Latest / The Morning Edition / Taiwan, trade and the balance of power: What’s at stake when Trump meets Xi Jinping

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Taiwan, trade and the balance of power: What’s at stake when Trump meets Xi Jinping · The Morning Edition

0:07
S1: When Donald Trump meets with XI Jinping this week, it
0:10
S1: will be a geopolitical heavyweight matchup with enormous stakes. According
0:14
S1: to Joe Biden's former deputy secretary of state, because on
0:19
S1: the table is everything from global trade to security. And
0:23
S1: this at a time when the American president is arguably
0:26
S1: at his weakest and the Chinese leader at his most paranoid.
0:30
S1: I'm Samantha Salinger Morris, and you're listening to The Morning
0:33
S1: Edition from The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald. Today,
0:37
S1: international and political editor Peter Hartcher on whether Trump may
0:41
S1: inadvertently lead the United States into unilateral concessions and unintentional appeasement,
0:48
S1: and what this might mean for the rest of us.
0:51
S1: It's May the 14th. Peter, welcome back to the podcast.
0:55
S2: Pleasure to be here, Samantha.
0:57
S1: Okay. So it's very timely what you've just written about
0:59
S1: because Donald Trump is landing in China when this episode
1:02
S1: goes to air on Thursday morning. Now, we're recording this
1:04
S1: on Wednesday, so it's before the meetings have taken place.
1:08
S1: But do we know what's on the agenda when Trump
1:10
S1: meets with XI Jinping? We know it's Trump's first visit
1:13
S1: to China in nine years. So kind of a big deal, right?
1:17
S2: Yes it is. It's a big deal. Beyond the transactions
1:22
S2: that are going to be on the table themselves, because
1:25
S2: this is a top level meeting between the long reigning
1:30
S2: global hegemon and the new already regional hegemon with aspirations
1:36
S2: to displace the US as the global hegemon. And XI
1:40
S2: Jinping has a favorite phrase that he's used in recent years.
1:44
S2: We are seeing change unseen in a hundred years. And
1:49
S2: as he said to Vladimir Putin, you and I are
1:52
S2: the ones driving that change. He sees this very much
1:56
S2: as to use another one of XI Jinping's favourites. The
1:59
S2: East is rising and the West is declining and he
2:03
S2: hopes to accelerate that trend. At this meeting, that is
2:07
S2: the big picture in XI Jinping's mind. Donald Trump has
2:12
S2: a more transactional approach, as we well know. Also more unpredictable,
2:19
S2: less consistent and more episodic. He's talking about big trade deal.
2:27
S2: A lot of people have speculated that he will be
2:29
S2: asking China for help with the Iran war, because Iran
2:32
S2: is a long standing friend and close, close partner of China.
2:38
S2: Trump has has said in the last hours that America
2:42
S2: doesn't need any help because the war is going so
2:44
S2: splendidly for him in Iran.
2:46
S1: So.
2:46
S2: Well, so he won't be consulting XI Jinping, apparently, on that.
2:51
S2: But he has said he's looking for a big trade deal.
2:54
S2: He he's going to be trying to get XI Jinping
2:57
S2: to agree to buy a bunch more US products and
3:01
S2: agree to cut back on the supply. The flow of fentanyl,
3:05
S2: the opioid essential to the US, because of the horrible
3:10
S2: health consequences it has on US citizens. But we've been
3:14
S2: here before, Samantha. There's a lot of media excitement about
3:19
S2: this trip and the prospects for a big trade deal,
3:21
S2: and Trump talks that up himself. We in the media
3:25
S2: are often accused of having short memories. And, you know,
3:28
S2: I'm pleading guilty. Guilty as charged here. But in this case,
3:33
S2: I did take the take the opportunity to check the
3:38
S2: the record. And in Trump's first term, when XI Jinping,
3:42
S2: the same two men, agreed to a big trade deal,
3:45
S2: hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese commitments to buy
3:49
S2: US products, XI Jinping didn't deliver. According to the Peterson
3:54
S2: Institute of International Economics, which is a credible Washington think tank.
3:58
S2: The Chinese government ended up buying 51% of what they
4:02
S2: had promised to buy. 51. The fentanyl side of things
4:06
S2: XI Jinping has been promising US presidents, including Obama, Biden,
4:10
S2: for years that China would stop the flow, curb the flow. It.
