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030 - Chapter 15 Part 1 - The Hungnam Redeployment · Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign

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Speaker 1: Chapter fifteen, Part one of US Marine Operations in Korea
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Speaker 1: nineteen fifty to nineteen fifty three, Volume three, The Chosen
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Speaker 1: Reservoir Campaign by Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona. This LibriVox
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Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain. The Hungnam redeployment waven
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Speaker 1: look happy. These were the first words to greet some
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Speaker 1: of the wary, unshaven Marines upon arrival in the ham Hung,
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Speaker 1: hung Nam area. They grinned obligingly in response to the
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Speaker 1: press photographer snapping pictures of the motor column from the roadside.
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Speaker 1: They were happy, indeed, to be back in a world
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Speaker 1: of hot meals and hot baths. They were happy to
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Speaker 1: be alive. Marines and attached Army troops found it astonishing
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Speaker 1: as well as flattering, to learn that such expressions as
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Speaker 1: epic and saga and miracle of deliverance were being applied
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Speaker 1: to the breakout in American newspapers. The press correspondents, in turn,
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Speaker 1: were astonished to learn that never for a moment had
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Speaker 1: the men doubted that they would slug their way out
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Speaker 1: to the sea coast. The running fight of the Marines
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Speaker 1: and two battalions of the Army's seventh Infantry Division from
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Speaker 1: Hagaru to Hamhung, forty miles by air but sixty miles
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Speaker 1: over the icy, twisting mountainous road, was a battle unparalleled
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Speaker 1: in US military history, commented Time, It had some aspects
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Speaker 1: of Batan, some of Azio, some of Dunkirk, some of
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Speaker 1: Valley Forge, some of the retreat of the ten thousand,
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Speaker 1: four one to four hundred BC, as described in Xenophon's Anabasis.
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Speaker 1: Not until the Marines had fought their way as far
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Speaker 1: as Chinhung Nie, the weekly news magazine continued, did there
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Speaker 1: appear to be much hope that they would come out
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Speaker 1: as an organized force? Then, for the first time it
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Speaker 1: looked as if most of the twenty thousand Marines would
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Speaker 1: get through. By reading contemporary press accounts, it is possible
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Speaker 1: to recapture the mood of the American public upon realization
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Speaker 1: of the disagrees which had overtaken the Eighth Army. It
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Speaker 1: was defeat, the worst defeat the United States ever suffered,
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Speaker 1: reported Time in the issue of eleven December nineteen fifty.
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Speaker 1: The nation received the fearful news from Korea with a
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Speaker 1: strange seeming calmness, the kind of confused, fearful, half believing
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Speaker 1: matter of factness with which many a man has reacted
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Speaker 1: upon learning that he has cancer or tuberculosis. The news
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Speaker 1: of Pearl Harbor nine years ago to the month had
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Speaker 1: peeled out like a fire bell, but the numbing facts
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Speaker 1: of the defeat in Korea seeped into the national consciousness
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Speaker 1: slowly out of a jumble of headlines, bulletins, and communiques.
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Speaker 1: Days passed before its enormity finally became plain. Newsweek called
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Speaker 1: it America's worst military licking since Pearl Harbor. Perhaps it
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Speaker 1: might become the worst military disaster in American history. Barring
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Speaker 1: a military or diplomatic miracle, the approximately two thirds of
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Speaker 1: the the U. S. Army that had been thrown into
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Speaker 1: Korea might have to be evacuated in a new Dunkirk
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Speaker 1: to save them from being lost in a new Baton
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Speaker 1: footnote Newsweek, thirty six, number twenty four, eleven, December fifty eleven.
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Speaker 1: Such quotations comments General MacArthur referring to the excerpts from
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Speaker 1: Time and Newsweek certainly do not reflect the mood of
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Speaker 1: the American public at the time, but rather the emotional
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Speaker 1: reaction of irresponsible writers. Neither of the two news magazines
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Speaker 1: had the slightest access to the basic information in factors
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Speaker 1: which involved the decisions and operations of our government and
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Speaker 1: its higher military commanders. The unreliability of these non professional
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Speaker 1: estimates of the situation is indeed eloquently demonstrated by comparing
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Speaker 1: them with the actual military reports by the commands involved.
