Latest / How Canadian Markets Work / Episode 75: Leverage and Risk Ratios (The Double Amplifier)
Transcript
- 0:01Imagine running a perfectly profitable business.
- 0:05Revenues up, margins are steady, your customers
- 0:08are happy. Sounds like the dream scenario. Right.
- 0:11But then literally overnight, a quarter of your
- 0:14net income just vanishes. And you didn't do a
- 0:17single thing wrong operationally. I mean, the
- 0:19actual cost of your money just changed. Yeah,
- 0:22that is a. terrifying reality for a lot of companies.
- 0:25It really is. So last time, we looked at short
- 0:27-term survival, whether a company can pay its
- 0:30immediate bills over the next 12 months. But
- 0:32today, we're panning the camera out to long -term
- 0:34solvency, the true weight of leverage, and this
- 0:38invisible threat of a sudden rate shock. And
- 0:42getting to the heart of a corporate collapse,
- 0:43it usually starts with people just asking the
- 0:45completely wrong question. Oh, how so? Well,
- 0:48analysts and armchair investors, they love to
- 0:50look at a balance sheet and ask, you know, how
- 0:52much debt is too much. Right, like looking for
- 0:54a magic number. Exactly. But a massive absolute
- 0:58debt load might be perfectly fine for one company
- 1:00and then instantly fatal for another. So the
- 1:03real question you have to ask is, can they service
- 1:05it? More importantly, what happens when the economic
- 1:09weather changes? Which makes total sense because
- 1:11absolute numbers in a vacuum are kind of meaningless,
- 1:14right? So we need to figure out how to actually
- 1:17answer that survival question for your portfolio.
- 1:20We do. And our mission for this deep dive is
- 1:22to unpack the crucial difference between operating
- 1:25and financial leverage, expose the hidden traps
- 1:28in like those common debt ratios you see on standard
- 1:31financial screeners, and then walk you through
- 1:33how to stress test a balance sheet yourself.
- 1:36before the market does it for you. Yeah and to
- 1:38really grasp leverage we have to start by zooming
- 1:41out from the balance sheet itself because You
- 1:44know, borrowed money is really only one piece
- 1:46of the puzzle. Right. The underlying structure
- 1:48of a business's costs. That's where leverage
- 1:50actually begins. We're talking about operating
- 1:52leverage here. Operating leverage. OK. So this
- 1:55is the mix of fixed versus variable costs that
- 1:57are just built into the business model, right?
- 2:00Before a single dollar is ever borrowed. Exactly.
- 2:03Let's use a steel mill as an example. OK. Classic
- 2:05heavy industry. Right. The plant must run. The
- 2:08furnaces have to be kept at this staggering temperature
- 2:1124 -7. Union contracts need to be paid, property
- 2:15taxes are due. And all of that happens whether
- 2:18the mill is operating at 60 % capacity or 90
- 2:21% capacity. Precisely. The costs don't just magically
- 2:24drop because orders from auto manufacturers slow
- 2:27down for a quarter. That sounds incredibly stressful
- 2:30to manage. It is. That high baseline of fixed
- 2:33costs means the company has high operating leverage.
- 2:37But once they sell enough steel to cover that
- 2:39massive fixed baseline, almost every new dollar
- 2:42of revenue flows straight down to the operating
- 2:44profit line. Oh, I see. Because the costs are
- 2:46already paid for. Right. It's highly profitable
- 2:49on the upside. But I'm guessing that blade cuts
- 2:51both ways. It absolutely does. If revenue dips
- 2:54even slightly below that baseline, profit doesn't
- 2:58just dip a little bit. It completely collapses.
- 3:01Because like we said, those massive furnace costs
- 3:03and property taxes, they don't budge. Okay, so
- 3:06compare that structure to, I don't know, a modern
- 3:09management consulting firm. Perfect contrast.
- 3:11Their primary costs are just human capital. people.
