Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 018 - Part Four The Johnson Years Objectives Confirmed Methods Expanded
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter seventeen, Vietnam The Advisory Years to nineteen sixty five
- 0:05Speaker 1: by Robert Foutrell and Martin Blumensen. This is a LibriVox recording.
- 0:10Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
- 0:14Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox DOTRG recording by
- 0:22Speaker 1: Paul Hampton. Chapter seventeen. Objectives confirmed, Methods expanded. Four days
- 0:30Speaker 1: after taking office, President Johnson reaffirmed past American objectives in Vietnam.
- 0:36Speaker 1: The United States was to help the Republic win the
- 0:38Speaker 1: war against the externally directed and sustained Communist conspiracy, assist
- 0:43Speaker 1: the government in developing public support, and keep US military
- 0:48Speaker 1: and economic aid at the same level. This is a
- 0:51Speaker 1: Vietnamese war, the President said, and the country and the
- 0:54Speaker 1: war must in the end be run solely by the Vietnamese.
- 0:58Speaker 1: He reiterated the October nineth teen sixty three pledged to
- 1:01Speaker 1: withdraw some Americans from the country, yet at the same
- 1:04Speaker 1: time he instructed the State Department to prepare a white
- 1:07Speaker 1: paper documenting Hanoi's control of the viet Cong and its
- 1:11Speaker 1: supply of them through LAOS. He further solicited JCS plans
- 1:15Speaker 1: for stepped up clandestine warfare on North Vietnam and for
- 1:19Speaker 1: cross border incursions into Laos to check infiltration. In Forming
- 1:24Speaker 1: General Taylor on December second, nineteen sixty three that Vietnam
- 1:27Speaker 1: was the most critical military area for the United States,
- 1:31Speaker 1: President Johnson asked the Chairman to have the Joint Chiefs
- 1:34Speaker 1: assign the best available officers to Harkins Blue Ribbon men
- 1:39Speaker 1: at every level. He also sent Secretary McNamara to visit
- 1:43Speaker 1: Vietnam again during December nineteen twenty. In Vietnam, the Defense
- 1:48Speaker 1: Secretary found General Men's government fragile and indecisive and drifting.
- 1:53Speaker 1: Unless current trends were reversed in the next two or
- 1:56Speaker 1: three months, they would lead to neutralization at best, and
- 2:00Speaker 1: more likely to a communist controlled state. The dilemma for
- 2:04Speaker 1: American policymakers was that pouring in personnel and other resources
- 2:08Speaker 1: to prosecute the war would hinder rather than help, the
- 2:11Speaker 1: Vietnamese stand on their own feet. Unable to resolve the
- 2:15Speaker 1: basic problem, the Secretary listened to sinc packed plans for
- 2:18Speaker 1: covert operations against North Vietnam. Vietnamese troops were to carry
- 2:23Speaker 1: out a wide range of sabotage and psychological operations to
- 2:26Speaker 1: pressure the insurgents with minimum risk. As for extensive forays
- 2:32Speaker 1: envisioned along the Laotian border, McNamara doubted if they would
- 2:36Speaker 1: be politically acceptable or militarily effective, but he approved having
- 2:41Speaker 1: U two high altitude photoplanes in Vietnam to obtain better
- 2:45Speaker 1: information on enemy infiltration routes. At McNamara's suggestion, the President
- 2:50Speaker 1: on December thirty one assured men of lasting American support.
- 2:55Speaker 1: He gave final approval to clandestine actions against North Vietnam
- 2:59Speaker 1: and to the U two five flights. The movement of
- 3:02Speaker 1: strategic air commands U two S to Binhuab proceeded so
- 3:05Speaker 1: swiftly that PACAFF first knew of it when the planes
- 3:08Speaker 1: entered the traffic pattern at Hickam. The high level photography
- 3:12Speaker 1: later revealed extensive logistics network in North Vietnam and LAOS
- 3:16Speaker 1: supply routes capable of infiltrating large numbers of trucks, men
- 3:21Speaker 1: and materiel into South Vietnam. General Harkins felt hopeful that
- 3:26Speaker 1: the Vietcong attacks had peaked immediately after the coup. His
- 3:30Speaker 1: optimism was short lived. Government ground actions that had decreased
- 3:34Speaker 1: after DM's downfall, sprang back to between five hundred and
- 3:38Speaker 1: six hundred a day by November twenty, but they were
- 3:41Speaker 1: blunted by mismanagement and defeat. A new commander spurred the
- 3:45Speaker 1: lethargic seventh Division south of Saigon, but he was relieved
- 3:49Speaker 1: before the month was up. Neither of two battalions conducting
- 3:53Speaker 1: clearing operations in Long On Province knew that the other
- 3:56Speaker 1: was there, and they fired on each other. The clash
- 3:59Speaker 1: killed two men and wounded twenty, exerting a demoralizing effect
- 4:04Speaker 1: on both units. Before dawn on November twenty fourth, the
- 4:08Speaker 1: aggressive twenty first Division fell victim to a carefully planned
- 4:11Speaker 1: and executed ambush in Anjuin Province. After the viet Cong
- 4:16Speaker 1: struck the Chao Lao outpost and a strategic hamlet near
- 4:19Speaker 1: the tip of the Kau Mau Peninsula. The division hurried
- 4:23Speaker 1: four Hella lifts of troops into two landing zones with
- 4:26Speaker 1: tactical aircraft flying pre strike escort and air cover. Enemy
- 4:31Speaker 1: fired down in H twenty one and damaged ten H
- 4:34Speaker 1: twenty one s and UH one's while the ground troops
- 4:38Speaker 1: took cover. USAF and Vietnamese A one HS, B twenty
- 4:42Speaker 1: six's and T twenty eights made repeated attacks in which
- 4:46Speaker 1: valor at times outweighed discretion. C forty sevens and C
- 4:50Speaker 1: one twenty three's pair dropped a battalion to pinch off
- 4:53Speaker 1: the foes withdrawal route. The gorillas escaped because the C
- 4:56Speaker 1: one twenty threes put most of the troops on the
- 4:59Speaker 1: far side of the Kai Nuk River. Three bodies were discovered,
- 5:03Speaker 1: and there were signs that at least one hundred fifty
- 5:05Speaker 1: insurgents had been carried away in Sampans. Brigadier General Robert H.