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Speaker 1: General D. MacArthur letter to Major General E. W. Snedeker,
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Speaker 1: seventeen October fifty six. The situation in West Korea was
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Speaker 1: depressing enough, but at least the Eighth Army had a
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Speaker 1: line of retreat left open. It was with apprehension that
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Speaker 1: the American public stared at front page maps showing the
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Speaker 1: entrapment of the first Marine Division and attached U. S
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Speaker 1: Army units and British Marines by Chinese forces. Press releases
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Speaker 1: from Korea did not encourage much expectation that the encircled
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Speaker 1: troops could save themselves from destruction by any means other
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Speaker 1: than surrender. In either event, the result would be a
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Speaker 1: military catastrophe without parallel in the nation's history. The first
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Speaker 1: gleam of Hope was inspired by the news that the
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Speaker 1: Marines had seized the initiative at Udam Knee and cut
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Speaker 1: a path through Chinese, blocking the route to Hagarou. Then
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Speaker 1: came the thrilling reports of air drops of supplies at
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Speaker 1: Hagaroo and the mass evacuation of casualties by air. Much
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Speaker 1: of the humiliation felt by newspaper readers was wipe clean
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Speaker 1: by pride as General Smith's troops fought through to Coto
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Speaker 1: Ree and Chinhung Knee and sub zero cold. The airdrop
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Speaker 1: of the bridge sections was a dramatic climax to the
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Speaker 1: realization that what had been a hope was now a fact.
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Speaker 1: The chosen reservoir troops had saved themselves and inflicted a
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Speaker 1: major defeat on the Chinese Communists in the doing. Testimony
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Speaker 1: of POW's had left no doubt that the mission of
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Speaker 1: the three CCF Corps was the annihilation of the surrounded
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Speaker 1: United States forces, but the result had been enemy losses
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Speaker 1: which did not fall far short of annihilation of the
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Speaker 1: CCF units themselves. It was in a spirit of prayerful thanksgiving, therefore,
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Speaker 1: that Americans read about the column of Grimy parkaclad men
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Speaker 1: which came out of the mountains of Northeast Korea on
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Speaker 1: eleven December nineteen fifty. They had come out fighting, and
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Speaker 1: they had brought their wounded and most of their equipment
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Speaker 1: out with them. Marines billeted in Hungnam area as late
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Speaker 1: as nine December. It had been General Smith's understanding that
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Speaker 1: the the first Marine Division would occupy a defensive sector
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Speaker 1: south and southwest of Hungnam. Then Colonel McAllister at Hungnam
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Speaker 1: was notified by ten Corps that plans for the defense
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Speaker 1: of the hung Nam area had been changed so that
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Speaker 1: the Marines were to embark immediately for redeployment by water
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Speaker 1: to South Korea. General Smith was informed on the tenth
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Speaker 1: and so promptly was the new plan put into effect
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Speaker 1: that the first Marine units were already loading out before
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Speaker 1: the last elements of the division arrived at Hungnam. No
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Speaker 1: changes were necessary, and the plans for the reception of
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Speaker 1: marine units in the Hungnam area worked out by Colonel
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Speaker 1: Snedtaker and Colonel McAllister on orders of General Smith. On
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Speaker 1: eight December. Snedtaker had issued detailed instructions which designated defensive
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Speaker 1: sectors for RCT IE at Chigyong and for RCT five
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Speaker 1: and RCT seven in the vicinity of Yampo Airfield. The
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Speaker 1: first Amphibian Tractor Battalion was charged with making such preparations
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Speaker 1: to receive the returning troops as putting up tents, installing stoves,
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Speaker 1: erecting heads, and equipping galleys. The Navy as usual was ready.
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Speaker 1: On fifteen November, it may be recalled General Smith had
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Speaker 1: candidly expressed his misgivings about the strategic outlook to Admiral
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Speaker 1: Moorhouse and Captain Sears. Morehouse was chief of staff to
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Speaker 1: Admiral Joy Comnaffee, and Sears served in a light capacity
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Speaker 1: under Admiral Doyle CTF ninety. This frank discussion had not
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Speaker 1: fallen upon deaf ears, and on the twenty eighth, only
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Speaker 1: a few hours after the first CCF attacks at Udam Knee,
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Speaker 1: Comnaffee alerted CTF ninety as to the possible need for
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Speaker 1: a redoployment operation by sea. The following day, Joy advised
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Speaker 1: that events in the chosen reservoir area made it desirable
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Speaker 1: for ships of TF ninety to be on six hours notice,
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Speaker 1: either in Korean waters or at Sassabo, Japan. CTF ninety
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Speaker 1: commenced planning immediately for either an administrative or emergency unloading.
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Speaker 1: His Operation ordered nineteen Dash fifty, issued on the twenty eighth,
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Speaker 1: for planning purposes provided for half of the amphibious force
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Speaker 1: to conduct redeployment operations on the East coast under Doyle
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Speaker 1: as comfibgrew IE, while the other half had a similar
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Speaker 1: mission on the West coast under Admiral Thakre comfibgrew three.
