Latest / Epic Fury: The US-Iran War Podcast / SAVAK — The Shah’s Secret Police and the CIA’s Role in Iran | Part 2/5 | Epic Fury Series
Transcript
- 0:16In 1957, four years after the CIA helped restore the shot of
- 0:21power, American intelligence officers sat down with their
- 0:24Iranian counterparts and began building something new.
- 0:27It was not a military alliance. It was not a trade agreement.
- 0:32It was a secret police force. Its name was SAVIK, the
- 0:36Organization of Intelligence and National Security.
- 0:39Its purpose was straightforward, find the enemies of the Shah and
- 0:42destroy them. Over the next 22 years, SAVIK
- 0:46would become one of the most feared internal security
- 0:49organizations in the world. Its methods included systematic
- 0:52torture, forced disappearances, show trials and the long term
- 0:56psychological destruction of anyone who dared to organize
- 1:00against the regime. 10s of thousands of Iranians pass
- 1:03through its detention facilities over the course of its
- 1:05existence. Many did not come out the same.
- 1:09Some did not come out at all. And throughout those two
- 1:12decades, the CIA was present in the training, in the methods, in
- 1:16the technology transfers, and in the intelligence sharing that
- 1:19helped SAVIC identify who to target.
- 1:21This is episode 2 of the CIA and Iran bonus series, the Shah's
- 1:25secret police, SAVIC, and the CIA's Iran Project.
- 1:29To understand why SAVIC was built, you first have to
- 1:32understand the situation the Shah found himself in after
- 1:35August 1953. The coup had returned him to
- 1:38power, but it had not given him genuine popularity.
- 1:41Large and important sections of Iranian society, nationalists
- 1:45who had supported Mosaic, liberal constitutionalists,
- 1:49members of the Communist Tutor Party, religious conservatives
- 1:52who distrusted the Shahs dependence on America, and
- 1:55ordinary workers who would believe in oil nationalization
- 1:58all regarded the restored Shah as a ruler whose authority
- 2:01rested on foreign intervention rather than legitimate
- 2:04democratic mandate. That resentment did not
- 2:07disappear when the crowds went home after the coup.
- 2:10It went underground. It became the political culture
- 2:13of opposition, quiet and dispersed but real and enduring,
- 2:17that the Shah's government would need to monitor and suppress for
- 2:20as long as it hoped to survive. The Shah understood his own
- 2:23vulnerability clearly. He had twice been close to
- 2:27losing power, in 1951, when Mosadaga's movement was at its
- 2:30peak, and again during the chaos of the August 1953 coup attempt
- 2:35before its second successful phase.
- 2:37He knew that the social forces which had produced Mosaddic had
- 2:40not been eliminated. They had been temporarily
- 2:43silenced. Sooner or later, without a
- 2:46permanent mechanism of control, they would resurface.
- 2:50He needed an apparatus capable of penetrating those forces
- 2:53before they could organize, identifying their leaders before
- 2:56they could build networks, and removing dangerous individuals
- 2:59from public life before they could become movements.
- 3:02The Americans who had invested considerable political capital
- 3:06and substantial financial resources and keeping the Shah
- 3:08in power, shared precisely this interest.
- 3:12A stable pro western Iran was the entire point of Operation
- 3:15Ajax. Allowing that stability to
- 3:18collapse because the Shah lacked the institutional tools to
- 3:21manage internal dissent was not an acceptable outcome.
- 3:24And so in 1957, with direct American involvement and with
- 3:28Israeli intelligence providing significant supporting
- 3:31expertise, Savik was formally established.
- 3:34The CIA's role in Savik's creation has been documented
- 3:37through declassified American government records,
- 3:40congressional investigations from the late 1970's, the
- 3:43memoirs of intelligence officers who served in Iran, and
- 3:46reporting by journalists and historians who gained access to
- 3:49relevant archives. Over the following decades.
- 3:52The agency helped design the foundational organizational
- 3:55structure of the new Security Service.
