Latest / Credit Union Exam Solutions Presents With Flying Colors / $16 Million In Fraud from the Inside: A Walk Through NCUA’s Latest IG Report
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker: Hey, everyone.
- 0:00This is Mark Trakel with another episode of With Flying Colors.
- 0:03Today, I'm going to walk through some of the items in the NCUA's Inspector
- 0:09General's last report to Congress.
- 0:12This is something I probably will do every six months.
- 0:15NCUA and every federal agency is required to file a report with
- 0:19Congress from the Inspector General on how the agency is responding to the
- 0:24requirements of the Inspector General.
- 0:27I've also started to monitor what the FDIC and the Fed and Treasury related to OCC
- 0:35is saying in their semiannual reports, and I'll have a separate podcast on that.
- 0:40But if you're wondering, if you're watching this on
- 0:44YouTube, you can follow along.
- 0:45If you're listening bear with me here as I point out how to find these reports.
- 0:50So on the NCUA website, you go to About, and you go to Inspector
- 0:54General, and you go to Reports.
- 0:59Reports, see more.
- 1:02And you go to Semiannual Reports and Letters to Congress.
- 1:05And you can see their last one was from the period of April 1st through
- 1:09September 30th of 2025, and that's the one I'm gonna be reporting on.
- 1:15And this was sent to the Inspector...
- 1:18was sent to Congress on, let's see, October 22nd.
- 1:24So what's that?
- 1:2630 and 22, 52 days after the end of the quarter.
- 1:30So at the af- the end of March add 52 days, we're looking at
- 1:35possibly having a report to Congress come out by the end of May.
- 1:39This podcast that I'm recording will come out about that point in time.
- 1:43So when that new one comes out, I'll jump on it and see if there's
- 1:47anything else I want to add to it.
- 1:49But- You can see the report has a message from the inspector general,
- 1:56goes through NCUA's mission shows their organizational chart, shows
- 2:00some key financial trends legislative highlights, a summary of how the IG works.
- 2:06It walks through the audits that they've done.
- 2:08There was nothing in particular there that caught my eye.
- 2:12And scrolling down to report on credit unions' non-material losses.
- 2:17The insurance fund NCUA the IG has to do to conduct a material loss review of any
- 2:24insured credit union if the loss of, to the insurance fund exceeds $25 million and
- 2:29an amount equal to 10% of the total assets of the credit union at the time in which
- 2:34NCUA initiated assistance or liquidation.
- 2:37So there are none that hit that this cycle.
- 2:40But if it's less than that, they report on credit unions of non-material
- 2:43losses, and those are the ones that I wanna walk through here.
- 2:47And with that, I have a...
- 2:51Let's see.
- 2:51How do I get to my PowerPoint here?
- 2:54Bear with me.
- 2:57The PowerPoint should be right here, and I am sharing the screen, and we will
- 3:05go to the slideshow on the PowerPoint.
- 3:08Pause.
- 3:11Now I wanna jump to my, the PowerPoint I put together on the fraud cases
- 3:15or the fraud files, as I call them, for this particular episode.
- 3:19And this comes from the IG report from October 2024 to September 2025.
- 3:30We're gonna walk through a pattern that's there.
- 3:33We're gonna walk through the IG r- I mentioned to you that I'm gonna be doing
- 3:36IG reporting on a semi-annual basis.
- 3:40And then I'll also follow up on what the other banking regulators are do- doing.
- 3:45We're gonna walk through the seven failures in the quarter talk a little bit
- 3:48about the fraud triangle and talk a little bit about the history of the IG and some
- 3:53reports talk about some examiner behavior that this will trigger walk through s- a
- 3:58prevention playbook on what you can do to prevent fraud and then talk a little bit.
- 4:03I've got a separate podcast on why exams have to be on site and we'll
- 4:06talk through a little bit about that.
- 4:08So There are seven failures that occurred from October 2024 to
- 4:14September 2025, and those are failures that cost the insurance fund money.
- 4:19You had Total Community Action Federal Credit Union in the southern
- 4:22region with a slight loss of $5,380.
- 4:27The root causes there were weak leadership, record
- 4:29keeping, and inaccurate books.
- 4:31You have Unilever Federal Credit Union in the eastern region failed
- 4:36in April of 2025 for a cost of 8.44
- 4:39million.
- 4:40There was internal fraud there, hidden borrowings and falsified liquidity.
- 4:45Eastern Kentucky Federal Credit Union, the southern region, in
- 4:48June of 2025 for a cost of 1.47
- 4:50million.
- 4:51Management lost visibility into the loan portfolio is the note we have here.