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Speaker 1: At this time comfibgrew three and most of the amphibious
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Speaker 1: units were in Japanese ports for upkeep and replenishment. All
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Speaker 1: were directed by Admiral Joi on the twenty ninth to
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Speaker 1: proceed to Sassebo. Comfibgrew I had just completed the opening
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Speaker 1: of hung Nam as a major resupply port and was
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Speaker 1: preparing to withdraw to Japan with the remaining amphibious force
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Speaker 1: on thirty November. However, the deteriorating situation of ground forces
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Speaker 1: in Korea made it necessary for all units of TF
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Speaker 1: ninety to be in Korean waters. The emergency appeared to
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Speaker 1: be more critical on the way west coast, and two
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Speaker 1: thirds of the smaller amphibious ships were allotted to the
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Speaker 1: Incheon area, while the transports were divided equally between Incheon
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Speaker 1: and hung Nam. The first week of December was devoted
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Speaker 1: to planning and preparing for a redeployment of ten Corps
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Speaker 1: by sea, which appeared more likely every day. Minesweeping operations
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Speaker 1: were resumed at Hungnam to enlarge the swept anchorage area
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Speaker 1: and provide swept channels for gunfire support ships. Ten Corps
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Speaker 1: Operation Order nine DASH fifty, issued on five December, provided
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Speaker 1: for the defense of the hung Nam area by setting
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Speaker 1: up a perimeter with a final defense line about seven
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Speaker 1: miles in radius. Pie shaped sectors of fairly equal area
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Speaker 1: converging on the harbor were assigned to the following major
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Speaker 1: units from east to west. First Rock Corps Less one
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Speaker 1: Division at Songjen, Seventh Infantry Division, Third Infantry Division with
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Speaker 1: first k M C Regiment Minus, and the first Marine Division.
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Speaker 1: The Marine sector included Yampo Airfield. On eight December, a
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Speaker 1: conference held on board the Mount McKinley by Kamnaffee and
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Speaker 1: CTF ninety was attended by Vice Admiral Strubel, com Seventh Fleet,
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Speaker 1: Rear Admiral John M. Higgins, COM CRUE Div Five and
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Speaker 1: Lieutenant General Shepherd, cg FMF Pack. General Shepherd was present
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Speaker 1: as representative of Commander Naval Forces Far East on matters
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Speaker 1: relating to the Marine Corps and for consultation and advice
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Speaker 1: in connection with the contemplated amphibious operation now being planned.
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Speaker 1: General Allman was directed on the ninth to redeploy to
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Speaker 1: South Korea and to report to the Commanding General of
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Speaker 1: the Eighth Army. After assembling in the Ulsan Pusan Massan area.
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Speaker 1: He was to release the first Rock Corps as soon
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Speaker 1: as possible to the Rock Army in the Samchuk area.
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Speaker 1: An assembly area in the vicinity of Massan, widely separated
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Speaker 1: from the other units of ten Corps was specified for
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Speaker 1: the First Marine Division. CTF ninety was assigned the following missions.
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Speaker 1: One Provide waterlift for and conduct redeployment operations of UN
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Speaker 1: forces in Korea as directed. Two control air and naval
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Speaker 1: gunfire support in designated embarkation areas. Three protect shipping en
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Speaker 1: route to debarkation ports. Four be responsible for naval blockade
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Speaker 1: and gunfire support of friendly units East coast of Korea,
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Speaker 1: including Pusan. Five be prepared to conduct small scale redeployment operations,
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Speaker 1: including ROCK forces and UN prisoners of war. Six Coordinate
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Speaker 1: with draw operations with CIG ten Corps and other commands
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Speaker 1: as appropriate. Seven support and cover redeployment operations in the
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Speaker 1: Hungnam or other designated Korean embarkation area. No such large
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Speaker 1: scale sealift of combined Army, Navy, air force, and marine elements,
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Speaker 1: not to mention the rock units had been attempted since Okinawa.
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Speaker 1: The time was so short. Moreover, that action could not
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Speaker 1: wait on detailed planning and organization. In any event, the
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Speaker 1: job had to be done. An enormous fleet of shipping
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Speaker 1: must be assembled from every available source in the Far East.
