Latest / Beyond The Horizon / Mega Edition: The OIG Report Into The Death And Circumstances Of Epstein's Death (Part 6) (6/14/26)
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
- 0:04In this episode, we're picking right up where we left
- 0:07off in the last episode, talking about the OIG's report
- 0:11into the circumstances surrounding Jeffrey Epstein's death. Part D failure
- 0:19to assign Epstein a new cellmate on August ninth, Section
- 0:24one Daywatch staff actions on August ninth, the Shoe Lieutenant
- 0:29told the OIG that he worked at MCC New York
- 0:33on August eighth, twenty nineteen, from approximately six a m.
- 0:37Until approximately two pm, and that he was off on
- 0:41August ninth, twenty nineteen. The Shoe Lieutenant, who shift ended
- 0:46over an hour before the USMS sent the second email
- 0:49regarding in May three's impending transfer, told the OIG that
- 0:54he was not aware that in May three was scheduled
- 0:57to be transferred out of MCC New York, and therefore
- 1:00he did not notify the captain that Epstein would require
- 1:04a new cell mate. According to the Shoe Lieutenant, as
- 1:07soon as the Shoe staff learned that in May three
- 1:10would be transferred, they should have notified a lieutenant on duty,
- 1:14the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, and the day Watch Activities
- 1:18lieutenant told the OIG on August ninth, twenty nineteen, they
- 1:22had oversight of the shoe from approximately six am until
- 1:26two pm due to their position descriptions and because of
- 1:30the shoe lieutenant's absence. According to the mcc New York
- 1:34staff roster on August ninth, twenty nineteen, Shoe Officer number
- 1:39one was listed as Senior Officer Specialist number five, although
- 1:44Shoe Officer number one is typically the officer in charge.
- 1:47Another senior Officer specialist told the OIG that in actuality
- 1:53he was the day watch shoe officer in charge on
- 1:55August ninth from approximately six am until two pm. The
- 2:00day watch shoe officer in charge said that since he
- 2:03had the most experienced and seniority, he was considered by
- 2:06everyone to be the shoe officer in charge, which the
- 2:10shoe lieutenant confirmed. The day watch shoe officer in charge
- 2:14told the OIG that he knew that Epstein had to
- 2:17have a cell mate. He said that as a general practice,
- 2:21every inmate who was transferred from suicide watch and or
- 2:24psychological observation to the shoe is placed with the cell mate.
- 2:29He also confirmed that the shoe lieutenant also instructed him
- 2:33that Epstein was to be housed with a cell mate
- 2:35at all times. According to the day Watch Shoe Officer
- 2:39in charge, between July thirtieth and August ninth, twenty nineteen,
- 2:43he told other mcc new York staff members who worked
- 2:47in the Shoe of Epstein's cellmate requirement, and further stated
- 2:51that everyone who worked in the Shoe should have known
- 2:54that Epstein was required to have a cell mate due
- 2:57to their knowledge, training, and experiens. The day Watch Shoe
- 3:02Officer in charge confirmed that on the morning of August ninth,
- 3:06twenty nineteen, the Shoe staff received an inmate call out
- 3:09list that listed in May three as WAB, which he explained,
- 3:14meant that in May three was being removed from mcc
- 3:18new York. He told the OIG that sometime between eight
- 3:22am and nine am, he escorted Epstein to the Shoe
- 3:26to the attorney conference room for Epstein's daily legal visit,
- 3:30during which time Epstein joked around with him. The day
- 3:34Watch Shoe Officer in charge said that he and Epstein
- 3:37were accompanied by CO one who was escorting in May
- 3:40three to receiving and discharge. The day Watch Shoe Officer
- 3:45in charge and co One both told the OIG that
- 3:48in May three was escorted to Receiving and discharge with
- 3:53all of his belongings, and both said that during the escort,
- 3:56the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge informed Epso that
- 4:00he would be assigned a new cellmate due to in
- 4:03May three's departure and the requirement that Epstein have a cellmate.