- 3:57It provided training for SAVIC officers initially conducted in
- 4:01the United States and subsequently in Iran itself.
- 4:04It transferred interrogation techniques.
- 4:07It provided technology for communication, surveillance, and
- 4:11interception. And it maintained an active,
- 4:14ongoing working relationship with Savic's leadership
- 4:16throughout the organization's entire existence.
- 4:19Israel's Mossad played an equally important and somewhat
- 4:22less frequently discussed role. The relationship between Israel
- 4:26and Iran under the Shah was a pragmatic alignment of interest
- 4:29between two non Arab states operating in a predominantly
- 4:32Arab regional environment. Israel needed regional partners,
- 4:36the Shah needed sophisticated intelligence expertise, and two
- 4:39countries found genuine common ground.
- 4:42Israeli trainers worked alongside their American
- 4:44counterparts in Savic's formation years, contributing
- 4:47expertise from Israel's own intelligence experience.
- 4:51The CIA, Mossad and Savic formed a triangular partnership that
- 4:55endured until the Islamic Revolution ended it abruptly in
- 4:581979. At its operational peak in the
- 5:011970s, Savic employed an estimated 13,000 full time
- 5:06professional officers. Beyond those core staff, it
- 5:09maintained a network of part time informants across Iranian
- 5:12society that some estimates placed in the hundreds of
- 5:15thousands of individuals. The organization operated inside
- 5:19universities monitoring student political activity.
- 5:22It placed informants inside factories and trade unions
- 5:26tracking labor organizing. It penetrated the civil service,
- 5:29the military officer corps, religious institutions,
- 5:32professional associations, and the Iranian diaspora living
- 5:36abroad. If you were a politically active
- 5:38Iranian anywhere in the world during the 1960s and 1970s,
- 5:42there was a meaningful and not merely theoretical probability
- 5:45that someone in your immediate circle was providing information
- 5:48about you to Savic. Savic's reach extended well
- 5:52beyond Iran's borders. It maintains stations in London,
- 5:56Paris, Frankfurt and across the United States, monitoring
- 6:00Iranian students and opposition figures living abroad.
- 6:03Iranian students at American universities who participated in
- 6:07anti Shah demonstrations would frequently discover upon
- 6:09returning home that SAVIC had detailed files on everything
- 6:12they had done while overseas. The message was clear.
- 6:16There is no distance that removes you from our awareness.
- 6:20The methods used inside Savic's detention facilities with a
- 6:23subject of sustained and detailed documentation by
- 6:26international human rights organizations throughout this
- 6:28period. Amnesty International published
- 6:31multiple reports on political imprisonment and torture in Iran
- 6:35during the 1970's. The techniques they documented
- 6:38were not incidental or the actions of rogue individuals.
- 6:42They were systematic, applied consistently and clearly.
- 6:45Institutional documented practices included severe and
- 6:49sustained beatings, electric shocks applied to sensitive
- 6:53areas of the body, suspension from the ceiling by the wrists
- 6:57or ankles for extended periods, causing severe joint damage.
- 7:01Sleep deprivation maintained over days or weeks.
- 7:05Mock executions designed to break psychological resistance.
- 7:09The burning of skin with cigarettes.
- 7:12Threats directed at the families and children of detainees.
- 7:15The deliberate destruction of individual sense of identity
- 7:18through sustained humiliation over long periods of
- 7:21confinement. In 1975, Amnesty International
- 7:25stated publicly that no country in the world had a worse human
- 7:29rights record than Iran. That was a significant claim in
- 7:32a decade that included active armed conflicts, military
- 7:35dictatorships, and authoritarian governments across multiple
- 7:38continents. It reflected the organization's
- 7:41assessment not just of the scale of Savic's activities, but of
- 7:45their systematic and institutionalized character.
