Latest / The Team House / Deep Dive Into Chinese (CCP) Espionage w/ Matt Brazil | EYES ON | Ep. 12
Transcript
- 0:00Hey, guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to you today
- 0:02about a way that you can help support the podcast. If you're not already,
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- 0:47you'd like to, and we really appreciate that, So go and check us
- 0:51out at patreon dot com Slash the Teamhouse. Hello everyone, and welcome to
- 0:57another episode of my zon. Before we go introducing ourselves, I'm Andy Millman,
- 1:02by the way, but before we go on to introduce my other August
- 1:07co hosts, I wanted to reveal today's guest Matt Brazil, who is bottom
- 1:14line is, if there is anything to know about China, then Matt doesn't
- 1:19know. I would be very surprised. How's that for a mini intro?
- 1:25And his why? Okay, Matt's some Matt's a throughout his career has been
- 1:30a senior analyst with the focus on China. Right now he's with Blue Path
- 1:36Labs. He's also a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation. He did China
- 1:42studies as an undergraduate way back in UC Berkeley. Matt. That wasn't in
- 1:46the sixties though, was it Maybe, but still still not known as necessarily
- 1:53as being a staunch pillar of the establishment. So good on you, But
- 1:57that's UC Berkeley, not Matt. Matt went on to be a entrepellar of
- 2:00the establishment, an army officer, intelligence selfice, served tours in Korea as
- 2:07well as with the NSA, And that is it. Yeah, so you
- 2:12know, in the wake of that, Jason and d please introduce yourself.
- 2:16Heybody, I'm Jason Lyons. I am a former Marine, former CIA officer
- 2:23now working with these scally wags, if that's the term over you. D.
- 2:28Hey guys, I'm d I'm the producer of the team House and eyes
- 2:30on. I'm the guy who puts it all together, semi puts it all
- 2:35together. And I'm just excited about this conversation today. Man, So to
- 2:42kick this off, and just for the sake of our audience, Matt feels
- 2:46feel free to contradict me here. But you know, Matt's specialization is an
- 2:50espionage counter espionage, or rather he writes about that, Matt, please elaborate
- 2:58on that, and and a little bit about your I didn't cover your written
- 3:01works, and you have an upcoming book, I believe too, right,
- 3:06Yeah, very true. So I'm the co author of Chinese Communist Espionage and
- 3:10Intelligence Primer, co author with Peter Mattis, who is a former CIA counter
- 3:19intelligence analyst and is now the president of the Jamestown Foundation. And so there
- 3:30is a book coming up. I'm trying to finish it up now. I've
- 3:35read some juicy excerpts, by the way, and hopefully we'll get into those.
- 3:40No. I mean, so, the first one was was intended for
- 3:47law enforcement and intelligence professionals as a handbook as a reference work. This next
- 3:53one is intended for the general public to try to explain in normal everyday terms.
- 3:59What's going on with with the Chinese security apparatus specifically its specifically how they
- 4:08go about recruiting. Yeah, you know with in in the West. And
- 4:13then I think you uncovered some some very key differences between what they do and
- 4:17what we do. And I'd love to hear your thoughts about, you know,
- 4:20effectiveness. Sure, yeah, would you like me to just launch right
- 4:26into it, launch right in ye stream? Let's saying yeah. So uh.
