individuals associated with Epstein have paid over $ 900 million to
• 46:49
  Speaker 1: settle Epstein-related claims. According to public reporting, JPMorgan Chase, Deutsche Bank,
• 46:55
  Speaker 1: Bank of America, Leon Black, and Epstein's estate have each
• 46:59
  Speaker 1: reached eight or nine-figure settlements to settle lawsuits filed by
• 47:03
  Speaker 1: Epstein's victims or state regulators in the USVI or New York.
• 47:09
  Speaker 1: These settlements include may have been reached in order to
• 47:11
  Speaker 1: preempt depositions of ultra-wealth individuals or high-ranking bank executives. These
• 47:17
  Speaker 1: settlements also prevented damaging information from coming out through litigation.
• 47:23
  Speaker 1: For example, shortly after Bank of America was sued by
• 47:26
  Speaker 1: Epstein victims, relying largely on information released by Senator Wyden,
• 47:31
  Speaker 1: a deposition with billionaire Leon Black was scheduled for March 26, 2026.
• 47:37
  Speaker 1: Just days before Black's scheduled deposition, Bank of America agreed
• 47:42
  Speaker 1: to a $ 62. 5 million settlement with the victims, thereby avoiding
• 47:45
  Speaker 1: Black's sitting for a deposition. The settlement similarly helped senior
• 47:50
  Speaker 1: bank executives who oversaw Black's accounts avoid answering questions about
• 47:54
  Speaker 1: their compliance with federal anti-money laundering laws. Furthermore, the true
• 47:59
  Speaker 1: figure of Epstein-related settlements is likely substantially higher. The investigation
• 48:04
  Speaker 1: spoke with individuals who were able to identify dozens and
• 48:08
  Speaker 1: possibly hundreds of of secret settlements between Epstein victims and
• 48:12
  Speaker 1: wealthy individuals connected to Epstein. Many of these settlements are
• 48:17
  Speaker 1: subjected to NDAs and were executed to resolve claims of
• 48:21
  Speaker 1: sexual assault filed by Epstein victims against businessmen implicated as
• 48:26
  Speaker 1: potential co-conspirators in Epstein's sex trafficking network. Banks refused to
• 48:31
  Speaker 1: cooperate with Senator Wyden's investigations. As part of the investigation,
• 48:35
  Speaker 1: Senator Wyden sent several requests for information to banks regarding
• 48:40
  Speaker 1: accounts related to Jeffrey Epstein. Each and every bank refused
• 48:44
  Speaker 1: to cooperate with Senator Wyden's investigation. First, on April 4, 2024,
• 48:48
  Speaker 1: Senator Wyden sent a letter to Bank of America CEO
• 48:52
  Speaker 1: Brian Moynihan seeking information on the handling of $ 170 million
• 48:57
  Speaker 1: in payments from Leon Black to Jeffrey Epstein. The letter
• 49:01
  Speaker 1: asked whether Bank of America conducted reports required due diligence
• 49:04
  Speaker 1: on the transactions and whether it ever sought business records
• 49:08
  Speaker 1: to substantiate the purpose of the transactions. The letter included
• 49:13
  Speaker 1: 16 questions and asked for Bank of America to allow
• 49:17
  Speaker 1: for interviews of Black's relationship managers. In response, attorneys for
• 49:21
  Speaker 1: Bank of America indicated they will not cooperate with Senator
• 49:24
  Speaker 1: Wyden's investigation unless subpoenaed. On September 24, 2025, Senator Wyden
• 49:30
  Speaker 1: sent a detailed request for information to JPMC CEO Jamie
• 49:35
  Speaker 1: Dimon regarding Epstein's accounts at JPMC. The letter followed a
• 49:39
  Speaker 1: disturbing report in the New York Times outlining compliance failures
• 49:43
  Speaker 1: by senior executives at JPMC that enabled sex trafficking from
• 49:48
  Speaker 1: Epstein's operation for nearly two decades. The letter included 31
• 49:53
  Speaker 1: different questions and requested a range of documents, including internal
• 49:57
  Speaker 1: correspondence between JPMC bankers. More importantly, the letter asked for
• 50:02
  Speaker 1: an explanation as to why JPMC waited six years after
• 50:06
  Speaker 1: Epstein was forced out as a client before reporting over
• 50:09
  Speaker 1: $ 1 billion in suspicious transactions in Epstein's accounts to the U.S. government.