- 4:08In his interview with the OIG, CO One confirmed this
- 4:11conversation between the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge and Epstein,
- 4:15but he did not provide any additional information regarding notifications
- 4:20made either by him or the day Watch Shoe Officer
- 4:24in charge. The day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge told
- 4:28the OIG that when he and the CO one left
- 4:31the Shoe with Epstein and in May three, both the
- 4:34day Watch Operations Lieutenant and the day Watch Activities Lieutenant
- 4:39should have been physically present in the Lieutenant's office and
- 4:42should have seen that in May three was departing the
- 4:45institution when they passed the office. The day Watch Shoe
- 4:49Officer in Charge said that while he did not expect
- 4:52in May three to return to mcc New York, there
- 4:56had been times when inmates had been escorted to receiving
- 4:58in discharge and as an expected removal, only to be
- 5:02returned to the shoe later the same day due to
- 5:05unforeseen circumstances. According to the day watch Shoe officer in charge,
- 5:11he did not select a new cell mate for Epstein
- 5:13because he was not certain that in May three had
- 5:16been discharged from the institution, although he assumed that in
- 5:20May three would not return to the shoe. The day
- 5:23watch Shoe officer in charge told the OIG that when
- 5:27his shift ended at approximately two pm, he informed the
- 5:31evening watch Shoe officer in charge and Senior Officer Specialist
- 5:35five that if in May three did not return to
- 5:38the shoe, Epstein would need a new cell mate. Upon
- 5:41Epstein's return from his attorney visit, the day watch shoe
- 5:46officer in charge said he specifically recalled telling the evening
- 5:50watch shoe officer in charge, in the presence of a
- 5:53senior Officer Specialist five, make sure this guy gets a bunkie,
- 5:57to which the Evening Shoe watch officer in charge replied,
- 6:01all right.
- 6:02Speaker 2: The day watch Shoe officer in charge.
- 6:04Speaker 1: Said that at some point that day it was likely
- 6:08that he also informed the day Watch Operations Lieutenant but
- 6:11he could not specifically recall if he had done so.
- 6:15The day Watch Shoe officer in charge told the OIG
- 6:19that a replacement cell mate should have been identified as
- 6:22soon as it was confirmed that in May three had
- 6:25left the institution. He said a new cellmate could have
- 6:28been reassigned before the four PM shoe count if it
- 6:32was known that in May three was not coming back,
- 6:35but the Shoe staff members had until Epstein returned from
- 6:38his attorney visit to assigned Epstein a new cellmate. According
- 6:42to the day Watch Shoe officer in charge, Shoe staff
- 6:46definitely should have realized that in May three was not returning,
- 6:50both during the four PM count and when Epstein returned
- 6:53from his attorney visit later that evening. The day Watch
- 6:57Shoe officer in charge told the OIG that at Ebstein's
- 7:00daily routine was that he would be with his attorneys
- 7:03in the attorney conference room until approximately eight pm, so
- 7:07Shoe personnel had time to make a new cellmate assignment.
- 7:12He had all Shoe staff members share the responsibility to
- 7:15find a replacement cell mate, and that anyone assigned to
- 7:18the Shoe could have found another inmate to replace in
- 7:21May three. However, he also said that due to Epstein's
- 7:26high profile, the Shoe personnel should have asked a lieutenant
- 7:29to contact the psychology department to see which inmate should
- 7:33have been placed with Epstein. On August twelfth, twenty nineteen,
- 7:38following Epstein's death, the day watch Shoe Officer in charge
- 7:41wrote a memorandum to the wardens dating on Friday, August ninth,
- 7:45twenty nineteen, at approximately one fifty pm. Iss the day
- 7:51Watch Shoe Officer in Charge passed on to the oncoming
- 7:54staff members the evening Watch Shoe Officer in Charge and
- 7:58President Shift staff Senior Officer Specialist five in CO two
- 8:02that in May three was going wab Ie with all
- 8:06of his belongings and possibly he may not return. Also
- 8:11that inmate Epstein number seven sixty three one eight DASH
- 8:15zero five to four will be needing a cell mate
- 8:18upon arrival from his attorney visit. The day watch Shoe
- 8:22Officer in charge departed the Shoe at approximately two PM
- 8:26and worked an overtime shift as a driver for mcc
- 8:29New York. He stated that he did not follow up
- 8:32with the Shoe staff to verify that Epstein had been
- 8:35assigned another cell mate mcc new York staff with responsibility
- 8:41for oversight and staffing of the Shoe during the day watch,
- 8:45including the Warden Associate Warden I, the Captain, the Shoe Lieutenant,
- 8:49the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the day Watch Activities Lieutenant,
- 8:53and the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, told the
- 8:56OIG that they all knew Epstein was required to have
- 8:59a cell mate pursuant to the Psychology Department's determination. They
- 9:04also confirmed that everyone who regularly worked in the Shoe
- 9:08knew of this requirement, and that it was the responsibility
- 9:11of all Shoe staff to notify a supervisor upon learning
- 9:15that Epstein needed to be assigned the new cellmate due
- 9:19to Inmate three's transfer to another prison.