- 4:33The acronym mice money, ideology, compromise, EGO is often used to
- 4:40describe how foreign intelligence services go after people. And in the Chinese case,
- 4:47the documented cases that we can read on the d J, the Department of
- 4:53Justice website, and by the way, dj dot gov is like a great
- 4:57resource for this kind of thing because the America are, to my knowledge,
- 5:00are the only country that publishes in detail what happened in espionage cases. And
- 5:11you read the indictments and there's an awful lot of detail there for the espionage
- 5:15nerd man, I got a quick question for you that that had us even
- 5:20Jason Stump the other day. So you know, the the government d o
- 5:27J is very open in some cases about most cases about naming the country for
- 5:31which the alleged spy was spying. But in some cases it doesn't. Now
- 5:36what what do you what? What reasons might there be for for not outing
- 5:43a foreign government if we are prosecuting someone for working for them. Yeah,
- 5:49I think it has to do This is only speculation on my part, but
- 5:53I think it has to do with the content of the case. In previous
- 5:59times, the US was reticent to name China in cases like this because they
- 6:09didn't want to upset bilateral relations. There was a lot at stake, not
- 6:14only on the commercial side, but also before nineteen eighty nine and a little
- 6:20bit afterwards, there was a lot of intelligence cooperation to spy on the Soviet
- 6:27Union after the After the Nixon visit, the US began providing intelligence to China
- 6:34about the Soviet Union in a trade relationship, and then after nineteen seventy nine,
- 6:45when the US and China established formal diplomatic relations, the Chinese side agreed
- 6:49to set up a sigand and Eland station in the Shinjong Wiger Autonomous Region to
- 6:57spy on Soviet missile tests. So that kind of thing was considered, of
- 7:01course by the Americans to be of high value. Nowadays. I think it
- 7:06probably has to do with the details of the case and how people who are
- 7:15in the press or more importantly in foreign intelligence services might be able to dig
- 7:21into sources and methods. On the US side, Okay, yeah, understand,
- 7:28Sorry, go ahead with the stream of consciousness. Okay, So you
- 7:34asked earlier about how the Chinese work in the United States and in other countries,
- 7:40and by the way, they are all over the place. I like
- 7:45to call it their worldwide espionage and influence offensive nowadays, which began to really
- 7:54expand under Sheijen Ping when he came to power in twenty twelve. As I
- 8:00was saying, we like to talk about mice, money, ideology, compromise,
- 8:03ego. On the Chinese side, they seemed to, according to the
- 8:09DOJ indictments, they seem to put a stress on money as the preferred method,
- 8:15which tracks with Marxist ideology, which is very important on their side,
- 8:20because if there's one thing that the Ministry of State Security is known for,
- 8:24it it's as a haven of true believers in Marxism. So the idea that
- 8:31capitalist nations are on the decline, that people are motivated entirely by money,
- 8:37which seems to be kind of on the mark. If you ask me,
- 8:41someone sold out that the recently was it forty two thousand dollars and that previously
- 8:46was like a twelve thousand dollar case in the last few weeks, right,
- 8:50both, maybe guys, that's almost irrelevant that you know that. But yeah,
- 8:56there was money, small small beer as far as the actual information,
- 9:01A lot of money to betray your country. I mean, that's very little
- 9:05money to betray your country, right, I mean unbelievable. Yeah. And
- 9:09and in one of the cases, these were these were two Chinese Americans,
- 9:13both of which I think had been born in China. And in one case,
- 9:18the mother of the sailor was encouraging him to go ahead and remember remember
- 9:24where he's from, et cetera, et cetera. And she was in the
- 9:28States while doing this, of course, right, yes, yes, yes,
- 9:31And this is something you know. I have to say first of all,
- 9:35that a very small percentage I'm sure it's under one percent of Chinese people
- 9:41would would really be subject to that kind of influence and pressure, that is
- 9:46ethnic Chinese people in the United States. And it's very important for us to
- 9:50keep ethnic Chinese people on side with the United States because not only are they
- 10:00American citizens and or permanent residents who just want to settle down here, work
- 10:05and be ignored and be ignored by the Chinese government, but but they're a
- 10:09very valuable resource. As a matter of fact, I've heard people I've lived
- 10:15in China for eight years, and during that time I was interested in this
- 10:20topic. And uh, for for the years I was, I was completing
- 10:24my doctoral dissertation on this topic, and the Chinese side knew it, and
- 10:30they were actually cooperating with me and giving me, feeding me their side of
- 10:33the story, introduced me, introducing me to a revolutionary hero, that sort
- 10:37of thing. But but but even then, people were quietly telling me,
- 10:45you know, all we really want to do is live our lives and try
- 10:50to stay out of the crosshairs of state security and public security. And this
- 10:56is one of the strengths that the that the Americans have in China. But
- 11:01that's, of course the other side of the coin. Well, what's what
- 11:05are the particularly interested of course in some of the weaknesses that the the Chinese.
- 11:13It's we generically use the term m sss, right, MSS but it's
- 11:20is it the MSS or is it a subdivision? And what sort of things
- 11:24you mentioned that kind of all over the place. But it seems as though
- 11:26once they hit paida on one particular methodology, they'll take that handler and he'll
- 11:33use it again, maybe in a different country. Is that that on target?
