Latest / Beyond the Summit with Amir Golshani / What Happens After the Fall of Iran’s Regime? | Mariam Memarsadeghi

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What Happens After the Fall of Iran’s Regime? | Mariam Memarsadeghi · Beyond the Summit with Amir Golshani

• Amir Golshani: Welcome back. Today we are stepping into one of the most urgent and difficult questions of our time. Not just what's happening inside Iran, but what comes next. Because beyond the headlines, beyond the war, beyond the politics, there is a deeper question. What does it actually take for a nation to move from repression to freedom? Our guest today is someone who has dedicated her life to the belief that civic literacy is the ultimate weapon against tyranny. What does it actually take for a nation to move from repression to freedom? Maryam Be'emar Sadegh is a senior fellow at MacDonald Laurier Institute, a presidential leadership scholar and the co-founder of Tavana, an initiative that has brought democratic education to millions of Iranians under the shadow of censorship. But what makes her voice different is this. She doesn't just study democracy. She believes it has to be built, prepared for, and sustained. Marianne, welcome to Beyond the Summit. Mariam Memarsadeghi: Thank you so much, Amir. Amir Golshani: I was reading something you wrote recently. said Iran's future depends on us. And it struck me because it's not just analysis. It's a sense of responsibility. So I want to start there. You left Iran at seven, but you said there hasn't been a single day that you haven't felt a moral responsibility toward its future. Where does that feeling really come from? Mariam Memarsadeghi: Honestly, it comes from childhood. There's never been a time when I didn't have that feeling, as you just mentioned. When I was seven years old, maybe even the feeling was stronger and more pure. We left in 1979, six months after Khomeini returned to Iran. I remember being very... ⁓ curious and wanting to know everything I possibly could about what's happening in the country, even though I was a child. actually, I think that children have a keen sense of politics and philosophy. ⁓ It's a human instinct. It's not something that necessarily gets with reading knowledge. mean, ⁓ it's ⁓ necessary have civic literacy and I've devoted my life to it, as you said, and I've even devoted a lot of time and effort to it here in the United States. I judge a competition on the US Constitution every year among America's best high school students across the country. But I think that that inner voice, that conscience, that inner knowing is what ⁓ really most. ⁓ And who honor it, people who ⁓ ⁓ honor their sense of responsibility to others, end up having ⁓ a much more receptive attitude towards education and in particular, democratic education. Amir Golshani: I love that. You also draw inspiration from both the American founding and Cyrus the Great. How do those two ideas, modern democracy and ancient Iranian identity, come together in your vision? Mariam Memarsadeghi: Well, you it's not even just ancient Iranian identity. I grew up as millions of Iranians grew up in a family ⁓ on both sides of my family, my father's and my mother's parents, an extended family on both sides ⁓ ⁓ radically different from anything that the regime is about. ⁓ it's a sense of a history that's rooted in ⁓ in the ancient world. Cyrus the Great is he's a person and he's a legacy, he's a heritage that Iranians are proud of for good reason. We ⁓ devoted ⁓ effort to educating people about Cyrus, sort of a deeper level of knowledge at Tavanna. That is all important to me. And of course, the founding fathers of the United States, the experience of creating the US Constitution, ⁓ is very important to me and it all comes together. I it's a good mean, ⁓ I was much younger, when I was a teenager, I remember thinking, ⁓ this is so hard, you know, there's this and there's that. But really this is what gives us such richness in life to be able to have such ⁓ cultural from Iran into our character and into our into our aspirations for Iran, but also, you know, the diaspora is really truly large and very successful. And those of us who've lived in the United States or in Canada and other democracies have ⁓ really from understanding what makes the difference. You know, I remember being a junior in high school ⁓ and the book ⁓ on US constitution. ⁓ that I later came to be the judge for the national competition that I mentioned about knowledge of the US Constitution. remember thinking, wow, this is what I've been waiting for my whole life. This what makes the difference between a free and open society and one that can slip into ⁓ so easily, after all of the progress and achievements of the Reza Shah era and the Muhammad Reza Shah era. And in particular, when I was a junior reading this, ⁓ We the People, ⁓ it's a civic education book that was funded and developed the curriculum by the US Congress to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the US Constitution. When I was reading that in particular, When I saw the First Amendment and the separation of church and state, it was the first time I