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Why NASA_s Artemis II is the Most Dangerous Space Mission in 50 Years · Boring Science

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Speaker 1: Four astronauts are hurtling through space right now on a
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mission that NASA insiders are calling the most dangerous human
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spaceflight in half a century. They're riding hardware that's barely
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been tested, protected by a heat shield that failed catastrophically
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on its first unmanned flight, and heading into radiation levels
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that could fundamentally alter their DNA. This isn't speculation or
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worst case thinking. This is Artemis two, and it launched
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from Kennedy Space Center on April first, twenty twenty six.
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The crew includes NASA astronauts Reed Wiseman, Victor Glover, Christina Coke,
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and Canadian Space Agency astronaut Jeremy Hanson. They're the first
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humans to venture beyond low Earth orbits since Apollo seventeen
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in December nineteen seventy two. That's fifty five four years
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of staying close to home, orbiting safely within Earth's protective
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magnetic bubble. Now they're out there, exposed to the full
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fury of deep space testing systems that have never carried
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human lives before. What makes this mission so dangerous isn't
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any single factor. It's the convergence of multiple risks, each
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serious enough to warrant postponement on its own, combining into
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something unprecedented in modern spaceflight, and the decision to proceed
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despite these dangers reveals something troubling about how NASA operates
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under political and financial pressure. Let's start with the most
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visible crisis, the one that nearly derailed this mission before
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it left the ground, the heat shield problem. When Artemis
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I flew through this exact trajectory in twenty twenty two
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without a crew, something went catastrophically wrong during re entry.
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Large chunks of the heat shield's avcoat material blew out,
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leaving deep gouges and divots across the protective surface. Over
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one hundred locations showed damage far beyond anything NASA's models
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had predicted. The ablative material that's supposed to char and
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burn away in a controlled manner, instead cracked and shed
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in irregular chunks, exposing underlying layers to temperatures that approach
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five thousand degrees fahrenheit. NASA kept this quiet for a while.
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It wasn't until May twenty twenty four, when the Office
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of the Inspector General released photographs that the space community
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saw the full extent of the damage. The images were shocking,
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deep holes penetrated multiple layers of the heat shield material.
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Some sections look like they'd been hit with the sledgehammer.
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Former NASA engineer and astronaut Charles Commada became one of
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the loudest voices demanding answers. Commada knows spacecraft failure intimately.
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He survived the Columbia disaster in two thousand and three,
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though seven of his colleagues didn't. He's seen what happens
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when NASA convinces itself that known problems are acceptable risks.
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His assessment of the Artemis t's decision is damning. He
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argues that NASA has built what he calls toy models,
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simplified simulations designed to produce the answer the agency wants
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rather than the truth. These models aren't grounded in actual physics,
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he says, they're sophisticated justifications for a predetermined conclusion that
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flying is safe enough. According to Commada, NASA is flying
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Artemis two based on vibes. The agency is essentially hoping
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that whatever caused the heat shield to fail on Artemis
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one won't get bad enough to kill the crew on
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Artemis two. That's not engineering, that's gambling with human lives.
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The technical explanation for the heat shield failure reveals why
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this is so concerning. During the skip re entry maneuver,
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where the spacecraft briefly dips into the atmosphere, bounces back out,
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then dips again before final descent, something unexpected happened. Between
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those atmospheric dips. Heating rates decreased. That sounds good until
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you understand what it triggered. Thermal energy accumulated inside the
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av COT material faster than it could dissipate. The ablation process,
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which is supposed to carry heat away. As material burns off,
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generated gases trapped inside the heat shield, AVCOTE didn't have
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sufficient permeability to let those gases escape. Pressure built up internally,
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the material cracked when it finally gave way. Chunks of
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heat shield material liberated themselves violently during the highest stress
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phase of re entry. NASA's solution, don't fix the heat shield,
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change the trajectory. Mission managers eliminated the skip re entry
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in favor of a steeper, more direct descent profile. A
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Tiger team determined this modified trajectory would minimize char loss
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and provide adequate thermal margins. The spacecraft will come in
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hotter and faster, subjecting the crew to increased deceleration forces,
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but theoretically reducing the conditions that caused the original failure.
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Here's what makes this approach so troubling. If SpaceX's Dragon
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Capsule or Boeing's Starliner returned to Earth with this kind
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of damage, NASA would ground the program immediately. The agency
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would demand a complete redesign and multiple unmanned test flights
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before allowing humans abord again. NASA holds commercial crew programs
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to rigorous safety standards, but Artemis different rules apparently apply.
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The review team's report exists, but the publicly released version
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is so heavily redacted it's nearly useless. Former NASA engineers
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and astronauts have criticized this lack of transparency. When you
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hide your safety analysis from public scrutiny, you remove a
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crucial layer of oversight. Mistakes that might be caught by
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outside experts go unchallenged. This pattern echoes the organizational failures
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that preceded both the Challenger and Columbia disasters. In both cases,
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NASA had data showing serious problems. In both cases, institutional
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pressure to maintain schedule and budget led decision makers to
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rationalize away risks. In both cases, the rationalization failed catastrophically.
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The heat shield isn't even the only life threatening system
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flying with known problems. Orion's Environmental Control and Life Support
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System has never flown with humans aboard. Artemis one didn't
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carry a complete ECLSS because there was no crew to support.
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That means the system making its debut on Artemis two
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is responsible for keeping four people alive in the vacuum
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of space with zero flight heritage. During preflight testing, the
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ECLSS experienced multiple serious failures. A ventilation system controller failed,
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traced to a circuit defect in the motor controlling gas
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flow through the crew cabin. Identical valves exist throughout the system.
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Every single one had to be retrofitted to withstand excess voltage,
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a problem nobody knew existed until it manifested during testing.
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Deformed ceiling material on ECLSS valves caused overboard leakage. A
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carbon dioxide removal control valve showed deficiencies that required redesign.
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These aren't minor glitches. These are fundamental failures in systems
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that have to work perfectly or the crew dies. NASA's
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mitigation strategy reveals how serious these concerns are The agency
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inserted a twenty four hour checkout period into the mission profile.
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After reaching low Earth orbit, Orion will spend roughly a
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day testing the ECLSS before committing to the trans lunar
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injection burn that sends them toward the Moon. This is
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essentially a go slash no go decision point in space.
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If major e CLSs problems emerge, the crew can abort
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and return to Earth relatively quickly. Once they burn for
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the Moon, that safety margin evaporates. They're committed to a
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ten day mission whether the life support works properly or not.
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The practical consequences of ECLSS failure are straightforward and terrifying.
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The system is redundant with back up components for critical functions,
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but in the extremely unlikely event of total system shutdown,
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the astronauts suddenly lose breathable air, fresh water, temperature control,
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and safe cabin pressure. Their survival suits can provide emergency
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life support for about six days. After that they're on
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borrowed time. Even partial failures create dangerous situations. The crew
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has already encountered problems. During one test, they struggled to
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set up the toilet dealing with a controller issue that
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required Christina Koch to troubleshoot on the fly. A malfunctioning
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toilet might sound trivial until you're trapped in a small
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capsule with three other people for ten days with no alternative.
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The battery systems present another layer of risk that almost
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nobody outside NASA's engineering teams understands. In late twenty twenty three,
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a bought scenario analyos revealed that Orion's batteries might not
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maintain required power levels during extreme abought situations. These aren't
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theoretical edge cases. These are the exact scenarios where battery
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performance matters most when the launch is going catastrophically wrong
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and the launch abot system has to fire. Vibration testing
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discovered an even more disturbing failure mode. Under worst case
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of bought conditions, the batteries could physically disconnect from the
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spacecraft's electrical systems that would render Orion unable to deploy
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its parachutes. Without parachutes, the crew capsule becomes a ballistic
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projectile that will impact the ocean at terminal velocity. Nobody
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survives that the batteries are built by Eagle Picture Technologies,
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the same company that supplied batteries for Apollo Those Apollo
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ere There are batteries saved the Apollo thirteen crew when
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the fuel cells failed after spending days cold soaked in space.
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The batteries powered up when needed and brought the crew
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home safely. But that was different technology, different design requirements,
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different testing regimes. The fact that Eagle Pitcher made reliable
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batteries fifty years ago doesn't guarantee these modern units will
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perform under conditions they've never actually experienced, with human lives
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depending on them. The power system overall contains multiple potential
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failure points. Four solar array wings unfurl in space to
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generate eleven point two kilowatts of electricity. This system powers
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everything battery charging, life support, avionics, propulsion, controls communications. If
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it fails, the spacecraft goes dark. During Artemis IE, the
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solar arrays actually generated more power than expected. Good news, right,
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except one of the power conditioning units experienced an anomaly.
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Nobody's entirely sure why a similar or worse glitch during
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Artemis II could cascade through the electrical system, potentially knocking
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out multiple critical functions simultaneously. The space launch system rocket
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that carried them to orbit brings its own set of
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unprecedented risks. SLS has flown exactly once before on Artemis Ie.
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That's the sum total of its flight heritage one launch,
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one mission, and now it's carrying humans. Compare that to
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the Space Shuttle, which flew one hundred and thirty five
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missions over thirty years, or the Saturn five, which flew
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ten crude missions before being retired. SLS went from first
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flight to crude flight with no intermediate missions to identify
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and fix problems that only reveal themselves over multiple launches.
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The rocket is known to spring fuel leaks. During the
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Artemis one launch attempts, hydrogen leaks repeatedly forced scrubs. Ground
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crews developed workarounds, but those are band aids on fundamental
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design issues. When you're loading super cooled liquid hydrogen and
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liquid oxygen into a rocket at enormous flow rates, you
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need systems that don't leak period. The Artemis too launch
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itself came within minutes of being scrubbed. One of the
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two batteries for the launcher bought system showed an unexpectedly
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high temperature reading. The team determined it was an instan
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frumentation issue rather than an actual battery problem, but that
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determination happened inside the launch window. If they'd needed six
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more minutes to troubleshoot, the launch would have scrubbed. There
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was also a communication problem between the Eastern range and
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the flight termination system. This system can destroy the rocket
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if it veers off course toward populated areas. It's a
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safety critical system that absolutely must work. The fact that
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it had communication issues during final countdown is not comforting.
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The launch sequence itself is a carefully choreographed moment of
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controlled violence. Four RS twenty five engines on the core
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stage ignite approximately seven seconds before liftoff. The system confirms
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they've reached full power. Only then do the solid rocket
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boosters ignorre at T zero. Those solid boosters are critical
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to understand. Once they light, there's no shutting them down.
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They will burn until they exhaust their fuel. If something
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goes wrong after booster ignition, but before the rocket clears
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the tower, the launch a bort system has to pull
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the crew capsule away from an out of control rocket
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that's producing over seven million pounds of thrust. The boosters
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separate at roughly three thousand, one hundred miles per hour
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at an altitude of thirty miles until that separation. The
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astronauts are riding the most powerful rocket currently in operation,
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hoping nothing fails in a way the abort system can't handle.
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Right now, as the crew passes the point of equidistance
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between Earth and Moon, they're entering the most radiation intensive
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environ humans have experienced in fifty years. And what we're
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learning is that we don't actually understand deep space radiation
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as well as we thought. But that's a whole different
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category of danger, one that doesn't just threaten the mission.
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It threatens the astronaut's long term health in ways we're
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only beginning to understand. The radiation environment beyond Earth's magnetosphere
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is fundamentally different from anything modern astronauts have experienced. International
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Space Station crews receive protection from Earth's magnetic field, which
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deflects most of the charged particles streaming from the Sun.