- 5:10Speaker 1: York Usa, who saw the entire operation, commended the fine
- 5:15Speaker 1: work of tactical air. The operation was nevertheless costly to
- 5:19Speaker 1: the air crews, most damage coming from fifty caliber fire.
- 5:23Speaker 1: Aircraft losses included an H twenty one A B twenty
- 5:26Speaker 1: six shot down with loss of the crew and the
- 5:29Speaker 1: crash landing after battle. Damages of two Vietnamese A one
- 5:33Speaker 1: hs and one T twenty eight. Ground fire hit twenty
- 5:36Speaker 1: five planes. The helicopter force had consisted of twelve H
- 5:40Speaker 1: twenty one s and thirteen UH ones. Its support came
- 5:44Speaker 1: from four T twenty eights for pre strike missions, two
- 5:48Speaker 1: B twenty six is for escort, and three B twenty six's,
- 5:51Speaker 1: eight A one h's and twelve T twenty eights for cover.
- 5:55Speaker 1: It was the largest one day close air support operation
- 5:59Speaker 1: to date. In an otherwise cheerless month, Captain Richard W.
- 6:03Speaker 1: Van Haik, air liaison officer, engineered one small air victory
- 6:08Speaker 1: against the gorillas along the Dong Nai River. The Viet
- 6:11Speaker 1: Kong habitually fired at aircraft, but slipped through a sweep
- 6:15Speaker 1: of the area by a government battalion on December eighth.
- 6:18Speaker 1: Van Haik persuaded the province chief to join him on
- 6:21Speaker 1: an L nineteen flight over that ground. Since the battalion
- 6:25Speaker 1: had just finished its sweep, the chief felt sure he
- 6:28Speaker 1: was wasting time. To his great surprise, he saw more
- 6:31Speaker 1: than fifty people. As the L nineteen drew brisk fire.
- 6:36Speaker 1: Van Haik drafted an air strike plan and on the
- 6:39Speaker 1: ninth and twelfth dropped leaflets to warn them persons working
- 6:43Speaker 1: with the Viet Cong were in danger. Because the area
- 6:46Speaker 1: was bordered by strategic hamlets, the hamlet chiefs blocked egress
- 6:51Speaker 1: from dawn to noon on December fourteenth. On that morning,
- 6:54Speaker 1: Van Haik and a Vietnamese observer flew into the area
- 6:58Speaker 1: discreetly trailed by three D twenty eight and two B
- 7:01Speaker 1: twenty six's When the L nineteen was fired upon, the
- 7:04Speaker 1: observer marked the target and the strike planes swept in
- 7:08Speaker 1: twenty three enemy were killed and others wounded. This modest
- 7:12Speaker 1: victory showed that arm reconnaissance could succeed in Vietnam. Twice
- 7:17Speaker 1: in December, gorillas in Zone D ambushed little convoys lacking
- 7:22Speaker 1: air escort. The Vietcong waylaid one in Yinlong Province on
- 7:26Speaker 1: the twenty third, resulting in fourteen men killed, seven wounded,
- 7:30Speaker 1: and five missing. Vietnamese and US Air Force planes flew
- 7:35Speaker 1: seventy three helicopter escort sorties in November and eighty three
- 7:39Speaker 1: in December, a decrease from earlier in the year. In part,
- 7:44Speaker 1: the decline mirrored the slowing of Vietnamese ground operations. It
- 7:48Speaker 1: also stemmed from the growing practice of letting U S
- 7:50Speaker 1: Army helicopter gunships take the place of strike aircraft. This
- 7:54Speaker 1: despite MACV directives requiring the use of Vietnamese aircraft before
- 7:59Speaker 1: bringing in American planes. In three corps the fifth divisions,
- 8:04Speaker 1: penchant for helicopter gunships contributed to a major defeat on
- 8:07Speaker 1: the afternoon of December thirty one A Ranger battalion ran
- 8:10Speaker 1: into about two battalions of Vietcong ten miles west of
- 8:14Speaker 1: Ben Kai and eight miles southeast of Dao Fieng. The
- 8:18Speaker 1: outnumbered Rangers formed a defensive perimeter and fought bravely, but
- 8:21Speaker 1: they needed help. The Fifth Division had several battalions at
- 8:25Speaker 1: Ben Kat and Dong Tieg, close enough to the scene
- 8:28Speaker 1: of action and sufficiently strong to smash the insurgents. An
- 8:32Speaker 1: L nineteen forward air controller and at least two A
- 8:35Speaker 1: one hs were constantly on station over the encircled Rangers.
- 8:39Speaker 1: Besides the twelve one hundred pound bombs and eight hundred
- 8:42Speaker 1: rounds of twenty millimeters ammunition carried by each A one AH,
- 8:46Speaker 1: more strike aircraft were available at binh Ha and Tansan Nuitt.
- 8:51Speaker 1: Captain Ken C. Spears, Junior Air liaison officer, time and
- 8:55Speaker 1: again asked that the A one hs be allowed to
- 8:57Speaker 1: strike what were clearly enemy positions, but his calls fell
- 9:01Speaker 1: on deaf ears. The orbiting relays of A one h's
- 9:04Speaker 1: returned to being Ha without firing a shot. The sole
- 9:08Speaker 1: air strikes came from three flights of armed UH one's
- 9:12Speaker 1: and failed to uproot the guerrillas. Rescue battalions arrived at
- 9:16Speaker 1: noon on January one, nineteen sixty four, long after the
- 9:19Speaker 1: Rangers had scattered. Ranger losses totaled six killed, twelve wounded,
- 9:24Speaker 1: and thirty one missing. An engagement that might have been
- 9:28Speaker 1: a victory ended in another disheartening defeat. Colonel Harvey E. Henderson,
- 9:34Speaker 1: acting Second Air Division commander, considered the failure to capitalize
- 9:38Speaker 1: on strike aircraft firepower to border on being criminal. Ambassador
- 9:42Speaker 1: Lodge cabled the same conclusion to Washington, citing Vietnamese failures
- 9:46Speaker 1: to take advantage of superiority of firepower, which can be
- 9:50Speaker 1: obtained by rapid reaction to VC troop concentrations. Admiral Felt
- 9:55Speaker 1: bluntly told General Harkins that A one H firepower was
- 9:58Speaker 1: quite superior to that of one It appears to me.