really came to understand that principle. said to myself, that's it. That's what makes the difference. All those other liberties are possible because that separation exists. When I saw the First Amendment and the separation of church and state, it was the first time I really came to understand that principle. I said to myself, that's it. That's what makes the difference. All those other liberties are possible because that separation exists. Amir Golshani: Absolutely. So just what you said, you know, it's another reminder for us how important it is to read about our history, to know about the culture, about our roots, about other nations, you know, and how they are created, you know, and how democracies are operated right now. When you say Iran's future depends on us, who is the us in your mind? Mariam Memarsadeghi: Every single Iranian, every single Iranian. I mean, I know that there are Iranians inside the country who not gone to ⁓ but who have extremely strong understanding of what's wrong with the country. They are highly motivated to contribute in a constructive, positive way, not just to the political development of the country, but to the social development. There's so much rehabilitation. so much psychosocial development that needs to happen because of the damage that the regime has done. And I know that every single Iranian is really truly motivated. I have yet to come across somebody who doesn't want to do their best. mean, we have unfortunately in the Iranian political space, opposition space, we have a lot of counterproductive ⁓ dynamics, ⁓ I never doubt that everybody wants to see a free Iran. Everybody really wants to do their best. not talking about people who are part of the regime ⁓ its extensions, its appendages outside. ⁓ Amir Golshani: So where do you put the role of responsibility? Because many of the problems that we are dealing with right now is coming directly as a result of indifference. many of the problems that we are dealing with right now is ⁓ coming directly as a result of indifference. Mariam Memarsadeghi: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Yeah, I mean, to be honest with you, it's difficult sometimes because, for example, recently I was at a dinner party just a few days ago. Iranian ⁓ Americans, very successful, different walks of life, business, medicine, ⁓ and academia. ⁓ ⁓ was looking around and thinking, wow, what were these guys doing a year ago? Why did it take so long? I mean, on the one hand, you can say, well, we should be grateful. We should feel fortunate. We should be very happy about how far we've come. Woman life freedom, and then, of course, now, and so much progress. ⁓ I know, unfortunately, that a lot of the people in the diaspora didn't always have that faith that we could get here. And that was frustrating. But it was also frustrating that a lot of the traps that ⁓ regime would lay for the diaspora were, you know, there was a lot of gullibility there. I all the NIAC years, for example. some of us at the beginning, was a very ⁓ small of us that would insist that this is an extension of the regime. all the NIAC years, for example. some of us at the beginning, was a very ⁓ small of us that would insist that this is an extension of the regime. And it took a long time for people to understand how all that works, how the cyber army works, how the regime only stays in power if the opposition is divided. I think we've come a long way. We still have to on it. Amir Golshani: even for Western government to ⁓ and acknowledge that Iranian people are different from Iranian regime, it took a long time. And even for Western government to identify and acknowledge that Iranian people are different from Iranian regime, it took a long time. So there are still voices, ⁓ saying this system can be reformed. But based on history, execution, repression, systematic control, I don't see any real path for reform left. It has to be changed. What's your take on that? Mariam Memarsadeghi: Yeah, I've never believed that a totalitarian regime can be reformed. I never participated in any of that. When Khatami first came to become president, oil was $15 a barrel. And so you can understand how Khameini and the regime at large needed to have something, some way of opening the country up, creating more trade, and it worked. They did. They did that. They got themselves through some difficult years with that facade of reform. Of course, you know, now everybody knows how it's gone. ⁓ only have the ⁓ not ever been able to reform anything, the people are more angry at reformists, arguably, than they are the hardliners because the reformists have, on top of being just as corrupt and incompetent, delivered a lot of lies that the hardliners didn't deliver to the people. And so you had the slogan, which is still my favorite slogan of all these wonderful slogans. Amir Golshani: I love it. So you have argued that the regime's violence, especially toward women, is not accidental, but foundational. Does that mean the system by design can produce anything but freedom? regime's violence, especially toward is not accidental, but foundational. Does that mean the system by design can produce ⁓ anything but freedom? Mariam Memarsadeghi: Well, it's a totalitarian regime. It's ideological. It's revolutionary. And the world has never seen one of those types of regimes produce anything but the worst forms of tyranny. So we have to compare the Islamic Republic of Iran to the to the Soviets, and cannot expect it to ever be able to improve You know, I studied political ⁓ we have to compare the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Nazis, to the Soviets, and cannot expect to ever be able to improve itself. philosophy I was in a program and left with a master's degree because I wanted to do practical work and I became a humanitarian aid worker. worked in the Balkan region. And I was a student of political philosophy, I studied a lot of Montesquieu. ⁓ And of the things most compelling about Montesquieu in my opinion, and I think it's rooted in other philosophies also. ⁓ But he's very good about explaining characters in the Persian letters that the despot becomes ⁓ enslaved as those who he has enslaved. ⁓ so as much as I ⁓ find evil and ⁓ for the greatest that humans can do to one another, The regime is trapped. The regime is trapped in the hell that it has created itself. And the children of these regime officials may know it better than anybody else, those of them who are honest with themselves. mean, lifestyle, the worldview, the approach to daily life is something that is suffocating. And... The regime trapped in ⁓ the hell that it created itself. And the children of these regime officials may know it better than anybody else, those of them who are honest with themselves. Yeah, so we can definitely not expect any positive movement forward from the regime ever. And it does worry me, of course, that the Trump administration is wanting to make some kind of a deal with the regime. Amir Golshani: this is ultimately about changing the whole structure because still some expert or people still think leadership change could fix things. But is this ultimately about individuals or about a structure that reproduces the same outcomes? The LC Rodriguez model, don't believe such thing works in Iran. We have such thing here. Mariam Memarsadeghi: Yes, I mean, also the difference between Venezuela and the Islamic Republic is that these Islamic Republic has a huge ⁓ military and nuclear threat to to everyone in the world really, that Venezuela didn't have. So mean, Venezuela was more of a problem ⁓ within Western Hemisphere. It's a threat to the United States oil interests. Of course, it's a tyranny. All those things were antithetical to American and particularly in its own hemisphere. But ⁓ in the of the Islamic Republic, it's much more than that. So it's all the more reason that Trump should not be seeking some kind a deal because the nature of the regime at its heart is anti-American, anti-Israeli, and intent to ⁓ both countries down, really take down Western civilization. That's why they pursue the nuclear bomb. Amir Golshani: So that being said, why do you think President Trump is emphasizing of this Delcy Rodriguize to guess model, know, is he looking for an off ramp or ⁓ defanging and degrading, Iran specifically in a military, you know, capabilities. So it's kind of, we are done. The mission is accomplished and we need to, you know, by sort of negotiation and dealing with someone within the system. So let's wrap it up. What do you think on that? Mariam Memarsadeghi: Yeah, I don't think it's one stable, solid, singular answer to your question. I think he vacillates. So I think that there are times when he thinks I'm going to use the Venezuela model as a way to the system in Iran, you know, to, to, to open it up, to create pressure, to get movement within the structure of the regime and then see how things move and shake down. And then let's create a real transition. And it's also worth mentioning that for Venezuela too, I don't think that this is the end point they have in mind. I think that this is part of a transition for Venezuela. But then there are times I think when Trump thinks, that's as good as I'm ever going to get. So let me just get there right now. In other words, he gets impatient and he thinks, okay, I want a deal. I want to deal right now. Well, to get a really good deal. I mean, even if let's assume for a moment that getting a deal is the best case scenario, which I, which I reject, even if you want a good deal, you're going to have to continue. You're going to have to stay the course. You're going to have to be patient. You're going to have to consistently escalate the pressure in order to get that deal. ⁓ Amir Golshani: Right. Okay, so that's a great point. to de-escalate is one thing. Another thing is the fact that before this war, Iran was already under enormous pressure economically, socially, politically, and the system was already approaching a breaking point. ⁓ over a month of war, this much destruction, you know, it's really hard to believe it can be sustained, even if by any means they can stay in power, they cannot run this country anymore. Mariam Memarsadeghi: Well, there are countries, are governments around the world that are even more corrupt and incompetent. So ⁓ that