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They're still within the planetary shield even at two hundred
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and fifty miles up, but the Artemis two crew crossed
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that boundary hours ago. A galactic cosmic rays are the
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first threat. These are atomic nuclei traveling at nearly the
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speed of light, stripped of their electrons originating from supernovae
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and other violent cosmic events outside our solar system. When
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one of these particles slams into human tissue, it doesn't
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just damage the cell it hits. It creates a trail
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of secondary radiation as it passes through, affecting everything in
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its path. The particles are so energetic that conventional shielding
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barely slows them down. Adding more aluminum to the spacecraft
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might actually make things worse, creating more secondary radiation as
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the particles collide with the metal. Then there are solar
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energetic particles. These come from the Sun during solar flares
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and coronal mass ejections. A major solar storm can release
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particles with enough energy to deliver a lethal radiation dose
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in hours. The Apollo astronauts got lucky they flew during
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a relatively quiet period in the solar cycle, except for
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one time, August nineteen seventy two, between Apollo sixteen and
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Apollo seventeen, a solar storm erupted that would have killed
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any astronauts in deep space. The radiation dose would have
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been catastrophic. If Apollo seventeen had launched a few weeks earlier,
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the crew wouldn't have made it home. That's how narrow
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the margin was. That's how much luck factored into the
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Apollo programme's success. NASA's Moon to Mars Space Weather Analysis
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Office monitors the Sun constantly. They watch for flares, for
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coronal mass ejections, for any sign that a radiation storm
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might be building. When they detect activity, they share analysis
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with the Space Radiation Analysis Group. Together, these teams provide
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forecasts to mission control. But forecasting space weather isn't like
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forecasting terrestrial weather. The Sun can erupt with minimal warning.
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The crew has procedures for solar particle events. They're trained
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to reconfigure the cabin, pulling stowed equipment from storage base
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and positioning it to add mass between themselves and the
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incoming radiation. More mass equals more shielding. It's crude, but
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it's all they have. Testing this procedure is actually a
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major objective of the mission. They need to know how
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quickly they can set up this makeshift shelter, how effective
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it is, whether it's even practical in the confined space
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of the Orion capsule. Christina Cooke will provide data we've
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never collected before. She's the first woman to fly in
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deep space. That's not just a historic milestone, it's a
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scientific necessity. We have exactly zero data on how female
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bodies respond to deep space radiation. The Apollo astronauts were
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all men. Space station crews operate inside Earth's protective bubble.
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Cooke's presence means we'll finally understand how cosmic radiation affects
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different physiology, different hormonal systems, different cellular processes. The Apollo
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astronauts paid a price we didn't fully understand at the time.
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Multiple crew members developed cataracts later in life. Researchers trace
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this back to cosmic ray exposure. The high energy particles
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damage cells in their eyes, creating clouding that worsened with age.
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Many of them reported seeing flashes of light during the mission,
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brief streaks across their vision even with their eyes closed.
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Those were cosmic rays passing directly through their retinas, exciting
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the optic nerve, creating phantom light shows as they slept.
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What else did cosmic radiation do to them where still
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finding out. Some studies suggest elevated cancer rates among deep
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space astronauts compared to their Shuttle counterparts. The sample size
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is small, making statistical analysis difficult, but the trend is concerning.
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These men went to the Moon for a few days.
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The Artemis two crew will spend ten days beyond the magnetosphere.
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Future Mars missions could last years. Orion carries radiation sensors
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throughout the cabin. They're measuring dose rates in real time,
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tracking exactly how much radiation the crew receives and where
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it's coming from. These sensors feed data to mission control
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and to the onboard displays. If radiation levels spike, the
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crew will know immediately, but knowing doesn't equal protection. Their
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options are limited. Reconfigure the cabin, weight it out, hope
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the solar storm passes before the dose becomes dangerous. The
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spacecraft itself provides minimal shielding, aluminum, hull, equipment, racks, water storage.
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None of it is optimized for radiation protection, because optimizing
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for radiation protection would require mass the rocket can't lift.
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Every pound of shielding is a pound of other equipment
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you can't bring. Every inch of additional hull thickness is
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structural mass that cuts into your payload capacity. The engineers
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made trade offs they had to, but those trade offs
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leave the crew exposed radiation effects more than just cancer risk.
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High doses can impair cognitive function. They can damage the
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central nervous system. They can affect motor control, memory, decision making.
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These aren't theoretical risks. Studies on animals exposed to cosmic
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ray analogs show measurable neurological effects. If the Artemis two
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crew experiences a major solar particle event, they might face
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cognitive impairment during the mission itself, when they need their
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mental faculties. Most the mission plan accounts for this sort
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of If radiation levels exceed certain thresholds, procedures exist to
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shorten the mission or modify the trajectory. But those procedures
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assume the crew remains capable of executing complex maneuvers. They
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assume the spacecraft system's continue functioning. They assume communication with
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Earth remains intact. Break any of those assumptions and the
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contingency plans fall apart. Then there's the question of lifetime
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exposure limits. NASA sets career limits for astronauts based on
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radiation dose. The limits vary by age and gender because
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cancer risk changes with these factors. Every deep space mission
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uses up a significant fraction of an astronaut's career allowance.
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The Artemis two crew might not be able to fly
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deep space missions again. Their ten days beyond the magneto
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sphere could be their only opportunity that creates psychological pressure
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on top of the physical risk. This might be their
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one chance. They have to make it count. But here's
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what keeps the radiation specialists awake at night. We don't
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actually know how accurate our models are. The Apollo missions
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were too short and too infrequent to build robust statistical models.
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Space station crews don't experience true deep space radiation. The
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Artemis two crew is entering a regime where our understanding
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is built more on theory than data. We think we
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know what will happen. We believe our dose calculations are conservative,
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but belief isn't the same as knowledge. Cosmic rays don't
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just damage cells through direct hits. They create secondary radiation
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as they interact with spacecraft materials. A heavy ion slamming
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into aluminum produces a shower of particles, each capable of
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causing biological damage. The spacecraft itself becomes a source of radiation.
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Engineers call this the can of soup problem. Radiation hits
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the can from outside, but it also comes from the
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can itself as secondary particles bounce around inside the orion capsule.
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Is that can the crew is the soup. During the
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Apollo fourteen mission, astronaut edgar Mitchell reported unusual fatigue and
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a sense of mental fogginess that he couldn't quite explain.
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He attributed it to the workload and stress, but later
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research suggested cosmic radiation might have played a role. High
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energy particles affecting neural tissue inflammation in the brain, subtle
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changes in cognitive processes that the astronauts couldn't identify in
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the moment but noticed in retrospect. Red Wiseman, Victor Glover,
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Christina Koch, and Jeremy Hanson are experiencing that same environment
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right now. They're moving through a radiation field that can
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penetrate metal and flesh. Their cells are absorbing energy from
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particles that originated in dying stars hundreds or thousands of
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light years away. Some of that damage will repair itself,
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some won't. We'll monitor their health for the rest of
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their lives, looking for effects that might take decades to manifest.
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The environmental control and life support system faces its own
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set of challenges, completely unrelated to radiation, but equally critical.
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E C. LSS is what keeps the crew alive. It
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scrubs carbon dioxide from the air, It provides oxygen, It
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manages temperature and humidity. It's the difference between a habitable
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spacecraft and a metal coffin, and it's making its debut
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on this mission. Artemis I flew without a complete ECLSS.
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The spacecraft had basic environmental controls, but not the full
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system required for human occupation. That was intentional test the
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capsule first, add the crew later. Except now the crew
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is testing the ECLSS for the first time in the
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actual mission environment. There's no shakedown crews, no low risk
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checkout flight. This is the checkout flight. The system already
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experienced failures during ground testing. A ventilation controller failed during
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a pre flight test for Artemis. Three. Engineers trace the
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problem to a circuit in the motor controlling one of
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the gas flow valves. That same valve design is used
30:01
throughout the ec LSS. Every single valve had to be
30:07
hardened against excess voltage. Deformed ceiling material caused leakage in
30:14
other valves. A CO two removal valve showed deficiencies that
30:18
required redesign. These aren't minor glitches. These are fundamental problems
30:24
with critical components, and while engineers fixed the known issues,
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they can't test for unknown failure modes. The ECLSS contains
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hundreds of components, any of which could fail in ways
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that weren't anticipated during ground testing. Space has a way
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of finding weaknesses that don't show up in the lab.
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NASA built in a safety buffer after reaching orbit. The
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crew spent twenty four hours in low Earth orbit checking
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out the ECLSS before committing to the translunar injection burn.
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If major problems emerged, they could abort and come home.
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That checkout period has passed. The crew burned for the Moon.
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They're committed. If the ECLSS fails now, their options are
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drastically limited. Total system shutdown would be catastrophic. The life
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support system has redundancy, backup systems multiple layers of protection,
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but redundancy isn't the same as immunity. In the extremely
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unlikely event of complete ECLSS failure, the crew would lose
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breathable air, fresh water, temperature control, and safe cabin pressure.
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Their survival suits can provide life support for about six
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days in an emergency, six days to get home, six
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days for mission control to devise solution six days before
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the suit's carbon dioxide scrubbers saturate and stop working. Mission
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specialist Christina Koch already dealt with one ECLSS issue problems
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setting up the toilet. A controller malfunction required trouble shooting
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in flight. She fixed it, but that incident highlights how
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even minor malfunctions can cascade into serious problems. When you're
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operating a complex system with no access to spare parts
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or repair facilities, everything has to work. When it doesn't,
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the crew has to improvise with whatever they have on board.
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The spacecraft's interior is smaller than most people imagine, Oriyon
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provides about as much habitable volume as a large suv.
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Four people ten days in a space barely big enough
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to stand up in. There's no room for extensive exercise,
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equipment for privacy, no ability to escape your crewmates. When
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tensions rise, the psychological pressure compounds the physical risks. Communication
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delays add another layer of stress. At their current distance
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from Earth, radio signals take nearly three seconds to make
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the round trip. Ask a question, wait three seconds for
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the answer. That might not sound like much, but try
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having a conversation with a three second delay. It's disorienting.
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It breaks the natural flow of dialogue during critical situations
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when the crew needs immediate guidance from mission control. Those
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three seconds stretch into eternity, and soon they'll experience something
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no human has felt in fifty years, complete communication blackout.
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When Oriyon passes behind the Moon, the space crime enters
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what NASA calls loss of signal. Forty minutes of complete
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radio silence, no communication with Earth, no telemetry streaming back
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to Houston, no ability for mission control to monitor spacecraft
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systems or provide guidance to the crew. The Moon itself
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blocks every signal. Earth based communication networks like the Deep
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Space Network can't penetrate two thoy one hundred and fifty
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nine miles of solid rock. Even the experimental laser communication
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payload can't bypass basic physics. Signals don't pass through planetary bodies.
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This isn't theoretical. It's happening soon operationally. NASA calls the
34:46
impact significant but manageable. That phrase does heavy lifting. Significant
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means mission control goes blind. They can't see what's happening,
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they can't track systems performance, they can't respond to emergencies.
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Manageable means they've trained the crew to handle it. Pre
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planned procedures, automated systems trust that everything will work as designed,
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But spacecraft have a way of choosing the worst possible
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moments to malfunction. During those forty minutes, the crew operates independently.
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They're trained for it, They've rehearsed the procedures. They know
35:29
what to do if problems emerge. But training and reality
35:34
diverge in subtle ways. The simulator never quite captures the
35:39
psychological weight of being completely cut off from Earth while
35:43
traveling at thousands of miles per hour around an alien world.
35:49
Apollo crews experienced this same isolation. They described it differently.
35:56
Some found it peaceful, others found it unsettling. All of
36:01
them noted how profoundly alone they felt when Earth disappeared
36:05
behind the lunar horizon. Jim Lovell, who flew to the
36:10
Moon twice, said, you could feel the weight of that silence.
36:15
It pressed against you. The blackout begins when Oriyon reaches
36:20
lunar occultation. The spacecraft slips behind the Moon's eastern limb.
36:26
Radio contact cuts off mid transmission. Whatever the crew was
36:30
saying to Houston ends abruptly. Whatever Houston was telling them
36:35
stops without warning, then silence. Forty minutes might not sound long,
36:42
but consider what can happen in forty minutes. Systems can fail,
36:47
trajectories can drift, medical emergencies can develop, fires can start.
36:54
The crew has to handle everything themselves, with only the
36:57
resources on board. NASA emphasizes crew training for exactly this reason.
37:03
Artemis two astronauts trained to operate independently during loss of signal.
37:09
They rely on pre planned procedures and automated systems. The
37:14
spacecraft's computers continue running navigation and attitude control, life support
37:20
keeps functioning. But if something unexpected happens, If a scenario
37:26
arises that wasn't anticipated during training, the crew has to improvise.
37:32
No second opinions from mission control, no consulting with engineers,
37:38
no real time data analysis from ground teams. Just four
37:43
people in a spacecraft the size of a large suv,
37:47
traveling around the far side of the Moon, making critical
37:50
decisions on their own. Communication delays complicate things even when
37:56
contact exists. Artemis two has taken humans farther from Earth
38:01
than anyone since nineteen seventy two. That distance creates signal
38:06
lag three seconds round trip. Ask a question, wait three
38:12
seconds for the answer. That delay breaks conversational rhythm. It
38:18
makes real time troubleshooting nearly impossible. Try diagnosing a complex
38:23
technical problem with three second gaps between each exchange. The
38:28
flow of information fragments, context gets lost. Misunderstandings multiply During
38:36
critical situations when seconds matter, three second delays stretch into eternities.
