Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [Mastermind] 1962 Warren Buffett to Partnership Letter
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- 0:001962, our performance in 1961, I have consistently told partners
- 0:05that it is my expectation and hope.
- 0:07It's always hard to tell which is which, that we will do
- 0:10relatively well compared to the general market in down or static
- 0:14markets, but that we may not look so good in advancing
- 0:17markets and strongly advancing markets.
- 0:20I expect to have real difficulty keeping up with the general
- 0:23market. Although 1961 was certainly a
- 0:26good year for the general market and in addition a very good year
- 0:30for us on both an absolute and relative basis, the expectations
- 0:35in the previous paragraph remain unchanged.
- 0:38During 1961, the general market as measured by the Dow Jones
- 0:42Industrial Average here and after called it Dow, showed an
- 0:45overall gain of 22.2%, including dividends received through
- 0:50ownership of the Dow. The gain for all partnerships
- 0:53operating throughout the entire year after all expenses of
- 0:57operation but before payments to limited partners or accrual to
- 1:01the general partner averaged 45.9%.
- 1:05The details of this game by partnership are shown in the
- 1:08appendix along with results for the partnership started during
- 1:12the year. We have now completed 5 full
- 1:14years of partnership operation and the results of these five
- 1:17years are shown below on a year by year basis and also on a
- 1:21cumulative or compounded basis. These results are stated on that
- 1:25basis described in the preceding paragraph.
- 1:28After expenses but before division of gains among partners
- 1:32or payments to partners. Your partnerships Operating
- 1:35entire partnership gain Dow Jones Industrials Your Gain 1957
- 1:41Three 10.4% - 8.4% Nineteen 58540.9 percent 38.5% Nineteen
- 1:5059625.9 percent 19.9% 196722 Point 8% - 6.3% Nineteen 61745.9
- 2:03percent 22.2% Including dividends received through
- 2:07ownership of the Dow On a compounded basis, the cumulative
- 2:11results have been Your partnership gained Dow Jones
- 2:14Industrials gain Nineteen 5710.4% - 8.4% 1957 to 5855.6
- 2:23percent 26.9 percent 1057 to 5995.9% Fifty 2.2 percent 1957
- 2:33to 60,140.6% Forty 2.6 percent 1957 to 61,251.0 percent 74.3%.
- 2:45These results do not measure the gain to the limited partner,
- 2:48which of course is the figure in which you are most interested.
- 2:52Because of the varying partnership arrangements that
- 2:55have existed in the past, I have used the over all net gain based
- 2:59on market values at the beginning and end of the year to
- 3:02the partnership as being the fairest measure of overall
- 3:05performance. 17 On a pro forma basis, adjusted to the division
- 3:10of gains entailed in our present Buffett Partnership Ltd
- 3:14agreement, the results would have been year limited.
- 3:17Partners gained out gain 19579 point 3% - 8.4% nineteen 5832.2
- 3:25percent 38.5% Nineteen 5920.9 percent 19.9% Nineteen 6018.6% -
- 3:356.3% 196135.9 percent 22.2% Compounded 19579 point 3% - 8.4
- 3:46percent 1957 to 5844.5 percent 26.9 percent 1957 to 5974.7
- 3:56percent 52.2 percent 1957 to 60,107.2 percent 42.6% 1957 to
- 4:0761,181.6% seventy 4.3% A word about par.
- 4:13The outstanding item of importance in my selection of
- 4:16partners, as well as in my subsequent relations with them,
- 4:20has been the determination that we use the same yardstick.
- 4:23If my performance is poor, I expect partners to withdraw and
- 4:27indeed I should look for a new source of investment for my own
- 4:31funds. If performance is good, I am
- 4:34assured of doing splendidly, a state of affairs to which I am
- 4:37sure I can adjust. The rub then is in being sure
- 4:41that we all have the same ideas of what is good and what is
- 4:45poor. I believe in establishing
- 4:47yardsticks prior to the ACT Retrospectively, almost anything
- 4:51can be made to look good in relation to something or other.
- 4:55I have continuously used the Dow Jones Industrial Average as our
- 4:59measure of par. It is my feeling that three
- 5:01years is a very minimal test of performance, and the best test
- 5:05consists of a period at least that long where the terminal
- 5:08level of the Dow is reasonably close to the initial level.
- 5:12While the Dow is not perfect, nor is anything else, as a
- 5:15measure of performance it has the advantage of being widely
- 5:19known, has a long period of continuity, and reflects with
- 5:22reasonable accuracy the experience of investors
- 5:26generally with the market. I have no objection to any other
- 5:29method of measurement of general market performance being used,
- 5:33such as other stock market averages, leading diversified
- 5:36mutual stock funds, bank common trust funds, etcetera.
