Latest / The Sperrins: Mining, Power & Community in Northern Ireland / #🎙️94 |Public Inquiry Week Beginning 8th End of Mine Waste Sep 2026 Day 1 |
Transcript
- 0:02Unknown: Welcome back. I'm Marella, your host, and I'm part of the Save Our Sperrins campaign. And this podcast is following the Curranalt public
- 0:12inquiry and the proposal for a gold mine in The Sperrins. If you're new to the podcast and wondering how we got here, I'd suggest going back to podcast
- 0:22number 43, the first in this public inquiry series, that will give you some of the background before joining us here. As the inquiry continues, I'll be
- 0:33following the evidence and the arguments, and trying to make sense of what they could ultimately mean for the people, the water, and the landscape of
- 0:42The Sperrins. Before we start the podcast today, I need to correct something. Last week, during the inquiry, the previous involvement of one of the Save
- 0:55Our Sperrins experts, geotechnical engineer Gordon Mackenzie, with Dalradian was raised. I did not know about that previous work, and I was
- 1:05caught out when it came up in the room. I assumed it hadn't previously been disclosed. I have since discovered that Gordon had disclosed it in a
- 1:14report to S.O.S. which I had neglected to read, so the record needs to be put straight. Gordon had been open about his previous involvement. Also, want to
- 1:23acknowledge Doug, who originally suggested Gordon to us and has given a considerable amount of his own time to help us through the inquiry. Gordon, Doug, I got
- 1:33it wrong. I put my hands up. I'm sorry. Today brought us to the end of this particular part of the public inquiry, dealing with the mine waste facility, filter
- 1:49tailings, moisture content, seismicity, subsidence, and everything else that has been attached to it over the last number of days. And as the
- 1:59minutes ticked down in the late afternoon, there was a sense the last topic conditions being rammed into the few minutes that were left. Points that emerged
- 2:09today included the amount of the assessment which still appears to depend on things being done later. Another was the question of how some of the mine waste
- 2:20systems are supposed to continue working over extraordinary long periods of time, and then this afternoon we got into Category A classification of the mine waste
- 2:32facility, where DFI's position came under what I would describe as fairly serious Scrutiny. I'll come to that because for me it was probably the most important
- 2:45part of the day, but the morning started with water drainage and climate change, and in particular whether the assumptions being used are
- 2:54conservative enough for something which is going to remain on this site for a very long time. The proposed surface water system has been designed
- 3:04around a one in 1000 year storm event with a 10% allowance for climate change, and we spent quite a bit of time listening to discussions around RCP 4.5 and
- 3:17RCP 8.5 climate models and the DFI guidance, which has been used, now RCP four five and RCP eight five sound terribly technical, but for our purposes,
- 3:33they're simply different ways of modelling what future climate change might look like. RCP four five assumes a more moderate pathway, while 8.5 looks at a
- 3:45much more severe one, with potentially greater extremes than things like rainfall. And when you're designing drainage around a mine waste facility
- 3:54that's going to remain there effectively forever, which one you use and what allowance you make for it, as you might imagine, becomes quite
- 4:02important. The applicant's position was that RCP 4.5, the more moderate model, was appropriate and consistent with the DFI guidance being relied
- 4:13upon. But questions were raised about why the more extreme 8.5 scenario hadn't been used, and more particularly, whether that 10% climate change allowance is
- 4:26really enough. We were also told there is a considerable spare capacity built into the system, and putting this into simpler language, the design looks at
- 4:38rainfall over a long period to estimate how much water the site may have to deal with, and then allows for a very extreme storm, what the engineers call a one in
- 4:491000 year event. That doesn't mean, incidentally, that one of these storms politely waits 1000 years before turning up. It means that is estimated to have
- 4:59a one. One in 1000 chance of occurring in any given year, and on top of that, there is additional storage and something called freeboard, which is
- 5:09basically the safety margin between the expected water level and the top of the pond or containment structure.
