Latest / Philosophy / 018 - XVIII Imagination and Memory
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter eighteen of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell. The LibriVox recording
- 0:05Speaker 1: is in the public domain imagination and memory. In this
- 0:10Speaker 1: chapter we have to consider the two topics of imagination
- 0:13Speaker 1: and memory. The latter has already been considered in chapter six,
- 0:18Speaker 1: but there we viewed it from outside. We want now
- 0:21Speaker 1: to ask ourselves whether there is anything further to be
- 0:24Speaker 1: known about it by taking account of what is only
- 0:27Speaker 1: perceptible to the person remembering. As regards the part played
- 0:32Speaker 1: by images, I do not think this is essential. Sometimes
- 0:36Speaker 1: there are memory images, sometimes not. Sometimes when images come
- 0:41Speaker 1: in connection with memory, we may nevertheless know that the
- 0:45Speaker 1: images are incorrect, showing that we have also some other
- 0:49Speaker 1: and more reliable source of memory. Memory may depend upon images,
- 0:54Speaker 1: as in the case mentioned above of the house where
- 0:57Speaker 1: I lived as a child, but it may also be
- 1:00Speaker 1: purely verbal. I am a poor visualizer except for things
- 1:05Speaker 1: I saw before I was ten years old. When now
- 1:08Speaker 1: I meet a man and wish to remember his appearance,
- 1:11Speaker 1: I find that the only way is to describe him
- 1:13Speaker 1: in words while I am seeing him, and then remember
- 1:17Speaker 1: the words I say to myself. This man has blue
- 1:21Speaker 1: eyes and a brown beard, and a small nose. He
- 1:24Speaker 1: is short, with a rounded back and sloping shoulders. I
- 1:28Speaker 1: can remember these words for months and recognize the man
- 1:32Speaker 1: by means of them, unless two men having these characteristics
- 1:36Speaker 1: are present at once. In this respect, a visualizer would
- 1:41Speaker 1: have the advantage of me. Nevertheless, if I had made
- 1:44Speaker 1: my verbal inventory sufficiently extensive and precise, it would have
- 1:49Speaker 1: been pretty sure to answer its purpose. I do not
- 1:52Speaker 1: think there is anything in memory that absolutely demands images
- 1:57Speaker 1: as opposed to words. Whether the words we use in
- 2:01Speaker 1: thought are themselves sometimes images of words, or are always
- 2:06Speaker 1: incipient movements, as Watson contends, is a further question as
- 2:10Speaker 1: to which I offer no opinion, since it ought to
- 2:14Speaker 1: be capable of being decided experimentally. The most important point
- 2:18Speaker 1: about memory is one which has nothing to do with images,
- 2:22Speaker 1: and is not mentioned in Watson's brief discussion. I mean
- 2:26Speaker 1: the reference to the past. The reference to the past
- 2:30Speaker 1: is not involved in mere habit memory e g. In
- 2:34Speaker 1: skating or in repeating a poem formerly learned, but it
- 2:38Speaker 1: is involved in recollection of a past incident. We do
- 2:43Speaker 1: not in this case merely repeat what we did before.
- 2:47Speaker 1: Then we felt the incident as present, but now we
- 2:50Speaker 1: feel it is passed. This is shown in the use
- 2:54Speaker 1: of the past tense. We say to ourselves at the time,
- 2:58Speaker 1: I am having a good dinner, but next day we
- 3:01Speaker 1: say I did have a good dinner. Thus we do not,
- 3:06Speaker 1: like a rat in a maze, repeat our previous performance.
- 3:10Speaker 1: We alter the verbal formula. Why do we do so?
- 3:14Speaker 1: What constitutes this reference of a recollection to the past.
- 3:19Speaker 1: Let us take up the question first from the point
- 3:22Speaker 1: of view of sensitivity. The stimulus to a recollection is,
- 3:26Speaker 1: no doubt, always something in the present, but our reaction
- 3:30Speaker 1: or part of it, is more intimately related to a
- 3:33Speaker 1: certain past event than to the present stimulus. This in
- 3:38Speaker 1: itself can be paralleled in inanimate objects, for example, in
- 3:43Speaker 1: a gramophone record. It is not the likeness of our
- 3:46Speaker 1: reaction to that called forth on a former occasion that
- 3:50Speaker 1: concerns us at the moment. It is the unlikeness in
- 3:54Speaker 1: the fact that now we have the feeling of pastness
- 3:57Speaker 1: which we did not have originally. You cannot sing into
- 4:01Speaker 1: a dictaphone I love you and then have it say
- 4:05Speaker 1: five days hence I loved you last Wednesday. Yet that
- 4:09Speaker 1: is what we do when we remember. I think, however,
- 4:13Speaker 1: that this feature of memory is probably connected with the
- 4:16Speaker 1: feature of reactions due to association. When the association is cerebral.