- 5:40You may feel I have established an unduly short yardstick in
- 5:44that it perhaps appears quite simple to do better than an
- 5:47unmanaged index of 30 leading common stocks.
- 5:50Actually, this index has generally proven to be a
- 5:54reasonably tough competitor. Arthur Weisenberger's classic
- 5:57book on investment companies lists performance for the 15
- 6:01years 1946 to 60 for all leading mutual funds.
- 6:05There is presently over $20 billion invested in mutual
- 6:09funds, so the experience of these funds represents
- 6:12collectively the experience of many million investors.
- 6:16My own belief, though the figures are not obtainable, is
- 6:20that portfolios of most leading investment council organizations
- 6:24and bank trust departments have achieved results similar to
- 6:28these mutual funds. Weisenberger lists 70 funds in
- 6:31his charts and statistics with continuous records since 1946.
- 6:36I have excluded 32 of these funds for various reasons since
- 6:40they were balanced funds, therefore not participating
- 6:43fully in the general market, rise, specialized industry
- 6:46funds, etcetera. Of the 32 excluded because I
- 6:50felt a comparison would not be fair, 18 31 did poorer than the
- 6:54Dow, so they were certainly not excluded to slant the
- 6:57conclusions below. Of the remaining 38 mutual funds
- 7:01whose method of operation I felt was such as to make a comparison
- 7:05with the Dow, reasonable 32 did poorer than the Dow and 6 did
- 7:09better, the six doing better at the end of 1960 at assets of
- 7:14about $1 billion and the 32 doing poorer had assets of about
- 7:186 to $12 billion. None of the six that were
- 7:21superior beat the Dow by more than a few percentage points a
- 7:25year. Below I present the year by year
- 7:27results for our period of operation excluding 1961 for
- 7:31which I don't have exact data. Although rough figures indicate
- 7:36no variance from the 1957 to 60 figures for the two largest
- 7:40common stock open end investment companies, mutual funds and the
- 7:44two largest closed end investment companies.
- 7:47Year Massachusetts INV Investors Lehman Tricon Dow Limited Trust
- 7:53Stock Partners 1957 - 12.0% - 12.4% - 11.4% - 2.4% - 8.4
- 8:04percent 9.3% Nineteen 5844.1 percent 47.6% Forty .8 percent
- 8:1233.2 percent 38.5 percent 32.2% 19598.2 percent 10.3 percent 8.1
- 8:22percent 8.4 percent 19.9% Twenty .9 percent 1960 - 0.9% - 0.1
- 8:31percent 2.6% Two point 8% - 6.3 percent 18.6% for Moody's Banks
- 8:38and Finance Manual 1961 Compounded Year Massachusetts
- 8:43Inv Investors Lehman Tricon Dow Limited Trust Stock Partners
- 8:481957 - 12.0% - 12.4% - 11.4% - 2.4% - 8.4 percent 9.3 percent
- 9:001957 to 5826.8 percent 29.3 percent 24.7% Thirty percent
- 9:0826.9% Forty 4.5% 1957 to 5937.2 percent 42.6% Thirty 4.8 percent
- 9:1940.9% Fifty 2.2 percent 74.7 percent 1957 to 6036 percent
- 9:2742.5 percent 38.3 percent 44.8 percent 42.6 percent 107.2%.
- 9:36Massachusetts Investors Trust has net assets of about $1.8
- 9:40billion Investors stock fund about $1 billion.
- 9:44Try Continental Corporation about dollars point 5 billion
- 9:48and Lehman Corporation about $350 million or a total of over.
- 9:523.5 dollars billion I do. Not present the above
- 9:56tabulations and information with the idea of indicting investment
- 10:00companies. My own record of investing such
- 10:03huge sums of money with restrictions on the degree of
- 10:06activity I might take in companies where we had
- 10:09investments would be no better if as good.
- 10:13I present this data to indicate the Dow as an investment
- 10:16competitor is no pushover and the great bulk of investment
- 10:20funds in the country are going to have difficulty in bettering
- 10:24or perhaps even matching its performance.
- 10:27Our portfolio is very different from that of the Dow.
- 10:30Our method of operation is substantially different from
- 10:33that of mutual funds. However, most partners as all
- 10:37alternative to their investment in the partnership would
- 10:40probably have their funds invested in a media producing
- 10:43results comparable to the Dow. Therefore, I feel it is a fair
- 10:47test of performance. Our method of operation, our
- 10:50avenues of investment, break down into 3 categories.
