Latest / Epic Fury: The US-Iran War Podcast / The Intelligence War Behind Operation Epic Fury | Part 5/5 | Epic Fury Series
Transcript
- 0:16We have arrived at the end of the thread.
- 0:19Over the course of this series, we have traced the CI as
- 0:22relationship with Iran across 73 years, from the summer of 1953,
- 0:27when Kermit Roosevelt arrived in Tehran with several $1,000,000
- 0:30in a mandate to destroy a democracy, to the spring of 2026
- 0:34when the bombs of Operation Epic Fury began falling on Iranian
- 0:38cities. We have covered the coup and the
- 0:40secret police it produced. We have covered the hostage
- 0:43crisis, the failed rescue mission, and the covert wars of
- 0:47the 1980s. We have covered the cyber
- 0:49weapons, the assassinations, and the collapse of diplomacy in the
- 0:53years that followed. This final episode brings the
- 0:56story to the present moment. It asks what the CIA knew before
- 1:00the strikes began, how the intelligence picture was
- 1:02assembled over decades of work, what the agency's role was in
- 1:06the decisions that produced this war, and what the full arc of 73
- 1:10years of involvement tells us about the conflict being fought
- 1:12today. This is episode 5 of the CIA and
- 1:16Iran bonus series, The intelligence war behind
- 1:19Operation Epic Fury. To understand the CI as role in
- 1:22the lead up to Operation Epic Fury, you have to understand how
- 1:26the intelligence picture had changed in years immediately
- 1:29preceding the strikes. The assessments that had
- 1:31characterized the agency's view of Iran's nuclear program
- 1:34through most of the Obama and early Trump years.
- 1:37That Iran had not made the political decision to build a
- 1:39nuclear weapon, that its program remained in a zone of strategic
- 1:43ambiguity between civilian capability and weapons
- 1:45readiness, had shifted materially by 2023 and into 2024
- 1:50and 2025. The shift was driven by a
- 1:53combination of factors that, taken individually, might each
- 1:57have been managed but that together produced a picture of
- 1:59genuine and accelerating urgency.
- 2:02Iran's withdrawal from the key constraints of the Joint
- 2:05Comprehensive Plan of Action following the Trump
- 2:07administration's departure from the agreement in 2018 have
- 2:11produced dramatic and measurable changes in the program's
- 2:14technical status. By mid 2023, Iran was enriching
- 2:18uranium to 60% purity at both the Natans and Ferdal
- 2:22facilities. The IAEA was reporting through
- 2:252024 that Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium had
- 2:29grown to a level that, if further process to 90% weapons
- 2:32grade material will be sufficient to produce multiple
- 2:35nuclear devices. The breakout timeline, the
- 2:38technical term for how long it would take Iran to produce
- 2:41enough weapons grade material for one device if it made the
- 2:43political decision to do so, had contracted to an estimated one
- 2:47to two weeks in the most pessimistic assessments, down
- 2:50from the approximately 1 year that the Joint Comprehensive
- 2:53Plan of Action had been designed to guarantee.
- 2:55That contraction from a 12 month breakout window to a window
- 2:58measured in days was the single most consequential intelligence
- 3:02development in the entire nuclear file.
- 3:04It fundamentally changed the nature of the problem.
- 3:08When the breakout timeline is measured in months, there is
- 3:11time to detect preparations, to issue warnings, to apply
- 3:14diplomatic pressure, and to mobilize international
- 3:17responses. When the breakout timeline is
- 3:19measured in days, none of those mechanisms are reliable.
- 3:23The intelligence picture had moved from a situation where
- 3:26covert action and diplomacy could manage the risk to a
- 3:29situation where the window for management had effectively
- 3:32closed. The IAA's ability to monitor the
- 3:35program had also degraded significantly in the same
- 3:38period. In September 2023, IEA Director
- 3:42General Rafael Grossi stated publicly that the agency had
- 3:45lost continuity of knowledge of significant parts of the Iranian
- 3:48nuclear program following Iran's removal of IA cameras and
- 3:52monitoring equipment at multiple declare facilities.