- 4:22Speaker 1: I think also that this is connected with the difference
- 4:24Speaker 1: in quality that exists usually, though not always, between images
- 4:29Speaker 1: and sensations. It would seem that in such cases, the
- 4:34Speaker 1: reaction aroused through association is usually different from that which
- 4:39Speaker 1: would have been aroused directly. In certain definite ways. It
- 4:43Speaker 1: is fainter and has, when attended to, the sort of
- 4:47Speaker 1: quality that makes us call it imaginary. In a certain
- 4:51Speaker 1: class of cases, we come to know that we can
- 4:53Speaker 1: make it real if we choose. This applies e g.
- 4:58Speaker 1: To the tactual images produce used by visible objects that
- 5:01Speaker 1: we can touch. In such cases, the image is attached
- 5:06Speaker 1: by us to the object, and its imaginary character fails
- 5:10Speaker 1: to be noticed. There are cases in which the association
- 5:14Speaker 1: is not due to some accident of our experience, but
- 5:18Speaker 1: to a collocation which exists in nature. In other cases, however,
- 5:22Speaker 1: we are perfectly aware if we reflect that the association
- 5:27Speaker 1: depends on some circumstance in our private lives. We may,
- 5:31Speaker 1: for instance, have had a very interesting conversation at a
- 5:35Speaker 1: certain spot, and always think of this conversation when we
- 5:38Speaker 1: find ourselves in this place. But we know that the
- 5:42Speaker 1: conversation does not actually take place again when we go
- 5:46Speaker 1: back to where it happened. In such a case, we
- 5:49Speaker 1: notice the intrinsic difference between the event is a sensible
- 5:53Speaker 1: fact in the present and the event has merely revived
- 5:56Speaker 1: by association. I think this different difference has to do
- 6:00Speaker 1: with our feeling of pastness. The difference, which we can
- 6:04Speaker 1: directly observe, is not, of course, between our present recollection
- 6:09Speaker 1: and the past conversation, but between our present recollection and
- 6:12Speaker 1: present sensible facts. This difference, combined with the inconsistency of
- 6:18Speaker 1: our recollection with present facts if our recollection were placed
- 6:22Speaker 1: in the present, is perhaps a cause of our referring
- 6:25Speaker 1: memories to the past. But I offer this suggestion with hesitation,
- 6:30Speaker 1: and as we shall find when we have examined imagination,
- 6:34Speaker 1: it cannot be the whole truth, though it may be
- 6:37Speaker 1: part of it. There are some facts that tend to
- 6:40Speaker 1: support the above view. In dreams, when our critical faculty
- 6:44Speaker 1: is in abeyance, we may live past events over again
- 6:48Speaker 1: under the impression that they are actually happening. The reference
- 6:52Speaker 1: of recollections to the past must therefore be a matter
- 6:56Speaker 1: involving a somewhat advanced type of mental activity. Conversely, we
- 7:01Speaker 1: sometimes have the impression that what is happening now really
- 7:05Speaker 1: happened in the past. This is a well known and
- 7:08Speaker 1: much discussed illusion. It happens especially when we are profoundly
- 7:13Speaker 1: absorbed in some inward struggle or emotion, so that outer
- 7:17Speaker 1: events only penetrate faintly. I suggest that in these circumstances,
- 7:23Speaker 1: the quality of sensations approximates to that of images, and
- 7:28Speaker 1: that this is the source of the illusion. If this
- 7:31Speaker 1: suggestion is right, the feeling of pastness is really complex.
- 7:37Speaker 1: Something is suggested by association but is recognizably different from
- 7:41Speaker 1: a present sensible occurrence. We therefore do not suppose that
- 7:46Speaker 1: this something is happening now, and we may be confirmed
- 7:49Speaker 1: in this by the fact that it is inconsistent with
- 7:52Speaker 1: something that is happening now. We may then either refer
- 7:56Speaker 1: the something to the past, in which case we have
- 7:58Speaker 1: a recollection so not necessarily a correct one, or we
- 8:02Speaker 1: may regard the something as purely imaginary, in which case
- 8:06Speaker 1: we have what we regard as pure imagination. It remains
- 8:10Speaker 1: to inquire why we do sometimes the one and sometimes
- 8:14Speaker 1: the other, which brings us to the discussion of imagination.