• 50:15
  Speaker 1: In response, JPMC sent a letter to Senator Wyden declining
• 50:19
  Speaker 1: to answer any of his questions or provide any of
• 50:22
  Speaker 1: the documents he requested. Instead, JPMC simply tried to lay
• 50:26
  Speaker 1: the blame for its mishandling of Epstein's accounts on a
• 50:29
  Speaker 1: single executive, former JPMC investment banking boss Jess Daly. JPMC's
• 50:36
  Speaker 1: response claimed, that with the exception of former JPMC executive
• 50:41
  Speaker 1: Jess Staley, the firm's executives, Kern and Former, are respected
• 50:45
  Speaker 1: professionals who acted with integrity and would never allow Epstein
• 50:48
  Speaker 1: to remain a client if they knew of his ongoing crimes.
• 50:52
  Speaker 1: This response was not only evasive, but unsealed documents proved
• 50:55
  Speaker 1: it to be demonstrably false. As discussed above, several of
• 51:00
  Speaker 1: Diamond's top lieutenants, including Mary Erdos, closely oversaw Epstein's accounts
• 51:05
  Speaker 1: and protected him from scrutiny and for years. Following this
• 51:09
  Speaker 1: response from JPMC, Senator Wyden sent the bank a second
• 51:13
  Speaker 1: request for information on October 20, 2025. The letter renewed
• 51:18
  Speaker 1: more than two dozen questions pertaining to bank documents, internal
• 51:21
  Speaker 1: Epstein reviews, and actions taken by several current and former executives.
• 51:27
  Speaker 1: Senator Wyden once again demanded an explanation as to why
• 51:31
  Speaker 1: the bank waited six years after it removed Epstein as
• 51:33
  Speaker 1: a client and to file suspicious activity reports on his
• 51:37
  Speaker 1: transactions that appeared to be related to sex trafficking. Again,
• 51:42
  Speaker 1: JPMC sent another summary response that did not answer a
• 51:45
  Speaker 1: single one of Senator Wyden's questions and refused to provide
• 51:49
  Speaker 1: a single document. Instead, JPMC directed Senator Wyden to records
• 51:54
  Speaker 1: unsealed in federal court. While the court records were useful
• 51:58
  Speaker 1: and informed many aspects of the report, Senator Wyden's investigators
• 52:02
  Speaker 1: were left to draw their own conclusions from those records,
• 52:06
  Speaker 1: about the complicity of J.P. Morgan and its executives in
• 52:09
  Speaker 1: facilitating Epstein's crimes. Senator Wyden's investigators also made requests to
• 52:15
  Speaker 1: both Deutsche Bank and JPMC for a copy of the
• 52:18
  Speaker 1: transcribed deposition of former Epstein relationship manager Paul Morris. Paul
• 52:23
  Speaker 1: Morris helped oversee Epstein's accounts at JPMC before leaving for
• 52:28
  Speaker 1: Deutsche Bank, where he brought Epstein with him as a
• 52:30
  Speaker 1: client after Epstein was kicked out of JPMC. Morris was
• 52:34
  Speaker 1: deposed in federal court, proceedings tied to a lawsuit filed
• 52:38
  Speaker 1: by Epstein victims against Deutsche Bank. Lawyers for both Deutsche
• 52:42
  Speaker 1: Bank and JPMC declined to make the deposition transcript available
• 52:46
  Speaker 1: to Senator Wyden's staff. Finally, Senator Wyden made a request
• 52:51
  Speaker 1: to BNY Mellon on January 15, 2026, regarding its role
• 52:56
  Speaker 1: in the processing of hundreds of transactions for Jeffrey Epstein
• 53:00
  Speaker 1: through its Pershing subsidiary. Similarly, attorneys for BNY Mellon indicated
• 53:06
  Speaker 1: that they would not cooperate with Senator Wyden's investigation. All right, folks,
• 53:11
  Speaker 1: we're going to wrap up right here. And in the
• 53:13
  Speaker 1: next episode, dealing with the topic we're going to pick
• 53:15
  Speaker 1: up with top bankers have faced no consequences for failing
• 53:19
  Speaker 1: to report Epstein. All the information that goes with this
• 53:23
  Speaker 1: episode can be found in the description box. What's up
• 53:27
  Speaker 1: everyone and welcome to another episode of the Epstein Chronicles.
• 53:32
  Speaker 1: In this episode, we're going to dive right back in
• 53:34
  Speaker 1: to the Ron Wyden report about Jeffrey Epstein and Wall Street.
• 53:39
  Speaker 1: And this will be the final episode of that report.
• 53:43
  Speaker 1: Top bankers have faced no consequences for failing to report Epstein.