- 3:14Yeah, people. So if the consulting market cools
- 3:16off, they can freeze hiring, they can cut bonuses,
- 3:19or if they have to reduce headcount relatively
- 3:21quickly. So their costs are variable. Exactly.
- 3:24Meaning they have low operating leverage, a 10
- 3:26% drop in revenue might only mean a roughly 10
- 3:29% drop in profit. So a small change in revenue
- 3:31for the steel mill produces a massive swing in
- 3:34operating profit, but the consulting firm stays
- 3:36pretty stable. Right. And that's just layer one.
- 3:39The second phase is financial leverage, which
- 3:41is the actual debt. The borrowed money. Right,
- 3:44because fixed debt obligations, specifically
- 3:46the interest payments, they always get paid first.
- 3:49So any swing in operating profit causes a massively
- 3:53amplified swing in whatever is left over for
- 3:55the equity holders. Because the interest expense
- 3:57is just another rigid hurdle you have to clear.
- 4:00Exactly. When you stack financial leverage, on
- 4:03top of operating leverage, you are fundamentally
- 4:06changing the risk profile of the entire enterprise.
- 4:10I've actually been trying to visualize how these
- 4:12two stack, and it feels a lot like a live music
- 4:16setup. OK, I like where this is going. So think
- 4:18of operating leverage as the volume knob on your
- 4:22electric guitar. Sure. And financial leverage
- 4:25is plugging that guitar into a massive amplifier
- 4:28stack. So if you turn up the guitar's volume,
- 4:30it gets loud. Yeah. But if you crank up both
- 4:34the guitar and the amplifiers and then you hit
- 4:36a wrong note, you don't just get a slightly bad
- 4:38sound. You literally blow out the speakers entirely.
- 4:41That is a great analogy. And that blown out speaker
- 4:43in the business world, that is a corporate default.
- 4:47Wow. OK. The most classic recipe for bankruptcy
- 4:50is stacking both types of leverage. in the wrong
- 4:53environment. You take a highly cyclical business
- 4:56with massive fixed costs. Like our hypothetical
- 4:59steel mill. Exactly. And you load up the balance
- 5:01sheet with heavy debt. Then, when the economic
- 5:05cycle turns downwards, the operating leverage
- 5:08wipes out the operating profit. And the financial
- 5:11leverage dictates they instantly can't cover
- 5:13their interest payments. It's an instant death
- 5:16spiral. It really is. Which brings us to the
- 5:18actual metrics. I mean, if we understand the
- 5:20mechanics of the amplifiers, how are we supposed
- 5:23to measure them when we're looking at a standard
- 5:2510K? Right, because you see these standard ratios
- 5:27everywhere. You do. But they seem to have some
- 5:30pretty dangerous blind spots. Let's start with
- 5:33debt to equity. I mean, on the surface, it's
- 5:36just total debt divided by total equity. Seems
- 5:38completely foolproof. It does seem foolproof,
- 5:41yeah. Until you realize the financial industry
- 5:43calculates it in two completely different ways.
- 5:46Wait, what? Yeah. And they often do it without
- 5:48disclosing which method they're actually using.
- 5:50You're kidding. How is that allowed? Well, it's
- 5:53just convention. Some analysts and data providers
- 5:56calculate it using strictly interest -bearing
- 5:58debt. So the actual bank loans, corporate bonds,
- 6:02and notes payable. Which makes sense. That's
- 6:04the actual borrowed money. But others throw in
- 6:06total liabilities. Meaning what? Like everything
- 6:09they owe? Everything. Which means they're including
- 6:12accounts payable to suppliers. defer taxes, and,
- 6:16you know, other operational liabilities that
- 6:18don't carry an interest rate and aren't technically
- 6:20borrowed capital. But the discrepancy between
- 6:22those two numbers could be staggering. It can
- 6:25be massive. You might be reading a research report
- 6:27using these strict interest -bearing definition,
- 6:30and then you go and compare it to a stock screener
- 6:32that uses total liabilities. So you're comparing
- 6:34apples to hand grenades. Exactly. You end up
- 6:37thinking a company is either incredibly conservative
- 6:40or dangerously over leveraged based entirely
- 6:44on a hidden definition. OK, so if debt to equity
- 6:47can be manipulated by accounting interpretations
- 6:50like that, it makes sense that lenders want a
- 6:53metric based on raw cash generation. They just
- 6:56want to see if the bills can actually get paid.