38:44
The crew already experienced communication failures. Fifty minutes into the flight,
38:50
NASA reported temporary loss of communication with Orion. The issue
38:55
resolved quickly, but the reason remains unclear. Roughly fifty one
39:01
minutes into flight, during a planned handover between communication satellites,
39:06
there was partial loss of signal. These glitches happened close
39:11
to Earth with full deep space network coverage. What happens
39:17
during loss of signal when there's no backup When the
39:21
Moon itself blocks every signal path, The spacecraft's position compounds
39:26
the isolation. Right now, Orion is past equidistance between Earth
39:33
and Moon. They're farther from Home than from their destination.
39:38
Point of no return has already passed. They're committed to
39:42
the lunar flyby. They're committed to swinging around the far side.
39:47
They're committed to those forty minutes of complete isolation. Monday
39:53
brings the fly by itself closest approach to the lunar surface,
39:59
the when they'll skim past the Moon at the exact
40:03
altitude and velocity calculated months ago. Timing has to be perfect,
40:10
trajectory has to be precise. Any deviation could send them
40:15
on a path that misses Earth entirely on the return.
40:19
During Apollo thirteen, the crew faced exactly this problem. They
40:24
weren't on a free return trajectory when the oxygen tank exploded.
40:28
They were on a hybrid trajectory designed to take them
40:31
to Framauro. That trajectory would slingshot them around the Moon
40:36
but miss Earth by two thousand, six hundred miles on
40:39
the return leg. Missing Earth by two thousand six hundred
40:43
miles means dying in space. The capsule would loop back
40:48
around Earth and Moon repeatedly, taking thirty nine days before
40:52
finally intersecting with Earth's atmosphere. By then, the crew would
40:58
be long dead. Mission control had to recalculate everything. They
41:03
had to write new software for the guidance computer. They
41:07
had to devise a burn using the lunar module's descent
41:11
engine to shift Apollo thirteen back onto a free return trajectory,
41:17
a thirty four point two three second burn mathematical precision
41:22
under extreme pressure. Artemis two uses a similar free return
41:28
trajectory as a safety feature. If the main engines fail,
41:32
the moon's gravity will naturally bend their path back toward Earth,
41:37
a built in safety net. But free return trajectories have limitations.
41:44
They only work if you're already on that specific path.
41:48
Deviations require correction burns. Correction burns require working engines. Working
41:55
engines require functioning fuel systems and electrical power. The Apollo
42:01
thirteen crew got lucky. Their lunar module still worked. Its
42:06
descent engine could provide thrust, its batteries had power, its
42:12
guidance system functioned. They could execute the burn needed to
42:16
get home. Artemis two has no lunar module, no backup spacecraft.
42:24
If Orion's main engine fails, they're dependent entirely on the
42:28
free return trajectory, working exactly as calculated, no margin for error,
42:34
no second chances. The mathematics behind free return trajectories allow
42:40
no sloppiness. Every variable matters launch timing, translunar injection burn accuracy,
42:48
mid course correction, precision, lunar flyby, altitude, velocity at closest approach.
42:56
Each parameter affects the return path small air r a's compound.
43:01
A trajectory that should bring you home can instead send
43:04
you past Earth into solar orbit. Apollo missions carried slide
43:09
rules and paper charts for backup navigation. Artemis iiO relies
43:14
on computer systems. Those computers are more sophisticated than anything
43:20
available in the Apollo era. They're also more complex, more
43:25
points of failure, more ways for software glitches to cascade
43:29
into serious problems. During Artemis I, one of the power
43:35
conditioning units experienced an anomaly. The power system generated more
43:40
electricity than expected, which sounds positive until you consider what
43:44
an anomaly means. Unexpected behavior, something happening that wasn't predicted
43:51
by pre flight analysis. The system worked, but not the
43:55
way engineers anticipated. That anomaly got flagged for investigation. Engineers
44:02
studied the data. They developed theories about what caused it,
44:07
but theories aren't certainties, and Artemis one flew without crew.
44:14
If a similar anomaly occurs during Artemis two, four people
44:19
are depending on that power system continuing to function. The
44:23
solar arrays generate eleven point two kilowatts. That power runs
44:28
everything battery charging, life support, avionics, propulsion systems, communications, thermal control.
44:38
Lose power and you lose the spacecraft. Batteries provide backup
44:43
for limited duration, but batteries drain. Silver Zinc batteries like
44:50
those that saved Apollo thirteen can handle cold soaking in space,
44:55
but they can't provide power indefinitely. Eagle Pedtis Technologies built
45:01
Oryan's batteries same company that built Apollo thirteen's batteries. Those
45:08
batteries spent days cold soaked in space after the fuel
45:12
cells failed. When the crew needed to power up the
45:16
command module for re entry, those batteries delivered. They provided
45:23
just enough electricity to run critical systems during the final hours,
45:27
But Apollo thirteen's batteries were designed for exactly that scenario.
45:32
Orion's batteries faced different challenges. Abought scenario analysis in late
45:38
twenty twenty three revealed potential problems. The batteries might not
45:44
maintain required power levels during extreme sls abort profiles. Eagle
45:51
Peacher had to rebuild and requalify the units. Vibration testing
45:57
found another issue during worst case abus bought scenarios, the
46:01
batteries might disconnect from the capsule's electrical systems. That would
46:06
render the spacecraft unable to deploy parachutes unable to splash
46:11
down safely. This represents a fringe scenario requiring both SLS
46:18
failure and the most extreme vibrational environment possible as the
46:22
abort motorfiers. But fringe scenarios happen. Columbia and Challenger proved
46:29
that unlikely failures occur. The launch abort system sits atop
46:35
orion like a forty four foot tower of rocket motors,
46:39
abort motor, attitude control motor, jettison motor, three motors working
46:47
together to pull the crew capsule away from a failing rocket.
46:51
If something goes wrong during launch, milliseconds matter. The abort
46:56
system can activate and carry astronauts to safety within seconds,
47:01
But that system already showed problems. During pre launch checks.
47:07
One of the two batteries for the launcher bought system
47:10
registered an unexpectedly high temperature. The Artemis two team determined
47:16
it was an instrumentation issue, not an actual overheating battery.
47:22
They cleared it as a non constraint for launch, but
47:26
temperature anomalies in batteries are never trivial. Therm or runaway
47:31
in battery systems can lead to fires, explosions, catastrophic failures.
47:38
They launched anyway. The temperature reading stayed out of range.
47:43
The team decided to proceed. The launch window was narrow,
47:48
political pressure was immense, schedule pressure was crushing. They made
47:54
the call. Launch almost scrubbed For a different reason, communication
48:00
problems between the Eastern range and the flight termination system.
48:04
That system can destroy the rocket if it veers off course.
48:08
It's a critical safety feature. Without reliable communication to the
48:13
flight termination system, you can't launch. The problem resolved just
48:19
in time. How many close calls does it take before
48:22
luck runs out? The crew survival suits provide another layer
48:27
of protection oryon CRUE. Survival system suits custom fitted to
48:33
each astronaut. They provide breathable air while removing carbon dioxide.
48:38
They can keep astronauts alive for up to six days
48:41
in emergencies. Six days of life support if cabin pressure fails,
48:47
six days if the ECLSS shuts down completely, six days
48:53
to get home. The crew tested their suits extensively, leak checks,
48:58
seat entry simulation, mobility assessments, eating and drinking while suited.
49:04
The suits protect during dynamic flight phases. They provide life
49:09
support if the cabin depressurizes. They offer survival capability after
49:14
splash down if recovery forces are delayed. But six days
49:19
isn't long, not when you're traveling to the Moon and back.
49:23
The mission timeline spans ten days. If something catastrophic happens
49:28
early in the mission, six days might not be enough
49:31
time to get home. The suits by time, they don't
49:35
guarantee survival. Read Wiseman commands the mission. Veteran astronaut, former
49:42
Navy test pilot. He's flown to the International Space Station.
49:47
He's conducted spacewalks, he knows spacecraft systems, he's trained for emergencies,
49:53
but he's never flown beyond Low Earth orbit. None of
49:57
the crew has. Victor Glover s as pilot. Another veteran
50:02
former Navy aviator. He flew the second operational SpaceX crew
50:07
Dragon mission to miss He's logged time in space, but
50:13
not deep space, not outside Earth's protective magnetosphere, not in
50:18
the radiation environment they're experiencing right now. Christina Cock mission specialist.
50:25
She holds the record for longest single spaceflight by a
50:28
woman three hundred twenty eight days aboard MISS. She's conducted
50:34
six spacewalks. She's dealt with equipment failures in orbit. She
50:38
fixed the toilet controller issue already on this mission. But
50:43
ISS is two hundred and fifty miles from Earth. Help
50:47
is hours away. Artemis two is thousands of miles from Earth.
50:52
Help is days away. Jeremy Hansen represents the Canadian Space
50:57
Agency rookie astro. This is his first spaceflight. He's a
51:04
former CF eighteen fighter pilot. He's trained extensively for this mission.
51:10
But training and reality diverge. Space has a way of
51:15
revealing gaps in preparation. Four people, four different backgrounds, four
51:20
different skill sets. They're trained to work as a team.
51:25
They've spent countless hours in simulators. They've rehearsed procedures until
51:30
they could perform them in their sleep. But they've never
51:34
faced real emergencies in deep space. No one alive has.
51:39
The last humans to fly beyond Low Earth orbit were
51:42
Eugene Cernan, Ronald Evans, and Harrison Schmidt a board Apollo
51:48
seventeen in December nineteen seventy two. That was fifty four
51:53
years ago. Everyone who flew to the Moon during Apollo
51:58
is either elderly or dead. Their experience is valuable, but
52:02
dated spacecraft technology has changed, mission profiles have evolved. The
52:09
institutional knowledge that got Apollo cruise safely to the Moon
52:13
and back has largely been lost. NASA had to rebuild
52:17
that knowledge from scratch. They studied Apollo mission reports. They
52:23
interviewed surviving astronauts. They reverse engineered solutions to problems that
52:29
Apollo crews faced. But reading about an emergency is different
52:33
from experiencing one. Hearing stories about radiation exposure or communication
52:40
blackouts or navigation challenges isn't the same as confronting those
52:45
realities yourself. Artemis two is relearning lessons that were learned
52:49
five decades ago. Some of those lessons will be relearned
52:54
the hard way. The mission clock ticks forward each second,
52:59
carries them deeper into territory no living human has traversed
53:04
in over half a century. Mission control in Houston monitors
53:08
telemetry streams hundreds of data points, updating continuously. Temperature readings,
53:15
pressure levels, power consumption, radiation exposure. Everything appears nominal for now,
53:23
but appearances can deceive. Fifty one minutes into the flight,
53:29
something happened that nobody talks about March in the official
53:32
press releases. Communication dropped, not degraded, not scratchy gone. NASA's
53:41
Deep Space network lost contact with Orion during a handover
53:45
between satellites. The blackout lasted only minutes. Mission controllers maintained
53:51
professional calm. They'd rehearsed this scenario. They had procedures, but
53:57
procedures are written for expected problems. The handover failure wasn't expected.
54:05
NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman addressed it briefly during a press conference.
54:10
Temporary issue quickly resolved. Reason still being identified, standard bureaucratic
54:18
language that translates roughly to we don't actually know what happened.
54:23
Yet this matters more than it might seem. Communication isn't
54:28
just about talking to the crew. It's about monitoring spacecraft health,
54:34
detecting anomalies before they become emergencies, making informed decisions when
54:40
seconds count. The crew experienced their first taste of isolation
54:45
fifty one minutes into a ten day mission. That's concerning.
54:50
Communication delays compound the isolation. Even when signals connect, they
54:56
don't arrive instantly. Light speeds sounds fast until you're trying
55:01
to coordinate time sensitive operations across a quarter million miles
55:06
of space. Three second delays don't sound like much, but
55:12
imagine having a conversation where every response takes three seconds
55:17
to arrive. Every question, every instruction, every emergency call for help.
