Latest / Beyond The Horizon / Mega Edition: Bryan Kohberger's Motion To Suppress The Arrest Warrant And Denial (9/6/26)
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: What's up everyone and welcome back to the program. In
- 0:03Speaker 1: this episode, we're going to get right back to the
- 0:05Speaker 1: court documents up in Moscow. And this time we're going
- 0:08Speaker 1: to take a look at Brian Kohlberger's motion to suppress
- 0:11Speaker 1: and memorandum in support of the arrest warrant. Case number 124-31665.
- 0:16Speaker 1: State of Idaho plaintiff versus Brian C. Kohlberger, the defendant.
- 0:24Speaker 1: Comes now. Brian C. Kohlberger buying through his attorneys of record.
- 0:28Speaker 1: and hereby submits the following memorandum in support of his
- 0:32Speaker 1: contemporaneously filed motion for an order suppressing all evidence gathered
- 0:36Speaker 1: by law enforcement as a result of his arrest. Issues 1.
- 0:41Speaker 1: This court should apply Idaho's exclusionary rule and law to
- 0:44Speaker 1: this search. 2. Affidavits submitted in support of the application
- 0:49Speaker 1: for the issued search warrant recklessly or intentionally omitted material information. Mr.
- 0:54Speaker 1: Kohlberger has filed a motion for a Franks hearing and
- 0:57Speaker 1: without repeating, incorporates that challenge to this search warrant. Three,
- 1:01Speaker 1: the affidavit submitted in support for the application for the
- 1:04Speaker 1: issued search warrant included information that must be excised. A,
- 1:08Speaker 1: all information in the affidavit was gathered because of law
- 1:11Speaker 1: enforcement's unconstitutional use of investigative genetic genealogy and thus nothing
- 1:17Speaker 1: in the warrant should remain. B, information about the client's
- 1:20Speaker 1: location taken from his phone must also be excised due
- 1:24Speaker 1: to being gathered from an invalid warrant. Facts. Due to
- 1:27Speaker 1: the haphazard way in which law enforcement, including the prosecutor's office,
- 1:31Speaker 1: has kept and disclosed records in this matter, the following
- 1:35Speaker 1: is a rough statement of facts as best the defense
- 1:37Speaker 1: can tell. On December 28, 2022, Trooper Larry of Pennsylvania
- 1:43Speaker 1: State Police became aware of the objective of arresting Mr.
- 1:46Speaker 1: Koberger via Moscow Police Corporal Payne. On December 29, 2022,
- 1:53Speaker 1: at 4.44 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, a magistrate in Pennsylvania
- 1:58Speaker 1: issued a search warrant for 119 Lambsden Drive, Chestnut Hill Township,
- 2:03Speaker 1: Monroe County, the home of Mr. Koberger's parents. On December 29, 2022,
- 2:09Speaker 1: at 2.22 p.m., the magistrate in this matter signed an
- 2:12Speaker 1: arrest warrant for Mr. Koberger in Latah County. The affidavit
- 2:17Speaker 1: for the warrant was signed by Moscow Police Department Corporal Payne.
- 2:20Speaker 1: The basic facts Corporal Payne used to support the arrest
- 2:23Speaker 1: are discussed in detail in a separately filed motion pursuant
- 2:27Speaker 1: to Franks v. Delaware. They're incorporated without repeating. At 2.43 p.m.
- 2:32Speaker 1: Pacific Standard Time on December 29, 2022, a criminal complaint
- 2:37Speaker 1: and probable cause order were filed in this matter. At
- 2:40Speaker 1: 10 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Pennsylvania SWAT began preparations to
- 2:45Speaker 1: arrest Mr. Koberger. Despite days of constant FBI surveillance, Pennsylvania
- 2:49Speaker 1: law enforcement did their own surveillance starting at 11.15 p.m.
- 2:54Speaker 1: And despite the fact that days of constant FBI surveillance
- 2:57Speaker 1: showed Mr. Kohlberger was unarmed and tended to go for
- 3:00Speaker 1: runs around his parents' neighborhood, police decided that forcefully entering Mr.
- 3:05Speaker 1: Kohlberger's parents' home was the best option. On December 30, 2022,
- 3:10Speaker 1: at 1.14 a.m., Pennsylvania SWAT raided Mr. Kohlberger's parents' home.
- 3:15Speaker 1: During the raid, law enforcement broke the door of the home,
- 3:17Speaker 1: held the entire family at gunpoint, and sees Mr. Kohlberger. Mr.
- 3:21Speaker 1: Kohlberger made statements to his arresting officers. He was transported
- 3:25Speaker 1: to a police station in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, and made statements
- 3:29Speaker 1: during transport. At the station, Mr. Kohlberger was processed during
- 3:33Speaker 1: which police collected information about his person. Finally, during interrogation,
- 3:37Speaker 1: before requesting an attorney, Mr. Kohlberger made statements to interrogators
- 3:41Speaker 1: from the Idaho State Police and Moscow Police Department. At
- 3:45Speaker 1: 4 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, On December 30, 2023, Pennsylvania
- 3:50Speaker 1: State Police filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Koberger. The argument. 1.
- 3:56Speaker 1: This court should apply Idaho's exclusionary rule and law to
- 3:59Speaker 1: this search. The first question this court must determine is
- 4:03Speaker 1: whether there is a conflict of laws in this matter, i.e.
- 4:06Speaker 1: whether Idaho law or Pennsylvania law controls the validity of
- 4:10Speaker 1: the arrest warrant for Mr. Koberger. Pennsylvania courts require a
- 4:13Speaker 1: warrant for a particular resident's To go after a person,
- 4:16Speaker 1: police are aware, has an arrest warrant. Commonwealth v. Romero, 2018.
- 4:21Speaker 1: The need for a warrant for a fugitive from another
- 4:24Speaker 1: state is codified in 42 Pennsylvania Code Section 9128 and 9129.
- 4:31Speaker 1: Without a governor's warrant, an officer can get a judicial
- 4:34Speaker 1: warrant to permit entry into a home. Without either type
- 4:37Speaker 1: of warrant, an officer lacks this authority. See 42 Pennsylvania
- 4:42Speaker 1: Code Section 9135. This understanding also comports with Peyton v.
- 4:47Speaker 1: New York, 1980. State warrants have no extraterritorial effect. State v. Bradley,
- 4:53Speaker 1: 106 Idaho, 1983. The use of an out-of-state warrant is
- 4:58Speaker 1: ipso facto a warrantless entry. Thus, law enforcement in Pennsylvania
- 5:03Speaker 1: cannot rely on the existence of the Idaho arrest warrant
- 5:06Speaker 1: to enter the home. Finally, it must be said that
- 5:08Speaker 1: there is very little daylight between the Idaho Constitution and
- 5:12Speaker 1: the Pennsylvania Constitution. Both apply exclusion to a failure to
- 5:16Speaker 1: knock and announce C-State v. Rausch, 99 Idaho, 1978. If anything,
- 5:22Speaker 1: Pennsylvania appears to have stricter warrant requirements for particularity, Commonwealth v. Grossman, Pennsylvania, 1989. 2.
