Latest / Combat Veteran News / Reacting to Crazy North Korea Combat Propaganda!

Transcript

Reacting to Crazy North Korea Combat Propaganda! · Combat Veteran News

0:00
The North Koreans are not exactly known
0:02
for their honest and transparent
0:04
government. So, it's unusual to see any
0:07
kind of propaganda video come out from
0:10
the DPRK, or at least one that contains
0:13
any elements of real operations. But the
0:17
latest drop from the North Koreans has
0:19
given us some real insight into their
0:22
2024 and 2025 operations in the Kursk
0:25
region. This is important because a lot
0:28
of intelligence indicates that the North
0:29
Koreans might be ramping up for another
0:31
operation.
0:33
But the real story, I think, is how to
0:35
tell propaganda from reality and who is
0:41
chiming in on the side of propaganda.
0:44
Let's take a look. So, I wanted to break
0:45
down this North Korean footage here
0:48
because I think this is pretty
0:49
significant and most of it should be
0:50
YouTube friendly. Uh I I really tried to
0:53
find this stuff that is at least
0:56
somewhat accessible to YouTube and the
1:00
North Koreans though it's worth noting
1:04
one we can see that there's so a lot of
1:06
this you've got to bear in mind is
1:08
likely staged and that could be filmed
1:12
uh you know filmed in Russia but not in
1:16
a combat zone. It could be filmed in a
1:18
combat zone but depicting like
1:21
non-combat operations. So, i.e. someone
1:23
shooting out of a window, but in fact,
1:25
they know there's not really a person
1:26
there, right? It could be training,
1:28
could be any number of things. But what
1:29
I think is significant is a there's a
1:32
couple of key factors here. One is this,
1:35
which appears to be a you North Korean
1:38
senior officer. We've heard that a
1:40
number that there were a small minority
1:42
of officers in this troop deployment. of
1:44
the I think 15,000 or so North Koreans
1:48
that deployed, you saw only about one to
1:52
200 officers. That's common in Soviet
1:54
militaries officers like like junior
1:56
officers leading from the front. It's
1:57
just not as much of a thing. Uh you see
2:00
more senior officers kind of in these
2:03
sort of forward positions, right? A lot
2:05
of times in these very hierarchical
2:07
militaries, this will be the only man
2:09
who can make any independent decision.
2:11
Everything a soldier is expected to do
2:13
is simply uh operate like an if then
2:16
statement. If you see a drone, you run
2:19
drill A2. If you see an enemy bunker,
2:22
you run drill A4. And the senior
2:26
commanders are the ones who will give
2:28
you more generalized orders. Beyond
2:30
that, you are not to take initiative
2:32
yourself. This is a key difference with
2:34
the US military where low-level
2:36
commanders are at least on paper
2:38
expected to have the authority to
2:41
stretch, adapt, even alter the goals of
2:43
their mission in the face of changing
2:45
circumstances. Uh, a good example from
2:49
my own experience, right, would be that
2:52
we were on a a patrol really really
2:55
close to the Pakistan border and we had
2:58
told our hireer that we were going to be
3:01
uh setting up a patrol base for
3:03
overnight in a clinic in a medical
3:06
clinic that our satellite image had
3:08
shown would be a pretty suitable
3:09
defensive spot. We get there, we look
3:11
around and we say, you know what,
3:12
actually this is kind of a death trap.
3:14
There's two narrow ways in and out. We
3:16
can't. We thought we would be able to
3:18
see them in satellite, but we actually
3:19
can't. There's some objects in the way.
3:20
And so I have to go, listen, we're going
3:22
to call an audible. We are actually
3:24
going to relocate to a different
3:27
position. We're going to split our
3:28
forces in two. Have one kind of
3:30
providing overwatch of the main patrol
3:31
base. And we are going to use this as
3:35
our sort of overnight fighting position,
3:37
our vehicle patrol base. Just had to
3:40
tell command, listen, circumstances
3:42
changed. This is the new location. uh
3:45
you know and and this is going to allow
3:47
us to achieve the ultimate objective.