- 10:54These categories have different behavior characteristics, and
- 10:58the way our money is divided among them will have an
- 11:00important effect on our results relative to the Dow.
- 11:04In any given year, the actual percentage division among
- 11:07categories is to some degree planned, but to a great extent
- 11:11accidental based upon availability factors. 19 The
- 11:16first section consists of generally undervalued securities
- 11:19here and after called generals, where we have nothing to say
- 11:23about corporate policies and no timetable as to when the
- 11:26undervaluation may correct itself.
- 11:29Over the years, this has been our largest category of
- 11:32investment and more money has been made here than in either of
- 11:36the other categories. We usually have fairly large
- 11:39positions, 5% to 10% of our total assets in each of 5 or 6
- 11:44generals with smaller positions in another 10 or 15.
- 11:48Sometimes these work out very fast, many times they take
- 11:51years. It is difficult at the time of
- 11:53purchase to know any specific reason why they should
- 11:56appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of
- 12:00glamour or anything pinning which might create immediate
- 12:03favorable market action, they are available at very cheap
- 12:06prices. A lot of value can be obtained
- 12:09for the price paid. This substantial excess of value
- 12:12creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction.
- 12:16This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity
- 12:20of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and
- 12:24appreciation potential. Over the years, our timing of
- 12:27purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales.
- 12:31We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the
- 12:34last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at
- 12:38some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we
- 12:41regard as fair value to a private owner.
- 12:44The generals tend to behave market wise very much in
- 12:46sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap
- 12:50does not mean it is not going to go down during abrupt downward
- 12:53movements in the market. This segment may very well go
- 12:56down percentage wise just as much as the Dow.
- 12:59Over a period of years, I believe the generals will
- 13:02outperform the Dow and during sharply advancing years like
- 13:061961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best
- 13:11results. It is of course also the most
- 13:14vulnerable in a declining market.
- 13:16Our second category consists of workouts.
- 13:19These are securities whose financial results depend on
- 13:22corporate action rather than supply and demand factors
- 13:25created by buyers and sellers of securities.
- 13:28In other words, they are securities with a timetable
- 13:31where we can predict within reasonable error limits when we
- 13:35will get how much and what might upset the apple cart.
- 13:38Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations,
- 13:41reorganizations, spin offs, etcetera lead to workouts.
- 13:46An important source in recent years has been sell outs by oil
- 13:49producers to major integrated oil companies.
- 13:53This category will roduce reasonably stable earnings from
- 13:56year to year to a large extent irrespective of the course of
- 13:59the Dow. Obviously if we operate
- 14:02throughout a year with a large portion of our portfolio and
- 14:05workouts, we will look extremely good if it turns out to be a
- 14:08declining year for the Dow or quite bad if it is a strongly
- 14:12advancing year. Over the years, workouts have
- 14:14provided our second largest category.
- 14:17At any given time we may be in 10 to 15 of these, some just
- 14:21beginning and others in the late stage of their development.
- 14:25I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion of our
- 14:28workout portfolio since there is a high degree of safety in this
- 14:32category in terms of both eventual results and
- 14:35intermediate market behavior. Results excluding the benefits
- 14:39derived from the use of borrowed money usually fall in the 10% to
- 14:4320% range. My self-imposed limit regarding
- 14:47borrowing is 25% of partnership net worth.
- 14:51Often times we owe no money and when we do borrow it is only as
- 14:55an offset against workouts. The final category is control
- 14:59situations where we either control the company or take a
- 15:02very large position and attempt to influence policies of the
- 15:06company. Such operations should
- 15:08definitely be measured on the basis of several years.
- 15:11In a given year they may produce nothing as it is usually to our
- 15:15advantage to have the stock be stagnant market wise for a long
- 15:18period while we are acquiring it.
- 15:20These situations, too, have relatively little in common with
- 15:24the behavior of the Dow. Sometimes, of course, we buy
- 15:28into a general with a thought in mind that it might develop into
- 15:31a control situation if the price remains low enough for a long
- 15:35period. This might vary will happen if
- 15:38it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of the
- 15:41company's stock, we sell it higher levels and complete a
- 15:44successful general operation. We are presently acquiring stock
- 15:48in what may turn out to be control situations several years
- 15:52hence. 20 Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company We are
- 15:56presently involved in the control of Dempster Mill
- 15:58Manufacturing Company of Beatrice, NE.
- 16:02Our first stock was purchased as a generally undervalued security
- 16:06five years ago. A block later became available
- 16:09and I went on the board about four years ago.
- 16:12In August 1961, we obtained majority control which is
- 16:16indicative of the fact that many of our operations are not
- 16:20exactly of the overnight variety.