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Speaker 1: More than one hundred thousand troops must be embarked, and
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Speaker 1: it was estimated at first that twenty five thousand Korean
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Speaker 1: refugees must be evacuated, though this figure had to be
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Speaker 1: nearly quadrupled. Mountains of supplies and thousands of vehicles must
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Speaker 1: be outloaded from a comparatively small port. While these activities
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Speaker 1: were in progress, the perimeter must be protected with naval
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Speaker 1: gunfire and aircraft against an enemy credited by ten cores
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Speaker 1: G two estimates with the capabilities of launching an attack
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Speaker 1: of sixty eight depleted divisions against the ham Hung hung
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Speaker 1: Nam area. It was dubbed an amphibious landing in reverse.
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Speaker 1: Since the plan called for the methodical shop ranking of
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Speaker 1: the perimeter under cover of airstrikes and naval gunfire until
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Speaker 1: the last platoon of the ground forces had embarked. Then
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Speaker 1: would come the grand finale of the demolitions. Embarkation of
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Speaker 1: first Marine Division. The wants On evacuation was instructive as
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Speaker 1: a rehearsal for the hungnom redeployment from two to ten December.
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Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel Crow's First Shore Party Battalion had charge of
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Speaker 1: the outloading, while sharing the defense of the harbor with
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Speaker 1: the battalion from the third Infantry Division and two KMC battalions.
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Speaker 1: Another Marine Outfit Company A of the first Amphibian Truck
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Speaker 1: Battalion speeded up the operation by making hundreds of round
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Speaker 1: trips between docks and ships with DUKWs air cover and
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Speaker 1: naval gunfire from supporting ships. Of TE ninety point twenty
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Speaker 1: one was so effective that Wanson had no enemy interference
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Speaker 1: worth mentioning. Covering missions continued to be fired until the
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Speaker 1: last friendly troops withdrew and operations were completed without the
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Speaker 1: necessity of destroying un supplies and equipment. Altogether, three thousand,
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Speaker 1: eight hundred thirty four troops, seven thousand nine Korean civilians,
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Speaker 1: one thousand, one hundred forty six vehicles, and ten thousand
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Speaker 1: thirteen bulk tons of cargo had been outloaded when the
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Speaker 1: operation was completed. On ten December, one detachment of shore
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Speaker 1: Party troops sailed for Pussan with the DUKWs in preparation
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Speaker 1: for unloading the First Marine Division upon its arrival at
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Speaker 1: that port. The hung Nam evacuation plan, as outlined in
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Speaker 1: ten Corps Operation Order ten DASH fifty issued on eleven December,
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Speaker 1: provided for the immediate embarkation of the first Marine Division
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Speaker 1: and the Third Rock Division. A smaller perimeter than the
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Speaker 1: original concept was to be defended meanwhile by the seventh
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Speaker 1: and third Infantry Divisions, with the latter having the final responsibility.
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Speaker 1: Major units were to withdraw gradually by side slipping until
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Speaker 1: only reinforced platoons remained as covering forces hold strong points.
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Speaker 1: Plans called for naval gunfire and air support to be
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Speaker 1: stepped up as the perimeter contracted. CTF ninety assumed control
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Speaker 1: of all naval functions on ten December, after approving loading
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Speaker 1: plans made at a conference of Navy officers and representatives
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Speaker 1: of ten Corps. Colonel Forney, Deputy Chief of Staff ten Corps,
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Speaker 1: was appointed Corps Evacuation Control Officer, with responsibility for the
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Speaker 1: operation of the hung Nam Port and was assigned to
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Speaker 1: Small Staff. Major Richard W. Shuttz of General Shepherd's Party
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Speaker 1: was placed in charge of the Operations Section. Two former
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Speaker 1: TTU PAC Marines on the ten Corps staff were assigned sections.
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Speaker 1: Major Charles P. Wyland the Loading shore section and Major JACKAR.
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Speaker 1: Monday the Navy Liaison section. Lieutenant Colonel Harry E. Moysel
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Speaker 1: US Army headed the Movement section, and Captain William C.
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Speaker 1: Cool US Army the Ration Section. Lieutenant Colonel Charles E.