• 53:48
  Speaker 1: This report identifies a number of senior bankers who closely
• 53:51
  Speaker 1: supervise decisions related to Jeffrey Epstein's accounts. The report also
• 53:56
  Speaker 1: identified top bankers overseeing Leon Black's accounts at the time
• 54:00
  Speaker 1: when Black paid Epstein $ 170 million. These bank employees are
• 54:05
  Speaker 1: at the locus of two decades of compliance failures enabled
• 54:09
  Speaker 1: Epstein's criminal activity. These bankers include Paul Morris, Mary Erdos,
• 54:14
  Speaker 1: Jess Staley, Stephen Cutler, John Duffy, Justin Nelson, Paul Barrett,
• 54:19
  Speaker 1: Mary Casey, David Brigstocke, Jeff Matusow, Jane Heller, Karen Weiss,
• 54:24
  Speaker 1: and Stuart Oldfield. Jeff Staley was forced out of his
• 54:27
  Speaker 1: position as CEO of Barclays and had lucrative bonuses frozen
• 54:31
  Speaker 1: over his ties to Epstein and was subject of an
• 54:34
  Speaker 1: investigation by the Financial Conduct Authority of the United Kingdom.
• 54:39
  Speaker 1: The rest of the bankers named in this list only
• 54:41
  Speaker 1: have faced no known criminal consequence or regulatory discipline and
• 54:46
  Speaker 1: remain employed in extraordinary lucrative positions at JPMC, Bank of America,
• 54:50
  Speaker 1: and elsewhere. 1. Mary Erdos called by some the most
• 54:54
  Speaker 1: powerful woman in finance, remains employed as JPMC's CEO of
• 54:59
  Speaker 1: Asset and Wealth Management, where she earns an annual salary
• 55:03
  Speaker 1: in excess of $ 29 million. Despite recent revelations of Erdos'
• 55:07
  Speaker 1: deep involvement with Epstein, recent SEC filings disclosed that JPMC
• 55:12
  Speaker 1: last month approved one-time retention bonus of $ 20 million for Erdos.
• 55:18
  Speaker 1: Her total compensation this year will exceed $ 50 million. Justin
• 55:22
  Speaker 1: Nelson Epstein's former relationship manager who kept close contact with
• 55:28
  Speaker 1: Epstein even after he was forced to exit JPMC in 2013,
• 55:32
  Speaker 1: currently remains employed as JPMC's managing director and head of
• 55:38
  Speaker 1: the asset management and financial principles coverage team for JPMorgan
• 55:42
  Speaker 1: Private Bank in Connecticut. In his role as market head,
• 55:46
  Speaker 1: he leads a team of 20 professionals who advise some
• 55:49
  Speaker 1: of the most influential leaders in the hedge fund, private equity,
• 55:52
  Speaker 1: real estate, and financial industries. Mary Casey, who also served
• 55:58
  Speaker 1: as Epstein's relationship manager at JPMC, remains employed at JPMC
• 56:03
  Speaker 1: as vice chair of JPMC's private bank. John Duffy, the
• 56:07
  Speaker 1: former CEO of JPMC private bank, remained employed at JPMC
• 56:13
  Speaker 1: until 2020 before becoming a partner at Spain Lindsay and
• 56:17
  Speaker 1: company LLP and New Orion Capital, a global M &
• 56:22
  Speaker 1: A advisory firm. Stephen Cutler. JPMC's former general counsel, who
• 56:28
  Speaker 1: repeatedly approved keeping Epstein on as a client, went on
• 56:31
  Speaker 1: to join elite law firm Simpson, Thatcher, and Bartlett, LLP,
• 56:35
  Speaker 1: as a partner before retiring in 2025. Leon Black's relationship
• 56:41
  Speaker 1: manager at Bank of America, who greenlit $ 170 million in
• 56:45
  Speaker 1: wire transfers to Epstein, also remained employed in lucrative positions,
• 56:49
  Speaker 1: making millions every year. Jane Heller, a top banker, who
• 56:53
  Speaker 1: oversaw the bank's relationship with Leon Black, currently serves as
• 56:57
  Speaker 1: a managing director and private client advisor at Bank of
• 57:00
  Speaker 1: America Private Bank in New York. Heller was recently described
• 57:06
  Speaker 1: in the Wall Street Journal as Bank of America's top
• 57:08
  Speaker 1: producer in the private bank and known for her extensive
• 57:11
  Speaker 1: roster of ultra-wealthy individuals that include celebrities and some of
• 57:16
  Speaker 1: the wealthiest people in the world. Similarly, Karen Weiss, a
• 57:20
  Speaker 1: top Bank of America banker, closely involved in Black's accounts
• 57:23
  Speaker 1: and who was deposed during a lawsuit against Bank of
• 57:26
  Speaker 1: America by Epstein victims, is currently a managing director and
• 57:30
  Speaker 1: private client advisor with Bank of America's private bank in
• 57:34
  Speaker 1: New York. In that capacity, Weiss works with a select
• 57:37
  Speaker 1: group of ultra high net worth individuals and families, providing
• 57:42
  Speaker 1: them with sophisticated advice. It appears that Epstein's relationship managers
• 57:47
  Speaker 1: at Deutsche Bank, Paul Morris and Stuart Oldfield, recently left
• 57:50
  Speaker 1: their positions at other firms. For example, Morris last month
• 57:55
  Speaker 1: left his position at Bank of America's Merrill Lynch subsidiary.