- 10:01Speaker 1: Felt said that our education program on the use of
- 10:04Speaker 1: air power is unsatisfactory. The Vietnamese A one H and
- 10:09Speaker 1: T twenty eight squadrons boosted their strike sorties in November
- 10:13Speaker 1: and December nineteen sixty three. Still they could not compensate
- 10:17Speaker 1: for the fewer serviceable USAF B twenty six's and T
- 10:20Speaker 1: twenty eights that were further diminished by battle damage. Moreover,
- 10:25Speaker 1: the work of the Vietnamese forward air controllers left a
- 10:28Speaker 1: lot to be desired. On December sixth, for example, an
- 10:32Speaker 1: L nineteen and two T twenty eights responded to a
- 10:35Speaker 1: request for an immediate air strike on a viet Cong battalion.
- 10:39Speaker 1: When just ten minutes from the target, the controller pleaded
- 10:42Speaker 1: the need to refuel his half full tanks. He and
- 10:46Speaker 1: the fighter planes touched down at Tayannin Airport, lunched during
- 10:49Speaker 1: the refueling, and went on their way. By then, the
- 10:53Speaker 1: enemy battalion had vanished. Assessments of the political and military
- 10:58Speaker 1: conditions in Vietnam the close of nineteen sixty three were
- 11:01Speaker 1: decidedly pessimistic, severing relations with South Vietnam and the United States,
- 11:06Speaker 1: Cambodia sought closer relations with China. Although Communist support of
- 11:11Speaker 1: the viet Cong stealing into the Delta through Cambodia had
- 11:14Speaker 1: already proved very worrisome, prospects swiftly worsened. The general situation
- 11:19Speaker 1: in Vietnam had also eroded since the assassination of DM
- 11:23Speaker 1: and would continue to be bat in nineteen sixty four.
- 11:27Speaker 1: During January May nineteen sixty four, Hanoi sent an estimated
- 11:31Speaker 1: forty seven hundred troops into South Vietnam. Formerly, most of
- 11:35Speaker 1: the infiltrators were ethnic Southerners. Now there were growing numbers
- 11:39Speaker 1: of native Northerners, many of them drafted into the North
- 11:42Speaker 1: Vietnamese army. The Vietcong had earlier relied on French and
- 11:46Speaker 1: American weapons, chiefly from stockpiles captured before nineteen fifty four
- 11:50Speaker 1: in Indo, China, and Korea. Currently most of the weapons
- 11:54Speaker 1: were Chinese brought by land and sea from North Vietnam.
- 11:58Speaker 1: On January twenty second, nineteen sixty four, the Joint Chiefs
- 12:01Speaker 1: of Staff responded to President Johnson's November nineteen sixty three
- 12:05Speaker 1: requests by presenting a ten point program of Bolder Actions
- 12:10Speaker 1: to arrest s Vn's military political decline. This proposed a
- 12:15Speaker 1: virtual takeover of the war from the Saigon government by
- 12:18Speaker 1: overt and covert bombing of North Vietnam, large scale commando raids,
- 12:23Speaker 1: mining the sea approaches, ground operations into Laos, and extended
- 12:28Speaker 1: reconnaissance over both Laos and Cambodia. The plan also called
- 12:31Speaker 1: for committing more US forces to support combat in Vietnam
- 12:35Speaker 1: and against North Vietnam at the Nang, where he commanded
- 12:39Speaker 1: the I Corps. Thirty seven year old Major General Nuin
- 12:43Speaker 1: Kang kept close watch on the new government. He believed
- 12:46Speaker 1: that some members of General Min's twelve men Executive Committee
- 12:50Speaker 1: were plotting to arrest men and other officers, including him,
- 12:54Speaker 1: and declare for Vietnamese neutralism. After notifying General Harkins of
- 12:58Speaker 1: his intentions, Kang flew to Psygon and on January thirty
- 13:03Speaker 1: headed a coalition of younger generals who managed a relatively
- 13:06Speaker 1: bloodless coup. He told Harkins the next day that the
- 13:09Speaker 1: coup was pro American, pro Western, and anti neutralist. The
- 13:13Speaker 1: new government would step up the war at once. Harkins
- 13:17Speaker 1: termed Kang the strongest military character in the country, even
- 13:21Speaker 1: though he lacked political appeal and complete control over the
- 13:24Speaker 1: armed forces. Ambassador Lodge thought the United States was beginning
- 13:28Speaker 1: to make real progress with a min government, but Kang's
- 13:31Speaker 1: one man rule might be more effective. President Johnson then
- 13:35Speaker 1: sent Kang a personal note of support. A few days later,
- 13:39Speaker 1: JCS Chairman Taylor ready to plan to revitalize the counter insurgency.
- 13:44Speaker 1: The key points embraced improved intelligence, a stabilized Kang government
- 13:48Speaker 1: through reforms of land tenure, liquidation of land debts, and
- 13:51Speaker 1: other measures, the prospect of no more coups, a quickened
- 13:55Speaker 1: campaign tempo bolder actions against North Vietnam, maybe by Vietnam.
- 14:00Speaker 1: These bombing, and US warnings to Hanoi to stop its
- 14:03Speaker 1: aid to the Viet Kong. The CIA warned that the
- 14:06Speaker 1: government and armed forces of South Vietnam must show definite improvement.
- 14:10Speaker 1: If not, there was an even chance at best that
- 14:12Speaker 1: Kang's administration would not survive. During the following few months.