- 16:22Presently we own 70% of the stock of Dempster with another
- 16:2610% held by a few associates. With only 150 or so other
- 16:31stockholders, a market on the stock is virtually non existent
- 16:35and in any case would have no meaning for a controlling block.
- 16:39Our own actions in such a market could drastically affect the
- 16:42quoted price. Therefore, it is necessary for
- 16:46me to estimate the value at your end of our controlling interest.
- 16:49This is a particular important sense.
- 16:52In effect, new partners are buying and based upon this
- 16:55price, and old partners are selling a portion of their
- 16:58interest based upon the same price.
- 17:01The estimated value should not be what we hope it would be
- 17:04worth or what it might be worth to an eager buyer, etcetera, but
- 17:08what I would estimate our interest would bring if sold
- 17:11under current conditions in a reasonably short period of time.
- 17:15Our efforts will be devoted toward increasing this value and
- 17:18we feel there are decent prospects of doing this.
- 17:21Dempster is a manufacturer of farm implements and water
- 17:24systems with sales in 1961 of about $9 million.
- 17:29Operations have produced only nominal profits in relation to
- 17:32invested capital. During recent years.
- 17:35This reflected a poor management situation along with a fairly
- 17:39tough industry situation. Presently, consolidated net
- 17:43worth book value is about $4.5 million or $75 per share.
- 17:49Consolidated working capital about $50 per share and at year
- 17:53end we valued our interest at $35 per share.
- 17:57While I claim no oracular vision in a matter such as this, I feel
- 18:01this is a fair valuation to both new and old partners.
- 18:05Certainly, if even moderate earning power can be restored, a
- 18:09higher valuation will be justified and even if it cannot,
- 18:13Dempster should work out at a higher figure.
- 18:15Our controlling interest was acquired at an average price of
- 18:19about $28.00 and this holding currently represents 21% off
- 18:24partnership net assets based on the $35 value.
- 18:27Of course, this section of our portfolio is not going to be
- 18:31worth more money merely because General Motors, US Steel,
- 18:35etcetera sell higher. In a Raging Bull market,
- 18:38operations and control situations will seem like a very
- 18:42difficult way to make money compared to just buying the
- 18:44general market. However, I am more conscious of
- 18:47that dangers presented at current market levels than the
- 18:50opportunities. Control situations along with
- 18:53workouts provide a means of insulating a portion of our
- 18:57portfolio from these dangers. The question of conservatism.
- 19:00The above description of our various areas of operation may
- 19:04provide some clues as to how conservatively our portfolio is
- 19:08invested. Many people some years back
- 19:10thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by
- 19:14purchasing medium or long term municipal or government bonds.
- 19:18This policy has produced substantial market depreciation
- 19:22in many cases and most certainly has failed to maintain or
- 19:25increase real buying power. Conscious, perhaps overly
- 19:29conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are
- 19:33behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip
- 19:36securities almost regardless of price, earnings ratios, dividend
- 19:40yields, etcetera. Without the benefit of
- 19:43hindsight, as I'll the bond example, I feel this course of
- 19:47action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all
- 19:49conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how
- 19:53high a multiplier greedy and capricious public will put on
- 19:57earnings. You will not be right simply
- 19:59because a large number of people momentarily agree with you.
- 20:02You will not be right simply because important people agree
- 20:06with you. In many quarters, the
- 20:07simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is enough to
- 20:11make a course of action meet the test of conservatism 21.
- 20:15You will be right over the course of many transactions if
- 20:19your hypothesis are correct, your facts are correct, and your
- 20:22reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only
- 20:26possible through knowledge and reason.
- 20:28I might add that in no way does the fact that our portfolio is
- 20:32not conventional prove that we are more conservative or less
- 20:36conservative than standard methods of investing.
- 20:38This can only be determined by examining the methods or
- 20:42examining the results. I feel the most objective test
- 20:45as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises
- 20:49through evaluation of performance in down markets.
- 20:53Preferably these should involve A substantial decline in the
- 20:55Dow. Our performance in the rather
- 20:58mild declines of 1957 and 1960 would confirm my hypothesis that
- 21:04we invest in an extremely conservative manner.
- 21:07I would welcome any partners suggesting objective tests as to
- 21:10conservatism to see how we stack up.
- 21:13We have never suffered a realized loss of more than 0.5%
- 21:17of 1% of total net assets and our ratio of total dollars of
- 21:22real gains to total realized losses is something like 100 to
- 21:26one. Of course, this reflects the
- 21:29fact that on balance, we have been operating in an up market.
