Latest / Eye Spy: The Intelligence History Podcast / Iran's Ministry of Intelligence
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome to Eye Spy, the Intelligence History Podcast.
- 0:08I'm your host, Krystel von Kumberg.
- 0:12Every few weeks, I'm going to be interviewing historians, practitioners, and scholars in
- 0:16the field of intelligence to explore some aspects of the past and what it can tell us
- 0:21about the present and future of intelligence studies.
- 0:26Steven R. Ward is a retired CIA intelligence analyst who specialises in Iran and the Middle
- 0:32East.
- 0:33He is currently working for the Joint Chiefs of Staff History and Research Office, where
- 0:38he is completing a classified history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the George W.
- 0:42Bush administration.
- 0:45During his CIA career, he was a visiting professor to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis between
- 0:502010 and 2012.
- 0:53From 2005 to 2006, he served as a Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Near East on
- 0:58the National Intelligence Council, and he served on the National Security Council staff as
- 1:03a Director for Intelligence Programs from 1998 to 1999.
- 1:08He is also a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point and a retired
- 1:13U.S. Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel.
- 1:18He is the author of Immortal, a military history of Iran and its armed forces, and has recently
- 1:24published Iran's Ministry of Intelligence, A Concise History.
- 1:33Welcome to Eye Spy, the intelligence history podcast.
- 1:38Thank you so much for joining me today.
- 1:40It's an honour to have you here.
- 1:43Well, thank you.
- 1:44I'm happy to be here and I'm pleased to help out in any way I can to talk about Iran's
- 1:52Ministry of Intelligence.
- 1:55Let's get started.
- 1:56So to begin, could you reflect on the key challenges you faced while researching the
- 2:03Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially focusing on their overlapping
- 2:09responsibilities in internal affairs as well as abroad, and how did you overcome these?
- 2:16I'll start out by saying that when I took on the project, I really got to enjoy it and
- 2:25was quite happy with the way the book finally turned out, but I've never held myself out
- 2:30as an expert on intelligence organisations or counterintelligence.
- 2:34As far as my career at CIA, I was a military analyst and focused on military organisations,
- 2:40national security policy, but because I had published an earlier work with the Georgetown
- 2:46University Press, they were looking for someone to contribute a textbook on Iran for their
- 2:54comparative intelligence organisations courses, and so I agreed to do that, and that's what
- 3:02actually got me started on the project.
- 3:06The biggest challenge, I think twofold.
- 3:11First is just that Iran's intelligence ministry, most, is a very secretive organisation and
- 3:19they just don't put out a lot of detailed information about their organisation, their
- 3:24structure, their operations, but when I started looking, I was able to find things that were
- 3:33valuable and helped me finish the book.
- 3:36Probably the next biggest drawback or challenge is that I don't speak Persian.
- 3:40I've tried a few times over decades to pick up the language and it never quite took with
- 3:46me, but I was able to take the small advance that Georgetown University Press gave me
- 3:55and I hired a young man, Baman Tavili, who's a native Persian speaker, as a research assistant,
- 4:02and although I was limited in the amount of hours I could actually use him, he did a lot
- 4:07of great work and research on Iranian government websites.
- 4:11He looked into government repositories that they have for their legislature and for the
- 4:17executive branch of their government.
- 4:20He looked at the Ministry of Intelligence own website and just Iranian media that found
- 4:29a lot of good stuff for us.
- 4:31A lot of its boilerplate wasn't particularly useful, but we were able to find a few gems
- 4:36that we thought added to the value of the book.
- 4:40The other thing that helped me overcome the Persian language was I was very pleased to
- 4:44find that available on ProQuest, which is available through most libraries, BBC Monitoring
- 4:53does translation of Persian media and found that they actually had done quite a bit.
- 5:02Just by searching on a few key terms, I was able to dig up a lot of good translated Iranian
- 5:07information, and then increasingly the Iranians themselves published a lot of stuff in English.
- 5:13So at the end of the day, I found a lot of material and it's just a matter of being careful
- 5:20about what you used, what you could validate as like, this is plausible, this is reasonable,
- 5:25or this is even true.
- 5:28Relyed a lot on some European websites that were tied to European government organizations
- 5:36and then a whole lot of Iranian dissident organizations or a couple of websites that
- 5:41are associated with Saudi Arabia that they were okay for certain factual things like this
- 5:47happened on this date, but you kind of had to ignore the analysis because it was always
- 5:52bent in a certain way.
- 5:55I guess the final thing is that I was a little surprised given the relationship between the
- 6:02United States and Iran is that there just wasn't a lot of scholarship available on it.
- 6:07There were a few people who had done some scholarly journal articles around the 2015-2017
- 6:15timeframe and there's a famous Library of Congress study that was published in 2012
- 6:22that frankly was sort of the go-to document for a lot of people who were interested in
- 6:28Iran's ministry intelligence.
- 6:30So everything was a little bit dated and could use some updating.
- 6:34So it kind of fell to me and if you get the book and look at the notes and the bibliography,
- 6:41you'll see that a lot of it was all pieced together from a lot of detective work with
- 6:46a wide array of sources.
- 6:49Yeah, that sounds like a really challenging endeavor, but definitely something worth doing
- 6:55considering that there's really limited scholarship in this field.
- 7:01Are there recurring themes from your book, Immortal, a Military History of Iran and its
- 7:06Armed Forces, such as a centralization of power or the tension between ideology and
- 7:12pragmatism that also appears in the MOIS's history and operations?
- 7:18First, great question.
- 7:22And I appreciate you mentioning Immortal.
- 7:26And yeah, I'm kind of a history nerd and I really did see a lot of rhyming within the
- 7:34history of Iranian governance going from the Islamic Republic back to the royal or monarchical
- 7:42government of the Shahs, not just in the 20th century, but even back into the 19th century
- 7:48of court politics and the use of multiple security organs, whether it was back in the
- 7:5719th century, it was sort of an urban-based military versus tribal levies that the monarchs
- 8:05used to balance off power.
- 8:08And you saw the same thing in the early 20th century where the first Pahlavi Shahs of Iran
- 8:15used the regular military and then there was actually, they had sort of a National Guard
- 8:20type organization, again, a tribal levy type thing where they would use them to balance
- 8:25off each other's power.
- 8:26So it wasn't that unusual when the revolution took place and the new government was established
- 8:32was one of the first things they did was they couldn't trust the Shah's army.
- 8:37So they set up their own, which is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, sometimes called
- 8:43the IRGC.
- 8:44And the IRGC initially was set up to coup-proof the new regime and to keep an eye on the army,
- 8:51but it's also designed to focus mostly on internal security and basically repress the
- 8:59growing dissidents and opposition movements in Iran as the clerics concentrated power
- 9:06in themselves to take over the new revolutionary government.
- 9:09So when they were setting up the Ministry of Intelligence, you already had a number
- 9:15of intelligence organizations already set up.
- 9:18The military still had military intelligence.
- 9:21The IRGC had their new intelligence bodies.
- 9:24There were all sorts of these revolutionary committees that basically had set themselves
- 9:28up as local judges and prosecutors to go after the Shah's officials and prosecute them for
- 9:38crimes real and imagined.