- 6:58Right. Cash is king to a lender. Which perfectly
- 7:00explains the market's total obsession with debt
- 7:03to EBITDA. I mean, you hear about it constantly.
- 7:06Lenders use this all the time for loan covenants,
- 7:09right? Dictating that a company's debt cannot
- 7:11exceed, say, four times its EBITDA. Yeah, lenders
- 7:14rely heavily on it because it attempts to approximate
- 7:16how many years of current earnings it would take
- 7:19to repay the entire debt load. So a debt EBITDA
- 7:22of four just implies a four -year payoff period
- 7:25if every single cent of earnings went straight
- 7:28to the bank. Exactly. And if a company breaches
- 7:30that covenant, they hit a cliff. What happens
- 7:33at the cliff? The bank can trigger higher interest
- 7:35rates, restrict dividend payments, or even demand
- 7:38immediate repayment of the loan. OK, but let's
- 7:41push back on EBITDA for a second here. By all
- 7:43means. We all know it stands for earnings before
- 7:45interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization.
- 7:49But if we are explicitly ignoring depreciation,
- 7:53aren't we just pretending that factories don't
- 7:55wear out? Or that servers don't need replacing?
- 7:58You've hit a nail on the head. It just feels
- 7:59like a convenient fiction for lenders to make
- 8:02a cash flow profile look way stronger than it
- 8:04really is. Your skepticism is entirely warranted.
- 8:08It is a structural bias built directly into the
- 8:11metric. By ignoring depreciation, EBITDA makes
- 8:15a highly capital -intensive business look like
- 8:18this amazing cash printing machine. Because it
- 8:20assumes that the historical cost of building
- 8:23the factory is somehow irrelevant to current
- 8:25cash generation. Exactly. But eventually, that
- 8:28steel mill furnace has to be rebuilt. And you
- 8:31can't pay the contractor with EBITDA. You have
- 8:33to pay them with real cash. Which is why relying
- 8:35solely on debt to EBITDA is so dangerous. You
- 8:38must always pair it with the capital expenditure
- 8:40line from the cash flow. statement right capex
- 8:42yeah you need to see the actual cash going out
- 8:45the door to maintain those physical assets yeah
- 8:48because if maintenance capex is eating up most
- 8:50that EBITDA well the company has far less capacity
- 8:53to service its debt than the ratio suggests so
- 8:56debt to equity is inconsistent and debt to EBITDA
- 8:58turns a blind eye to aging equipment correct
- 9:01this leads us to the metric that actually cuts
- 9:03through the noise interest coverage yes interest
- 9:06coverage is beautifully direct you take operating
- 9:09income and you divide it by interest expense
- 9:11It's just simple division. Very simple. It doesn't
- 9:14ask how many years it takes to pay off the principal.
