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Constructivism & English School: Diplomacy of Ideas · Diplomacy and International Relations

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Welcome back to Diplomacy and International Relations by
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Bastian Freiborg. This is the deep dive designed
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specifically for you, aiming to really cut through the noise of
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global politics. Yeah, to deliver those core
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insights you need to be properly informed.
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And today we're tackling something pretty fundamental, I
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think a really rewarding challenge in international
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relations. Absolutely.
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We're digging into the ideas that, well, kind of shatter the
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old assumption that international politics is all
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about fixed material power. We're deep diving into
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constructivism. OK, constructivism.
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So our mission today is to explore this pretty
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revolutionary idea that the whole setup of global
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governance, the rules, the structures, even how we define
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power or interest isn't just some cold hard fact set in
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stone. Exactly.
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It's not predetermined. The argument is that this
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reality is constantly being built, socially constructed,
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through the shared ideas, the beliefs, the everyday practices
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of, and, you know, other actors too.
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So we're basically asking, is the world system this harsh dog
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eat dog self help place defined only by armies and economies
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like near realism tells us? Or is it, as Alexander went
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famously put it, more of a fluid social reality, something that
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states are constantly creating and recreating just by
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interacting with each other? And we'll be using Wentz's key
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works, but also looking at his critics to really pull apart the
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arguments that shape how we understand IR today.
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It's. Crucial, isn't it?
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Because this helps explain things that traditional theories
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sometimes struggle with. Think about the end of the Cold
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War. So rapid, so peaceful,
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relatively speaking. Or how national identities seem
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to shift over time. Understanding this really
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changes how you look at everything, doesn't it?
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From a trade negotiation to a border dispute, you start
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looking beyond just the capabilities.
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And into this realm of shared understanding, shared meaning,
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it adds a whole new layer. Now before we really jump into
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the deep end, just a quick note. If you want to help keep this
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deep dive going and get access to our extra content, you can
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Yep, the links right there in the description.
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Your support means a lot. OK, let's get started.
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OK, let's unpack this. Where do we even begin the
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foundational challenge? Right?
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Constructivism is often pitched as the idealist alternative to,
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well, the materialism of near realism neoliberalism.
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Right, the big isms. Yeah, it sounds abstract.
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Idealist versus materialist. Let's make it concrete.
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What does it actually mean to switch from thinking about the
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world as fundamentally material to thinking about it as
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fundamentally based on ideas? OK, so we have to start with
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ontology. That's the philosophical term
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for, you know, what exists, what's the world fundamentally
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made of, right. So traditional theories, what we
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sometimes call rationalist theories, they really start with
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material forces, Things you can count, measure, locate military
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hardware, GDP figures, oil reserves, the sheer distribution
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of power across the map. Which seems logical.
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I mean, tanks and money are definitely real things.
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They have effects. They absolutely are real, and
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they do have effects. But constructivism argues
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they're may be the wrong starting point if you want to
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explain social life like international politics.
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OK, constructivism takes an idealist approach.
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It argues that the deep structure of society, the
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underlying logic, is actually constituted by ideas, shared
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knowledge, norms, culture, beliefs, rather than just those
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brute physical facts. So the physical stuff exists,
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but it's sort of inert until we give it meaning.
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Precisely. Material facts exist, but they
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don't dictate their own meaning. We give them meaning through our
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shared understanding. The US military example from our
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sources is perfect here. I think it really clarifies it.
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Let's take, you know, arguably the most powerful material force
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on the planet. The US military, absolutely.
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It's got men's capability, ships, planes, nukes, that
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physical distribution of force, the material fact, it's just
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there. But the crucial question is,
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what does that power mean? Yeah, because if you're a
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military planner sitting in Ottawa, that US aircraft carrier
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offshore means something completely different than if
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you're sitting in Havana. Exactly.
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To Canada, that material force signifies security, alliance,
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partnership. To a historically communist
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Cuba, it's traditionally meant threat, coercion, the
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possibility of invasion. Same ships, same planes, same
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material facts. The guns are identical in both
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scenarios, but the meaning of that capability and therefore
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it's actual power, the relationship is constructed by
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the social relationship that already exists by the shared
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ideas or the lack of them between those states.
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OK, but hang on. If I'm playing devil's advocate,
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a hardline new realist might say, well, Canada is just being
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naive. The potential threat of that
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U.S. military power is still objectively there, whatever
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Canada thinks they'd say. Ideas are just a thin layer over
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a fixed reality of threat. How does constructivism counter
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that? That's a common critique.
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The constructivist response is that the realist is making a bit
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of a logical leap. They're confusing a potential
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threat with a constituted threat.
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Yes, the material forces could be threatening, but their actual
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political effect, whether they function as a source of fear or
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a source of security, depends entirely on the shared history,
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the shared practices, the shared ideas between the actors.