- 8:18Speaker 1: I think we shall find that memory is more fundamental
- 8:21Speaker 1: than imagination, and that the latter consists merely of memories
- 8:25Speaker 1: of different dates assemble together. But to support this theory
- 8:30Speaker 1: will demand first an analysis of imagination, and then, in
- 8:34Speaker 1: the light of this analysis, an attempt to give further
- 8:37Speaker 1: precision to our theory of memory. Imagination is not, as
- 8:42Speaker 1: the word might suggest, essentially connected with images, no doubt.
- 8:47Speaker 1: Images are often, even usually present when we imagine, but
- 8:52Speaker 1: they need not be. A man can improvise on the
- 8:55Speaker 1: piano without first having images of the music he is
- 8:59Speaker 1: going to make. A poet might write down a poem
- 9:02Speaker 1: without first making it up in his head. In talking,
- 9:06Speaker 1: words suggest other words, and a man with sufficient verbal
- 9:10Speaker 1: associations may be successfully carried along by them for a
- 9:13Speaker 1: considerable time. The art of talking without thinking is particularly
- 9:19Speaker 1: necessary to public speakers, who must go on when once
- 9:22Speaker 1: they are on their feet, and gradually acquire the habit
- 9:26Speaker 1: of behaving in private as they do before an audience.
- 9:30Speaker 1: Yet the statements they make must be admitted to be
- 9:33Speaker 1: often imaginative. The essence of imagination therefore does not lie
- 9:38Speaker 1: in images. The essence of imagination, I should say, is
- 9:43Speaker 1: the absence of belief together with a novel combination of
- 9:47Speaker 1: known elements in memory, when it is correct, the combination
- 9:52Speaker 1: of elements is not novel, and whether correct or not,
- 9:56Speaker 1: there is belief. I say that in imagination there is
- 10:00Speaker 1: a novel combination of known elements, because if nothing is novel,
- 10:05Speaker 1: we have a case of memory, while if the elements,
- 10:08Speaker 1: or any of them are novel, we have a case
- 10:11Speaker 1: of perception. This last I say, because I accept Hume's
- 10:15Speaker 1: principle that there is no idea without an antecedent impression.
- 10:20Speaker 1: I do not mean that this is to be applied
- 10:22Speaker 1: in a blind and pedantic manner. Where abstract ideas are concerned.
- 10:27Speaker 1: I should not maintain that no one can have an
- 10:29Speaker 1: idea of liberty until he has seen the statue of liberty.
- 10:33Speaker 1: The principle applies rather to the realm of images. I
- 10:37Speaker 1: certainly do not think that in an image there can
- 10:40Speaker 1: be any element which does not resemble some element in
- 10:43Speaker 1: a previous perception. In the distinctive manner of images. Hume
- 10:48Speaker 1: made himself an unnecessary difficulty in regard to the theory
- 10:52Speaker 1: that images copy impressions. He asked the question, suppose a
- 10:57Speaker 1: man has seen all the different shades of color that
- 11:00Speaker 1: go to make up the spectrum, except just one shade.
- 11:04Speaker 1: To put the thing in modern language, suppose he has
- 11:07Speaker 1: never seen light of a certain small range of wavelengths,
- 11:11Speaker 1: but has seen light of all other wavelengths. Will he
- 11:15Speaker 1: be able to form an image of the shade he
- 11:17Speaker 1: has never seen? Hume thinks he will. Although this contradicts
- 11:22Speaker 1: the principle, I should say that images are always more
- 11:26Speaker 1: or less vague copies of impressions, so that an image
- 11:30Speaker 1: might be regarded as a copy of any one of
- 11:32Speaker 1: a number of different impressions of slightly different shades. In
- 11:37Speaker 1: order to get a test case for Hume's question, we
- 11:40Speaker 1: should have to suppose that there was a broad band
- 11:42Speaker 1: of the spectrum that the man had never seen, say
- 11:46Speaker 1: the whole of the yellow. He would then, one may
- 11:49Speaker 1: suppose be able to form images which, owing to vagueness,
- 11:53Speaker 1: might be applicable to orange yellow, and others applicable to
- 11:57Speaker 1: green yellow, but none applicable to a yellow midway between
- 12:02Speaker 1: orange and green. This is an example of an unreal
- 12:06Speaker 1: puzzle manufactured by forgetting vagueness. It is analogous to the
- 12:12Speaker 1: following profound problem. A man formerly hairy is now bald.