- 7:48The question of direct CIA responsibility for those
- 7:51specific methods is among the most contested aspects of this
- 7:54history. The documentary record that is
- 7:57publicly available establishes clearly that CIA officers
- 8:00trained SAVIC in interrogation techniques and that those
- 8:03techniques were subsequently applied in context that included
- 8:06torture. Whether American trainers
- 8:09explicitly taught the methods that Amnesty International
- 8:12documented in detail, or whether SAVIC developed or adopted those
- 8:15particular methods through other means after receiving
- 8:18foundational training from the Americans, is a question on
- 8:20which historians continue to disagree, partly because the
- 8:24relevant CIA records remain partially classified.
- 8:27What the historical record does not support is the claim that
- 8:30the CIA was unaware of what SAVIC was doing.
- 8:33American intelligence officers in Tehran were in regular
- 8:36operational contact with their SAVIC counterparts.
- 8:40Intelligence products derived from SAVIC interrogations flowed
- 8:43through channels that connected directly to the CIA Station
- 8:47reports on the treatment of political prisoners, on the
- 8:50suppression of opposition organizations, on the outcomes
- 8:53of SAVIC operations. All of this information was
- 8:55available to American officials throughout this period.
- 8:59The consistent policy choice made in Washington was to treat
- 9:02Savik's internal activities as a domestic Iranian matter that did
- 9:06not affect the fundamental strategic value of the
- 9:08partnership with the Shah's government.
- 9:10This position was not entirely hidden from Congress.
- 9:14The Church Committee investigations of 1975 and 1976
- 9:18raised questions about CIA relationships with foreign
- 9:21services that employed torture. Former CIA Director Richard
- 9:25Helms, who had served as United States ambassador to Iran from
- 9:281973 to 1977, testified before Senate committees about the
- 9:33agency's relationship with the shah's government.
- 9:36He acknowledged the relationship and defended it on strategic
- 9:39grounds. The broader strategic logic that
- 9:42sustained American support for the Shah and his security
- 9:45apparatus throughout this period was rooted in Iran's genuine
- 9:48importance to American Cold War strategy.
- 9:51Iran was one of the largest buyers of American military
- 9:54equipment in the world during the 1970s, purchasing billions
- 9:57of dollars of weapons systems annually.
- 10:00It was a critical supplier of oil to Western economies.
- 10:03It provided intelligence access on the Soviet Union's southern
- 10:07flank. It was the largest and most
- 10:09powerful non Arab state in a strategically vital region.
- 10:13American officials across multiple administrations,
- 10:16Republican and Democrat, made the calculation that these
- 10:19interests outweighed the cost of association with savage methods.
- 10:23That calculation was, in retrospect, catastrophically
- 10:26wrong, not only morally but strategically.
- 10:30The brutality of the apparatus Bill to ensure the Shah's
- 10:33survival contributed directly and meaningfully to the
- 10:36revolution that destroyed his regime.
- 10:38The domestic political landscape of Iran throughout the SAVIC
- 10:41years showed a consistent pattern.
- 10:43Organized opposition in any form leftist, liberal, nationalist,
- 10:48trade unionist or Islamist was identified, infiltrated and
- 10:52suppressed. The Tudor party was largely
- 10:55destroyed in the immediate post coup period.
- 10:58The National Front associated with MOSAIC was monitored
- 11:01continuously and its most prominent figures periodically
- 11:04arrested. The Mojahedin E Calc, A leftist
- 11:07Islamist organization that emerged in the 1960s, was
- 11:10targeted with particular intensity after it turned to
- 11:13armed resistance in the early 1970s, with several of its
- 11:17founding members executed. Iranian universities, centers of
- 11:21nationalist and leftist political organizing, were
- 11:23placed under sustained SAVIC surveillance and regularly
- 11:26disrupted through arrests. What SAVIC could not suppress
- 11:30was the mosque. This is the structural
- 11:32contradiction at the heart of the Shah's security strategy,
- 11:36and it is a failure of strategic intelligence assessment that
- 11:39runs through the entire period of American involvement.