3:49
There was other stuff where we had said
3:50
we're going to for example get to an
3:52
observation post. Well, we get as close
3:54
as we can. We say, "Listen, getting to
3:56
this observation post is actually so
3:58
inaccessible that it would our vehicles
4:00
can't provide overwatch. It's literally
4:02
too steep." Uh and so we say, "Okay,
4:04
we're going to audible it. We're going
4:05
to do a different related objective."
4:07
And this ability to do these things,
4:10
this empowerment to do these things for
4:12
junior officers, for non-commission
4:14
officers, that sense of listen, I'm
4:16
telling you what to do, but I'm telling
4:19
you why we want to do it. And the why is
4:20
more important because if you know the
4:22
why, you can think through the rest of
4:25
the problem. The North Korean officer
4:26
corps is not going to operate that way.
4:28
They can't for both political reasons
4:31
and also for uh just sort of cultural
4:35
reasons, right? there a Soviet military
4:36
outgrowth. So the fact that this guy is
4:38
here and conducting any level of
4:39
planning is a sign of just how much the
4:42
North Koreans wanted to be involved.
4:44
They weren't providing empty manpower.
4:46
They were providing leadership officers
4:48
who are going to learn about the tactics
4:49
and how to fight in this war.
4:53
And again, some of this looks
4:55
performative. You see some of these
4:56
senior folks here receiving a briefing.
4:58
This looks pretty Soviet. And I say that
5:01
because you can see there's some Russian
5:03
translators here. But oftentimes these
5:05
kind of briefings are formal affairs.
5:07
Guys will be told you will be wearing
5:09
your full body armor, your full kit,
5:11
even though it's in a bunker and likely
5:13
secured. Um, you can see that these are
5:17
just sparkling new helmets. And this is
5:20
common to all Soviet militaries,
5:22
including often the Ukrainian military,
5:23
where these briefings are like almost
5:25
performances. The actual execution of
5:27
the briefing is almost scripted. It's
5:29
almost reading from a script. instead,
5:32
right? You know, it doesn't look like
5:34
kind of the messy uh the messiness of a
5:38
real briefing. Again, oftentimes at the
5:41
brigade level, uh US briefings will be
5:44
the exact same way. Um the the cultural
5:47
belief among militaries is that the act
5:51
of preparing for a briefing is as
5:53
important or more important than the act
5:55
of executing the briefing. Right? The
5:57
fact that you wrote the script is more
5:59
important than you actually reading it.
6:04
Okay, so this looks like propaganda
6:07
again, a pre-brief, but here's a couple
6:08
of notes. One, you can see this plate
6:10
carrier. It's got this kind of
6:11
wraparound. I think this is probably a
6:15
um like a we some call them bulks. The
6:19
idea is that there is oftentimes a soft
6:23
kevlar armor that stretches up to the
6:24
shoulder and wraps around their waist to
6:26
protect against shrapnel. And then in
6:28
your front and back are ceramic plates
6:31
that are meant to uh um stop full-size
6:36
rifle rounds. And again, in 2024, 2025,
6:40
and certainly 2026, for the average
6:44
uh fighter in Ukraine, the odds of being
6:49
wounded by shrapnel or explosives is is
6:52
probably I would estimate it is probably
6:56
95 to five. 95% of casualties are from
6:59
explosive shrapnel uh which could be
7:02
stopped by soft armor. only 5% probably
7:04
are from uh uh rifle bullets, right?
7:08
Because only a tiny number of people
7:09
even get close enough to Russian forces
7:11
to engage in a direct firefight. So
7:14
again, does that mean that the Russian
7:16
these guys were expecting a direct
7:17
firefight? No. But it reflects again
7:20
probably Russian issued body armor.
7:22
That's sort of my theory.
7:27
This looks like training again. This
7:29
looks like more training footage. You
7:32
don't see as many mortar operations.