- 11:37I know I'm throwing a couple of questions you at once. It's just
- 11:39yeah, if you don't mind talking about their methodology, really sure. So
- 11:46in the book published a year and a half ago, Spies and Lies,
- 11:50that Spies and Lies by Alex Joski and Australian scholar, he gave some really
- 12:00interesting cases of state security officers, some very senior, engaged in influence operations,
- 12:11that is, trying to convince politicians in Australia and others to support Chinese
- 12:20foreign policy objectives. And there's a history behind that, going back to the
- 12:26Revolution, of intelligence officers engaged in influence operations. Sort of on the side.
- 12:35There are some scholars who criticize what Joski wrote, saying that he's conflating
- 12:41the two espionage and influence, but I think the jury is out on that
- 12:46particular question. So that's one methodology of interest where we have intelligence officers or
- 12:56agents engaged in influence operations and recent example here in the San Francisco Bay area
- 13:05is a woman named Fang Fong, and that is Christine Fong f Angi,
- 13:11who was being run by a state security officer out of the Chinese consulate in
- 13:18San Francisco. She was a student in at cal State East Bay in Hayward,
- 13:26and she was engaged in influenced operations, including some honey operations where she
- 13:35was had had relationships with some American politicians, which is outlined in a in
- 13:46a recent book by by somebody whose name all of a sudden, Bethany Allen
- 13:52ehem Ebraheimian. Her recent book outlines that in detail she has probably published the
- 13:58best account, Bethany Allen Ebraheimian of Fung Fung's operations. That was her name,
- 14:09Funk Fong. Okay, that that is likely to be a movie.
- 14:13No, I'm just wondering because Jack and Jason always tell us this rather lame
- 14:16story of honey pot who are they suspect who work for a Chinese foreign service
- 14:24place and pursued them relentlessly. But my point is it's it's kind of this
- 14:31urban myth almost, isn't it that a lot of people think they're being pursued.
- 14:35But it is something that the Chinese, you know, it's among their
- 14:37many the many methods of getting people of coercing people into giving up information.
- 14:45Right it is, And the Christine Fung's modus op Brandy not to get stuck
- 14:52on her, but her motus o Brandy was to get to know and be
- 14:58friendly with not only for sexual entrapment, but with politicians whom she judged were
- 15:05up and coming, or maybe that the San Francisco Consulate judged were up and
- 15:11coming people who were on the local board of supervisors, et cetera. But
- 15:22the money aspect has certainly been very prominent in these different cases, and it
- 15:33probably makes up a very large percentage of how these cases are pursued. So
- 15:39Matt, let me ask stepping back a little bit and to kind of dispel
- 15:46the boogeyman concept, is I'm going to adventure of the guest that the answers
- 15:52know, but is the average person who gets on a plane in Beijing flies
- 15:58to the US. You know, they're moving here, not just business,
- 16:02they're going to live here. Are they approached beforehand normally and told, hey,
- 16:07we're going to be knocking on your door to do some you know some
- 16:10work for us, or is it someone who has specific access to say a
- 16:17judge or politicians. So what I'm basically what broadly, what I'm asking is
- 16:21is every Chinese that comes to this country told that they're expected to do this
- 16:29or is it just a few. I suspect it's just a few. But
- 16:34that's just my hypothesis. There's a lot of controversy over this. There are
- 16:40cases that have been documented where a local state security bureau will learn that because
- 16:52you know, people have to apply for a passport through the Ministry of Public
- 16:56Security, that's the National Police, and MPs and MPs and MSS trade information.
- 17:03They have databases that they that they share that they can both mutually take
- 17:11a look at. And so when somebody is leaving China to go to the
- 17:17United States and they're going to study physics at MIT, then there's a high
- 17:22risk that they will be approached and asked not to get in contact with a
- 17:29state security officer in Chicago or anything like that necessarily. But when you come
- 17:34home for Chinese New Year, you're expected to come and see us and tell
- 17:40us what's going on, the contacts you're making and such. But I think
- 17:45again, this is controversial. My friend Nicholas f. To Miata's, for
- 17:51example, who studies this stuff. He's put together a compendium of cases that
- 17:56has now uped about nine hundred where he is analyzing how they were done,
- 18:04and he's written a book which I think is called Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics,
- 18:11which you can find on Amazon. So in his opinion, nearly a
- 18:17very large percentage of people are approached. In my opinion, the Chinese Communist
- 18:25Party has always considered their society to be full of enemies, and I think
- 18:32this probably this probably causes them to be more careful about whom they approach,
- 18:48but they do, they do operate. I think one indication that they're selective
- 18:53is the case that came out three or four years ago now Shui En Juhn,
- 19:00the state security officer who was arrested in Belgium after being lured into a
- 19:07trap by the FBI and the Belgian authorities, and he was extradited to the
- 19:11United States, put on trial and convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison.