- 14:17Speaker 1: The new government could not immediately turn the tide. About
- 14:20Speaker 1: twelve miles south of Tai Nin City lay the village
- 14:23Speaker 1: of Ben Kou, a cluster of six strategic hamlets housing
- 14:27Speaker 1: some six thousand people. Before dawn on February sixth, nearly
- 14:32Speaker 1: one thousand gorillas drove the Vietnamese militia out of Being Koo.
- 14:36Speaker 1: While waiting for the government forces to appear, The Viet
- 14:39Speaker 1: Cong forced the villagers to dig firing positions and shelters.
- 14:44Speaker 1: Although USAF officers thought that precise air attacks would dislodge
- 14:48Speaker 1: the insurgents with least danger to civilians, the Three Corps
- 14:52Speaker 1: commander authorized firing into the village by artillery strike aircraft
- 14:57Speaker 1: and helicopter gunships. Pairs of A one HS B twenty
- 15:01Speaker 1: six's and T twenty eights struck as directed by Vietnamese
- 15:05Speaker 1: forward air controllers. The insurgents fled after dark, leaving eleven
- 15:10Speaker 1: of their dead behind. Civilian casualties numbered forty six killed,
- 15:15Speaker 1: sixty wounded, and six hundred and seventy burned in varying degrees.
- 15:20Speaker 1: The bombardment demolished six hundred and seventy houses and damaged
- 15:24Speaker 1: two hundred others, depriving two thousand people of shelter. Though
- 15:28Speaker 1: American relief supplies soon came, the survivors were more grateful
- 15:32Speaker 1: to the enemy, who made them dig for cover. Vietnamese
- 15:36Speaker 1: officers said there would be no complaint about the civilian casualties,
- 15:40Speaker 1: yet the USAF counterinsurgency expert, Major General Edward G. Lansdale
- 15:46Speaker 1: pointed out that the government forces had violated a cardinal
- 15:49Speaker 1: rule by not protecting people under Vietcong attack. Cambodi opposed
- 15:54Speaker 1: a prickly problem to the Kyang regime. Prince Cianook charged
- 15:58Speaker 1: on February eleventh that two Vietnamese aircraft had attacked a
- 16:02Speaker 1: Cambodian village and killed five people. He held the United
- 16:06Speaker 1: States partly to blame because it had overarmed Vietnam and
- 16:10Speaker 1: torpedoed plans for an international conference to establish Cambodia's neutrality. Later,
- 16:16Speaker 1: border incidents impelled Sianook to accept arms from China and
- 16:20Speaker 1: the Soviet Union. During Vietnamese border actions on March nineteen,
- 16:25Speaker 1: Cambodian T twenty eight shot down a USAFO one. The
- 16:29Speaker 1: American pilot, Captain yuy Thorston Scobel, and the Vietnamese observer
- 16:34Speaker 1: were killed in the Interim intelligence estimates in Washington highlighted
- 16:39Speaker 1: Hanoi's intent to expand support for the viet Cong. South
- 16:42Speaker 1: Vietnam situation was seen as extremely serious. On February twenty,
- 16:48Speaker 1: President Johnson ordered Secretary of McNamara to have the Joint
- 16:52Speaker 1: Chief study the question of how to decrease Hanoi's activities.
- 16:56Speaker 1: McNamara sent the president's directive to JCS Chairman Taylor on theid,
- 17:01Speaker 1: adding that among alternatives being considered was a carefully planned
- 17:05Speaker 1: program designed to exert increasing military pressures on North Vietnam.
- 17:11Speaker 1: Johnson said publicly on February twenty one that those directing
- 17:14Speaker 1: and supplying the viet Cong were playing a deeply dangerous game.
- 17:19Speaker 1: He also formed the Vietnam Coordinating Committee to run the
- 17:22Speaker 1: Washington side of the war. The chairman was mister William H. Sullivan,
- 17:27Speaker 1: a Foreign Service officer and the United Nations advisor to
- 17:31Speaker 1: the State Department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. Members represented
- 17:36Speaker 1: the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, the
- 17:40Speaker 1: Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House. The President told
- 17:45Speaker 1: Sullivan to find a way to speed operations against North
- 17:48Speaker 1: Vietnam and to examine how to make Hanoi desist from
- 17:51Speaker 1: its hostile actions. As the war seemed about to enter
- 17:55Speaker 1: a new phase, there was talk in Washington, Hawaii, and
- 17:59Speaker 1: Saigon a voluntary repatriation of US dependents from Vietnam, but
- 18:04Speaker 1: the hope of keeping Khan and power led to the
- 18:07Speaker 1: decision not to move dependents out of the country. General
- 18:11Speaker 1: Kang on February twenty two published the National Pacification Plan
- 18:15Speaker 1: that MACV had desired since DM's overthrow. The concept called
- 18:19Speaker 1: for local spreading, oil stain or oil spot operations. These
- 18:24Speaker 1: were military clear and hold actions, starting in safe areas
- 18:28Speaker 1: and rolling back the viet Cong Within pacified regions, A
- 18:32Speaker 1: new life development program would enhance the civilians standard of living.
- 18:36Speaker 1: These passification measures were to be completed in one and
- 18:39Speaker 1: two corps by January one, nineteen sixty five, and in
- 18:43Speaker 1: three and four corps a year later. Core commanders were
- 18:48Speaker 1: to write their own plans for pursuing the overall goal
- 18:52Speaker 1: in the three courts. For example, a program commencing in
- 18:55Speaker 1: June was expected to push outward in concentric circles until
- 18:59Speaker 1: the adjacent provinces of Ji Din, binh Bind, Wong Hoo, Nijea, Longan,
- 19:06Speaker 1: and fuk Thai were firmly under government control. General Harkins
- 19:10Speaker 1: concluded that the offensive would work if there are no
- 19:13Speaker 1: more coups in Khan Stays alive, and the Joint Chiefs
- 19:17Speaker 1: accepted the oil spot idea as part of an integrated political, socioeconomic,
- 19:22Speaker 1: and psychological offensive. To support more fully the military effort,
- 19:26Speaker 1: the Chiefs endorsed giving jet aircraft to the Vietnamese Air
- 19:29Speaker 1: Force and to the farm Gate First Air Commando Squadron.