- 9:40And they all had some element of law enforcement and intelligence gathering or investigation,
- 9:47I guess might be in that circumstance, a better way to put it, to achieve the goals they want
- 9:54to achieve of putting opponents of the new regime in jail.
- 9:57And so when they created the Ministry of Intelligence, part of that was to get some of that under
- 10:03control because at some point it is working at cross purposes.
- 10:08It often happens when you set up competing organizations and the overlaps were not helping
- 10:13the organization.
- 10:14So they were trying to put a lot of it under the control of a new ministry, but at the
- 10:19same time, they didn't give it total control and the Revolutionary Guard continued to do
- 10:24its bit of intelligence work.
- 10:26They set up a new law enforcement command that did a lot of the national police type
- 10:33work that still within the realm of internal security intelligence type work, surveillance
- 10:41and the like, was involved in it.
- 10:44And the difference was in the Constitution or the way they amended the law rather that
- 10:50set up the Ministry of Intelligence was they said, you're the head of this new intelligence
- 10:54community and you're going to be the premier organization and you need to run it all.
- 11:00And like a lot of things that look good on paper, never quite worked out.
- 11:05In fact, the ministry throughout the period since it was formally initiated its work in
- 11:111984 has kind of struggled to keep all the other parts of Iran's basically police state
- 11:18apparatus aligned and working together under its command.
- 11:24And increasingly in the past decade, the IRGC is just really a power unto itself and pretty
- 11:30much does what it wants when it wants.
- 11:32And the MOIS, the Ministry of Intelligence finds itself basically trying not to be sidelined
- 11:41any more than it has been.
- 11:43And again, like I said, there are echoes of that in Iran's history going back a couple
- 11:48of centuries of these just competing organizations.
- 11:51And it's not a bad way if you're a new theocratic and authoritarian regime and you're worried
- 11:59about your stability and your security to have these competing power centers to offset
- 12:04one another.
- 12:06And the first supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, was just a master at kind of taking all the
- 12:12different factions and setting them against each other.
- 12:16And then he would balance one against the other.
- 12:20And that just made him more powerful.
- 12:22And when he died and the current supreme leader took over Ali Khamenei, he followed that example
- 12:28and made sure that basically everyone is kind of beholding to him in some fashion and that
- 12:34he's the one who settles disputes, which makes him a much more powerful leader.
- 12:40But yeah, I think I'll stop there with that particular question.
- 12:43But that gives you a sense of sort of what they have to deal with.
- 12:46Definitely.
- 12:47And backtracking a little bit, what motivated the establishment of the Ministry of Intelligence
- 12:55in post-revolutionary Iran?
- 12:59And how did the socio-political context shape its structure and objectives?
- 13:05And what were the primary factors that really led to the establishment, I guess, of the
- 13:10MOIS in 1984, growing out of the revolution that deposed the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi?
- 13:17And how did it absorb, if it did, the remnants of the Shah's disbanded intelligence service?
- 13:25Yeah, that's another great question.
- 13:29When the Shah was in charge, he had his own intelligence ministry as the Organization
- 13:38of Intelligence and Security.
- 13:39It went by the abbreviation SAVAK.
- 13:42And SAVAK was notorious as a very brutal, repressive organ of the state.
- 13:50And when the Iranian people turned against the Shah, there were a lot of reasons why.
- 13:58Some of it was economic.
- 13:59A lot of it was the political repression.
- 14:01A lot of it was rapid westernization of the country under the Shah that the clerics in
- 14:07particular didn't like.
- 14:09And Ayatollah Khomeini, the first Supreme Leader, when he was exiled at the time, and
- 14:17his diatribes against the Shah and against the Shah's government catapulted him up to
- 14:24be the leader of the movement.
- 14:26And to his credit, he was a far-seeing man.
- 14:31He began thinking even before he returned to Iran about what it would take to govern
- 14:36the country when the revolution succeeded.
- 14:41And so he actually, while he was exiled in Paris, made contact with SAVAK officers and
- 14:49began to sort of develop a relationship with these people, knowing that when the revolution
- 14:54succeeded, it was going to need certain elements of state security.
- 14:59And so when he arrived back in Iran in February of 1979, after the Shah fled the country,
- 15:08most of the security services just shut down.
- 15:11They went home, locked the doors and left.
- 15:13But fairly rapidly, within a couple of weeks, the SAVAK officers went to Khomeini and basically
- 15:20pledged their loyalty to him and said, you know, we're willing to work for this state.
- 15:24And so some of the SAVAK offices overseas, people just took down a picture of the Shah
- 15:30and put up a picture of Khomeini and began working for the new Islamic Republic.
- 15:35And what Khomeini did was he said, OK, all you guys who are willing to work for me, fine,
- 15:42we're going to organize you.
- 15:43They put them under, at the time Iran had a prime minister as well as a president.
- 15:48So they put them under the prime minister and they began operating out of his office,
- 15:53a small intelligence organization.
- 15:56And again, they were in competition with military intelligence.
- 15:59They were in competition with the revolutionary committees and with the new revolutionary
- 16:04guard.
- 16:06And they all were pretty much focused on the internal security because the popular revolt
- 16:15against the Shah had been certainly the religious element to it.
- 16:20But a large part of it were secular leftist, Marxist and communist, some people who you
- 16:26would kind of just call democratic nationalists.
- 16:30And they figured out pretty early on that the clerics were taken over, that the clerics
- 16:36came in better prepared.
- 16:37The clerics took over all the levers of government and just were better able to run the country
- 16:45than the other groups were.
- 16:47So those groups initially fell into opposition.
- 16:51And in short order, a bunch of events happened.
- 16:55There were a number of failed coups that the intelligence service helped to identify and
- 17:02foil.
- 17:03You then had Iraq invaded Iran and started the eight year long Iran-Iraq war.
- 17:07So you had all these issues of a foreign enemy and the potential for foreign spies inside
- 17:15the country that they had to focus on.
- 17:17And after about a couple of years, the political opposition seen just how tightly the clerics
- 17:24were controlling the government, they moved over into violent opposition.
- 17:29So you started having a lot of bombings and assassinations and other things.
- 17:34And so those are kind of the catalysts of the government saying we need a formal intelligence
- 17:40organization that can bring together all these various parts that we have and turn into something
- 17:46that's more effective because in 1981 and 1982, you had some really bad bombings where
- 17:57the president, the prime minister, top generals were killed in bombings.
- 18:02The current supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, was injured in one of those bombings.
- 18:06He lost the use of one of his arms in those bombings.
- 18:10So that got them moving to put together the new Ministry of Intelligence.
- 18:16So they came up with the proposal, passed the law in August of 1983.
- 18:22They then took a year to try to assemble all the various pieces and the ministry started
- 18:28its formal functioning in August of 1984.
- 18:32And as you indicated in your question, they took the SAVAK officers from the prime minister's
- 18:37office.
- 18:38They took the revolutionaries from some of the committees.
- 18:42They took some of the other intelligence people from the Revolutionary Guard and they basically
- 18:48said to the guard, you do military intelligence along with the regular armed forces.
