Latest / KAJ Politics LIVE / Iran-Oman, Saudi-Pak-Turkey, India-France Rafale | Irina Tsukerman | Global Politics for Leaders 74
Transcript
- 0:19Speaker 1: Welcome to this episode of the World according to Iron
- 0:22Speaker 1: Our Sugarman, or very special series on global politics on
- 0:26Speaker 1: the Cage a Masterclass Live.
- 0:28Speaker 2: Ire In A.
- 0:29Speaker 1: Sugarman is a US based national security a human rights
- 0:32Speaker 1: lawyer as well as a renowned geopolitical analyst. Her writings
- 0:36Speaker 1: and commentary have appeared in diverse US and international media
- 0:40Speaker 1: and have been translated to over a dozen languages and
- 0:44Speaker 1: every fortnight in the world. According to Iron Our Sugarman,
- 0:47Speaker 1: we traverse the geopolitical landscape and delvid to pressing international
- 0:52Speaker 1: issues and gain insight from irenage expert perspective.
- 0:56Speaker 2: Welcome to the episode once again, Irena.
- 1:00Speaker 3: Sure, thank you, I'm so glad to be here.
- 1:03Speaker 1: I know several big topics again this time, and this
- 1:07Speaker 1: time let's again begin with the Iran update, and before
- 1:11Speaker 1: we come to the Iran oman path, let's talk about
- 1:15Speaker 1: about the key appointments that Iran seems to.
- 1:17Speaker 2: Have made and that needs.
- 1:19Speaker 1: The involvement of the Supreme Leader, whereas a lot of
- 1:23Speaker 1: people are questioning about whether he is there or not.
- 1:28Speaker 1: Help us understand what is happening in terms of key
- 1:30Speaker 1: appointments and what do we know about the Supreme Leader's help.
- 1:37Speaker 3: So the first thing to know is that videos of
- 1:40Speaker 3: showing the alleged Supreme Leader Musht Tabo Haamily, he seemed
- 1:45Speaker 3: to be more or less acrey, but it could have
- 1:47Speaker 3: been anything. It's unclear whe that video was manutulated or not. However, however,
- 1:55Speaker 3: that appears to be the first gesture right around suchler
- 2:01Speaker 3: the biological status of the Supreme Leader, so to speak.
- 2:06Speaker 3: And as for the key appointments, they are related to
- 2:09Speaker 3: the fact that the region has been replacing personnel following
- 2:12Speaker 3: enormous losses and its senior political, military insecurity leadership. These
- 2:19Speaker 3: changes should be read primarily as an effort to restore
- 2:22Speaker 3: institutional continuity after decapitation strikes and internal shocks. So one
- 2:30Speaker 3: of the key appointments is Mosen Rizai. He's the Secretary
- 2:33Speaker 3: of the Supreme National Security Council and the Supreme leaders
- 2:37Speaker 3: representative there. That is probably the most political consequential appointment.
- 2:43Speaker 3: Risai commanded the RGC from nineteen eighty one to nineteen
- 2:47Speaker 3: ninety seven and comes from a generation that constructed most
- 2:51Speaker 3: of the Guard's institutional power. He is there to replace
- 2:56Speaker 3: Mohammad Baker zul Kadar, who had taken over after allulary
- 3:01Speaker 3: Jority was killed earlier this year. Giving resign both the
- 3:06Speaker 3: secretaryship and the Supreme Court leaders are representative position concentrates
- 3:12Speaker 3: considerable influence over national security coordination in one veteran or
- 3:17Speaker 3: GC figure. It places an experienced military and political operator
- 3:21Speaker 3: directly at the intersection of negotiations with Washington, the Carmus confrontation,
- 3:28Speaker 3: relationships with Oman nuclear policy, and Iran's broader regional strategy.
- 3:33Speaker 3: In some ways, Risaign could play as key over the
- 3:36Speaker 3: role overall in Iran's military and politics as Cassom Solmoni.
- 3:42Speaker 3: Of course, there's danger and risk to doing something like that,
- 3:45Speaker 3: because if some solemney is skilled without training someone equally potent,
- 3:52Speaker 3: there is a huge gap that Iran will struggle to replace.
- 3:55Speaker 3: But officiall see what happens with the resign, it's a
- 3:59Speaker 3: pretty kill important to to look at his appointment in
- 4:03Speaker 3: terms of the Iranoman negotiations. He has repeatedly emphasized the
- 4:08Speaker 3: Iranian control over the security environment surrounding the Strait of
- 4:12Speaker 3: Hormus and has extensive experience with using asymmetric pressure to
- 4:17Speaker 3: altern adversaries calculations. It's not simply h that among negotiations
- 4:26Speaker 3: are just another Iranian search for an exit ramp to
- 4:30Speaker 3: run is showing that it can simultaneously negotiate navigation arrangements.