itself, and even repressive, that by itself is not gonna be enough to bring down the regime. So the regime is not just going to say, well, you know what, we really screwed up, so we should just step aside. There needs to be some way of There's things need to result in. an important part of, if not a majority of the people who are working for the regime to say, no, we shouldn't do this anymore. We can't go on like this anymore. That hasn't happened, but it can happen. I think one of the reasons that the internet has cut off in Iran is because the regime is afraid that when the rank and file, when the bulk of the IRGC, the Basij understands what's happened to the country. understands the ramifications, the effects of the bombings, then they are not going to be as cohesive, coherent as ⁓ ⁓ the regime. So what needs happen is more psychological, I guess is what I'm saying, than it is related to the economics. I know that there have been people who worked very hard on creating a robust sanctions infrastructure to pressure regime. ⁓ And then of course this bombing campaign. But these things by themselves are not what caused that final tipping point. It's the psychology of the regime. Amir Golshani: So that being said, do you see this as the beginning of an end or could the system still stabilize and survive longer than people expect? do you see this the beginning of an end or could the system still stabilize and survive longer than people expect? Mariam Memarsadeghi: I think that the system can survive if it, yes, I think the system can survive. One of the reasons I think it can survive is because the Trump approach has not been, it hasn't been the Israeli approach. The Israeli approach is one of, be truly secure so long as this regime exists. Therefore we have invested over many years in all these different ways that we can degrade and destroy the regime. One of the reasons I think it can survive is because the Trump approach has not been, it hasn't been the Israeli approach. The Israeli approach is one of, cannot be truly secure long as this regime exists. Israel's problem is it can't do it on its own. Can't do it by itself. It can't own the problem of post Islamic Republic, Iran by itself. The United States, unfortunately has course corrected from the mistakes of, ⁓ in Iraq in particular. ⁓ Trump knows that his, his base, his mandate is not happy with entering another. What I consider if it needs to be done properly, know, ⁓ war that includes ground troops and has a longer term commitment. Amir Golshani: So is it fair to say that trajectory of this scenario is moving toward a more close militarized state, more kind of extreme version of the current system? moving toward a more close militarized more kind of extreme version of the current system? Mariam Memarsadeghi: If the regime survives war, then it's going to be more paranoid, more insular, more repressive, militarized, as you said. And they're to be paranoid about each other. The regime has been revealed to be deeply penetrated, infiltrated by the CIA and the Mossad. If the regime survives this war, then it's going to be more paranoid, more insular, more repressive, militarized, as you said. ⁓ they're going to be paranoid, and they always have been, but even more, they'll be paranoid about each other. The regime has been revealed to be deeply penetrated, infiltrated by the CIA and the Mossad. And the regime is just going to be whoever wants to take control of the regime. So I imagine there are different IRGC units that are competing with each other, different parts of the regime competing with each other. They are going to want to prioritize understanding who's real, who they can count on and who's a spy. And it's just going to be very, very difficult. And at the same time, they have to deal with the population. So they are going to unleash more terror. Amir Golshani: Right, Mariam, that was the worst case scenario. Now let's consider the opposite scenario. Let's say this is not sustainable, then the real question becomes what replaces it? Mariam Memarsadeghi: Yeah. Sure. Okay, well what replaces it depends a lot on what we've been talking about. how the war goes going to have a lot to do with what replaces the Islamic Republic of Iran. ⁓ The US and Israel being the ones that are the primary actors, know, it's not ⁓ The people of Iran have done extremely heroic things. It's by historical standards, ⁓ their of courage and and awareness is just exemplary. But speaking of the best case scenario in the here and now, it's going to be because of U.S. and Israeli action that takes the country to a certain point where then the people of Iran feel that they can safely come out onto the streets. That would be if for example, continues to target the Basij, which it seems like it's backing off from because Trump is wanting to make a deal. Now, I hope that doesn't work out. And they go back to that playbook of targeting the best siege and degrading the repressive apparatus and then giving the go ahead to the people who I am sure if it comes to that point will wholeheartedly go back to the streets. So the best case scenario is, yes, the ⁓ continues to be targeted