Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / IPO Boom, Market Top?
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome back to the Deep Dive. Today we are tackling a pattern
- 0:05that was fascinated investors for well over a century, the IPO
- 0:10boom. That's right, we're going to
- 0:11dive into the history books. We're talking the Roaring 20s,
- 0:13the.com bubble, the recent SPAC craze to answer one really
- 0:18critical question for you. And that question is, does a
- 0:21flood of new companies hitting the stock market mean the whole
- 0:24thing is about to top out? Is it a reliable signal for a
- 0:27crash? OK, let's get into it.
- 0:29Yeah. You see that correlation
- 0:30mentioned all the time, but we need to know, is it just a
- 0:33coincidence or is there a real fundamental mechanism at play
- 0:38here, right. So our mission today is to look
- 0:40at the data, test that idea, and I think most importantly,
- 0:43understand why. Why are corporate insiders so
- 0:46good at timing their exits? It all comes down to this core
- 0:50idea, something academics called the Market Timing Hypothesis.
- 0:53It sounds a bit technical, but the idea is actually really
- 0:55simple. It is.
- 0:56It just says that the people with the best information, you
- 0:59know, the founders, the VC's, they're smart, they're
- 1:02opportunists. And they aren't looking for fair
- 1:05value, they're looking for maximum value.
- 1:07They choose to list their company to sell you their stock
- 1:10during these little windows of opportunity.
- 1:13Windows when the public market is just, well, irrationally
- 1:16excited and willing to pay any price.
- 1:17Exactly. It's about maximizing the
- 1:19transfer of wealth from the public to them.
- 1:22OK. So if we're going to use this as
- 1:24a signal, we need to define our terms.
- 1:27What actually makes an IPO market hot?
- 1:30It's not just the number of companies going public, though
- 1:33that's part of it. It's really defined by three
- 1:36things. Super by valuations, certain
- 1:38behavioral signs, and maybe most visibly, extreme underpricing.
- 1:43And by underpricing, you mean the pop, right?
- 1:45That big jump in the stock price on day one.
- 1:47That's the one. Normally, you know, a 10, maybe
- 1:4915% pop feels about right. It does.
- 1:51Historically, something in that range, say 7 to 15%, was just
- 1:55seen as, you know, a fair reward for a risk on a new company.
- 1:59But in a hot market, that number goes crazy.
- 2:02It goes completely irrational. You just have to look at the.com
- 2:05peak in 1999 and 2000, the average first day return was a
- 2:09shocking 65%. 65% wait, why would a company leave that much
- 2:15money on the table? That just sounds like a mistake.
- 2:17Because it's not a mistake, it's fuel for the machine.
- 2:20That huge pop creates this powerful sentiment feedback
- 2:25loop. Ah, so it gets on the news.
- 2:27Everyone's talking about it. Everyone's talking about it.
- 2:29It creates this intense FOMO, the fear of missing out.
- 2:33People see those returns and just pile in.
- 2:35They start to see IP OS as free money.
- 2:38And all that new demand let's the investment bankers push
- 2:40valuations even higher, which in turn allows VCs to bring even
- 2:44lower quality companies to the market.
- 2:46It's a speculative cycle. It just feeds on itself, and
- 2:49that cycle creates a huge structural risk for the
- 2:52individual investor. It's called the winner's curse.
- 2:54OK, the winner's curse. That sounds ominous.
- 2:57Break that down for us. It's based on something called
- 2:59asymmetric information. It's just a fancy way of saying
- 3:02the seller knows more about what they're selling than you, the
- 3:05buyer does. So how does the curse work with
- 3:08an IPO? Well, the theory is pretty
- 3:10simple and a little shilling. The informed investors, the big
- 3:13institutions and hedge funds, they get the first look.
- 3:16If they think an IPO is a good deal, they demand a huge
- 3:19allocation. And you, the retail investor,
- 3:22you might get a few shares if you're lucky.
- 3:24So you're saying the only time I as a regular person get all the
- 3:29shares I want? Is when the smart money has
- 3:31already passed on it. Wow, so getting a big allocation
- 3:35is actually a bad sign. That is exactly what the data
- 3:37suggests. Easy access often means it's an
- 3:39inferior investment at that price.
- 3:42Your money is basically providing the exit liquidity for
- 3:44the institutions who are just looking to flip the stock after
- 3:47that first day pop. The system is set up against you
- 3:50in a boom. It really is OK.
- 3:52With that in mind, let's go to the historical proof.
- 3:55Let's start with the big one, the crash that started this
- 3:58whole conversation in 1929. Right.
- 4:01That crash was preceded by an absolute frenzy of new issuance,
- 4:05but it was in a very specific, kind vehicle.