- 12:17Speaker 1: He lost his hair as one by one. Therefore, there
- 12:20Speaker 1: must have been just one hair that made the difference,
- 12:23Speaker 1: so that while he had it he was not bald,
- 12:26Speaker 1: but when he lost it he was. Of course, baldness
- 12:30Speaker 1: is a vague conception, and so is copying. When we
- 12:34Speaker 1: are speaking of the way in which images copy prototypes.
- 12:38Speaker 1: What causes us in imagination to put elements together in
- 12:42Speaker 1: a new way? Let us think first of concrete instances.
- 12:48Speaker 1: You read that a ship has gone down on a
- 12:50Speaker 1: route by which you have lately traveled, Very little imagination
- 12:54Speaker 1: is needed to generate the thought I might have gone down.
- 12:58Speaker 1: What happens here is the route is associated both with
- 13:02Speaker 1: yourself and with shipwreck, and you merely eliminate the middle term.
- 13:08Speaker 1: Literary ability is largely an extension of the practice, of
- 13:11Speaker 1: which the above is a very humble example. Take say,
- 13:17Speaker 1: and all our yesterdays have lighted fools the way to
- 13:20Speaker 1: dusty death out out reef candle. Life's but a walking shadow,
- 13:27Speaker 1: a poor player who struts and frets his hour upon
- 13:30Speaker 1: the stage, and then is heard no more. It is
- 13:34Speaker 1: a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
- 13:38Speaker 1: signifying nothing. I do not pretend to explain all the
- 13:43Speaker 1: associations which led Shakespeare to think of these lines, but
- 13:47Speaker 1: some few are obvious. Dusty death is suggested by Genesis
- 13:52Speaker 1: three nineteen dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.
- 13:58Speaker 1: Having spoken of lighting fools the way it is natural
- 14:02Speaker 1: to think of a candle, and thence of a walking
- 14:04Speaker 1: shadow being lighted by the candle along. The way from
- 14:08Speaker 1: shadows to players was a well established association in Shakespeare's mind. Thus,
- 14:14Speaker 1: in Midsummer Night's Dream he says of players, the best
- 14:18Speaker 1: in this kind are but shadows, and the worst are
- 14:21Speaker 1: no worse if imagination amend them. From a poor player
- 14:26Speaker 1: to a tale told by an idiot is no very
- 14:29Speaker 1: difficult transition for a theater manager, and sound and fury,
- 14:34Speaker 1: no doubt, often formed part of the tales to which
- 14:36Speaker 1: he had to listen in spite of their signifying nothing.
- 14:40Speaker 1: If we knew more about Shakespeare, we could explain more
- 14:44Speaker 1: of him in this sort of way. Thus, exceptional imaginative
- 14:48Speaker 1: gifts appear to depend mainly upon associations that are unusual
- 14:53Speaker 1: and have an emotional value, owing to the fact that
- 14:56Speaker 1: there is a certain uniform emotional tone about them. Many
- 15:01Speaker 1: adjectives are suitable to death in a mood quite different
- 15:04Speaker 1: from Macbeth's. It may be called noble, puissant, and mighty.
- 15:09Speaker 1: A chancellor of the exchequer, thinking of the death duties,
- 15:13Speaker 1: might be inclined to speak of lucrative death. Nevertheless, he
- 15:17Speaker 1: would not, like Vaughan, speak of dear beauteous death. Shakespeare
- 15:22Speaker 1: also would not have spoken of death in such terms,
- 15:25Speaker 1: for his view of it was pagan. He speaks of
- 15:28Speaker 1: that churial death. So a man's verbal associations may afford
- 15:33Speaker 1: a key to his emotional reactions. For often what connects
- 15:37Speaker 1: two words in his mind is the fact that they
- 15:40Speaker 1: rouse similar emotions. The absence of belief that a company's
- 15:45Speaker 1: imagination is a somewhat sophisticated product. It fails in sleep
- 15:50Speaker 1: and in strong and emotional excitement. Children invent terrors for
- 15:55Speaker 1: fun and then begin to believe in them. The state
- 15:59Speaker 1: of entertaining an idea without believing it is one involving
- 16:03Speaker 1: some tension, which demands a certain level of intellectual development.