- 19:15A very interesting case. But one of the people who was in his
- 19:18network was a young man named Ji Chauchun and g Chauchun had emigrated to the
- 19:29United States. Ostensibly he was a graduate student in Chicago, and he had
- 19:36joined the US Army under a program that the US Army has to bring in
- 19:41people with hard languages and even if they're not citizens. And so he raised
- 19:48his right hand and sport to defend the Constitution United States and all that jazz,
- 19:52just like the rest of us. But he was he was an agent
- 19:56in the network of Shrian Jun and his job was to spot Chinese people in
- 20:03the Chicago area who were graduate students and who were engaged in STEMS science and
- 20:11technology engineering occupations that might be of interest to Chinese military development. So that
- 20:18would indicate that certainly they ain't going after everybody as they leave. They're probably
- 20:23being selective. But again, you know, I think that my idea,
- 20:33even Nick's ideas about this or at the level of hypothesis, we're not at
- 20:37the theory level quite yet. Well it makes sense, doesn't it. I
- 20:40mean, they why would they ignore this incredible potential asset. And when you
- 20:45look at the way they think about everything else, from you know, from
- 20:51integrating a market a company with the Chinese Communist Party to how they controlled covid.
- 20:56It's all kind of done in a very kind of the same way,
- 21:00isn't it place, And they mirror image too, you know, they figure,
- 21:03hey, look at what we're doing. You know, we're going after
- 21:07We're using everybody we possibly can. We're going after all these different people and
- 21:11so on. The CIA must be doing the same thing. And this is
- 21:15why we're going around our anti spy campaigns and warning children to watch out what
- 21:21their parents are doing and stuff like that crazy story. If only we were
- 21:25yeah, if we went, Hey, guys, it's Jack. I just
- 21:27wanted to talk to you today about a way that you can help support the
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- 22:17So go and check us out at patreon dot com slash the Teamhouse. So
- 22:22I'm I'm intrigued too about because you talk about, you know, the recruitment
- 22:27of their own people going over as seas, and you mentioned and this is
- 22:33you know, this is being a topic that's that's recurring in the skin the
- 22:38last two years, but recruiting ethnic Chinese of dual national Jill national all who
- 22:45have joined the militariy I'm not Jill national, No they would, but who
- 22:49are yeah, someday in some cases Jull national, in some cases first generation
- 22:53immigrants, in some cases pending citizenship. But they also of course target people
- 23:00with no such connections. And you, you know, you mentioned that with
- 23:03a different kind of different approach. I thought it was very interesting. When
- 23:11we think of approaches, we think of kind of more af furtive bump,
- 23:17you know, perhaps not in a dark alley, but in a bar or
- 23:19this and that. But I was just looking at what it was it.
- 23:22Kevin Mallory. I was just you know, when I was doing some background
- 23:26reading on for this. Kevin Mallory is a CIA, you know agency guy.
- 23:32Chinese turned him and they met him. He was, he was contacted
- 23:37on LinkedIn. The guy, the guy who contacted him was very obvious from
- 23:42his profile that he was you know, he was had something to do or
- 23:47background in Chinese intelligence. That's, you know, at least what the FBI
- 23:52reported. That's how the initial bump took place, you know, and then
- 23:56they hooked him with twenty five thousand dollars payment in Shanghai and he was,
- 24:03you know, he was done. Yeah, you know, I would like
- 24:07to point out to everybody that LinkedIn when you when you get in an in
- 24:12mail from somebody, uh, if you look for those three dots on the
- 24:18top right hand of the of the mail, you click on it, you
- 24:22have an option to report and block somebody, and that should always be done
- 24:29when you get these in and I get them every day. Sure of really
- 24:37it's really kind of goofy the way they're doing it, and and I hope
- 24:40they continue to be goofy about, you know, coming up with these pictures
- 24:45that show a woman from her nose down, you know, and in the
- 24:52photograph and your your your profile is so interesting. I would like to get
- 24:59to know you. I have the background in point. Yeah, it's just
- 25:03ridiculous and I and I hope they stick to that approach because it's so obvious
- 25:07and ridiculous. But but they won't, you know, they they If there's
- 25:12one thing that that I think they do, it's learned from experience and and
- 25:21these approaches will probably improve over time and the more artificial intelligence will change everything
- 25:29quite certainly. And just give it a few months, a few years.