- 3:55Iran had also suspended implementation of the Additional
- 3:58Protocol, which allowed for more intrusive and short notice
- 4:01inspections beyond the standard safeguards agreement.
- 4:04The combination of a rapidly expanding program and a degraded
- 4:07inspection regime meant that the intelligence communities
- 4:10confidence in its picture of Iran's actual nuclear status had
- 4:13declined precisely when those assessments mattered most.
- 4:17The CIA's human intelligence posture inside Iran had evolved
- 4:20significantly across the four decades since the catastrophic
- 4:24failure of the late 1970s that had left the agency effectively
- 4:27blind to the Islamic Revolution. The lessons of that failure had
- 4:31driven A sustained effort to build a more diverse and more
- 4:34deeply embedded network of human sources inside the country.
- 4:38That network drew on multiple communities and channels.
- 4:42Iranian diaspora figures with family connections and business
- 4:46relationships inside Iran. Technical experts with knowledge
- 4:49of specific elements of the nuclear and missile programs.
- 4:53Individuals within the Iranian government, military and
- 4:56clerical establishment who were recruited as winning agents or
- 5:00whose communications were accessed through signals
- 5:02intelligence and cyber operations without their
- 5:04knowledge. The breadth of this collection
- 5:06architecture, built piece by piece over 40 years, represented
- 5:10an intelligence capability of enormous depth and considerable
- 5:14moral complexity. The full scope of the CIA's
- 5:17human intelligence penetration of Iran in the years preceding
- 5:21Operation Epic Fury remains classified.
- 5:24What the public record establishes is that the Agency
- 5:27had access to significant and detailed intelligence about the
- 5:30nuclear program status. The Stuxnet operation itself
- 5:34required knowledge of the specific centrifuge
- 5:36configurations at Natans that could only have been obtained
- 5:39through human sources with physical access to the facility.
- 5:42The targeting intelligence that supported the assassination of
- 5:45Iranian nuclear scientists between 2010 and 2012 required
- 5:49granular knowledge of the scientists, movements, security
- 5:52arrangements and daily routines that similarly points to human
- 5:56sources with close access. The picture the CIA was working
- 5:59from in the years preceding the strikes was not assembled from
- 6:03satellites alone. It was built from human
- 6:05relationships cultivated over years at enormous personal risk
- 6:10to the individuals who provided the information.
- 6:13There's also the question of what the CIA knew about Iran's
- 6:16political decision making regarding the nuclear program,
- 6:19the question of intent rather than capability, which has
- 6:21always been the hardest to answer with confidence through
- 6:24any intelligence means. The public reporting on this
- 6:26question in the years preceding the strikes paints a picture of
- 6:30genuine analytical uncertainty that resolved only gradually and
- 6:34incompletely. American and Israeli
- 6:36intelligence services had historically disagreed about the
- 6:39clarity and imminence of Iran's nuclear weapons and tensions.
- 6:43The CI as analytical position, had consistently been more
- 6:46cautious than Israel's, more willing to maintain the
- 6:49distinction between possessing A capability and making the
- 6:52political decision to exercise it, more attentive to the
- 6:55internal dynamics of Iranian decision making, and more
- 6:58resistant to the assumption that capability automatically
- 7:01translated into intention. That analytical difference had
- 7:04been a persistent and sometimes acute source of tension between
- 7:08the two intelligence services, and in the policy debates their
- 7:11assessments fed. By 2024 and into 2025, those
- 7:16analytical differences had narrowed substantially.
- 7:19Several factors drove the convergence.
- 7:22The rapid technical advancement of the program beyond any
- 7:25civilian justification. The public statements by senior
- 7:29Iranian officials explicitly acknowledging that Iran
- 7:32possessed the technical capability to build a nuclear
- 7:35weapon. The broader strategic context.