- 4:36Speaker 3: You made sanction to relieve an attempt to convert this
- 4:40Speaker 3: leverage into political Canado concessions, so other resign. The Council
- 4:46Speaker 3: is a well position to coordinate these tructs. And now
- 4:50Speaker 3: the important appointment is not a Wakhigi. He's now the
- 4:53Speaker 3: commander in chief of their GC. Wahigi has previously commanded
- 4:58Speaker 3: their GC. Could He also served as a Defense minister
- 5:04Speaker 3: and most recently held senior government and military responsibilities. His
- 5:09Speaker 3: background is heavily connected with external operations, regional networks and
- 5:13Speaker 3: strategic military pling. His successful Hambit Tackport, who was killed
- 5:19Speaker 3: during the US Israeli strikes the earlier and put Euality
- 5:22Speaker 3: in charge of the entire dis massa to go the
- 5:25Speaker 3: type of institution how many months after the known as
- 5:29Speaker 3: last and separate his countries command structure. But he's not
- 5:34Speaker 3: a younger, has a critic command that brought into re
- 5:37Speaker 3: from the gods the revolutionary generation, and phassesses decades of
- 5:42Speaker 3: relationships throughout the security establishment. What makes you useful for
- 5:48Speaker 3: restoring concision following leadership, rehabitation, decapitation, because over there just
- 5:53Speaker 3: his ideological and institutional gratuity and the image his experience
- 5:59Speaker 3: also means the parties is eternal, military network, missile and
- 6:04Speaker 3: jo enforces, maritime operations, and even an internal politic grow
- 6:09Speaker 3: can be coordinated. Bone already familiar with virtually every component
- 6:14Speaker 3: of this system. Again in some ways and inspired choice,
- 6:18Speaker 3: but in other ways it's also high levels choice. If
- 6:24Speaker 3: he will be it will be very difficult to replace
- 6:27Speaker 3: one man with such enormous rich and understanding of the system.
- 6:32Speaker 3: There's also making General Ali Abdulahi, who is now the
- 6:36Speaker 3: keys of step of the armed Forces. Abdah artupies the
- 6:41Speaker 3: senior coordinating position connecting the regular armed forces and the
- 6:45Speaker 3: actor see He's appointment. That is important because erastespan months
- 6:49Speaker 3: absorbed the consequences of stress. That's exposed vulnerabilities in command
- 6:54Speaker 3: and control, in air defense, in the intelligence, security, and
- 6:58Speaker 3: senior leadership survival. Abdulahi becauds the job overbuilding and military
- 7:04Speaker 3: commendsstem all over run remains a confrontation with the US
- 7:08Speaker 3: and Israel. There's also a major junior Timar's Heidiary. He's
- 7:13Speaker 3: the Deputy Chief of the Staff and Chief of Staff
- 7:16Speaker 3: of Armforces. He previously commanded the Regular Army's ground forces,
- 7:22Speaker 3: elevating him into the central convensure who gives the art
- 7:26Speaker 3: a significant presence in the post war Your organization RA
- 7:30Speaker 3: needs the conventional military alongside the registic for territorial defense,
- 7:35Speaker 3: infrastructure protection, logistics, and sustainable and regalization. His a portant
- 7:41Speaker 3: suggests that YRN is trying to improve conditions between organizations
- 7:45Speaker 3: whose responsibilities have historical overlapped and even completed without always
- 7:51Speaker 3: producing officially efficientcial and operation. Another important care of and
- 7:58Speaker 3: joining the higher echallance. Now it's weird and otherwise time
- 8:03Speaker 3: here he retained, He retained and elevated within UH the
- 8:09Speaker 3: naval com manstructure. This is particularly relevant to promuse. The
- 8:14Speaker 3: US Navy is the principal Iranian instrument for asthmatric American
- 8:18Speaker 3: warfare and the go from the state of promusion including
- 8:22Speaker 3: classic aircraft, mines and ship missiles, draws and harassment, procisure
- 8:27Speaker 3: of commands of commercial shipping. Any political arrangement negotiated with
- 8:32Speaker 3: the non automately depends upon the military implementation on the
- 8:36Speaker 3: Iranian side, which means very maybe almost practical influence, whether
- 8:42Speaker 3: the arrangement of contents for say, time the new commander
- 8:47Speaker 3: of the Pastige this might be the appointment with the
- 8:50Speaker 3: clearest domestics complications, but previously had urgency intelligence for more
- 8:56Speaker 3: than a decade and became closely lived to surveillance, counter
- 9:00Speaker 3: intelligence and suppression of a position of activity. Retution to
- 9:05Speaker 3: a major operational position suggests that the vision internal instability
- 9:10Speaker 3: is part of the same security problem as the eternal war.
- 9:14Speaker 3: That's supportment and therefore tells us something important about the
- 9:17Speaker 3: visuals assessment of its own vulnerabilities. Economic deterioration, casualties, infrastructure damage,
- 9:25Speaker 3: elit disruption, and public disatisfaction create opportunities for new protests.
- 9:30Speaker 3: The Beastige there is the organization designed to provide huge
- 9:35Speaker 3: numbers of politically reliable personal for neighborhood log and control, demonstration, checkpoints, surveillance,
- 9:42Speaker 3: and depression. Instilling a former intelligence chief with expensive experience
- 9:47Speaker 3: in domestic progression inditates preparation for another period of serious
- 9:52Speaker 3: internal pressure. Now, of course, Mohammed Buter or Kad is
- 9:58Speaker 3: moved from the essence as Sea secretary position, so the
- 10:02Speaker 3: political advisors to discipreme leader his reassignment is also worth watching.
- 10:08Speaker 3: It's another doctrinal figure instead of immediate political orbits.
- 10:14Speaker 4: Rather than removing frond the system, the emerging original therefore
- 10:19Speaker 4: experience revolutionary se disfigure all over the over. The disciplinement
- 10:26Speaker 4: is marked to the restoration of the old revolutionary stivity
- 10:31Speaker 4: at the moment of extraordinary vulnerability. Design lasses in Bing
- 10:37Speaker 4: define sucreen remaking complications comminators to be relying on people
- 10:47Speaker 4: whose loyalty to these not the public and familiarity to
- 10:53Speaker 4: have a previous crisis.