• 57:59
  Speaker 1: Ophiel recently stepped down as CEO of Third Lake Associates
• 58:03
  Speaker 1: in April of 2026 after the release of the Epstein
• 58:07
  Speaker 1: Files library. However, it's unclear whether those departures were voluntary
• 58:13
  Speaker 1: or the result of termination. 60 Minutes interview currently being
• 58:17
  Speaker 1: suppressed by CBS News leadership. On March 26, 2026, Senator
• 58:23
  Speaker 1: Wyden sat for a taped interview at the Senate Finance
• 58:26
  Speaker 1: Committee hearing room with former 60 Minutes correspondent Sharon Alfonsi.
• 58:32
  Speaker 1: The interview was part of a broader segment being prepared
• 58:34
  Speaker 1: by 60 Minutes regarding the conduct of Wall Street banks
• 58:38
  Speaker 1: and the government of the U.S. Virgin Islands with regard
• 58:41
  Speaker 1: to Jeffrey Epstein and his associates. Over the course of
• 58:45
  Speaker 1: the interview, Senator Wyden answered questions related to his multi-year
• 58:49
  Speaker 1: investigation on into transaction financing, Epstein-Sachs trafficking operation, and potential
• 58:55
  Speaker 1: consequences for banks over potential willful violations of federal anti-money
• 59:00
  Speaker 1: laundering laws. However, shortly after the taping of the interview
• 59:04
  Speaker 1: with Senator Wyden, CBS News leadership led by Barry Weiss
• 59:08
  Speaker 1: made the decision to fire Sharon Alfonsi. As a result,
• 59:13
  Speaker 1: the interview with Senator Wyden will not be aired, and
• 59:16
  Speaker 1: it's unclear whether Barry Weiss and CBS News leadership will
• 59:20
  Speaker 1: allow the broader segment to ever be aired. Proposed reforms
• 59:24
  Speaker 1: to federal anti-money laundering laws In response to the compliance
• 59:28
  Speaker 1: failures of major banks in the handling of transactions involving
• 59:31
  Speaker 1: Jeffrey Epstein, Senator Wyden's staff is crafting legislation that would
• 59:36
  Speaker 1: strengthen anti-money laundering laws and hold banks and individual employees
• 59:40
  Speaker 1: accountable for failure to comply. Major financial institutions cannot be
• 59:46
  Speaker 1: allowed to look the other way and fail to report
• 59:48
  Speaker 1: suspicious transactions in a timely manner because they don't want
• 59:52
  Speaker 1: to inconvenience ultra-wealthy clients. Private banking and wealth management executives
• 59:58
  Speaker 1: must face consequences when they do not follow the law
• 1:00:01
  Speaker 1: and fail to properly report suspicious financial activity by high-risk customers,
• 1:00:06
  Speaker 1: especially registered sex offenders with known connections to potential human trafficking.
• 1:00:12
  Speaker 1: Instances where a bank exits a client due to patterns
• 1:00:15
  Speaker 1: of suspicious transaction, such as those indicative of money laundering
• 1:00:19
  Speaker 1: or human trafficking, must be subject to immediate disclosure. Individual
• 1:00:24
  Speaker 1: bankers must also face consequences when they fail to conduct
• 1:00:27
  Speaker 1: due diligence on large wire transfers that lack a clear
• 1:00:31
  Speaker 1: business purpose or don't request business records to substantiate the
• 1:00:35
  Speaker 1: alleged economic activity behind a transaction. Had banks notified federal
• 1:00:41
  Speaker 1: law enforcement about Epstein's activities in a timely manner, his
• 1:00:45
  Speaker 1: crimes against women and girls could have been stopped much sooner.