- 7:38The degradation of Hezbollah as a deterrent following Israeli
- 7:41military operations in Lebanon. The weakening of the wider Axis
- 7:44of Resistance network and the deaths of senior IRGC commanders
- 7:48in Israeli strikes, which would remove the external deterrence
- 7:52architecture that Iran had historically relied upon as an
- 7:55alternative to nuclear weapons and intelligence products not
- 7:59fully visible in the public record.
- 8:00That the two services were sharing and producing together.
- 8:04That convergence in the intelligence assessment was
- 8:07almost certainly a necessary political precondition for the
- 8:10decision to launch Operation Epic Fury.
- 8:13An operation of this scale, the most comprehensive application
- 8:17of American airpower in more than two decades, required a
- 8:20shared intelligence foundation that both governments could
- 8:23stand behind. The CI as analytical alignment
- 8:26with Israeli intelligence provided that foundation and in
- 8:29doing so served a function that the agency has served at
- 8:32critical junctures throughout its Iran history, providing the
- 8:35intelligence architecture that makes a policy decision
- 8:38possible. The targeting intelligence that
- 8:40informed the strike packages of Operation Epic Fury was the
- 8:44product of decades of accumulated collection.
- 8:47The nuclear program's physical infrastructure, the enrichment
- 8:50facilities at Natanz and for DAO, the research reactor at
- 8:53Iraq, the missile production sites at Isfahan, the weapons
- 8:57relevant research installations at Parchin have been mapped
- 9:00through satellite imagery, signals intelligence, human
- 9:03sources, and in some cases through the kind of direct
- 9:05technical access that the Stuxnet program had demonstrated
- 9:08was possible. The targeting database,
- 9:11assembled over decades of collection, was, by February
- 9:142026, one of the most comprehensive intelligence
- 9:17products ever developed against any single country's nuclear and
- 9:21military infrastructure. The missile and air defense
- 9:24picture was similarly detailed. Iran had invested heavily in its
- 9:28air defense network over the preceding decade, fielding
- 9:31Russian S300 systems and domestically produced
- 9:34equivalents and integrating them into a layered network designed
- 9:38to complicate precisely the kind of air campaign the United
- 9:41States and Israel were planning. The CI as collection against
- 9:44that air defense network. Identifying radar locations,
- 9:48command nodes, communication architectures, and the specific
- 9:51vulnerabilities in the integrated system was essential
- 9:54to the planning of an air campaign capable of penetrating
- 9:57Iranian airspace. The Growler electronic warfare
- 10:00aircraft used to suppress Iranian air defenses in the
- 10:03opening hours of the operation were working from detailed
- 10:06intelligence about the specific technical parameters of the
- 10:09systems they were suppressing. That intelligence had been
- 10:12collected, refined and updated over years of dedicated effort.
- 10:17The military command targeting was equally intelligence
- 10:19intensive. The killing of senior IRGC and
- 10:22Iranian military commanders in the opening hours of Operation
- 10:26Epic Fury was not improvised. It was the product of sustained
- 10:30and patient collection on their movement patterns, communication
- 10:34habits, security arrangements and physical locations at
- 10:37specific times. The kind of precise real time
- 10:40targeting intelligence required to kill senior military
- 10:43commanders at the outset of a major operation requires months
- 10:47or years of preparatory collection and penetration of
- 10:50their security environments. The CI as contribution to that
- 10:53targeting picture, built on the human intelligence networks and
- 10:57signals collection infrastructure developed over
- 10:59decades, was essential to the operations opening hours.
- 11:03There is one further dimension of the intelligence history
- 11:06preceding Operation Epic Fury that deserves direct attention
- 11:09because it connects the abstract history of the preceding 4
- 11:12episodes to the human reality at the center of intelligence work.