- 18:52We're going to do internal intelligence.
- 18:55And from the committees, they took away a lot of the police powers and said, you know,
- 19:00we're going to handle the investigation of internal dissidence and internal opposition.
- 19:08And that's basically they threw them all together.
- 19:11And I guess they worked well enough.
- 19:14There is over the course of the history, there are problems and complaints of that.
- 19:21Although the law that created the ministry stipulates that it must not be politicized
- 19:27and it forbids intelligence officers belonging to any political party or anything like that.
- 19:33But you know, some of the early senior officials immediately recognized like, well, they may
- 19:37not belong to any political factions, but they quite clearly have strong political views.
- 19:42And they tried to set up an organization and work rules and the like to minimize that.
- 19:49And I think over time, they actually succeeded in some areas, but it still exists and you
- 19:56still see samples of it today.
- 19:59So what you end up with in 1984 is this ministry that is geared primarily towards internal
- 20:08security.
- 20:09It is very closely entwined with the judiciary to do investigative work and to help with
- 20:15prosecutions and to put people in jail.
- 20:18But it does also have the traditional task of a foreign intelligence service, which is
- 20:24has to go out and try to collect intelligence overseas against Iran's external enemies and
- 20:31all the things that go with that.
- 20:32So it took over SIGINT, the signals intelligence from the regular military that wasn't related
- 20:40to military intelligence collection.
- 20:43It took over human intelligence.
- 20:45It took over whatever other limited stuff they had with communications.
- 20:52And over time, eventually, of course, they would get into cyber area and work in that
- 20:58field.
- 21:01That was their mission.
- 21:02And then as I said, their establishment law said, you're the head of all the various parts
- 21:08of the intelligence community.
- 21:10And they tried to work that as best they could.
- 21:13And judging from what the various ministers have said over the years is that it's always
- 21:18a work in project.
- 21:20Iran is trying, when they come in, they almost always announces that they're going to improve
- 21:26it, which suggests to me that they haven't quite got to where they want it yet.
- 21:31How did the complexities of transitioning from the Shah's intelligence apparatus to
- 21:35a system increasingly aligned with the institutionalization of revolutionary Islamism take shape?
- 21:42And were there any similarities between these?
- 21:46And did the need for pragmatism to ensure regime survival eventually make ideology less
- 21:51relevant for national security purposes?
- 21:54That's a really interesting question.
- 21:58And I try to touch on it in the book.
- 22:02I'm not sure even now I have a good answer for it because the regime works so hard to
- 22:10make ideology the foundation for everything that they do.
- 22:15And even when they're giving lip service to it, which happened occasionally, depending
- 22:20upon the minister for the MOIS, that you still see it running throughout in how they view
- 22:30themselves and how they view their mission.
- 22:34So as I said, when the Islamic Republic was created, they didn't entirely discard SAVAK's
- 22:42officers or their capabilities.
- 22:45So what they brought into the new ministry is I think some lingering lack of a better
- 22:50term nationalism and maybe chauvinism, given how things ran during the Shah's day, that
- 23:01was not totally counter to the new revolutionary dogma, but Khomeini's dogma, which you could
- 23:09refer to as Khomeiniism or you'll sometimes hear it referred to as Valiati Faki or rule
- 23:15of the jurisprudent.
- 23:17Basically it's rule by a Ayatollah like Khomeini, which is what his system was set up to do.
- 23:25But it's more international and outward looking as a rule.
- 23:29And so a lot of the really true believers, the most dogmatic members of the clerical
- 23:36regime, particularly in the Revolutionary Guard, they do see themselves with the grand
- 23:41mission to spread Khomeiniism, whereas I think the SAVAK folks were much more grounded in
- 23:48we're here to protect the country, our homeland, and anything we do external to that is still
- 23:55geared towards protecting the homeland.
- 23:58The revolution ultimately transitioned into we're all about protecting the regime and
- 24:07safeguarding the revolution.
- 24:08So that is always job one.
- 24:10But underneath is we do want to spread it.
- 24:13So that's how primarily with the Revolutionary Guard in the lead, you have Iran early on
- 24:18helping to form Hezbollah in Lebanon and supporting Iraqi dissonance against Saddam Hussein and
- 24:26other places because of their anti-Western anti-Israeli orientation of the revolutionaries.
- 24:33They very early made connections with militant Palestinians like Hamas and would support
- 24:40them.
- 24:41So there you can have kind of the revolutionary side of it.
- 24:45The ideology internally is just the regime is very dogmatic in that they want people
- 24:52to live by the tenets of Islam to follow what the Quran says.
- 24:59So as you hear very often, the emphasis not just on being obedient to the supreme leader
- 25:06and supportive of the theocratic government, but that you follow various moral laws.
- 25:12So women are veiled.
- 25:13Women have very restricted rights.
- 25:17Men are supposed to wear beards, no alcohol, things like that.
- 25:21And there are local police forces who take care of most of the morality stuff, but that
- 25:26still exist within the purview of the intelligence ministry.
- 25:29So sometimes they get involved in policing morality under the prime minister, not the
- 25:40prime minister, sorry, under the president before last, or actually, I guess, two ago,
- 25:48President Rouhani, the intelligence minister actually admitted is that we're on the internet
- 25:56and we police the internet.
- 25:57And when we see something that's immoral, we take it off.
- 26:01So again, that's one of the things where ideology is kind of driving them.
- 26:05More pragmatically, that same minister, Alavi, he was very much on, we're not here so much
- 26:12to punish people.
- 26:13We're here to educate people.
- 26:15So we don't want you to commit crimes or to find yourself entrapped by foreign intelligence
- 26:24organizations.
- 26:25We want to help you avoid that.
- 26:26So I don't know if many people believe that line because they still arrested a lot of
- 26:31dual nationals and reporters and other people for being in the wrong place at the wrong
- 26:36time.
- 26:37But you can see it in at least in their cultures that they try to think of themselves as this
- 26:44mix of nationalists, pragmatic, and also revolutionary and ideological in order to achieve the goals
- 26:52of the regime.
- 26:53And it's interesting, when I was doing my research is in 2021, Iran had the major protest
- 27:04in the country when a young Kurdish woman was basically beaten to death by the morality
- 27:09police and under the banner of women, life and freedom, you had these protests.
- 27:17What was it happened?
- 27:19Just a few months before the young woman was tragically killed, you had the then minister,
- 27:25who's actually the current one, Ismail Qadhi, who was talking about how the ministry needed
- 27:32to get more involved in policing morality.
- 27:35And I didn't find a lot of evidence that they got more involved.
- 27:39But clearly, there was a clamp down during that summer that basically lit the match that
- 27:44started that blow up in late 2021 that went into 2022.
- 27:49So I do think there are periods when pragmatism tempers the ideological rigidity of the government.
- 27:56Again, Alavi really worked hard to try to get this idea of popular intelligence where
- 28:03he wanted everybody to support the country and to, interestingly, didn't talk so much
- 28:09about securing the revolution, but of protecting the homeland and to try to get Iranians to,
- 28:16just like we did here in the United States, if you see something, say something.