- 10:56Speaker 3: And this also has other years to the interpret a
- 11:00Speaker 3: divisions in trun but not to send to the practice
- 11:05Speaker 3: negus positions and institutional witnesses. With the architecture continues to
- 11:11Speaker 3: a political authority religious power. The SPI leader requires that
- 11:19Speaker 3: you see, of course the security because your inclusion well,
- 11:24Speaker 3: the RGC requires the leader so religious institutional author in
- 11:29Speaker 3: religious West's extraordinary political position who we let in regard
- 11:34Speaker 3: to commanders into the s an s and senior military
- 11:38Speaker 3: positions that leadership and of course for the Iran a
- 11:43Speaker 3: mondy of this mess. The stuff uh indicates the US
- 11:48Speaker 3: religious inclusion those retied simultaneously. It's like an overs international statility,
- 11:54Speaker 3: the bush positional versity until you see a practical.
- 12:00Speaker 1: Right.
- 12:00Speaker 3: There are just enabled to regulate Americans that track traffic
- 12:07Speaker 3: boll taps practice to suppress the metical one is hitting
- 12:15Speaker 3: the fat with an institutional frust design to complication while
- 12:20Speaker 3: going because things didn't happen with everybody for good. I
- 12:26Speaker 3: would say even reason trust Hammily is not moving for
- 12:31Speaker 3: the reform in goal. He's not currently focusing in reforming
- 12:35Speaker 3: the or to see second, the rivalry the difficult team
- 12:41Speaker 3: in the months reading up to the development, It's may
- 12:46Speaker 3: be about to be cetral because these old things go
- 12:50Speaker 3: that external Christ crisis affectedly and they both together in
- 12:58Speaker 3: various The death is there are not new places restored
- 13:04Speaker 3: that disruption and expected canomic Christ and the purpose may
- 13:10Speaker 3: not be as as they would normally be reprising because
- 13:15Speaker 3: of the scisely, because the resolved, because the institutional usion
- 13:23Speaker 3: remains signal stability and reinforcements previous previous infrastarter because they
- 13:34Speaker 3: are now being settled. If there is a holistic amount
- 13:38Speaker 3: of question, there is now more power to the usion
- 13:42Speaker 3: to both concealed and repress it. So what that means
- 13:46Speaker 3: is the derision reconsolidated itself quite effectively and there received
- 13:52Speaker 3: balance with the Supreme Leader's position appears to remain preserved
- 13:57Speaker 3: uh and more or less uh more or less.
- 14:02Speaker 1: Intact, absolutely absolutely in terms of Iran Oman fact, how
- 14:12Speaker 1: should we understand?
- 14:14Speaker 2: What does it mean to the world?
- 14:16Speaker 1: Is it a solution or is it just you know,
- 14:19Speaker 1: another thing that is going to happen before we finally happen.
- 14:25Speaker 3: Oman is getting an upgrade because previously it was best
- 14:29Speaker 3: known as a familiar intermediary between Iran and various other
- 14:35Speaker 3: parties in the region, and it was quite comfortable in
- 14:38Speaker 3: playing the role, and it tripped the benefits of being
- 14:41Speaker 3: associated with Iran's orbit, but at the same time independent
- 14:46Speaker 3: enough to be considered a Western ara and the key
- 14:50Speaker 3: member of the GCC. But now we're seeing Oman, as
- 14:55Speaker 3: a result of these talks, become a more trusted and
- 14:59Speaker 3: level urgible partner for Iran and move most quarly into
- 15:04Speaker 3: the Iranian ecosystem, at the same time being elevated to
- 15:08Speaker 3: a roll of an architect of a more elaborate arrangement
- 15:12Speaker 3: involving Iran maritime access and regional gas coalation. So this
- 15:17Speaker 3: evolution gives Muscat considerably more influence because the negotiations are
- 15:22Speaker 3: no longer confined to the nuclear file. The central issues
- 15:26Speaker 3: increasing the freedom of navigation through the strait of Hormus.
- 15:30Speaker 3: Iran's ability to threaten, obstruct, or monetize shipping has demonstrated
- 15:35Speaker 3: that the nuclear issue cannot easily be isolated from maritime security, sanctions,
- 15:40Speaker 3: energy experts, and regional military activity, and to Run benefits
- 15:45Speaker 3: from this expansion of the agenda. Every additional subject becomes
- 15:49Speaker 3: another bargaining instruments. Shipping access, nuclear restrictions, sanction to relief, inspection,
- 15:56Speaker 3: oil experts, and regional escalation can be treated across negotiating tracks.
- 16:02Speaker 3: One likewise benefits from becoming indispensable. MOSCAT has relationships with Washington, Toronto,
- 16:10Speaker 3: the Gesusy States, and can communicate with actors that often
- 16:13Speaker 3: refuse direct contact with one another. As a one sense
- 16:17Speaker 3: of framework also raises the political cost of abandoning the talks,
- 16:22Speaker 3: because doing so can appear to reject a regional diplomatic
- 16:27Speaker 3: initiative rather than simply rejecting Iranian demands. AMAN is in
- 16:31Speaker 3: a position to leverage all of this to its own benefit,
- 16:35Speaker 3: to basically make its own terms not just Irans, but
- 16:39Speaker 3: of course, the danger shares that an interim maritime arrangement
- 16:43Speaker 3: gradually substitutes crisis management for resolution of the underlying problem itself.
- 16:50Speaker 3: Iran could receive economic benefits from reopen trade and shipping,
- 16:55Speaker 3: while retaining significant nuclear capabilities and rebuilding military assets. For Washington,
- 17:01Speaker 3: the temptation is obvious were opening cameos, reducing attacks, and
- 17:05Speaker 3: stabilizing energy market, which generate immediate economics and political benefits.
- 17:11Speaker 3: But the long term gets concerns what to run receives
- 17:15Speaker 3: in exchange, and whether the agreement creates enforceable restrictions or
- 17:20Speaker 3: simple purchases another interval of relative calm.
- 17:27Speaker 1: Absolutely absolutely so. Any timeline for this to finally come
- 17:32Speaker 1: to a situation when things will happen on the ground
- 17:37Speaker 1: on this deed, well, it's.