- 11:16Throughout the 73 years this series has covered, the CIA's
- 11:20Iran operations have depended on Iranians.
- 11:23On Iranian officials who were recruited to provide information
- 11:26about their government. On Iranian technical experts who
- 11:30gave access to the nuclear program.
- 11:32On Iranian businessmen who carried messages and created
- 11:36cover. On Iranian activists and
- 11:38opposition figures who were cultivated, used, and in some
- 11:42cases abandoned when they were no longer operationally useful.
- 11:45Some were caught, some were executed.
- 11:48The RG CS counterintelligence apparatus disrupted multiple CIA
- 11:52networks inside Iran over the decades, and the cost in human
- 11:56lives paid by Iranian citizens for the intelligence the agency
- 11:59collected was significant and mostly invisible in the public
- 12:02record. This dimension of the story
- 12:04tends to disappear from the standard narrative of
- 12:07intelligence operations, which focuses on the institutions and
- 12:10their capabilities rather than on the individual human beings
- 12:13whose choices are at the center of the real story.
- 12:16The Iranian men and women who made those choices to cooperate
- 12:19with a foreign intelligence service against their own
- 12:21government, at enormous personal risk for whatever combination of
- 12:25reasons drove them, are the human material out of which 73
- 12:28years of CIA operations against Iran were built.
- 12:31Their names are not in this series.
- 12:34Their stories are largely not in the public record.
- 12:37But they are the people on whom everything else rested.
- 12:41Some of those people were idealists who genuinely believe
- 12:44that providing intelligence to the United States would hasten
- 12:46the end of a government they despised and open a path to a
- 12:49freer Iran. Some were pragmatists who made a
- 12:52calculated assessment of where their interest lay.
- 12:55Some were coerced or compromised into cooperation under
- 12:58circumstances that left them little choice.
- 13:01And some, when their networks were rolled up by IRGC
- 13:04counterintelligence, when their names were extracted through
- 13:06interrogation of others, when they were arrested and tried and
- 13:09in some cases executed, were simply people who had made a
- 13:12fateful decision and paid the full price for it.
- 13:15The CIA's Iran program was built on their sacrifice.
- 13:19That fact deserves to sit alongside every account of what
- 13:22the Agency achieved. The broader question this series
- 13:25has been building toward is one that the intelligence history
- 13:28alone cannot answer, but that the intelligence history
- 13:31illuminates in ways that other framings do not.
- 13:34Did 73 years of CIA involvement with Iran, the coup, the secret
- 13:38police, the hostage crisis and its covert aftermath, the cyber
- 13:41weapons and the assassinations and the diplomatic collapses
- 13:45make the conflict known as Operation Epic Fury more likely
- 13:48or less likely? The honest answer, supported by
- 13:51the evidence of the full historical record, is that it
- 13:54made it more likely, not in a simple or mono causal way.
- 13:59The Islamic Republic would have pursued a nuclear program
- 14:02regardless of American covert action.
- 14:05The deep structural antagonism between the Islamic Republic's
- 14:08founding ideology and American interests in the region would
- 14:12have produced serious conflict regardless of any specific CIA
- 14:15operation. The nuclear question would have
- 14:18required resolution in some form, regardless of Stuxnet or
- 14:22the assassinations or the JCPOA withdrawal.
- 14:25But the specific character of the conflict as it now exists,
- 14:28the depth of the mutual distrust, the absence of any
- 14:31functional diplomatic channel, the systematic hardening of
- 14:34Iranian political culture against any accommodation with
- 14:37the West, the elimination of the Iranian political voices most
- 14:41interested in finding a different path, all of these
- 14:43dimensions of the present conflict were shaped decisively
- 14:47by the history this series has traced.
- 14:49The 1953 coup established the foundational Iranian conviction
- 14:53that American rhetoric about democracy and sovereignty was a
- 14:56mask for imperial interest. Whenever that interest
- 14:59conflicted with Iranian nationalism, the SAVIC years
- 15:02confirmed and deepened it. The Iran Contra affair added the
- 15:06dimension of cynicism. The revelation that America
- 15:09would secretly sell weapons to an enemy it publicly condemned.