- 16:09Speaker 1: It may be assumed that imagination at first always involved belief,
- 16:14Speaker 1: as it still does in dreams. I am not concerned
- 16:18Speaker 1: at the moment to define belief, but a criterion is
- 16:21Speaker 1: influence on action. If I say, suppose there were a
- 16:25Speaker 1: tiger outside your front door, you will remain calm. But
- 16:29Speaker 1: if I say, with a manner as to command belief,
- 16:32Speaker 1: there is a tiger outside your front door, you will
- 16:35Speaker 1: stay at home, even if it involves missing your train
- 16:38Speaker 1: to the office. This illustrates what I mean when I
- 16:42Speaker 1: say that imagination in its developed form involves absence of belief.
- 16:48Speaker 1: But this is not true of its primitive forms, and
- 16:51Speaker 1: even a civilized adult passing through a churchyard on a
- 16:54Speaker 1: dark night may feel fear if his imagination turns in
- 16:58Speaker 1: the direction of ghosts. When imagination passes into belief, it
- 17:03Speaker 1: does not, as a rule, become a belief about the past. Generally,
- 17:07Speaker 1: we place the imagined object in the present, but not
- 17:11Speaker 1: where it would be perceptible to our senses. If we
- 17:14Speaker 1: place it in the past, it is because the past
- 17:17Speaker 1: has some great emotional significance for us. If a person
- 17:21Speaker 1: we love has been in great danger and we do
- 17:24Speaker 1: not know whether he has come through safely, imagination of
- 17:27Speaker 1: his death may lead us to believe that he has
- 17:30Speaker 1: been killed. And often imagination leads us to believe that
- 17:33Speaker 1: something is going to happen. What is common to all
- 17:38Speaker 1: such cases is the emotional interest. This first causes us
- 17:42Speaker 1: to imagine an event and then leads us to think
- 17:45Speaker 1: that it has happened, is happening, or will happen according
- 17:49Speaker 1: to the circumstances. Hope and fear have this effect equally.
- 17:54Speaker 1: Wish fulfillment and dread fulfillment are equally sources of dreams
- 17:59Speaker 1: and day dreams. A great many beliefs have a source
- 18:02Speaker 1: of this kind, but in spite of psychoanalysis, there are
- 18:06Speaker 1: a great many that have a more rational foundation. I
- 18:10Speaker 1: believe that Columbus first crossed the ocean in fourteen ninety two,
- 18:14Speaker 1: though fourteen ninety one or fourteen ninety three would have
- 18:17Speaker 1: suited me just as well. I cannot discover that there
- 18:21Speaker 1: is any emotional element in this belief, or in the
- 18:25Speaker 1: belief that Semipolantisk is in Central Asia. The view that
- 18:30Speaker 1: all our beliefs are irrational is perhaps somewhat overdone nowadays,
- 18:34Speaker 1: though it is far more nearly true than the views
- 18:37Speaker 1: that it is displaced. We must now return to the
- 18:41Speaker 1: subject of memory. Memory proper does not, like imagination, involve
- 18:47Speaker 1: a rearrangement of elements derived from past experience. On the contrary,
- 18:52Speaker 1: it should restore such elements in the pattern in which
- 18:55Speaker 1: they occurred. This is the vital difference between memory and
- 18:59Speaker 1: imagine belief. Even belief involving reference to the past may,
- 19:05Speaker 1: as we have seen, be present in what is really imagination,
- 19:09Speaker 1: though it may not seem to be so to the
- 19:11Speaker 1: person concerned. That means so we still have to consider
- 19:15Speaker 1: what constitutes the reference to the past. Since the view
- 19:19Speaker 1: tentatively suggested before we had considered imagination turns out to
- 19:23Speaker 1: be inadequate, there is one possible view, suggested though not
- 19:29Speaker 1: definitely adopted, by doctor Broad in his chapter on memory
- 19:33Speaker 1: already referred to. According to this view, we have to
- 19:37Speaker 1: start from temporal succession as perceived within what is called
- 19:41Speaker 1: the species present, i e. A short period of time,
- 19:45Speaker 1: such that the events that occur throughout it can be
- 19:48Speaker 1: perceived together. I shall return to this subject presently. For example,
- 19:53Speaker 1: you can see a quick movement as a whole. You
- 19:56Speaker 1: are not merely aware that the object was first in
- 19:59Speaker 1: one place than in another. You can see the movement
- 20:02Speaker 1: of the second hand of a watch, but not of
- 20:05Speaker 1: the hour hand or minute hand. When you see a
- 20:09Speaker 1: movement in this sense, you are aware that one part
- 20:12Speaker 1: of it is earlier than another. Thus you acquire the
- 20:15Speaker 1: idea earlier, and you can mean by past earlier than this,
- 20:20Speaker 1: where this is what is actually happening. This is a
- 20:24Speaker 1: logically possible theory, but it seems nevertheless somewhat difficult to believe.