- 11:42The Shah's modernization program, the White Revolution,
- 11:44launched in 1963, included land reform, voting rights for women,
- 11:49expanded public education, and rapid industrialization.
- 11:53Financed by oil revenues, these programs delivered real
- 11:57improvements for parts of Iranian society.
- 12:00They also produce severe social dislocation.
- 12:03Land reform broke traditional rural relationships and
- 12:06accelerated migration into cities that lack the
- 12:09infrastructure to absorb the numbers arriving.
- 12:12The rapid Westernization visible at the elite level created a
- 12:15cultural gap that fell to many ordinary Iranians, like an
- 12:19erasure of their identity. The mosque stood in direct
- 12:22contrast to everything the Shah's modernization project
- 12:25represented. It was local, familiar,
- 12:27conducted in Persian, rooted in Iranian identity and Islamic
- 12:31tradition, and genuinely independent of the state
- 12:34apparatus. Unlike political parties,
- 12:36student organizations, trade unions, and newspapers, it was
- 12:39too dispersed and too socially embedded for any Security
- 12:43Service to monitor comprehensively without a level
- 12:45of disruption that would be more politically damaging than the
- 12:48dissent it aimed to suppress. Ruhala Khomeini had been exiled
- 12:52in 1964 following his arrest the previous year after sermons
- 12:55attacking the Shahs land reform program and the extension of
- 12:59legal immunity to American military personnel in Iran, a
- 13:02concession Khomeini characterized as a humiliation
- 13:05of Iranian sovereignty. He settled in the Shia holy city
- 13:08of Najaf in Iraq and from there spent the next 14 years
- 13:12developing the political theology that would become the
- 13:15constitutional foundation of the Islamic Republic.
- 13:18His lectures were recorded on audio cassettes smuggled across
- 13:21the border into Iran, duplicated in private homes in the back
- 13:25rooms of religious book shops, and distributed through the
- 13:28mosque network to audiences across the country.
- 13:31Saavik knew the cassettes existed.
- 13:34It attempted to interdict them. It could not stop them.
- 13:38The distribution network was too diffuse, too embedded in
- 13:41everyday religious practice, and too reliant on the kind of
- 13:44informal social trust that security services find very
- 13:47difficult to fully penetrate. By the late 1970s, Khomeini's
- 13:51voice was familiar to millions of Iranians who had never met
- 13:54him and had no means of accessing his ideas through any
- 13:57legitimate media channel. Savik had failed at the one task
- 14:01that would have mattered most. By the mid to late 1970's, the
- 14:05internal pressures inside the Shah system had reached the
- 14:08critical intensity. Oil revenues had surged
- 14:11dramatically after the 1973 price shock, generating money
- 14:15that the government spent on extraordinary military expansion
- 14:19and on ambitious but poorly coordinated development
- 14:21projects. Inflation was significant and
- 14:24persistent urban migration was creating enormous new
- 14:28populations of economically insecure people in cities that
- 14:31lack the infrastructure to support them.
- 14:34Corruption at every level of the government and the royal
- 14:36household was visible, widespread, and deeply resented.
- 14:41The Carter administration, which took office in January 1977, had
- 14:45placed human rights at the center of its foreign policy.
- 14:49American officials began communicating to the Shah that
- 14:51they expected some movement toward political liberalization.
- 14:55The Shah made cautious and limited concessions, releasing
- 14:59some political prisoners, tolerating slightly more press
- 15:02criticism, allowing some limited political organizing.
- 15:05These partial openings had consequences that neither the
- 15:08Shah nor his American advisors had fully anticipated.
- 15:12They created visible space for opposition forces that have been
- 15:15suppressed for years to begin emerging again.
- 15:18And they signal to Iranians, watching carefully that the
- 15:20regime might be weakening. The revolution gained mass
- 15:23momentum through 1978. Demonstrations that began in
- 15:27January in the City of Calm spread across the country in
- 15:31escalating waves. Throughout this period, the CI
- 15:35as assessments of Iranian political stability continued to
- 15:38reflect a fundamental analytical failure.