- 5:29Speaker 1: The affidavit submitted in support of the application for the
- 5:35Speaker 1: issue's search warrant recklessly or intentionally omitted material information. The
- 5:40Speaker 1: Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that no warrant shall issue but
- 5:43Speaker 1: upon probable cause, supported by oath of affirmation, and particularly
- 5:48Speaker 1: describing the place to be searched and the persons or
- 5:51Speaker 1: things to be seized. Groh v. Ramirez, 540, 2004, quoting U.S.
- 5:56Speaker 1: Constitution Amendment 4, Probable cause exists when, given all the
- 6:00Speaker 1: circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a fair
- 6:04Speaker 1: probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
- 6:07Speaker 1: found in a particular place, Illinois v. Gates, 1983. Because
- 6:12Speaker 1: the right of a man to retreat into his own
- 6:14Speaker 1: home and there to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion
- 6:17Speaker 1: stands at the very core of the Fourth Amendment. Kylo v. U.S., 535, 2001.
- 6:24Speaker 1: Quoting Silverman, United States, 365, 1961. Courts have firmly established
- 6:30Speaker 1: the basic principle of Fourth Amendment law, that searches and
- 6:33Speaker 1: seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.
- 6:39Speaker 1: For a search warrant to be valid, the judge issuing
- 6:42Speaker 1: the warrant must rely on an affidavit or affidavits sworn
- 6:45Speaker 1: to before the judge or by testimony under oath and
- 6:48Speaker 1: recorded that establish the grounds for issuing the warrant. Any
- 6:52Speaker 1: discrepancy between the items for which there was probable cause
- 6:56Speaker 1: and their description in the search warrant requires suppression. Criminal
- 7:01Speaker 1: Procedure and Rights of Accused Section 887-2022 It's clear that
- 7:03Speaker 1: the issuing magistrate himself if he is to fulfill the
- 7:09Speaker 1: constitutionally mandated function of interposing an independent intelligence between the
- 7:14Speaker 1: law enforcement officer and the citizen, must actually, and in fact,
- 7:18Speaker 1: draw the inferences from the evidence presented to him. It
- 7:22Speaker 1: is for this reason that the courts have insisted that
- 7:25Speaker 1: the full facts from which inferences might be drawn and
- 7:28Speaker 1: information necessary to determine their reliability be placed before the
- 7:32Speaker 1: issuing magistrate. Finally, a criminal defendant may challenge the veracity
- 7:37Speaker 1: of an affidavit used to obtain such a warrant. Upon
- 7:41Speaker 1: a preliminary showing of a warrant's deficiency, the defendant must prove,
- 7:45Speaker 1: by a preponderance of evidence, that intentional or reckless falsehoods
- 7:49Speaker 1: were included in the warrant affidavit and were material to
- 7:52Speaker 1: the magistrate's finding of probable cause, or that material exculpatory
- 7:57Speaker 1: information was deliberately or recklessly omitted. An omission of exculpatory
- 8:02Speaker 1: facts is material or Only if there is a substantial
- 8:04Speaker 1: probability that the omitted information been presented, it would have
- 8:09Speaker 1: altered the magistrate's determination of probable cause. Whether an omission
- 8:13Speaker 1: was intentional or reckless might be inferred, in part, for
- 8:17Speaker 1: the relative importance of the information and its exculpatory power.
- 8:22Speaker 1: Idaho at 48, 981 at 1158. The challenge pursuant to
- 8:27Speaker 1: this section of the motion is separately laid out in Mr.
- 8:30Speaker 1: Koberger's motion for hearing under Franks. The motion and proffer
- 8:34Speaker 1: are incorporated, but not repeated herein. 3. The affidavit submitted,
- 8:39Speaker 1: in support of the application for the issued search warrant,
- 8:41Speaker 1: included information that must be excised. Where information in a
- 8:46Speaker 1: warrant was obtained via a violation of the Constitution, Idaho
- 8:50Speaker 1: courts excise that information. See State v. Johnson, 1986. State v. Bunting, 2006.
- 8:55Speaker 1: State v. Butterbaugh, 2002. A. All information in the affidavit
- 9:04Speaker 1: was gathered because of law enforcement's unconstitutional use of investigative
- 9:08Speaker 1: genetic genealogy, and thus nothing in the warrant should remain. Mr.
- 9:13Speaker 1: Kohlberger has argued in a separate motion that the genetic
- 9:16Speaker 1: genealogy investigation in this matter was done in violation of
- 9:19Speaker 1: the Constitution. Additionally, he has argued that there would be
- 9:23Speaker 1: no investigation into him without that original constitutional violation. It
- 9:28Speaker 1: is not that the results of the IGG sped up
- 9:30Speaker 1: the investigation. Instead, they focused the investigation on Mr. Kohlberger,
- 9:36Speaker 1: a person whose only connection to the case was his
- 9:38Speaker 1: mode of transportation and the shape of his eyebrows, two
- 9:41Speaker 1: identifications of little to no value, as previously argued. As
- 9:47Speaker 1: the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, while the initial burden
- 9:51Speaker 1: in showing a factual nexus between illegality and the evidence,
- 9:56Speaker 1: the state must show it would have been discovered anyway.
- 9:58Speaker 1: State v. Moss won v. Moss 171-2022 The state cannot
- 10:03Speaker 1: make this showing. Without IGG, there is no case, no
- 10:07Speaker 1: request for his phone records, surveillance of his parents' home,
- 10:10Speaker 1: no DNA taken from his garbage out front. Because the
- 10:13Speaker 1: IGG analysis is the origin of this matter, everything in
- 10:17Speaker 1: the affidavit should be excised. B. Information about the client's
- 10:21Speaker 1: locations taken from his phone must also be excised due
- 10:24Speaker 1: to being gathered from an invalid warrant. Separately, the information
- 10:29Speaker 1: gathered via the warrant from Mr. Kohlberger's AT & T
- 10:31Speaker 1: account and the pen trap and trace device warrant should
- 10:34Speaker 1: be excised for the reasons set out in the warrants.
- 10:38Speaker 1: Conclusion Mr. Kohlberger requests this court suppress all evidence obtained
- 10:42Speaker 1: by police via the warrant that permitted them to arrest Mr. Kohlberger.