- 25:33Do you have any questions? Sorry? I was asking D if he had
- 25:38any nothing specific, I mean, more a broader point, like what's the
- 25:45mss' goal is it? Ip? Mostly is it how the US goes about
- 25:51it, like protecting our interest across the globe and stuff like that. Like
- 25:55what's their main aim? I guess yeah, they used to go after a
- 26:03lot of different things. In twenty seventeen twenty eighteen, there was a reorganization,
- 26:11and without getting too political science y about it, it seems to have
- 26:15been an effort to get MSS and the military to define their turf and go
- 26:25after what they're supposed to go after that may or may not be working well.
- 26:30It's kind of hard to say. But now we have four different bodies
- 26:37doing this kind of work. We have State Security, which is going after
- 26:44it seems both military and civilian technology, and of course political intelligence and possibly
- 26:56probably not economic intelligence because that's all pretty much opens the United States, unlike
- 27:00China. And then you have the Joint Intelligence Bureau, which used to be
- 27:07known as the Second Department of the PLA and the Joint Intelligence Bureau of the
- 27:12People's Liberation Army goes after military technology and they're or at least in theory they
- 27:21do. Their actual activities are a little bit unclear so far. And then
- 27:27you have the the PLA Strategic Support Force, which is like their NSA,
- 27:34so they do signal intelligence. They also do web based hacking and other type
- 27:40of intelligence too. But you know the the State Security, Administry of State
- 27:47Security and the Ministry of Public Security. According to recent revelations out of a
- 27:55hacking contractor from Shanghai called Asoon, UH, they're they're they're doing hacking too
- 28:02overseas, and they're going after dissidents, political enemies overseas, and they're going
- 28:08after political secrets. Uh. In countries all over the world, the usual
- 28:15sort of regular spy stuff. But but they're employing these these hacking firms at
- 28:22the at the uh UH State Security Bureau level in the provinces to go after
- 28:29these these secrets. And sometimes it's because in the Shinjong Leiger Autonomous Region,
- 28:33for example, they're worried about dissonance overseas who are either training to be terrorists
- 28:41in their minds or who are talking too much about what's going on in Shinjong,
- 28:47and so they pressure relatives and then they find out names of people and
- 28:51then they go after them using hacking. And then there's Denied Front Work Department,
- 28:57which is a department of the a major department of the Chinese Communist Party,
- 29:03and they're the influence peddlers. Yeah, it's it's interesting, isn't it.
- 29:10So the Russian in the sense that that Russian cyber activity, both you
- 29:15know cyber and the sense of oco offensive cyber operations turning once to zeros that
- 29:22might rant description of this but also disinformation using cyber as a domain. And
- 29:29the Russians get a lot of publicity about this. But I'm intrigued when you
- 29:33talk about the Chinese because when we talk about Chinese espionage, and this is
- 29:38anecdotal, you know, I'm told by friends in the FBI that ninety percent
- 29:42of the cases they're handling our Chinese and that they are way more you know,
- 29:48they regard China as a threat exponentially more dangerous than Russia or Iran.
- 29:53And yet again we just keep hearing about Russia on the Ciber peace. Do
- 29:57you think we should also be equally it sounds kind of a dumb question,
- 30:00but more worried about China. They're only dumb answers, and I'm good at
- 30:07them. But yeah, I would agree with what your friends at the Bureau
- 30:17are saying, if only because of the developing sophistication and the quantity, the
- 30:29sheer quantity of operations that are going on, and the way they're doing it
- 30:37is through these hacking contractors like Issume, a Shanghai based company that's been around
- 30:44for about ten years that has offices in four other Chinese cities. And the
- 30:53data dump that was put on GitHub of their of their stuff, probably by
- 31:00an insider of some sort or who was who is being run by a competitor,
- 31:07it seems indicates that that they were going all over the place they were.