- 19:34Speaker 1: They likewise urged studies of how to escalate operations against
- 19:38Speaker 1: North Vietnam to pack aff The papers and studies flowing
- 19:42Speaker 1: out of Washington and Hawaii mirrored the uneasiness with which
- 19:46Speaker 1: US authorities view the possibility of engaging US ground forces
- 19:50Speaker 1: with communist forces anywhere. There was another way, However, strictly
- 19:54Speaker 1: USAF operations with initial non nuclear strikes would hand the
- 19:59Speaker 1: Air Force wrong arguments for building its tactical forces. At
- 20:03Speaker 1: the same time, the United States would be able to
- 20:05Speaker 1: react quickly to threats, to control operations carefully, and to
- 20:09Speaker 1: pull out at once if need be. General le May,
- 20:13Speaker 1: as usual, had little confidence in the very limited actions
- 20:16Speaker 1: and studies recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We
- 20:20Speaker 1: are swatting flies, he said, when we ought to be
- 20:23Speaker 1: going after the manure pile. He wanted more positive and
- 20:28Speaker 1: bolder actions, to include bombing targets in North Vietnam. Now.
- 20:32Speaker 1: The Air Force chief favored expanded interdiction crop destruction attacks
- 20:37Speaker 1: on guerrillas and laos, destroying dams and dikes in North
- 20:40Speaker 1: Vietnam to flood croplands, disrupting power sources, bombing North Vietnamese
- 20:45Speaker 1: military centers and mining ports. He advocated sending more aircraft,
- 20:50Speaker 1: including jets, to enlarge air dropped and air landed operations,
- 20:54Speaker 1: greater bombing of targets beyond the reach of ground forces,
- 20:57Speaker 1: and heavier escort and cover. He wished to relay blacks
- 21:00Speaker 1: the barriers to cross border actions to keep the United
- 21:03Speaker 1: States from getting bogged down in a ground war on
- 21:05Speaker 1: the Asian mainland. The only hope was massive air operations.
- 21:10Speaker 1: Prodded by General LeMay and pursuing the President's expressed views,
- 21:15Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs in early March proposed overt military actions
- 21:19Speaker 1: against North Vietnam. The initial phase would witness low level
- 21:22Speaker 1: reconnaissance over Laos and North Vietnam air strikes. Amphibious raids,
- 21:27Speaker 1: sabotage and harassment of shipping were to follow. Then would
- 21:30Speaker 1: come destruction of highway bridges, airfields, pol dumps, and other
- 21:35Speaker 1: supply targets. The climax would be full scale air and
- 21:39Speaker 1: naval operations against North Vietnam. Whialt. W Rostau, chairman of
- 21:44Speaker 1: the Policy Planning Council at the Department of State, thought
- 21:47Speaker 1: North Vietnam vulnerable to bombing. After all, Ho Chi Minh
- 21:52Speaker 1: was no longer a gorilla with nothing to lose. He
- 21:55Speaker 1: had an industrial complex to protect. W Avril, Harriman and
- 21:59Speaker 1: Rajeri hillsmen of the State Department opposed escalated measures against
- 22:03Speaker 1: North Vietnam since the Laotian infiltration routes seemed to be
- 22:07Speaker 1: used but little. On March sixth, Kang fired three corps
- 22:12Speaker 1: commanders and five of the nine division commanders. Soon, a
- 22:16Speaker 1: wholesale removal of twenty three province chiefs ensued. The disruption
- 22:21Speaker 1: of leadership shook the confidence of the armed forces and
- 22:24Speaker 1: of the people. Military desertions soared. Meanwhile, the prestige of
- 22:28Speaker 1: the Viet Cong rose. Weakness at Zeigon and decentralized military
- 22:34Speaker 1: command let the corp commanders store up power. Rancor between
- 22:38Speaker 1: ground commanders and province and district chiefs bread confusion and disagreement.
- 22:43Speaker 1: Air force officers sensed that uncoordinated air strikes might permit
- 22:47Speaker 1: some party to make the Americans escapegoat for a tragic incident.
- 22:52Speaker 1: Before making up his mind on the options at hand,
- 22:55Speaker 1: President Johnson sent Secretary McNamara and General Taylor to Vietnam
- 23:00Speaker 1: during March eight through ten. They accompanied General Kang on
- 23:03Speaker 1: his speech making visits to Canto Baklieu, the Hohau Area,
- 23:08Speaker 1: Hu and Saigon. On the platform, McNamara and Taylor stood
- 23:12Speaker 1: on either side of Kang and lifted his hands in
- 23:15Speaker 1: the air as a visible signe of US support. In private, talks,
- 23:20Speaker 1: McNamara and Taylor gained the impression that the military situation
- 23:23Speaker 1: had gone downhill. Nearly forty percent of the countryside was
- 23:27Speaker 1: under Vietcong influence and control, including the critical provinces around Saigon.
- 23:32Speaker 1: In eight of the forty three provinces, the insurgents held
- 23:36Speaker 1: seventy five to ninety percent of the land. Kang was
- 23:39Speaker 1: sure that his government troops could clear the country, but
- 23:41Speaker 1: doubted if they could keep it. He preferred covert actions
- 23:45Speaker 1: against North Vietnam until rear area security was set up.
- 23:49Speaker 1: No one was optimistic about limited covert operations. Although clandestine
- 23:53Speaker 1: activities could be expanded by easing kerbs on bombardment men,
- 23:58Speaker 1: money and materiel were no object. McNamara said the United
- 24:02Speaker 1: States had to press on. After discussing the aerial mining
- 24:06Speaker 1: of North Vietnamese waters, the Defense Secretary directed that mine
- 24:10Speaker 1: laying training for Vietnamese pilots begin at once. Ambassador Lodge
- 24:16Speaker 1: objected to massive destruction before trying a carrot and stick approach.