- 15:13The Stuxnet operation reinforced the conviction that American
- 15:16technological superiority would be deployed against Iranian
- 15:20infrastructure without warning or accountability.
- 15:23The assassination campaign added the dimension of physical menace
- 15:27that Iranian scientists working on legitimate technical programs
- 15:31could be killed on their way to work with no acknowledgement and
- 15:33no consequence. Each episode added a further
- 15:36layer of evidence for the argument that permanent hostile
- 15:39deterrence was the only rational Iranian posture toward the
- 15:42United States. The tragedy embedded in this
- 15:45history is that it was not predetermined at multiple points
- 15:49across the 73 years. In the early days of Mosadaga's
- 15:52government, in the immediate aftermath of the revolution,
- 15:55when some channels remained open, in the Katami years, when
- 15:58genuine reformist energy was present inside Iran.
- 16:01In the early phases of the Obama nuclear negotiations, when real
- 16:04diplomatic progress was being made, there were genuine
- 16:07possibilities for a different outcome.
- 16:09Those possibilities were foreclosed sometimes by Iranian
- 16:12intransigence and ideology, sometimes by American covert
- 16:16action and diplomatic inflexibility, and most often by
- 16:19the compounding interaction between the two in which each
- 16:22act of mistrust generated the conditions for the next.
- 16:25The CI as Iran project began in the summer of 1953 with a
- 16:29calculation that a young democracy was worth less than
- 16:32the oil beneath its ground and the strategic position it
- 16:35occupied on the Cold War map. That calculation was made by
- 16:38serious people under genuine constraints and genuine fears in
- 16:42a genuinely dangerous world. It was wrong.
- 16:46The evidence of its wrongness has been accumulating at
- 16:49enormous cost in human lives and human dignity on both sides for
- 16:53seven decades. Beyond the intelligence picture
- 16:56itself, there is the question of institutional culture, what the
- 16:59CIA had become after 73 years of involvement with Iran as an
- 17:04organization. That long engagement had
- 17:06produced a cadre of officers with deep expertise in Iranian
- 17:09politics, culture, language and psychology, people who
- 17:13understood the country in ways that the agency's leadership in
- 17:161978 had conspicuously failed to do.
- 17:20It also produced, through the cycles of penetration and
- 17:23counter penetration of network building and network loss, a
- 17:26certain hard edge pragmatism about what was possible inside
- 17:29Iran and what was not. That institutional experience
- 17:33was present in the rooms where the intelligence assessments
- 17:36that preceded Operation Epic Fury were debated.
- 17:39Some of those lessons pointed toward humility.
- 17:42The CIA had been wrong about Iran at the most important
- 17:45moments in the relationship, wrong about the stability of the
- 17:48Shah's government, wrong about the direction of the revolution,
- 17:51periodically wrong about the pace of the nuclear program.
- 17:55An institution with that record of consequential error had
- 17:58reasons to approach its current assessments with caution.
- 18:01Other lessons pointed in a different direction toward the
- 18:04conviction that covert action, applied with sufficient
- 18:07sophistication and resources, could produce decisive results
- 18:11against a regime the agency have been studying for decades.
- 18:14The confidence that informs Stuxnet, the precision
- 18:17assassination campaign, and the targeting intelligence assembled
- 18:21for Operation Epic Fury was the confidence of an organization
- 18:24that believed it understood its target well enough to act
- 18:27decisively on that understanding.