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So if the US and Canada have this long history of
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cooperation, shared democratic values, a security community?
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Then that U.S. military power is in practice constituted as
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benign in that relationship. The material fact itself, the
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physical capability, explains relatively little about the
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actual dynamic until it's filtered through this lens of
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shared ideas and identity. The meaning is key.
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This leads us straight into how interests and power themselves
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are constructed. Traditional IR often assumes
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interests like survival or maximizing power are just fixed
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inherent properties of states. But if constructivism is right,
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interests must also be ideas. They're fundamentally ideas,
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yes, Or rather beliefs based on ideas.
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Went argues that the meaning of the explanatory force of
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material capabilities, which is Walt's key variable in the
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realism, are actually constituted by the distribution
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of interests in the system. OK, so powers meaning depends on
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interests, but then where do the interests come from?
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That's the next logical step. Exactly.
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And the constructivist answer takes that further step back.
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It asserts that interests themselves are ideas.
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How so? Survival seems pretty material.
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Well, a state has basic material needs, sure, like the biological
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need for security, for resources.
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But how a state decides to pursue that security, that's the
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interest. And that's an idea.
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It's a culturally shaped belief about the best way to meet that
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need. So does a state believe security
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comes from constantly arming itself and balancing against
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rivals? That's the classic self help
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realist idea. Or does it believe security
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comes from building trust, creating international
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institutions, forming collective security arrangements?
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That's a liberal or constructivist idea about how to
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achieve the same goal. The goal survival might be
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constant, but the path chosen, the interest, is defined by the
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shared concepts and beliefs. Precisely.
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The difference isn't material, it's ideational, which means
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ideas become the necessary starting point for any deep
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analysis, because the ultimate effect of material power is
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always shaped by these culturally constituted ideas
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about interests. If you just assume interests are
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fixed and selfish, you miss the whole social process of how they
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got that way. Now what?
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About the pushback that this sounds a bit extreme, like the
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physical world doesn't matter at all.
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Went seems aware of this right? He talks about rump materialism.
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He. Does, and it's a really
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important nuance to grasp. He's not a radical ideal of
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saying only ideas exist. He accepts what he calls rump
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materialism. Rump Materialism.
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OK, it's an acknowledgement that yes, brute material forces exist
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and they have their own inherent causal powers.
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We're talking about things like the basic physical environment,
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geography, human biological needs, technology.
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Things that are undeniably real and have effects regardless of
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what we think about them. A tsunami hits whether you
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believe in tsunamis or not. Exactly.
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And nuclear bomb has a physical effect.
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But, and this is the crucial qualifier, Wind argues that once
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you properly separate ideas and material forces for analysis,
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those material forces actually explain relatively little about
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social life on their own. Because their political effect
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is always mediated, interpreted through ideas.
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Always the existence of a nuclear bomb is a material fact,
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but it's political significance. Is it a deterrent, A threat?
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A status symbol? Depends entirely on who owns it,
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who it's aimed at, and the relationship between them.
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Is it owned by a friend, An enemy, A rival?
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That meaning is social, not physical.
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So why even bother acknowledging this rump materialism if ideas
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are so dominant and explaining social outcomes?
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Well, there's two key things. First, it avoids philosophical
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problems, the absurdity of denying the physical world. 2nd,
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and perhaps more importantly for the theory, it allows
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constructivism to remain compatible with scientific
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realism in its epistemology. Oh right, ontology, what the
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world is made of, versus epistemology, how we can know or
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study it. Exactly.
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Scientific realism is the belief that we can gain progressively
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better, more accurate knowledge about the world, even about
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things we can't directly see or touch, like social structures or
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shared beliefs. Things like the state
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sovereignty, trust. These are real concepts with
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real effects, even if they're not physical objects.
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Right, They are social kinds. By holding on to scientific
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realism, Went distinguishes his constructivism from more radical
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post positivist or postmodern approaches that might reject the
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possibility of objective knowledge or systematic
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scientific inquiry into social life altogether.
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So you can still be a scientist studying the laws of
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international relations, even if those laws are about how shared
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ideas shape outcomes, not just how material forces collide.
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That's the claim. It allows for a critical social
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science that aims to uncover the deep structures of international
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life, understanding that those structures are built from ideas,
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norms and inter subjective meanings.
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It gives us tools to study things like trust, legitimacy,
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identity, things crucial to politics but often invisible to
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purely materialist views. OK, let's shift gears a bit to
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what's often called the core puzzle in social theory, the
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agent structure problem. Yes, the classic debate.
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In IR it boils down to do states, the agents, shape the
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international system, the structure, or does the
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international system basically dictate how states behave and
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even what they are? Neorealism definitely leans
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heavily towards structure dictating things.
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Neoliberalism maybe gives states a bit more wiggle room, more
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agency. So where does constructivism
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land on this? Does it pick a side?