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Speaker 1: Warren served as Colonel Forney's executive officer until he was
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Speaker 1: incapacitated by pneumonia and relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Crow. The
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Speaker 1: Second Engineer Special Brigade, US Army was responsible for operation
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Speaker 1: of the dock facilities, traffic control in the dock areas,
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Speaker 1: and for furnishing Japanese Stevadores, winch operators, cargo handling equipment,
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Speaker 1: and dunnage. A reinforced company from the First Shore Party
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Speaker 1: Battalion worked the lst and small craft beaches while controlling
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Speaker 1: the lighterage for ships loading in the stream. It was
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Speaker 1: decided on eleven December that First Marine Division staging to
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Speaker 1: assembly areas should commence immediately. Loading was to be expedited
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Speaker 1: so that ships could be used for a second and
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Speaker 1: even third turnaround. Embarkation Order three DASH fifty, issued by
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Speaker 1: the Division on the eleventh, assigned vehicle and cargo assembly
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Speaker 1: areas to units, and an embarkation Control office was set
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Speaker 1: up in the dock area as compensation for the cramp
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Speaker 1: confines of the hung Nam Harbor. The title range was
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Speaker 1: less than a foot as compared to the maximum of
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Speaker 1: thirty one feet at Incheon, and though the docks had
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Speaker 1: space for only seven ships, Major Wiland planned to double
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Speaker 1: birth four additional ships and load them from the on
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Speaker 1: board side. In addition, eleven LSTs could be handled simultaneously,
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Speaker 1: seven at Green Beach one and the others at Green
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Speaker 1: Beach Two. Marine units awaiting shipping remained on a stand
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Speaker 1: by basis, ready to begin loading at once upon assignment
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Speaker 1: of space by the Embarkation Officer. The division rear CP
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Speaker 1: at Hungnam had become the only CP with General Smith's arrival,
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Speaker 1: and on the eleventh, General Craig the ADC returned from
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Speaker 1: emergency leave. General MacArthur flew to Yanpo Airfield on the
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Speaker 1: eleventh for a brief conference with General Almond and approved
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Speaker 1: the ten Corps plan. A date of twenty seven December
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Speaker 1: was set for Corps units to pass under the control
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Speaker 1: of the eighth Army in South Korea. The outloading of
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Speaker 1: the first Marine Division was making good progress on the
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Speaker 1: twelfth when General Smith visited the docks on a tour
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Speaker 1: of inspection. That evening, he and General Shepherd attended a
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Speaker 1: dinner at the core CP in honor of General Almond's
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Speaker 1: fifty eighth birthday. The Army was represented by Major Generals
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Speaker 1: bar Soul and Clark L. Ruffner, ten Courts, chief of Staff.
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Speaker 1: By the following day, the fifth and seventh Marines were
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Speaker 1: ready to sail. Embarkation Officers loaded their ships by sight
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Speaker 1: planning as they went along, Not knowing in advance what
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Speaker 1: type of ship might be assigned. They found that carefully
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Speaker 1: calculated stowage diagrams were out of the question. Under these circumstances,
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Speaker 1: amphibious training and experience were invaluable. Space in the tense
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Speaker 1: city established by ten Corps to the rear of the
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Speaker 1: Lst Beaches had been made available to Marine units awaiting embarkation.
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Speaker 1: Most of them, however, moved directly from their bivouac areas
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Speaker 1: to the beach while the Marines they were outloading. The
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Speaker 1: two Army divisions defending the perimeter had only minor patrol actions.
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Speaker 1: Their artillery supplied most of the interdiction fires at the outset,
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Speaker 1: with naval gunfire giving the deep support. Vigorous air support
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Speaker 1: by Navy, Air Force and Marine planes also did much
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Speaker 1: to discourage any hostile intentions the enemy may have had.
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Speaker 1: MAGSIS one, the Ground Control Intercept Squadron at Yanpo stopped
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Speaker 1: directing the high altitude fighters on eleven December and passed
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Speaker 1: over to the USS Mount McKinley the task of keeping
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Speaker 1: the perimeter clear of any enemy planes. Overall control of
19:37
Speaker 1: air still remained ashore with m TAX two at fifteen hundred.
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Speaker 1: On the thirteenth, General Smith went aboard the USS bayfield
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Speaker 1: and opened the Division CP as his last duty on shore.
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Speaker 1: He attended memorial services held by the division at the
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Speaker 1: Hung Nam Cemetery. While the commanding General paid his tribute
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Speaker 1: to the honored dead, Chinese POWs were making prep for
20:00
Speaker 1: the interment of the last bodies brought down from Chinhung Knee.
20:04
Speaker 1: The marine loading was completed on the fourteenth. At a
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Speaker 1: conference that day was CTF ninety on board the Mount McKinley.
