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Judge Sweets Opinion Denying Maxwell's Request For Summary Judgement (Part 6) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

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  Speaker 1: What's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
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  In this episode, we're picking back up where we left
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  off with the judge suite opinion about Klain Maxwell and
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  her attempt to get a summary judgment against Virginia Roberts.
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  So let's get right back to it. Part five. The
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  motion for summary judgment to dismiss the defamation claim on
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  the grounds of substantial truth is denied. Maxwell has asserted
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  that the press release is substantially true and that the
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  defamation claim should therefore be dismissed see defense briefing at
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  thirty nine. Whether or not Roberts lied about Maxwell's involvement
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  in the events that Roberts has alleged took place is
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  the intensely contested factual issue that is the foundation of
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  this action. Accordingly, summary judgment is not appropriate see Mitra
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  Sports International Limited, First Home Box Office Incorporated, twenty two f.
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  Supp three D two forty two fifty five Sday twenty fourteen,
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  denying a summary judgment because it would require the court
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  to decide disputed facts to determine whether the statement at
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  issue was substantially true. Da Silva Versus Time Incorporated, nine
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  oh eight f. Dot supp One eighty four, one eighty
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  seven SDN Y, nineteen ninety five, denying motion for some
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  rejudgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact
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  as to whether defamatory photo and caption were true. Under
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  New York law, truth is an absolute, unqualified defense to
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  a civil defamation action, and substantial truth suffices to defeat
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  a charge of libel. Jewel versus NYP Holdings Incorporated. Twenty
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  three f Dot supp. Two d three forty eight, three
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  sixty six, sdn Y, nineteen ninety eight. A statement is
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  substantially true if the statement would not have a different
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  effect on the mind of the reader from that which
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  the pleated truth would have produced. Id quoting Flextein for Sis.
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  Friedman one ninety three, e five thirty seven, five thirty
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  eight and Y nineteen thirty four. Thus, it is not
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  necessary to demonstrate complete accuracy to defeat a charge of libel.
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  It is only necessary that the gist or substance of
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  the challenge statements be true. Printers to Incorporated versus Professional
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  Publishing Incorporated. Seven eighty four f Dot two d one
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  forty one, one forty six, Second Circuit nineteen eighty six.
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  See also Corcala versus W. W. Norton in Company. Six
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  eighteen f Dot supp. One fifty two, one fifty five,
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  sdn Y, nineteen eighty five. Slight inaccuracies of expression are
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  immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true in substance,
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  internal quotation marks and citation omitted. Sharon versus Time Incorporated.
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  Six h nine f. Supp. Twelve ninety one, twelve ninety four,
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  sdn Y, nineteen eighty four. Is permitted to prove the
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  substantial truth of his statement by establishing any other proposition
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  that has the same gist or sting as the original libel,
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  that is the same effect on the mind of the reader.
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  The Honorable Loretta A. Presca has noted that cases addressing
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  whether a statement is substantially true Jule twenty three, f. Dot. Supp. At.
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  Three sixty seven, there are cases in which a statement
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  is non actionable because it's completely true. Ce E. G. Carter,
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  two thirty three, AD Dot two d four seventy three,
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  four seventy four. New York Appeals Division, Second Department, nineteen
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  ninety six claim that defendant committed libel by informing the
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  authorities that plaintiff was endorsing checks made payable to the
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  defendant and depositing them in plaintiff's acount held non actionable
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  where a plaintiff had in fact endorsed checks made payable
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  to the defendant. There are cases where one struggles to
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  identify any area of ambiguity as to truth. Jewel twenty
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  three f. Supp At three sixty eight. C. E. G.
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  Miller versus Journal News, two eleven A D two D
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  six twenty six six twenty seven, New York Appeals Division,
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  Second Department, nineteen ninety five. Statement that plaintiff was suspended
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  substantially true where plaintiff was placed on administrative leave. There
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  are cases where the line between the statement and the
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  admitted truth is more tenuous, but the overall gist cannot
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  be said to be substantially different. C. Eg. Guccioni versus
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  Hustler Magazine Incorporated. Eight hundred f. Dot two d two
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  ninety eight, three two and three three, Second Circuit, nineteen
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  eighty six, holding that statement which implied that plaintiff was
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  then currently an adulterer was substantially true where plaintiff had
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  ceased being an adulterer but had unabashedly committed adultery for
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  thirteen of seventeen years Finally, there are those cases in
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  which a defendant simply asked too much in asserting that
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  a statement is substantially true, because the difference between the
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  two is plainly substantial Jewel twenty three f. Supp At.
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  Three sixty eight. For example, the court in Da Silva
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  nine O eight f. Dot supp At. One eighty six
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  and one eighty seven held that a photograph of plaintiff
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  which identified her as a prostitute was not substantially true,
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  where the plaintiff had been a prostitute for some six
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  years but was not at the time of the publication.
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  After reviewing the spectrum of cases, the facts upon which
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  Maxwell bases her argument are insufficient to allow this court
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  to find substantial truth. As a matter of law, a
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  material dispute of fact exists as to the admitted truth
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  or the reality. In this case, Maxwell is cited to
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  various facts to counter roberts claims, such as roberts high
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  school enrollment, short term jobs, and a lack of record
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  on private flight logs during some of the relevant time
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  period as evidence that Maxwell and Epstein did not abuse Roberts.