• 1:00:49
  Speaker 1: It's a systemic failure and moral indictment of Wall Street
• 1:00:52
  Speaker 1: that the vast majority of Epstein's suspicious financial transactions were
• 1:00:56
  Speaker 1: not reported as suspicious until long after he was arrested.
• 1:01:00
  Speaker 1: Epstein's sex trafficking activity required access to huge amounts of
• 1:01:04
  Speaker 1: cash and the ability to wire money around the world efficiently.
• 1:01:08
  Speaker 1: Financial services he received from Wall Street banks like JPMC
• 1:01:12
  Speaker 1: and Deutsche Bank. Epstein was forced out of JPMorgan in
• 1:01:17
  Speaker 1: 2013 over concerns about his activity, but the bank waited
• 1:01:21
  Speaker 1: six years before reporting the full extent of his suspicious
• 1:01:25
  Speaker 1: financial activity to regulators. Documents demonstrate that despite Epstein's behavior,
• 1:01:30
  Speaker 1: JPMC executives were eager to continue working with him to
• 1:01:34
  Speaker 1: drive additional business with Leon Black and other wealthy clients. Additionally,
• 1:01:39
  Speaker 1: big banks failed to scrutinize massive payments that Epstein received
• 1:01:43
  Speaker 1: from Leon Black for purported tax advice. Epstein depended on
• 1:01:47
  Speaker 1: the money he received from Black to finance his criminal activity.
• 1:01:51
  Speaker 1: The multiple $ 8 million to $ 20 million wire transfers sent
• 1:01:54
  Speaker 1: from Black to Epstein called for exacting scrutiny and examination
• 1:01:59
  Speaker 1: of business records to prove that the payments were for
• 1:02:02
  Speaker 1: genuine estate planning service. To deter these types of compliance
• 1:02:06
  Speaker 1: failures in the future, Senator Wyden will soon propose legislation
• 1:02:10
  Speaker 1: to deter Wall Street from turning a blind eye to
• 1:02:13
  Speaker 1: suspicious financial activity. The proposed legislation will cover the following
• 1:02:18
  Speaker 1: principles and proposed reforms that extending to accounts held by
• 1:02:22
  Speaker 1: ultra-high net worth individuals while exempting community banks. Signed attestation
• 1:02:28
  Speaker 1: for accounts involving ultra-high net worth individuals. The contemplated legislation
• 1:02:33
  Speaker 1: will require that the client relationship with significant total assets
• 1:02:37
  Speaker 1: a senior manager must sign an attestation every year confirming
• 1:02:41
  Speaker 1: that the best, to his or her knowledge, the client's
• 1:02:44
  Speaker 1: accounts have properly been screened to fully comply with federal
• 1:02:48
  Speaker 1: anti-money laundering laws. This provision will be modeled after the
• 1:02:52
  Speaker 1: original Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley, which required CFOs to certify
• 1:02:58
  Speaker 1: that financial statements were accurate. This section will require either
• 1:03:03
  Speaker 1: the bank designated U.S. compliance officer or the relationship manager
• 1:03:07
  Speaker 1: of the client's account to attest that the bank has
• 1:03:10
  Speaker 1: taken minimum required measures to monitor the client's accounts, attest
• 1:03:15
  Speaker 1: they reviewed the client's transaction activity for potentially suspicious patterns,
• 1:03:19
  Speaker 1: involving cash withdrawals, wire transfers that lack a clear business purpose,
• 1:03:24
  Speaker 1: movement of money to high-risk jurisdictions, and other transactions with
• 1:03:28
  Speaker 1: typologies of potential money laundering or other crimes, including human trafficking.
• 1:03:34
  Speaker 1: Attest that the bank, to the best of their knowledge,
• 1:03:37
  Speaker 1: has fully reported all suspicious transactions to the U.S. Treasury
• 1:03:41
  Speaker 1: Department in a timely manner as required by law. Attest
• 1:03:45
  Speaker 1: that the bank conducted enhanced due diligence for large wire
• 1:03:48
  Speaker 1: transfers made inquiries to the client regarding the purpose of
• 1:03:53
  Speaker 1: the transaction, and asked for business records to verify or
• 1:03:56
  Speaker 1: substantiate the stated purpose of those transactions. Attests that the
• 1:04:01
  Speaker 1: bank has subjected all transactions involving registered sex offenders or
• 1:04:06
  Speaker 1: convicted felons to enhanced due diligence where it concerns cash
• 1:04:10
  Speaker 1: withdrawals or movements of money that lack a clear business purpose.