- 10:46Speaker 1: As explained above, law enforcement... failed to knock and announce
- 10:50Speaker 1: before raiding the home, and the warrant lacked probable cause
- 10:53Speaker 1: as written, given its heavy reliance on conclusions reached by
- 10:57Speaker 1: law enforcement without the details necessary for the magistrate to
- 11:00Speaker 1: draw its own conclusions, and because the warrant omitted exculpatory
- 11:04Speaker 1: information and information that put into question the reliability of
- 11:08Speaker 1: the facts upon which it relies, and finally because the
- 11:11Speaker 1: affidavit relied on evidence gained in violation of the Constitution,
- 11:16Speaker 1: all in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1,
- 11:18Speaker 1: Section 17. This document was dated November 13th, 2024, and
- 11:24Speaker 1: it was signed by Ann Taylor. All of the information
- 11:27Speaker 1: that goes with this episode, including my contact information, can
- 11:31Speaker 1: be found in the description box. What's up, everyone, and
- 11:34Speaker 1: welcome back to the program. In this episode, we're going
- 11:37Speaker 1: to get right to those orders by Judge Hippler, and
- 11:41Speaker 1: we're going to start out first with the order on
- 11:44Speaker 1: defendant's motions to suppress... Arrest Warrants, Pennsylvania Warrants, Apartment Warrant,
- 11:50Speaker 1: and Idaho Warrant to Search Person. State of Idaho Plaintiff vs.
- 11:55Speaker 1: Brian C. Koberger, the Defendant Introduction Defendant is charged with
- 12:01Speaker 1: one count of burglary and four counts of murder in
- 12:04Speaker 1: the first degree in connection with the stabbing deaths of
- 12:07Speaker 1: four University of Idaho students in the early morning hours
- 12:10Speaker 1: of November 13, 2022. On December 30, 2022, he was
- 12:15Speaker 1: arrested pursuant to a warrant at his parents' home in Pennsylvania.
- 12:20Speaker 1: At the time of his arrest, Pennsylvania authorities executed search
- 12:23Speaker 1: warrants for defendant's person, his vehicle, and his parents' home.
- 12:27Speaker 1: Around the same time, a fifth warrant for a search
- 12:30Speaker 1: of defendant's Pullman, Washington apartment was issued by a Washington magistrate.
- 12:35Speaker 1: After defendant was transported back to Idaho, law enforcement obtained
- 12:39Speaker 1: a sixth warrant for a search of defendant's person. Through
- 12:43Speaker 1: six different motions, defendant seeks suppression of evidence gathered by
- 12:47Speaker 1: law enforcement through these warrants on several grounds. His argument
- 12:51Speaker 1: for motions have largely been disposed of through the court's
- 12:55Speaker 1: contemporaneously filed orders. Still remaining, however, is 1. Whether suppression
- 13:01Speaker 1: is warranted due to law enforcement's failure to knock and
- 13:04Speaker 1: announce in executing warrants at the Kohlberger residence. and two,
- 13:08Speaker 1: whether defendants' post-arrest statements are suppressible as fruit of the
- 13:13Speaker 1: poisonous tree and or due to Miranda violation. A suppression
- 13:18Speaker 1: hearing on the portion of defendants' motions at issue in
- 13:21Speaker 1: this order was held on January 24, 2025, during which
- 13:25Speaker 1: the court received testimony from Detective Corporal Brett Payne and
- 13:29Speaker 1: Detective Lawrence Mowry, both from the Moscow Police Department. The
- 13:34Speaker 1: court found both detectives to be credible and reliable. Following argument,
- 13:38Speaker 1: the court took the matter under advisement. The court finds
- 13:42Speaker 1: suppression is not warranted because 1. Exigent circumstances excuse the
- 13:46Speaker 1: abbreviated knock and announce and 2. Defendant has not established
- 13:51Speaker 1: a Miranda violation. 2. Standard. The standard review of a
- 13:55Speaker 1: motion to suppress is bifurcated. The power to assess the
- 13:59Speaker 1: credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
- 14:04Speaker 1: factual inferences is invested in the trial court. State v.
- 14:08Speaker 1: Valdez Molina, 127, Idaho, 102, 106, 897, P. 2D, 993, 997, 1995.
- 14:18Speaker 1: A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence
- 14:21Speaker 1: combines the issue of law and fact, and the trial
- 14:24Speaker 1: court's factual findings will not be overturned unless they are
- 14:27Speaker 1: clearly erroneous. State v. Conant, 143, Idaho, 797, 799, 153, P. 3D, 477, 479-2007.
- 14:39Speaker 1: When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged,
- 14:43Speaker 1: the application of constitutional principles to the facts found will
- 14:47Speaker 1: be freely reviewed. State v. Veneroso, 138 Idaho 925-928-71, p. 3d 1072-1075, 2003.
- 14:51Speaker 1: Finding a Fact On November 13, 2022, An officer from
- 15:05Speaker 1: the Moscow Police Department responded to a residence located at
- 15:09Speaker 1: 1122 King Road in Moscow, Idaho, where he discovered the
- 15:12Speaker 1: bodies of Madison Mogan, Kaylee Gonsalves, Ethan Chapin, and Zanna Kernodle.
- 15:18Speaker 1: Each appeared to have been stabbed to death. The investigation
- 15:20Speaker 1: that ensued was a multi-agency affair involving members of the
- 15:24Speaker 1: Moscow Police Department, the Idaho State Police, and the FBI,
- 15:28Speaker 1: among others. defendant who was a PhD student at Washington
- 15:32Speaker 1: State University in Pullman, Washington, emerged as a suspect in
- 15:36Speaker 1: the investigation. On or around December 16, 2022, defendant left
- 15:42Speaker 1: his Pullman apartment and drove to his parents' home located
- 15:45Speaker 1: at 119 Lambsden Drive in Albrightville, Pennsylvania, where he remained.