7:34
Okay, so they have these highlight reels
7:36
that are quick cuts. But here's what I
7:38
want to point out. You notice these are
7:39
not Korean markings. These are not
7:41
Russian markings. They're American
7:43
markings. And the reason is because they
7:44
are likely flying. These are
7:46
reconnaissance drones flying Mavics uh
7:49
uh right a Mavic 3 uh from DJI flagship.
7:55
Uh it's their flagship drone. It runs
7:59
you about $7,000. It is extremely
8:02
stabilized. Um, and it is a top tier
8:06
filming drone. It is also a top tier
8:09
combat drone. It was recently banned in
8:11
the United States. Um,
8:14
not because the DJI poses significant
8:17
security risks, but there is thinking
8:19
that that would be the case, but in part
8:20
to sort of create an environment in
8:22
which uh commercial drone companies can
8:24
scale up production, sort of own own the
8:26
market. Uh the fact that the president's
8:28
kids happen to be the board members of
8:31
really the only civilian drone companies
8:33
and they just got handed uh basically
8:35
the exclusive access to the US market is
8:38
not suspicious at all. So you can see
8:40
here again there's this uh North Korean
8:44
propaganda depicting the North Korean
8:46
state as being this like great paradise
8:49
worth defending. And I point out that
8:53
what I think is interesting about this
8:54
is that you have, you know, we
8:56
understand that these are this is part
8:59
of the
9:00
eb and flow of geopolitics. The North
9:04
Koreans have something that the Russians
9:05
want, which is trained military-age
9:08
males capable of fighting in an
9:10
organized way. The Russians desperately
9:12
need that. And in 2025, they really I
9:14
mean, they're desperate now, but they
9:16
were desperate then, too. because
9:18
oftentimes the average Russian recruit
9:19
has two weeks of training. The average
9:21
North Korean has mandatory military
9:23
service for nearly a decade. And so you
9:26
have someone who has
9:29
500 times the amount of training as a as
9:32
a regular uh Russian infantryman. So
9:35
even if it's mediocre quality North
9:37
Korean training, just simply living the
9:40
military lifestyle, you're going to get
9:41
a higher caliber of soldier. And that is
9:44
what most reports indicate that these
9:45
North Koreans when they were fighting in
9:47
Kursk
9:49
were uh were fighting with very outdated
9:52
tactics and very quickly adapted. Um but
9:55
again the geopolitics is one thing but
9:59
notice how even though there's not
10:02
really it is
10:04
the North Korean troop deployments only
10:06
benefit North Korea in like tangential
10:08
ways, right? By dying for Russia, the
10:11
Russians provide North Korea with rocket
10:12
and nuclear capabilities they otherwise
10:14
wouldn't have. The North Korean state
10:16
receives significant financial
10:17
assistance. That's kind of the the deal.
10:20
Um, but for the average North Korean
10:22
family, what do they have to hear about
10:24
this? Well, for them, they're just
10:27
simply reframing as, well, this is
10:28
defending a brotherly nation. Hey,
10:31
shoulderto-shoulder
10:32
march Russia's soldiers may the road get
10:35
harder and slower. Uh, again, sort of
10:38
part of this like,
10:42
yeah, like welcoming suffering,
10:43
welcoming struggle. Again, they love
10:46
these these propaganda videos of just
10:48
how hard these guys are are struggling
10:50
and fighting. Uh, seems highly likely to
10:52
be true.