- 20:30Speaker 1: I do not know, however, of any easier theory, and
- 20:33Speaker 1: I shall therefore adopt it provisionally while waiting for something better.
- 20:39Speaker 1: For the understanding of memory, it is a help to
- 20:42Speaker 1: consider the links connecting its most developed forms with other
- 20:45Speaker 1: occurrences of a less complex kind. True recollection comes at
- 20:50Speaker 1: the end of a series of stages. I shall distinguish
- 20:54Speaker 1: five stages along the way, so that recollection becomes the
- 20:58Speaker 1: sixth in gradual progress. The stages are as follows one. Images,
- 21:05Speaker 1: as we have seen images at any rate in their
- 21:08Speaker 1: simpler parts. In fact, copy past sensations more or less vaguely,
- 21:13Speaker 1: even when they are not known to do so. Images
- 21:17Speaker 1: are mnemic phenomena in the sense that they are called
- 21:20Speaker 1: up by stimuli formerly associated with their prototypes, so that
- 21:24Speaker 1: their occurrence is a result of past experience according to
- 21:28Speaker 1: the law of association. But obviously an image which in
- 21:32Speaker 1: fact copies of past occurrence, does not constitute a recollection
- 21:36Speaker 1: unless it is felt to be a copy. Two familiarity.
- 21:42Speaker 1: Images and perceptions may come to us, and so may
- 21:45Speaker 1: words or other bodily movements with more or less of
- 21:48Speaker 1: the feeling we call familiarity. When you recall a tune
- 21:53Speaker 1: that you have heard before, either by images or by
- 21:56Speaker 1: actually singing it, part of what comes to you may
- 21:59Speaker 1: feel from me failiar, part unfamiliar. This may lead you
- 22:03Speaker 1: to judge that you have remembered the familiar part rightly
- 22:07Speaker 1: and the unfamiliar part wrongly. But this judgment belongs to
- 22:11Speaker 1: a later stage three habit memory. We've already discussed this
- 22:17Speaker 1: in chapter six. People say they remember a poem if
- 22:21Speaker 1: they can repeat it correctly, but this does not necessarily
- 22:25Speaker 1: involve any recollection of a past occurrence. You may have
- 22:29Speaker 1: quite forgotten when and where you read the poem. This
- 22:33Speaker 1: sort of memory is mere habit, and is essentially like
- 22:36Speaker 1: knowing how to walk. Although you cannot remember learning how
- 22:39Speaker 1: to walk, this does not deserve to be called memory
- 22:43Speaker 1: in the strict sense. Four recognition. This has two forms.
- 22:50Speaker 1: A when you see a dog, you can say to yourself,
- 22:54Speaker 1: there is a dog without recalling any case in which
- 22:57Speaker 1: you have seen a dog before, and even without reflecting
- 23:00Speaker 1: that there have been such cases, this involves no knowledge
- 23:04Speaker 1: about the past. Essentially, it is only an associative habit. B.
- 23:10Speaker 1: You may know I saw this before, though you do
- 23:13Speaker 1: not know when or where, and cannot recollect the previous
- 23:16Speaker 1: occurrence in any way. In such a case, there is
- 23:20Speaker 1: knowledge about the past, but it is very slight. When
- 23:24Speaker 1: you judge I saw this before, the word this must
- 23:28Speaker 1: be used vaguely, because you did not see exactly what
- 23:32Speaker 1: you see now, but only something very like this. Thus,
- 23:36Speaker 1: all that you are really knowing is that on some
- 23:39Speaker 1: past occasion you saw something very like what you are
- 23:42Speaker 1: seeing now. This is about the minimum of knowledge about
- 23:47Speaker 1: the past that actually occurs. Five. Immediate memory. I come
- 23:54Speaker 1: now to a region intermediate between sensation and true memory,
- 23:59Speaker 1: the region of what is sometimes called immediate memory. When
- 24:03Speaker 1: a sense organ is stimulated, it does not, on the
- 24:06Speaker 1: cessation of the stimulus, return at once to its unstimulated condition.
- 24:12Speaker 1: It goes on, so to speak, vibrating like a piano
- 24:15Speaker 1: string for a short time. For example, when you see
- 24:19Speaker 1: a flash of lightning, your sensation brief as it is
- 24:23Speaker 1: lasts much longer than the lightning is a physical occurrence.
- 24:28Speaker 1: There is a period during which a sensation is fading.