20:11
Speaker 1: General Smith inquired as to the possibility of having the
20:14
Speaker 1: ships carrying the Marines unload at Massan instead of Poussan,
20:18
Speaker 1: thus saving a forty mile movement by truck. Admiral Doyle
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Speaker 1: pointed out that this procedure was not feasible because of
20:25
Speaker 1: the lack of lighterage facilities at Massan. The additional turnaround time, moreover,
20:31
Speaker 1: would have delayed the evacuation of remaining core units. The
20:35
Speaker 1: fourteenth was also the day when marine air strikes from
20:38
Speaker 1: Yampo ended with the departure of the last of the
20:41
Speaker 1: wings land based fighters for Japan. Shortly after midnight, the
20:45
Speaker 1: Air Defense Section of M tax II passed control of
20:48
Speaker 1: all air in the Hungnam area to the Navy's Tactical
20:51
Speaker 1: Air Control Squadron I of TF ninety aboard the USS
20:55
Speaker 1: Mount McKinley. The Marine squadron then set up a stand
20:58
Speaker 1: by tack aboard the LT until the final withdraw on
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Speaker 1: twenty four December. At ten thirty On fifteen December, as
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Speaker 1: the bayfield sailed, the curtain went down on one of
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Speaker 1: the most memorable campaigns. In the one hundred seventy five
21:12
Speaker 1: year history of the Marine Corps, a total of twenty
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Speaker 1: two thousand, two hundred fifteen marines had embarked in shipping,
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Speaker 1: consisting of an APA, an Aka, three aps, thirteen LSTs,
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Speaker 1: three lsds and seven commercial cargo ships. The Yampo airlift continued, however,
21:31
Speaker 1: until seventeen December, when the field was closed and a
21:34
Speaker 1: temporary airstrip nearer the harbor was made available to twin
21:38
Speaker 1: engine R four ds for the final phase of the
21:41
Speaker 1: air evacuation. The only marine units left in Hungnam were
21:45
Speaker 1: a reinforced Shore Party Company, an Anglico Group, and one
21:48
Speaker 1: and a half companies eighty eight LVTs of the first
21:52
Speaker 1: Amphibian Tractor Battalion. They passed under the operational control of
21:57
Speaker 1: ten Corps to assist in the outloading of army units. Also,
22:01
Speaker 1: Colonel Becker C. Batterton, commanding MAG twelve, had moved to
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Speaker 1: hung Nam for the final evacuation of his air group
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Speaker 1: from Yanpo and to arrange for loading its heavy equipment
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Speaker 1: and remaining personnel aboard SS Twanda Victory. Then on eighteen
22:17
Speaker 1: December he flew his command post to Etami, the last
22:21
Speaker 1: ten days at hung Nam, with ten days remaining for
22:25
Speaker 1: the embarkation of the two army divisions. The problem of
22:28
Speaker 1: Korean refugees threatened to disrupt the schedule, but CTF ninety
22:33
Speaker 1: contrived somehow to find the shipping, and the homeless Koreans
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Speaker 1: were willing to put up with any hardships to escape
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Speaker 1: from communist domination. It became standard practice to embark at
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Speaker 1: least five thousand on an lst, not counting children in arms,
22:47
Speaker 1: and no less than twelve thousand human sardines found standing
22:50
Speaker 1: room on one commercial cargo ship. The most fragile link
22:54
Speaker 1: in the complex chain of operations was represented by the
22:57
Speaker 1: two three hundred ninety ten diesel election tric tugs. No
23:01
Speaker 1: others were available, nor were spare parts to be had.
23:05
Speaker 1: Yet both tugs had clocked more than five thousand running
23:08
Speaker 1: hours since the last overhaul. Thus it seemed almost a
23:11
Speaker 1: miracle that neither broke down for more than three hours
23:14
Speaker 1: in all, and repairs were made with materials at hand.
23:18
Speaker 1: On the eighteenth, when the last rock sailed for Samchuk,
23:21
Speaker 1: the seventh Infantry Division was in the midst of its outloading.
23:25
Speaker 1: By twenty December, all troops of this unit had embarked
23:28
Speaker 1: according to schedule. Responsibility for the defense of Hungnam then
23:33
Speaker 1: passed to Admiral Doyle as General Almon and his staff
23:36
Speaker 1: joined CTF ninety on board the flagship Mount McKinley. General
23:40
Speaker 1: Soul's third Division now manned the shore defense alone. When
23:44
Speaker 1: the perimeter contracted to the immediate vicinity of Hungnam following
23:47
Speaker 1: the evacuation of ham Hung and Yanpo Airfield. Two cruisers,
23:52
Speaker 1: seven destroyers, and three rocket firing craft covered the entire
23:56
Speaker 1: front from their assigned position in mineswept lanes. A total
24:00
Speaker 1: of nearly thirty four thousand shells and twelve thousand, eight
24:03
Speaker 1: hundred rockets was fired by these support ships, with the
24:06
Speaker 1: battleship Missouri contributing one hundred sixty two sixteen inch rounds.