- 28:21He had a similar campaign in Iran, which again, not sure how well it worked, but at least
- 28:26that's where their hearts were in trying to present themselves as pragmatic and not punitive
- 28:33. We also, in researching this, we found a lot of documents, press pieces, some of the
- 28:42stuff they do in the cultural realm where the ministry likes to, without saying this,
- 28:47but it likes to compare itself favorably to the Revolutionary Guard intelligence organizations.
- 28:52So it comes off as more of the good cop and the guard or the bad cops.
- 28:59The history itself sometimes says, well, it's actually just bad cop and less bad cop, but
- 29:05they at least try to present themselves as playing by the rules, abiding by the laws,
- 29:12because Iran does have, at least in the Constitution, certain civil liberties.
- 29:17It's just they don't always honor them.
- 29:19Would you briefly highlight how NYS is organized and what its core functions and scope of activities
- 29:28are?
- 29:29Yeah.
- 29:30What I found in my research was, one, they don't publish that information.
- 29:36They keep it classified.
- 29:37So occasionally there were some things that came out in the press where they would refer
- 29:42to a deputy minister or one of the directors generals who was subordinates to the minister.
- 29:50And you bit by bit got to find stuff as to what their organization was.
- 29:55But what I found, they follow basically the organization that most intelligence organizations
- 30:04do is that they have different directorates set up to do the main tasks.
- 30:10So there is a directorate of operations that is focused externally.
- 30:16You have a center that does analysis, kind of the equivalent of where I used to work
- 30:23in CIA where they're the ones who read reports and write products for policymakers and others.
- 30:32You have a technical collection office.
- 30:34You have an office that focuses on finding corruption and things like that.
- 30:40I came up with at least eight directorates that you could definitely identify.
- 30:47They covered internal security, foreign intelligence.
- 30:50There was a counterintelligence directorate, the office of analysis that I mentioned.
- 30:54They had a counterterrorism directorate, technical collection, anti-corruption.
- 30:59And they also had a directorate for security, which they actually call protection.
- 31:04And you'll see that a lot in Iran as just every part of the intelligence community has
- 31:09a protection organization.
- 31:12And what those are is in the United States, we would call them security organizations.
- 31:17They are the people who are responsible for protecting facilities, for vetting employees,
- 31:23for protecting information, things like that.
- 31:26But those are the main things.
- 31:29Can't find any good evidence of it, but there are references saying like there are administrative
- 31:34departments.
- 31:35They have an office that does financial stuff.
- 31:37They have an office responsible for training and things like that.
- 31:41But I actually resisted the temptation to create a wiring diagram because I just knew
- 31:47it wasn't going to be right.
- 31:49And so I just kind of talk about it generally is what their main offices are.
- 31:54I think for people new to Iran and to the Ministry of Intelligence, I think of it as
- 32:00sort of a hybrid CIA, FBI, or hybrid MI5, MI6 from a British perspective that it just
- 32:10does everything these countries' organizations do, just in some cases not as well, in other
- 32:17cases maybe as well, but without having to worry too much about civil liberties and due
- 32:23process as they do their work.
- 32:28But it's interesting to me that they put a lot of emphasis on protection, it would seem,
- 32:36just from reading the press and some of the documents that we saw.
- 32:39But that is really one of their biggest weaknesses is what we would call operational security,
- 32:46is that they are clearly very subject to having their operations blown and penetrated by foreign
- 32:53intelligence.
- 32:54A lot of the stuff that happened over the past several years in Europe where MOIS operations
- 33:01have been discovered and stopped was somebody along the line had poor communication security
- 33:09or maybe some penetration within the office.
- 33:14And that's both the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC clearly has a lot of serious
- 33:20penetrations as the Israelis have demonstrated repeatedly by conducting assassinations and
- 33:26sabotage inside Iran over the years.
- 33:30It seems to me their focus mostly internally, where they operate overseas, including the
- 33:37United States, Canada, United Kingdom, they tend to be focusing a lot more on dissidents
- 33:46and Iranian opposition types, more so than trying to gather intelligence information.
- 33:56And I couldn't find any really good explanations for that other than they clearly view the
- 34:02opposition groups as a more serious threat.
- 34:05And they may feel they find enough in open sources about what the United States is up
- 34:10to that they don't have to work too hard at that.
- 34:14I did detect a change in the past decade or so as everything is much more connected on
- 34:20the internet and cyber capabilities have improved, is that relying mostly on contractors and
- 34:30hacker groups inside Iran that they just subcontract to do a lot of their work is that the ministry
- 34:38does seem to be doing a lot of external intelligence, foreign intelligence collection over the internet
- 34:45by basically trying to penetrate into systems and gather as much information they can or
- 34:50by using email and things like that to do phishing and other things to get people to
- 34:58unknowingly give them information.
- 35:01And I think one example, they kind of set up a job site for people working in the national
- 35:07security field that they were trying to get as much detailed personal information as they
- 35:13could from people who would be going into the internal security field that they might
- 35:17could use somewhere down the road.
- 35:19So that gives you a kind of an aspect of what they do.
- 35:26I'd also say on foreign intelligence, they don't have that many partners, but they have
- 35:32been working with the Russians, they've been working with the Chinese.
- 35:36You see occasionally they work with some European services, Pakistanis and Turks.
- 35:44No real information on the extent of those contacts or what is actually shared, but it
- 35:51does mean that they do have conduits of information, depending on how generous, say the Russians
- 35:58are feeling that they might be getting good information on their enemies that they don't
- 36:03have to bother to go out and collect.
- 36:06And focusing on how politics, I guess, leaks into intelligence, how does the primary decision
- 36:14making process within the MOS function and how does its relationship with Iran's political
- 36:20leadership, particularly the president, operate in practice?
- 36:24Yeah, let me go back and do a little bit of history then to kind of answer that question.
- 36:31When the officials of the revolutionary government first started proposing to create an intelligence
- 36:39bureau or not an intelligence ministry, you know, a lot of the leaders, including some
- 36:47of the very senior leaders, all had first-hand experience with SAVAK, which is to say they
- 36:52had been in SAVAK's prison cells, they had been tortured by SAVAK officials.
- 36:57And so they all came to the question of do we want to create an intelligence ministry
- 37:02with that in the back of their mind?
- 37:04So what they wanted was something that would not become all-powerful, that would become
- 37:11very repressive.
- 37:12They wanted something that would be controlled and be accountable to some part of the government.
- 37:19But they did have some arguments.
- 37:21So part of the officials thought that the ministry should come under the executive branch
- 37:29and be accountable to the elected president and to the elected legislative members.
- 37:36But then there were other parts who thought, well, perhaps because they had looked at foreign
- 37:41intelligence services, they said, oh, that's a way to hamstring your intelligence organization.
- 37:46We really should have multiple intelligence organizations, and they should all only report
- 37:50to the supreme leader.
- 37:52So that way they're aligned with the person who actually does make all the major decisions
- 37:58in Iran, and they don't have to worry about any constraints on their activities.