- 21:32However, there have been many opportunities for lost
- 21:35transactions even in markets such as these.
- 21:37You may have found out about a few of these yourselves.
- 21:40So I think the above facts have some significance.
- 21:44The question of size. Aside from the question as to
- 21:46what happens upon my death, which with a metaphysical twist,
- 21:49is a subject of keen interest to me, I am probably asked most
- 21:54often, what effect is the rapid growth of partnership funds
- 21:57going to have upon performance? Larger funds tug in two
- 22:01directions. From the standpoint of passive
- 22:04investments, where we do not attempt by the size of our
- 22:07investment to influence corporate policies, larger sums
- 22:11hurt results. For the mutual fund or trust
- 22:14department investing in securities with very broad
- 22:17markets, the effect of large sums should be to penalize.
- 22:20Results only vary slightly. Buying 10,000 shares of General
- 22:25Motors is only slightly more costly on the basis of
- 22:29mathematical expectancy than buying 1000 or 100 shares in
- 22:33some of the securities in which we deal, but not all.
- 22:36By any means, buying 10,000 shares is much more difficult
- 22:40than buying 100 and is sometimes impossible.
- 22:43Therefore, for a portion of our portfolio, larger sums are
- 22:47definitely disadvantageous. For a larger portion of the
- 22:50portfolio, I would say increased sums are only slightly
- 22:53disadvantageous. This category includes most of
- 22:57our workouts and some generals. However, in the case of control
- 23:01situations, increased funds are a definite advantage.
- 23:04A Sanborn map cannot be accomplished without the
- 23:08wherewithal. My definite belief is that the
- 23:10opportunities increase in this field as the funds increase.
- 23:14This is due to the sharp fall off in competition as the anti
- 23:18mounts, plus the important positive correlation that exists
- 23:21between increased size of company and lack of concentrated
- 23:25ownership of that company's stock.
- 23:28Which is more important, the decreasing prospects of
- 23:30profitability in passive investments or the increasing
- 23:34prospects in control investments?
- 23:36I can't give a definite answer to this since to a great extent
- 23:39it depends on the type of market in which we are operating.
- 23:43My present opinion is that there is no reason to think these
- 23:46should not be offsetting factors.
- 23:49If my opinion should change, you will be told, I can say most
- 23:53assuredly that our results in 1960 and 1961 would not have
- 23:58been better if we had been operating with a much smaller
- 24:00sums of 1956 and 1957 and a prediction 22.
- 24:06Regular readers, I may be flattering myself will feel I
- 24:09have left the tracks when I start talking about predictions.
- 24:13This is one thing from which I have always shield away, and I
- 24:16still do in the normal sense. I am certainly not going to
- 24:19predict what general business or the stock market are going to do
- 24:22in the next year or two. Since I don't have the faintest
- 24:25idea. I think you can be quite sure
- 24:28that over the next 10 years there are going to be a few
- 24:30years when the general market is plus 20 or 25, a few when it is
- 24:35minus on the same order and a majority when it is in between.
- 24:39I haven't any notion as to the sequence in which these will
- 24:43occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the
- 24:47long term investor. Over any long period of years, I
- 24:50think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something
- 24:53like 5% to 7% per year compounded from a combination of
- 24:58dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of recent
- 25:02years, anyone expecting substantially better than that
- 25:06from the general market probably faces disappointment.
- 25:09Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance
- 25:12of the Dow without worrying too much about what are the absolute
- 25:16results in a given year are a plus or a minus.
- 25:19I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow
- 25:23declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the
- 25:28partnership and the Dow advanced 20%.
- 25:31I have stressed this point in talking with partners and have
- 25:34watched them nod their heads with varying degrees of
- 25:37enthusiasm. It is most important to me that
- 25:39you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and
- 25:43agree with me not only in your cerebral regions but also down
- 25:46in the pit of your stomach for the reasons outlined in my
- 25:49method of operation. Our best years relative to the
- 25:52Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets.
- 25:56Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply
- 26:00varying amounts. There are bound to be years when
- 26:02we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can
- 26:06average 10 percentage points per year better than it, I will feel
- 26:10the results have been satisfactory.
- 26:12Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a
- 26:16year, and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one
- 26:20year in the next 10, no one knows which one, we should be
- 26:23down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged
- 26:29during the year, we would hope to be up about 10 percentage
- 26:32points. If it is up 20% or more, we
- 26:35would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance
- 26:38such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow
- 26:41produces a 5% to 7% per year overall gain compounded, I would
- 26:46hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year.
- 26:50The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no
- 26:54question but that they may appear very much so when viewed
- 26:57from the vantage point of.