- 24:31Speaker 1: It is then called an acoluthic sensation. It is owing
- 24:36Speaker 1: to this fact that you can see a movement as
- 24:38Speaker 1: a whole as observed before. You cannot see the minute
- 24:43Speaker 1: hand of a watch moving, which you can see the
- 24:45Speaker 1: second hand moving. That is because it is in several
- 24:49Speaker 1: appreciably different places within the short time that is required
- 24:53Speaker 1: for one visual sensation to fade, so that you do actually,
- 24:58Speaker 1: at one moment see an in several places. The fading sensations, however,
- 25:04Speaker 1: feel different from those that are fresh, and thus the
- 25:07Speaker 1: various positions which are all sensibly present, are placed in
- 25:11Speaker 1: a series by the degree of fading, and you acquire
- 25:15Speaker 1: the perception of movement as a process. Exactly the same
- 25:19Speaker 1: considerations apply to hearing a spoken sentence. Thus, not only
- 25:24Speaker 1: an instant, but a short finite time is sensibly present
- 25:29Speaker 1: to you at any moment. This short finite time is
- 25:32Speaker 1: called the specious present. By the felt degree of fading,
- 25:37Speaker 1: you can distinguish earlier and later in the specious present,
- 25:41Speaker 1: and thus experience temporal succession without the need of true memory.
- 25:46Speaker 1: If you see me quickly move my arm from left
- 25:49Speaker 1: to right, you have an experience which is quite different
- 25:52Speaker 1: from what you would have if you now saw it
- 25:55Speaker 1: at the right, and remember that a little while ago
- 25:58Speaker 1: you saw it at the left. The difference is that
- 26:01Speaker 1: in the quick movement, the whole falls within the species present,
- 26:06Speaker 1: so that the entire process is sensible. The knowledge of
- 26:10Speaker 1: something as in the immediate past, though still sensible, is
- 26:14Speaker 1: called immediate memory. It has great importance in connection with
- 26:19Speaker 1: our apprehension of temporal processes, but cannot count as a
- 26:23Speaker 1: form of true memory. Six true recollection. We will suppose,
- 26:31Speaker 1: for the sake of definiteness, that I am remembering what
- 26:34Speaker 1: I had for breakfast this morning. There are two questions
- 26:38Speaker 1: which we must ask about this occurrence. A. What is
- 26:42Speaker 1: happening now when I recollect? B What is the relation
- 26:47Speaker 1: of the present happening to the event remembered? As to
- 26:51Speaker 1: what is happening now, my recollection may involve either images
- 26:56Speaker 1: or words. In the latter case, the words themselves may
- 26:59Speaker 1: be merely imagined. I will take the case in which
- 27:03Speaker 1: there are images without words, which must be the more primitive,
- 27:07Speaker 1: since we cannot suppose that memory would be impossible without words.
- 27:13Speaker 1: The first point is one which seems so obvious that
- 27:16Speaker 1: I should be ashamed to mention it, but for the
- 27:18Speaker 1: fact that many distinguished philosophers think otherwise. The point is this,
- 27:23Speaker 1: whatever may be happening now, the event remembered is not happening.
- 27:28Speaker 1: Memory is often spoken of as if it involved the
- 27:31Speaker 1: actual persistence of the past which is remembered. Bergsen e g.
- 27:37Speaker 1: Speaks of the interpenetration of the present by the past.
- 27:41Speaker 1: This is mere mythology. The event which occurs when I
- 27:45Speaker 1: remember is quite different from the event remembered. People who
- 27:49Speaker 1: are starving can remember their last meal, but the recollection
- 27:53Speaker 1: does not appease their hunger. There is no mystic survival
- 27:58Speaker 1: of the past when we remember, merely a new event
- 28:01Speaker 1: having a certain relation to the old one. What this
- 28:05Speaker 1: relation is we shall consider presently. It is quite clear
- 28:09Speaker 1: that images are not enough to constitute recollection, even when
- 28:13Speaker 1: they are accurate copies of a past occurrence. One may,
- 28:17Speaker 1: in a dream live over again a past experience. While
- 28:21Speaker 1: one is dreaming, one does not seem to be recalling
- 28:25Speaker 1: a previous occurrence. But living through a fresh experience we
- 28:29Speaker 1: cannot be said to be remembering. In the strict sense.