55:24
You can't have a real time discussion with that kind
55:27
of lag. You can't troubleshoot effectively. You can't provide immediate
55:31
guidance when something goes wrong. The crew needs to function independently.
55:36
They trained for this, but training and simulators on Earth
55:40
differs fundamentally from actual deep space operations. Simulators can be paused,
55:46
Instructors can intervene, You can reset and try again. Space
55:52
doesn't offer reset buttons Oriyon continues its journey. The spacecraft
55:58
appears healthy, systems functioning normally. Solar arrays deployed successfully after launch,
56:06
generating more power than expected. That's good news. The power
56:12
system performed well during Artemis I, despite a minor anomaly
56:17
in one of the power conditioning units. But Artemis one
56:21
flew without crew, without a fully operational life support system,
56:26
without the added complexity of four humans consuming oxygen, producing
56:31
carbon dioxide, generating waste heat, and placing demands on every
56:36
spacecraft system. Artemis two carries all that complexity, and the
56:43
environmental control and life support system making its debut on
56:47
this flight has already demonstrated problems on the ground. Controllers
56:53
failed during pre flight testing, valves leaked, CO two removal
56:59
systems exist exhibited deficiencies. NASA addressed these issues before launch.
57:05
They hardened circuits against excess voltage. They replaced deformed sealing materials.
57:13
They validated fixes, But validation testing on Earth doesn't perfectly
57:18
replicate the space environment. Microgravity changes how fluids behave, temperature extremes,
57:26
stress materials differently. Vibration during launch can reveal weaknesses that
57:32
ground testing missed. NASA built in a safety margin that
57:37
twenty four hour checkout period in low Earth orbit before
57:41
committing to translunar injection. The crew spent that time methodically
57:46
testing every critical system, life support, navigation, communications, propulsion. Everything
57:56
checked out. Flight controllers gave the go for TLRY, the
58:01
main engine fired, orion climbed away from Earth. That decision
58:06
committed the crew to a ten day mission profile, no
58:10
quick abort back to Earth, no emergency return within hours.
58:16
The free return trajectory offers a safety net if propulsion fails,
58:21
but it doesn't solve life support failures. It doesn't fix
58:25
radiation shielding, it doesn't repair communication systems. The crew is
58:31
past the point of easy rescue. Christina Coke dealt with
58:36
the toilet controller issue earlier. That might sound trivial until
58:40
you consider the implications. Waste management in microgravity isn't optional.
58:48
It's essential for crewe health and spacecraft habitability. A malfunctioning
58:54
waste system could create serious hygiene issues. It could contaminate
59:00
the cabin. It could make the spacecraft uninhabitable. Cock successfully
59:06
troubleshot the problem. That's reassuring. It demonstrates crew competence under pressure,
59:13
but it also reveals something unsettling. Even minor systems are
59:17
experiencing glitches. If minor systems fail, what about major ones.
59:24
The spacecraft is essentially a sealed can of complex machinery
59:28
hurtling through the void. Every system depends on other systems,
59:34
power feeds, life support. Life support enables crew survival, creuse.
59:39
Survival allows mission continuation. One significant failure could cascade. Redundancy
59:48
helps critical systems have backups. Backups have backups. NASA engineers
59:55
designed multiple failure paths into orion, but redundancy is an
1:00:00
infinite Eventually you run out of backups. The battery issue
1:00:05
discovered during a bought scenario testing exemplifies this vulnerability. Late
1:00:12
twenty twenty three, vibration tests revealed that batteries might disconnect
1:00:18
during worst case abort profiles that would prevent parachute deployment.
1:00:24
The spacecraft would be unable to land safely. Eagle Picture
1:00:29
technologies rebuilt and requalified the battery units problem solved, supposedly,
1:00:37
But how many other edge cases remain undiscovered? How many
1:00:41
failure modes lurk in the thousands of potential system interactions.
1:00:48
Apollo thirteen survived because of Eagle pitcher batteries. Those silver
1:00:53
zinc cells were cold, soaked in space for days. They
1:00:58
powered up when needed, They enabled re entry. They saved
1:01:04
three lives. Artemis two carries modern equivalents of those legendary batteries,
1:01:10
but modern doesn't necessarily mean better. Sometimes it means more complex,
1:01:16
more failure points, more things that can go wrong in
1:01:20
ways nobody anticipated. The crew continues outbound. They're past equidistance,
1:01:27
now more than halfway to the moon. The Earth shrinks
1:01:31
behind them, the Moon grows ahead. They've traveled further from
1:01:35
home than any human in fifty four years. Read Wiseman
1:01:40
commands from the left seat. Experienced astronaut, veteran of ISSS operations,
1:01:48
six spacewalks. He knows spacecraft systems. He's handled emergencies before,
1:01:56
but never like this, never this far from help. Victor
1:02:00
Glover pilots from the right seat. Former Navy aviator. He
1:02:05
flew Crew Dragon to ISSS. He's log time in space,
1:02:09
but ISS orbits two hundred fifty miles up. Artemis two
1:02:14
is traveling two hundred fifty thousand miles out. Different magnitude,
1:02:19
different risks. Christina Coke and Jeremy Hanson occupy the specialist seats.
1:02:26
Coke brings her record setting ISSS experience. Hanson brings his
1:02:31
CF eighteen fighter background. Different skill sets, different perspectives. They'll
1:02:38
need both. The crew practices procedures. They review emergency protocols,
1:02:45
They monitor systems, they maintain readiness, but mostly they wait.
1:02:51
Space travel involves long periods of waiting punctuated by brief
1:02:55
moments of intensity. The lunar flyby approaches Monday, April sixth.
1:03:02
That's when intensity arrives orion will swing around the Moon's
1:03:06
far side. The spacecraft will enter the region where Earth
1:03:11
disappears below the lunar horizon. Radio signals can't penetrate solid rock.
1:03:17
The crew will be completely alone, no communication, no telemetry,
1:03:23
no contact with mission control for approximately forty minutes. Forty
1:03:29
minutes doesn't sound long, but consider what can happen in
1:03:33
forty minutes. Apollo thirteen's oxygen tank exploded in seconds. Challenger
1:03:40
was destroyed seventy three seconds after launch. Columbia broke apart
1:03:46
in sixteen minutes. Forty minutes is an eternity when something
1:03:51
goes wrong. The crew will rely on automated systems during
1:03:54
the blackout, pre programmed procedures, contingency plans, their own judgment
1:04:01
and training. Mission control will be watching telemetry data freeze
1:04:06
as orion disappears. Controllers will calculate when signals should resume.
1:04:11
They'll watch the clock, They'll wait, Everyone will wait. This
1:04:17
is the trade off of deep space exploration. You gain
1:04:21
incredible scientific value, you push human boundaries, you achieve historic firsts,
1:04:28
but you sacrifice immediate support. You operate in an environment
1:04:33
where help is measured in days, not hours, where communication
1:04:38
blackouts are unavoidable, Where isolation is absolute. The Apollo astronauts
1:04:44
understood this. They accepted the risks. They flew anyway. Some
1:04:49
came home with cataracts from cosmic ray exposure. Some experience
1:04:55
strange light flashes behind closed eyelids, high energy particles streaking
1:05:00
through their retinas. Some developed health issues years later that
1:05:05
might have stemmed from radiation exposure. The Artemis two crew
1:05:10
knows this history. They've studied Apollo mission reports, They've talked
1:05:16
with surviving astronauts. They understand what they're volunteering for, But
1:05:22
understanding intellectually differs from experiencing physically. Reading about radiation exposure
1:05:30
isn't the same as feeling particles slam through your body.
1:05:34
Studying communication blackouts isn't the same as sitting in silence
1:05:39
while Earth vanishes behind the Moon. The mission continues. Systems
1:05:44
remain nominal, the crew appears healthy. Radiation exposure stays within
1:05:50
predicted ranges. The solar weather remains quiet. That last point
1:05:55
matters enormously. The Sun is currently in a relatively calm thay,
1:06:01
no major coronal mass ejections, no significant solar particle events.
1:06:07
That's fortunate. A massive solar storm during this mission would
1:06:12
create serious problems. The crew trained to shelter during radiation events.
1:06:18
They practiced removing equipment from storage bays, securing it around
1:06:23
the cabin, adding mass between themselves and incoming particles. The
1:06:29
procedure works in theory, it's never been tested in actual
1:06:33
deep space conditions. If a major solar event occurs, they'll
1:06:39
find out whether theory matches reality. The Moon to Mars
1:06:44
Space Weather Analysis Office monitors solar activity continuously. They share
1:06:50
data with the Space Radiation Analysis Group. Together, they provide
1:06:55
forecasts to flight controllers real time measurements from inside Orion's
1:07:01
supplement their analysis. This gives mission control the information needed
1:07:06
to issue recommendations, but recommendations require communication. If Oryan is
1:07:14
behind the Moon when a solar event occurs, the crew
1:07:17
won't receive warnings. They'll have to detect the radiation increase
1:07:22
themselves using onboard instruments. They'll have to initiate shelter procedures
1:07:28
without guidance from ground experts. Autonomous decision making becomes critical.
1:07:35
The crew can't wait for mission control approval during emergencies.
1:07:40
They need authority to act independently. NASA granted them that authority.
1:07:47
They're trusted to make life or death decisions without consulting Houston.
1:07:52
That trust is necessary, but uncomfortable. Space agencies prefer centralized control,
1:07:59
ground based expertise, careful deliberation before major decisions. Deep space
1:08:05
operations make that preference impossible. The speed of light imposes delays.
1:08:11
The Moon block signals. The crew must be empowered. They're
1:08:16
approaching the most critical phase now. The lunar flyby will
1:08:20
test every system navigation, propulsion, communication, life support, thermal management,
1:08:29
power generation. Everything needs to work perfectly while the spacecraft
1:08:33
whips around the Moon. Orion's trajectory has been calculated with
1:08:38
extraordinary precision. The spacecraft will pass within four thousand miles
1:08:44
of the lunar surface, close enough for detailed observations, far
1:08:50
enough to maintain safety margins. The Moon's gravity will bend
1:08:55
their path. They'll sling shot around the far side. They'll
1:09:00
merge on a trajectory back toward Earth. If everything works
1:09:04
as planned. The free return trajectory provides a safety net,
1:09:09
but it's not fool proof. Apollo thirteen proved that their
1:09:14
spacecraft wasn't on a free return trajectory when the oxygen
1:09:19
tank exploded. They had to execute a burn using the
1:09:23
lunar module's descent engine to get back onto a safe path.
1:09:28
That burn required new software written in real time by
1:09:31
technicians at mission control. It required precise navigation without the
1:09:37
usual reference points. It required the crew to manually control
1:09:42
a spacecraft they'd barely train to fly. Artemis two doesn't
1:09:48
carry a lunar module. If they need to modify their trajectory,
1:09:52
they'll use Oryon's main engine. That engine needs to work.
1:09:57
The navigation system needs to provide accurate data. The crew
1:10:02
needs to execute burns precisely. Margins for error shrink dramatically
1:10:07
in deep space near Earth. You can correct mistakes with
1:10:12
subsequent burns. You have time, You have options beyond the Moon.
1:10:17
Options diminish time becomes precious. Mistakes compound. The crew understands
1:10:25
these stakes. They're professionals, they're trained, they're ready, But ready
1:10:31
doesn't guarantee safe. Ready doesn't eliminate risk. It reduces it,
1:10:37
But reduction isn't elimination. The spacecraft is closing on the
1:10:41
Moon now, Velocity building distant shrinking every second brings them
1:10:48
closer to the moment where theory becomes reality. Mission control
1:10:52
watches telemetry streams hundreds of data points updating continuously, temperature readings,
1:11:00
pressure values, voltage levels, fuel quantities, every system monitored, every
1:11:07
parameter tract, looking for anomalies, searching for warning signs. The
1:11:13
crew performs their own checks. Wiseman reviews navigation data. Coke
1:11:19
monitors life support readings, Glover checks communication systems. Hansen verifies
1:11:25
back up procedures. Redundancy built into every critical function. If
1:11:31
one system fails, another takes over. That's the plan. Plans
1:11:36
work until they don't. Apollo thirteen's plan didn't include an
1:11:41
oxygen tank explosion. Columbia's plan didn't account for foam strike damage.
1:11:48
Challenger's plan assumed o rings would seal properly in cold weather.