- 17:39Speaker 3: It's once again back and forth. Trump threatens on on,
- 17:43Speaker 3: they run, negotiate and threaten back. There occasional clashes in
- 17:49Speaker 3: the waters. Each side signals deterrence and aggression to maintain
- 17:54Speaker 3: its nego shaking leverage, and then ultimately nothing comes of it.
- 17:59Speaker 3: But what increasingly becomes obvious is that the Arab States
- 18:05Speaker 3: are okay. They're they're more or less okay with allowing
- 18:10Speaker 3: Iran on amand to retain control of the Strait of Hormus.
- 18:15Speaker 3: And what is increasingly shapping up is that Iran and
- 18:18Speaker 3: AMoD will maintain some level of control. What that will
- 18:23Speaker 3: look like means to be seen, but they will not
- 18:25Speaker 3: be forced out of the physical ability to harass ships,
- 18:31Speaker 3: plant mines, or dictate terms of engagement, including collecting tolls
- 18:37Speaker 3: from passing tankers and other ships. So this is precisely
- 18:42Speaker 3: the status WO that is being negotiated that US initially
- 18:47Speaker 3: refused to accept altogether. Freedom of navigation in place exactly
- 18:51Speaker 3: the opposite of this situation. Uh we do not need
- 18:56Speaker 3: to see uh bridge to essentially collecting the coins from
- 19:03Speaker 3: the passive. But yet that's exactly what is imagining as
- 19:07Speaker 3: a result of the competition with the run, without, by
- 19:09Speaker 3: the way, resulting any of the underlying issues at all.
- 19:15Speaker 1: Absolutely absolutely staying in the part of the world. Let's
- 19:19Speaker 1: look at the pact between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey.
- 19:26Speaker 2: Help us understand what does this defense fact is all about.
- 19:31Speaker 1: You know, what are the mechanics, who will get impacted,
- 19:34Speaker 1: what will they benefit?
- 19:35Speaker 2: Will it last? What does it cover? Who is the
- 19:39Speaker 2: winner here? Who is the loser year. How does it
- 19:42Speaker 2: impact the region?
- 19:44Speaker 3: So we should start by saying that one many seems
- 19:47Speaker 3: surprised by this supposedly unexpected development. In reality, the talks
- 19:52Speaker 3: have been on going for about a year. They were
- 19:57Speaker 3: first mentioned last year and then quickly discarded, but they
- 20:01Speaker 3: actually kept on going behind the scenes, and they have
- 20:04Speaker 3: seen the practical outcomes of these talks on the ground
- 20:08Speaker 3: because even while the normal the formal negotiations remained quiet,
- 20:14Speaker 3: Saudi arabaj in Pakistan have been increasing step by step
- 20:18Speaker 3: the military cooperation in formalizing the various processes both political
- 20:26Speaker 3: and defense that have been a part of the framework.
- 20:29Speaker 3: And the first nature sign of that was the formalization
- 20:33Speaker 3: of the Saudi Pakistan Pact. Again, none of it is
- 20:37Speaker 3: new because the two countries have been cooperating in various
- 20:41Speaker 3: issues for a very long time, but the formalized framework
- 20:44Speaker 3: allowed that to become more structured, allowed certain things to
- 20:49Speaker 3: become permissible which previously were either sabrosa or not done,
- 20:54Speaker 3: and effectively extended the nuclear umbrella first to Saudi Arabia
- 20:58Speaker 3: and now through the to a lateral framework to Jurity
- 21:03Speaker 3: as well. This broader arrangement raises repeated questions over the
- 21:11Speaker 3: reliability and speed of US security guarantees. Iran reacted by
- 21:17Speaker 3: essentially saying that it's not concerned by the pact and
- 21:20Speaker 3: that all the Pact does think it is that US
- 21:22Speaker 3: is losing influence in the region, which is not alsogether inaccurate.
- 21:27Speaker 3: But it's also not altogether accurate to say that the
- 21:30Speaker 3: pact simply replaces the US presence. First of all, US
- 21:34Speaker 3: has not actually gone anyway, even as it's trying to flee,
- 21:38Speaker 3: it has actually been dragged back into the fray. And second,
- 21:42Speaker 3: while while there's a lot of token paper, it's unclear
- 21:47Speaker 3: what those commitments actually entail in practice. Some have gone
- 21:51Speaker 3: so far as to paul the New Defense Pact the
- 21:54Speaker 3: new the Arab Natal of sorts. But I see that
- 21:58Speaker 3: as at best and then you lateral and at worst
- 22:02Speaker 3: likely again mostly a pr moved by side Arabia or
- 22:07Speaker 3: mostly and its chief achievement, I could be the nuclear
- 22:11Speaker 3: umbrella in position rather than any practical military effect. The
- 22:16Speaker 3: new arrangement was tested almost before it got off the
- 22:19Speaker 3: ground with the Hooki attacks on Aramco and on passing ships,
- 22:24Speaker 3: and the Ramco attacks were quite destructive. They led to
- 22:28Speaker 3: a closure of a facility Jizrael in Sauia Arabia, but
- 22:33Speaker 3: the new partners of reality did not react. That has
- 22:37Speaker 3: not been a concerted pushed back against the hookies. That
- 22:41Speaker 3: has not been. We have not seen any joint operations
- 22:44Speaker 3: and response, and so far the framework remains theoretical only. Still,
- 22:50Speaker 3: it s content potential extents beyond the headline usual defense provision.