- 24:20Speaker 1: The United States could offer North Vietnam advantages for seizing
- 24:24Speaker 1: aggression while at the same time confronting Hanoi with covert
- 24:28Speaker 1: actions such as unacknowledged air strikes. Photos by r F
- 24:32Speaker 1: one oh one reconnaissance planes revealed active Vietcong bases right
- 24:37Speaker 1: across the border in Cambodia, but hot pursuit across the
- 24:40Speaker 1: frontier was ruled out. In light of American negotiations to
- 24:43Speaker 1: keep Cambodia from giving up neutrality and winding up in
- 24:47Speaker 1: the Hanoi and Peaking camp, the political damage would far
- 24:51Speaker 1: outweigh any military worth. Secretary McNamara asked if it was
- 24:56Speaker 1: better to shore up the Vietnamese Air Force or to
- 24:59Speaker 1: send more USAF aircraft. He learned that Americans had to
- 25:03Speaker 1: fill in the gaps caused by lack of motivation on
- 25:06Speaker 1: the part of the Vietnamese air Force, its inability to
- 25:08Speaker 1: produce fast reaction strikes, and its reluctance to fly at
- 25:13Speaker 1: night and on weekends. After a round of talks in Hawaii,
- 25:17Speaker 1: McNamara and Taylor flew back to Washington. The Defense Secretary
- 25:21Speaker 1: proposed twelve steps to President Johnson for changing the course
- 25:25Speaker 1: of the war. Though stressing actions within the country, The
- 25:28Speaker 1: Secretary suggested that plans be laid for border control actions
- 25:32Speaker 1: inside lous and Cambodia. On seventy two hours notice. These
- 25:36Speaker 1: would be tit for tat bomb strikes and commando raids
- 25:39Speaker 1: by Vietnamese forces on such North Vietnamese targets as communications centers,
- 25:44Speaker 1: training camps, and infiltration routes. For the present, McNamara resisted
- 25:49Speaker 1: border control or graduated military pressure operations. He nevertheless thought
- 25:54Speaker 1: there ought to be stand by plans for gradually tightening
- 25:57Speaker 1: the screws on North Vietnam would be triggered on thirty
- 26:01Speaker 1: days notice and involve air attacks on military and possibly
- 26:05Speaker 1: industrial targets. The Joint Chiefs judged the Defense Secretary's program
- 26:10Speaker 1: to be too sparse unless quick decisive action against North
- 26:13Speaker 1: Vietnam was added. John A. McCone CIA director labeled McNamara's
- 26:19Speaker 1: proposals too little, too late. He urged swift operations in
- 26:23Speaker 1: the South to match intensive air and naval moves on
- 26:25Speaker 1: the North. General LeMay spoke to the point he did
- 26:29Speaker 1: not think that the military tools and concepts were generally
- 26:32Speaker 1: sound inadequate. He deplored the shackling of sound military activities
- 26:37Speaker 1: with artificial political bonds that events had long made obsolete.
- 26:42Speaker 1: The National Security Council concurred in the Secretary of Defense's recommendations,
- 26:47Speaker 1: but warned the United States should commit itself to the
- 26:50Speaker 1: clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to communism,
- 26:54Speaker 1: otherwise the result would destroy SITO. President Johnson harbored doubts,
- 26:59Speaker 1: but approved that proposals, preferring the Secretary's approach to that
- 27:03Speaker 1: of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The political and military
- 27:06Speaker 1: base in South Vietnam seemed too fragile to invite expanded
- 27:09Speaker 1: enemy hostilities. Furthermore, striking North Vietnam might bring the Chinese
- 27:14Speaker 1: and Soviets into the war. The President asked all agencies
- 27:18Speaker 1: to support energetically the actions called for. Shortly afterwards, the
- 27:23Speaker 1: Joint Chiefs answered a question put by Johnson on March four.
- 27:27Speaker 1: Had all possible support been given American and Vietnamese units
- 27:31Speaker 1: since he had become president. The chiefs said they had
- 27:34Speaker 1: hoped for stronger US action to encompass air reconnaissance in
- 27:37Speaker 1: Lousing Cambodia, clandestine intelligence operations in Cambodia, hot pursuit by
- 27:42Speaker 1: ground troops, inspection of Cambodian shipping in the Mekong Delta,
- 27:47Speaker 1: and jet fighters for South Vietnam, but all had been
- 27:50Speaker 1: turned down due to national policy. In a major address
- 27:54Speaker 1: on March twenty sixth, nineteen sixty four, Secretary of Defense
- 27:58Speaker 1: McNamara excis playing the four options open to the president.
- 28:02Speaker 1: The United States could withdraw from Vietnam, but this was
- 28:05Speaker 1: completely untenable. Vietnam could be neutralized, risking an eventual Communist takeover,
- 28:12Speaker 1: military actions could be spread into North Vietnam, a choice
- 28:16Speaker 1: being carefully studied, or the United States could focus on
- 28:19Speaker 1: helping the Vietnamese win, the option already approved by Johnson.
- 28:23Speaker 1: Even if fighting beyond South Vietnam was needed, it would supplement,
- 28:27Speaker 1: rather than substitute, for general progress and stability in the country.
- 28:33Speaker 1: The decision to center on the battle inside Vietnam underscored
- 28:36Speaker 1: the demand to relax the rules of engagement for air operations.
- 28:40Speaker 1: On March twenty seven, MACVE authorized strike aircraft to operate
- 28:44Speaker 1: to the border if it was a river or road elsewhere.
- 28:48Speaker 1: They could fly as close as two thousand meters when
- 28:50Speaker 1: directed by a forward air controller five thousand meters when not.
- 28:54Speaker 1: Aircraft were forbidden to fire across or violate the frontier
- 28:58Speaker 1: without diplomatic clearance. The State Department sympathized with the JCS
- 29:03Speaker 1: stand for hot pursuit into Cambodia under certain conditions, but
- 29:07Speaker 1: contested any easing of the curbs. This position governed in
- 29:11Speaker 1: nineteen sixty four and was reiterated firmly by McFee in
- 29:15Speaker 1: October and November after aircraft flew over the border by accident.