- 28:33Speaker 1: Unless we have a belief referring to the past, Images
- 28:37Speaker 1: which like those in dreams, feel as if they were sensations,
- 28:41Speaker 1: do not constitute recollection. There must be some feeling which
- 28:46Speaker 1: makes us refer the images to a past prototype. Perhaps
- 28:50Speaker 1: familiarity is enough to cause us to do so, and
- 28:54Speaker 1: perhaps this also explains the experience of trying to remember
- 28:58Speaker 1: something and feel that we are not remembering it right.
- 29:02Speaker 1: Parts of a complex image may feel more familiar than
- 29:06Speaker 1: other parts, and we then feel more confidence in the
- 29:09Speaker 1: correctness of the familiar parts than in that of the others.
- 29:13Speaker 1: The conviction that the image we are forming of a
- 29:16Speaker 1: past event is wrong might seem to imply that we
- 29:19Speaker 1: must be knowing the past otherwise than by images, But
- 29:23Speaker 1: I do not think this conclusion is really warranted, since
- 29:27Speaker 1: degrees of familiarity in images suffice to explain this experience.
- 29:33Speaker 1: B What is the relation of the present happening to
- 29:37Speaker 1: the event remembered? If we recollect correctly, the several images
- 29:42Speaker 1: will have that kind of resemblance of quality which images
- 29:46Speaker 1: can have to their prototypes, and their structure in relations
- 29:50Speaker 1: will be identical with those of their prototypes. Suppose, for instance,
- 29:55Speaker 1: you want to remember whether in a certain room the
- 29:58Speaker 1: window is to the right or left of the door.
- 30:00Speaker 1: Is viewed from the fireplace, you can observe your image
- 30:04Speaker 1: of the room consisting inter alia of an image of
- 30:08Speaker 1: the door and an image of the window standing. If
- 30:11Speaker 1: your recollection is correct in the same relation as when
- 30:14Speaker 1: you are actually seeing the room, memory will consist in
- 30:18Speaker 1: attaching to this complex image. The sort of belief that
- 30:22Speaker 1: refers to the past, and the correctness of memory consists
- 30:26Speaker 1: of similarity of quality and identity of structure between the
- 30:30Speaker 1: complex image and a previous perception. As for the trustworthiness
- 30:36Speaker 1: of memory, there are two things to be said. Taken
- 30:39Speaker 1: as a whole, memory is one of the independent sources
- 30:43Speaker 1: of our knowledge. That is to say, there is no
- 30:46Speaker 1: way of arriving at the things we know through memory
- 30:49Speaker 1: by any argument wholly derived from things known otherwise. But
- 30:54Speaker 1: no single memory is obliged to stand alone because it
- 30:58Speaker 1: fits or does not fit into a system of knowledge
- 31:01Speaker 1: about the past based upon the sum total of memories.
- 31:06Speaker 1: When what is remembered is a perception by one or
- 31:08Speaker 1: more of the public senses, other people may corroberate it.
- 31:13Speaker 1: Even when it is private. It may be confirmed by
- 31:16Speaker 1: other evidence. You may remember that you had a toothache
- 31:20Speaker 1: yesterday and that you saw the dentist today. The latter
- 31:24Speaker 1: fact may be confirmed by an entry in your diary.
- 31:27Speaker 1: All these make a consistent whole, and each increases the
- 31:31Speaker 1: likelihood of the other. Thus we can test the truth
- 31:35Speaker 1: of any particular recollection, though not of memory as a whole.
- 31:40Speaker 1: To say that we cannot test the truth of memory
- 31:43Speaker 1: as a whole is not to give a reason for
- 31:46Speaker 1: doubting it, but merely to say that it is an
- 31:48Speaker 1: independent source of knowledge, not wholly replaceable by other sources.
- 31:54Speaker 1: We know that our memory is fallible, but we have
- 31:57Speaker 1: no reason to distrust it on the whole, after sufficient
- 32:01Speaker 1: care and verification has been taken. The causation of particular
- 32:05Speaker 1: acts of recollection seems to be wholly associative. Something in
- 32:10Speaker 1: the present is very like something in the past and
- 32:13Speaker 1: calls up the context of the past occurrence in the
- 32:16Speaker 1: shape of images or words. When attention falls upon this context,
- 32:22Speaker 1: we believe that it occurred in the past, not as
- 32:24Speaker 1: mere images, and then we have an act of recollection.
- 32:30Speaker 1: There are many difficult problems connected with memory, which I
- 32:33Speaker 1: have not discussed, because they have an interest, which is
- 32:36Speaker 1: more purely psychological than philosophical. It is memory as a
- 32:41Speaker 1: source of knowledge that specially concerns the philosopher. End of
- 32:46Speaker 1: Chapter eighteen,