- 22:57Speaker 3: The three countries have strong incentives to expand intelligence sharing,
- 23:01Speaker 3: military exercises, training, air and missile defense coordination, drone and
- 23:06Speaker 3: counter droom capabilities, maritime security, logistics, defense, industrial cooperation, and
- 23:12Speaker 3: contingency planning. All of that is something that will be
- 23:16Speaker 3: worked out over time. No one expects these things to
- 23:19Speaker 3: become perfectly in line in the matter of days. Since
- 23:23Speaker 3: the signing. Turkey brings a substantial defense industry, combat experience, drones,
- 23:29Speaker 3: electronic warfare, missiles, and native derived military practice. Pakistan contributes
- 23:35Speaker 3: a large military nuclear status, missile capabilities, extensive experience training
- 23:41Speaker 3: Saudi forces, and a long institutional relationship with KSA. We
- 23:46Speaker 3: had supplies, financing, strategic geography and increasingly large procurement opportunities.
- 23:53Speaker 3: The nuclear question will remain deliberately ambiguous. Pakistan is unlikely
- 23:59Speaker 3: to issue a transparent nuclear garantee comparable to the US
- 24:02Speaker 3: extended deterrent, and React benefits from allowing Iran and other
- 24:06Speaker 3: adversaries to wonder how far Pakistani commitments extend. The tigic
- 24:11Speaker 3: ambiguity itself becomes part of the deterrent value of this arrangement,
- 24:17Speaker 3: but whether the fact ultimately survives will depend less on
- 24:22Speaker 3: diplomatic warmth and more on what happens during the first
- 24:26Speaker 3: serious crisis, I mean, mini crisis is already a questionable test,
- 24:32Speaker 3: but there could be something more. Pakistan has close relations
- 24:38Speaker 3: with Iran and cannot casually transform itself into the military
- 24:42Speaker 3: arm of Saudi policy against Tehran. Turkya has its own
- 24:45Speaker 3: complicated relationship with Tehran and remains a NATA member. Saudis
- 24:50Speaker 3: also have extensive economic relations within Yem, where Pakistan regards
- 24:55Speaker 3: in Yea as its primary strategic adversary. Those overlapping relationship
- 25:00Speaker 3: will repeated the test how broadly the collective defense language
- 25:04Speaker 3: is interpreted. Saudis are probably the most obvious immediate winner
- 25:10Speaker 3: because they acquire additional military options without surrendering their US relationship,
- 25:16Speaker 3: and Donald Trump has said nothing about this pact, which
- 25:20Speaker 3: means there is tacit approval for the time being. Pakistan
- 25:24Speaker 3: gains Saudi financial and diplomating backing defense contracts, training opportunities,
- 25:29Speaker 3: and greatest strategic elements in the Gulf. Turkey gains another
- 25:34Speaker 3: major market for its defense industry and a stronger political
- 25:37Speaker 3: foothold in golf security. Still, Iran, despite its comment, has
- 25:43Speaker 3: its reasons to be wary of the pact because a
- 25:47Speaker 3: Saudi confrontation could potentially bring Pakistani mental intelligence and military
- 25:51Speaker 3: expertise together with Turkish technology and apparitional capabilities. More reason
- 25:58Speaker 3: to concern is also for India, especially if sujifinancing strengthens
- 26:04Speaker 3: Pakistani capabilities that are theoretically intended goal defense but remain
- 26:09Speaker 3: fungible in the South Asian crisis. Israel is also watching
- 26:14Speaker 3: the arrangement carefully and with a concern because Trulities participation
- 26:18Speaker 3: gives additional regional military influence. And Moreover, the Pakistani Prime
- 26:24Speaker 3: Minister made an unambiguous critical comment indicating that this defense
- 26:31Speaker 3: pact may be as much against Israel as against Iran.
- 26:37Speaker 3: So you could also see an additional internal train within
- 26:41Speaker 3: the GCC, with Yui Kata behind Kuwait not necessarily sharing
- 26:47Speaker 3: identical threat perceptions, and some of them not wanting Sajariba
- 26:51Speaker 3: to become the center of a new regional defense structure.
- 26:55Speaker 3: We had sparallel effort to organize a maritime security raises
- 26:59Speaker 3: a larger about whether Saudis are supplementing gic mechanisms or
- 27:04Speaker 3: gradually constructing security institutions around themselves. The pact is consequently
- 27:11Speaker 3: more important as an emerging security network than as a
- 27:14Speaker 3: literal Islamic natal. Pakistan has used nationalist language Mecca, there's
- 27:23Speaker 3: been the mecha signing indicated a religious significance, But the
- 27:27Speaker 3: durability will ultimately depend whether and whether the members develop
- 27:32Speaker 3: command arrangements, interoperability, logistics, procurement coordination and specific contingency plans,
- 27:38Speaker 3: and which it can survive in definitely on paper, but
- 27:42Speaker 3: the functioning alliance requires the three governments to decide exactly
- 27:47Speaker 3: what they're prepared to fight for, and simply having a
- 27:50Speaker 3: political structure to coordinate rhetoric conditions is not going to
- 27:55Speaker 3: cut it.
- 27:58Speaker 1: Absolutely lutely, Irena, I wonder why Pakistan is leaving that
- 28:04Speaker 1: role of you know the world's new peacemaker, taking the
- 28:08Speaker 1: mental from President Trump and actually you know, establishing much
- 28:13Speaker 1: more peace in butter more.
- 28:16Speaker 2: Areas of the world.
- 28:17Speaker 5: Rather going for this fact, especially this fact, you know,
- 28:22Speaker 5: does it does it really think it will work in
- 28:25Speaker 5: a world like today where more bilateral country to country relations.
- 28:30Speaker 2: That are happening as further requirement. How does it look
- 28:34Speaker 2: like in terms of its existence? Uh, more and more
- 28:37Speaker 2: more countries are talking one to one.