- 9:17It asks how many times over the company can pay
- 9:19its current interest obligations from its current
- 9:22operating profit. It's basically a real -time
- 9:24pulse check. Exactly. Okay, let's ground this
- 9:27with our running case study. We have Meridian
- 9:29Tool Works, our fictional industrial manufacturer
- 9:32from the previous deep dive. Let's do it. And
- 9:34to avoid just rattling off a dry spreadsheet,
- 9:37let's frame their balance sheet kind of like
- 9:38a household budget. OK, what else? So they have
- 9:41$75 million in equity, but they carry $82 million
- 9:44in interest -bearing debt. 12 short -term, 70
- 9:48long -term. But if we look at their total liabilities,
- 9:52including what they owe everyday suppliers, that
- 9:55number jumps to 110 million. OK, so if we apply
- 9:58the flawed metrics first, you can instantly see
- 10:00the distortion we talked about. Depending on
- 10:02whether you use the 82 million or the 110 million
- 10:04figure, their debt to equity is either a balanced
- 10:071 .09 or a much heavier 1 .47. Right, apples
- 10:12to hang grenades. And looking at their EBITDA,
- 10:14which is sitting at 42 million, that's 30 million
- 10:18operating income plus 12 million in depreciation,
- 10:21their debt to EBITDA is roughly 1 .95x. So less
- 10:26than two years of earnings to clear the debt.
- 10:28On paper, Meridian looks like an absolute fortress,
- 10:31moderate leverage, plenty cash flow. They do
- 10:34look like a fortress. And their interest coverage...
- 10:36completely confirms that baseline. Okay, walk
- 10:39us through the math. Their operating income is
- 10:4130 million and their current interest expense
- 10:43is 6 million. 30 divided by 6 gives us a coverage
- 10:47ratio of 5 .0. So they can pay their interest
- 10:50five times over. That sounds incredibly safe.
- 10:52It is safe. today. But here is the aha moment
- 10:55we really need to dig into. Corporate debt doesn't
- 10:58sit frozen in time like a 30 year fixed residential
- 11:01mortgage. Right. It matures. It matures. It has
- 11:04to be refinanced. And it gets refinanced at whatever
- 11:06the prevailing market rate happens to be on that
- 11:08exact day. Oh, wow. OK, I see where this is going.
- 11:11Think about the massive macroeconomic shift we
- 11:14saw between 2022 and 2023. We moved from an era
- 11:18of essentially zero interest rates to an incredibly
- 11:22aggressive tightening cycle. Right. Companies
- 11:24that had borrowed cheaply suddenly face a radically
- 11:27different environment when it was time to roll
- 11:30over their debt. OK, so let's run that exact
- 11:32rate shock on Radian. Let's do it. The business
- 11:34itself is operating flawlessly. They are selling
- 11:37the exact same volume of tools, margins are identical,
- 11:41operating income is still locked in at $30 million,
- 11:44but they have to refinance that $82 million in
- 11:46debt and rates have jumped. So their annual interest
- 11:49expense goes from $6 million to $9 million. So
- 11:52their interest coverage ratio drops from 5 .0
- 11:55down to 3 .3. Which still seems OK. Still have
- 11:58cushion, yeah. The margin of safety is definitely
- 12:00shrinking. Now, let's push it to a full stress
- 12:03scenario. OK. What if rates have spiked enough
- 12:05that their interest expense actually doubles
- 12:07from the original $6 million to $12 million?
- 12:09OK, so $30 million in operating income divided
- 12:11by $12 million in interest, the coverage drops
- 12:14to 2 .5. Right. But the real story is the bottom
- 12:17line, isn't it? Their pre -tax profit falls from
- 12:20$24 million down to $18 million. Their net income
- 12:23plummets by a full 25%. Yes. A quarter of the
- 12:27shareholders' earnings evaporates solely because
- 12:30the cost of capital changed. The business did
- 12:32nothing wrong, but the financial leverage amplified
- 12:36the rate shock. That is brutal. OK, so a 5x coverage
- 12:40is obviously safe, and a 2 .5x coverage hurts,
- 12:43but they live to fight another day. Right. What
- 12:47is the actual danger zone? What is the threshold
- 12:49where analysts start legitimately sounding the
- 12:51alarm? Well, the general consensus is that when
- 12:54interest coverage drops below 2 .0, the market
- 12:56gets very anxious. You're paying half your operating
- 12:59profit just to serve as debt. Ouch. OK. Yeah.
