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15 - The Republic - Plato · Logic Library

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Book four, Part three. The time then has arrived Glaucon, when,
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like huntsmen, we should surround the cover and look sharp that justice does not
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steal away and pass out of sight and escape us. For beyond a doubt,
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she is somewhere in this country. Watch therefore, and strive to catch
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a sight of her. And if you see her first, let me know.
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Would that I could, But you should regard me rather as a follower
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who has just eyes enough to see what you show him. That is about
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as much as I am good for. Offer up a prayer with me and
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follow. I will, But you must show me the way. There is
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no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing. Still
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we must push on. Let us push on. Here. I saw something,
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hallo, I said. I began to perceive a track, and I
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believe that the query will not escape good news, he said. Truly,
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I said, we are stupid fellows. Why so, why, my good
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sir, At the beginning of our inquiry ages ago, there was justice tumbling
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out at our feet, and we never saw her. Nothing could be more
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ridiculous, like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands.
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That was the way with us. We looked not at what we were
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seeking, but at what was far off in the distance, And therefore I
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suppose we missed her. What do you mean, I mean to say that,
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in reality, for a long time past we have been talking of justice
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and have failed to recognize her. I grow impatient at the length of your
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exordium. Well, then, tell me, I said, whether I am
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right or not. You remember the original principle which we were always laying down
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at the foundation of the state, that one man should practice one thing only,
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the thing to which his nature was best adapted. Now justice is this
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principle or part of it? Yes, we often said that one man should
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do one thing only. Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own
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business and not being a busybody. We said so again and again, and
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many others have said the same to us. Yes, we said so.
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Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be
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justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference? I cannot,
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but I should like to be told, because I think that this is the
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only virtue which remains in the state, when the other virtues of temperance and
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courage and wisdom are abstracted, and that this is the ultimate cause and condition
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of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them, is
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also their preservative. And we were saying that if the three were discovered by
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us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one that follows of necessity.
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If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities, by its presence,
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contributes most to the excellence of the state, Whether the agreement of rulers
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and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law
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ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers,
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or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in
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children and women, slave and freemen, artisan ruler subject The quality I mean
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of every one doing his own work and not being a busybody, would claim
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the palm. The question is not so easily answered, certainly, he replied.
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There would be a difficulty in saying which, then, the power of
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each individual in the state to do his own work appears to compete with the
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other political virtues wisdom, temperance, courage, Yes, he said, and
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the virtue which enters into this competition is justice. Exactly. Let us look
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at the question from another point of view. Are not the rulers in a
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state, those to whom you would entrust the office of determining suits at law?
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Certainly? And are suits decided on any other ground, but that a
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man may neither take what is another's nor be deprived of what is his own.
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Yes, that is their principle, which is a just principle. Yes.
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Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and
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doing what is a man's own and belongs to him. Very true. Think
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now, and say, whether you agree with me or not, Suppose a
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carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a
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carpenter, and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the
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same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change.
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Do you think that any great harm would result to the state. Not
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much. But when the cobbler, or any other man whom nature designed to
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be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength, or
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the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his
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way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and
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guardians for which he is unfitted and either to take the implements or the duties
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of the other. Or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior
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all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that
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this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the state
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most true, Seeing then I said that there are three distinct classes. Any
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meddling of one with the other, or the change of one to another,
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is the greatest harm to the state, and may be most justly termed evil
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doing. Precisely, and the greatest degree of evil doing to one's own city
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would be termed by you in justice. Certainly, this then is injustice.
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And on the other hand, when the trader, the auxiliary and the guardian
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each do their own business, that is justice and will make this city just.
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I agree with you. We will not, i said, be over
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positive as yet. But if on trial this conception of justice be verified in
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the individual as well as in the state, there will be no longer any
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room for doubt. If it be not verified, we must have a fresh
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inquiry. First, let us complete the old investigation which we began, as
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you remember, under the impression that if we could previously examine justice on the
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larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual.
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That larger example appeared to be the state, And accordingly we constructed as good
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a one as we could, knowing well that in the good state justice would
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be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual.
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If they agree, we shall be satisfied. Or if there be a
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difference in the individual, we will come back to the state and have another
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trial of the theory. The friction of the two, when rubbed together,
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may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth. And the vision
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which is then revealed we will fix in our souls that will be in regular
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course. Let us do as you say. I proceeded to ask, when
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two things a greater and less are called by the same name, are they
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like or unlike? In so far as they are called the same like?
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He replied the just man, then if we regard the idea of justice,
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only will be like the just state. He will. And the state was
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thought by us to be just when the three classes in the state severally did
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their own business, and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by
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reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes. True, he
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said, And so of the individual, we may assume that he has the
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same three principles in his own soul which are found in the state, and
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he may be rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in
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the same manner. Certainly, he said once more, then, O,
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my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question, whether the soul has
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these three principles or not? An easy question? Nay, rather, Socrates,
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the proverb holds that hard is the good. Very true, I said,
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And I do not think that the method which we are employing is at
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all adequate to the accurate solution of this question. The true method is another,
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and a longer one. Still, we may arrive at a solution not
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below the level of the previous inquiry. May we not be satisfied with that?
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He said? Under the circumstance, I am quite content, I too,
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I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied. Then, faint not in
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pursuing the speculation, he said, Must we not acknowledge? I said,
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that in each of us there are the same principles and habits which there are
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in the state, and that from the individual they pass into the state.