4:17
S2: It changes the flow. It masks the flow. It has
4:19
S2: never stopped the flow. So what we are seeing here
4:22
S2: is Donald Trump going in to do the same thing
4:25
S2: he's done before, in which he failed to get the
4:28
S2: concessions he sought, but hoping to succeed now where he
4:32
S2: failed before. That's either eternal optimism or the definition of insanity.
4:37
S1: Okay. Good point. But it's not just trade though, right?
4:40
S1: Because we've also got potentially the balance of regional power
4:44
S1: in Asia sort of happening here. Or at stake, I guess.
4:47
S1: So walk us through that.
4:49
S2: Yes. There's a lot at stake. There's the relative competition
4:52
S2: of the two countries. Their economic position, their technological dominance.
4:58
S2: In which China has been and continues to overtake the
5:02
S2: US in cutting edge areas. And then there is the
5:06
S2: security dimension. The really touchy point here for especially for
5:13
S2: Beijing is Taiwan. And while Trump says that XI Jinping
5:18
S2: will try to talk him out of selling US arms
5:21
S2: to Taiwan, which Taiwan obviously uses to defend itself and
5:25
S2: try to fend off any Chinese military action. Trump hasn't
5:29
S2: given any sign about how he will respond to XI
5:32
S2: Jinping's pressure on Taiwan. But it is the it is
5:37
S2: the jewel in the crown for XI Jinping, and he
5:40
S2: will attempt to either get concessions somehow in US policy
5:46
S2: on the treatment and protection of Taiwan. Mhm. Or he
5:49
S2: will try to engage Donald Trump's ability, willingness to resist
5:55
S2: any plans he may have for wresting control of Taiwan.
6:02
S2: A lot of talk about a military invasion. I think
6:05
S2: my view is that's much less likely. It's the dumber
6:09
S2: way to do it. XI Jinping has much more success,
6:12
S2: proven success in his strategic affairs, with a careful incrementalism
6:18
S2: that falls just short of kinetic violence. His forces, his
6:22
S2: military has been rehearsing a trade embargo, a transport and
6:27
S2: all sorts of freight air movement embargo around Taiwan in
6:32
S2: in the last year or two. That sort of blockade
6:34
S2: is much more likely the sort of tactic he would
6:37
S2: use if he resorts to to forceful means to try
6:40
S2: to subdue Taiwan. So he'll be looking at Donald Trump
6:42
S2: and thinking, are you going to try to interfere? Are
6:46
S2: you a US president who will try to stop me,
6:50
S2: or will you like your predecessors? Let me just continue
6:53
S2: to push push you out of the region the way
6:56
S2: I've been doing since I took this job in 2012
6:59
S2: as president of China.
7:00
S1: Now we know that Donald Trump is very erratic. So
7:03
S1: I don't know how much weight we should put to
7:04
S1: what he says or doesn't say, but he was almost
7:06
S1: aggressively noncommittal. Right about Taiwan. I think in the lead
7:10
S1: up to this, I think Donald Trump said something along
7:12
S1: the lines of, yeah, she doesn't want us selling arms
7:15
S1: to Taiwan. And I don't know. We're going to talk
7:17
S1: about it as though he was talking about, you know,
7:19
S1: what he was planning for lunch or something.
7:22
S2: I like aggressively noncommittal. Yeah. That's good.
7:24
S1: Oh that's what that's what it sounded like to me.
7:26
S1: Because I know that some people do worry that Trump's
7:29
S1: unpredictable China policy may inadvertently lead the U.S. into unilateral
7:33
S1: concessions and unintentional appeasement. So I guess how much of
7:37
S1: a concern is there with this particular meeting, because you've
7:40
S1: written that the XI Jinping that Donald Trump is going
7:42
S1: to encounter is increasingly paranoid. So I don't know. Might
7:47
S1: that dynamic lead possibly Trump in one direction or the
7:50
S1: other in terms of his willingness to stand up to XI.
7:53
S1: When it comes to the defense of Taiwan.
7:56
S2: Well, predicting Donald Trump, of course, is a mug's game.
7:59
S1: It's a horrible thing to do.
8:00
S2: To your.