- 5:17So the applicants' experts were clearly confident that all these different layers give them plenty of capacity to deal with extreme rainfall. The discussion
- 5:27became more interesting, though, when we got into the rainfall figures being used to make those calculations in the first place. The long-term rainfall record
- 5:37came from Lochfay, some 20 miles from the mine site, while interestingly, Dalweden also has its own weather station in Coronalt. We heard explanations
- 5:48about how the two sets of figures had been correlated, why the much longer Lochfair record was useful, and some of the difficulties with the on-site
- 5:57measurements. While Fedelma pointed out that rainfall in the wettest part of The Sperrins can be considerably higher. Doctor Stephen Emermann approached the
- 6:06whole thing from a different direction. His evidence was that you should begin with the consequences of failure and let those consequences determine the
- 6:14level of event you design for. A one in 100 year event might be perfectly normal for many engineering projects, but where failure could have a
- 6:25catastrophic consequence, including fatalities, he said the industry standard moved towards much more extreme events, including maximum
- 6:35precipitation. I think that's where what could otherwise become a dry argument about percentages and climate models becomes more important, because
- 6:45nobody is really arguing over whether the weather forecast should say 10% or 20% more rain. They're arguing about how much uncertainty and extreme weather
- 6:57should be allowed in for the design of a mine waste facility, which will be sitting there long after the mine itself has closed. That question of just
- 7:06how long all of this has to keep working was something we returned to again and again as the day went on, because we seemed to travel through just
- 7:14about every conceivable period of time. There was 20 or 25 year life of mine, 50 year design periods, monitoring periods after closure, discussion of
- 7:26liners lasting hundreds of years, and then occasionally the word "in perpetuity" would appear, which makes 50 years sound suddenly quite short
- 7:35indeed. A lot of time was spent on the drainage system underneath the tailings, and to borrow a phrase we heard from the other side today, I'll put
- 7:45this in layperson's language: there are perforated pipes and strainage material underneath a very substantial quantity of mine waste, and those pipes have
- 7:55an important job to do. We were told that the system has considerable redundancy; that individual pipes have far more capacity than the expected
- 8:05groundwater flows require, and that if one part fails, the remainder of the system can continue to operate. The difficulty being raised from our
- 8:15side was what happens to all of this infrastructure as the decades pass, particularly when you can't actually get at it. Niall pointed out that the
- 8:26perforated pipes clog, which probably came as less of a revelation to the farmers in the room than it did to some of the engineers, and there was
- 8:35discussion about filters and drainage gravel around the pipes, which should prevent that happening. But once you put many metres of mine waste on top of
- 8:45the whole arrangement, replacing a blocked or damaged pipe becomes a very different proposition from calling somebody with a digger on a
- 8:53Monday morning. The same problem of time came up with the liner beneath the facility. We heard detailed evidence about modelling pin holes, larger
- 9:03holes, tears, and long-term degradation of the liner, and the applicant's position was that conservative assumptions had been used, and that even
- 9:14with degradation there would be very little increase in seepage. There was discussion about a manufacturer's lifespan running into hundreds of years, although
- 9:25nobody appeared to have the manufacturer's documentation there to show us today, and Dr. Emmermann's response was that the long-term lifetime of these
- 9:34liners over the sort of time scale we are discussing is uncertain. The question then moved on to what happens when water actually gets through the
- 9:44liner. We heard the engineer in phrase that the water beneath it eventually reports to the pollen row burn untreated, which simply means that's where the drainage
- 9:55system ultimately carries the water, and obviously that becomes important. If contaminated water has managed to get through the liner in the
- 10:03first place, there was quite a lengthy discussion about how any deterioration in water quality would be detected, whether the water could be intercepted and
- 10:14treated, and what would happen next.