- 28:42Speaker 3: So Pakistan does not necessarily see those shows as usual
- 28:46Speaker 3: exclusives for Sogan as it has the support to continue
- 28:49Speaker 3: its diplomatic peace Mangolin, if you'll continue to do so,
- 28:54Speaker 3: and so far it hasn't stopped. It still continues to
- 28:56Speaker 3: play somewhat of role in the in the US to
- 29:01Speaker 3: run negotiations, is still trying to get its food in
- 29:05Speaker 3: the door in other areas while pursuing a security structure simultaneously,
- 29:11Speaker 3: and Practistan uses the strong affoord for being able to
- 29:15Speaker 3: balance those two seemingly comforting but growing rules in a
- 29:20Speaker 3: very globalized environment. Regarding the multilateral arrangements, frankly, there is
- 29:26Speaker 3: a great deal of distrust between the three members. Saudi
- 29:31Speaker 3: and Arabia and Turkey have historic beef that dates back
- 29:37Speaker 3: to the Ottoman Empire and that is not easily overcome
- 29:41Speaker 3: by the fact that a particular fraction of the royal
- 29:43Speaker 3: family has made a strategic decision to grow closer to
- 29:47Speaker 3: Turkey over mutually threats, mutual ideology of that particular faction,
- 29:54Speaker 3: and because of US unreliability. There's a loone tribal and
- 30:02Speaker 3: history history of grievances over the Ottoman treatment of the
- 30:06Speaker 3: Arab tribes. None of it is going to go away
- 30:09Speaker 3: easily in certainly not in the near future. Regarding Pakistan
- 30:14Speaker 3: too well, Pakistan has proved useful to both Saudis and Turkey,
- 30:18Speaker 3: and their military transactions have been quite extensive and growing.
- 30:24Speaker 3: That doesn't mean that Pakistan is viewed as a completely
- 30:27Speaker 3: trustworthy party by either side du its Iranian links and
- 30:33Speaker 3: uh Shiah Shia groups inside it. On the one hand,
- 30:39Speaker 3: due to its own internal security conflicts regarding UH, regard
- 30:44Speaker 3: regarding UH, some of its unstable areas, and it's conflicts
- 30:53Speaker 3: with now with the Taliban, and furthermore, Pakistan is not
- 30:57Speaker 3: seen as equal in status to by either of its
- 31:01Speaker 3: partners UH. So we will see that some of these
- 31:05Speaker 3: elements will probably raise themselves behind the scenes on the
- 31:09Speaker 3: implementation level. By the way the troops are integrated and
- 31:13Speaker 3: treated and later on also in the political and economic
- 31:17Speaker 3: aspects of the Yeale in Southeast and Tokia likely to
- 31:22Speaker 3: resent what they see as a junior partner at best,
- 31:25Speaker 3: a country that does not speak Arabic, that religiously seen
- 31:29Speaker 3: as a country that has been colonized by by the
- 31:36Speaker 3: by the early Muslims uh it does not seem to
- 31:41Speaker 3: have the same level of political respect. So we shall
- 31:47Speaker 3: see what will happen with that. But in terms of confession,
- 31:50Speaker 3: this is not a good starting point.
- 31:54Speaker 1: Absolutely, absolutely, Now moving on from this particular topic, the
- 32:00Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan Turkish depends back to the things happening
- 32:05Speaker 1: on the ground China and Taiwan, and Taiwan is doing
- 32:11Speaker 1: is having its war game.
- 32:13Speaker 3: How should be.
- 32:13Speaker 2: Under under time? The war games are a bit different.
- 32:16Speaker 1: It's almost like you're preparing something for almost something imminent.
- 32:21Speaker 2: How does it look? Is it really going to happen?
- 32:24Speaker 2: China invading Taiwan.
- 32:27Speaker 3: Well, there is this uncomfortable question re opened by these
- 32:31Speaker 3: war games, where the Western assessments have overestimated the cost
- 32:36Speaker 3: China would necessarily incur while attempting to seize Taiwan. Outcomes
- 32:41Speaker 3: depending enormously on assumptions concerning warning time, US intervention, Japanese participation,
- 32:48Speaker 3: Taiwanese mobilization, Chinese surprise, and the type of operation Vision chooses.
- 32:55Speaker 3: China does not necessarily need to begin with the normal
- 32:58Speaker 3: style amphibious and a blockade, a quarantine, a cyber campaign,
- 33:03Speaker 3: missile strikes, sabotage, political warfare, and seizure of offshore islands.
- 33:09Speaker 3: What progressively isolated one while forcing Washington to decide when
- 33:14Speaker 3: and how to intervene. Trainer's missile inventory is particularly important
- 33:20Speaker 3: because Beijing can attack Taiwanese air based, sports, radar installations,
- 33:25Speaker 3: command facilities, communications and energy infrastructure before exposing large numbers
- 33:31Speaker 3: of troops to amphibious separations. Taiwan has consequently been preparing
- 33:36Speaker 3: for a much broader confrontation. Civil defense planning, reserve reform,
- 33:41Speaker 3: infrastructure protection, stock pirlon, dispersed command, anti ship weapons, drones,
- 33:47Speaker 3: and asymmetric systems all have become important because Taiwan's survival
- 33:51Speaker 3: may depend on maintaining organized resistance during the opening phase.
- 33:57Speaker 3: Worgans should never be treated as predictions comes from exposing dependencies.