8:00
S1: Departure, I know. Yeah.
8:02
S2: Absolutely. Absolutely. So we we just don't know. But another
8:07
S2: line of his on Taiwan in the last day or so.
8:10
S2: And he's used this line before. He said Taiwan is
8:14
S2: 67 miles from China and 9000 miles from the US. Yeah.
8:19
S2: Implicit in that is it's their sphere of influence. It's
8:23
S2: their it's their territory. And I'm going to let them
8:26
S2: have it. And why should we bother? We are so distant.
8:30
S2: When he first used that phrase, his former vice president,
8:35
S2: Mike pence said, what is distance to a global superpower?
8:39
S2: Is the US a global superpower or not? That is
8:43
S2: a nice way of framing exactly how XI Jinping will
8:46
S2: be looking at it. There's been a lot of talk
8:48
S2: and theorizing and hypothesizing in US strategic circles in recent
8:53
S2: months and years about whatever the Trump doctrine is. Does
8:57
S2: he have a Monroe Doctrine or Don Rowe? They're calling
9:00
S2: it to carve the world into spheres of influence. And
9:04
S2: if so, the US is going to be satisfied with
9:06
S2: the Western Hemisphere in the Middle East and leave the
9:08
S2: Indo-Pacific to China or whatever. If he is even remotely
9:13
S2: moving in that direction, that is music to XI Jinping's ears.
9:17
S2: That is precisely the long term goal of the Chinese
9:20
S2: Communist Party is to force the US out first of
9:23
S2: the Western Pacific and then beyond, and taking control of
9:27
S2: Taiwan is a critical step in achieving that. In terms
9:31
S2: of the the paranoia in the Chinese leadership, it's a really,
9:35
S2: really interesting phenomenon. So in absolute terms, the Iran war
9:40
S2: has weakened both countries. It's weakened the US and Trump's
9:43
S2: position because of what it's done to fuel prices. And
9:46
S2: his popularity and inflation have all suffered because of this
9:49
S2: pointless war that he's found himself in.
9:52
S1: And presumably minimizing military stocks and so forth as well.
9:54
S1: Really running.
9:55
S2: Really running down not only their literal ammunition stocks, but
9:59
S2: also their credibility in the world and, and demonstrating a
10:03
S2: further weakening of US alliance structures, NATO in particular, which
10:08
S2: is which is the singular, the single most important source
10:13
S2: of power the US has had in the world over
10:15
S2: other countries is that alliance system. No other country has
10:19
S2: anything like it. Trump is busy damaging it. But China
10:22
S2: also has been damaged by the Iran war. Iran is
10:25
S2: one of its affiliates. Iran has weakened. It's also punishing
10:29
S2: stocks of supply of fuel and fertilizer and other supplies
10:33
S2: to China. So everybody's suffering. But the relative standing, the
10:37
S2: relative standing of the two leaders, that's the absolute standing.
10:39
S2: The relative standing is that Trump is much weaker. To
10:42
S2: quote the German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, Trump is being humiliated
10:47
S2: by Iran. And we see that every day. And XI
10:51
S2: Jinping is stronger. XI Jinping is now 13 or 14,
10:54
S2: depending on which job you want to use, whether it's
10:57
S2: secretary of the party or president. He's 13, 14 years
11:01
S2: into his job. He's stronger than ever. He's more dominant
11:04
S2: than ever in in China, he had the Constitution amended
11:09
S2: so that he can serve beyond two terms. This is
11:11
S2: his third five year term. He'll very likely still be
11:15
S2: in the job when Donald Trump, his term, runs out.
11:18
S2: He has purged the political system, the military, the commercial sector.
11:23
S2: He's purged the security services. He's purged everything and everybody
11:28
S2: to cement control. The problem is, if you're a dictator
11:34
S2: and you're constantly concerned not only about the state of
11:37
S2: your the legitimacy of your claim to power, but if
11:42
S2: you've got there through scheming. These are constant sources of
11:46
S2: worry and concern, and he's become increasingly paranoid the more
11:51
S2: powerful he gets. Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown,
11:55
S2: and XI Jinping demonstrates that. And just two two very
11:58
S2: brief anecdotes from the last two weeks.
12:01
S1: Just the last one of them, you said was quite
12:03
S1: unusual even for XI Jinping, who obviously is.