- 10:17We were told that the drainage chambers would be monitored during the mine's operation, and for a period after closure, and that there is a sump system
- 10:26which could intercept water and allow it to be pumped for treatment if water quality indicated that was necessary. All of that may work exactly as
- 10:36intended, but the difficulty I kept coming back to as I listened was that the monitoring has an end date, while the mine waste facility doesn't, and once
- 10:46you start using words like in perpetuity, you inevitably have to think beyond the period during which people are regularly inspecting chambers
- 10:56and submitting reports. That flowed into another issue which has been troubling third parties throughout this inquiry, and that is the amount of detail
- 11:04which appears capable of being dealt with later through management plans, monitoring arrangements, further assessments, or planning
- 11:14conditions. We heard it again around emergency planning and around the possibility of more than one thing going wrong at the same time. The question was
- 11:25put as to whether multiple risks occurring together had actually been considered, and the answer eventually was that they had, which naturally led to people
- 11:36looking for where that assessment was. Finally, we found it, Table 6.1, and there was a discussion around cumulative impacts being
- 11:46implicit within the analysis. With more explanation after lunch about how those different risks had been dealt with. After long verbal gymnastics, I
- 11:58remained unconvinced that the question had been answered, but that's my humble opinion. Doctor Emmermann made what I thought was a useful distinction here
- 12:08because an emergency plan isn't something you prepare after a catastrophic failing. Telling people who phones whom and where everybody goes when the alarm
- 12:19sounds sounded to me a bit like a school fire drill. To quote, before a project is approved, the decision maker and the community need to understand the
- 12:31consequences of failure; otherwise, they aren't really in a position to decide whether the risk is acceptable in the first place. And Fidelema was able to
- 12:42bring this into more human terms when she returned to recently heard evidence about how the DFI would be notified within 48 hours of an instant, and asks
- 12:53when the community will be told, because if somebody downstream is worried about their family, their home, or their livestock, the knowledge that the relevant
- 13:02government department should hear about it some time within the following two days wasn't entirely comforting. After lunch, we returned to Dr.
- 13:12Emman's report on the filtered tailings failures in Indonesia, and there was quite an effort from S. Orcade to distinguish those facilities from Coronel.
- 13:23We heard that the Indonesian tailings were different, that they were clay dominated, that there had been serious problems with quality control, and that S
- 13:32R K's role there had been as a reviewer rather than a designer. S R K had, in fact, identified a number of those deficiencies itself, including shortcomings
- 13:45against international standards, and its position was very much that the Indonesian experience was a false comparator for Coronel. Doctor Emmermann didn't
- 13:56dispute that these are different projects, but his response was interesting because he talked about the way industrial safety normally develops, using
- 14:06commercial aviation as an example, where an accident is investigated precisely because the industry wants to understand what happened and what can be
- 14:16learned from it. His difficulty with simply distinguishing Indonesia from Coronel was that failures of quality control, construction, and human
- 14:27judgement aren't unique to one country, and if filter tailings facilities are failing elsewhere, there is surely something to be learned from why
- 14:37they had failed. There was one comment from the applicant side, the coronalt would be operating only around six or 7% of what was described as Emmerman's
- 14:48technological limit, but Emmerman was quite clear that the line in his report wasn't intended as some sort of safety boundary where everything below
- 14:57it is safe and everything above it isn't. Explaining that other filter tailings facilities have failed below that line, and his point was it describes the limit
- 15:09of industry experience rather than providing a guarantee. And then we came to Category A, which for me changed the complexion of the afternoon
- 15:18considerably. To explain category A is important because it is the highest risk classification under mine waste regulations applied where
- 15:27failure or incorrect operation of a waste facility could give rise to a major accident.
- 15:34That classification brings with it more stringent regularity and safety regimes, including stronger requirements around major accident prevention and
- 15:43emergency planning. So whether coronalt is category A isn't simply a matter of terminology; it determines the level of protection, scrutiny, and
- 15:55preparation required for a facility intended to remain long after the mining has finished. DFI was asked whether, having heard the evidence during these
- 16:05sessions, it remained satisfied with its original conclusion that the mine waste facility should not be classified as as Category A. DFI said that it was
- 16:19satisfied, and that nothing it had heard had changed that conclusion. You could have heard a pin drop in the room. The problem came when people started
- 16:32asking about the evidence behind it. The wording of the legislation was examined fairly carefully because the test being discussed isn't simply whether a
- 16:42major accident will happen, nor whether somebody considers it particularly likely to happen. The word in the legislation which attracted all the