- 29:20Speaker 1: Following a CDO Council meeting in Manila on April fifteen,
- 29:24Speaker 1: Secretary Rusk and General Wheeler went to Saigon with Ambassador Lodge.
- 29:28Speaker 1: They weighed the chances of squeezing North Vietnam by Vietnamese
- 29:32Speaker 1: covert operations, by covert US support for Vietnamese aerial mining
- 29:36Speaker 1: and strikes, and lastly by covert American Vietnamese naval displays, bombardments,
- 29:42Speaker 1: and air attacks. Rusk felt that the limited resources given
- 29:45Speaker 1: Vietnam inhibited US officials from daring new efforts. He wondered
- 29:50Speaker 1: whether enough Americans were aiding civil administrative services in cleared
- 29:53Speaker 1: areas that had to be held on April twenty eight,
- 29:57Speaker 1: The President therefore suggested to Lodge that two or three
- 30:00Speaker 1: hundred troops be replaced by civilian advisors to shift the
- 30:04Speaker 1: emphasis toward the art of peace. Hanoi meanwhile, became more belligerent.
- 30:10Speaker 1: On April thirteen, Ho Chi Min declared that if the
- 30:13Speaker 1: United States carried the war to North Vietnam, he had
- 30:17Speaker 1: powerful friends ready to help him. In the Laotian panhandle,
- 30:21Speaker 1: North Vietnamese construction crews, signalmen, and truck drivers improved infiltration routes.
- 30:27Speaker 1: Also in April, a North Vietnamese regiment was recalled from
- 30:30Speaker 1: Laos and given special military and political training for operations
- 30:34Speaker 1: in Vietnam. Hanoi began to form new regiments for dispatch southward.
- 30:39Speaker 1: Having probe Laotian government forces since November nineteen sixty three,
- 30:43Speaker 1: pathat Lao and North Vietnamese troops on April twenty seven
- 30:47Speaker 1: launched heavy attacks on the Plane of Jars after boasting
- 30:50Speaker 1: that they could take any district headquarters in the Meikong Delta.
- 30:53Speaker 1: The viet Cong on the night of April twelfth overran
- 30:56Speaker 1: the district capital of Kien Long on the Kaumau Peninsula.
- 31:00Speaker 1: In the ensuing air ground battle, the enemy lost at
- 31:03Speaker 1: least fifty five men killed, including the commander, yet two
- 31:06Speaker 1: hundred and eighty three Vietnamese and nine Americans were casualties.
- 31:10Speaker 1: The capital was in ruins, and some two hundred civilians
- 31:13Speaker 1: were killed or wounded. On May second, a viet Cong
- 31:16Speaker 1: underwater demolition team sank the US aircraft ferry Card while
- 31:21Speaker 1: it was birthed in the Saigon River and delivering helicopters.
- 31:25Speaker 1: Stung by these successes, General Kang told Lodge on May
- 31:29Speaker 1: four that he wanted to declare war on North Vietnam.
- 31:32Speaker 1: He wished to have ten thousand Special Forces troops to
- 31:35Speaker 1: cover the whole Cambodian Leotian border. Would the United States
- 31:38Speaker 1: start bombing beyond the confines of South Vietnam? On this question,
- 31:43Speaker 1: there was a serious split between American policymakers, and even
- 31:47Speaker 1: within the Joint chiefs of Staff. General LeMay and General
- 31:51Speaker 1: Wallace M. Green Junior USMC had urged low level reconnaissance
- 31:55Speaker 1: in air strikes against the North by US aircraft. In
- 31:58Speaker 1: a shift of opinion the other their JCS members, Chairman Taylor,
- 32:02Speaker 1: General Harold K. Johnson USA, and Admiral David L. MacDonald
- 32:07Speaker 1: USN believed that heavy pressure was not warranted, at least
- 32:10Speaker 1: for the present. In its study of how to tighten
- 32:14Speaker 1: the screws on North Vietnam, Sullivan's Vietnam Coordinating Committee noted
- 32:19Speaker 1: that North Vietnam's economy was chiefly agrarian There were relatively
- 32:23Speaker 1: few industrial targets that, if wiped out, would have an
- 32:25Speaker 1: immediate military impact. Still, a steady step up in air
- 32:29Speaker 1: power from psychological applications to selective strikes could hurt Hanoi
- 32:34Speaker 1: and slow its support to the viet Cong. Sink Pack. Meantime,
- 32:38Speaker 1: firmed up plans for the United States to take part
- 32:41Speaker 1: in military operations in loves, Cambodia, and North Vietnam if
- 32:45Speaker 1: the authorities in Washington so ordered. Communist activities in the
- 32:50Speaker 1: Laotian Panhandle prompted the Joint Chiefs to plan with the
- 32:54Speaker 1: government of Vietnam for airlifting Vietnamese intelligence teams into the
- 32:58Speaker 1: area around Chippone. When Secretary of McNamara and General Taylor
- 33:02Speaker 1: visited Saigon during May twelve and thirteen, McNamara let Kang
- 33:07Speaker 1: know that bombing North Vietnam would be no substitute for
- 33:10Speaker 1: clearing the viet Cong out of South Vietnam. The two
- 33:13Speaker 1: found Harkins optimistic, Westmoreland less so, and Lodge satisfied with
- 33:18Speaker 1: the size and composition of US efforts. Further large scale contributions,
- 33:23Speaker 1: he said, are not warranted. The collapse of government defenses
- 33:28Speaker 1: on the plane of Jars on May seventeen, demanded rapid
- 33:31Speaker 1: reaction within LAOS and a second look at the merits
- 33:34Speaker 1: of exerting pressure on North Vietnam. A National Security Council
- 33:37Speaker 1: working group chaired by Assistant Secretary of State William P.