12:05
S2: Yeah, well, one of them, I suppose they're both unusual.
12:08
S2: One was more unusual than the other. Yeah. So he's
12:11
S2: purged the military. So although he puts a huge premium
12:15
S2: on control, control of everything within that, he uses instability
12:20
S2: as a tool of control. And he's used that in
12:22
S2: in the military. He purged the military, appointed all his
12:26
S2: own people. But then having all his own people there,
12:28
S2: he's purged it again. And last, just last week, two
12:33
S2: former defense ministers that he had appointed are both generals
12:37
S2: were sentenced to death in Chinese courts for bribery. And
12:44
S2: there's a two year reprieve on the death sentence that
12:47
S2: may or may not end up being killed. They may
12:50
S2: get jailed for life. But this is a these are
12:53
S2: his own men.
12:56
S1: After the break.
12:58
S2: The bigger and more powerful his military becomes, the more
13:01
S2: paranoid he is, and that even his own appointees to
13:05
S2: to those jobs have to be purged.
13:13
S1: And so the purpose of this is not just to
13:15
S1: put everyone on, you know, in the crouch position, so
13:17
S1: to speak.
13:18
S2: Yes, I think I think that's exactly right. The pretext
13:23
S2: is always corruption, but it's a pretext. You have to
13:26
S2: be corrupt and be scheming, or somehow seem to be
13:29
S2: disloyal to be to be purged. The Central Military Commission
13:34
S2: of China, which is the paramount body of power chaired
13:37
S2: by the president himself. Until recently, it had eight members,
13:41
S2: including XI Jinping. Well, XI Jinping purged six of them.
13:46
S2: And there's just him and one general left on that
13:49
S2: committee now. And the general isn't even a real military general.
13:53
S2: He's a political commissar. He's there to keep an eye
13:56
S2: on the on the military. It's a pretty lonely sort
13:58
S2: of meeting to go from eight people to two. And
14:00
S2: none of them are actually military commanders. So that's really
14:03
S2: interesting that, you know, the more the bigger and more
14:06
S2: powerful his military becomes, the more paranoid he is, and
14:10
S2: that even his own appointees to those jobs have to
14:13
S2: be purged.
14:14
S1: Are getting the chop.
14:15
S2: And sentenced to death, some of them. This is pretty
14:17
S2: striking stuff.
14:19
S1: But and then he did something, I guess, strange you'd
14:21
S1: call it, to sort of an alert to the young
14:23
S1: people in China. Yes, yes. What's he doing with them?
14:26
S2: This this is not just unusual. This is really quite bizarre.
14:29
S2: In to our way of thinking, I suppose. He has
14:32
S2: the secret police issuing a public statement and a video
14:35
S2: with a little AI generated guy in a police uniform
14:39
S2: giving life advice to the Chinese youth. about what, three
14:45
S2: weeks ago, I suppose it was the Ministry of State Security,
14:48
S2: which is the premier intelligence and control and spying agency
14:53
S2: in China. Put out this announcement, directed to the youth
14:58
S2: of China to tell them that you have to stay sharp,
15:01
S2: remain ambitious, work hard and remember your goals and make
15:06
S2: make China great. And to warn them against a phenomenon
15:10
S2: known as lying flat, lying flat Tang ping, they call it,
15:14
S2: which is essentially giving up or opting out of the
15:18
S2: mainstream economy labor market. So these are young people who've
15:23
S2: mostly come out of university, have a great deal of
15:25
S2: difficulty finding a job. With unemployment rate higher, the economy
15:28
S2: is in a bit of a slump. They're finding even
15:31
S2: if they can get a job, there's this so-called nine, nine,
15:33
S2: six culture where you're supposed to work from 9 a.m.
15:35
S2: to 9 p.m., six days a week. They're not feeling
15:39
S2: that they're getting ahead. It's impossible to have the lives
15:41
S2: that their parents had. Does this sound familiar? It's got echoes.
15:45
S2: Echoes in in the West, in Australia. Yeah. Which is
15:48
S2: being worked out right now in our federal budget and
15:50
S2: political processes. So so this is kind of familiar, but
15:53
S2: they call it lying flat. What's the point of trying.