- 16:51attention was "could. In the context of whether failure or incorrect operation of a waste facility could give rise to a major accident or serious
- 17:04environmental consequence. Conor Fagan for FODC made the point that the choice of word is deliberate and reflects a precautionary approach, and his
- 17:17argument was that if the risk cannot be ruled out on the information before the decision maker, you don't get to substitute the much higher test
- 17:26of whether you think the event is likely to happen, and that was where things became distinctly uncomfortable for for DFI. My parland asked whether
- 17:39the whether the department's evidence was showing the environmental consequences of a failure, what clean up would involve, and how long the damage
- 17:49might last, DFI referred to its experts having carried out a consequence risk assessment, but when pressed to identify where the information was in the
- 18:00documentation before the inquiry. It wasn't able to provide it at that point. For us, that was a big moment, and frankly, a fairly significant
- 18:08blow to DFI's position, because Category A hadn't suddenly appeared out of thin air at 4o'clock in the afternoon. The department knew the
- 18:18classification was being challenged. It knew third parties were coming back to it, and yet, when it was asked directly to show the evidential
- 18:26basis for maintaining its conclusions, it couldn't point the inquiry to it. If the facility falls within category A, it brings a different
- 18:38regulatory regime with it, which is precisely why the basis upon which DFI has decided that it doesn't fall into that category needs to be capable of proper
- 18:49scrutiny. The Locks Agency's evidence also matters in this context because Dr. Sarah McLean had addressed the possible consequences of a catastrophic
- 19:00failure resulting in tailings or waste rock entering the pollen row, and subsequently the Uncleoo SAC, including impacts on Atlantic salmon, which, given
- 19:12their life cycle, would take multiple generations to recover from, assuming mitigation and recovery were even possible. Then there was another lengthy
- 19:22explanation from the applicant side about a possible slump type failure, with mr. Spears explaining why the filtered tailings wouldn't behave like a
- 19:33conventional slurry dam, and why there were various measures available if material did move towards one of the ponds. There was space available, water could
- 19:43be pumped, other ponds could be used, and at one stage even sandbags made an appearance, which perhaps was in the image of a highly sophisticated mine
- 19:54waste engineering project that people might have been thinking they would carry home with them in their heads this evening. It didn't exactly fill us with
- 20:02confidence, as you might imagine. Conor Fagan's response to all of that was probably one of the sharper observations of the afternoon, because his point
- 20:12was that we just heard a detailed explanation of why such a failure was considered unlikely, whereas the category A argument revolves around whether
- 20:25such a failure could occur and what the consequences would then be, and that's an important distinction, particularly when previous evidence and Table 6.1
- 20:36itself had contemplated a slump type failure, and when Golder's evidence had apparently considered the possibility of dirty water reaching the pollen
- 20:46row, by late afternoon we'd moved on to the proposed conditions. And typically, after everything we'd heard, these conditions weren't exactly
- 20:55finished articles either. There's a surprise.
- 20:59One was acknowledged by DFI to be a tricky condition, which might need refinement, while another was accepted as lacking sufficient bite and needing to
- 21:08be strengthened. There were also concerns that too much was being left to future plans, monitoring, and conditions after approval, rather than being
- 21:18properly assessed before decisions are made, and that really brought me back to where I'd started this morning, because so much of what we've
- 21:27been discussing concerning systems which may have to protect this valley long after the people designing them, operating them, regulating them,
- 21:35and indeed the people sitting in this quarry room have disappeared from the scene. The models eventually have to meet the real world, and here that
- 21:44real world is a valley with homes and farms and people living downstream. The mine may have an operating life measured in decades, but we're being
- 21:54asked to accept a mine waste facility, whose consequences stretch far beyond that, and I think it's entirely reasonable that the evidence supporting the
- 22:04decision being made about it should be available now in front of this inquiry, where it can be examined and challenged. The most troubling thing I took away
- 22:13from today was that when DFI was asked to demonstrate the evidential basis for one of the most important of these decisions, its conclusion that
- 22:23this is not a category A mine waste facility. It couldn't point us to the evidence. After all the 1000s of pages we've been through, all the
- 22:33appendices, annexes, tables, technical reports, and heaven help us, differing PDF page numbers, that was quite the omission, even in layperson's
- 22:44language. Thanks for listening. See you all tomorrow. You've been listening to the Save Our Sperrins podcast, Voices from the Frontline. Thank you for
- 22:56joining us today. All the links you need, from campaign updates to our social media pages, as well as links shared by today's guests and resources mentioned
- 23:06in the conversation, are available in the show notes. Please take a moment to share this podcast with friends, neighbours, or anyone who cares
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- 23:24voices further. Together, our voices are stronger. Thanks for listening, and until next time, keep standing with the land, the water, the air, and the people
- 23:35who protect them.