- 31:17They were running hacking jobs in India, Malaysia, Japan, Korea,
- 31:25Indonesia, the UK and other places that are not immediately coming to mind.
- 31:33Uh and uh. And it also indicates that they weren't being paid all that
- 31:37much. That typical unfortunately to a Chinese company that the that the management was
- 31:45making all the money and the worker bees were were We're not making very much
- 31:52money and we're miserable and being overworked. Now as a counter intelligence opportunity,
- 32:00one would think yes, But one of the one of the axioms of this
- 32:06problem is that is that running espionage in China has always been difficult. Going
- 32:15back to the revolution, it was hard for the nationalists to run espionage in
- 32:19the Red areas because they were so locked down. And indeed China language,
- 32:28same language, same cultural even the same language and culture both Han Chinese.
- 32:32Yeah, yeah, so it's the counter espionage counterintelligence ah h environment there is
- 32:45is the hardest of targets, and so finding somebody to to approach has it
- 32:55seems it's like it's a lot of it's being done over the web, just
- 32:59like they're doing a lot of stuff over the web against us. The the
- 33:04counterpoints seems to be going on as well. Yeah, very interesting. Sorry,
- 33:09go ahead, Chase. Sorry. Given the it seems that the Chinese
- 33:15intelligence focuses on, as you said, tech, you know, it t
- 33:22those sorts of things, probably political as well, and seeing publicly at least
- 33:27that it seems like Iran is not above rendering someone who they consider a threat
- 33:36assassinations. The same with the Russians as well. I don't see I personally
- 33:42don't seem to see that in the Chinese. Am I wrong in that?
- 33:45Are they above you know, conditions as fascinating someone or rendering someone that they
- 33:53see as an issue? I have not. I've asked that question about assassinations
- 34:00to a number of my contacts and so far I'm not getting any positive responses.
- 34:07So it does not seem that way. And that's related to another problem
- 34:10that I'll get into after finishing answering your point. But when it comes to
- 34:16renditions in the countries along China's periphery, the land border countries, specifically Laos
- 34:27and Thailand, there have been kidnappings of dissidents taken back to China to face
- 34:37trial. And this also includes people who in Hong Kong before the recent crackdown
- 34:45made Hong Kong basically totally my mainland city now almost anyway, much much more,
- 34:52much more of a mainland city than it used to be. Of people
- 34:55being just abducted and taken back to Chin. And they do this, it
- 35:01seems, when it's operationally convenient to get somebody across a land border and back
- 35:10into China. So that's why it allows Thailand, Hong Kong, Macau going
- 35:19back decades, Macau, it used to be, by the way, before
- 35:22nineteen ninety seven and the nineteen ninety nine handover of Hong Kong and Macau respectively,
- 35:30that people with security clearances could travel. Americans could travel to Hong Kong,
- 35:35no problem, but not to MACAUA yeah yeah. So so in countries
- 35:46that are more far afield, the United States and in Europe and other places,
- 35:55the emphasis seems to be there there. There are people who come over
- 36:00here from state security and try to convince somebody to go back to China to
- 36:07face trial because if you don't, we've got your family. And indeed,
- 36:15public security people have actually told me that somebody, a Chinese person living overseas
- 36:22is like a kite. We have the string here on the ground they can
- 36:27fly around all they want, but we have the string, and that string
- 36:30is their family. Wow. Thank you appreciate that. That's a powerful analogy.
- 36:36Yeah, definitely is cool. But this sort of thing goes back,
- 36:42you know, it's it's got a long history. During the revolution, the
- 36:46same sort of ideas we're in play where the UH or espionage and influence operations
- 37:00were commingled at times where families were used as pressure, where where money was
- 37:09used to recruit people to work for the revolution. But also during that time
- 37:16it was a very different time ideology was and and appeals to patriotism and and
- 37:23appeals to fight against Japan during that long period of Japanese occupation and the exploitation
- 37:31of China and foreign exploitation of China were used to appeal to people to spy
- 37:40for the communist cause. And they were extremely UH successful during that time.