15:55
S2: We're going to give up and lie flat.
15:57
S1: And so it's actually a bit of a rebellious stance
15:59
S1: isn't it, from the young people there. Yeah. Yeah.
16:01
S2: It's kind of through history. It's kind of common. It's
16:04
S2: nothing unusual. But this has been been running now for
16:07
S2: about five years. It's a post-COVID phenomenon. XI Jinping warned
16:10
S2: against it in 2021. He said no more lying flat.
16:13
S2: Get out. Work hard. If things I know things are difficult,
16:17
S2: endure hardship. And he used the specific phrase eat bitterness.
16:22
S2: His advice to the youth was eat bitterness. Well, they didn't.
16:25
S1: Really love to hear that. Yeah.
16:26
S2: Globally, they lapped it up, which is why five years later,
16:29
S2: they've now got the Ministry of State Security coming out
16:33
S2: and sending out this diktat. Don't surrender to this Tang
16:36
S2: Ping thing because lying flat is being promoted. You might
16:39
S2: just think it's a social phenomenon. It's actually the sinister
16:42
S2: hand of hostile foreign intelligence forces.
16:45
S1: That's right. This is the CIA. This is the foreign
16:48
S1: spies who are who are getting you to do this.
16:51
S2: Yes, exactly.
16:52
S1: And so so tell us about this. How why is
16:54
S1: this so strange? Because lay people will be listening to
16:56
S1: this and they'll be going, well, secret service in China,
16:58
S1: they meddle in all kinds of ways. And, you know,
17:00
S1: I believe people in China still have to read the
17:02
S1: manifesto of.
17:04
S2: XI.
17:04
S1: Jinping of XI Jinping daily. So, you know, for those
17:06
S1: who are thinking going, well, isn't this just par for
17:08
S1: the course? How is this not just par for the course? Peter.
17:11
S2: Uh, well.
17:12
S1: And why does it matter?
17:13
S2: Well, the Ministry of State Security hasn't done this sort
17:17
S2: of life advice thing before. Is it going to work? Well,
17:21
S2: if it does, it's it'll only work because, I mean,
17:24
S2: one of the reasons I think it's so pernicious is
17:27
S2: that there's an implicit threat in that if you're a
17:30
S2: young Chinese person and you decide life is too difficult,
17:33
S2: I'm going to move home, stay with the folks a
17:35
S2: few years longer. Just give up for a while. They've
17:39
S2: now put you in the frame as being a tool
17:41
S2: of a hostile foreign force. You're now supposed to be
17:45
S2: a suspect. I think this is really unfortunate sort of framing.
17:49
S2: And is it going to be productive? I think unlikely
17:52
S2: to actually be productive. And a sinologist, an Australian sinologist,
17:57
S2: Jeremy Barmé, said he thinks it is, quote, incredibly insulting
18:03
S2: to say, to demean, to be so paternalistic and condescending
18:08
S2: to say to China's younger generations. In Obama's words, he's
18:13
S2: sort of voicing the implicit logic here from the Chinese
18:16
S2: Communist Party. We've raised and educated the smartest generation in
18:20
S2: Chinese history. And now, you guys, you're too stupid to
18:24
S2: figure out what lying flat is and whether you're being
18:27
S2: manipulated by a hostile foreign force. Just very insulting.
18:31
S1: It is. Okay, okay. But just to push back a
18:33
S1: little bit. So for those of us non sinologists who
18:35
S1: hear this and go, okay, well, we vaguely hear of,
18:38
S1: you know, Chinese Communist Party and other factors, you know,
18:42
S1: trying to control its citizens. How is this any different?
18:46
S1: And why does it matter? You know, I mean, obviously
18:48
S1: it sounds horrible, but why does it matter on a
18:50
S1: global stage? Why does it matter in the context of
18:52
S1: this particular meeting between XI Jinping and Donald Trump, and
18:55
S1: how the tenor of what's happening in China might impact,
18:59
S1: I guess, on global affairs?
19:01
S2: I think it's striking because it is an an outward
19:06
S2: sign of an inward paranoia. The system is so fragile
19:10
S2: and so insecure in itself that it sees this as
19:14
S2: a threat. Young people who can't get work and opt out,
19:18
S2: or whatever it is, is some sort of a threat
19:21
S2: to the political structure and and the tenure of the
19:25
S2: Chinese Communist Party. That's the importance of this.