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How else can they come there take the quality of pass or spirit. It
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would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, when found in states, is
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not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it, for example,
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the Thracians, Scythians, and in general the northern nations. And the same
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may be said of the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of
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our part of the world, or of the love of money, which may,
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with equal truth be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians. Exactly so,
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he said, there is no difficulty in understanding this, none whatever. But
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the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these principles
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are three or one, whether that is to say, we learn with one
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part of our nature are angry with another, and with a third part desire
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the satisfaction of our natural appetites, or whether the whole soul comes into play
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in each sort of action. To determine that is the difficulty. Yes,
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he said, there lies the difficulty. Then let us now try and determine
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whether they are the same or different. How can we he asked, I
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replied as follows, the same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in
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the same part or in relation to the same thing, at the same time
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in contrary ways. And therefore, whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the
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same, we know that they are really not the same but different. Good
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For example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in
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motion at the same time in the same part? Impossible? Still, I
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said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we should
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hereafter fall out. By the way, imagine the case of a man who
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is standing and also moving his hands and his head. And suppose a person
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to say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at
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the same moment. To such a mode of speech, we should object,
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and should rather say that one part of him is in motion while another is
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at rest. Very true. And suppose the objector to refine still further,
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and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops, but hole
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tops, when they spin around with their pegs fixed on the spot, are
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at rest and in motion at the same time. And he may say the
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same of anything which revolves in the same spot. His objection would not be
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admitted by us. Because in such cases things are not at rest and in
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motion in the same parts of themselves. We should rather say that they have
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both an axis and a circumference, and that the axis stand still, for
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there is no deviation from the perpendicular, and that the circumference goes round.
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But if while revolving the axis inclines either to the right or left, forwards
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or backwards, then in no point of view can they be at rest.
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That is the correct mode of describing them. He replied. Then none of
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these objections will confuse us or incline us to believe that the same thing,
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at the same time, in the same part, or in relation to the
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same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways. Certainly not
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according to my way of thinking. Yet I said that we may not be
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compelled to examine all such objections and prove at length that they are untrue.
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Let us assume their absurdity and go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if
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this assumption turn out to be untrue, all the consequences which follow shall be
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withdrawn. Yes, he said, that will be the best way. Well,
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I said, would you not allow that assent? And dissent desire and
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aversion, attraction and repulsion are all of them opposites, whether they are regarded
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as active or passive, For that makes no difference in the fact of their
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opposition. Yes, he said, they are opposites, Well, I said,
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And hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and again willing
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and wishing, all these you would refer to the classes already mentioned, You
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would say, would you not that the soul of him who desires is seeking
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after the object of his desire, or that he is drawing to himself the
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thing which he wishes to possess. Or again, when a person wants anything
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to be given him, his mind longing for the realization of his desire into
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itimates his wish to have it by a nod of assent, as if he
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had been asked a question. Very true? And what would you say of
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unwillingness and dislike and the absence of desire? Should not these be referred to
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the opposite class of repulsion and rejection? Certainly, admitting this to be true
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of desire generally, let us suppose a particular class of desires, and out
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of these we will select hunger and thirst, as they are termed, which
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are the most obvious of them. Let us take that class, he said.
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The object of one is food, and of the other drink. Yes,
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and here comes the point. Is not thirst, the desire which the
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soul has of drink, and of drink only, not of drink qualified by
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anything else, for example warm or cold, or much or little, or
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in a word, drink of any particular sort. But if the third be
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accompanied by heat, then the desire is of cold drink, or if accompanied
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by cold, then of warm drink. Or if the thirst be excessive,
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then the drink which is desired will be excessive, or if not great,
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the quantity of drink will also be small. But thirst pure and simple will
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desire drink pure and simple, which is the natural satisfaction of thirst, as
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food is of hunger. Yes, he said, the simple desire is,
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as you say, in every case, of the simple object, and the
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qualified desire of the qualified object. But here a confusion may arise, and
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I should wish to guard against an opponent starting up and saying that no man
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desires drink only but good drink, or food only, but good food.
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For good is the universal object of desire, and thirst, being a desire,
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will necessarily be thirst after good drink, And the same is true of
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every other desire, Yes, he replied. The opponent might have something to
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say. Nevertheless, I should still maintain that of relatives, some have a
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quality attached to either term of the relation. Others are simple and have their
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correlatives simple. I do not know what you mean. Well, you know,
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of course that the greater is relative to the less, certainly, and
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the much greater to the much less. Yes, And the sometime greater to
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the sometime less, and the greater that is to be to the less that
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is to be, certainly, he said. And so of more and less,
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and of other correlative terms, such as the double and the half,
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or again the heavier and the lighter, the swifter and the slower, and
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of hot and cold, and of any other relatives. Is not this true
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of them all? Yes? And does not the same principle hold in the
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sciences. The object of science is knowledge, assuming that to be the true
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definition. But the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge.
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I mean, for example, that the science of house building is a
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kind of knowledge which is defined and distinguished from other kinds, and is therefore
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termed architecture. Certainly, because it has a particular quality which no other has.
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Yes. And it has this particular quality because it has an object of
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a particular kind. And this is true of the other arts and sciences.
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Yes. End of Book four, Part three,