10:57
Uh, you can see them again possibly
10:58
evacuating casualties, possibly
11:00
training. It's not clear. So, then we
11:03
splice in these North Korean military
11:04
parades. This is the sort that um the
11:08
the
11:09
uh both the US president wanted to have
11:11
and authoritarians really loved. This
11:13
isn't about making the authoritarian
11:16
feel good. That's part of it. But part
11:18
of it too is sort of impressing upon
11:21
people state capacity. Uh, and if you're
11:24
not in a state that grants people an
11:26
impressive level of freedoms, an
11:28
impressive level of prosperity, an
11:30
impressive level of um, assistance of
11:33
help, you really have very few options
11:36
to impress upon people the capabilities
11:38
of the state and you're reduced in
11:41
effect to
11:43
shows of force. That's all you have to
11:45
make people think that the country can
11:47
do anything, right? You can see here
11:49
again there's some more of these these
11:51
propaganda footage of them like doing
11:54
slow salutes. Very dramatic. Uh you can
11:57
see here again looks like they are
12:00
engaging drones. But notice notice a
12:02
couple of takeaways. One, this is almost
12:04
certainly a Russian provided assault
12:05
rifle. Why? Because it has the Pikatini
12:09
rail systems. This is where you would
12:10
mount your optics and stuff, but there
12:12
are no optics mounted there using iron
12:14
sights. And I think what you have here
12:17
is North Korea, if they were going to
12:19
issue sights, they would issue railed
12:21
weapons. If they and if they're going to
12:23
issue sites, they're going to expect
12:24
them to be used. Um,
12:28
but the Russians would issue you a rifle
12:29
and give you the option and
12:31
encouragement to purchase your own
12:32
sights. This is common. Most reports
12:34
have indicated that the Russian military
12:36
provides its soldiers with extremely
12:38
minimal gear. uh no issued body armor,
12:41
no issued helmets, um oftentimes simply
12:44
just uniforms and a basic weapon. Uh
12:48
again, a weapon probably in the style of
12:50
this AK-101 and that it's up to the
12:52
Russians themselves to purchase on the
12:54
free market additional protective
12:56
equipment. So if that were the case,
12:59
again, the North the there would be an
13:02
expectation that Russia would issue this
13:03
rifle and that they would expect
13:06
additional optics, additional things to
13:08
get installed on the rifle afterward.
13:10
And the fact that we we don't see that
13:13
for the North Koreans kind of implies
13:15
that again, I think a lot of these North
13:17
Korean troops received
13:20
Russian issued gear. I think there's a
13:21
lot of Russian issued gear here. Um, and
13:24
then
13:25
you also, but but I think part of it
13:29
too, the North Korean government likely
13:30
is analyzing all this gear that was
13:32
given. They say, "Listen, we gave you a
13:34
bunch of gear. We put you in in the
13:35
thick of the fight. You fought it out
13:37
for a while. You took casualties. You
13:38
learned and adapted. Then you come back
13:40
and I bet North Korean sat there and
13:42
said, "Tell us about the gear that
13:43
worked. Tell us about the tactics that
13:45
were effective. Tell us the things you
13:47
learned. Tell us how you fought well,
13:49
what needed to happen, what didn't
13:50
happen." Again, in in in communist
13:53
militaries, they have what's often
13:55
called a criticism session. This
13:57
criticism session is actually an
13:58
important part of the process. And on
14:00
one hand, it is political criticism.
14:02
Someone might say something like for
14:04
example um uh you know I have a duty um
14:10
I have a duty to my unit and I failed to
14:12
live up to that duty um because I um
14:17
uh I could have shared my food with my
14:21
uh friend who was who who who had lost
14:24
his because he couldn't get his backpack
14:26
after a drone attack. Um but I didn't I
14:28
was too hungry and I failed to do that.
14:30
Right? So, it can be personal value
14:32
stuff, but it can also often be used for
14:34
military purposes. Someone might say,
14:36
"Hey, I dug a fighting position. Um, and
14:40
my fighting position I realized uh would
14:42
have been vulnerable to a drone because
14:45
it didn't have a 90° angle at the
14:47
entrance." And so, they might say, "In
14:49
this criticism session, I have
14:50
criticized myself. I see that I can do
14:52
better." Uh, there's some stuff about
14:54
like party members, non-party members.