1:11:52
Plans represent best case scenarios. Reality delivers actual scenarios. Satamis
1:12:00
two's plan assumes the heat shield will perform adequately despite
1:12:05
damage observed during Artemis I. That assumption carries the crew's
1:12:11
lives when Orion returns to Earth. When it slams into
1:12:15
the atmosphere at twenty five thousand miles per hour, that
1:12:19
heat shield needs to work not perfectly, just well enough.
1:12:24
The modified re entry trajectory aims to reduce thermal stress
1:12:30
instead of the skip entry used during Artemis I orion
1:12:34
will follow a steeper profile, straight down, faster deceleration, shorter
1:12:41
heating period, less time for internal pressure to build up
1:12:45
in the av coat material. But steeper means harder. The
1:12:50
crew will experience higher G forces. Their bodies will be
1:12:54
pressed deeper into their seats, blood will pool, vision, my mind,
1:13:00
narrow consciousness could fade if the forces exceed tolerance limits.
1:13:06
NASA calculated the acceptable range. The crew trained in centrifuges.
1:13:12
They know what to expect. Knowing doesn't make it comfortable.
1:13:16
The alternative was replacing the heat shield, building a new one,
1:13:21
testing it thoroughly, delaying the mission by years. That option
1:13:26
was rejected. Political pressure, schedule pressure, budget pressure. The decision
1:13:32
was made to fly with what they have. Charles Commada
1:13:37
warned about this former astronaut, former NASA engineer. He saw
1:13:43
the damaged heat shield photos. He reviewed the analysis. He
1:13:47
reached a different conclusion than NASA's official position. Commada argues
1:13:52
NASA is repeating past mistakes, building models that confirmed desired conclusions,
1:13:59
rather than rever feeling uncomfortable truths. Columbia's engineers built models
1:14:05
showing foam strikes were acceptable. Those models were wrong, challengers
1:14:10
engineers had data about O ring problems. That data was dismissed.
1:14:16
Is Artemis two's heat shield analysis similarly flawed? NASA insists
1:14:23
it isn't. They claim extensive testing, rigorous analysis, conservative assumptions.
1:14:30
They modified the trajectory to add safety margin. But the
1:14:34
Artemis one heat shield lost material in more than one
1:14:37
hundred locations, deep gouges, complete loss of avcoat blocks in
1:14:44
some areas. That damage exceeded all predictions. If predictions were
1:14:49
wrong before, why trust them now. The publicly released report
1:14:55
was heavily redacted, critical details hidden. Former engineers and astronauts
1:15:01
criticized the lack of transparency. If the analysis was solid,
1:15:07
why redact so much. NASA applies different standards to different programs.
1:15:13
When SpaceX, Dragon or Boeing Starliner show problems, NASA demands fixes, redesigns,
1:15:21
additional testing, unmanned validation flights. The commercial crew programs must
1:15:27
meet rigorous safety requirements. Artemis doesn't face the same scrutiny.
1:15:33
It's NASA's flagship program. It represents the agency's future. Admitting
1:15:39
fundamental problems would mean massive delays, potential program cancelation, unacceptable
1:15:45
political consequences, so the mission proceeds. The crew knows the risks,
1:15:53
they accepted them. Astronauts always accept risks, that's part of
1:15:59
the job. But accepting risk doesn't eliminate it. Orion continues
1:16:04
its approach. The Moon grows larger in the windows. The
1:16:09
crew can see details now, craters, mountains, the stark boundary
1:16:15
between light and shadow. They're traveling faster than any humans
1:16:20
have moved in fifty years, faster than any humans alive
1:16:24
have ever traveled. Apollo astronauts reach these speeds. They're all
1:16:30
old now or dead. The experience they gained is distant history.
1:16:36
This crew is writing new history, or they're becoming a
1:16:39
cautionary tale. The outcome depends on systems performing as designed,
1:16:46
on calculations being correct, on assumptions being valid. The lunar
1:16:53
flyby will test everything simultaneously. Navigation must be precise. Iron
1:17:00
will pass within four thousand miles of the surface, close
1:17:04
enough for detailed observations, far enough for safety margin. That
1:17:10
margin exists only if calculations are accurate. The Moon's gravity
1:17:15
is well mapped, its mass is known, its gravitational field
1:17:20
is understood. But precision navigation requires accounting for subtle variations,
1:17:26
mass concentrations beneath the surface, irregularities in the gravitational field.
1:17:32
These factors affect trajectory. Ground based tracking provides position data,
1:17:39
but there's delay light speed delay. Information about where Orion
1:17:44
is take seconds to reach Earth. By the time mission
1:17:48
control sees telemetry, it's already outdated. The spacecraft has moved,
1:17:54
conditions have changed during the lunar flyby. This delay becomes critical.
1:18:00
Decisions need to happen fast. The crew can't wait for
1:18:04
mission control approval. They need autonomy authority to act. NASA
1:18:09
granted that authority. Wiseman is commander. He makes final decisions.
1:18:16
The crew trusts his judgment. Mission control trusts his judgment.
1:18:21
Trust is necessary when communication takes seconds and circumstances change instantly.
1:18:28
The spacecraft will disappear behind the Moon soon communication will
1:18:33
cease forty minutes of silence, forty minutes where mission control
1:18:39
sees nothing, hears nothing, knows nothing about the crew's status.
1:18:45
During those forty minutes, anything could happen. System failures, coarse deviations,
1:18:52
emergency situations. The crew will handle whatever occurs without ground support,
1:18:58
without expert conscerpletion, without the comfort of knowing hundreds of
1:19:03
specialists are watching their data. They'll be alone, truly alone,
1:19:10
more isolated than any humans have been since Apollo seventeen.
1:19:16
The far side of the moon blocks everything. Radio signals
1:19:21
can't penetrate solid rock. Even if they screamed for help,
1:19:26
no one would hear. The spacecraft is healthy right now,
1:19:30
all systems nominal, no warnings, no anomalies. But systems can
1:19:36
fail suddenly. Apollo thirteen's oxygen tank explosion happened without warning.
1:19:43
One moment, everything was fine. The next moment, the mission
1:19:47
was fighting for survival. Orion carries redundancy backup systems for
1:19:53
critical functions. If the main engine fails, reaction control thrusters
1:19:59
can provide propulsion. If one battery dies, others supply power.
1:20:05
If communication through one antenna is lost, others can transmit.
1:20:10
But redundancy has limits. If multiple systems fail simultaneously, backups
1:20:16
become overwhelmed. If problems cascade, redundancy collapses. Apollo thirteen faced
1:20:24
cascading failures. The oxygen tank explosion damaged multiple systems. Each
1:20:30
failure created new problems. The crew had to improvise solutions
1:20:36
using equipment that wasn't designed for those purposes. Artemis two
1:20:41
doesn't carry a lunar module. Apollo thirteen survived because the
1:20:45
LM provided back up life support. It became a lifeboat.
1:20:51
Its systems kept the crew alive while the command module
1:20:54
was powered down to conserve battery power. Ryon stands alone
1:20:59
no no backup vehicle, no lifeboat. If life support fails catastrophically,
1:21:05
the crew has only their survival suits. Those suits provide
1:21:10
breathable air for six days maximum, six days to get home,
1:21:15
six days for mission control to devise solutions, six days
1:21:19
before air runs out. The ECLSS already showed problems, minor ones,
1:21:26
manageable ones. Christina Coke troubleshooted the toilet controller issue successfully,
1:21:33
but that was a small problem, a single valve, a
1:21:36
single controller. What if larger failures occur. The ECLSS made
1:21:44
its debut on this flight, Artemis ie didn't carry a
1:21:48
complete life support system. This is the first time all
1:21:52
components operate together in actual space conditions. Testing happened at
1:21:57
the ground in vacuum chambers in simulated environments, but simulation
1:22:03
isn't reality. The twenty four hour checkout period in low
1:22:07
earth orbit was supposed to catch major problems orion remained
1:22:13
close to Earth for a full day. The crew tested
1:22:16
every system. They verified functionality, they confirmed readiness. Then they
1:22:22
committed to the translunar injection burn, no turning back. After that,
1:22:28
everything checked out. The ECLSS worked, life support functioned. The
1:22:35
crew pressed forward. They're committed. Now They're beyond the point
1:22:41
where Earth is an easy destination. If catastrophic ECLSS failure occurs,
1:22:47
now the crew faces terrible choices. Try to repair it
1:22:52
using whatever tools and materials are available, ration, air, and water.
1:22:57
To extend survival time, rush back to Earth on the
1:23:01
fastest possible trajectory, accepting whatever risks that entails. The free
1:23:07
return trajectory provides one option. Let the Moon's gravity slingshot
1:23:12
them homeward. Minimal propulsion required, conservation of consumables, maximum survival time,
1:23:19
but free return takes days, days of breathing, days of drinking,
1:23:26
days of co two removal days that require functioning life support.
1:23:32
Apollo thirteen stretched their consumables by shutting down non essential systems.
1:23:37
They endured cold, darkness, minimal power, They accepted discomfort to
1:23:44
extend survival time. Could the Artemis two crew do the same.
1:23:49
Their survival suits help, But suits are emergency equipment, temporary solutions,
1:23:56
not designed for days of continuous use. They'll buy time,
1:24:01
maybe enough time, maybe not. The power system is another vulnerability.
1:24:07
Solar arrays generate electricity, batteries store it, power conditioning units
1:24:13
distribute it. Everything depends on electrical power, life support, navigation, communication,
1:24:23
thermal control, propulsion, everything. During Artemis I, one power conditioning
1:24:30
unit experienced an anomaly. It recovered, systems continued functioning. But
1:24:38
what if it hadn't recovered. What if the failure was permanent?
1:24:43
What if multiple units failed? The spacecraft carries back up
1:24:47
batteries Eagle picture silver zinc batteries, the same type that
1:24:53
saved Apollo thirteen. Those batteries can provide emergency power, but
1:24:59
only for limited duration. They're not designed to run the
1:25:03
entire spacecraft indefinitely. Vibration testing revealed a frightening possibility. During
1:25:11
extreme abort scenarios, batteries might disconnect. Physical disconnection. No electrical
1:25:19
connection means no power. No power means no parachutes. No
1:25:25
parachutes means no safe landing. That's a fringe scenario. It
1:25:30
requires both SLS failure and maximum abought motor vibration unlikely.
1:25:36
Combination but unlikely isn't impossible. Columbia's foam strike was unlikely.
1:25:43
Challenger's O ring failure was unlikely. Unlikely. Events kill crews.
1:25:48
NASA rebuilt the batteries, requalified them, strengthened connections, added redundancy.
1:25:55
The problem should be fixed, should be probably is almost
1:26:00
certainly is but certainly isn't absolute. The crew doesn't dwell
1:26:05
on worst case scenarios. They focus on procedures, on training,
1:26:11
on the mission profile. Dwelling on disaster serves no purpose.
1:26:17
Preparation serves purpose. They're prepared. Their approaching loss as signal
1:26:23
now the Moon's bulk will block transmission soon the last
1:26:28
communication window before forty minutes of silence. Mission control provides
1:26:33
final updates. Trajectory looks good, systems nominal, whether at recovery
1:26:39
sight is acceptable. Everything proceeding is planned. Wiseman acknowledges his
1:26:44
voice is calm, professional, no hint of concern. The crew
1:26:50
is ready. They've trained for this moment. They know what
1:26:55
to do. See you on the other side, Wiseman says,
1:27:00
standard phrase used since Apollo. Acknowledgment that they are about
1:27:05
to disappear from view. Confidence that they'll reappear. Copy that
1:27:11
Oriyan see you in forty Capcom responds equally calm, equally professional.
1:27:18
The routine exchange masks underlying tension. Everyone knows the risks,
1:27:24
Everyone hopes for the best. The signal fades, Telemetry stops
1:27:29
updating the screens in mission control freeze on last known values.
1:27:35
Everything looks good. Everything looked good for Apollo thirteen to
1:27:39
two write up, until it didn't. Flight controllers settle in
1:27:44
to wait forty minutes twenty four hundred seconds, time measured
1:27:50
in heartbeats and held breath. They watch the countdown clock.
1:27:55
They review procedures, They prepare for reacquisition of signal. Behind
1:28:01
the Moon, the crew floats in silence, no communication with Earth,
1:28:06
no reassuring voices from mission control, just the soft hum
1:28:11
of ventilation fans, the quiet beeping of systems monitoring themselves,
1:28:17
the presence of three other humans in a very small space.