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  The details in signific against the facts offered are highly
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  contested and therefore cannot establish the substantial truth of the
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  press release, reasonable jurors could conclude that the statements are
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  not substantially true. Bayer versus Heiss, seven thirty four f supp.
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  Two D three eighty nine, three ninety nine SDNY twenty ten.
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  The motion for some rejudgment to dismiss the defamation on
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  the ground of substantial truth is denied as not having
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  been established by undisputed material facts. Part six. The defamation
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  claim is not barred by New York law. Maxwell has
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  moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
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  press release is opinion and protected by the pre litigation
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  privilege under New York's law. Because New York law does
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  not support Maxwell's position, the motion for some rejudgment based
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  on the characterization of the press release as opinion and
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  as protected by pre litigation privilege is denied. One the
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  press release is not opinion as previously held. Maxwell's statement
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  that Roberts claims of sexual assault or lies is not
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  an expression of opinion. First, statements that roberts claims against
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  Maxwell are untrue have been shown to be untrue, and
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  our obvious lies have a specific and readily understood factual,
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  meaning that Roberts is not telling the truth about her
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  history of sexual abuse and Maxwell's role, and that some
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  verifiable investigation has occurred to come to a definitive conclusion
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  proving that fact. Second, these statements, as they themselves allege,
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  are capable of being proven true or false, and therefore
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  constitute actionable fact and not opinion. Third, in their full context,
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  while Maxwell's statements have the effect of generally denying Robert's story,
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  they also clearly constitute fact to the reader. Roberts versus Maxwell,
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  one sixty five f Dot supp Three D one forty seven,
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  one fifty two SDNY twenty sixteen. This court further concluded
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  that Roberts cannot be making claims shown to be untrue
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  that our obvious lies without being a liar. Furthermore, to
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  suggest an individual is not telling the truth about her
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  history of having been sexually assaulted as a minor constitutes
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  more than a general denial. It alleges something deeply disturbing
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  about the character of an individual willing to be publicly
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  dishonest about such a reprehensible crime. Maxwell's statements clearly imply
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  that the denials are based on facts separate and contradictory
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  to those that Roberts has alleged. Maxwell argues that the
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  context of the entire statement tested against the understanding of
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  the average reader, should be that of a press release
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  as a whole, being read only by journalists. Defense Briefing at.
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  Twenty two, quoting Aaronson versus Wisma, four eighty three, two
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  D eleven thirty eight, eleven thirty nine, nineteen eighty five. However,
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  the ultimate audience for a press release is the public.
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  The motion to dismiss opinion clearly address this issue. Sexual
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  assault of a minor is a clear cut issue. Either
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  transgressions occurred or it did not. Either Maxwell was involved
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  or she was not. The issue is not a matter
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  of opinion, and there cannot be differing understanding of the
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  same facts that justified diametrically opposed opinion. As to whether
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  Maxwell was involved in roberts abuse, as Roberts has claimed,
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  either Roberts is telling the truth about her story and
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  Maxwell's involvement, or Maxwell is telling the truth and she
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  was not involved in the trafficking and ultimate abuse of
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  Roberts Roberts, one sixty five f at supp At one
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  fifty two. Maxwell has urged that these conclusions at the
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  motion to dismiss stage should be revisited and revised when
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  considering the summary judgment motion, since the standard deciding a
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  rule twelve B six motion is different from the standard
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  for deciding a Rule fifty six motion. In deciding a
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  twelve B six motion, the court must accept as true
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  the factual allegations and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor.
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  A plaintiff need only state a claim that is plausible
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  on its face Idea one forty nine internal quotation marks
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  and citation omitted. In contrast, for rule fifty six motion,
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  the plaintiff defending the motion may not rest on the
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  allegations in her complaint Anderson, four to seventy seven at
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  two forty nine. In deciding its motion to dismiss opinion,
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  the court relied on Davis versus Boheim twenty two three
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  d nine ninety nine twenty fourteen and held that the
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  three allegedly defamatory statements in the press release have a
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  specific and readily understood factual meaning, are capable of being
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  proven true or false, and clearly constitute fact to the reader. Roberts,
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  one sixty five f. Supp At one fifty two. The
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  Court determined that the dispositive inquiry for purposes of deciding
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  whether an allegedly defamatory statement is fact or non actionable
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  opinion is whether a reasonable reader could have concluded that
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  the statement were conveying facts about the plaintiff id at
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  one fifty one. Internal quotation marks and citation omitted. To
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  answer that inquiry, three factors enumerated in Davis were applied cid.
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  These three factors are the same as the four factors
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  in immunoag versus Morjinkowski five sixty seven, ne E Dot
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  two D twelve seventy and y in nineteen ninety one.
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  The difference is that the Davis Court collapsed the Immunoa G,
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  third and fourth factors into one cee Davis twenty two
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  ne e at three d at one zero zero five.
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  The critical aspect of the inquiry, as articulated in the
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  third factor set fourth above, is to view the statements
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  in context Juel twenty three f Dot su pp two
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  d at three seventy seven. This contextual analysis proceeds on
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  two levels, the broader social setting of the statements as
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  well as their immediate context. Citing Immuno five sixty seven,
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  ne E two D at twelve eighty all right, folks,
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  we're gonna wrap up this episode right here, and then
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  the next episode we're gonna finish it off. All of
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  the information that goes with this episode can be found
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  in the description box