14:55
Generally, non-party members don't
14:57
criticize party members. But these
15:00
struggle sessions are are an important
15:02
way for these units to create an
15:04
environment where they're capable of
15:05
learning. Now,
15:08
before I talk about about the
15:11
propaganda, who's promoting this kind of
15:12
narratives and the helpful tool we have
15:18
to discern propaganda now, thanks to the
15:20
North Koreans putting out stuff like
15:21
this, I want to mention that of course,
15:23
guys, if you need energy, and believe
15:25
me, I'm making videos on a Sunday
15:26
afternoon. Uh, my kids were up super
15:29
early.
15:30
That's why I'm basically dependent on
15:32
Strike Gum, right? This was originally
15:34
one of my show packs, but I just keep
15:36
using it. Uh, hu Strikeum is the energy
15:39
drink alternative. 90 milligrams of
15:41
caffeine, 100 milligrams alpha GPC, made
15:42
in the USA, veteranowned, fueling
15:44
everybody from streamers to Ukrainian
15:45
drone pilots. Go to strikeum.com, pick
15:47
some up. Try the five-pack. If you're
15:49
tired of spending five bucks a pop on
15:51
energy drinks, you can get for the same
15:53
price of one energy drink, you can get
15:57
basically an entire pack of strike gum
16:00
and it's going to have the energy of
16:03
five of these energy drinks. So instead
16:05
of five monsters, one pack of strike
16:07
gum. It's a no-brainer. So, here's what
16:09
I thought was most interesting is that
16:11
the official stance when these Russian
16:14
when these North Korean troops were sent
16:15
into into into fight in Kursk
16:19
was that the uh that this was propaganda
16:24
that the West was lying about North
16:25
Koreans. They would claim instead they
16:27
were just Russians who were from Asiatic
16:30
regions. Dmitri Pescov, the Kremlin
16:32
spokesperson, uh said in response to
16:35
reports by this North South Korean, US
16:37
and Ukrainian intelligence services that
16:39
North Korean troops were fighting in
16:40
Kursk, uh he dismissed them on state TV
16:44
and in the task, explicitly calling the
16:46
deployment claims quote an information
16:47
canard and fake news concocted by
16:49
Western and Ukrainian intelligence
16:51
services. It's a direct quote from
16:52
Pescov himself. You can also see TAS
16:55
Russian state media network frame the
16:57
deployments as a coordinated
16:58
psychological operation by Western
17:00
intelligence agencies designed to
17:02
justify further NATO support for Keefe.
17:04
Then
17:07
of course
17:08
uh you had what we'll generously call
17:12
alternative commentators. And here's
17:14
some of the pundits that repeated that
17:16
Kremlin talking point that there were no
17:17
North Koreans fighting in Kursk. And
17:20
remember these names because they are
17:21
notorious Kremlin propagandists. Right.
17:24
Scott Ritterder, who if I remember
17:26
correctly is a pedophile, uh, who is a
17:28
former UN weapons inspector and
17:29
political commentator, dismissed claims
17:31
of North Korean combat deployments in
17:32
his online broadcast and podcast
17:34
appearances. He framed the intelligence
17:35
reports as a as desperate fabrications
17:37
by Western intelligence in Keefe, aimed
17:39
at escalating NATO involvement, arguing
17:41
that Russia's military capacity made
17:42
foreign infantry unnecessary. This is
17:44
obviously total lie because again, the
17:47
North Korean government now says, "No,
17:48
no, no, that was us all along." Larry
17:50
Johnson, a former CIA analyst and
17:51
contributor to um alternative
17:55
geopolitical shows. Uh he downplayed and
17:57
dismissed reports of North Korean troops
17:59
entering the conflict, casting them as
18:00
exaggerated Western disinformation meant
18:02
to manufacture a pretext for deeper US
18:04
involvement. Patrick Lancaster uh a
18:08
so-cal a self-described independent
18:10
video blogger operating in Russian
18:11
controlled areas. Uh Lancaster produced
18:15
content and gave interviews asserting
18:16
there was no evidence of North Korean
18:17
forces on the ground, which is not the
18:19
same thing as North Koreans are on the
18:20
ground. It just means I didn't see them.