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It tries not to. The constructivist answer is
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mutual constitution. It basically says choosing
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between agent and structure is a false dichotomy.
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They're inseparable in social reality.
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Mutual constitution. OK, so it's a two way St.
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A loop, Exactly. It's dynamic, it's recursive.
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The actions of states, the agents constantly contribute to
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creating and recreating the institutions, the norms, the
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shared understandings that make up the structure of
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international. Life and at the same time.
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And at the same time, those very structures, the norms, the
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institutions, are busy defining, socializing and influencing the
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states themselves, their identities, their interests.
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So both the actors and the system can change each other and
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change themselves in the process of interacting.
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That's the core idea. They're constantly Co
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determining each other. It still sounds quite abstract,
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this idea of X creating Y while Y is simultaneously creating X.
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How do we get a handle on that? This is where the distinction
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between causal and constitutive effects comes in, right?
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Yes, this distinction is absolutely vital for
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understanding how mutual constitution works, and it's a
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key methodological difference for constructivism.
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OK, so causal effects, that's the standard scientific model.
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Pretty much. A causal relationship is when X
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produces an effect. Y, and crucially, X&Y exist
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independently of each other. The sun causes heat.
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A billiard ball hitting another causes it to move.
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X&Y are separate entities linked by a causal process.
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So in IRA, near realist might say the anaric structure causes
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states to balance power structure and behavior are
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separate. Exactly.
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But a constitutive relationship is fundamentally different.
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Here, X is what it is because of its relationship to YX actually
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presupposes Y for its existence or meaning.
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The relationship isn't just contingent, it's definitional.
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OK, examples help here. Think of a master and a slave.
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You can't be a master without a slave, and vice versa.
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The identity of master is constituted by the relationship
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to slave. Or think of a professor and a
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student. The roles define each other,
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they don't exist in isolation. Precisely.
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Or the chess example. A Queen's power isn't caused by
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the rules of chess in the way gravity causes an apple to fall.
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The rules of chess constitute what it means to be a queen.
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Without those rules, it's just a piece of carved wood or plastic.
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And applying that to IRA sovereign state.
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A sovereign state is constituted by the international institution
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of sovereignty. That shared understanding that
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norm doesn't just cause states to act in certain ways, like not
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invading each other Willy nilly. It defines what it fundamentally
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means to be a state within the international system.
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It confers a specific legal and social status.
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That feels like the real conceptual leap.
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It's not just changing behavior, it's changing identity, changing
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what you are. That seems like a line
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rationalist theories which assume fixed actors can't really
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cross. That's often seen as the
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dividing line. Yes, Constructivists focus on
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these constitutive effects because they show how structure
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impacts not just what states do, but who they are when calls
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these property effects. Rationalism, particularly
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microeconomic versions, often struggles here because it needs
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agents with predefined fixed properties like fixed interests
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before they interact with the structure.
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If the structure can actually shape the agents fundamental
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properties, then you can't assume those properties are
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fixed from the start. Right.
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It forces a shift in the questions we ask.
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Instead of just asking what does the structure cause the state to
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do? Well, you have to start asking
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what does the structure enable or constitute the state to be?
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And this isn't just philosophical here.
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Splitting. You're saying it helps explain
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real world phenomena? Definitely things like the
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emergence and spread of human rights norms, or the pressure
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towards democratization globally.
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These are hard to explain fully if you only look at material
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power and fixed interests. They involve changes in shared
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ideas about what constitutes legitimate statehood and
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behavior. They involve constitutive
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changes. Let's make this concrete again
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with the sovereignty example. How does the everyday practice
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of international law illustrate this mutual constitution, this
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constant making and being bound by the rules?
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OK, think about core international legal norms like
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Article 2 four of the UN Charter prohibiting aggressive war and
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Article 51 permitting self-defense.
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The bedrock principles. Right now, imagine a state
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decides to use military force, maybe intervening in another
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country's civil war. They justify this action,
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perhaps by claiming it's purely self-defense, or maybe invoking
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A newer concept like the Responsibility to Protect.
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RTP. They're doing two things
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simultaneously. First, by feeling the need to
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justify their actions in terms of the existing rules, they are
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implicitly reinforcing the legitimacy of those rules.
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They're acknowledging the structure.
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They have to play the game, even if they're bending the.
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Rules, exactly. But second, by arguing for their
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specific interpretation, maybe stretching the definition of
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self-defense, or arguing for a particular understanding of R2P
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in this context, they are actively trying to redefine the
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norms they're engaged in, what we might call ideological work.
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Trying to shape how the international community
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understands those concepts going forward.
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Precisely, they're trying to shift the shared understanding
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so state actions produce and reproduce the norms, and those
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norms simultaneously shape and constrain state actions and
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justifications. States are both rule followers
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and rulemators in an ongoing process.