- 9:22Speaker 2: The day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge and CO.
- 9:24Speaker 1: One, however, were the only two mcc new York staff
- 9:28members working the day watch on August ninth, twenty nineteen,
- 9:32who told the OIG that they were aware of Inmate
- 9:35three's transfer and the need to assign Epstein a new cellmate.
- 9:40CO one's immediate superior, the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge,
- 9:44was already aware of the need to assign Epstein a
- 9:47new cellmate, while the day Watch Shoe Officer in charge
- 9:50told the OIG that he made a number of notifications.
- 9:54Other witnesses cannot confirm that he passed on information regarding
- 9:58Epstein's need or a new cell mate. The day Watch
- 10:02Operations Lieutenant and the day Watch Activities Lieutenant both told
- 10:06the OIG that they did not know in May three
- 10:09had been transferred out of the facility, despite the fact
- 10:13that both were recipients of the second email the USMS
- 10:17sent out on August eight that included the information about
- 10:20in May three's and pending transfer out of mcc New York.
- 10:24On August ninth, rather, the day Watch Operations Lieutenant and
- 10:28the day Watch Activities Lieutenant told the OIG that they
- 10:32believed in May three had been removed from mcc New
- 10:35York for a court appearance. The day Watch Activities Lieutenant
- 10:40did not recall in May three departing the institution with
- 10:43all of his belongings, or having any conversations with day
- 10:47Watch Shoe Officer in charge or anyone else regarding Inmate
- 10:51three's departure from mcc New York. According to the day
- 10:55Watch Activities Lieutenant, he did not know that Epstein was
- 10:59without a cell Other senior officials, including the Warden Associate
- 11:04Warden I and the captain, were also unaware of Inmate
- 11:07three's transfer and the need to assign Epstein a new
- 11:11cell mate. These officials concurred that while all shoe staff
- 11:15and supervisors were responsible for notifying a supervisor in the
- 11:19chain of command of the need to assign Epstein a
- 11:22new cellmate, the day watch shoe officer in charge bore
- 11:25a primary responsibility for the notification because he was the
- 11:29shoe officer in charge and one of the two people
- 11:32who saw the Inmate three leave the facility with all
- 11:36of his belongings. The Captain told the OIG that since
- 11:40Epstein was in the attorney conference room all day, no
- 11:44one may have even thought about it, and may have
- 11:47only become aware when they put Epstein back in his
- 11:50cell after his attorney visit that evening. The Captain said
- 11:54as soon as the shoe staff became aware that Epstein
- 11:57was without a cell mate, they should have notified the
- 11:59evening watch Operations lieutenant. The Captain said that if he
- 12:03had been informed, he would have taken immediate action to
- 12:06ensure that Epstein was either assigned a new cell mate
- 12:10or monitored until that assignment occurred. The Captain, however, was
- 12:15one of the recipients of the USMS August eighth email
- 12:19that notified members of mcc New York supervisory staff of
- 12:23inmate three transfer to another facility. The warden and associate
- 12:28warden did not receive this email. The warden told the
- 12:31OIG that he was off duty on August ninth, twenty nineteen.
- 12:36The warden said that in the event Epstein was without
- 12:39a cell mate, the plan was to review the situation
- 12:42and decide who should replace inmate three, but that no
- 12:46inmate in the shoe was pre selected to replace in
- 12:49May three if this event occurred. All right, So we're
- 12:53going to wrap up this episode right here, and then
- 12:56in the next episode we're going to pick up where
- 12:58we left off, and and that's going to be with
- 13:01section two Evening watch staff actions on August ninth. All
- 13:06of the information that goes with the episode can be
- 13:08found in the description box pig. What's up, everyone, and
- 13:13welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're
- 13:18going to pick back up with the OIG report and
- 13:21we're going to take a look at chapter six.
- 13:25Speaker 2: So let's get started. Chapter six.
- 13:28Speaker 1: The availability of limited recorded video evidence due to the
- 13:33security camera recording system failure. In August twenty nineteen, the
- 13:38Metropolitan Correctional Center located in New York, New York. MCC
- 13:43New York had approximately one hundred and fifty video security
- 13:47cameras no audio placed throughout the institution.
- 13:51Speaker 2: The Office of the.