• 1:04:14
  Speaker 1: Enhanced penalties for individual bankers who fail to report suspicious
• 1:04:18
  Speaker 1: activity to the US Treasury Department in a timely manner.
• 1:04:23
  Speaker 1: Under federal law, bank employees who violate the BSA through
• 1:04:27
  Speaker 1: willful or negligent conduct by failing to report suspicious activity
• 1:04:31
  Speaker 1: to the US Treasury Department can face civil or criminal penalties.
• 1:04:36
  Speaker 1: The contemplated legislation will significantly enhance these penalties by increasing
• 1:04:41
  Speaker 1: the fines or prison sentences that bank employees can receive
• 1:04:45
  Speaker 1: for patterns of negligence or willful violations of the BSA.
• 1:04:50
  Speaker 1: Enhanced fines may be proportionate to the total compensation that
• 1:04:53
  Speaker 1: bank employees received at the time of the violation of
• 1:04:57
  Speaker 1: the BSA occurred. For violations of the BSA that involve
• 1:05:00
  Speaker 1: transactions that were related to human trafficking scheme, the law
• 1:05:04
  Speaker 1: will direct banks to claw back houses or bonuses paid
• 1:05:08
  Speaker 1: to executives responsible for the violation of the BSA. Mandatory
• 1:05:13
  Speaker 1: reporting of exits involving high-risk clients. The contemplated legislation will
• 1:05:18
  Speaker 1: require that banks disclose to the U.S. Treasury Department when
• 1:05:21
  Speaker 1: it has exited a client over concerns of problematic transaction activity. Specifically,
• 1:05:27
  Speaker 1: banks will be required to make a short declaration to
• 1:05:30
  Speaker 1: the U.S. Treasury Department signed by the bank's U.S. compliance
• 1:05:33
  Speaker 1: officer describing the circumstances that led to the decision to
• 1:05:37
  Speaker 1: exit the client, including any patterns of suspicious financial activity
• 1:05:43
  Speaker 1: The declaration must also disclose to the U.S. Treasury Department
• 1:05:47
  Speaker 1: the name of the bank and geographic location where the
• 1:05:49
  Speaker 1: exited client's funds were transferred. This provision will be modeled
• 1:05:54
  Speaker 1: after Section 2.2 of the DOJ's Swiss Bank Program, more
• 1:05:59
  Speaker 1: commonly known as the Lever Lists. Mandatory Reporting of Restrictions
• 1:06:05
  Speaker 1: on Access to Cash The contemplated legislation will require banks
• 1:06:09
  Speaker 1: to file suspicious activity reports with the U.S. Treasury Department
• 1:06:14
  Speaker 1: whenever it made a decision to restrict a client's ability
• 1:06:17
  Speaker 1: to withdraw cash or wire money. This provision will extend
• 1:06:21
  Speaker 1: to any individual who had signatory authority or a power
• 1:06:24
  Speaker 1: of attorney over the client's accounts and were authorized to
• 1:06:27
  Speaker 1: transact on client's behalf. Enhanced screening of accounts set up
• 1:06:32
  Speaker 1: on related parties under 25 years old. The contemplated legislation
• 1:06:37
  Speaker 1: will require banks to conduct due diligence of situations where
• 1:06:40
  Speaker 1: the client or as representatives establish or control bank accounts
• 1:06:45
  Speaker 1: for unrelated third parties under the age of 25, such
• 1:06:49
  Speaker 1: as individuals who are not the client's children or related
• 1:06:53
  Speaker 1: by blood. In any instance that their accounts are set
• 1:06:56
  Speaker 1: up for women under the age of 25 from foreign countries,
• 1:07:00
  Speaker 1: the contemplated legislation may require the client to sit for
• 1:07:04
  Speaker 1: an interview explaining the circumstances behind the establishment of the accounts.
• 1:07:09
  Speaker 1: Professional consequences for gatekeepers who participate in human trafficking. The
• 1:07:15
  Speaker 1: contemplated legislation will provide federal agencies the authority to revoke
• 1:07:19
  Speaker 1: certain registrations or professional licenses to accounts and attorneys who
• 1:07:24
  Speaker 1: enable human trafficking or sex trafficking. For example, accounts who
• 1:07:28
  Speaker 1: are willing co-conspirators in a human sex trafficking conspiracy could
• 1:07:32
  Speaker 1: lose the right to represent clients before the IRS for
• 1:07:35
  Speaker 1: a period of five years. Recommendation. federal action. Wall Street
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  Speaker 1: banks felled Epstein's victims by providing Epstein the financial infrastructure
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  Speaker 1: needed to recruit, transport, and harbor the young women and
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  Speaker 1: girls who fell prey to his trafficking scheme. Banks like JPMC,
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  Speaker 1: Bank of America, and Deutsche enabled Epstein's trafficking by willfully
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  Speaker 1: turning a blind eye or being criminally negligent to thousands
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  Speaker 1: of suspicious transactions by Epstein and ignoring repeated obvious red flags.