18:22
Um in early 2025 interviews, he say
18:24
stated he found no trace of North Korean
18:26
soldiers despite searching the cursed
18:27
region, which is interesting because
18:29
that's that's not the same thing as
18:31
they're not there. Uh Jackson Hle,
18:34
pro-Russian influencer, uh called
18:36
reports of North Korean soldiers Western
18:37
propaganda and fake news. And of course,
18:39
Douglas McGregor, a retired US Army
18:41
colonel and military analyst, heavily
18:43
skeptical towards reports during podcast
18:44
appearances, arguing that Western
18:45
narrative of North Korean troop
18:46
movements with a propaganda effort to
18:48
justify further military aid in New
18:49
Ukraine. The irony is of course that
18:53
even they are just got outed as liars by
18:55
the Russians and North Koreans
18:56
themselves because the North Koreans
18:58
again built a literal monument to
19:01
uh their troops who were killed in
19:05
Kursk, right?
19:09
So all of this I think is important
19:12
because one the best thing that we have
19:15
from all this is that the
19:20
the um
19:24
yeah here we go. This is from North
19:25
Korea. This is the memorial museum of
19:27
combat feats and overseas military
19:28
operations. Uh this is an a war memorial
19:32
commemorating North Korean intervention
19:34
in the Russo Ukrainian war, particularly
19:36
soldiers who fought in the Kursk
19:38
campaign.
19:40
Uh Kim during the opening ceremony
19:43
praised North Korean soldiers who self
19:45
blasted themselves with grenades to
19:47
avoid being captured by Ukrainian
19:48
forces. There are approximately 280
19:50
individual graves for North Korean
19:51
soldiers killed in Kursk diuramas and
19:53
artifacts from the conflict, which is
19:55
weird because it's probably going on.
19:57
Uh, captured Ukrainian equipment is
19:59
displayed at the museum, including an
20:01
armored fighting vehicle, a Leopard 2
20:02
A4, and an M1 A1 Abrams tank. North
20:05
Korea also confirms the deployment of a
20:07
unit to launch ballistic missiles in
20:09
attacks against Ukraine. So,
20:13
if you take away anything from this, you
20:15
should understand that this is a
20:19
uh here's some of the photos, by the
20:20
way, of this memorial, right? You can
20:24
see it's literally flanked by the
20:25
graves. This this is if you are mad at
20:28
the global war on terror memorial that
20:30
makes no sense and is kind of
20:31
bewildering and alienating. Um the North
20:33
Koreans deserves some credit. Okay, I
20:35
love this is a diarama uh depicting the
20:38
fighting when it looks not nothing like
20:40
any of the fighting, which is fine.
20:43
But uh look, they even have an anti-
20:45
drone rifle. Okay, again, this is
20:48
typical North Korean kind of propaganda
20:49
stuff. Um,
20:52
but
20:54
I point this out because
21:00
now we get the names of people who we
21:01
shouldn't trust. And I want to point out
21:04
this also validates my sources, right?
21:06
The sources we depend on, right?
21:09
Reputable news outlets, official uh,
21:13
state intelligence agencies, right?
21:15
Again, we don't take anybody at face
21:18
value here, but when you look at a bunch
21:20
of people with a bunch of different
21:22
incentives to to to tell the truth, and
21:24
then you realize something is true,
21:27
right, it speaks to your credibility as
21:28
an analyst, and it discredits Colonel
21:31
McGregor, uh, Scott Ritter, Jackson Hle,
21:34
and other clowns, pro-Russian
21:36
propagandists. Anyway, thanks to Mike,
21:38
Allen, William, Thomas, Deborah, Jeff,
21:40
Christine, GMAT, Dan, Al, Don, James,
21:41
BC, Tree, and all Lieutenant folks. We
21:43
really appreciate you guys. We'll catch
21:44
you in the next one. Cheers.