- 4:56Seoul Community Federal Credit Union, the southern region, June of 2025, for a loss
- 5:01just over $91,000 caused by insolvency.
- 5:05Yes insolvency's caused by loan losses or write-offs federal
- 5:08Credit Union Act violations and unsafe and unsound operations.
- 5:12Butler Heritage Federal Credit Union in the southern region,
- 5:15$192,000 in June of 2025.
- 5:19You had record keeping, BSA, and IT compliance failures.
- 5:23Aldersgate Federal Credit Union, western region, July 2025, 7.98
- 5:29million.
- 5:30This was a management level fraud.
- 5:32Loan and share, loans and share accounts were abused, so that
- 5:35would've been fake loans or not recording book shares on, on two sets
- 5:41of books essentially, most likely.
- 5:43And Members 1st of Maryland Federal Credit Union in the eastern region
- 5:50August of 2025, for a loss of about $230,000.
- 5:55They had pervasive record keeping problems and declining net worth.
- 5:59You can see if you're watching the two items that are highlighted in
- 6:03pink were internal fraud cases.
- 6:06And t- Eastern Kentucky, Now that doesn't make sense.
- 6:10What, why is those showing us pink internal fraud cases?
- 6:14And you also had Eldersgate management level fraud, which
- 6:17is internal fraud cases.
- 6:18So ignore the reference to the pink.
- 6:20So what we have here you can see the two largest losses, Unilever Federal
- 6:24Credit Union was internal fraud, 8.44
- 6:27million, and members for excuse me, no Eldersgate 7.98
- 6:32million, almost 8 million.
- 6:33So two losses, the two biggest ones one just over 8 million and one just under
- 6:388 million had fraud driving the train.
- 6:41And what happens when people aren't watching?
- 6:43Fraud happens.
- 6:44And when you have 27% less staff there's less people watching.
- 6:48So I think what you're going to see over these next cycles, the next one, two,
- 6:54three, four, five, six, let's say, let's call it six reports to Congress every six
- 6:59months they have to report to Congress.
- 7:00So I'm gonna say over the next three years, I think you're gonna see bigger
- 7:03losses that pop up here just because the fact that NCUA has less people there.
- 7:07And I'm not saying that they shouldn't have do- done what they did.
- 7:11I'm just saying that when you have less people stopping by credit unions
- 7:15the likelihood of fraud goes up.
- 7:17It's just when you see a police car in the middle of the road and they don't have
- 7:22anybody in it, it makes people slow down.
- 7:24You see the police car, you slow down.
- 7:25You see the examiner, sometimes you slow down.
- 7:29So what does this data tell you?
- 7:31There were seven credit union failur- failures.
- 7:33There were 16 million plus dollars from fraud alone.
- 7:37Those are the two, Unilever and Eldersgate combined.
- 7:40Four of the seven losses had re- record-keeping failures, TCA, Butler
- 7:44Heritage, Member First, and Seoul.
- 7:47And 50% of the fraud was from the inside.
- 7:50Key takeaways, two failures, Unilever and Elders- Eldersgate
- 7:54were driven by internal fraud.
- 7:56Both involved trusted insiders with system access, insufficient
- 8:00oversight, and falsified records.
- 8:02The boards in both cases were making decisions based on numbers that they, that
- 8:05had been deliberately corrupted by staff.
- 8:08The three elements that enable every fraud, what are they?
- 8:11Pressure, opportunity, and rash- rationalization.
- 8:15Those are, that's the the fraud triangle, if you will.
- 8:18That's if you read up on fraud, if you t- if you're a certified fraud examiner,
- 8:22you know far more than me on this.
- 8:24But from the pressure side, personal financial stress, lifestyle, debt,
- 8:29workplace performance demands.
- 8:31A- alone, pressure is not enough, but it's the ignition.
- 8:34It lights the- It lights the fraud.
- 8:37Opportunity, access and authority, and insufficient oversight, often structur-
- 8:42often structural at small credit unions.
- 8:44The most controllable element, design your organization to limit
- 8:47it, but again, if you're super small, sometimes that is difficult.
- 8:52Rationalization, "I'll pay it back.
- 8:54They owe me."
- 8:54The longer someone is trusted, the larger the fraud losses tend to be.
- 9:00The AC- ACFE finding internal control weaknesses drove nearly
- 9:04half of all occupational fraud.
- 9:07Not phishing attacks, not external attackers.
- 9:09NCUA trains certified fraud examiners because this framework
- 9:13maps directly to what examiner finds.
- 9:15Now, NCUA doesn't do fraud exams, but they do have certain people on
- 9:19their team that are fraud examiners.
- 9:22They do let those folks take some of their continued development to enhance that.