- 13:52Speaker 1: Inspector General found that approximately eleven cameras were located in
- 13:56and around the Special Unit housing unit where where Epstein
- 14:01was confined at the time of his death on August tenth,
- 14:04twenty nineteen, including one at the end of the l
- 14:07tier where Epstein was housed that showed any movement in
- 14:11or out of inmate cells and in the tiers hallway.
- 14:15In addition to broadcasting live video, MCC New York had
- 14:20a system that recorded the live video feeds. Following Epstein's death,
- 14:24MCC New York officials and FBI investigators attempted to review
- 14:29video recordings related to the incident and discovered that although
- 14:33the security cameras were working and transmitting live video, recorded
- 14:38video from most of the cameras in the Shoe area
- 14:42was not available due to a malfunction of the video
- 14:45recording system that had occurred on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen,
- 14:50including video from the camera at the end of EL Tier.
- 14:54As a result, while the L tier video camera was
- 14:57transmitting a live video feed on the night of August ninth,
- 15:00twenty nineteen and the morning of August tenth, twenty nineteen,
- 15:05the video was not being recorded. One of the cameras
- 15:08that had available recordings from August ninth and tenth was
- 15:12a camera located outside a housing unit adjacent to the shoe.
- 15:17That camera captured video of a large part of the
- 15:20common area of the shoe, including the shoe officer station
- 15:24and portions of the stairways leading to the different shoe tiers,
- 15:28including the L Tier. Thus, anyone entering or attempting to
- 15:32enter the L Tier from the common area of the shoe,
- 15:35including on August ninth and tenth, would have been picked
- 15:39up by the video recorded by that camera. In addition,
- 15:42the recording showed the shoe officer station, where the two
- 15:45shoe staff were seated at a desk immediately outside the
- 15:49entrance to the L Tier and diagonally across from Epstein's cell,
- 15:53which was the first cell on the right hand side
- 15:56of the L Tier. Section one back round round on
- 16:00the security camera system at MCC new York. All video
- 16:04surveillance from mcc new York's cameras was connected to a
- 16:09DVR system. The DVR system had two data storage systems
- 16:14that were labeled DVR one and DVR two, and each
- 16:17consisted of sixteen hard drives used for storing digital recordings.
- 16:22Roughly half of mcc new York security cameras were assigned
- 16:26to record to DVR one and the other half were
- 16:29assigned to record to DVR two. Cameras assigned to DVR
- 16:33one only recorded to the DVR one hard drives, and
- 16:37cameras assigned to DVR two only recorded to the DVR
- 16:41two hard drives. Therefore, if DVR one crashed, no video
- 16:45from the DVR two assigned cameras could be retrieved from
- 16:49DVR one, and vice versa. The OIG's investigation revealed the
- 16:54history of camera problems at MCC new York. In August
- 16:58twenty nineteen, the electro technician was the only such technician
- 17:03at MCC new York. The electronics technician told the OIG
- 17:07that when he began to work at mcc new York
- 17:10in twenty sixteen, he found that the facility's security camera
- 17:14system needed to be upgraded. According to the electronics technician,
- 17:18the system had not properly been maintained prior to his arrival,
- 17:23The hard drives in the DVRs frequently malfunctioned and needed
- 17:26to be replaced, and the overall system was outdated, in
- 17:30part because the cameras were analog and not digital. The
- 17:35electronics technician told the OIG that throughout his tenure at
- 17:39mcc new York, the camera system was subject to frequently
- 17:43recurring failures, particularly with the respect.
- 17:47Speaker 2: To the DVR hard drives.
- 17:49Speaker 1: The warden, who assumes his responsibilities at mcc new York
- 17:53in May of twenty eighteen, told the OIG he was
- 17:56generally aware that there were problems with the security GUS
- 18:00camera system throughout the institution. He further stated that efforts
- 18:04were undertaken to determine which cameras were working and which
- 18:08needed to be fixed, and that mcc new York officials
- 18:12intended to ultimately seek funding to replace the entire system.
- 18:19Federal Bureau of Prisons records reflect that on September sixth,
- 18:22twenty eighteen, the warden submitted a memorandum to the BP's
- 18:27Northeast Regional Director to request eight hundred thousand dollars in
- 18:31funding to replace the entire camera system. The memorandum identified
- 18:36an estimated project start date of December one, twenty eighteen,
- 18:40and an estimated completion date of February ninth, twenty nineteen.