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It's this constant negotiation reinforcing the structure while
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also trying to nudge it. That's mutual constitution in
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action. Now to really understand how a
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state navigates this, we need to look inside the state at its
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identity. Wendt uses Meads ideas of the I
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and the ME. Can you break down those two
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layers of state identity? Sure.
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The first layer is what Wendt calls corporate identity.
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Think of this as the state's intrinsic sense of self, It's
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basic self organizing quality. It includes its physical basis,
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territory, population, its internal political structures,
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its historical memory, its fundamental drive for survival
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and autonomy. This is the state as a distinct
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entity. It's basic platform, relatively
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independent of others. Relatively, yes.
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It's the state's individuality. It's IA state could
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theoretically possess this even in total isolation.
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OK. And the second layer.
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The second layer is social identity.
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This corresponds more to Meads me.
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These are the meanings a state attributes to itself, but
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crucially by taking the perspective of others.
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These are roles played in relation to other actors.
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Like being a friend, an enemy, a rival, A hegemon, A developing
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nation, a rogue state. Exactly.
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These identities only exist within a social context, through
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interaction and recognition by others.
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You can't be a friend all by yourself.
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So these social identities are constantly being performed,
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negotiated, redefined through diplomacy and interaction.
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Continuously. And they're deeply constitutive.
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A state likely has one core corporate identity, but it can
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hold multiple social identities at the same time.
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Perhaps it's a friend to one neighbor, a rival to another.
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And here's the kicker, right? The state's interests are
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heavily chased by these social identities.
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That's the crucial link. Interests aren't just derived
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from the corporate need for survival.
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They depend significantly on the social roles the state adopts or
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is assigned. So if a state adopts A
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collective social identity with another state, sees itself as
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part of a we, its interests change.
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Absolutely. If state A comes to identify
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with state B, seeing state B's security as integral to its own,
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then state A's definition of self-interest expands.
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An attack on B might be perceived as an attack on A.
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Security becomes a collective concern, not purely egoistic.
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Think of NATO's Article 5. That fundamentally alters the
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calculation of interests compared to a purely self help
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view. The interests flow from the
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shared social identity. Exactly who you think you are in
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relation to others shapes what you want.
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OK, this leads us directly to probably the most famous
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constructivist phrase. Anarchy is what states make of
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it. When's?
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Classic article title. Yeah, is a direct shot across
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the bow of Neorealism. Because neorealism insists that
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anarchy, the lack of a world government, is this fixed, harsh
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condition that automatically forces states into competitive
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self help behavior, power politics is inevitable.
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Right. Constructivists actually agree
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on the starting point. Anarchy is the formal condition
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of the international system. There's no 911 to call.
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They accept the anarchy problematique, but they argue
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the meaning and consequences of anarchy are not fixed.
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They depend entirely on the shared ideas, the shared
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knowledge of the social relationships that states build.
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Within that anarchic framework, the cultural content of anarchy
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varies enormously. So anarchy itself is just an
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empty vessel, and what matters is the kind of social liquid,
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the shared beliefs and practices that states pour into it.
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That's a good analogy. The nature of the system, its
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constraints, its opportunities, depends on the dominant
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discursive social practices, as Wendt puts it, the ways states
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talk about and act towards each other, which reproduce or
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transform how they see themselves and others.
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And when identifies 3 main cultures that can fill this
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anarchic vessel right, ranging from pure conflict to deep
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cooperation. Yes, a spectrum of possibilities
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based on the prevailing shared knowledge.
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Let's start at the nasty end, the Habisian culture.
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What does that look like? This is anarchy at its worst.
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It's a culture of enemies. Actors fundamentally view each
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other with deep suspicion and hostile intent.
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They engage in what went calls deep revisionism.
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They don't just distrust each other.
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They may actively seek to eliminate the other, to destroy
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their existence, life, or liberty.
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So violence isn't just possible, it's expected and potentially
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unlimited. Exactly.
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In a pure Hawaiian culture, violence has no internal limits
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based on shared norms. The only limits are practical
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ones. Insufficient power, geographical
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distance, sheer exhaustion. It really is a war of all
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against all logic. This sounds like the neo realist
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world, but if Wentz says the world is socially constructed,
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why would such a horrible system persist?
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Surely states would want to change it.
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Because it can become a powerful self fulfilling prophecy.
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If states believe they're in a Habesian world and act
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accordingly, building up arms, launching pre emptive attacks,
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treating others as enemies, then their actions confirm that
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belief for everyone else. So others react defensively,
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aggressively. Which then confirms the first
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state's initial belief. The hostile behavior reproduces
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the hostile mindset which justifies the hostile behavior.
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The idea that IR must be self help becomes a self-sustaining
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social construction, not an objective necessity.