- 4:08And it sounds a lot like something we've seen very
- 4:10recently. We're talking about the
- 4:12investment trust mania. These were essentially leveraged
- 4:14funds, kind of like closed end funds today.
- 4:17And you're right, structurally they look almost identical to
- 4:21the SPAC's of the twenty 20s. They were just a way to funnel
- 4:23retail money into pure market speculation, and the numbers
- 4:26were just. Insane Kleinzie is the right
- 4:29word. In August of 1929, just two
- 4:32months before the crash, these trusts made-up nearly 60% of all
- 4:36new securities being issued. But the real poison was the
- 4:39leverage. They were borrowing money to buy
- 4:41stocks. Piling debt on top of equity.
- 4:43It created this massive, fragile pyramid, it amplified the write
- 4:47up, and it guaranteed the collapse would be catastrophic.
- 4:49It's a total shift from investing to just pure financial
- 4:52engineering. But here's a detail I found
- 4:54fascinating. It's a signal almost nobody
- 4:56talks about the price of a seat on the New York Stock Exchange.
- 5:00Oh this is a brilliant piece of data.
- 5:02The price of an NYS ES membership, a seat is basically
- 5:06a real time bet on the future profitability of Wall Street
- 5:09itself. It's the ultimate insider
- 5:10signal. So what did the insiders see
- 5:12coming? The data is amazing.
- 5:15Researchers found that NYSEC prices started falling hard.
- 5:18I'm talking drops of 20% months before the stock market actually
- 5:23peaked in October 1929. So the brokers, the people
- 5:26running the machine, they were already.
- 5:28They sensed the party was ending.
- 5:30They were selling their tools before the public even heard the
- 5:33music stop. It's a classic smart money
- 5:36indicator. Incredible.
- 5:37OK, let's jump ahead. Let's go to the textbook example
- 5:39of this whole theory, the.com Bubble of 19992000.
- 5:43Yeah, this is the cleanest evidence you'll ever find.
- 5:46And it wasn't just the number of IP OS, it was the sheer amount
- 5:49of money being raised. The proceeds are just off the
- 5:52charts. Over 60 billion in 1999, another
- 5:5555 billion in 2000. But the real smoking gun, the
- 5:59most reliable signal that the top was in, was the collapse in
- 6:02quality. This is the profitability
- 6:04inversion you. Mentioned exactly.
- 6:05We can actually measure this. Professor Jay Ritter's work on
- 6:08this is legendary. He found that in the early
- 6:101980s, only about 20% of companies going public were
- 6:13unprofitable. Which makes sense.
- 6:15You go public when you're a successful, profitable business.
- 6:18You would think, but by 1999 that number had flipped.
- 6:21Nearly 80% of companies coming to market.
- 6:24We're losing money 80%. The market was valuing eyeballs
- 6:28and clicks, not profits. It was a complete inversion of
- 6:32financial logic. It.
- 6:33Was. And that brings us to the most
- 6:35recent example, the the rhyme with history of the 2021
- 6:40liquidity tsunami. Record activity over 3000 new
- 6:44listings globally, raising more than $600 billion.
- 6:48And the vehicle this time. Was the SAC the direct
- 6:50descendant of the 1929 investment trust?
- 6:53It just speed everything up. It allowed these super
- 6:55speculative, often pre revenue companies like all those EV
- 6:58startups to go public based on nothing but a PowerPoint deck of
- 7:02future projections. Bypassing all the usual
- 7:04scrutiny. All of it.
- 7:05It was pure, raw liquidity chasing a story.
- 7:08And we know how that story ended.
- 7:10What were the consequences for people who bought in?
- 7:12The timing is just perfect. The peak of SPAC mania was late
- 7:1620/21, which was, you know, almost the exact top of the
- 7:19overall market, the DSPAC index, the thing that tracks these
- 7:22companies. It collapsed.
- 7:24It lost nearly 70% of its value. By 2023, more than 90% of those
- 7:29companies were trading below their $10 offering price.
- 7:33The cycle played out perfectly again.
- 7:36The window slam shut on the public OK, but we have to
- 7:39address the big exception. This is a powerful signal, but
- 7:42it's not perfect. If you were only watching IPO
- 7:45volumes, you would have completely missed the 2008
- 7:47crisis. That's a hugely important point.
- 7:50The 2008 great financial crisis was not preceded by a big U.S.
- 7:53equity IPO boom. The volumes in 2007 were
- 7:57actually pretty moderate. So why didn't the signal work
- 7:59then? What was different about 2008?
- 8:01The difference is everything. It's a matter of a credit bubble
- 8:04versus an equity bubble. We can explain that.
