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DDH - The McCollum Memo · Plausibly Live - The Dave Bowman Show Podcast

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  History is strange, it's alien, and it won't give us what we
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  would like to have. The McCollum Memo Now, you might
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  not know that name off the top of your head, but after today
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  you might find this tale, well, fascinating.
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  It's a key piece of the puzzle that explains a lot about
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  America's entry into World War 2, and why some folk believe
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  that FDR may have known more about the Pearl Harbor attack
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  than he ever let on. I'm not one of them.
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  But it's this memo that leads to that idea.
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  We start with some background. By 1940, the world, of course,
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  was already on fire. Nazi Germany had gobbled up much
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  of Europe. Japan was tearing through Asia
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  like nobody's business. Specifically China.
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  Here at home, though, the United States was doing its best to
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  stay out of it. Isolationism was still a very
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  popular position. And sure, we were sending some
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  aid to Britain and a little bit to China, but nobody wanted
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  another World War, at least not on paper.
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  But quietly, behind the scenes, there were some folks in the
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  military and intelligence community who were starting to
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  think, you know, we're going to have to deal with Japan sooner
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  or later. One of those people was
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  Lieutenant Commander Arthur M McCollum, a naval intelligence
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  officer. And this guy was deep, deep into
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  the nitty gritty of US Japan relationships.
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  And he had been watching Japan's aggressive moves very closely.
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  On October 7th, 1940, he drafted a memo, today known simply as
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  the McCollum Memo, that laid out a very bold plan.
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  Now imagine that this is a Lieutenant Commander in the Navy
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  and he's sending a memo with these ideas, which were simple
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  provoked Japan into attacking the United States.
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  That's right, he wasn't just predicting a conflict between
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  the United States and Japan, he was offering a road map for how
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  the United States could practically force Japan into
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  striking. First, his memo outlined an 8
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  point strategy designed to put the squeeze on Japan.
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  Each action was meant to increase tensions, provoke
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  anger, and ultimately push Japan to the breaking point.
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  He recommended things like strengthening US bases in the
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  Pacific, cutting off Japan's oil supply, building up the alliance
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  with Britain and Holland, the Netherlands in the Pacific, and
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  helping China fight back against Japan's invasion.
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  That was a calculated move. McCollum believed that Japan not
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  only wouldn't, but couldn't sit back if the United States
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  started implementing these steps.
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  He was probably right. If you look at the history, you
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  can see how each of these actions, whether they were
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  deliberate or not, would put Japan in a typed spot.
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  By the time Pearl Harbor happened in December of 1941,
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  Japan felt it had no other options but to strike first.
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  Now, where this gets interesting is whether or not FDR actually
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  saw the memo. There's no hard proof that he
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  actually saw the McCollum memo. There's no smoking gun, no
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  document with FDR signature saying, hey, go ahead and do
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  this. But here's the thing, a lot of
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  his recommendations eventually became U.S. policy.
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  Was that simply because they made sense, or did McCollum cede
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  those ideas? Embargoes were slapped on Japan,
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  United States Pacific Fleet was bolstered and moved to Hawaii,
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  and the Philippines were reinforced.
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  Was all this just a coincidence? It's possible.
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  Maybe Mccollum's ideas were filtering up the chain of
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  command and FDR, knowingly or unknowingly, followed the
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  playbook. For years, historians have
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  debated whether Roosevelt actively wanted to get the US
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  into the war and saw Japan as a way to make that happen.
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  After all, Europe was falling apart. the US needed to be
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  involved if it wanted to say in the post World War.
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  Selling another war to the nation still scarred from World
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  War One was not going to be an easy task.
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  Once the attack on Pearl Harbor happened.
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  Didn't take long for conspiracy theories to sprout.
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  Some people then and even today believe that FDR had seen the
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  memo and at least he understood the consequences of the United
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  States actions in the Pacific. They argued that Roosevelt may
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  have wanted Japan to attack first so the American people who
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  would be outraged by the sneak attack would rally behind the
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  declaration of war. And ultimately, that's what
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  happened. In the years since, these
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  theories have only grown. Some argue that Pearl Harbor was
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  quote, allowed UN quote to happen.
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  Although most historians dismiss this as conspiracy talk, I would
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  be one of them. Here's the bottom line. the
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  United States was taking steps that it knew would make Japan
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  angry and isolated. Whether FDR explicitly planned
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  it that way or not, the very actions outlined in the memo
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  played a role in leading up to the attack.
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  Now, whether the memo was a blueprint or just one man's
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  suggestion, it was part of a broader strategy that eventually
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  would draw the United States into World War 2.
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  The steps laid out in the memo lined up closely with the
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  escalating tensions between the United States and Japan.
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  By cutting off Japan's access to critical resources, fortifying
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  military positions in the Pacific, the US was,
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  intentionally or not, cornering Japan.
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  And when they felt trapped, Japan lashed out, just as
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  McCollum had predicted. Today, the McCollum memo remains
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  a controversial part of World War 2 history.
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  It's not really widely known, but those who do know about it
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  see it as a critical piece of the puzzle.
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  Did the memo lead directly to Pearl Harbor?
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  It's up for debate, But there's no denying that McCollum clearly
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  saw the writing on the wall, and his recommendations aligned
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  almost perfectly with how things would play out.
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  The bigger question is whether FDR saw this coming, whether he
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  might have been willing to let things escalate for the sake of
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  getting the United States into the war.
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  And it's the kind of thing that leaves you wondering what's
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  really happening behind the scenes in government decision
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  making, doesn't it? In the end, the McCallum memo is
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  a reminder that history often has more layers than we think.
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  It's not just about the events we see on the surface.
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  It's about the strategies, memos, decisions made and smoke
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  filled back rooms long before the first shot is ever fired.
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  And as we dig deeper into history, we can see how even the
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  smallest of memos can help shape world events.