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And the historical example often used is the Habesian first
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encounter. Right, like the clash between
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the Aztecs and the Spanish conquistadors when Cortez
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arrived, Montezuma and the Aztecs had no prior interaction,
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no shared understanding or conceptual framework for who
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these strangers. Were they literally couldn't
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place them in their social world?
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Exactly, leading to disastrous misinterpretations like possibly
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thinking they were gods which contributed to the collapse of
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their empire. They were operating based on
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purely internal private meanings that weren't shared or
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understood by the other side. So the point isn't just that the
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Spanish had guns. The material power matter, of
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course, but the outcome, conquest and destruction, was
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enabled by this lack of shared social context.
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Anarchy was permissive of that outcome.
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If the Spaniards had arrived with radically different beliefs
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and intentions, say, like peaceful Quaker missionaries,
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the material power might have been present, but the social
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interaction and outcome could have been entirely different.
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The ideas, the interpretations were decisive.
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OK, let's move away from that grim picture.
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The next stage is the locking culture.
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This is where most analysts would probably place the modern
22:31
national system, right post Westphalia.
22:33
Yes, the locking culture is generally seen as the dominant
22:36
one for much of modern history. It's a system of rivals, not
22:39
necessarily enemies. Rivals.
22:41
OK, so they compete, but there are rules.
22:44
Crucially, yes. In a locking culture, states
22:48
recognize each other's basic right to exist, the right to
22:51
life and liberty, essentially translating to respect for
22:54
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
22:57
So you don't automatically seek to conquer or eliminate your
23:01
rivals. No.
23:02
Violence is still possible, and wars happen, but it's generally
23:06
seen as limited, a tool for specific policy aims, not
23:10
existential destruction. There's a sense of civilization,
23:13
of self restraint, to find boundaries for conflict.
23:15
And the institution of sovereignty is key here, that
23:18
mutual recognition of statehood. Absolutely.
23:20
Central sovereignty functions is a vital social institution.
23:24
It allows states to make reasonably reliable guesses
23:27
about each other's intentions, specifically that they are
23:29
likely status quo actors regarding existence.
23:33
Not inherently revisionist without needing to read minds.
23:36
He creates A baseline expectation of non interference
23:38
which reduces the worst case security dilemma fears.
23:41
It helps moderate them, yes. It's a critical step away from
23:44
the pure killer be killed logic of the Abesian world.
23:47
But how deeply held is this respect for sovereignty in a
23:51
locking culture? Is it based on genuine moral
23:54
belief? Our sources mentioned something
23:56
about second degree internalization.
23:58
Right, this is important. Compliance with locking norms
24:01
like sovereignty is often based on instrumental calculation.
24:05
It's self interested compliance. This is second degree
24:08
internalization. Meaning states follow the rule
24:11
not because they believe it's inherently right, but because
24:14
the benefits of following it outweigh the costs of breaking
24:17
it. Exactly.
24:18
They might respect sovereignty because it ensures
24:21
predictability, facilitates trade, avoids costly wars, or
24:25
maintains their own legitimacy. They value the norm because it
24:28
serves other interests. They are largely indifferent to
24:32
the norm itself. So if the calculation changes,
24:34
say a powerful state figures that can violate A weaker state
24:37
sovereignty cheaply and gain a lot, then the norm doesn't offer
24:41
much protection. That's the vulnerability of a
24:43
purely locking system. Violation remains a live option
24:47
if the costs and benefits shift. Compliance is contingent on
24:51
self-interest. It's like paying taxes.
24:53
Most do it because the consequences of not paying are
24:56
worse, not out of deep love for the tax system itself.
25:00
So locking culture offers stability, but it's potentially
25:03
fragile. It relies on calculations
25:05
remaining favorable. Precisely.
25:07
It's a significant improvement over Hobbes, but it's not based
25:11
on deep shared identity or intrinsic value for the norms.
25:14
Which brings us to the third culture, the most cooperative 1,
25:18
the Kantian culture. That sounds like the ideal,
25:21
maybe like the relationships within the EU or between the US
25:25
and Canada. That's the canonical example,
25:27
yes. The Kantian culture represents a
25:29
move beyond rivalry to genuine friendship and collective
25:32
identity. States in this culture expect
25:35
each other to follow 2 fundamental rules.
25:37
OK, what are they? First, dispute between members
25:39
of the group will be settled without war or even the threat
25:42
of war. Non violence is the bedrock
25:45
expectation within the community.
25:46
Rule 1. Friends don't fight friends.
25:49
Pretty much. And second, they will fight as a
25:51
team if anyone member is attacked by an outsider.
25:55
This is the principle of mutual aid or collective security, and
25:58
attack on one is an attack on all.
26:01
This implies a much deeper level of trust and integration, a much
26:04
higher capacity for collective action.
26:07
What kind of internalization does this require?
26:09
This requires the deepest level, third degree internalization,
26:13
which equates to legitimacy. The shared roles and norms
26:16
aren't just calculations. They become part of the state's
26:19
actual identities. So the distinction between us
26:22
and them softens within the group.