militarily, but especially its repressive apparatus There comes a point where Israel US governments both believe that the regime is significantly degraded and from the skies through technology in particular, US and Israel can be backup and surveillance for street protesters. There comes a point where Israel and US governments both believe that the regime is significantly degraded and from the skies through drone technology in particular, US and Israel can be backup and surveillance for street protesters. And combine the best of nonviolent civil disobedience, ⁓ street strikes. ⁓ sit-ins the technology that we already know and see as possible from the skies. Amir Golshani: So this is great because it takes us to one of the points that you usually put more emphasis on, which is freedom is not just about removing a regime. What does a real democratic transition actually require? freedom is not just about removing a regime. Mariam Memarsadeghi: Well, for me, that's the most important question. It's something that I have really ⁓ tried to devote a lot of time and effort to. I mean, you could say that the entire reason for Tavaana is to have a population that is aware of how other countries have transitioned to democracy so that Iranians can demand the kinds of political decisions and political entities that can help to get Iran to a democratic place, to a free and open society. So that one of the things that we did at Tavanna, which is still going strong, is case studies about other countries' successful experiences moving from different forms of tyranny to democratic political systems. These are really big challenges. All these countries, all these different cultures have addressed it in different ways. There are lots of lessons to learn there. ⁓ The classes that Tavana teaches has been doing for than 15 years now, know, draw upon the curricula that international institutions have developed and then these case studies that Tavana created ⁓ from about these other countries. So, ⁓ well, among the most important things is ⁓ buy-in. transition, you don't want spoilers. You don't want... a significant enough portion of the society. It doesn't have to be a large part of society, but a part of society that is not convinced of what this bigger trend is doing. So let me be more specific. In the case of Iran, Pahlavi has managed to convince great, great, great people that he is leading. And he is leading in my eyes and he's extremely popular. back five years ago, 10 years ago, 15 years ago, 20 years ago, if you asked me who do I think Iranian people respect the most, I always said Pahlavi. ⁓ gatherings or political meetings where ⁓ someone question the popularity of Pahlavi, I always felt the need to say, no, that's unrealistic. He is the most popular and he has the most potential because he has consistently stood on the democratic principles and human rights principles, secularism. I think the problem is that It's manifold. One is that the regime is very good at creating divisions, stoking division, creating discourses that take people apart more than bring them together. ⁓ But the problem is also an interior one to Pahlavi and his operation in that from the get-go, they didn't reject these attempts. didn't take, not only did they not take strong measures to reject them, Amir Golshani: Right. Mariam Memarsadeghi: and create a discourse and a way of politics, a way of being political that rejects those kinds of divisions, they kept going more and more in the extremist ⁓ exclusion. So for example, a lot of the discourse around ⁓ anti-1979, know, a panjohafti. I come from a family that really... was grandfather was a colonel in the Shah's Artesh and my parents strongly supported Bakhtiyar I don't have a background in terms of family of support for the revolution. ⁓ And like said, you know, I was seven years old when the revolution happened. I never I never participated in, for example, you know, the diaspora. Many people went and voted during the Green Movement or they voted for. Khatami or Rohani or whatever. never did any of those things, but I think that it's very important not to fall into the regime's trap of creating these discourses of Panjoh Hafti or Fandi Bandi or all of these things that try and make a whole category of people be unacceptable and dehumanize them and prevent that sense of nationalism that is very inclusive. The sense of nationalism that is very inclusive is the one that is going to allow us to transition to democracy. Again, at this point, getting rid of the Islamic Republic is not something that the opposition is going to do. It's not something Pahlavi is going to do. It's something that the United States and Israel are either going to do with the help of the Iranian people on the ground, or it's not going to happen because the United States and Israel are going to give up too soon. So the real task in front of Pahlavi is how is he going to manage the transition? at this point, getting rid of the Islamic Republic is not something that the opposition is going to do. It's not something Pahlavi is going to do. It's something that the United States and Israel are either going to do with the help of the