- 18:29Whether that confidence was justified, whether the
- 18:31intelligence picture that informed Operation Epic Fury was
- 18:35accurate enough, comprehensive enough, and honestly enough
- 18:38presented to the policy makers who acted on it, is a question
- 18:41that will be examined by historians and intelligence
- 18:43professionals for decades. The precedent of the Iraq
- 18:46weapons of mass destruction assessments of 2002 and 2003,
- 18:51which were later found to be significantly wrong and partly
- 18:53shaped by political pressure on the analytical process, casts a
- 18:57long shadow over any subsequent case where intelligence
- 19:00assessments were used to justify a major military operation in
- 19:03the Middle East. The Iranian people, who have
- 19:05lived through everything this series has described, through
- 19:08the coup and the Savic years, through the revolution and the
- 19:11hostage crisis, through eight years of devastating war with
- 19:14Iraq, through decades of sanctions and isolation, through
- 19:18Stuxnet and the assassinations and the collapse of the nuclear
- 19:21deal, and now through the bombs of Operation Epic Fury, carry a
- 19:24weight of historical experience that no intelligence assessment
- 19:28fully captures. Many Iranians despise the
- 19:31Islamic Republic. Many others, whatever the
- 19:34reservations about the government, feel a profound
- 19:37attachment to Iran as a nation and a profound resentment of the
- 19:40foreign interference that has shaped their country's
- 19:42trajectory since 1953. The CIA 73 year history with
- 19:47Iran is, among other things, the history of what happens when a
- 19:50great power treats another country primarily is a problem
- 19:53to be managed, rather than as a Society of human beings with
- 19:56their own history, their own dignity, and their own
- 19:58legitimate interests in determining their own future.
- 20:01The tools of covert action, the bribery, the propaganda, the
- 20:05assassinations, the cyber weapons are instruments that are
- 20:08applied to States and programs and capabilities.
- 20:11They can destroy infrastructure and kill individuals and delay
- 20:15timelines. They are not instruments that
- 20:18engage with peoples or resolve the underlying human and
- 20:21political realities that produce the conflicts they are deployed
- 20:24against. And the gap between those two
- 20:26approaches to another country is, in the end, what the full
- 20:29history of the CIA and Iran reveals most clearly.
- 20:33Operation Epic Fury is not the end of that story.
- 20:37It is the latest and most violent chapter of it.
- 20:40What comes next? Whether the destruction of
- 20:42Iran's nuclear infrastructure produces a settlement, a
- 20:45prolonged insurgency, the collapse of the Islamic
- 20:48Republic, or something else entirely will depend on choices
- 20:51that have not yet been made by people who have not yet fully
- 20:54reckoned with the history that brought the world to this point.
- 20:57What that history suggests above all else, is that the choices
- 21:00made in the next months and years matter as profoundly as
- 21:03the choices made in 1953, and that making them well requires
- 21:07understanding what happened when they were made badly before.
- 21:10It requires understanding that covert action is not a
- 21:13substitute for policy, that instruments capable of delaying
- 21:17a problem are not the same as instruments capable of resolving
- 21:20it. That the people of a country and
- 21:22the government of the country are not the same thing, and that
- 21:25treating them as interchangeable produces the kind of accumulated
- 21:28resentment that outlasts every administration in every
- 21:31operation and every ceasefire. And that the 73 year record of
- 21:36the CIA's involvement with Iran is not, in the end, a record of
- 21:40American power being insufficient.
- 21:42It is a record of American power being applied in ways that
- 21:45consistently produced outcomes no one intended and costs no one
- 21:49fully anticipated. This has been the CIA and Iran
- 21:52Bonus Series 5 episodes tracing 73 years of covert action,
- 21:57intelligence failure, diplomatic collapse, and the making of a
- 22:00war. Thank you for listening Epic
- 22:03Fury, the US Iran War Podcast continues with daily coverage of
- 22:08Operation Epic Fury as it unfolds.
- 22:10Subscribe on Spotify, Apple Podcast or YouTube.
- 22:14Share this series with someone who wants to understand not just
- 22:17what is happening in this conflict, but how the world
- 22:20arrive here and what it will take to find a way out.