- 15:51Speaker 1: On or about December 28, 2022, the FBI and Moscow
- 15:55Speaker 1: Police Department requested assistance from the Pennsylvania State Police. in
- 15:59Speaker 1: their investigation, specifically in obtaining and executing warrants. As part
- 16:05Speaker 1: of this assistance, PSP reviewed reports and affidavits prepared by
- 16:09Speaker 1: the Moscow Police Department, including a probable cause statement prepared
- 16:13Speaker 1: by Detective Brett Payne outlining the circumstances of the crime
- 16:17Speaker 1: and the investigation to date. On December 29, 2022, a
- 16:22Speaker 1: criminal complaint and probable cause order were filed in this
- 16:26Speaker 1: action and the Latah County Magistrate issued a warrant for
- 16:29Speaker 1: defendant's arrest. See Defense Exhibit B to Lambsden's motion. The
- 16:36Speaker 1: same day, PSP applied for and obtained three search warrants
- 16:39Speaker 1: from a Pennsylvania magistrate, one for 119 Lambsden Drive, two
- 16:44Speaker 1: for a defendant's person, and three for a defendant's vehicle,
- 16:48Speaker 1: which was believed to be parked in the garage of
- 16:51Speaker 1: 1119 Lambsden Drive. The search warrants were supported by the
- 16:55Speaker 1: Affidavit of Probable Cause of Trooper Justin Larry, to which
- 16:59Speaker 1: was attached Detective Payne's probable cause statement. See Defense Exhibit
- 17:03Speaker 1: A to Lambsden Motion. Later that day, PSP received the
- 17:07Speaker 1: signed arrest warrant issued by the Latah County Magistrate. Late
- 17:12Speaker 1: in the evening on December 29, 2022, PSP and its
- 17:17Speaker 1: Special Emergency Response Team, CERT, prepared for the execution of
- 17:20Speaker 1: the warrants. Detective Payne was present briefly to observe the
- 17:24Speaker 1: final preparations, but then departed to prepare for defendant's arrival
- 17:28Speaker 1: at the PSP police station. It was Detective Payne's understanding
- 17:33Speaker 1: that PSP and CERT were preparing for a knock and
- 17:36Speaker 1: announce entry. During their final preparation, CERT snipers set an
- 17:41Speaker 1: umbrella around the residence to monitor any activity therein while
- 17:44Speaker 1: the helicopter monitored from overhead in the event defendant exited
- 17:48Speaker 1: the residence. At 1233 a.m., snipers observed a kitchen light
- 17:52Speaker 1: turn on and saw a taller, young, white male wearing
- 17:56Speaker 1: a black hoodie standing near the glass sliding door leading
- 17:59Speaker 1: out to the deck. At 1240 a.m., the same person
- 18:02Speaker 1: was seen again. This time, officers were able to positively
- 18:06Speaker 1: identify the person as defendant. At 1255 a.m., the light
- 18:12Speaker 1: turned on in the garage where defendant's vehicle was believed
- 18:15Speaker 1: to be parked. At 103 a.m., lights flashed in the
- 18:18Speaker 1: garage and as if the vehicle was being locked or
- 18:21Speaker 1: unlocked by a key fob. At 1.09 a.m., the defendant
- 18:25Speaker 1: was seen in the kitchen of the home, this time
- 18:27Speaker 1: wearing rubber gloves and handling a plastic baggie. Based on
- 18:31Speaker 1: these observations, law enforcement believed defendant was potentially destroying evidence
- 18:35Speaker 1: from the vehicle that was related to the homicides. Law
- 18:39Speaker 1: enforcement was also aware that defendant possessed a Glock handgun,
- 18:43Speaker 1: prompting a concern over officer safety due to the defendant's
- 18:46Speaker 1: heightened mental state of awareness. or threat level of police
- 18:49Speaker 1: possibly tracking them. Thus, law enforcement made the decision to
- 18:54Speaker 1: shorten the knock and announce when executing the warrants. At
- 18:58Speaker 1: approximately 1.14 a.m., Sirt made announcements from a bearcat parked
- 19:02Speaker 1: in the driveway of the residence. Immediately following announcements, Sirt
- 19:07Speaker 1: effectuated a forced entry into the residence. Defendant was arrested
- 19:11Speaker 1: without incident in a bedroom. His vehicle was located and
- 19:14Speaker 1: secured in the garage. Once apprehended, Defendant was handcuffed and
- 19:19Speaker 1: placed in a police vehicle. See state exhibit S6 to
- 19:23Speaker 1: lambs in objection. He was notified that he was in
- 19:26Speaker 1: a police vehicle and being audio and video recorded, which
- 19:29Speaker 1: he acknowledged. While awaiting transport, defendant informed law enforcement that
- 19:34Speaker 1: he unloaded the Glock 22 handgun in the residence by
- 19:37Speaker 1: his bed. During transport, defendant engaged in small talk with
- 19:41Speaker 1: the accompanying officers. When defendant expressed at one point that
- 19:45Speaker 1: he wanted to know what was going on with his arrest,
- 19:47Speaker 1: Law enforcement told him investigators were going to speak with
- 19:50Speaker 1: him at the station about the situation. The details of
- 19:54Speaker 1: the investigation were not discussed with Defendant. Once they arrived
- 19:58Speaker 1: at the station, Defendant was escorted into the processing room
- 20:01Speaker 1: to await interviews with Detective Payne, which occurred 10 minutes later.
- 20:05Speaker 1: Defendant was then informed of his Miranda rights and and
- 20:08Speaker 1: an interview subsequently began. Conclusions of Law There are two
- 20:14Speaker 1: issues before the court. One, whether law enforcement felt to
- 20:17Speaker 1: comply with the knock-and-announce rule in executing the warrants at
- 20:21Speaker 1: 119 Lambsden, and two, whether defendants' post-arrest statements are suppressible
- 20:26Speaker 1: as fruit of the poisonous tree and or due to
- 20:30Speaker 1: a Miranda violation. The state contends law enforcement abbreviated knock-and-announce
- 20:35Speaker 1: was justified by exigent circumstances, And further, defendant's statements are
- 20:40Speaker 1: not suppressible since there is no poison in his tree
- 20:43Speaker 1: and because he has not demonstrated any incriminating statements were
- 20:47Speaker 1: made while under interrogation. The state is correct. A. Law
- 20:51Speaker 1: enforcement did not violate defendant's rights in executing the Pennsylvania warrant.
- 20:56Speaker 1: Applicable Law Defendant contends that law enforcement's failure to fully
- 21:01Speaker 1: comply with the Knock and Announce Rule in executing the
- 21:04Speaker 1: Pennsylvania warrants violated his rights under the Pennsylvania and or
- 21:08Speaker 1: Idaho constitutions. While he contends Idaho law should be applied
- 21:12Speaker 1: to law enforcement's actions under a conflict of law analysis,
- 21:16Speaker 1: he recognizes at the same time that there is very
- 21:19Speaker 1: little daylight between Idaho and Pennsylvania law on the issue. Likewise,
- 21:24Speaker 1: the state notes that there is little difference between the
- 21:27Speaker 1: two on knock and announce and therefore does not take
- 21:30Speaker 1: a position on what law should apply. The court finds
- 21:34Speaker 1: it unnecessary to choose what law should apply given their
- 21:37Speaker 1: virtual identicality. Defendant is not asserting his Fourth Amendment rights
- 21:42Speaker 1: were violated. Though not cited by either party, this is
- 21:45Speaker 1: likely because the United States Supreme Court has held that
- 21:48Speaker 1: a violation of the Fourth Amendment's knock-and-announce requirement does not
- 21:52Speaker 1: require suppression of evidence. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S., 586, 2006. Alright,
- 21:58Speaker 1: we're going to wrap up right here, and in the
- 22:01Speaker 1: next episode, we're going to finish this bad boy off.
- 22:04Speaker 1: All of the information that goes with this episode can
- 22:06Speaker 1: be found in the description box. What's up everyone and
- 22:10Speaker 1: welcome back to the program. In this episode, we're picking
- 22:13Speaker 1: up where we left off with Judge Hipler's order on
- 22:17Speaker 1: the motion to suppress warrants from Pennsylvania and other searches.