26:24
They develop a genuine we feeling.
26:25
Yes, the state's corporate identity starts to incorporate
26:28
the collective identity. The welfare of other members
26:31
become seen as part of 1's own welfare.
26:33
This allows for genuine altruism and helps overcome the free
26:37
riding and collective action problems that often plague lock
26:40
in systems. That seems like a massive
26:42
transformation, moving from lucky and rivalry based on
26:45
calculation to Kantian friendship based on shared
26:48
identity. How does a system actually make
26:50
that leap? It means overcoming potentially
26:52
centuries of mistrust. It's a complex learning process,
26:55
absolutely. It often requires conscious
26:58
effort and what when calls reflexivity.
27:01
Reflexivity. Thinking about thinking.
27:04
Sort of. It means a state becoming aware
27:07
that the hostility or distrust it perceives from others might
27:10
actually be at least partly a reaction to its own past actions
27:14
and signals, recognizing your role in creating the dynamic
27:18
you're stuck in. So realizing maybe they fear me
27:20
because I act fearsome. Exactly, and this realization
27:23
can open the door to change. It often takes 1 actor to try
27:27
and break the cycle. Like the Gorbachev example.
27:29
The Soviet Union under Gorbachev and his new thinking in the late
27:32
80s is a classic case study. It was a conscious, explicit
27:36
attempt to change the social identity of the Soviet state in
27:40
the eyes of the West. How did they try to do that?
27:42
Through unilateral actions designed to signal
27:45
trustworthiness and peaceful intentions, reducing troop
27:47
levels in Europe, withdrawing from Afghanistan, allowing
27:50
Eastern European states more freedom.
27:53
These were costly signals, acts of self binding and self
27:56
restraint. The goal wasn't just material
27:59
change, but to change perceptions.
28:01
The stated goal, according to proponents of new thinking, was
28:05
precisely to change the shared ideas. 2 As went quotes one
28:09
official take away the Western excuse for being afraid of the
28:12
Soviet Union by changing its own behavior and signals, the Soviet
28:17
leadership attempted to initiate a transformation in the
28:20
collective ideational structure, the culture of the Cold War
28:23
itself. That completely reframes the end
28:26
of the Cold War. It wasn't just about material
28:28
collapse or victory, but potentially a successful or at
28:32
least attempted social reconstruction of identities and
28:35
relationships. That's the constructivist
28:37
interpretation, yes. It highlights the power of
28:39
state, practice and ideas in potentially reshaping the entire
28:42
system. OK, so let's bring this down on
28:44
earth. When we apply these ideas,
28:46
especially about identity, social roles, norms, to actual
28:49
foreign policy, we can see constructivism moving beyond
28:52
theory to explain real diplomatic behavior.
28:55
The German debate about military intervention in the 90s,
28:57
particularly Bosnia and Kosovo, seems like a perfect example.
29:01
It's a fascinating case, yeah, because it shows high stakes
29:03
policy becoming a genuine public debate.
29:06
But who Germany should be as a nation?
29:08
Because post WWII German identity was built on these two
29:12
incredibly strong, almost sacred, Never.
29:15
Exactly. On the one hand, never again war
29:18
reflecting a deep seated pacifism and commitment to non
29:21
intervention born from the horrors of Nazism and WWI.
29:25
And on the other hand. Never again.
29:27
Auschwitz reflecting a profound moral responsibility to prevent
29:31
genocide, fascism and mass atrocities wherever they might
29:35
occur, also born from the Nazi experience.
29:38
And for decades, those two principles work together, or at
29:41
least didn't directly clash. Avoiding war seemed consistent
29:45
with preventing the conditions that led to Auschwitz.
29:47
Right. But then came the Balkan wars.
29:49
In the 1990s. You had mass murder, ethnic
29:52
cleansing happening right on Europe's doorstep.
29:54
Suddenly, the principles collided head on.
29:56
Preventing another Auschwitz might require violating never
29:59
again war. Precisely the policy dilemma,
30:02
especially for figures like Foreign Minister Joshua Fischer.
30:05
The Green Party wasn't just a simple calculation of national
30:08
interest versus humanitarianism. It was a deep normative
30:11
contradiction at the very core of of German identity.
30:14
So the debate wasn't just about strategy, it was about the soul
30:17
of the nation. In many ways, yes.
30:20
Should Germany stick to its pacifist principles above all
30:23
else, even if it meant standing by while atrocities occurred?
30:27
Or did the responsibility to act against genocide override the
30:30
commitment to non intervention? The German self had to choose
30:34
between two fundamental, historically rooted obligations.
30:38
So policy making became an exercise in redefining identity.
30:43
Actively articulating and redefining that identity to
30:46
justify a course of action. They had to argue about what it
30:50
meant to be German in this new, challenging context.