Iranian people on the ground, or it's not going to happen because the United States and Israel are going to give up too soon. So the real in front of Pahlavi is how is he going to manage the transition? Amir Golshani: Right. Mariam Memarsadeghi: Unfortunately, the transition plan that his team has written him ⁓ very high concentration of power. He is effectively the head of all three branches of government. as we know, ⁓ emergency powers can easily become ⁓ more permanent. that phase, that provisional government, the way it's set up, can set the tone. for a lot of exclusion, alienation, ⁓ of accountability. Amir Golshani: Let's assume that Prince Pahlavi is listening or watching this episode. Do you have any recommendation at this point before it gets too late? Mariam Memarsadeghi: Well, it's been a long time. mean, now it's been a few years that I have been trying to do that. ⁓ Others have as well. I wrote a piece very favorable him in, I think it's now published by Persuasion. Persuasion. And then another piece also on persuasion, think maybe less than a year later, that was critical of Pahlavi. So I'm one of the maybe small handful of people who was very, very supportive of Pahlavi, but really some important mistakes. So the important mistakes, in my view, are one, create initiatives. So you're going to have If you're going to display unity, make it real unity. Invite opponents, invite those who've been critical, invite those who have, who even your own people, your most highest level associates and advisors have ⁓ alienated, the olive branch to those people. And that includes everyone who was at the table for the Georgetown coalition. So make amends for that. Again, this is not so Pahlavi becomes more popular. He already has popularity. That's not the issue. The issue is, can he create a stable transition? He's going to need that. He's going to need that truly pluralistic, truly unified approach for that. So that's one. Second is to... this is not so Pahlavi becomes more popular. He already has popularity. That's not the issue. The issue is, can he create a stable transition? He's going to need that. He's going to need that truly pluralistic, truly unified approach for that. be more engaged in what people are saying and how they're saying it. So I think Pahlavi has taken a choice I'm not gonna get involved in these that are happening between different groups and different types of people on social media. But every now and then, if he takes a very principled stance, and he takes that principled stance, in an unexpected way against the people who are most in his own camp. He will win a lot of credibility. He will win a lot of faith and trust. And the thing is, Pahlavi used to do this. Pahlavi used to do this. He used to speak out regularly against extremists in his own camp. And few years ago when Women Life Freedom when the Georgetown Coalition kind of fell apart, and it's worth mentioning that his closest associates were against him being at that table. And so they were really not interested in it being a ⁓ successful experience. All along the way, Pat Levy himself was the one that said, no, I want to enter. I want to be part of this. I want to do this. But the pressure from his own people, particularly after the Mahsa coalition was written and the regime cyber army was very successful in giving this impression to people that this is all a trap to get Pahlavi into something that is going to be very unsuccessful, to bring him down, to humiliate him, to, you know, basically a big conspiracy theory that the cyber army managed to roll out successfully, intelligent people. became part of that discourse and Pahlavi ultimately pulled out of the Georgetown coalition. So basically, gonna be ⁓ easy, but in some ways to take two steps forward, he needs to take one step back, fix up, clean up house from the past, recognize that his own people, his own closest advisors have talked about the need to hang. Islamic regime officials from lampposts. I mean, even if you believe in the death penalty, hanging people from lampposts is not conducive to a stable, peaceful, democratic transition. can't have these people in particular be responsible for your transition planning. Amir Golshani: Hmm. Right. are very important issues because like, let's let me give you an analogy about ⁓ strait of Hormuz So it's some choke point that, you know, everyone directly or indirectly, they have a dog in the game. So it's not sustainable. It has to be resolved. Finally, sooner or later, it has to be resolved. Otherwise, you know, the world economy will collapse, you know, ⁓ some consequential, impacts Mariam Memarsadeghi: Yeah. Yeah. Amir Golshani: would affect everyone in the world. It's already started, but it would be in a worse sense. So it has to be resolved. this regime in Iran is also similar thing. It's not sustainable. It has to go. It has to be replaced. And what we are preparing for and what you mentioned is for the transition and day after. The biggest mistake that people make is when they think about day after. So what do you think about those mistakes that people have about after? Mariam Memarsadeghi: One mistake is to rush