24:10
Speaker 1: At the finish of the bombardment. About eight hundred more
24:13
Speaker 1: eight inch shells and twelve thousand, eight hundred more five
24:16
Speaker 1: inch shells were expanded at Hungnam than during the naval
24:19
Speaker 1: gunfire preparation for the inch on landing, seven embarkation sites
24:24
Speaker 1: were employed from left to right. They were designated as
24:28
Speaker 1: Pink beach, Blue beach, Green one and two beaches, and
24:32
Speaker 1: Yellow one two and three beaches. The seventh ARCT holding
24:38
Speaker 1: the left sector was to embark from Pink Beach. Blue
24:42
Speaker 1: and Green one beaches were assigned to the sixty fifth
24:44
Speaker 1: RCT in the center, while the fifteenth URCT had Green
24:48
Speaker 1: two and the three yellow beaches. HR had been set
24:52
Speaker 1: at eleven hundred. On the twenty fourth and seven LSTs
24:55
Speaker 1: were beached at zero eight hundred to receive Third Infantry
24:58
Speaker 1: Division troops. Soon, the three regiments were reduced to as
25:02
Speaker 1: many battalions, which acted as covering forces while the other
25:06
Speaker 1: troops fell back to assigned beaches. All withdraws were conducted
25:10
Speaker 1: methodically along specified routes by units using marked panels. Then
25:15
Speaker 1: the battalions themselves pulled out, leaving only seven reinforced platoons
25:19
Speaker 1: manning strong points. The Hungnam redeployment came to an end
25:23
Speaker 1: when these platoons boarded an LST after a search for stragglers.
25:28
Speaker 1: Air and naval gunfire support had made it an uneventful finish,
25:32
Speaker 1: except for the accidental explosion of an ammunition dump on
25:35
Speaker 1: Pink Beach resulting in two men killed and twenty one wounded.
25:40
Speaker 1: All beaches were cleared by fourteen thirty six, on Sunday afternoon,
25:43
Speaker 1: the twenty fourth, with Abele and Baker companies of the
25:46
Speaker 1: Amtrak battalions sticking it out to the end. Marines of
25:50
Speaker 1: these units provided fires to cover the flanks of the
25:53
Speaker 1: last withdraws, and manned thirty seven LVTs evacuating Army troops
25:57
Speaker 1: from Pink Beach. With the exception of three LVTs lost
26:01
Speaker 1: in the ammunition dump explosion on that beach, all LVTs
26:05
Speaker 1: and lvta's were safely re embarked on lsds at the
26:09
Speaker 1: finish of the operation. Remarkably few supplies had to be
26:13
Speaker 1: left behind for lack of shipping space. Among them were
26:17
Speaker 1: four hundred tons of frozen dynamite and five hundred thousand
26:20
Speaker 1: pound bombs. They added to the tumult of an awe
26:23
Speaker 1: inspiring demolition scene. The entire Hungnown waterfront seemed to be
26:28
Speaker 1: blown sky high in one volcanic eruption of flame, smoke
26:32
Speaker 1: and rubble, which left a huge black mushroom cloud hovering
26:35
Speaker 1: over the ruins. The chill, misty dawn of Christmas Day
26:39
Speaker 1: found the mom McKinley about to sail for Olsan with
26:42
Speaker 1: CTF ninety and Generals Almond and Shepherd. After an eminently
26:46
Speaker 1: successful operation. It had been pretty much the Navy's show
26:51
Speaker 1: in the absence of enemy interference, and the final statistics
26:54
Speaker 1: were staggering. One hundred five thousand military personnel, ninety one
26:59
Speaker 1: thousand refugees, seventeen thousand, five hundred vehicles, and three hundred
27:04
Speaker 1: and fifty thousand measurement tons of cargo loaded out in
27:07
Speaker 1: one hundred ninety three shiploads by one hundred and nine ships,
27:11
Speaker 1: with naval, air and surface units, effectively isolating the beachhead.
27:16
Speaker 1: We were able to take our time and get everything out,
27:18
Speaker 1: commented Admiral Joy on twenty six December. Admiral Doyle has
27:23
Speaker 1: turned in another brilliant performance we never never contemplated at Dunkirk,
27:28
Speaker 1: not even faintly. Marines arrived at new assembly area while
27:35
Speaker 1: the remaining ten core units completed out loading at Hungnam.
27:38
Speaker 1: The Marines were landing at Pusan and proceeding by motor
27:41
Speaker 1: marks to their new assembly area in the vicinity of Massan.