30:52
And how did they resolve it politically?
30:54
How did they justify intervention?
30:56
Well, Fisher and others crafted a powerful narrative.
30:59
They argue the German military participation in NATO's
31:02
intervention wasn't about waging war in the old sense.
31:05
Instead, they framed it as an action necessary to stop war to
31:07
prevent mass murder, drawing parallels to the Allied
31:10
liberation of Germany from Nazism in 1945.
31:13
South intervention became framed as consistent with ending
31:16
fascism, making the Never Dan Auschwitz principle the primary
31:19
one in this specific extreme circumstance.
31:22
Exactly, they essentially redefine the military action as
31:25
a form of liberation, aligning it with the core anti fascist
31:29
element of post war German identity.
31:32
It shows identity isn't static, it's a social construct that
31:35
gets actively debated, negotiated and reconstructed,
31:39
especially during crises. OK, let's shift focus now to
31:43
international organizations, iOS like the UN, the World Bank, the
31:47
IMF. Constructivism offers a pretty
31:50
different view of these compared to traditional theories, right?
31:53
Very different. The traditional, often realist
31:56
or neoliberal institutionalist view, sometimes called the
31:58
pluralist view, tends to see iOS is basically tools or arenas.
32:03
They're mechanisms that states, particularly powerful states,
32:07
use to pursue their interests. Like a hammer doesn't do much on
32:09
its own, right? Constructivists, drawing on
32:12
sociological insights, argue that iOS are much more than
32:15
that. They are autonomous actors in
32:17
their own right. They have their own cultures,
32:18
their own agendas, their own sources of power and influence.
32:21
Well, wait, states create these iOS?
32:23
How do they become autonomous from their creators?
32:25
The autonomy emerges as a constitutive, effective
32:28
bureaucracy itself. Think about Max Weber's classic
32:31
analysis of bureaucracy. IOS develop their own internal
32:35
institutional cultures, specialized expertise, formal
32:38
rules, standard operating procedures, informal norms.
32:42
Like the distinct culture of Eurocrats in Brussels or the
32:45
specific economic mindset often found at the World Bank or IMF.
32:49
Exactly. This internal social structure
32:52
gives them a degree of independence from the day-to-day
32:54
whims of Member States. They developed their own ways of
32:57
seeing the world, their own priorities.
32:59
And this autonomy gives them actual power.
33:02
Power to shape world events. Yes, particularly the power to
33:05
define reality. This is crucial. iOS don't just
33:08
respond to global problems. They actively classify,
33:11
categorize, and define what counts as a problem and how it
33:14
should be understood. The World Bank defines what
33:16
constitutes development and measures poverty.
33:19
The UNHCR defines who legally qualifies as a refugee and under
33:23
what conditions repatriation is safe.
33:26
The IMF defines financial stability and prescribes
33:29
remedies for crises. This power to define and
33:32
classify as a core constitutive power.
33:34
And once an IO defines the reality, say, labeling a country
33:38
as having a governance deficit or identifying a situation as a
33:41
complex humanitarian emergency, that definition legitimizes
33:45
certain actions. It absolutely empowers
33:47
intervention. Defining corruption is a
33:50
security issue or human rights abuses as threats to
33:53
international peace creates new justifications for iOS like the
33:57
UN Security Council to intervene in the domestic affairs of
34:00
states, sometimes overriding traditional sovereignty
34:03
concerns, especially in weaker states.
34:05
But this power, this internal culture and way of defining
34:08
things can also backfire. The sources talk about IO
34:11
pathology. Yes, the very things that give
34:13
iOS autonomy and power, their rules or expertise, their
34:16
standardized approaches, can also lead to dysfunction or
34:19
negative consequences. Bureaucracies can become rigid,
34:23
self-serving, or disconnected from reality.
34:26
What are some examples of these pathologies in practice?
34:28
With one key issue is standardized knowledge, iOS
34:31
often develop one-size-fits-all solutions based on their
34:34
internal expertise and apply them everywhere.
34:36
The IMS response to the Asian financial crisis in the late 90s
34:39
is often cited. They prescribed austerity and
34:41
high interest rates. Yes, the standard package used
34:44
for crises often caused by government overspending.
34:48
But in many Asian countries, the crisis stemmed from private
34:50
sector debt and weak financial regulation.
34:53
Applying the standard IMF formula arguably ignored the
34:57
specific local causes and might have even worsened the downturn.
35:01
In some cases the institutions favorite idea didn't fit the
35:04
reality. Another pathology mentioned is
35:07
professional insulation. Right. iOS often become
35:10
dominated by specific professional groups.
35:12
Economists at the World Bank and IMF, lawyers at international
35:16
courts may be diplomats at the UN.
35:18
This concentration can create an organizational echo chamber, a
35:22
worldview insulated from local contexts and alternative
35:25
perspectives. So development projects designed
35:27
solely by economists might completely miss crucial social
35:31
or political factors on the ground.