- 15:41The agency's network was concentrated among the Shah's
- 15:44government, the military and the business elite.
- 15:47It had very limited penetration of the clerical networks and
- 15:50working class districts where revolutionary sentiment was
- 15:53deepest. In August 1978, as millions of
- 15:56Iranians were taking to the streets in the largest
- 15:58demonstrations in the country's history, the CIA produced an
- 16:01assessment concluding that Iran was not in a revolutionary or
- 16:05even pre revolutionary situation.
- 16:07It was among the most consequential intelligence
- 16:10failures of the Cold War era. The Shah fled Iran in January
- 16:141979. He died in exile in Egypt in
- 16:18July 1980. Khomeini returned to a welcome
- 16:22that drew crowds estimated in the millions.
- 16:25Revolutionary tribunals began their work.
- 16:28SAVIC officers were among the earliest and most prominent
- 16:30targets arrested, tried and in many cases executed by the
- 16:34system that replaced the one they had spent two decades
- 16:37protecting. The organization was formally
- 16:40dissolved. The scale of what SAVIC
- 16:42represented inside Iranian society is worth pausing on
- 16:4613,000 officers and hundreds of thousands of informants meant
- 16:50that a university lecturer could not know whether the student in
- 16:53the third row was there to learn or to report.
- 16:56A factory worker who spoke too freely at lunch could find
- 16:59himself detained before the week was out.
- 17:01A clergyman had to weigh every word against the possibility
- 17:05that someone in the congregation was taking notes.
- 17:08The pervasiveness of that surveillance shaped Iranian
- 17:10political culture in ways that outlasted SAVIC itself.
- 17:13The habit of speaking carefully, of not trusting strangers, of
- 17:17maintaining a public face that bore little relationship to
- 17:20private belief. 1 area of the SAVIC story that deserves more
- 17:24attention than it typically receives is the organization's
- 17:27relationship with Iranian intellectual and artistic
- 17:30immunity. SAVIC did not only target
- 17:32political activists and trade union organizers.
- 17:36It maintained active surveillance of writers, poets,
- 17:39film makers, and academics, anyone whose work touched on
- 17:42themes of social criticism, national identity, or political
- 17:46life in ways that could be interpreted as implicitly
- 17:48critical of the regime. The result was a sustained and
- 17:51damaging assault on Iranian cultural life that lasted the
- 17:54better part of two decades. Iranian cinema, which was
- 17:58developing A genuinely distinctive artistic voice
- 18:01during the 1960s and 1970s, operated under constant
- 18:05scrutiny. Scripts were reviewed by censors
- 18:07connected to Savic before production could begin.
- 18:10Films were screened for content before release.
- 18:14Directors whose work was deemed too politically ambiguous or too
- 18:17sympathetic to the poor and dispossessed found their
- 18:20projects blocked, their funding withdrawn, or themselves placed
- 18:24under surveillance. The generation of Iranian film
- 18:27makers who would go on to international acclaim after the
- 18:29revolution developed their craft in an environment of systematic
- 18:32repression that shaped not only what they could say but how they
- 18:35learned to say things. Indirectly, the literary
- 18:38community suffered similarly. Iran has one of the richest
- 18:42poetic traditions in the world, and poetry had long served as a
- 18:45vehicle for political and social commentary in Persian culture, a
- 18:49tradition the censors understood very well and watched very
- 18:52carefully. Riders who tested the limits 2
- 18:55openly risked arrest. Some were imprisoned, some were
- 18:59driven into exile. A generation of riders either
- 19:02left the country, learn to speak in heavily coded language that
- 19:06cannot be directly attributed to political descent, or fell
- 19:09silent entirely. This cultural suppression had a
- 19:13particular irony. The writers and intellectuals,
- 19:16the Shah's security apparatus worked hard as the silence, were
- 19:20in many cases exactly the people whose voices might have offered
- 19:23alternative frameworks for Iranian political identity that
- 19:26were neither subservient to the regime nor rooted in Khomeini's
- 19:29political theology. By systematically destroying the
- 19:33secular intellectual left and the liberal nationalist
- 19:36tradition, Savic helped ensure that when the revolution came,
- 19:39the ideological field had been largely cleared of alternatives
- 19:42to the religious framework Khomeini offered.