- 22:22Speaker 1: Idaho's knock and announce statute requires police to announce their presence, purpose,
- 22:27Speaker 1: and authority before entering someone's home. I see section 19-4409
- 22:33Speaker 1: and 19-611. These requirements are also imposed by Article 1,
- 22:39Speaker 1: Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, State v. Rauch 99,
- 22:43Speaker 1: Idaho 586, 593, 586p. 2d, 671, 678, 1978. In Rauch, however,
- 22:44Speaker 1: the Idaho Supreme Court adopted an exception to the rule
- 22:46Speaker 1: for exigent circumstances. While the court cautioned that such exigencies
- 23:01Speaker 1: are to be determined on a case-by-case basis, it did
- 23:04Speaker 1: set forth general circumstances under which exigent circumstances may be found,
- 23:10Speaker 1: including 1. reasonable belief that compliance with a NOC and
- 23:14Speaker 1: announced statute would result in destruction of evidence, or 2.
- 23:18Speaker 1: a reasonable relief that compliance would place the officer in peril.
- 23:22Speaker 1: In addition, the court set forth six factors to consider
- 23:26Speaker 1: when determining whether exigent circumstances exist. 1. The gravity or
- 23:31Speaker 1: violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is
- 23:34Speaker 1: to be charged. 2. Whether the suspect is reasonably believed
- 23:38Speaker 1: to be armed. 3. A clear showing of probable cause. 4.
- 23:43Speaker 1: A strong reason to believe the suspect is in the
- 23:45Speaker 1: premises to be entered. 5. The likelihood that the suspect
- 23:48Speaker 1: will escape if not swiftly apprehended. 6. The peaceful circumstances
- 23:54Speaker 1: of the entry. The court further explained that exigent circumstances
- 23:59Speaker 1: could include those immediate circumstances where a defendant may be armed,
- 24:03Speaker 1: where evidence may be easily and immediately destroyed, where a
- 24:07Speaker 1: defendant may escape, or where a defendant has engaged in
- 24:10Speaker 1: furtive conduct. Once it is determined defendant's rights have been
- 24:14Speaker 1: violated by police entry into a residence, suppression of evidence
- 24:18Speaker 1: resulting from the entry is required under Idaho's exclusionary rule.
- 24:23Speaker 1: Pennsylvania's knock-and-announce rule is set forth in its criminal rules,
- 24:27Speaker 1: and is imposed under Article 1, Section 8, of Pennsylvania's Constitution,
- 24:32Speaker 1: prohibiting unreasonable searches. The officer may break open an outer
- 24:38Speaker 1: or inner door or window of a house, or any
- 24:40Speaker 1: part of a house, or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if,
- 24:44Speaker 1: after notice of his authority and purpose, he has refused admittance.
- 24:49Speaker 1: IC Section 19-611 To make an arrest, if the offense
- 24:53Speaker 1: is a felony, a private person, If any public offense,
- 24:56Speaker 1: a peace officer may break open the door or window
- 24:59Speaker 1: of the house in which the person is to be
- 25:01Speaker 1: arrested or in which there is reasonable grounds for believing
- 25:04Speaker 1: him to be after having demanded admittance and explain the
- 25:08Speaker 1: purpose for which admittance is desired. Rule 207 P.A.R. Crim P.
- 25:15Speaker 1: A law enforcement officer executing a search warrant shall before
- 25:18Speaker 1: entry give or make reasonable effort to give a notice
- 25:22Speaker 1: of the officer's identity, authority, and purpose for any occupant
- 25:26Speaker 1: of the premises specified in the warrant unless exigent circumstances
- 25:30Speaker 1: require the officer's immediate forcible entry. Pennsylvania courts recognize four
- 25:36Speaker 1: exigent circumstances justifying dispensing with the rule. 1. The occupants
- 25:40Speaker 1: remain silent after repeated knocking and announcing. 2. The police
- 25:44Speaker 1: are virtually certain that the occupants of the premises already
- 25:47Speaker 1: know their purpose. 3. The police have reason to believe
- 25:51Speaker 1: that an announcement prior to entry would imperil their safety.
- 25:55Speaker 1: Or 4. The police have reason to believe that evidence
- 25:58Speaker 1: is about to be destroyed. Commonwealth v. Frederick PA Supreme
- 26:03Speaker 1: Court 2015 These circumstances are viewed under an objective standard,
- 26:09Speaker 1: looking only to the facts and circumstances with which the
- 26:12Speaker 1: officers are faced at the time they act on their
- 26:14Speaker 1: decision to dispense with the knock and announce. Commonwealth v.
- 26:19Speaker 1: Walker 874 A. 2d 667-673, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 2005. As in Idaho,
- 26:27Speaker 1: a violation of Pennsylvania's knock and announce requirements results in suppression.
- 26:33Speaker 1: As applied to the facts here, there are no substantive
- 26:36Speaker 1: differences between the knock and announce standards under Idaho law
- 26:40Speaker 1: and Pennsylvania law. Consequently, the court need not determine what
- 26:44Speaker 1: choice of law applies. It is undisputed that law enforcement
- 26:48Speaker 1: executed and abbreviated knock and announce prior to entry into
- 26:52Speaker 1: 119 Lambsden. According to the state, however, compliance was excused
- 26:57Speaker 1: by exigent circumstances, namely law enforcement's belief defendant was destroying
- 27:02Speaker 1: evidence of the crime and that compliance with knock and
- 27:05Speaker 1: announce would have placed officers' safety in jeopardy. The defendant
- 27:09Speaker 1: argues that these are not true exigencies. He notes that
- 27:13Speaker 1: he was surveilled by law enforcement prior to the execution
- 27:16Speaker 1: of the warrant and that there is no evidence he
- 27:18Speaker 1: is seen with weapons. Such officers shall wait or respond
- 27:23Speaker 1: for a reasonable period of time after his announcement of identity, authority,
- 27:27Speaker 1: and purpose unless exigent circumstances require the officer immediate forcible entry.
- 27:33Speaker 1: If the officer is not admitted after such reasonable period,
- 27:36Speaker 1: the officer may forcibly enter the premises and may use
- 27:40Speaker 1: as much physical force as to effect entry therein as
- 27:43Speaker 1: is necessary to execute the search. Defendant contends that in
- 27:48Speaker 1: the days prior to the execution of the warrants, law
- 27:51Speaker 1: enforcement had seen defendant go for runs around his parents' neighborhood.