- 38:04What they eventually decided to do was create a ministry as part of the executive branch
- 38:09that was accountable to the legislature.
- 38:13But they put in this requirement that the minister had to be a cleric, and the cleric,
- 38:19he had to be a mid-ranking cleric who had experience with interpreting religious law.
- 38:31And in that regard, the minister, while he would be nominated by the president and answer
- 38:39to the president on some cases, he would have to be approved by the supreme leader.
- 38:44And his primary obedience as a cleric was to the Ayatollah, who was the supreme leader.
- 38:50And so that's where you start when it comes to decision-making, is you have an intelligence
- 38:56minister who basically reports to the president, but really there's only one guy he actually
- 39:05answers to, and that's the supreme leader.
- 39:08All I can tell from my research and looking at the ministry itself is like any bureaucratic
- 39:12organization, it's hierarchical and it's a centralized process for decisions that require
- 39:20high-level input.
- 39:22So there would be a chain of command that would come up from the subcomponents to the
- 39:27directorates to the deputy minister to the minister for decisions that the minister could
- 39:33make at his level, for other decisions that would have to be made at a higher level.
- 39:38It would probably go to the president who would then take it to another organization,
- 39:43which is called the Supreme National Security Council, which like our national security
- 39:48council consists of the president as the chair.
- 39:52It also includes the supreme leader or his representative, and then the minister of intelligence,
- 39:59the foreign minister, the defense minister, other appropriate ministers, and they hash
- 40:05out the policy and then they make a decision and that's it.
- 40:11Otherwise, as sometimes happens in Western governments, is that there are compartmented
- 40:16programs that are so sensitive that only a very few people are made aware of them.
- 40:21And you get a sense that there have been programs like that where maybe only the supreme leader
- 40:29and the minister are involved in the decision-making and that happens.
- 40:34And then there were, of course, over the years, there have been instances of illegal decision-making
- 40:40that where there were extrajudicial killings perpetrated by officers of the ministry, that
- 40:50those decisions were made without input from people above them, although with the approval
- 40:56of the larger clerical government.
- 41:00So I think that pretty much hits everybody.
- 41:06I guess I didn't talk too much about the modulus.
- 41:10The modulus does vote on the nomination of the minister and they, in theory, can turn
- 41:18somebody down.
- 41:19They never have.
- 41:21They can call the minister and the deputy ministers up for questioning.
- 41:24They do that occasionally.
- 41:27That's where it tends to get mostly political is you tend to find the conservatives, when
- 41:36there's a pragmatic or reformist minister leading the ministry, they tend to call them for the
- 41:42modulus or the legislature much more often to kind of grill them about what they're doing
- 41:47and press them to maybe not be as light-handed as they're trying to be.
- 41:52Interestingly, the Revolutionary Guard intelligence organization isn't answerable to the legislature.
- 41:59They only answer to the supreme leader.
- 42:01And so they don't have to worry about ever going before the members of the modulus and
- 42:08having to answer questions.
- 42:10So that's one of the constraints that the ministry has to operate under and has to be
- 42:15aware of when they're making decisions.
- 42:18The ministry has been politicized over time.
- 42:22Basically the ministers, the first two ministers were very close to the supreme leader and
- 42:27the more conservative side of the government.
- 42:30And they clearly leaned in that direction.
- 42:32That's where some of the extrajudicial killings started when they were in charge.
- 42:38You then had a series of reformist presidents who appointed more reformist ministers who
- 42:44tried to basically, like I said, try to turn the ministry more to the we're the good cops,
- 42:49we're playing by the rules, we're professional.
- 42:53They generally tried to move in those directions, but then would find countervailing pressure
- 42:58from the hardline parts of the government that they weren't working hard enough or they
- 43:04weren't suppressing dissent or protecting the country well enough.
- 43:08And you see the pendulum kind of swing back towards the middle.
- 43:11Then you had in the mid 2000s, another hardline president gets elected.
- 43:18He takes the ministry back the other way.
- 43:20They become much more repressive.
- 43:22And that's kind of the way it goes.
- 43:23Now, right now we're in kind of a weird situation where the current president is described as
- 43:30a pragmatist.
- 43:32He was elected after his predecessor, who was a hardliner, died in a helicopter crash
- 43:37last May.
- 43:40And he kept the same intelligence minister, a guy named Ismail Khatib.
- 43:46And Khatib is a hardliner.
- 43:49He's a conservative.
- 43:51And as much as I've been able to pay attention to it recently, I don't see that he's softened
- 43:56his approach despite the fact that the current president is called a pragmatist.
- 44:01And it'll be interesting to see over the coming years, what changes if any that might occur
- 44:07and how the ministry is treating the public and how it goes about its mission.
- 44:16And looking at the competition within Iran, how does the NIS actually collaborate or compete
- 44:25with different entities such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in matters of intelligence
- 44:32and security?
- 44:36It's really hard to say.
- 44:38I wasn't able to find too many examples where they publicly would come out and say, we collaborated
- 44:44and we did this together.
- 44:47It clearly happens.
- 44:52The relationship seems much more competitive.
- 44:54I mean, from the very get-go, when they first formed the ministry, the Revolutionary Guard
- 45:00was supposed to turn over some buildings and equipment as well as personnel to the ministry.
- 45:06And they basically dragged their feet for a couple of years before they did some but
- 45:14not all of the stuff that they were by law required to do.
- 45:19And then you just saw sort of the overlap of when the ministry was created, the guard
- 45:25was told, you focus on military intelligence.
- 45:28And they were still in the middle of the Iran-Iraq War.
- 45:31So you would think the guard would actually have welcomed the chance to focus on the battlefront,
- 45:36but they never gave up continuing to chase down political opposition, minority ethnic
- 45:45groups who had formed dissident groups.
- 45:49And that just continued to compete.
- 45:51And then over time, I think most people are familiar with the Revolutionary Guard Quds
- 45:57Force, which is the one that basically serves as the external force that worked with Hezbollah,
- 46:05works with Hamas, trains all the Iraqi militias, and works with the Houthis in Yemen.
- 46:11It's kind of an external arm of Iran's intelligence setup.
- 46:17It's more of a covert action or kind of a special forces-like arm to work in those areas.
- 46:24And then bit by bit over the past few years, the guard has moved into external operations
- 46:29of going after the external opposition, Iranian opposition, which once was a purview of just
- 46:39the Ministry of Intelligence.
- 46:40They were the ones who went after people overseas, and now the guard's stealing it.
- 46:46So that's competition.
- 46:48The one or two times I can think of where they've worked together involved sort of
- 46:55counterterrorism missions inside the country, where they did come out and say, you know,
- 47:00we work together.
- 47:01And because of that, we were able either to foil a terrorist attack or more often than
- 47:06not it was we were able to, after the terrorists attacked, we were able to capture the terrorists
- 47:11and attack their bases outside the country.
- 47:17The big transition in the relationship and in the competition occurred in 2009.
- 47:24That's when the guard, which as a military organization had a number of intelligence
- 47:30branches, they brought them all together in one single organization, which they called
- 47:36the intelligence organization.
- 47:38And they created it in response to the Green Movement protest of 2009.