- 13:01And when it falls below 1 .5, the situation is
- 13:04critical. Because there's no wiggle room. Exactly.
- 13:07The company has virtually no room for error if
- 13:09sales dip even slightly, and if it drops below
- 13:111 .0. Then the operating profit literally cannot
- 13:14cover the interest payments. Right. Below 1 .0
- 13:17means the business is fundamentally underwater.
- 13:20They have to dip into cash reserves, liquidate
- 13:23assets, or, ironically, borrow even more money
- 13:26just to pay the interest on the money they already
- 13:29borrowed. Borrowing to pay interest. That just
- 13:32creates a complete death spiral. It does. Which
- 13:34is why the most practical thing anyone can do
- 13:37when analyzing a company is the DIY stress test.
- 13:40Oh, I like the sound of that. How do we do it?
- 13:42Don't wait for a quarterly earnings call to find
- 13:44out a company is vulnerable. look at the income
- 13:47statement, find the interest expense, and just
- 13:49mentally double it. Double it just to see what
- 13:52happens. Exactly. If doubling the interest expense
- 13:55pushes the coverage ratio dangerously close to
- 13:58that 1 .5 mark, you know they are highly sensitive
- 14:00to monetary policy. That is such a good rule
- 14:03of thumb. But to really assess the threat, you
- 14:05have to look at the timeline. What do you mean?
- 14:07You have to check the footnotes for the debt
- 14:09maturity schedule. If they have massive tranches
- 14:12of debt coming due in the next 12 months during
- 14:14a high -rate environment, well, a refinancing
- 14:17shock is imminent. But if the bulk of their debt
- 14:20doesn't mature for, say, 8 or 10 years, they
- 14:23have the breathing room to just wait out the
- 14:25cycle. Okay. And we can't forget the context
- 14:29of the business model itself, right? I mean,
- 14:32applying a hard rule of 2 .0 to every single
- 14:34company kind of ignores the reality of operating
- 14:37leverage we talked about earlier. It absolutely
- 14:39does. Context is everything. Like, take a regulated
- 14:42utility company. They are providing electricity
- 14:45with locked -in, highly predictable cash flows.
- 14:48They can comfortably carry a massive debt load.
- 14:50Because the operating risk is practically zero.
- 14:53People pay their electric bills even during a
- 14:55recession. Right. But if you take that exact
- 14:57same debt load and drop it onto a cyclical mining
- 15:00company where revenue can literally evaporate
- 15:03overnight if the price of popper crashes, it
- 15:06would destroy them. It totally mirrors our previous
- 15:08deep dive on short -term liquidity. Oh, how so?
- 15:11Well, judging a utility by normal leverage ratios
- 15:14is exactly like realizing a grocery store's liquidity
- 15:17ratio makes it look bankrupt compared to a software
- 15:20company. The industry entirely dictates the reality
- 15:22of the math. That is a perfect parallel. Industry
- 15:25context is paramount. And beyond industry differences,
- 15:30there are significant accounting complexities
- 15:32that can really warp these metrics. Like what?
- 15:35Take lease obligations. A few years ago, the
- 15:38Financial Accounting Standards Board, the FASB,
- 15:41fundamentally changed how leases are reported.
- 15:44Right, because historically, if an airline leased
- 15:47a fleet of jets or a retailer leased 100 storefronts,
- 15:51they just recorded the monthly lease payment
- 15:53as a standard operating expense. Exactly. The
- 15:56massive future obligation wasn't anywhere on
- 15:59the balance sheet. It was just invisible. It
- 16:00allowed companies to hide billions in effectively
- 16:03debt -like obligations. So the rule change forced
- 16:07companies to pull the present value of all those
- 16:09future lease payments directly onto the balance
- 16:11sheet as liability. Which means overnight, without
- 16:14a single thing changing in the real world, their
- 16:16total liability has just skyrocketed. Yes. Their
- 16:19reported leverage ratios artificially ballooned.