- 27:55Speaker 1: Given these observations, defendant posits that there is no reason
- 27:59Speaker 1: to arrest him inside the house. Lambsden Motion, page 10. However,
- 28:03Speaker 1: defendants cited to no evidence of law enforcement's observation in
- 28:07Speaker 1: this regard. The only evidence this court could locate is
- 28:11Speaker 1: from the search warrant application for the Pennsylvania warrants, where
- 28:14Speaker 1: PSP trooper Larry states that the investigators began physical surveillance
- 28:19Speaker 1: of the property and area of 119 Lambsden Drive, Chestnut
- 28:23Speaker 1: Hill Township, and in the early morning hours of Tuesday,
- 28:26Speaker 1: December 27, 2022, observed Brian Kohlberger walking near his residence.
- 28:32Speaker 1: In furtherance of this argument, defendant cites to State v. Ramos,
- 28:36Speaker 1: where the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the executing
- 28:39Speaker 1: officer's belief that the home contained large amounts of marijuana
- 28:42Speaker 1: was not alone sufficient to justify the officer's breaking down
- 28:45Speaker 1: the door five seconds after knocking and announcing. Such a rule,
- 28:50Speaker 1: the court observed, would impermissibly create a blanket exception to
- 28:54Speaker 1: the knock-and-announce rule, which Rausch sought to avoid. The court
- 28:58Speaker 1: further found that the officer's exposure in approaching the home
- 29:01Speaker 1: did not justify the violation, observing that nearly all residential
- 29:05Speaker 1: homes have exposed front aspects. Defendant also relies on Commonwealth v. Kitchener,
- 29:11Speaker 1: where a Pennsylvania court found exigent circumstances where officers were
- 29:16Speaker 1: executing an arrest warrant upon a fugitive with a history
- 29:19Speaker 1: of violence, a propensity for fleeing from police, and who
- 29:22Speaker 1: was reputed to like guns, machine guns in particular. The
- 29:26Speaker 1: officers knocked and announced heard running footsteps within the residence
- 29:29Speaker 1: and believed the man was trying to escape or harm himself,
- 29:33Speaker 1: forcibly entered the home. The court found that given everything
- 29:36Speaker 1: the officers knew prior to executing the warrant, the forceful
- 29:39Speaker 1: entry was justified. The defendant points out that unlike in Kitchener,
- 29:44Speaker 1: law enforcement had no knowledge that defendant had a prior
- 29:47Speaker 1: criminal history, a reputation for violence, or was a gun aficionado.
- 29:51Speaker 1: They did not see him with a weapon and therefore
- 29:53Speaker 1: there was no reasonable basis to fear for their safety.
- 29:57Speaker 1: At most, he argues, law enforcement, had nondescript fears such
- 30:00Speaker 1: as those presented in Ramos. There are two infirmities in
- 30:04Speaker 1: defendant's argument, however. First, he entirely ignores the destruction of evidence,
- 30:09Speaker 1: which is what law enforcement relied upon greatly in dispensing
- 30:13Speaker 1: with the knock-and-announce requirement here. The evidence demonstrates that while
- 30:17Speaker 1: preparing to execute the warrants, law enforcement identified the defendant
- 30:21Speaker 1: in the early morning hours as he turned on a
- 30:23Speaker 1: light in the kitchen and then proceeded into the garage
- 30:26Speaker 1: where his vehicle was believed to be parked. Law enforcement
- 30:29Speaker 1: was aware that defendant was suspected of having driven that
- 30:33Speaker 1: vehicle during the commission of the homicides and knew it
- 30:36Speaker 1: could contain evidence. Law enforcement then saw the vehicle lights
- 30:40Speaker 1: flash in the garage as if a vehicle was being
- 30:42Speaker 1: unlocked or locked. Immediately afterwards, they saw defendant again in
- 30:47Speaker 1: the kitchen wearing rubber gloves and handling a plastic baggie. Further,
- 30:51Speaker 1: it was 109 a.m. in the morning, a time when
- 30:54Speaker 1: most people would not be removing items from their car
- 30:57Speaker 1: with rubber gloves. These observations gave rise to the reasonable
- 31:01Speaker 1: belief that perhaps aware of law enforcement surveillance defendant was
- 31:05Speaker 1: destroying or secreting evidence of the crimes. Second, compounding the
- 31:09Speaker 1: concern of the potential destruction of evidence, there was an
- 31:12Speaker 1: equally compelling concern that a knock and announce could pose
- 31:15Speaker 1: a serious danger to law enforcement. Law enforcement had reviewed
- 31:19Speaker 1: the investigation reports and probable cause statements provided by Idaho detectives,
- 31:25Speaker 1: the executing officer's new defendant, based on compelling evidence, was
- 31:29Speaker 1: believed to have orchestrated an unprovoked and exceptionally brutal quadruple
- 31:33Speaker 1: homicide with a knife. They had information he was in
- 31:36Speaker 1: possession of a Glock handgun. They knew he was in
- 31:39Speaker 1: the residence, awake, potentially aware of law enforcement's presence, and
- 31:43Speaker 1: potentially destroying evidence, or perhaps retrieving his gun or a
- 31:47Speaker 1: weapon from the vehicle. His vehicle was in the garage nearby,
- 31:52Speaker 1: thus giving him means of a quick escape, while prior
- 31:54Speaker 1: to allegedly killing four people defendant may not have had
- 31:57Speaker 1: an extensive criminal history or general reputation for violence, as
- 32:02Speaker 1: did the defendant in Kitchener. It does not mean law
- 32:04Speaker 1: enforcement's safety concerns were unreasonable, given what they knew. When
- 32:09Speaker 1: these circumstances are collectively considered, the court finds law enforcement
- 32:13Speaker 1: was well justified in making an abbreviated announcement and forced entry. Thus,
- 32:18Speaker 1: suppression is not warranted. B. Defendant has not established he
- 32:23Speaker 1: was interrogated when he made unidentified statements. Defendant next argues
- 32:28Speaker 1: any statements he made to law enforcement prior to being
- 32:31Speaker 1: Mirandized must be suppressed, either as fruits of the poisonous
- 32:35Speaker 1: tree or as Miranda violations. Having determined the execution of
- 32:39Speaker 1: the warrants at 119 Lambsden was valid, the question is
- 32:42Speaker 1: whether there was a Miranda violation. The court finds that
- 32:46Speaker 1: there was not. Pursuant to Miranda and its progeny, to
- 32:50Speaker 1: protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, police must
- 32:54Speaker 1: inform individuals of their right to remain silent and their
- 32:57Speaker 1: right to counsel, either retained or appointed, before undertaking a
- 33:01Speaker 1: custodial interrogation. The term interrogation includes not only express questioning,
- 33:07Speaker 1: but also its functional equivalent. The functional equivalent of interrogation
- 33:12Speaker 1: includes any words or actions on the part of the police,
- 33:15Speaker 1: other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody, that
- 33:19Speaker 1: the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
- 33:22Speaker 1: incriminating response. Custody is determined by whether there is a
- 33:26Speaker 1: formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the
- 33:29Speaker 1: degree associated with a formal arrest. The state does not
- 33:33Speaker 1: dispute defendant was in custody when first detained. However, there
- 33:37Speaker 1: is no evidence before the court that defendant was interrogated
- 33:40Speaker 1: at any point from his arrest to the time he
- 33:42Speaker 1: was formally interviewed by Detective Payne, at which point he
- 33:46Speaker 1: was Mirandized. The sole evidence that the defendant engaged in
- 33:50Speaker 1: small talk with officers, with the only exception being when
- 33:53Speaker 1: he was briefly asked about his arrest, and was told
- 33:56Speaker 1: that investigators were going to speak to him at the
- 33:59Speaker 1: station about the situation. Voluntary or spontaneous statements or questions,
- 34:04Speaker 1: unprompted by interrogation, fall outside the scope of Miranda. Consequently,
- 34:09Speaker 1: there is no basis for suppression. Conclusion. Based on the foregoing,
- 34:14Speaker 1: the court denies the following. Defendant's motion to suppress Pennsylvania
- 34:18Speaker 1: warrant for 119 Lambsden Drive. Defendant's motion to suppress arrest
- 34:23Speaker 1: warrant November 14, 2024. Motion to suppress Pennsylvania's search warrant
- 34:28Speaker 1: for white Hyundai Elantra bearing VIN number 5NPDH4AE6FH79860, November 14th, 2024.