- 34:02Speaker 3: If Chinese missiles suppress Tewanese air power, if Tevan loses
- 34:09Speaker 3: communications immediately. If US forces cannot operate from regional basis,
- 34:14Speaker 3: the outcome changes to Martic group. The most dangerous conclusion
- 34:17Speaker 3: from favorable Chinese simulations would be Beijing deciding that victory
- 34:22Speaker 3: is achievable a tolerable cost. The joint depends partly upon
- 34:26Speaker 3: convincing Chinese leaders that anytime to conquer Tevan would produce
- 34:31Speaker 3: unpredictable military, economic, and political consequences. But so far the
- 34:35Speaker 3: exercise is showed that China can take Taiwan that incurring
- 34:40Speaker 3: extremely high military or even political for that matter, cost. Still,
- 34:46Speaker 3: China is not without its own vulnerable is the Strait
- 34:49Speaker 3: of Morocco is primarily uh an example of that. More
- 34:54Speaker 3: of a Tewan has been prepared specifically for hybrid warfare situations,
- 35:01Speaker 3: which included testing a situation where communications are significantly disrupted,
- 35:06Speaker 3: and it was able to manage that at least in
- 35:10Speaker 3: a simulation setting quite comprehensively. The bigger issue is the
- 35:15Speaker 3: political commitment, the political will to fight over the average
- 35:19Speaker 3: citizens and the political crisis and in past facing the
- 35:23Speaker 3: Taiping Is government. At the moment, numerous articles by experts
- 35:27Speaker 3: Western experts under sport how this political and past benefits
- 35:32Speaker 3: China and otherwise the overall preparedness for to stay off
- 35:37Speaker 3: potential attacks, especially at the time when US commitments are
- 35:42Speaker 3: less predictables than previously.
- 35:46Speaker 1: Absolutely, Irena, So who can Taiwan bank on or it
- 35:50Speaker 1: knows about the fact that.
- 35:52Speaker 2: Mode there will be more diplomacy, more politics.
- 35:55Speaker 1: Ah, before you know any any help may come in
- 35:59Speaker 1: and that you really have to pend for itself?
- 36:01Speaker 2: Is it preparing for that? Well?
- 36:04Speaker 3: Interestingly enough, Japan is becoming a more and more reliable
- 36:08Speaker 3: partner in the regional First of all, it's expending its
- 36:12Speaker 3: own spending and preparedness. It's also shown it's where it's
- 36:18Speaker 3: political direction has headed, with its extensive and growing assistance
- 36:22Speaker 3: to Ukraine, its willingness to confront its own constitutional challenges
- 36:28Speaker 3: quite bluntly, and the leadership of Prime Minister the Cage,
- 36:34Speaker 3: who also consolidated power through legislative elections which favored her
- 36:40Speaker 3: hawkish positions. Also, Japan is increasingly seen as a key
- 36:47Speaker 3: player in any Taiwan confrontation, and Japan sees itself positioned
- 36:52Speaker 3: to provide assistance rather than simply stay on the periphery
- 36:56Speaker 3: and try to survive and such an attack, how fast
- 37:02Speaker 3: and how long that restructuring is going to take remains
- 37:07Speaker 3: anyone's guests. However, so far the spending level is still
- 37:11Speaker 3: not at the level where it should be for Japan
- 37:13Speaker 3: to be considered prepared for any major regional conflagration. But
- 37:20Speaker 3: also let's keep in mind that Taiwan and Japan have
- 37:23Speaker 3: had long standing political ties, including Japan's environment directly in
- 37:29Speaker 3: Taiwan back in the day before Taiwan became virtually independent,
- 37:35Speaker 3: self sufficient country, it has not always been occupied or
- 37:41Speaker 3: under Chinese control. As Hibisi's narratives have tried to underscore,
- 37:47Speaker 3: the historic continuity is just not what China has tried
- 37:51Speaker 3: to portray. Japan has also historic stakes in the region,
- 37:55Speaker 3: and we can see this rival with shand and play
- 37:58Speaker 3: out in real time. By the way, it can also
- 38:03Speaker 3: enhance other Japanese origional ambitions and objectives, aside from simply
- 38:09Speaker 3: defending Taiwan from the Chinese inclosions and in the region
- 38:14Speaker 3: from Chinese aggression. Overall, we will see where the japan
- 38:18Speaker 3: positions have to become more overrieval power to China economically
- 38:25Speaker 3: and politically. So far, it's still not there yet. It
- 38:29Speaker 3: has suffered significant economic and demographic challenges over time. Whether
- 38:35Speaker 3: it's will Rukul remains to be seen, but it certainly
- 38:39Speaker 3: tries to send signals that it's well on the way there.
- 38:45Speaker 2: Absolutely I don know.
- 38:47Speaker 1: Moving on from this part of the world to my
- 38:51Speaker 1: part of the world, that is India and Rance rapel deal,
- 38:56Speaker 1: how do you look at that? Is it a sign
- 38:59Speaker 1: of you know, much more consolidation between the two two countries,
- 39:04Speaker 1: much more you know, moving from diplomacy to more defense
- 39:09Speaker 1: facts and all.
- 39:10Speaker 2: How should one understand this?
- 39:15Speaker 3: So this perspective rafile expansion that was offered by Frans
- 39:19Speaker 3: is potentially enormous. The current plants envisions up to one
- 39:24Speaker 3: hundred and fourteen additional aircraft, with a substantial portion manufacturing
- 39:29Speaker 3: in India, potentially making the problem one of the largest
- 39:32Speaker 3: fighter procurements in recent history, usually much more than aircraft.
- 39:37Speaker 3: Local production, technology transfer, maintenance, supply chains, weapons integration, and
- 39:43Speaker 3: Indian industrial participation are central to the negotiations because India
- 39:48Speaker 3: wants a greater control over the life cycle of its
- 39:51Speaker 3: combat fleet. France is unusually attractive because Paris is often
- 39:56Speaker 3: more flexible than Washington, controlling strategic autonomy. In you can
- 40:00Speaker 3: purchase sophisticated French equipment while avoiding some of the political conditions,
- 40:05Speaker 3: independency concerns associated with the US systems, and the relationship
- 40:10Speaker 3: already extends into submarines, naval aviation, space intelligence, maritime security
- 40:16Speaker 3: and in the Pacific cooperation the fault. Therefore it come
- 40:19Speaker 3: actually part of a larger defense ecosystem that is fast growing.