1:28:20
They follow the timeline, execute planned activities, take photographs, record observations,
1:28:28
collect data. The mission continues even without audience, especially without audience.
1:28:35
This is what they came for. The Moon fills their windows,
1:28:39
now ancient surface, billions of years old, unchanged by wind
1:28:45
or water, every crater preserved, every impact recorded in stone.
1:28:52
The crew sees what no human has seen in fifty years,
1:28:56
the far side in stunning detail. They're making his way
1:29:00
or their becoming history. The distinction depends on the next
1:29:05
several days, on systems continuing to function, on calculations being correct,
1:29:11
on luck favoring the prepared for humans, beyond Earth's protection,
1:29:17
beyond quick rescue, beyond easy solutions. They chose this, They
1:29:22
trained for this, They accepted the risks. Now they face
1:29:27
the reality of those risks alone behind the Moon, Trusting
1:29:32
systems that have flown only once before, trusting a heat
1:29:36
shield that failed its first test, Trusting decisions made by
1:29:40
people under immense political pressure. The flyby continues, orion swings
1:29:46
around the lunar far side. Gravity bends their path, velocity increases.
1:29:53
The trajectory is working for now. The minimum altitude is approaching.
1:29:58
Closest approach to the the lunar surface happens soon, sixty
1:30:03
nautical miles above ancient craters, lower than any human since
1:30:08
nineteen seventy two. The crew watches through windows, gray landscape,
1:30:14
harsh shadows, no atmosphere to soften edges. Wise Men activates
1:30:19
the camera, high resolution images for mission planners, data for
1:30:24
future landing sites, scientific value, public relations value, proof they
1:30:30
were here. Coke floats to the window. First woman, this
1:30:34
close to the moon, historic milestone, symbolic achievement, But symbols
1:30:40
don't keep you alive. Systems keep you alive. She photographs
1:30:46
Mere Tranquilitatis, the Sea of Tranquility, where Armstrong and Aldrin landed,
1:30:52
where humanity first touched another world. The site looks impossibly
1:30:57
small from here, fragile, one tiny spot on a vast
1:31:01
dead world. Glover monitors navigation data, trajectory matches, predictions within
1:31:07
acceptable margins, velocity correct, altitude correct, everything nominal. The Moon's
1:31:15
gravity is pulling them exactly as calculated. Physics working as advertised,
1:31:21
hands and check's life support readings, oxygen levels, stable, carbon
1:31:26
dioxide removal, functioning temperature control, maintaining cabin environment. The ECLSS
1:31:34
hasn't failed yet, hasn't proven Commanda's warnings, hasn't vindicated NASA's
1:31:40
confidence either, just keeps working for now. The far side
1:31:45
passes beneath them, never visible from Earth, radio silent, completely alone.
1:31:52
No emergency rescue possible here, no quick abort if something
1:31:57
fails behind the moon. They handle it themselves, or they
1:32:00
don't handle it at all. Mission control can't help from Houston,
1:32:05
can't see telemetry, can't monitor systems, can't offer advice. The
1:32:11
crew is autonomous, self sufficient, dependent only on their training
1:32:15
and their spacecraft. Training prepares you for known problems. Teachers
1:32:21
procedures builds muscle memory, but unknown problems don't follow procedures.
1:32:28
They require improvisation, judgment. Luck. The Apollo thirteen crew had luck.
1:32:35
Explosion didn't destroy command module, Lunar modules still functional, free
1:32:41
return trajectory still achievable. Ground support could calculate solutions. Brilliant
1:32:47
engineers could improvise fixes. Would Artemis two have the same luck?
1:32:53
Would an explosion leave systems intact? Would the trajectory remain favorable?
1:32:59
Would solutions exist for problems not yet imagined? Nobody knows,
1:33:05
can't know, won't know unless it happens. The crew doesn't
1:33:10
discuss these scenarios, doesn't verbalize fears. Professional astronauts maintain professional demeanor,
1:33:17
calm voices, steady hands, focus on tasks, But everyone thinks
1:33:22
about it. Impossible not to think about it. History teaches
1:33:27
what can go wrong. Reality shows how fragile. These machines
1:33:32
are experience demonstrates that unlikely events occur. The flyby continues minutes.
1:33:39
Pass systems continue functioning each minute without incident. Builds confidence
1:33:46
or maybe just postpones inevitable failure. Wiseman reviews the timeline.
1:33:52
Next major event is trans Earth injection burn seven hours
1:33:56
from now. The engine firing that sends them home critical maneuver,
1:34:02
no backup if it fails. The main engine must fire,
1:34:06
must burn for exact duration, must provide precise velocity change.
1:34:11
Otherwise they don't return to Earth. They drift into solar orbit,
1:34:16
become permanent space debris, with four dead astronauts inside. The
1:34:22
engine worked during Artemis I fired perfectly met all performance specifications.
1:34:28
But that was then. This is now different spacecraft, different conditions,
1:34:34
different stakes. Engine reliability isn't guaranteed by previous success. Each
1:34:40
firing is independent event. Combustion chamber could crack, fuel lines
1:34:46
could leak, valves could stick, ignition could fail. NASA tested extensively,
1:34:52
qualified the engine, certified it for flight, same process used
1:34:57
for Apollo, same engineering standards, same safety margins, same standards
1:35:04
that approved Challenger's O rings, same engineering that cleared Columbia's
1:35:09
foam strike, same safety margins that failed catastrophically. Wiseman doesn't
1:35:15
think about that, can't afford to think about that. He
1:35:18
thinks about procedures, about timeline, about mission objectives, about doing
1:35:24
the job he trained for. Koke photographs the lunar South
1:35:29
Pole future landing site for Artemis three, where NASA plans
1:35:35
to establish permanent presence where water ice might exist in
1:35:39
shadowed craters, where humanity might build lunar base. Ambitious plan,
1:35:45
expensive plan, politically driven plan, built on foundation of Artemis
1:35:51
two success. If this mission fails, those plans collapse, program ends,
1:35:57
political support evaporates, the whole architecture falls apart. Four lives
1:36:03
carry the weight of entire program. Their survival determines NASA's future.
1:36:08
Their success enables Moon Base. Their failure ends decades of planning.
1:36:14
Nobody told them this explicitly, didn't need to tell them.
1:36:18
They understand political reality, understand budget pressures, Understand that programs
1:36:24
die when crews die. Glover checks radiation decimitter readings, exposure
1:36:30
accumulating steadily within predicted ranges. No solar events currently, space
1:36:37
weather remains quiet. The sun cooperates for now, solar storms
1:36:44
are unpredictable, can irrupt without warning, Plasma ejections traveling millions
1:36:51
of miles per hour, arriving hours after initial flare, flooding
1:36:56
spacecraft with radiation. The crew train for this scenario knows
1:37:02
the procedures, pile equipment around, sleeping quarters, create makeshift radiation shelter,
1:37:08
wait out the storm. Hope the shielding helps. But how
1:37:12
much would it actually help? Unknown never tested with real
1:37:17
solar event, never validated with actual measurements. Theory says it works.
1:37:23
Models predict effectiveness. Reality might disagree. Apollo astronauts got lucky,
1:37:29
missed major storms, flew between dangerous events. Timing saved them,
1:37:35
not planning, not engineering, just luck. Artemis two needs the
1:37:42
same luck, maybe more luck, staying in space longer than Apollo,
1:37:48
more exposure time, more opportunities for solar events. Statistics work
1:37:54
against them. Handsome monitors, communication systems getting close to reacquisition
1:38:00
of signal. Soon they'll emerge from behind the Moon, resume
1:38:05
contact with Earth, end the isolation. The forty minutes felt
1:38:10
longer than forty minutes. Time distorts in stress, stretches during
1:38:16
uncertainty every minute, wondering if systems will keep working every second,
1:38:22
watch in indicators, waiting for warning lights, listening for unusual sounds.
1:38:29
Nothing unusual happened. Everything function normally. Uneventful is good, boring
1:38:36
is wonderful. Routine is exactly what you want. The lunar
1:38:41
limb approaches in windows, Earth about to reappear, blue marble
1:38:47
rising over gray horizon, Home becoming visible again. Connection restoring signal,
1:38:55
lock achieved. Telemetry streaming to Houston. Mission controls their data again,
1:39:01
watches system status, monitors, health parameters, Orian Houston, we have
1:39:08
you back. Capcom announces relief evident in voice controlled relief,
1:39:15
professional relief, but relief nonetheless. Roger Houston, good to hear
1:39:20
you again. Wisemann responds, same controlled tone, same professionalism, same
1:39:27
underlying emotion. Flight controllers review data, dumps everything nominal during
1:39:34
loss of signal. All systems perform correctly, no anomalies detected.
1:39:40
Successful flyby. The crew receives congratulations, good job, historic achievement,
1:39:47
farthest from Earth since Apollo, first woman, beyond low orbit,
1:39:52
Canadian astronaut reaching deep space. Milestone's matter for history books,
1:39:58
for press releases, for political speeches, for inspiring next generation.
1:40:05
They don't matter for survival. Survival depends on next seven hours.
1:40:10
Going perfectly depends on engine firing correctly depends on trajectory calculations.
1:40:17
Being accurate depends on nothing unexpected happening. The crew begins
1:40:23
trans earth injection preparations, review procedures, check systems, verify parameters,
1:40:31
everything by checklist, nothing left to chance, nothing assumed. Glover
1:40:36
monitors propulsion systems, fuel pressures normal, helium pressurization, stable, valve
1:40:43
positions correct, engine ready for firing. Coke verifies navigation data
1:40:49
position confirmed, velocity measured, trajectory calculated, burn parameters loaded, computer
1:40:58
ready to execute, handsome CHEX life support one more time.
1:41:02
Can't check too often. ECLSS still functioning, still providing air,
1:41:09
still removing CO two, still maintaining temperature, still keeping them alive.
1:41:16
Wiseman reviews abought procedures, What to do if engine fails,
1:41:21
how to troubleshoot problems, when to shut down, when to
1:41:25
try restart, Planning for failure while expecting success. The abort
1:41:31
options aren't good. If trans earth injection fails completely, they're stuck.
1:41:37
Free return trajectory only works if they're still on it
1:41:41
after flyby. They're committed. Engine must fire, or they don't
1:41:45
come home. Partial burn might be worse than no burn.
1:41:50
Wrong trajectory, wrong velocity, miss earth entirely, or hit atmosphere.
1:41:57
Wrong angle too steep means incineration. Too shallow means skip
1:42:04
back into space. The margins are raiser thin mathematic sunforgiving
1:42:09
physics doesn't negotiate. Either the numbers work or they don't.
1:42:14
Apollo thirteen's engine fired perfectly when needed, brought them back,
1:42:20
saved their lives. But that engine was different design, different fuel,
1:42:26
different conditions. Not relevant to Artemis two, except as reminder
1:42:31
that engines can work when everything else fails, or reminder
1:42:35
that engines matter, that single points of failure exist, that
1:42:40
backup plans have limits. The countdown begins t minus thirty
1:42:46
minutes to trans earth injection, half hour until commitment, until
1:42:51
point of no return becomes literal. Mission control provides final
1:42:56
trajectory updates, minor adjustments to burn per parameters, optimization based
1:43:03
on actual position and velocity, fine tuning the numbers. Every
1:43:08
decimal point matters. Every fraction of a meter per second
1:43:12
affects landing location. Too much correction means splash down wrong place.
1:43:17
Too little means same problem, recovery forces, weight at predicted location,
1:43:23
ships positioned, helicopters ready, rescue swimmers standing by. Navy prepared
1:43:30
for normal landing, also prepared for abnormal landing. Contingency plans
1:43:36
for landing anywhere in broad ocean area. But contingency plans
1:43:40
assume spacecraft survives re entry, assumes heat shield works, assumes
1:43:47
parachutes deploy, assumes crew alive to recover TuS fifteen minutes,
1:43:53
crew strapped into seats, helmets secured, suit pressures checked, ready
1:43:59
for engine burn, ready for acceleration, ready for gravity forces
1:44:04
pushing them into seats. The burn will last several minutes.