- 9:27But again, with 27 for less, 27% less staff I imagine some of those
- 9:33fraud examiners took the buyout.
- 9:37The fraud triangle in action.
- 9:39You've got the case studies of Unilever and Aldersgate.
- 9:41The loss on Alders-- in Unilever, $8.44
- 9:44million.
- 9:45Two trusted employees were involved.
- 9:47What was the method?
- 9:48Hidden borrowings and falsified liquidity reports.
- 9:52So they were borrowing money, but not putting it on the financial statement.
- 9:56Again, the board was making decisions on information that wasn't accurate.
- 10:01And again, on the fraud opportunity, they had system as-
- 10:04access, they had no dual control.
- 10:06They had rat- rationalization insider trust accumulated over time.
- 10:11So they've been there a long time, everybody trusts what they say.
- 10:15Aldersgate, July 1st, 2025, just under, just $2,000 under $8 million.
- 10:21It was management themselves, not a rogue employ- employee.
- 10:24Fraudulent activity across loans and share accounts.
- 10:27That could be taking funds from inactive accounts, booking fictitious loans.
- 10:31Those are the kind of things you typically would see at NCUA
- 10:34for these type of situations.
- 10:36And it was the worst case of governance failure.
- 10:39The perpetrators ran the institution, ran the credit union.
- 10:43And again, opportunity, highest level access, no oversight, and
- 10:46rationalization, and were operating without any accountability.
- 10:51The outgoing IG's legacy from the early 2000s, NCUA's
- 10:56examiners don't look for fraud.
- 10:57The position was e- examiners don't look for fraud during exams.
- 11:01The inspector general pushed it because of fraud ca- Material loss reviews.
- 11:07Fraud at small credit unions kept causing Share Insurance Fund losses.
- 11:11Progress was made.
- 11:12NCUA adopted examiner fraud checklists, robust scope steps, job
- 11:16aids and fraud-related procedures.
- 11:19Result was there was a reduced fraud losses to the insurance fund.
- 11:22Now, Jim Hagan retired as part of the buyout, and the acting IG, Marta Irzag
- 11:28has the advantage of the fact that these things have been put in place under
- 11:33the prior regime, and she also worked for Jim Hagan when I was there at NCUA,
- 11:37and is very capable of leading the IG.
- 11:40Now, however, again, with twenty-seven percent less staff, what has that done
- 11:44to NCUA's use of the fraud checklist?
- 11:47The steps that they take as part of their exams, they have to cut in certain places.
- 11:52And if they cut in the fraud area, it will likely potentially lead to
- 11:56fraud increasing moving forward.
- 12:00Examiner behavior what they're pattern matching against the, the loan portfolio.
- 12:04Do you know what's in your book?
- 12:06Loan stratification, concentration reports, delinquency trend analysis by
- 12:10product, vid-vintage, and originator.
- 12:12Are people looking at these reports to see if something pops out?
- 12:16Liquidity reporting, Unilever.
- 12:18Is anyone independently verifying these numbers?
- 12:21Again, coming back to the supervisory committee.
- 12:23BSA and recordkeeping.
- 12:25NCUA has a zero tolerance for recordkeeping problems.
- 12:28If you have recordkeeping problems, you will see them every quarter, not
- 12:32every hundred and twenty days, not every hundred and eighty days, not
- 12:35every year, not every other year.
- 12:36You will see them quarterly.
- 12:38Now, what they do when they show up, are they pushing you to to get an audit?
- 12:43Are they pushing you to make sure that things are resolved?
- 12:45So if you see these accounting issues causing losses that means that the
- 12:49credit union failed, the supervisory committee failed, and NCUA failed
- 12:52probably in what they were looking at.
- 12:55Getting to the supervisory committee.
- 12:56All seven of these situations the supervisory committee is
- 13:00your first line of defense.
- 13:02Are they doing their job?
- 13:03Are they being listened to?
- 13:05And then IT controls.
- 13:07This was an issue at Butler Heritage.
- 13:08It's something that every NCUA board member has said they lose sleep at
- 13:12night because of the IT side of things.
- 13:14I lose sleep on that side of it, but they haven't had a lot of losses
- 13:17tied to that, but maybe that'll be something that comes soon.
- 13:21Now, smaller credit unions, less than fifty million dollars in assets their
- 13:25biggest vulnerability is structural.
- 13:27They have limited staff, which creates opportunities for default.
- 13:31And you can o- you can compensate that with active oversight of the supervisory
- 13:35committee or whoever does your audit.
- 13:37Looking at account maintenance reports.
- 13:39Manda-mandatory consecutive vacation.