- 18:45The BOP approved the funding request, and on September twenty first,
- 18:49twenty eighteen, a contract in the amount of six hundred
- 18:53ninety eight thousand, one hundred eight dollars and ninety nine
- 18:56cents was awarded to Company one to provide various equipment
- 19:00for the project and associated labor. On September twenty fourth,
- 19:05twenty eighteen, a separate contract in the amount of thirty
- 19:08four thousand, eighty nine dollars and twenty eight cents was
- 19:12awarded to Company two to provide a sorted networking, equipment
- 19:16and wiring needed to install the camera system. As the
- 19:21camera upgrade project was beginning, BOP officials recognized that mcc
- 19:26new York's mechanical, electrical, and plumbing systems were also in
- 19:30need of major repairs. Mcc new York did not have
- 19:33enough qualified technicians on staff to complete both the camera
- 19:38installation and other repairs needed at the facility, so beginning
- 19:42the week of March seventeenth, twenty nineteen, the GOP's Northeast
- 19:47Regional Office arranged for technicians from the BP institutions to
- 19:52conduct temporary duty assignments at MCC New York to perform
- 19:56the work. During the course of the TDY rotatetions, work
- 20:01was not consistently conducted on the camera upgrades because sometimes
- 20:05TDY staff assigned to the project were used to cover
- 20:08shortages at MCC New York's custody posts, and sometimes there
- 20:13were not enough TDY volunteers who possess the skills required
- 20:17to do the camera work. At the time of Epstein's
- 20:21death on August tenth, twenty nineteen, the camera system upgrade
- 20:25had not been completed. Immediately following Epstein's death, Company one
- 20:30officials arrived at MCC New York and installed the new
- 20:33recording system within a couple of days, and recording functionality
- 20:38was restored using the existing cameras. The majority of the
- 20:42new cameras did not arrive to the facility until October
- 20:46twenty nineteen, and they were installed in stages as the
- 20:50wiring work was conducted. According to the electronics technician, as
- 20:55of August twenty twenty one, when the MCC closed the
- 20:59wiring work had still not been fully completed. Part two
- 21:04Discovery of security camera system recording issues in August of
- 21:08twenty nineteen. Part A discovery on August eighth of the
- 21:13DVR two failure that occurred on July twenty ninth. According
- 21:18to forensic analysis conducted by the FBI after Epstein's death,
- 21:22disc failures occurred in MCC New York's DVR two system
- 21:26on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, which resulted in the
- 21:30system being unable to record. According to BOP records and
- 21:35OIG interviews, the BOP did not learn about the failure
- 21:39until August eight, twenty nineteen, when the Special Investigative Services
- 21:44Lieutenant and Dissociate ward I attempted to review recorded surveillance
- 21:49video for a matter unrelated to Epstein. The SIS lieutenant
- 21:55told the OIG she discovered that no recorded video was
- 21:59available for several of the institution's cameras, so she reported
- 22:03the matter to the communications office, and the electronics technician
- 22:08arrived to assess the problem sometime before his shift was
- 22:11scheduled to end. The electronics technician told the OIG that
- 22:16he found that roughly half of the institutions approximately one
- 22:20hundred and fifty cameras which were assigned to record to
- 22:23DVR two were displaying a live video but were not recording.
- 22:28The electronics technician told the OIG that before Epstein's death,
- 22:33no one was specifically tasked with ensuring that the video
- 22:36from the cameras was being recorded. The electronics technician said
- 22:41that he therefore did not perform any daily checks to
- 22:45ensure that the video is being recorded. The warden indicated
- 22:49that SIS staff are usually responsible for checking the system
- 22:53for recording functionality and reporting any problems to the communications office. However,
- 23:01the SIS lieutenant told the OIG that it was her
- 23:04belief that the electronics technician should have been checking the
- 23:07system daily to ensure it was recording. The OIG found
- 23:12that there are no BOP policies that specifically state that
- 23:16institutional staff must perform periodic checks to ensure the camera
- 23:21system is fully functional or that security camera systems have
- 23:26the capacity to record. The facility manager told the OIG
- 23:31that since Epstein's death, he now checks to ensure that
- 23:34all cameras and the recording system are working on a
- 23:38daily basis, and he subsequently provides a report about the
- 23:42status of the system to the facilities, executive staff, the
- 23:46SIS and electronics technicians. All right, folks, we're going to
- 23:51end this episode right there, and then in the next
- 23:53episode we're going to pick up with section B of
- 23:58Chapter six and keep it moving. All of the information
- 24:02that goes with the episode can be found in the
- 24:04description box.