to elections too soon, think of elections as being the most important part of democracy. mean, having a say in who rules and represents, of is one of the defining ⁓ spirits of democracy. ⁓ without institutions, ⁓ a strong judiciary, without rule of law, without a sense of ⁓ a ⁓ law and order, without secure borders, without an education system, without public services that being provided reliably. People are going to be in a position to develop strong. transparent, accountable political parties to then therefore have good, strong elections. And of course, elections require institutions too. Elections themselves require institutions. They require independent electoral bodies. They require independent election monitors, ⁓ and international. They require strong press. These ⁓ particularly, yeah, I mean, they were lacking in transition planning. so, on the one hand, you wanna avoid going too fast towards elections. On the other hand, you want to avoid having, as I mentioned before, a provisional government that is not truly representative of the people. So, and especially if provisional government is gonna be there for a while. I mean, You want to make sure that the country's territorial integrity is secure. Well, the best way to do that is to have a good, strong representation, participation, inclusion from all parts of the country geographically, and to have itself be the way that people work through their differences and conflicts than, you know, I hope we don't see this in any way, but to have ⁓ different types of actual violent conflict in the country while a political transition is also trying to be happening. Amir Golshani: Right. mentioned part of the problem. So I want to go to other aspects of that. So we often hear about the need for unity among opposition groups. Why that been so difficult to achieve? Part of that is because of the regime, because of cybersecurity, because of what they're doing. What other aspects are there that are being ignored? Mariam Memarsadeghi: Yeah, mean, the unity is important. Let me just say first, though, that I think that there are times when people use that as an excuse not to do the right thing. Now, it can be from within the opposition itself. It can be from foreign governments, namely the United States, that ⁓ want to get involved in all the things that it needs to get involved with. So it says, you uses the excuse of, well, the opposition is not united. ⁓ So I think we need to be mindful of that. But I say that as someone who's always talked about the importance of unity and why doesn't it exist. Part of it, as I mentioned already, is that Pahlavi needs to be able to have much more discipline and control and eyes and ears, his own eyes and ears on what people are doing and what, when his own people do not ⁓ by and live in practice his own values. I mean, ⁓ the very same day that Pahlavi will go out and give a speech about ⁓ and inclusion and tolerance and listening to each other and with other people's points of view and all being on the same page and ⁓ of the most, you know, flowery and democratic of ⁓ and discourses. The very same day, his most important people will get on X and say the opposite. And that's just standard classic holding their own turf. They don't want to give up that very authoritarian, strong, discourse that is associated with them. They don't want to they don't want to cede any territory. It's at times like that that Pat Levy needs to step back in and say, did you hear me? Because I just said this and you're my people and you're doing the opposite of it. And I expect you not to do that because it ⁓ we know it, we're going to have to stop being about what we say. Amir Golshani: Right. Mariam Memarsadeghi: going to be a day when it's not about speeches and posts on X and interviews and press releases. ⁓ going to be a time when it's about actual work, ⁓ actual governance, about actual you're in charge of the country. You need to make sure things don't fall apart. Public services, the economy, the security, the borders, the schools, the hospitals, the trash pickup. You need to have your people be able to listen to you, be accountable to you. Amir Golshani: So I love it. That being said, ⁓ how important it is to give people something to defect to, because it's important to defect from Islamic regime, but they need something to defect to, a clear vision of what comes next. How important it is. how important it is to give people something to defect to, because it's important to defect from Islamic regime, but they need something to defect to, a clear vision of what comes next. Mariam Memarsadeghi: Yeah, yeah. They need to have something to defect to. They also need to have a process in which that they can defect, they can rely on, that gives them some measure of safety. Unfortunately, right now, IRGC rank and file mid-level, we're in a bit of a difficult situation because after the massacre, the regime ensured that every single part of that chain of command has their hands dirty with the people's blood. time and again, Pahlavi has said, if somebody's hands are not soiled by the blood of the people, they can join the new government. They can