- 34:41Speaker 1: Defendant's motion to suppress Pennsylvania's search warrant for Mr. Kohlberger's person.
- 34:46Speaker 1: Defendant's motion to suppress search warrant for defendant's apartment. It's
- 34:50Speaker 1: so ordered, dated this 19th day of February, 2025, and
- 34:55Speaker 1: this was signed by Judge Hippler. And like I was
- 34:58Speaker 1: saying earlier, we have several more orders to dive into,
- 35:01Speaker 1: so we're going to get cracking on that as well.
- 35:04Speaker 1: All of the information that goes with this episode can
- 35:07Speaker 1: be found in the description box. What's up, everyone, and
- 35:11Speaker 1: welcome back to the program. In this episode, we're headed
- 35:14Speaker 1: back up to Moscow, and we're going to take a
- 35:16Speaker 1: look at a few motions that were filed in Limineh
- 35:19Speaker 1: By the defense. And all of these motions have to
- 35:22Speaker 1: do with inflammatory evidence. Case number CR01-24-31665. State of Idaho Plaintiff.
- 35:32Speaker 1: First Brian C. Kohlberger, the defendant. Motion in limine number one.
- 35:38Speaker 1: Inflammatory evidence. Comes now. Brian C. Kohlberger by and through
- 35:42Speaker 1: as attorneys of record. And hereby moves the court for
- 35:45Speaker 1: an order preventing the prosecution from introducing irrelevant... and unfairly
- 35:50Speaker 1: prejudicial photographs, testimony, and other exhibits in violation of his
- 35:54Speaker 1: right to a fair trial protected through the 5th, 6th,
- 35:57Speaker 1: and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution and Section 1,
- 36:02Speaker 1: Article 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Such rights are protected
- 36:06Speaker 1: through application of Idaho criminal rules and Idaho rules of evidence. Mr.
- 36:11Speaker 1: Koberger respectfully requests this court order the state to not
- 36:15Speaker 1: try the case through eliciting testimony and other evidence that
- 36:19Speaker 1: is exceptionally inflammatory. Presenting the case in an emotional and
- 36:24Speaker 1: inflammatory way is unfairly prejudicial. Any probative value is less
- 36:28Speaker 1: than the danger. Additionally, the prosecution should not present the
- 36:32Speaker 1: same information in a variety of ways, which is misleading
- 36:36Speaker 1: or accumulative and a waste of time. IRE 403 states,
- 36:41Speaker 1: Although relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value
- 36:44Speaker 1: is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
- 36:48Speaker 1: of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
- 36:52Speaker 1: of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
- 36:56Speaker 1: cumulative evidence. The case contains over 68 terabytes of data.
- 37:02Speaker 1: This data contains thousands of photographs. Many depict roughly the
- 37:06Speaker 1: same content. There are photographs that depict the deceased as
- 37:09Speaker 1: well as the same location without the deceased. Multiple officers
- 37:14Speaker 1: took photographs of the same areas. Additionally, there are many
- 37:18Speaker 1: hours of body-worn camera footage. Body-worn footage depicts the officers
- 37:23Speaker 1: moving throughout the house. There are hundreds of photographs of
- 37:26Speaker 1: autopsy proceedings. In addition to this evidence, over 100 officers
- 37:31Speaker 1: and investigators have been involved in the case and hundreds
- 37:34Speaker 1: of people that have been interviewed. Mr. Kohlberger seeks to
- 37:38Speaker 1: protect the integrity of this trial and requests an order
- 37:42Speaker 1: preventing inflammatory evidence, including testimonial evidence, to be excluded. Appeals
- 37:48Speaker 1: to emotion, passion, or prejudice of the jury through use
- 37:51Speaker 1: of inflammatory tactics are impermissible. State v. Phillips 144, Idaho 82, 87, 156, P. 3D, 583, 588.
- 37:56Speaker 1: See also State v. Babb 125, Idaho 934, 942, 877, P. 2D, 905, 913, 1994.
- 37:58Speaker 1: State v. Ellington 151, Idaho 53, Mr. Koberger acknowledges the
- 38:23Speaker 1: Idaho Supreme Court has held that a photograph cannot be
- 38:26Speaker 1: excluded merely on the basis of being gruesome. However, Mr.
- 38:35Speaker 1: Koberger is not making that motion. Rather, he is requesting
- 38:39Speaker 1: that the state be prevented from introducing inflammatory evidence. Multiple
- 38:44Speaker 1: studies have found that mock jurors are more likely to
- 38:47Speaker 1: convict when exposed to graphic photos. Kevin S. Douglas. The
- 38:51Speaker 1: impact of photographic evidence on mock jurors' decisions in a
- 38:55Speaker 1: murder trial. Probative or prejudicial. 21 Law and Human Behavior 485-501-1997.
- 39:05Speaker 1: Gruesome evidence and emotion. Anger blame and jury decision making.
- 39:10Speaker 1: Other studies have shown that judicial instructions to ignore such
- 39:13Speaker 1: evidence are ineffective, while some have actually found such instructions
- 39:17Speaker 1: cause jurors to place more emphasis on that evidence. Joel
- 39:22Speaker 1: Lieberman and Jamie Ampt understanding the limits of limiting instructions,
- 39:26Speaker 1: social psychological explanations for the failures of instructions, to Disregard
- 39:31Speaker 1: Pretrial Publicity, and Other Inadmissible Evidence. David A. Sklansky, Evidentiary
- 39:37Speaker 1: Instructions and the Jury as Others, 65 Standard, Review 407-2013.