- 47:45For folks who aren't familiar with it, the 2009 was an election year.
- 47:49The election was disputed when the president at the time was reelected.
- 47:54And his opponents thought that the count was wrong and the vote was rigged and people went
- 48:02into the streets.
- 48:03And for several months, there were regular nationwide demonstrations that the national
- 48:10police law enforcement forces were called in Revolutionary Guard brought in their militia
- 48:16called the besiege.
- 48:18And then the ministry and the regular IRGC units were brought in in some cases to suppress
- 48:25protest.
- 48:26And at that point, the supreme leader decided that he wanted more control over internal
- 48:33security than he had with just the Ministry of Intelligence.
- 48:37So he put the intelligence organization together for the IRGC, put one of his trusted lieutenants
- 48:45in charge of it.
- 48:47And they immediately began a project of building out and taking on more duties and missions
- 48:53inside the country to suppress all types of dissent.
- 48:58And I will say there is a big difference in the good cop, bad cop situation where in the
- 49:04late from about 2009, really until 2021, where the MOIS really did make an effort to try
- 49:14to kind of abide by some of the laws and not be so repressive towards groups that weren't
- 49:22sort of actively trying to overthrow the government.
- 49:25They did their share of it.
- 49:27But the IRGC was just they would go after labor unions, they would go after reporters,
- 49:32they would go after dual nationals, Iranians with either British or American citizenship.
- 49:39They went after environmentalists because the environmentalists were complaining that
- 49:44the government wasn't doing the right thing to protect Iran's environment.
- 49:49And so they started arresting all these people who I think from the more pragmatic politicians'
- 49:56perspective was you're not helping us in the world or you're not really helping us at home
- 50:03in terms of securing the regime.
- 50:05You're just making everybody think that we're paranoid and we're afraid.
- 50:10And why are we afraid?
- 50:11Is it because we're weak and vulnerable?
- 50:14And the guards' approach was we don't care, any threat must be stamped out.
- 50:20And so the competition really just kind of took off there.
- 50:27And they would fight over things like the ministry would say we're the only ones who
- 50:32are really capable of saying who's involved in espionage and who isn't.
- 50:39And so they would come out, the guards would arrest people and the ministry on some occasions
- 50:44come out and say we've already looked at those people, they're not spies.
- 50:49And the guards' approach generally was we don't care what you think, we're going to
- 50:53put them before a judge anyway.
- 50:55And the guard usually won in those episodes.
- 50:58Another thing that the guard got involved in, one of the missions that the ministry
- 51:02has as part of their protection function was they vetted all people who ran for political
- 51:10office.
- 51:11And there's another organization I won't go into that also approves everybody who gets
- 51:16to run for election, but they would look to the Ministry of Intelligence to give them
- 51:21small dossiers on who was running.
- 51:23And basically did they pass the test of they were trustworthy people and kind of like what
- 51:32we do with our own nominees for political office, but also it had an ideological component
- 51:37to it is that did these people support the revolution or not?
- 51:41Well there were some complaints by the hardline conservatives that too many pragmatists and
- 51:46reformists were getting in.
- 51:48So the Revolutionary Guard stepped in and started doing it first, doing it on their
- 51:53own ad hoc and then they convinced the legislature when it was controlled by conservatives to
- 51:59pass a law that gave them a role in vetting politicians.
- 52:03So they now have a much stronger hold on who gets to run for office, which means who gets
- 52:09to be a member of the legislature who gets to run for president and all to concentrate
- 52:15power in the hardliners, which obviously over the long term is going to shape the ministry
- 52:20and how pragmatic and practical it can be and keep its political masters happy.
- 52:27Absolutely fascinating.
- 52:29Thank you.
- 52:32You already briefly mentioned the international activities, but perhaps you can tell us a
- 52:40little bit more about assassinations and kidnapping plots.
- 52:44Okay, well yeah, the number of events over the past years as to what they've been doing,
- 52:53the most controversial things are the assassinations of regime opponents or in some cases the abductions
- 53:00of the regime opponents who are traveling in the region or lured into the region by
- 53:08the Iranians to where they can get them in the position to capture.
- 53:16Some of the more famous ones, I think you had a situation where in the Netherlands back
- 53:24in 2016 an assailant who was linked to the ministry killed a member of one of the opposition
- 53:35groups that's fairly well known called the Majahedin al-Khalk.
- 53:41They're a fairly large organization, fairly active, and they are constantly, they're not
- 53:49really much of a threat, but they're very public and from an information operations
- 53:55perspective they are probably one of the more challenging opponents that the regime have.
- 54:00They're not popular in Iran at all because during the 1980s they sided with Saddam Hussein
- 54:06in his war against Iran and they were in Iraq for many, many years.
- 54:12But anyway, one of the guys who was involved in the bombing in 1981 that killed a bunch
- 54:19of the revolutionary officials, three decades later they killed him.
- 54:30A year later in the Netherlands they killed the leader of an Arab liberation movement,
- 54:36a group that represents the Arab dominated southwestern part of Iran.
- 54:43One of the more famous incidents that did not happen was in 2018 there was this large
- 54:50MIS plot to bomb a rally in Paris and apparently some of their communications got intercepted
- 54:59by the Israelis.
- 55:00The Israelis alerted the Germans and the Belgians which is where the plot was being developed.
- 55:06They waited until everything was getting ready to go into action and then they swooped in
- 55:10and arrested the plotters and tore that thing up.
- 55:17More recently you have had a couple of kidnappings.
- 55:21There was a gentleman named Ruhollah Zam who was a dissident who was lured back into Iraq
- 55:32where he was kidnapped and driven back into Iran and put on trial.
- 55:38In 2010 there was a group called Jundala who represent the Baluk minority in Iran.
- 55:46And Jundala, pretty violent group, they do a lot of bombings, kidnappings, assassinations.
- 55:54And in 2010 the ministry managed to orchestrate with the Iranian military.
- 56:04They discovered that Rigi was flying on an airplane from across the Persian Gulf.
- 56:11He was crossing Iranian airspace to get to Central Asia.
- 56:16They arranged for the Iranian Air Force to force that civilian airliner down in Iran.
- 56:20They took him off the plane.
- 56:22They put him before a judge.
- 56:24They tried him and they hanged him in short order.
- 56:29More recently we've had surveillance in the United States.
- 56:33There's a group out in California that the ministry kind of subcontracted to some Iranian
- 56:41Americans to surveil the leader of the group.
- 56:46And they were quickly noticed, reported to the police and arrested.
- 56:51And then the FBI I think swooped in and took him over.
- 56:56More recently, an Iranian dissident in New York City was also similarly surveilled.
- 57:01There was a kidnapping plot that was about ready to be executed.
- 57:05And they identified that that was going on.
- 57:08The FBI was on top of it and they went in, grabbed him and arrested him.
- 57:15More recently the head of British MI5 came out, this was back in September, and gave
- 57:22a warning that Iranian intelligence had been working with criminal groups and possibly
- 57:28with the Russians in Great Britain.
- 57:31And again, they were surveilling dissidents and were plotting to do various things, sabotage
- 57:37and kidnappings there.