- 33:41Speaker 1: Bundy prepared a thirty day scenario of political actions leading
- 33:45Speaker 1: to air strikes against North Vietnamese targets and a call
- 33:49Speaker 1: for an international conference on Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs J
- 33:52Speaker 1: three Operations listed targets in these categories of ascending importance
- 33:58Speaker 1: to convince Hanoi that it was too risky to back
- 34:00Speaker 1: the Viet Kong and Path at Lao, to deter Hanoi
- 34:03Speaker 1: from escalating the conflict, and to destroy the North Vietnamese
- 34:06Speaker 1: industrial base. In meetings on May twenty four and twenty five,
- 34:11Speaker 1: the Executive Committee of the National Security Council put forward
- 34:15Speaker 1: selected portions of the scenario. President Johnson then enjoined his
- 34:19Speaker 1: senior advisers to hold a major strategy conference in Hawaii
- 34:23Speaker 1: on June one two. The Soviet Union, early in nineteen
- 34:27Speaker 1: sixty four had advocated new meetings of the Geneva Powers
- 34:30Speaker 1: on Vietnam and Cambodia, and on May twenty seven, a
- 34:34Speaker 1: Polish diplomatic initiative called for a conference on Laos. After
- 34:38Speaker 1: hearing charges of border violations. The United Nations Security Council
- 34:43Speaker 1: suggested that observers be placed along the Cambodian frontier to
- 34:46Speaker 1: ease tensions. The United States and South Vietnam welcomed the proposal,
- 34:51Speaker 1: but the viet Cong and Cambodia spurned it. As Acting Chairman,
- 34:56Speaker 1: LeMay advised the Joint Chiefs on May twenty eight that
- 34:59Speaker 1: the UNS the United States was losing Southeast Asia fast.
- 35:03Speaker 1: The Chiefs, he argued, ought to present at the upcoming
- 35:06Speaker 1: Honolulu Military Conference a clear record on how to start winning.
- 35:11Speaker 1: He said the only way to end Hanoi's support of
- 35:14Speaker 1: the insurgency in Vietnam and Laos would be to destroy
- 35:17Speaker 1: its means. To do so, air attack should be made
- 35:20Speaker 1: on infiltration points at dnbing Fu and vinn to show
- 35:24Speaker 1: the sharp change in American outlook and resolve. On the thirtieth,
- 35:28Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs accepted LeMay's views and passed them to McNamara.
- 35:33Speaker 1: Upon his return, Chairman Taylor disagreed with these views and
- 35:36Speaker 1: sent his own to the Defense Secretary, initially proposing more
- 35:40Speaker 1: limited actions against targets less risky than VINN and DNB
- 35:44Speaker 1: and FU. The purpose, he stated, would be to impress
- 35:48Speaker 1: upon Hanoi US readiness to take more drastic action should
- 35:52Speaker 1: Vietnam enlarge its support for the viet Cong. Present at
- 35:56Speaker 1: the Secretary Defense Conference on June one and two were
- 35:59Speaker 1: Second Scretary Rusk Ambassador Lodge, General Taylor, Admiral Felt, and
- 36:04Speaker 1: mister Sullivan of the President's Vietnam Coordinating Committee. General Harkins,
- 36:09Speaker 1: whose relations with Lodge had soured, did not attend. The
- 36:12Speaker 1: atmosphere was gloomy. The talk focused on getting congressional approval
- 36:17Speaker 1: for wider action in Southeast Asia. Envisioned were commitment of
- 36:21Speaker 1: American divisions, a partial US mobilization, and air at tax
- 36:25Speaker 1: on North Vietnam. Lodge favored a careful bombing campaign. He
- 36:29Speaker 1: believed it would bolster the shaky Kang government and impart
- 36:32Speaker 1: a feeling of unity to the war weary South Vietnamese.
- 36:36Speaker 1: At the end, the consensus was to wait and see
- 36:39Speaker 1: what developed. Mister James B. Seaborn, the Canadian member of
- 36:44Speaker 1: the International Control Commission, visited North Vietnam and apprised the
- 36:48Speaker 1: government of American thoughts on a negotiated peace based on
- 36:51Speaker 1: concessions by both sides. If Annoy would stop sending men
- 36:55Speaker 1: in arms, South Washington would respond with economic aid, denying
- 36:59Speaker 1: it any attempt to threaten. The United States was well
- 37:02Speaker 1: aware of Hanoi's strings on the viet Cong. If the
- 37:05Speaker 1: war heated up, the greatest devastation would be loosened upon
- 37:08Speaker 1: North Vietnam. Seaborne stressed President Johnson's desire for a settlement
- 37:13Speaker 1: based on Hanoi's promise to abide by the Geneva Agreements
- 37:16Speaker 1: of nineteen fifty four and nineteen sixty two. North Vietnamese
- 37:20Speaker 1: officials were unimpressed. They wanted the United States to withdraw
- 37:23Speaker 1: totally from Vietnam. This would be followed by a neutral
- 37:27Speaker 1: regime in Saigon, with the National Liberation Front charting the
- 37:30Speaker 1: future of the country. Seaborne, during a second trip in August,
- 37:34Speaker 1: conveyed the warning that American patients was wearing thin. Hanoi's
- 37:38Speaker 1: reply was hardly encouraging for peace. Secretary McNamara and General
- 37:43Speaker 1: Taylor had asked the JCS and sink Pack to forge
- 37:46Speaker 1: a three phase air strike plan against North Vietnam. If
- 37:49Speaker 1: set in motion, it would signal American readiness to attack
- 37:52Speaker 1: all major military targets in the country. On July eleven,
- 37:56Speaker 1: the Planner settled on ninety four air strike objectives in
- 37:59Speaker 1: North THEIATA, eighty two targets, and twelve armed reconnaissance routes.
- 38:04Speaker 1: They next set about drafting detailed plans for this massive
- 38:07Speaker 1: air action. Sink Pack rather than MACVEE, was to have
- 38:12Speaker 1: overall direction of operations against North Vietnam through pack aff
- 38:15Speaker 1: and pack Fleet commanders, but the principal thrust of American
- 38:19Speaker 1: policy continued to be countering the insurgency within the borders
- 38:23Speaker 1: of South Vietnam. To that end, the MCVI commander was
- 38:26Speaker 1: to devote his full attention end of Chapter seventeen, recording
- 38:32Speaker 1: by Paul Hampton