- 13:42That's another thing they teach you in the fraud classes.
- 13:44Surprise cash counts.
- 13:46Anony- anonymous reporting hotline, bond coverage review
- 13:50do they have the right coverage?
- 13:51'Cause these losses can be recovered sometimes.
- 13:54And the annual fraud-specific audit inquiry.
- 13:57Auditors should ask directly whether management is aware of any fraud.
- 14:00When I was the executive director at NCUA, the CPAs would sit down, and
- 14:04they would ask me that, and I would have to sign a letter saying that I
- 14:07was not aware of any fraud at NCUA.
- 14:10Same type of thing happens in the audits.
- 14:12Mid-size and larger credit unions, 50 million above you get into behavioral
- 14:17analytics and AI monitoring, which is a new tool where you can w-
- 14:21you can watch outliers, role-based access controls, internal audits.
- 14:25Of course, these credit unions can afford internal audits and can do
- 14:28fraud-related reviews, and they can do more granular loan portfolio
- 14:34visibility with the resources that they have as a large, larger credit union.
- 14:41Now, the living fraud risk assessment, you've got member risk, you've got product
- 14:44risk, and you've got enterprise risk.
- 14:47On the member side, who are your members?
- 14:49What channels and products do they use?
- 14:52Are onboarding controls adequate for the risk pro- file?
- 14:55Of course, you have people pretending to be who they're not, and you
- 14:58see a lot of fraud in that arena.
- 15:00Product risk, which products carry the highest fraud exposure, business
- 15:04accounts, digital channels, loan products with minimal documentation.
- 15:07What specific things are you doing at your credit union where the,
- 15:11where you could perhaps enhance and make your procedures more robust?
- 15:15And then enterprise risk, the most under-invested assessment.
- 15:18Given your current control environment, where are the most
- 15:21exploitable gaps right now?
- 15:23And then having someone look at those gaps.
- 15:26Now, why virtual exams will never replace on-site exams.
- 15:30They need to see you, right?
- 15:31NCUA can do a lot of things off-site, and they can get, can identify anomalies,
- 15:36but coming in, looking at loan files, asking questions, walking through their
- 15:40fraud checklist, looking at account reconcilements, ticking and tying the
- 15:44financial statement from a, from an NCUA perspective can reveal fraud.
- 15:49You also, when NCUA shows up my guys here on the podcast have talked about,
- 15:53you pull your sample of 30 loans.
- 15:55They bring you 35 because somebody knows those other five loans are fraudulent.
- 15:59That does happen.
- 16:00So just showing up, you have whistleblowers who don't blow the
- 16:03whistle, but they point NCUA staff in the right direction, which is why,
- 16:08again, having a good, well-trained exam team and having on-site exams
- 16:12is something, in my opinion, that'll never go away and never should go away.
- 16:17So five things to take back to your credit union from this.
- 16:21Fraud can come from the inside.
- 16:22Two of the seven failures were internal, combined losses over $16 million.
- 16:26Your greatest fraud risk isn't external hackers, it's insider
- 16:30access without oversight.
- 16:33The opportunity is the controllable element.
- 16:36You can't always detect pressure or predict rationalization.
- 16:39You can design your organization to limit opportunity through segregation of duties,
- 16:44dual controls, and mandatory vacations.
- 16:47Wrecking, record keeping, number three, record keeping failures
- 16:50compound every other problem.
- 16:53Four of seven failures had significant record keeping issues.
- 16:56Inaccurate records don't just fail the auditors, they fail your board, your
- 17:00examiners, and your own decision-making, and of course, your members.
- 17:04Examiners are pattern matching.
- 17:05Every ques- hard question about your loan portfolio, liquidity reporting,
- 17:09or supervisory committee activity has a failed credit union behind it.
- 17:13They're not adversaries.
- 17:14They carry institutional memory about failure.
- 17:17Some of these questions are to try and figure out if there is fraud.
- 17:21And lastly, the fraud risk assessment should be alive, not an annual review.
- 17:27It's not something you can just check the box.
- 17:28It's something you need to be looking at all times.
- 17:30Ask the uncomfortable questions.
- 17:32Where does opportunity exist right now, and who in your organization
- 17:36might already feel pressure?
- 17:38All right, that's a wrap on this episode of what I'm calling The Fraud Files.
- 17:42Watch for more frequent discussion about what NCUA is saying in their
- 17:46IG reports and what the other banking regulators are saying in their reports.
- 17:52And with that, I'm gonna stop sharing, and I'm gonna click thank you for listening.
- 17:56Thank you for watching.
- 17:57As always, this is Mark Trakel.
- 17:59Signing off, I hope you'll listen or watch again soon