- 39:44Speaker 1: Michelle Cox and Sarah Tanford, Effects of Evidence and Instructions
- 39:48Speaker 1: in Civil Trials. an experimental investigation of rules of admissibility.
- 39:54Speaker 1: Emily R. Edwards and Karen E. Motorella, preserving the right
- 39:59Speaker 1: to a fair trial, an examination of prejudicial value of
- 40:02Speaker 1: visual and auditory evidence. Saul M. Kasson and David A. Garfield,
- 40:08Speaker 1: blood and guts, general and trial-specific effects of videotaped crime
- 40:12Speaker 1: scenes on mock juror verdicts. Mr. Koberger's right to a
- 40:17Speaker 1: fair trial free from irrelevant evidence Cumulative and unfairly prejudicial evidence,
- 40:22Speaker 1: as guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of Idaho
- 40:26Speaker 1: and the United States of America, would be violated to
- 40:28Speaker 1: allow exhibits depicting gruesome details or the emotional reactions of
- 40:33Speaker 1: the police officers at the scene or during their testimony
- 40:36Speaker 1: during trial. This document was dated February 24, 2025, and
- 40:40Speaker 1: it was signed by Ann Taylor. All right, moving on
- 40:45Speaker 1: to the next document. This one is motion in limine
- 40:48Speaker 1: number three, the use of the term murder. Case number 0124-31665.
- 40:53Speaker 1: State of Idaho plaintiff versus Brian C. Kohlberger, the defendant.
- 41:01Speaker 1: Comes now. Brian C. Kohlberger buying through his attorneys of
- 41:05Speaker 1: record and hereby moves the court for an order prohibiting
- 41:08Speaker 1: the use of the words murder, murderer, murdered, murder weapon,
- 41:12Speaker 1: and similar forms of the word murder applied to Brian
- 41:15Speaker 1: Kohlberger during the trial of this matter. This motion is
- 41:19Speaker 1: not seeking a prohibition on the use of the word
- 41:22Speaker 1: murder or its varying forms in the charging document or
- 41:25Speaker 1: jury instructions. This motion is made pursuant to ICR 47
- 41:29Speaker 1: IRE 403-701-702, the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to the
- 41:31Speaker 1: United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the
- 41:34Speaker 1: Idaho Constitution. Whether the killing at issue are murder as
- 41:44Speaker 1: allegedly committed by Brian Koberger or by an alternate suspect
- 41:49Speaker 1: or someone still unknown is the ultimate issue. Each side
- 41:52Speaker 1: will present this very argument to the jury. It's a
- 41:56Speaker 1: matter of fact to be found by the jury after
- 41:58Speaker 1: the court instructs the jury with the applicable instructions to
- 42:02Speaker 1: label Mr. Koberger as a murderer, the alleged weapon consistent
- 42:06Speaker 1: with an empty sheath as a murder weapon, or to
- 42:09Speaker 1: assert that any of the four decedents was murdered by Mr.
- 42:13Speaker 1: Kohlberger denies his right to a fair trial and the
- 42:16Speaker 1: right to be presumed innocent. IRE 403 allows exclusion of
- 42:20Speaker 1: evidence that is unfairly prejudicial to a party. By analogy,
- 42:25Speaker 1: the same principle should apply to terminology that is unfairly prejudicial.
- 42:29Speaker 1: The use of the word murder during the course of
- 42:31Speaker 1: the trial is unfairly prejudicial in that it asserts a
- 42:35Speaker 1: factual and legal conclusion of the evidence, a determination, which
- 42:39Speaker 1: is left to the jury. The prosecutor, law enforcement, and
- 42:43Speaker 1: medical examiner are viewed with authority and respect by most jurors.
- 42:47Speaker 1: When persons with authority speak, laypeople tend to believe their
- 42:50Speaker 1: statements and conclusions. If the prosecution and or its witnesses
- 42:55Speaker 1: use these words in its case in chief, it would
- 42:58Speaker 1: improperly imply to the jury that it's the prosecutor or
- 43:01Speaker 1: witness's belief or opinion that the defendant is guilty of murder.
- 43:06Speaker 1: This is improper opinion testimony under IRE 701-704. It's improper
- 43:12Speaker 1: for the prosecution to express a personal belief unless the
- 43:15Speaker 1: comment is based solely on inference. Expert testimony that concerns
- 43:20Speaker 1: conclusions or opinions that the average juror is qualified to
- 43:24Speaker 1: draw from, the facts utilizing the juror's common sense and
- 43:27Speaker 1: normal experience is inadmissible. State v. Ellington 151 Idaho 53
- 43:33Speaker 1: 66 253 P. 3D- 727- 740- 2011. Mr. Koberger requests an order prohibiting the
- 43:43Speaker 1: lawyers and witnesses from using the words murder, murderer, murdered,
- 43:47Speaker 1: murder weapon, as well as a derivative form of the
- 43:50Speaker 1: word murder. This document was dated February 24th, 2025, and
- 43:56Speaker 1: this was also signed by Ann Taylor. All right, moving
- 44:00Speaker 1: on to our final document for this episode, we have
- 44:03Speaker 1: the motion in limine number four. using the term psychopath
- 44:12Speaker 1: or sociopath. Comes now. Brian C. Kohlberger buying through his
- 44:23Speaker 1: attorneys of record and hereby moves the court for an
- 44:26Speaker 1: order prohibiting the state from name-calling. Specifically, this motion seeks
- 44:31Speaker 1: to bar the use of the terms psychopath and sociopath.
- 44:36Speaker 1: This motion is made pursuant to ICR 47, IRE 403,
- 44:41Speaker 1: 701 through 704, the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to
- 44:46Speaker 1: the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 13 of
- 44:50Speaker 1: the Idaho Constitution. IRE 403 allows exclusion of evidence that
- 44:55Speaker 1: is unfairly prejudicial to a party. By analogy, the same
- 44:59Speaker 1: principle should apply to the terminology that is unfairly prejudicial.
- 45:04Speaker 1: The use of the word psychopath or sociopath during the
- 45:06Speaker 1: course of the trial is unfairly prejudicial. See attached affidavit
- 45:11Speaker 1: of John Edens. This is improper opinion testimony under IRE 701-704.
- 45:18Speaker 1: Neither term is a proper diagnosis and is unequivocally unfairly prejudicial. Mr.
- 45:23Speaker 1: Kohlberger requests an order prohibiting the lawyers and witnesses from
- 45:27Speaker 1: using the words psychopath and sociopath. This document was dated
- 45:32Speaker 1: February 24th 2025, and this document was signed by Ann Taylor.
- 45:37Speaker 1: All right, folks, that's going to do it for this one.
- 45:40Speaker 1: All of the information, including my contact information, can be
- 45:44Speaker 1: found in the description box.