35:33
Leading to failures? Yes, because the institution
35:36
lacks the diversity of expertise anthropologists, sociologists,
35:40
local area specialists needed to understand the complex reality
35:43
is trying to influence. It applies its own professional
35:46
logic, which might be inappropriate.
35:48
And a final example was about symbolic mandates.
35:52
This refers to iOS sometimes prioritizing activities that
35:55
symbolize success according to their mandate, even if those
35:59
activities aren't substantively effective or might even be
36:03
counterproductive. Like the focus on holding
36:06
elections quickly in post conflict situations.
36:08
Exactly. Elections are a clear,
36:11
measurable benchmark, a symbol of democratic transition and
36:15
mission accomplishment for the UN or other intervening bodies.
36:18
So officials might push for elections, say, in Bosnia after
36:21
the war, even if the conditions aren't right, ethnic tensions
36:24
are fine and the parties running are still highly nationalistic.
36:28
And the result might be that the election actually cements the
36:31
very divisions the intervention was supposed to overcome.
36:34
That was a critique in the Bosnian case.
36:36
The early elections arguably legitimized ethnically
36:38
segregated entities because holding the election itself
36:41
became the bureaucratic priority, the symbol of success,
36:45
regardless of the political outcome on the ground.
36:47
So looking at these applications, the German
36:49
identity debate, the way iOS function, what's the big
36:52
critical take away that constructivism offers for people
36:56
trying to understand or even practice international
36:58
relations? I think the critical insight is
37:01
really twofold. First, it pushes for policies
37:03
that are much more context sensitive, more aware of local
37:06
norms and identities, less reliant on standardized top down
37:10
solutions. OK, that makes sense and. 2nd,
37:13
2nd, and maybe more profoundly, by showing us how fundamental
37:16
concepts, refugee development, security, sovereignty, even war
37:22
are socially constructed, it forces us to be critical about
37:25
those definitions. We have to ask whose definition
37:28
is being used? Whose interests do that
37:29
definition serve? How does the way we define a
37:32
problem shape the solutions we consider possible?
37:35
It reveals the power inherent in the act of defining and how
37:39
those definitions can sometimes legitimize policies that are
37:41
restrictive, discriminatory, or just don't work, often masking
37:45
deeper power imbalances or structural issues.
37:47
Exactly. It encourages a more critical
37:49
and self aware approach to global governance #tag Outro.
37:53
Well, that brings us to the end of this really quite intensive
37:56
deep dive into constructivism. It feels like the central take
38:00
away is pretty powerful, doesn't it?
38:02
That international politics isn't just this predetermined
38:05
game of material chess played by unchanging, selfish actors.
38:09
No, it's much more dynamic. It's this constantly evolving
38:13
social reality, and it's defined by the roles states play, the
38:17
norms they follow or contest, and, crucially, the shared ideas
38:21
they collectively build up over time.
38:23
We're sort of trapped by the rules of the game.
38:25
But we're also constantly rewriting those rules through
38:28
every diplomatic statement, every treaty negotiation, every
38:31
argument over the meaning of a word like aggression or
38:35
humanitarian. And if we loop back to those 3
38:37
cultures of anarchy, Habesh and Locky and Kantian, it seems like
38:41
maybe, just maybe, the international system, especially
38:43
with all its institutions and communication, has started to
38:47
develop a kind of collective awareness of its own workings,
38:50
an emerging sense of an international public sphere.
38:53
That's certainly a hopeful reading.
38:54
Some constructivists might propose a second order,
38:57
awareness that the system itself is a product of our collective
39:00
beliefs and practices. Which leads to a really
39:03
fascinating, maybe even urgent question for anyone interested
39:07
in diplomacy IR global governance for you listening.
39:12
Yeah, if the system can become reflexive states can
39:15
collectively realize that the self help logic isn't
39:18
inevitable, but often a self fulfilling prophecy driven by
39:21
their own shared ideas of fear and distrust, then what does
39:25
that mean ethically? What are the possibilities and
39:28
responsibilities for intentionally trying to shape
39:31
that system? For engaging in a kind of global
39:34
constitutional design, actively trying to skeer global society
39:38
towards a more stable, more cooperative, maybe even a
39:41
contian culture. It's just the whole perspective,
39:43
doesn't it? From just adapting to a harsh
39:45
reality to potentially taking collective responsibility for
39:48
creating a different. One a really provocative thought
39:50
to carry with you as you watch the next international summit or
39:53
crisis unfold. Thank you so much for joining us
39:55
on this deep dive today. Thank you, it was a great
39:57
discussion. If you found this exploration
39:59
valuable, please do follow Diplomacy and International
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40:08
Yeah, those ratings genuinely help more people interested in
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40:13
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40:14
Until next time.