19:28
S1: It sounds like this could be a very a tipping
19:30
S1: point moment. Like if you've got an increasingly paranoid XI Jinping,
19:34
S1: who obviously is dead set on increasing his power in
19:39
S1: his hemisphere. And then you've got Donald Trump, who he's
19:42
S1: suffering in this war, in this overseas adventurism. He had
19:47
S1: a platform of not interfering in foreign powers and such.
19:51
S1: So he might be in an appeasement mode. Could this
19:53
S1: be a tipping point where he does say something as
19:56
S1: explosive as, yeah, we might really strongly consider stopping selling
19:59
S1: arms to Taiwan. And, you know, we're just we're just
20:02
S1: pulling back here like.
20:04
S2: It's it's entirely possible. Yeah. As we've learned with Donald Trump.
20:08
S1: Yeah.
20:09
S2: Anything absolutely anything is possible.
20:11
S1: Yeah. And I guess just to wrap up, Peter, we
20:13
S1: know that Kurt Campbell, he served as deputy secretary of
20:16
S1: state and Indo-Pacific coordinator during the Biden administration. He has
20:21
S1: said this summit could change the course of U.S. China competition. Now,
20:25
S1: you've mentioned some of the factors involved in that, but
20:28
S1: do you think I mean, is that overegging it? Is
20:30
S1: that is that really possible? And if it does really
20:34
S1: change the course of U.S. China competition, is that something
20:37
S1: that's likely to affect us here in Australia?
20:39
S2: Mhm. Well. Donald Trump has already done a lot of
20:44
S2: things to change the competition between those those two powers.
20:48
S2: And we've talked about a few already. But just look
20:51
S2: at the technology question. The Biden administration had put restrictions
20:56
S2: on exporting the most high quality silicon chips, semiconductors to China,
21:03
S2: the ones which the US companies are using to try
21:07
S2: to establish global advantage in artificial intelligence. Well, Trump lifted
21:11
S2: those bans and said, go ahead. You can sell them.
21:14
S2: Ceding American technological advantage in one of the few areas
21:18
S2: where it still had an edge. So he's already conceded
21:22
S2: so much power to XI Jinping. Who knows what he
21:26
S2: will give, what he will take. But could it affect
21:29
S2: the balance? Absolutely. Even a slight hint from Donald Trump
21:35
S2: that he would be indifferent to China. Making some sort
21:39
S2: of move on. Taiwan would change the balance of power,
21:43
S2: not just between the two of them, but in the world,
21:46
S2: because it would encourage XI Jinping and hasten perhaps, plans
21:50
S2: that he has. He has said that this is an
21:53
S2: inevitable task and a generational one. The so-called reunification, the
22:00
S2: annexing of Taiwan has to be accomplished by by this generation,
22:03
S2: his generation. So that's a pretty clear cut intent. Now
22:07
S2: Trump gives him any hint that he will be indifferent
22:10
S2: to to whatever XI Jinping has in mind, then that
22:14
S2: will change the balance of power. It will affect the
22:17
S2: position of the US in the region. It will threaten
22:21
S2: the security of Japan, of Korea, South Korea. It will
22:26
S2: threaten the position of the Philippines, the Vietnamese, everybody right
22:29
S2: down from the South China Sea all the way down
22:33
S2: to the Straits of Malacca and beyond into the Indian Ocean.
22:35
S2: It will directly affect Australian power and ability to navigate
22:40
S2: in the world, literally, to navigate where our submarines and
22:44
S2: and our commercial vessels may or may not be allowed
22:46
S2: to go. And where the scope of US military power
22:50
S2: may be redefined. These are the stakes. That's why it's
22:54
S2: important we await to see the outcome of this, of
22:57
S2: this summit.
22:57
S1: Very interesting. Well, thanks, Peter, as always.
23:00
S2: Always a pleasure, Samantha.
23:06
S1: Today's episode was produced by Kai Wong with technical assistance
23:10
S1: by Debbie Harrington. Our executive producer is Tammy Mills, and
23:14
S1: our podcasts are overseen by Lisa Muxworthy and Tom McKendrick.
23:18
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S1: for listening.