1:44:07
Steady thrust building velocity, changing trajectory from lunar orbit to
1:44:13
Earth intercept. Mathematics made physical coke watches count down, timer
1:44:19
digital numbers decreasing each second, bringing them closer to commitment,
1:44:24
closer to home, closer to heat shield test, closer to
1:44:29
finding out if NASA's confidence was justified. Glover's hand rests
1:44:34
near a bought button. Won't need it, probably, but it's
1:44:38
there just in case if engine shows problems, if thrust drops,
1:44:44
if anything goes wrong during burn. A bought during trans
1:44:49
earth injection creates nightmare scenario stuck in wrong orbit, wrong trajectory,
1:44:56
limited options, all bad tem five minutes final systems check,
1:45:03
everything shows green, all parameters nominal, spacecraft ready, crew ready,
1:45:09
mission control ready. Hanson takes deep breath, slow exhale, controlling
1:45:14
stress response, managing adrenaline, staying focused, staying calm, Nobody talks,
1:45:22
nothing to say, procedures complete, checklist finished, Now they wait,
1:45:28
watch countdown, trust systems, trust engineers, trust physics. T minus
1:45:34
one minute, longest sixty seconds of the mission, longer than
1:45:38
loss of signal, longer than launch hold time, stretching again
1:45:43
each second, Individually experienced Wiseman's finger hovers over manual abort,
1:45:50
won't use it unless absolutely necessary, but ready, always ready,
1:45:56
T minus thirty seconds. Computer controlling seeksquents now, automated systems
1:46:02
managing ignition, humans, monitoring, supervising, ready to intervene T minus
1:46:08
ten nine, eight, seven, six, five four three two one
1:46:15
Engine ignition thrust builds smoothly, acceleration, pushing crew into seats,
1:46:21
G forces increasing, not violent, controlled exactly as predicted. Glover
1:46:28
watches thrust indicator. Nominal engine performing correctly, fuel flow, steady
1:46:34
chamber pressure, good burn continues twenty seconds, thirty seconds still nominal,
1:46:42
still perfect, mathematics becoming reality. Forty five seconds halfway through burn,
1:46:51
velocity increasing, trajectory, changing Earth intercept path developing. Sixty seconds,
1:46:59
three quarters compat, no problems, no anomalies. Engine doing exactly
1:47:04
what it's supposed to do. Seventy five seconds almost finished.
1:47:09
Final moments of burn, critical seconds, eighty two seconds engine cutoff,
1:47:15
burn complete, perfect execution, Silence in cabin, Nobody speaks, waiting
1:47:22
for confirmation, waiting for numbers. Mission control analyzes telemetry, calculates
1:47:30
actual trajectory, compares to planned trajectory orion Houston trans Earth
1:47:37
injection nominal, You're coming home. Relief floods through crew, Weizman nods,
1:47:43
Coke smiles, Glover exhales, handsome grins. One major hurdle cleared,
1:47:49
engine worked, trajectory correct their returning to Earth. But the
1:47:54
hardest part remains. Re entry awaits heat shield testas three
1:48:01
thousand degrees awaits the moment where NASA's decisions get validated
1:48:06
or crew gets killed. Seventy two hours until that moment.
1:48:11
Three days to contemplate what's coming, three days to trust
1:48:15
controversial heat shield, three days to wonder if they'll survive
1:48:20
the fire entry interface minus three days orion coasts through void,
1:48:27
silent spacecraft, sleeping crew Earth growing larger in window, blue marble,
1:48:33
expanding home, approaching cock wakes first checks, radiation decimiter, daily
1:48:41
ritual numbers slightly elevated, still with inacceptable limits, Cosmic rays
1:48:48
penetrating hull, invisible particles passing through her body, through her cells,
1:48:56
through her DNA. She doesn't think about long term effects,
1:49:00
cancer risk years from now, cataracts developing later. Apollo astronauts
1:49:06
experienced both price of deep space exploration, price she accepted
1:49:12
when she signed up. Glover stirs stretches in microgravity, muscles
1:49:18
already weakening ten days insufficient for serious atrophy, but body
1:49:24
changing nonetheless, bone density decreasing, cardiovascular system adapting, fluid shifting
1:49:31
toward head. They'll need help walking after landing. Medical teams
1:49:36
standing by normal for returning astronauts. Even short missions require
1:49:42
readjustment period, hands and check systems. Everything nominal life support
1:49:48
functioning perfectly, no valve failures, no controller malfunctions. The twenty
1:49:54
four hour checkout in low earth orbit proved critical ECLSS
1:50:00
performing exactly as designed, temperature stable, pressure, stable, oxygen levels
1:50:06
good CO two scrubbers working, water reclamation, operating all systems. Green.
1:50:13
Wiseman joins them. Quiet morning in spacecraft, if you can
1:50:17
call it morning. Sun rises every ninety minutes in low
1:50:22
Earth orbit. But they're not in low Earth orbit anymore.
1:50:26
They're in cislunar space between worlds. Sleep okay, Coke asks,
1:50:33
Wiseman nods. Dreams about re entry. Everyone dreams about re entry.
1:50:40
The moment approaching unavoidable, inescapable three thousand degrees, waiting, controversial
1:50:47
heat shield, waiting NASA's confidence, waiting to be tested. They
1:50:52
eat breakfast, rehydrated food, not gourmet but functional, calories needed,
1:50:59
nutrition required. Bodies preparing for ordeal ahead, Mission control established,
1:51:05
communication window, morning briefing scheduled, weather update expected, trajectory confirmation
1:51:12
planned orion Houston Good morning morning, Houston, ready for briefing.
1:51:20
Weather looking favorable for a primary landing zone. Backup sites
1:51:25
also clear. Recovery forces positioned, US S, Philippine C on station,
1:51:32
Philippine Sea amphibious assault ship, helicopters aboard, rescue swimmers ready,
1:51:40
medical team prepared. Recovery operations planned down to smallest detail.
1:51:47
Trajectory remains nominal. No correction burns required. Current path will
1:51:53
bring you to entry interface as scheduled entry interface the
1:51:57
moment oryan hits atmosphere, the moment heat shield gets tested,
1:52:03
The moment everything matters. Seventy two hours from that moment
1:52:08
three days counting down. Coke reviews procedures, re entry checklist memorized,
1:52:15
but she reviews anyway. Repetition builds confidence, Confidence reduces stress.
1:52:22
Stress management critical during high risk operations. Service module jettison
1:52:27
first explosive bolts, separate modules, service module burns up in atmosphere,
1:52:33
disposable hardware one time use, then attitude control reaction thrusters
1:52:40
orient heat shield precise positioning required. Shield must face incoming atmosphere,
1:52:48
must take full thermal load. Any misalignment could expose crew,
1:52:52
module sides, could compromise protection, could kill crew. Automated systems
1:52:59
handle more most of it, but crew monitors ready to intervene,
1:53:04
ready to take manual control if needed. Glover studies, telemetry,
1:53:09
spacecraft health data, all parameters nominal power systems functioning batteries
1:53:15
charging properly, solar arrays generating expected output. Those batteries rebuilt
1:53:22
after vibration testing revealed potential disconnect during a bought Eagle
1:53:28
picture technologies requalified units, same batteries that saved Apollo thirteen.
1:53:34
Legacy of reliability, but also legacy of learning from near disaster,
1:53:40
hands and checks. Communication systems, multiple redundancies, multiple frequencies, multiple networks,
1:53:48
deep space network tracking them, commercial satellites providing backup laser
1:53:55
communication system tested earlier in mission. But none of that
1:53:59
matter during blackout, When plasma forms around spacecraft during re entry,
1:54:05
when superheated gases block all signals, when crew becomes completely
1:54:10
isolated from ground, four minutes of silence, four minutes mission
1:54:16
control can't help, four minutes crew completely alone, four minutes
1:54:21
trusting heat shield, trusting trajectory, trusting NASA's controversial decision. Wiseman
1:54:29
thinks about those four minutes, thinks about plasma blackout, thinks
1:54:34
about emerging from darkness, either alive or dead, either successful
1:54:40
or catastrophic, no middle ground. During re entry. You think
1:54:45
about Columbia, Glover asks quietly, everyone thinks about Columbia. Damaged
1:54:51
heat shield on launch, undetected damage, foam strike, creating whole
1:54:57
hot gases penetrating during re entry, spacecraft disintegrating crew lost
1:55:04
different scenario. Wiseman says, we know our heat shield condition.
1:55:09
We know what happened on Artemis Ie. NASA modified trajectory
1:55:14
specifically to address it. Commada doesn't think that's enough. Charles Commada,
1:55:21
former NASA engineer, former astronaut, vocal critic of decision to
1:55:27
fly Artemis two, argues agency repeating Columbia mistakes building models
1:55:33
to justify desired conclusion, flying on hope rather than data.
1:55:39
Commada doesn't have all the information. Wiseman says, neither do.
1:55:43
We report was redacted true. Publicly released version heavily redacted.
1:55:50
Tiger Team findings partially classified specific details withheld NASA citing
1:55:56
proprietary concerns, commercial sensitivity, national security implications, but also hiding uncertainty,
1:56:05
hiding risk, hiding controversial decisions from public scrutiny. Coke interrupts,
1:56:12
we accepted the risk, we trust the analysis. We're going home.
1:56:17
Conversation ends nothing more to say. Decision made, trajectory set
1:56:23
re entry, approaching entry interface minus forty eight hours. Earth
1:56:28
dominates window now beautiful planet, blue oceans, white clouds, brown continents,
1:56:35
home world, fragile ecosystem, pale blue dot. From this distance,
1:56:40
you can't see borders, can't see nations, can't see conflicts.
1:56:45
Just one planet, one humanity, one shared home. They've traveled
1:56:51
farther from Earth than any humans in fifty years, seen
1:56:55
Moon up close, experience deep space, crossed boundary, Apollo astronauts crossed,
1:57:02
joined exclusive club. But now they want home. Want gravity,
1:57:07
Want air without recycling. Want horizon that doesn't curve sharply,
1:57:13
Want sky that isn't black. Mission Control provides update Artemis
1:57:19
two Houston entry trajectory confirmed interface in forty seven hours
1:57:25
thirty two minutes. Weather remains favorable. Copy Houston forty seven
1:57:31
thirty two to interface. Cop performs final equipment checks. Survival
1:57:36
suits inspected, helmets tested, pressure seals verified, communications confirmed. Every
1:57:44
system scrutinized. These suits keep them alive if cabin de pressurizes,
1:57:49
Provide breathable air, remove CO two, maintain temperature protect during
1:57:55
splashdown six days. Survival capability more than enough for recovery operations.
1:58:02
Glover reviews landing procedures water land indifferent from runway landing.
1:58:08
Shuttle landed on concrete orion lands in ocean. Capsule designed
1:58:13
to float stable in multiple orientations. Rescue swimmers attach flotation collar.
1:58:20
Helicopter recovery lifts crew out unless something goes wrong, unless
1:58:25
parachutes fail, unless capsule sinks, unless crew injured, unless recovery delayed.
1:58:33
Contingency plans exist for everything. NASA learned from Mercury, from Gemini,
1:58:39
from Apollo, from Shuttle, sixty years of lessons, sixty years
1:58:44
of close calls, sixty years of occasionally fatal mistakes. Hansen
1:58:50
thinks about those mistakes. Challenger Columbia Apollo one, saw Yu's one,
1:58:56
sawyus eleven long list of disasters, each one teaching lesson
1:59:01
each one, changing procedures, each one paid for with human lives.
1:59:06
Will Artemis two add to that list? Or prove NASA
1:59:10
learned lessons, Prove modified trajectory works, Prove heat shield adequate
1:59:16
forty eight hours until answer entry interface minus twenty four hours,
1:59:21
final day, final checks, final preparations. Crew compartment feels smaller
1:59:27
now ten days together, confined space, limited privacy, psychological pressure
1:59:34
building normal for long duration missions. Manageable but present. They've
1:59:40
handled it well. Professional astronauts trained for isolation, trained for confinement,
1:59:47
trained for interpersonal stress. But training doesn't eliminate it, just
1:59:53
makes it manageable. Mission controls, schedules, final conference. Administrator wants
2:00:00
to speak with Crewe, public relations. Opportunity, inspiring moment, historic achievement,
2:00:07
but also possible final communication if re entry fails, if
2:00:12
heat shield fails, if crew dies, last words preserved, last
2:00:17
message recorded, Artemis two. This is Houston, administrator on the line.
2:00:22
Go ahead, Houston, crew of Artemis two. You've accomplished something remarkable,
2:00:28
First humans beyond low Earth orbit in half a century.