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  Speaker 1: When top executives were warned about Epstein's suspicious transactions, they
• 1:08:12
  Speaker 1: declined to properly notify federal law enforcement because they viewed
• 1:08:16
  Speaker 1: Epstein as a useful source of referrals with even wealthier individuals.
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  Speaker 1: Wall Street chose profits over justice. The lack of enforcement
• 1:08:25
  Speaker 1: against Wall Street, banks, and their employees regarding their handling
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  Speaker 1: of Epstein's accounts is a miscarriage of justice. This report
• 1:08:33
  Speaker 1: includes the following actions should be taken by federal bank
• 1:08:36
  Speaker 1: regulators to and prosecutors. 1. Investigations by the U.S. Treasury Department,
• 1:08:42
  Speaker 1: Federal Reserve, the comptroller of the currency, into handling of
• 1:08:46
  Speaker 1: Epstein's accounts by Wall Street banks. The U.S. Treasury Department,
• 1:08:50
  Speaker 1: Federal Reserve, and comptroller of the currency must conduct thorough
• 1:08:53
  Speaker 1: investigations into potential violations of federal anti-money laundering laws by
• 1:08:58
  Speaker 1: major banks and their These investigations should also extend to
• 1:08:51
  Speaker 1: major banks that held accounts for wealthy benefactors who paid
• 1:08:53
  Speaker 1: Epstein large sums of money under questionable circumstances. These investigations
• 1:08:58
  Speaker 1: should cover at a minimum the following issues as they
• 1:09:01
  Speaker 1: related to JPMC, Bank of America, and Deutsche Bank. A.
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  Speaker 1: Evidence of significant delays by banks in reporting of suspicious
• 1:09:27
  Speaker 1: financial activity from Epstein's accounts to the U.S. Treasury Department. B.
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  Speaker 1: Evidence that major banks underreported the full extent of Epstein's
• 1:09:37
  Speaker 1: suspicious financial activity. C. Evidence that banks failed to conduct
• 1:09:41
  Speaker 1: appropriate due diligence on large payments to Epstein from wealthy benefactors. D.
• 1:09:47
  Speaker 1: Evidence that bankers failed to act on persistent patterns of
• 1:09:51
  Speaker 1: suspicious financial transactions in Epstein's accounts for nearly two decades,
• 1:09:56
  Speaker 1: including millions in cash withdrawals, millions in payments to women
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  Speaker 1: and girls, and transactions to high-risk foreign jurisdictions in Russia
• 1:10:04
  Speaker 1: and throughout Eastern Europe. E. Evidence that individual bankers willfully
• 1:10:10
  Speaker 1: and knowingly ignored repeated red flags in Epstein's transaction activity
• 1:10:14
  Speaker 1: in order to protect Epstein as a client or as
• 1:10:18
  Speaker 1: a source of referrals. with other ultra-wealthy clients. F. Evidence
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  Speaker 1: that top bankers ignored repeated requests from top compliance officials
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  Speaker 1: to terminate Epstein for years in order to protect their
• 1:10:31
  Speaker 1: relationship with Epstein. G. Evidence that employees from private banking
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  Speaker 1: wealth management divisions at banks withheld information on suspicious activity
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  Speaker 1: from compliance. H. Evidence that top bankers signed off on
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  Speaker 1: continuing to work with Epstein even though his assets were
• 1:10:49
  Speaker 1: transferred to other banks over concerns of money laundering and
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  Speaker 1: human trafficking. 2. Criminal investigations by the U.S. Department of
• 1:10:58
  Speaker 1: Justice into handling of Epstein's accounts by big banks. The
• 1:11:01
  Speaker 1: Department of Justice must take prompt action to conduct a
• 1:11:05
  Speaker 1: criminal investigation into several major financial institutions into potential violations
• 1:11:11
  Speaker 1: of the BSA and other anti-money laundering laws in relation
• 1:11:15
  Speaker 1: to the handling of Epstein's accounts and payments to Epstein
• 1:11:18
  Speaker 1: by wealthy benefactors. Compliance failures by major financial institutions allowed
• 1:11:24
  Speaker 1: Epstein to gain access to the cash he needed to recruit, transport, harbor,
• 1:11:29
  Speaker 1: and abuse victims of a sex trafficking scheme. The evidence
• 1:11:33
  Speaker 1: presented in this report suggests that these banks may have
• 1:11:36
  Speaker 1: engaged in willful violations of the BSA or exhibited criminal
• 1:11:40
  Speaker 1: negligence based on previous results in litigation filed by Epstein's victims.