- 16:22So you really can't reliably compare a pre -transition
- 16:25leverage ratio to a post -transition one. Not
- 16:27for any company with heavy leasing, no. You also
- 16:31have to be extremely vigilant about contingent
- 16:34obligations. Why are those? Well, if a parent
- 16:36company guarantees the debt of a risky subsidiary,
- 16:39That guarantee doesn't usually show up in the
- 16:42primary debt figure on the balance sheet. It's
- 16:44buried deep in the footnotes. Man, the lesson
- 16:47is always read the footnotes. Always read the
- 16:50footnotes. And there's one final golden rule
- 16:53of leverage ratios that trips up a lot of people.
- 16:55OK, lay it on us. Never apply these traditional
- 16:59metrics to financial institutions. Really? Never.
- 17:02Never. Banks operate as highly leveraged entities
- 17:05by design. They take in deposits. which are technically
- 17:09liabilities, and they lend them out. Oh, right.
- 17:12If you run a standard debt -to -equity test on
- 17:14a perfectly healthy regional bank, the math will
- 17:17suggest it's on the brink of catastrophic failure.
- 17:20They operate under a completely different, highly
- 17:22regulated set of capital requirements. Standard
- 17:25corporate leverage math simply does not apply
- 17:27to them. That makes total sense. Okay, let's
- 17:30pull all this together. We've seen how operating
- 17:33leverage, which is the fixed costs in a business
- 17:36model, stacks with financial leverage, the borrowed
- 17:39money, to create this amplifier effect that can
- 17:42either supercharge returns or trigger a collapse.
- 17:46Right. And we've also established that debt to
- 17:47equity is highly vulnerable to different accounting
- 17:50interpretations, while debt to EBITDA can dangerously
- 17:53obscure the real costs of maintaining depreciating
- 17:56assets. Faming the interest coverage ratio, the
- 17:58ultimate safety check. operating income divided
- 18:01by interest expense. The real -time pulse check.
- 18:04Exactly. And the real key is stress testing it
- 18:07yourself, right? Projecting a rate shock, checking
- 18:10the maturity schedule and the footnotes, and
- 18:12contextualizing it all within the specific industry.
- 18:15That right there forms a incredibly robust toolkit
- 18:18for evaluating long -term solvency. It really
- 18:20does. But, you know, there is a fascinating macro
- 18:23paradox to mull over based on all of this. Oh,
- 18:27yeah. So we just walked through how rising interest
- 18:29rates can crush a leveraged company when it's
- 18:32forced to refinance. Right. The 25 % drop in
- 18:35net income. Exactly. But think back to our earlier
- 18:37deep dives on inflation. Inflation actively erodes
- 18:40the real value of fixed debt. Ah, yes. Right.
- 18:43If the purchasing power of money falls, the actual
- 18:46burden of a billion -dollar debt is effectively
- 18:48lighter in real terms. It is, which creates an
- 18:52incredible tension for corporate treasurers.
- 18:54Right. Heavily indebted companies are in this
- 18:56bizarre position where they quietly want inflation
- 18:59to run hot because it literally melts away the
- 19:02real weight of their principle, but simultaneously
- 19:05they are locked in this high -stakes tug -of
- 19:07-war against central banks who are aggressively
- 19:09raising rates to kill that exact same inflation.
- 19:12It's a paradox. One force is quietly shrinking
- 19:15the real value of their debt while the other
- 19:18force threatens to balloon their interest payments
- 19:20into completely unsustainable territory. It is
- 19:23a silent battle playing out on literally every
- 19:26leveraged balance sheet in the market. Does inflation
- 19:29melt the debt away before the refinancing cliff
- 19:31hits, or does the rate shock crush them first?
- 19:34That tug of war is happening right now, and it's
- 19:36definitely something to watch closely as you
- 19:38navigate your portfolio tomorrow.