- 8:06The bubbles in 19/29/2000 and 20/21 were fundamentally about
- 8:10equity valuations. The public was just paying way
- 8:13too much for shares of stock. But 2008 was different. 2008 was
- 8:17a credit and housing bubble. The speculation wasn't in
- 8:19stocks, it was in debt. Mortgage-backed securities CE OS
- 8:23The hot new issuance was happening in the bond market,
- 8:25not the stock market. So the take away is IPO booms
- 8:29are a fantastic warning sign for a stock market bubble.
- 8:33An equity evaluation bubble? Yes.
- 8:35But they might not see a crisis that's building up in the credit
- 8:37markets or the banking system. You need to use different gauges
- 8:40for different problems. Exactly right.
- 8:42All right, so let's make this actionable.
- 8:43Let's move from history to the here and now.
- 8:46What are the real time signals that you listening right now can
- 8:50watch to see if the market is getting too hot?
- 8:52There are two great microstructure signals to watch.
- 8:56The 1st is something called the Gray Market Premium or GMP.
- 8:59The Gray market? That sounds a bit shady.
- 9:02It's not as shady as it sounds. It's basically an unofficial
- 9:04futures market for an IPO stock before it actually starts
- 9:08trading. It's a measure of early hype.
- 9:10And what does a high GMP tell you?
- 9:12It is a direct, unfiltered measure of retail FOMO and the
- 9:17research is clear. A really high premium, say over
- 9:2050%. It does predict a huge pop on
- 9:22day one, but it's powerfully negatively correlated with long
- 9:26term returns. So if the crowd is willing to
- 9:28pay 50% more before the stock even exists, it's a huge red
- 9:32flag. A classic contrarian signal.
- 9:35It's the definition of a contrarian signal.
- 9:37The stock is priced for perfection with no margin for
- 9:40error. The second thing to watch is the
- 9:42post IPO lockup expiration. That's the day when all the
- 9:46insiders, the founders and VCs are finally allowed to sell
- 9:50their shares. Exactly.
- 9:51It's usually 90 to 180 days after the IPO and when that lock
- 9:56up ends it can cause a massive supply shock.
- 9:59The number of shares available to trade can triple or quadruple
- 10:02overnight. It's like opening the
- 10:04floodgates. It is, and if you see heavy
- 10:06selling from insiders right when that lock up expires, that's a
- 10:09screaming signal. The people who know the company
- 10:11best are telling you they think the valuation has peaked.
- 10:14And when you put all this together, what's the final
- 10:16verdict on buying into these hot IP OS?
- 10:19It's sobering. The data shows unequivocally
- 10:22that IP OS that launched during these hot periods have the worst
- 10:25long term performance. They historically underperform
- 10:29the market by about 20% over the next three years.
- 10:31It just reinforces that core idea.
- 10:34It does. An IPO boom is a highly
- 10:36effective structural transfer of wealth from the public to
- 10:39insiders. OK.
- 10:40So let's synthesize all of this. The actionable take away for you
- 10:43the listener seems pretty clear, but it takes discipline.
- 10:46It does. An IPO boom, especially one with
- 10:49a lot of unprofitable companies and crazy first day pops, is a
- 10:52signal to be more cautious, not more aggressive.
- 10:56And you have to be really skeptical of the deals that are
- 10:58easy to get. Remember the winner's curse?
- 11:00If it's easy, ask why. So what's the smart strategy?
- 11:03It's simple. Avoid the pop and wait for the
- 11:06flop. Just wait six months, maybe a
- 11:08year. Let the hype die down.
- 11:10Let the lock up expire. Let the company actually report
- 11:14some real quarterly earnings, yes.
- 11:16Let the facts replace the story. That price discovery period
- 11:19often gives you a much lower and much safer entry point.
- 11:23All right. And here's a final thought to
- 11:24leave you with the hot, frothy IPO market signals.
- 11:28A market top What does a cold frozen IPO market signal?
- 11:33That's a great question. Historically, those periods when
- 11:36the IPO window is slammed shut, when only the absolute best,
- 11:40most profitable companies can even think about going public,
- 11:44those have often been generational buying
- 11:46opportunities. A time when fear is high, but so
- 11:49is quality. So being cautious now,
- 11:52preserving your capital when everyone else is gambling it
- 11:55might just set you up for a spectacular opportunity later
- 11:58on. Use this analysis is another
- 12:00tool for managing risk in your own portfolio.
- 12:02Thanks for tuning in. Disclaimer All analysis is based
- 12:05on publicly available sources. The content is for educational
- 12:08purposes only and is not investment advice.
- 12:10Always conduct your own due diligence before making any
- 12:12investment decisions. And if you want to hear more of
- 12:15our deep dives, you can find us on Apple and Spotify podcasts.
- 12:18Just search for the deep dive.