• 1:11:45
  Speaker 1: A thorough federal criminal investigation into the matter could result
• 1:11:49
  Speaker 1: in significant fines on banks. These investigations should also examine
• 1:11:54
  Speaker 1: the conduct of individual bankers and individuals who transacted on
• 1:11:58
  Speaker 1: Epstein's behalf. 3. Criminal Investigation by U.S. Department of Justice
• 1:12:03
  Speaker 1: and Epstein's Associates The Department of Justice must take steps
• 1:12:07
  Speaker 1: to hold other participants in Epstein's criminal sex trafficking activity accountable.
• 1:12:12
  Speaker 1: It's unacceptable that the only Epstein involved and Glenn Maxwell
• 1:12:16
  Speaker 1: have faced consequences in what is one of the largest,
• 1:12:19
  Speaker 1: if not the largest, sex trafficking ring in U.S. history.
• 1:12:22
  Speaker 1: DOJ must conduct criminal investigations into Darren Indyk, Richard Kahn,
• 1:12:27
  Speaker 1: Harry Beller, and other Epstein aides. DOJ must also investigate
• 1:12:31
  Speaker 1: the conduct of men who sign secret settlements with victims
• 1:12:34
  Speaker 1: of Epstein's scheme and possible abused, trafficked women and girls. 4.
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  Speaker 1: The House Committee on Oversight and Reform investigation should seek
• 1:12:43
  Speaker 1: additional records of bankers, who covered Epstein's accounts. The House
• 1:12:47
  Speaker 1: Committee on Oversight and Reform has subpoenaed information from several
• 1:12:51
  Speaker 1: banks as part of their investigation into the government's response
• 1:12:54
  Speaker 1: to Jeffrey Epstein's crimes. These subpoenas were sent to JPMC
• 1:12:58
  Speaker 1: and Deutsche Bank, among others. However, available information indicates that
• 1:13:03
  Speaker 1: these subpoenas covered a limited set of information that will
• 1:13:07
  Speaker 1: not encompass potential compliance failures by big banks in relation
• 1:13:11
  Speaker 1: to the handling of Epstein's accounts. House Oversight Committee must
• 1:13:14
  Speaker 1: subpoena all emails sent or received by specific bankers at JPMC,
• 1:13:19
  Speaker 1: Deutsche Bank, and Bank of America in order to fully
• 1:13:22
  Speaker 1: understand how major banks failed Epstein's victims. The House Oversight
• 1:13:27
  Speaker 1: Committee should consider subpoenas for emails regarding Epstein's accounts for
• 1:13:31
  Speaker 1: all of the following bankers concerning Epstein's accounts. Paul Morris,
• 1:13:36
  Speaker 1: Mary Erdos, Jess Staley, Stephen Cutler, John Duffy, Justin Nelson,
• 1:13:41
  Speaker 1: Mary Casey, David Brigstocke, Paul Barrett, Jeff Matusow, Jane Heller,
• 1:13:47
  Speaker 1: Karen Weiss, and Stuart Oldfield. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Besant
• 1:13:52
  Speaker 1: must immediately turn over all SARs filed by banks related
• 1:13:56
  Speaker 1: to Epstein's accounts to the Senate Finance Committee for additional review.
• 1:14:01
  Speaker 1: Treasury Secretary Scott Besant must stop playing politics with U.S.
• 1:14:05
  Speaker 1: Treasury Department Epstein file and produce records to the Senate
• 1:14:09
  Speaker 1: Finance Committee without delay. His failure to do so perpetuates
• 1:14:13
  Speaker 1: a system where Epstein's wealthy benefactors on Wall Street facilitate
• 1:14:17
  Speaker 1: human trafficking with impunity. Alright folks, well that's going to
• 1:14:22
  Speaker 1: do it for the report from Senator Wyden on Jeffrey
• 1:14:26
  Speaker 1: Epstein and his pals on Wall Street. All the information
• 1:14:29
  Speaker 1: that goes with this episode can be found in the
• 1:14:32
  Speaker 1: description box.