- 57:39So the ministry stays very, very active.
- 57:43And I think that's one of those things that it's relatively low cost to them.
- 57:52So they don't give up too much.
- 57:54Occasional, a lot of the plotters are people that they've recruited and either in effect
- 58:02have blackmailed into doing things because they have family back in Iran.
- 58:06I mean, the plot to bomb the Paris rally, the poor people who were actually being charged
- 58:14with planting the bomb were in that situation.
- 58:18They got recruited, initially rewarded with some money and the like.
- 58:23But a lot of it came down to is like they had family in Iran that they had to worry
- 58:27about.
- 58:28There was a former military officer who was kidnapped or they tried to kidnap and failed
- 58:36in Turkey.
- 58:37But basically, the way they got close to him was they contacted his wife and threatened
- 58:43to do bad things to her family if she didn't help turn over her husband.
- 58:49So they give you a sense of how they operate and what they're like when they're operating
- 58:56outside their country.
- 58:59Inside the country, again, they're considered judicial officers.
- 59:03So this is kind of their FBI type role is where they have the ability to get warrants
- 59:10to investigate, to basically go into people's homes or businesses.
- 59:17They can, as part of their investigations, they can hold people, they can interrogate
- 59:23them, they can eventually hand them over to a prosecutor.
- 59:26And then they're part of the court case as they testify against them and present evidence
- 59:30against them when their case is eventually adjudicated.
- 59:35And they do that a lot.
- 59:38There are a number of Iranian human rights groups that will say that, again, regardless
- 59:44of what their propaganda is, the ministry doesn't really abide by due process.
- 59:52The human rights group will call it torture.
- 59:54It sounds to me more like just harsh treatment.
- 59:56I don't think they are bringing out the real severe tortures, but they do put people in
- 1:00:05isolation.
- 1:00:06They will put them in physically uncomfortable poses or put them in sleep deprivation type
- 1:00:14situations with lights and music, things like that, that will wear down a body.
- 1:00:20But again, they're not as brutal as the RGC intelligence people are.
- 1:00:27There you have people who've been in Iran and gotten out, who had been under the care
- 1:00:33of the RGC, who would talk about being physically beaten and things like that, that they had
- 1:00:39to suffer.
- 1:00:40So I think you just got an organization that is very, very active.
- 1:00:50They're good at some things.
- 1:00:52Other things they do less well is evidenced by the fact that a lot of their operations
- 1:00:56get blown.
- 1:00:57But occasionally they do have things that come off like clockwork.
- 1:01:04One in particular, and last thing I'll mention, Jamshid Sharmaad, who in 2020 during the pandemic,
- 1:01:11right as it was starting, was traveling overseas and he was going from the United States.
- 1:01:16He stopped over in the United Arab Emirates in Dubai.
- 1:01:21He's on his way to India.
- 1:01:22Well, somehow or another, the Iranians figured out that he was traveling, found out that
- 1:01:28he was going to be stopping in Dubai and somehow managed to arrange to kidnap him into Dubai,
- 1:01:34get him into a safe house somewhere, transport him.
- 1:01:37And we're not sure how he transported him to Iran, but they got him to Iran.
- 1:01:42And once he was there, he was put in jail and then later tried.
- 1:01:47And I'm not 100% sure.
- 1:01:50I think he's still in jail at this point.
- 1:01:54But that was a pretty complex operation and they pulled it off without getting caught
- 1:02:00and they pulled it off successfully.
- 1:02:03So that's the kind of thing they're capable of doing.
- 1:02:07There was an incident in Canada a couple of years ago where they hired some hell's angels.
- 1:02:12So they just went out and found criminals and they tried to get them to do some recruiting
- 1:02:18or do some surveillance and possibly some other things.
- 1:02:22But again, law enforcement got onto it pretty quickly and was able to break it up.
- 1:02:28What are the primary challenges Iran faces today and how does the MIS justify its actions
- 1:02:36while managing its public image and addressing concerns of corruption and legitimacy?
- 1:02:42Okay, another great question.
- 1:02:46For me, it's kind of like where to start.
- 1:02:48Iran faces so many critical political, economic and security challenges.
- 1:02:55Right now, everything's in the news from the Israel Hamas, Israel Hezbollah, Israel strikes
- 1:03:03on Iran, just concern about a wider regional war that Iran clearly does not want but is
- 1:03:09worried about.
- 1:03:11I think the biggest issue Iran faces now that has an impact on the ministry is just the
- 1:03:17government's legitimacy is crumbling.
- 1:03:21There's widespread dissatisfaction with the government.
- 1:03:26People are unhappy with the political repression, with economic mismanagement.
- 1:03:31They don't like the strict social controls and again, having to wear the veil, just basically
- 1:03:38the ability to live their lives they want to.
- 1:03:40It's left people frustrated and dissatisfaction is just very, very high.
- 1:03:47The ministry, part of their job is to keep an eye on when that dissatisfaction starts
- 1:03:53to bubble over into protests, demonstrations or some other types of actions.
- 1:03:58Again, as we've talked about, the ministry has tried to balance competing agendas of
- 1:04:05pragmatic president and more hardline and conservative, non-elected parts of the government,
- 1:04:12starting with the Supreme Leader and other parts of the clerical establishment.
- 1:04:16They're always trying to get public cooperation to get people to, if they see something, say
- 1:04:21something about provocateurs or terrorists or militants who might pose a threat to the
- 1:04:27public.
- 1:04:28It's hard to say how that works.
- 1:04:31As I was mentioning a while ago, the current president, Massoud Pesetsky, is characterized
- 1:04:39as a reformist or at least a pragmatist.
- 1:04:42He seems concerned about legitimacy, but so far hasn't seemed to do a whole lot on that
- 1:04:50realm.
- 1:04:51It's really hard to say.
- 1:04:54Particularly between sanctions, the prospect of even more sanctions under the Trump administration,
- 1:05:01Ron is having a lot of issues.
- 1:05:03But I think a lot of people who study it will tell you that their biggest problem is mismanagement,
- 1:05:08that because of sanctions and shortages, it's allowed corruption to flourish.
- 1:05:13The Revolutionary Guard is a big part of that corruption.
- 1:05:16They've taken over large parts of the economy.
- 1:05:21While the ministry has a mission to fight corruption, they have to do it under the constraints
- 1:05:28that a lot of the people who are the worst perpetrators of it are basically beyond the
- 1:05:33law.
- 1:05:34They can't touch them.
- 1:05:35So that doesn't leave them much room to work.
- 1:05:40On the security front, I think their biggest concern right now is, again, the Israelis
- 1:05:47repeatedly over the year, just in the past year, between the assassination of the leader
- 1:05:52of Hamas and Tehran back in July to various sabotage incidents against Iranian facilities.
- 1:06:01The fact that the Israeli airstrikes were so perfectly targeted against Iranian military
- 1:06:09facilities and production facilities and the like shows that they've got a lot to do in
- 1:06:15terms of protecting themselves.
- 1:06:20They haven't handled it well in the past.