defect. There's this sense of amnesty, immunity. But now we're in a different position because people have seen with their own eyes how this massacre was carried out and it wasn't carried out by Khamenei and 10 people at the very top. It was carried out by, you know, the rank and file mid-level people, all parts of the IRGC in the Basij. So that's difficult because how much do the Iranian people stomach that kind of defection? But the other problem is that Pahlavi never created a credible means by which they can do that. And I'm not sure, you know, the whole Amir Golshani: Right. Mariam Memarsadeghi: QR code system. Yes, sure. There's a ton of applications that came in, but those haven't been vetted for all we know. Those are fakes from the regime. And the Pahlevi people don't have the means to ⁓ determine is who in the regime. They just simply don't have that capacity. They don't have that intelligence. They don't have those human resources. But it doesn't seem, and I could be wrong about this, I could be wrong about this, be wrong about this. It doesn't seem like the United States and Israel have created a credible means by which important people or really anyone from the regime can surrender. Until we get to that place where there's some way of surrendering that I'm not saying a golden parachute, there's some kind of a reliability there. Like they know where they can go to and not be killed. It's going to be very hard to get rid of the regime. It doesn't seem like the United States and Israel have created a credible means by which important people or really anyone from the regime can surrender. Amir Golshani: Right. So do you see this ending through collapse, internal fracture, or gradual transition? do you see this ending through collapse, internal fracture, ⁓ or transition? Mariam Memarsadeghi: Hmm. I wish I had a crystal ball. Really, really tough to say right now. Really tough to say right now because I don't think that a the United States has a fixed strategy. That doesn't mean it's a negative. That doesn't mean it's a weakness. But I think there are many contingencies that the United States and Israel are thinking about. And right at this particular moment when we're speaking, this is March 30th, Amir Golshani: It is. Mariam Memarsadeghi: 2026, it's really hard to predict whether the United States and Israel are going to go all the way and make sure that the regime is completely finished or not. Amir Golshani: I believe this would be one of the only chances they have ever had in the past 47 years, know, might be the only chance ever. ⁓ Mariam, is there anything that I haven't asked what you want to talk about? If yes, you know, this is the time. Mariam Memarsadeghi: Mm-hmm. Yep. I spent some time in the Balkan region, almost three years, and I worked a lot on different aspects of post-conflict transition from, reconstruction of homes to, the first free and fair elections to the reintegration of former combatants, ⁓ all stuff. and ⁓ became familiar with many sectors government, provisional government. And I wrote a book for the organization that I worked for, International Organization for Migration, that was about the lessons learned in the programming. ⁓ think at that point it was two years of programming, immediate two years after the NATO bombing of Kosovo. ⁓ one of the things that Amir Golshani: Right. Mariam Memarsadeghi: I think about on a daily basis is that we are so in the social media space when it comes to Iran. We're so in the language space. This person writes this, this person writes that, this person gives this interview, this person gives that panel discussion, this person gives this lecture. ⁓ ⁓ real work that's required has a different logic and it has a different set of skills and requirements. And I'm really looking forward to the day when we can do real work for Iran. And I hope that people start to prepare themselves for that day because ⁓ work has ⁓ and goals that are not ⁓ the here and now. ⁓ have to have a vision of something, for example, reforming the school system, something I'm very interested about. That is, you you have to have ⁓ plans that are for the first six months, one year, five years, 10 years, and people who are willing to not think about how they look and sound, know, in a tweet, but rather, ⁓ know, having their heads down, working very, very hard for goals and rewards that come years later. Amir Golshani: I love that, I want to close on something more personal. After everything you have seen, studied, and worked toward, what does freedom mean to you today? Mariam Memarsadeghi: to me means every woman, man, girl having possibility to live life the way they would to live it and to have choices and that are dependent on themselves. that their life, community, their country is driven by them and that they have the opportunity to be responsible for their own life, to be responsible for their own village or city that they live in, their own country, to have the opportunity to contribute. For me, freedom is as much about responsibility as it is about rights. Amir Golshani: Mariam thank you for this insightful and deep conversation. Mariam Memarsadeghi: Thank you so much.