- 40:24Speaker 3: When the other hand, Friends also sees India as a
- 40:27Speaker 3: major in the Pacific, partner with the demographic which needed
- 40:33Speaker 3: to essentially supplying France's own limitations and shortcomings.
- 40:41Speaker 2: Absolutely absolutely so.
- 40:44Speaker 1: Does it look like that in India and France are
- 40:49Speaker 1: becoming much much closer and will have a longer term
- 40:53Speaker 1: fact about more things, or it's just a business deal
- 40:57Speaker 1: between the two countries.
- 40:58Speaker 3: I do know that this year is for now more
- 41:04Speaker 3: of a standalone you the implications are far reaching and
- 41:07Speaker 3: the fact that there are other things being negotiated that
- 41:10Speaker 3: very much favor India's own defense advancements indicate that the
- 41:15Speaker 3: relationship on these terms is only likely to grow over time.
- 41:22Speaker 2: Absolutely absolutely.
- 41:23Speaker 1: And talking of this deal, why about here, it's a
- 41:27Speaker 1: business deal. It's a much more forward looking deal. Why
- 41:31Speaker 1: is the US not providing Ukraine with patriots means that
- 41:36Speaker 1: is there a problem somewhere Ukraine needs it, US can
- 41:40Speaker 1: give it to Ukraine or where is the problem yet?
- 41:45Speaker 3: So one of the issues has been the general US
- 41:50Speaker 3: willingness to share that technology without the countries. Is not
- 41:53Speaker 3: unique to Ukraine. It's been a problem for everyone because
- 41:56Speaker 3: right now the whole world is experiencing a short that
- 41:59Speaker 3: you Patriot interceptors, and it would be to US advantage
- 42:04Speaker 3: to outsource the production to cheaper places. But nevertheless there's
- 42:11Speaker 3: been a problem, and of course scarcity is just one
- 42:15Speaker 3: aspect of it. Patriot batteries, interas and interceptors are finite production,
- 42:20Speaker 3: cannot immediately satisfied worldwide demand, and used planners have to
- 42:23Speaker 3: account for requirements in Europe, the Middle East, and in
- 42:26Speaker 3: the Pacific. More where he creates consumption requirements are unusually
- 42:31Speaker 3: severe because Russia can force Kiev to expand expensive interceptors
- 42:36Speaker 3: against repeated ballistic and aerodynamic threats. The problem is involves
- 42:40Speaker 3: both batteries and the sustainable supply of Pact two Impact
- 42:44Speaker 3: three interceptors. Washington has also been keen on preserving reserves
- 42:49Speaker 3: for US forces. Recent Middle Eastern conflicts have reinforced the
- 42:53Speaker 3: Pentagon's concerns that high end air defense ammunition can be
- 42:57Speaker 3: consumed at extraordinary speed units sustained combat. Meanwhile, Europe possesses
- 43:03Speaker 3: patriot systems, but the governments are reluctant to surrender operitional
- 43:07Speaker 3: batteries when they're simultaneously being told to prepare for potentially
- 43:12Speaker 3: a larger Russian threat. Eastern European states in particular and
- 43:16Speaker 3: Reasonable argue that transferring their remaining defense defenses creates vulnerabilities
- 43:21Speaker 3: on native territory. European procurement has also moved far too
- 43:25Speaker 3: slowly to eliminate the shortage. Governments spent years treaching air
- 43:29Speaker 3: and missile defense as a secondary requirement, leaving Europe without
- 43:34Speaker 3: enough launchers, interceptors, trade crews, or even industrial capacity for
- 43:39Speaker 3: the security environment it now faces. Ukraine is encountering a
- 43:43Speaker 3: vicious cycle. Sneeds become more urgent as Russian missile attacks continue,
- 43:50Speaker 3: while the same attacks convince NATO members that they cannot
- 43:53Speaker 3: afford to relinquish their own air defenders. There is also defenses.
- 43:58Speaker 3: There's also an industrial policy failure. After years of war,
- 44:02Speaker 3: Western production still has not reached the scale required for
- 44:06Speaker 3: prolonged high intensity missile comfort. The Patriot debate exposes the
- 44:10Speaker 3: gap between political declarations. It's about supporting Ukraine and the
- 44:15Speaker 3: physical inventory required to sustain that policy. And that's even
- 44:18Speaker 3: true for the US, where the defense industry has been
- 44:22Speaker 3: told to triple the Patriot production, quadruple the third production.
- 44:28Speaker 3: But in reality this is all government rhetoric. The private
- 44:33Speaker 3: companies are not obliged to commit to these increased cycles,
- 44:38Speaker 3: although in certain advantages from the perspective of securing additional
- 44:42Speaker 3: government contructs and payments, but it's not also necessarily possible
- 44:48Speaker 3: to do so while lost. Companies are also producing other
- 44:52Speaker 3: items that require personnel, logistical planning, and so forth. So
- 44:57Speaker 3: unless US plans to a take over these defense industries,
- 45:03Speaker 3: simply gaining control of the speed with which UH this
- 45:08Speaker 3: industry cycle is optimized is not within its direct control.
- 45:15Speaker 1: Wonderful with this, it's set up on this very special
- 45:18Speaker 1: edition of the world according to Iron a Superman on
- 45:21Speaker 1: the j Masterclass Live.
- 45:23Speaker 2: Thank you so much indeed for joining us.
- 45:26Speaker 3: Thank you mm hmmm