- 1:06:22There's been charges by other Iranians within the political system that the ministry is
- 1:06:27possibly penetrated by foreign intelligence service and they need to do something about
- 1:06:32it.
- 1:06:35In terms of managing its public image, like I said, it tries its best to come across as
- 1:06:41the good cop, that it's only interested in educating the people and protecting them from
- 1:06:48foreign powers, trapping them into espionage or sedition or something like that.
- 1:06:53I'm just doubtful that many people buy it.
- 1:06:56I mean, I will say this, Iranians, no less than any other people, love their homeland
- 1:07:05and love their fellow Iranians and that they will want to protect their country.
- 1:07:10So, they're going to be suspicious of foreigners and they're going to be on the lookout for
- 1:07:15things that might pose a threat to public safety.
- 1:07:17So they probably do help the ministry in that regard, but I don't think a lot of them are
- 1:07:25going to be inclined to be snoops and snitches against their neighbors or to go out of their
- 1:07:32way to help the security apparatus of a government that they find is veering over into not just
- 1:07:41being authoritarian, but becoming increasingly more of a police state that is watching everything
- 1:07:48and censoring everything and that you need to be very careful about.
- 1:07:54And I do have in the book a chapter or part of a chapter that talks about cyber realm
- 1:08:01and again, the ministry is very active there, but the Iranian people have always been big
- 1:08:10on the internet.
- 1:08:11Persian is surprisingly one of the more active languages on the internet and the Iranians
- 1:08:17are very skilled in setting up their private virtual networks and ways they can get around
- 1:08:23a lot of the government controls, but it's an area where they're constantly challenging
- 1:08:27the security forces and security forces are trying to keep up in order to, again, mostly
- 1:08:34to censor, but also to kind of keep track of potential threats that might be coming
- 1:08:40from that direction.
- 1:08:42So I think that's the major challenges.
- 1:08:46I will say this, whether they're under a hardline government or reformist government, the ministry
- 1:08:52does take its job seriously in terms of we want to protect the regime and we want to
- 1:08:58avoid failing the way Savak did.
- 1:09:03We want to make sure that if there does arise a major challenge to the regime, that we're
- 1:09:10there to protect it.
- 1:09:12My final question is what do you forecast for the future and what key insights do you
- 1:09:18hope readers will take away from your book?
- 1:09:21One of the more important insights that I came away with is you have this consolidation
- 1:09:27of power by hardline conservatives in Iran.
- 1:09:31Now that's just part of the broader political thing, but interestingly, before President
- 1:09:38Raisi died in his helicopter crash in May, which sadly came after the manuscript was
- 1:09:45finished and was sent off to be processed, I was able to get in some updates to it.
- 1:09:52You had this alignment where Raisi was being touted as a possible replacement as Supreme
- 1:09:59Leader for Khamenei.
- 1:10:02He was the former chief justice of Iran.
- 1:10:08He also had worked with the Ministry of Intelligence on and off throughout his career.
- 1:10:14The man who replaced him as chief justice was a former Minister of Intelligence, a guy
- 1:10:21named Mohseni Ejehi, and Khatib, the new intelligence minister, worked for both of those two men
- 1:10:31at the judiciary in their intelligence and protection office for many, many years.
- 1:10:38You had these three individuals who knew each other, were close, had worked together, and
- 1:10:44they're in this alignment of one's president, one's Minister of Intelligence, and one's
- 1:10:49the chief justice.
- 1:10:51The other thing readers should take away from the book is that there is this very strong
- 1:10:55Ministry of Intelligence judiciary tie that, as I mentioned, the officers are considered
- 1:11:02judicial officers.
- 1:11:04Most of the ministers, not all, but most of them, particularly the early ones, were either
- 1:11:09prosecutors or judges before and after they were minister, and then, of course, you've
- 1:11:15got one who's now the chief justice.
- 1:11:18There's these really strong ties that I think creates a power center that involves the Ministry
- 1:11:23of Intelligence, the judiciary, and the presidency, at least while Raisi was there.
- 1:11:29Now that he's gone, that's probably weakened a little bit, but I do think that actually
- 1:11:34helps the ministry have a stronger profile vis-a-vis the Revolutionary Guard than it
- 1:11:40had previous to that setup.
- 1:11:42Depending upon who the next supreme leader is, the current one's 85 years old, so sometime
- 1:11:48in the next decade probably we'll have a new supreme leader.
- 1:11:51That could make the ministry much stronger than it was.
- 1:11:55The other things, in addition to the relationship with the IRGC and how that competition kind
- 1:12:01of affects everything the ministry does, is just the hostile relationship with the United
- 1:12:06States and Israel.
- 1:12:09The ministry, because it's more internally focused, and I think this is the reason why
- 1:12:14there isn't just much out there about it right now, is that I don't think it's ever been
- 1:12:18that big of a problem for other foreign intelligence services.
- 1:12:21They keep an eye on it, but it's not a major threat.
- 1:12:24But increasingly, as the shadow war with Israel has escalated, I'm pretty sure the ministry
- 1:12:31is going to be called on to do more.
- 1:12:33And they do have some successes in the past.
- 1:12:35They actually recruited a former Israeli minister that I talk about in the book several years
- 1:12:40ago.
- 1:12:42This Israeli actually got himself in trouble and had been kicked out of government for
- 1:12:47criminal activities, but they managed to recruit him.
- 1:12:51And then they actually hacked the phone number of a former defense minister and was able
- 1:12:57to get information off of his cell phone.
- 1:13:00So it's not that they're inactive.
- 1:13:02They just are more deliberate about how they go about it.
- 1:13:05But I think that's likely to increase because they're definitely in much greater level of
- 1:13:12hostility with Israel than they were before.
- 1:13:14And I think that'll carry over into being a much hostile relationship with the United
- 1:13:19States.
- 1:13:20As far as insights go, I don't think I'd offer too much beyond kind of what I was saying
- 1:13:27earlier is that they know the regime is weak.
- 1:13:32A lot of the current regime leaders were there in 1978 and 79 when they overthrew the Shah.
- 1:13:38So they have a sense of what a revolution looks like and what they need to be afraid
- 1:13:43of.
- 1:13:44And I think going forward with their own legitimacy weakening is that they're likely to probably
- 1:13:53be more repressive than the Shah was and ask their various security organs to do much more.
- 1:13:58So a lot of it depends on what the Iranian people are willing to put up with and how
- 1:14:05much they can tolerate before too much is too much and they react to it.
- 1:14:13I think we'll see more protests like the Women Life Freedom Movement of a couple of years
- 1:14:17ago and I think that's going to be a real challenge to the ministry.
- 1:14:24How do you handle nationwide protests that are likely to grow in popularity because everybody
- 1:14:32is just so unhappy with the regime and how it operates.
- 1:14:36This has been really wonderful.
- 1:14:38Thank you.
- 1:14:39Well, thank you again.
- 1:14:40I appreciate the opportunity to talk about my book and I've been listening to your podcast
- 1:14:46and I'm a big fan of them.
- 1:14:48I think they're just really well done and informative.
- 1:14:50So thank you for what you're doing.
- 1:15:20Thank you.