- 19:45The repression of secular descent contributed to the
- 19:47Islamization of the revolutionary movement by
- 19:50default. There's also a dimension of the
- 19:52Savic story connected directly to the United States that rarely
- 19:56appears in popular accounts of this period.
- 19:59During the 1970s, Iranian students studying in America
- 20:03were among the most politically active of any foreign student
- 20:06population in the country. Large and vocal Iranian student
- 20:10organizations held demonstrations outside Iranian
- 20:12consulates, published newsletters criticizing the
- 20:15Shah, and organized public events that drew significant
- 20:18attention to Savic's human rights abuses.
- 20:21SAVIC monitored these students through its American stations.
- 20:25Some of those students were later identified to the Iranian
- 20:28government and faced consequences upon returning
- 20:31home. What makes this dimension
- 20:33particularly significant is that it happened on American soil.
- 20:37A foreign intelligence service was running active surveillance
- 20:40operations against people living in the United States with at
- 20:43least the tacit awareness of American intelligence agencies
- 20:46that were in regular communication with SAVIC.
- 20:49The political rights of Iranian students in America were being
- 20:52systematically compromised by an organization the CIA had helped
- 20:56build that received little attention in Washington at the
- 20:59time. It received considerably more
- 21:02after the Revolution, when students who have been watched
- 21:04by SAVIK became some of the most committed voices in the movement
- 21:08that sees the American Embassy. There is one final dimension of
- 21:11the Savage story that deserves direct attention before we close
- 21:15this episode, because it connects the events of those
- 21:17decades to the present in a way that is not merely symbolic.
- 21:21When the Islamic Republic was established, the new government
- 21:24did not simply dismantle the security state it inherited.
- 21:28It studied it. It took what it had learned from
- 21:30Savic's methods, the informant networks, the interrogation
- 21:34techniques, the surveillance infrastructure, the use of
- 21:37prison and fear as instruments of political control, and
- 21:40adapted them for its own purposes.
- 21:42Vivek, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security that
- 21:45replaced SAVIC, was in many structural respects a
- 21:48continuation of what had come before, now oriented against a
- 21:52different set of enemies. The political prisoners of the
- 21:54Islamic Republic in the decades that followed were processed
- 21:57through systems that had structural roots in the security
- 22:00architecture the CIA had helped construct.
- 22:03That is not a comfortable observation.
- 22:06It is an accurate one. The CIA's Iran project was built
- 22:10on the belief that the right instruments of control, properly
- 22:13resourced and managed, could produce a stable political
- 22:16environment. What the history actually
- 22:19produced was a demonstration that repression does not
- 22:22eliminate opposition. It drives it underground,
- 22:25radicalizes it, and eventually produces a reaction more
- 22:29powerful than anything the original movement could have
- 22:31achieved on its own. That is the deepest lesson of
- 22:35SAVIC. Next time in this series,
- 22:37Episode 3 covers the hostage crisis, the failed rescue
- 22:41mission that ended in disaster in the Iranian desert, in the
- 22:44Iran Contra affair, the secret arms for hostages deal that
- 22:48nearly brought down a presidency.
- 22:50This is the CIA and Iran bonus series, part of Epic Fury, the
- 22:54US Iran War podcast. Subscribe on Spotify, Apple
- 22:58podcast or YouTube. Share this with someone who
- 23:01wants to understand not just the war being fought today, but the
- 23:05seven decades of choices that made it possible.