27:45
Speaker 1: General Craig the ADC had gone ahead with the advance
27:49
Speaker 1: party from hung Nam and made arrangements for the reception
27:51
Speaker 1: of the division. News from the front in West Korea
27:55
Speaker 1: was not encouraging as the Eighth Army plan further withdraws
27:58
Speaker 1: for G two reports in indicated that the advancing Chinese
28:01
Speaker 1: were about to launch a great new offensive shortly. Despite
28:05
Speaker 1: the persistent rumors that all Korea might be evacuated by
28:08
Speaker 1: UN forces, General MacArthur insisted in his Special Communique of
28:13
Speaker 1: twenty six December that operations were skillfully conducted, without loss
28:17
Speaker 1: of cohesion, and with all units remaining intact. In its
28:21
Speaker 1: broad implications, I consider that these operations, initiated on twenty
28:25
Speaker 1: four November and carried through to this Hungnam redeployment, have
28:29
Speaker 1: served a very significant purpose, possibly in general result the
28:33
Speaker 1: most significant and fortunate of any conducted during the course
28:36
Speaker 1: of the Korean Campaign. The might of a major military
28:40
Speaker 1: nation was suddenly and without warning thrown against this relatively
28:44
Speaker 1: small United Nations command, but without attaining a decision, due
28:48
Speaker 1: to intervening circumstances beyond our power to control or even detect.
28:53
Speaker 1: We did not achieve the United Nations objective, but at
28:57
Speaker 1: a casualty cost less than that experienced in a compareable
29:00
Speaker 1: period of defensive fighting on the Puissan perimeter. We exposed
29:04
Speaker 1: before too late secret political and military decisions of enormous
29:07
Speaker 1: scope and threw off balance enemy preparations aimed at surreptitiously
29:12
Speaker 1: massing the power capable of destroying our forces with one
29:15
Speaker 1: mighty extended blow. Questions to the proper evaluation of the
29:19
Speaker 1: Eighth Army withdraw turned into a controversy during coming months,
29:23
Speaker 1: with political as well as military implications. Press representatives, military critics,
29:29
Speaker 1: and soldiers of other nations, while crediting MacArthur with the
29:33
Speaker 1: great victory at Incheon, were for the most part of
29:36
Speaker 1: the opinion that the Eighth Army withdraw of November and
29:38
Speaker 1: December was a costly reverse footnote General MacArthur comments are
29:44
Speaker 1: as follows. This again is a non professional estimate, belied
29:50
Speaker 1: by the facts and the viewpoints of all senior commanders present.
29:54
Speaker 1: It was the purpose of Red China to overwhelm and
29:56
Speaker 1: annihilate through a sneak attack the Eighth Army in ten
30:00
Speaker 1: by the heavy assault of overwhelming forces of a new
30:03
Speaker 1: power not heretofore committed to war against which it knew
30:07
Speaker 1: or rightly surmised there would be no retaliation. This plan
30:12
Speaker 1: was foiled by our anticipatory advance, which uncovered the enemy's
30:16
Speaker 1: plot before he had assembled all of his forces, and
30:19
Speaker 1: by our prompt strategic withdraw before he could inflict a
30:22
Speaker 1: crippling blow of a pearl harbor nature. This was undoubtedly
30:26
Speaker 1: one of the most successful strategic retreats in history, comparable
30:30
Speaker 1: with and markedly similar to Wellington's Great Peninsula withdraw. Had
30:35
Speaker 1: the initiative action not been taken and an inert position
30:39
Speaker 1: of adequate defense assumed, I have no slightest doubt that
30:42
Speaker 1: the Eighth Army and ten Corps both would have been annihilated.
30:46
Speaker 1: As it was, both were preserved with practically undiminished potential
30:50
Speaker 1: for further action. I have always regarded this action, considering
30:55
Speaker 1: the apparently unsurmountable difficulties and overwhelming nods, as the most success,
31:00
Speaker 1: ustful and satisfying I have ever commanded. MacArthur letter seventeen
31:05
Speaker 1: October fifty six. Marine officers in Korea had no first
31:09
Speaker 1: hand knowledge of USACK operations. It was obvious, however, that
31:14
Speaker 1: an Eighth Army retirement south of the thirty eighth parallel
31:17
Speaker 1: had made it desirable, if not actually necessary, for ten
31:20
Speaker 1: quarter withdraw from Northeast Korea. Even though General Allman held
31:24
Speaker 1: that a ham hung hung down perimeter could be defended
31:27
Speaker 1: throughout the winner. End of Chapter fifteen, Part one, read
31:32
Speaker 1: by Aaron Bennett,