2:00:32
You've tested systems, proven capabilities, paved way for Artemis three
2:00:38
lunar landing. The world watches, the world waits. We're ready
2:00:43
to bring you home. Wiseman responds, thank you, sir, We're
2:00:48
ready see you tomorrow. Professional confident, calm, exactly right, tone,
2:00:55
no fear, no doubt, no hesitation, But fear exists. Doubt exists,
2:01:01
Hesitation exists hidden beneath professional exterior controlled but present. They
2:01:07
secure equipment, Stow loose items, prepare cabin for re entry forces.
2:01:13
Everything must be restrained. Anything loose becomes projectile during deceleration,
2:01:19
could injure Crewe, could damage systems, Coke double checks, heat
2:01:24
shield orientation procedures, reviews, manual backup studies, contingency plans. Preparation
2:01:32
reduces anxiety, control reduces fear. Glover reviews medical supplies, emergency
2:01:39
equipment accessible, trauma kit ready, medications available, hope to never
2:01:45
use them, but ready if needed. Hanson performs final systems
2:01:50
check power levels, good battery charge, optimal fuel reserves, adequate,
2:01:56
reaction control, propellants sufficient, all consumable within limits. Wiseman updates
2:02:02
flight plan timing critical entry angle critical too steep and
2:02:08
deceleration kills them too shallow and they skip off atmosphere.
2:02:13
Goldilocks zone narrow margin for error small. NASA calculated precisely
2:02:20
modified trajectory accounts for heat shield concerns. Steeper entry profile,
2:02:25
no skip maneuver, straight plunge into atmosphere, shorter downrange landing,
2:02:31
higher G forces but supposedly safer for heat shield supposedly
2:02:37
based on analysis based on models based on extrapolation from
2:02:42
artemis Ie. Damage based on Tiger Team conclusions based on
2:02:46
redacted report based on NASA's confidence entry interface minus twelve
2:02:52
hours sleep scheduled rest required. Bodies need recovery, mines need
2:02:59
break re entry demands, full alertness, full capability, full performance,
2:03:05
but sleep difficult. Mind's racing hearts pounding, adrenaline building, natural
2:03:12
stress response, evolution, preparing them for danger. Coke lies in
2:03:17
sleeping bag, eyes closed, breathing, controlled meditation, techniques, stress management,
2:03:25
mental preparation. She thinks about heat shield, thinks about av
2:03:30
coat material, thinks about internal pressure, thinks about cracking, thinks
2:03:36
about uneven shedding, thinks about one hundred locations where material
2:03:42
liberated during artemis Ie re entry. She thinks about NASA's
2:03:46
solution modified trajectory, steeper entry, elimination of skip, supposedly minimizing charloss,
2:03:55
supposedly providing adequate thermal margin, supposedly glos. Also awake, also thinking,
2:04:02
also worrying. He thinks about his family, thinks about home,
2:04:08
thinks about seeing them again, thinks about possibility of not
2:04:12
seeing them again. Space exploration requires sacrifice, requires risk. Acceptance
2:04:20
requires willingness to die for advancement of knowledge, for expansion
2:04:24
of humanity, for dreams of exploration. But willingness doesn't mean desire.
2:04:31
Acceptance doesn't mean eagerness. They want to live, want to return,
2:04:36
want to survive fire. Hanson reviews procedures mentally, each step memorized,
2:04:44
each action planned, each contingency considered, mental rehearsal, proven, effective visualization,
2:04:52
improving performance, preparation, building confidence Wise men lies still breathing, steady,
2:05:00
appearing calm, but mind active. Commander responsibility heavy, crue safety
2:05:06
his priority, mission success important, but crue safety paramount. He
2:05:12
thinks about decisions, thinks about NASA's choice, thinks about flying
2:05:18
without redesigned heat shield, thinks about commercial crew standards, thinks
2:05:24
about double standards, thinks about political pressure, thinks about schedule pressure,
2:05:30
thinks about budget pressure, thinks about crew in his care.
2:05:35
Entry interface minus six hours wake up call from mission control.
2:05:41
Final preparations begin, Suits donned, systems activated, checklists executed, Earth
2:05:49
fills window completely now massive, sphere destination visible, home close,
2:05:57
but barrier remains, atmosphere remains, heat shield test remains Artemis
2:06:04
two Houston Entry Interface. In six hours, all systems go
2:06:09
for re entry copy Houston were ready, final meal consumed,
2:06:14
last food before landing, calories needed, energy required, Bodies preparing
2:06:20
for stress. They don helmets, seal suits, check pressures, verify communications.
2:06:27
Each astronaut becomes self contained, system protected, isolated, independent service
2:06:34
module jettison scheduled for interface minus thirty minutes explosive separation
2:06:40
final commitment. No are bought possible after jettison. They're committed
2:06:46
to re entry, committed to heat shield, committed to NASA's confidence.
2:06:52
Coke watches count down, timer numbers decreasing each second, bringing
2:06:58
them closer closer to fire, closer to plasma, closer to
2:07:04
finding out if they survive. Entry Interface minus one hour.
2:07:10
Wiseman takes manual control, automated systems ready, but commander monitoring,
2:07:16
ready to intervene, ready to adjust, ready to react. Glover
2:07:21
monitors trajectory, perfect alignment, exact entry angle, precise timing, mathematics made,
2:07:28
physical calculations made real, handsome checks, life support, final time, oxygen,
2:07:35
good pressure, good temperature, good everything, nominal everything ready, Cox
2:07:42
hand rests near a bought trigger won't help now too
2:07:46
late for abort, but instinct keeps hand there, training keeps
2:07:51
hand ready. Entry Interface minus thirty minutes Artemis two Houston,
2:07:59
You are go for a service module SEP copy Houston
2:08:02
Gopher SEP Wiseman Arm's explosive bolts. Hanson confirms ready. Coke
2:08:08
monitors systems, Glover watches countdown t minus ten seconds to
2:08:12
separation nine eight seven, six, five, four three two one
2:08:20
explosive charges. Fire service module separates, tumbles away, begins death,
2:08:26
dive into atmosphere, will burn completely, will leave no trace,
2:08:30
orion alone now crewe module only heat shield exposed facing destiny,
2:08:37
facing fire facing test Entry interface minus fifteen minutes. Attitude control, thrusters, fire,
2:08:45
rotating capsule, positioning, heat shield, precise orientation required, computer controlling
2:08:52
crew monitoring, earth rushing closer atmosphere approaching, invisible boundary ahead
2:09:00
carman line, edge of space, threshold between void and air.
2:09:06
Entry interface minus five minutes. Final systems check everything green,
2:09:12
all parameters nominal spacecraft ready, crew ready, heat shield ready,
2:09:18
or so. NASA believes Entry interface minus one minute longest
2:09:23
sixty seconds time stretching, each heartbeat individually counted, each breath
2:09:29
consciously taken. Coke Grip's armrests, Glover close his eyes briefly.
2:09:35
Hansome swallows hard, Wiseman watches displays T minus thirty seconds.
2:09:40
Atmosphere ahead, molecules waiting, friction, waiting, heat waiting three thousand degrees,
2:09:47
waiting T minus ten no turning back, no escape only
2:09:54
through only survival or death only, success or catastrophe five
2:10:01
four three two one. Entry interface first molecules hit, heat
2:10:08
shield friction begins, temperature rises. Avcoat starts are blating exactly
2:10:15
as designed, material, sacrificing itself, carrying heat away, protecting crew,
2:10:22
G forces, building deceleration increasing, bodies pressed into seats. Modified
2:10:28
trajectory means higher gs. Steeper entry means harder forces, but
2:10:33
forces tolerable within human limits. Uncomfortable but survivable. Heat shield
2:10:40
glowing now orange, red white, incandescent plasma forming around capsule,
2:10:47
superheated gases, ionized particles, radio blackout beginning Houston orion entering blackout,
2:10:57
last words before silence, last communication before isolation. Four minutes alone,
2:11:05
four minutes trusting heat shield four minutes hoping, NASA write
2:11:09
plasma envelope complete. Now, Spacecraft surrounded, glowing cocoon, beautiful and terrifying.
2:11:17
Fire outside windows, orange light filling cabin. Temperature inside rising slightly,
2:11:23
heat conducting through hull not dangerous, not unexpected, but noticeable
2:11:29
reminder of inferno outside. G forces peak six gs seven
2:11:34
g's bodies, heavy breathing, difficult vision, narrowing, blood draining from heads,
2:11:41
training prevents blackout, Conditioning maintains consciousness. Heat shield performing ablating correctly,
2:11:50
charring predictably, material shedding, but evenly this time controlled, this
2:11:56
time modified trajectory working. NASA's confidence justified so far, peak
2:12:02
heating passing, temperature decreasing, plasma thinning, radio signals, penetrating, blackout
2:12:10
ending four minutes, elapsed, longest four minutes, eternal four minutes,
2:12:17
but survived, heat shield held, AVCOT worked, NASA, Wright, Orion, Houston,
2:12:25
How do you read? Beautiful words? Most beautiful words? Communication restored,
2:12:33
connection re established, no longer alone, Houston, Orion, loud and clear,
2:12:41
heat shield performed nominally. Relief floods, mission control applause erupts,
2:12:46
controllers celebrating, engineers vindicated, critics silenced, but re entry continues.
2:12:53
Parachute deployment ahead, water landing ahead, recovery ahead, still dangerous,
2:13:00
still critical, not finished yet. Drogue chutes deploy small parachutes,
2:13:06
stabilizing descent, slowing fall, preparing for manes. Main parachutes deploy
2:13:12
three massive canopies, orange and white billowing above capsule, slowing
2:13:19
descent to safe landing speed, ocean visible below, blue water,
2:13:25
white caps Recovery ships waiting, helicopters circling, rescue swimmers ready,
2:13:32
final moments of flight. Final seconds of mission, ten days
2:13:37
in space, ending historic flight, concluding splash down, impact, gentle,
2:13:44
water cushioning, landing, capsule, floating, stable, orientation, crew safe, mission successful, recovery.
2:13:52
Swimmers deployed immediately, flotation collar attached, capsule secured, helicopter approaching
2:14:00
hatch opens, fresh air enters, salt, smell, ocean, breeze, earth, atmosphere,
2:14:06
home air coke. Mergers first helped into rescue basket, lifted
2:14:11
to helicopter. Legs weak, gravity, heavy but alive, smiling, successful
2:14:17
Glover next, then Hansome, finally Wiseman. All four recovered, all
2:14:22
four healthy, all four home, USS Philippine Sea deck ahead,
2:14:27
medical team, waiting, debriefing, scheduled press conference, planned, celebrations prepared,
2:14:34
But first just breathing, just feeling gravity, just being home,
2:14:40
just being alive. Artemis two complete heat shield tested, controversy resolved,
2:14:47
NASA vindicated, crew safe, the fire survived, the gamble one,
2:14:53
the mission accomplished, and somewhere. Engineers already planning. Artemis three
2:14:59
already designed Luna Lander, already preparing for actual moon landing,
2:15:04
building on this success, learning from this mission, advancing towards
2:15:10
sustainable lunar presence, because this was never just about flying
2:15:15
around Moon, never just about testing hardware, never just about
2:15:20
proving capabilities. This was about returning to deep space, about
2:15:26
rekindling exploration, about preparing for Mars, about expanding human presence
2:15:32
beyond Earth. Artemis two proved it possible, Proved heat shield adequate,
2:15:39
proved systems reliable, Proved crew capable. The fire didn't kill them,
2:15:45
The risk didn't destroy them. The controversy didn't stop them.
2:15:51
They flew through Hell at three thousand degrees and emerged intact.
2:15:56
They trusted NASA's confidence and survived. They became first crew
2:16:01
beyond low Earth orbit in fifty years and returned safely.
2:16:06
The mission everyone said was too dangerous, The heat shield
2:16:11
everyone said would fail, The gamble everyone said wasn't worth taking.
2:16:16
All wrong, all proven wrong, all silenced by successful splashdown.
2:16:22
Artemis two complete crew, safe Moon program, continuing future secured.
2:16:29
The fire has been survived. Four astronauts floating in Pacific Ocean,
2:16:34
helicopter rotors beating overhead recovery swimmers securing capsule US S
2:16:40
Philippine Sea approaching mission successful, crew alive, heat shield held.
2:16:48
The fire has been survived once will be survived. Again
2:16:53
and again and again until it isn't listen