- 37:47And and the the efforts of Chinese communist intelligence during the revolution were very key
- 37:54to the victory. And so from that they they learned that and from lessons
- 38:02from before that that espionage was a core business of the party during those times.
- 38:12Intelligence operations had a seat at the table at this Party Central Committee that
- 38:16was at the same table, if not equal to the propaganda and Military and
- 38:22and Organization departments, which are the three key departments of the party. Now
- 38:30that the nomenclature is a little bit different because it's all been moved over to
- 38:36the government side rather than on the party side, it's still it's still important.
- 38:42But the interestingly, the party doesn't like to admit that they do foreign
- 38:49intelligence operations at all. They will they will talk about doing stuff in Taiwan
- 38:57certainly, and Taiwan is uh along with the United States are those two are
- 39:01the main enemies where most of the attention, I have to say, is
- 39:07focused and historically has been focused on both Taiwan and the US. But you
- 39:12know, they don't do spy trades at all, inspite of the fact that
- 39:15the US has at least one of their officers in a federal penitentiary. The
- 39:25only one right now used to be two. There used to be Chi Mac.
- 39:30They're smart enough to use diplomats as the case handlers, just smart not
- 39:35to get caught. Yeah that's true. Well, you know the ones that
- 39:40were caught, The really prominent ones were Larry Wu Tai Chin from nineteen eighty
- 39:49four eighty five, who who was a who is a long term non official
- 40:00cover officer who was actually an officer of Chinese intelligence, and he was not
- 40:05a trader. He was infiltrated into the US by the Chinese services, and
- 40:14so the US begrudgingly acknowledges that, you know when you talk to people about
- 40:21that case, but they let him. They did not acknowledge him, they
- 40:25did not try to trade him. They let him kill himself in jail after
- 40:30he was sentenced or before he was sentenced, after he was convicted. And
- 40:35then there's Chi Mak, who was also a military intelligence officer who went first
- 40:44to Hong Kong and then emigrated to the United States and set up himself as
- 40:49an employee of a navy systems contractor called Power Paragon, and he was engaged
- 40:59in sending export controlled technology relevant to naval operations, including quiet propulsion systems,
- 41:10to China for twenty years until he was caught. And I think it was
- 41:15two thousand and six or two thousand and five. There was a really good
- 41:21article in The New Yorker that came out about a year and a half ago
- 41:25that outlined that case in retrospect. But they let Chimak rot in prison and
- 41:35die there at the age of eighty two or eighty three. In October of
- 41:40twenty twenty two, he passed away at Lompok Federal Penitentiary. So it's really
- 41:47it's a very odd sort of thing that they way one way. It's one
- 41:54way. Loyalty, right, loyalty to the party, the party, and
- 41:59you get call at the party. It's not going to help you out.
- 42:01You're on your own. If you were caught. The secretary will not will
- 42:06disavow knowledge of your actions, madam as we uh you know, so just
- 42:13feounding up guys before I do anything more from that. I had a had
- 42:19a question that no you answered. I was actually gonna ask about Taiwan.
- 42:24But I guess a branch off of that would be given the tensions between the
- 42:29two. Uh yeah, so would anyone. I'm assuming that they're already Chinese
- 42:35intelligence working on the you know, on Taiwan. But given the tensions,
- 42:40are those coming into Taiwan from the mainland automatically suspect And does the Taiwan have
- 42:50the intelligence apparatus, the numbers to be able to keep up with that.
- 42:57It's a it's a tough problem. So there when when I was in Taiwan
- 43:04last April doing doing reporting for this upcoming book. You know, usually as
- 43:12a former commercial officer, I'm able to approach a U S diplomatic post and
- 43:17talk to the the r s O, the Regional Security Office, and and
- 43:22certainly talk to the commercial section and ask them questions about the local scene and
- 43:28all that. But not in Taiwan. They did not want to speak to
- 43:31me. And I understand why, you know, I understand why. Uh.
- 43:37The the relationship between the US and Taiwan right now and the military assistance,
- 43:43which which is very well documented. By the way, if you've ever
- 43:45heard of a guy named Wendell Minnick M I N N I c K,
- 43:51you can find him on the web Wendell uh I. I like to call
- 43:57him. I tell I tell him, Wendell, you're theveyor of doom.
- 44:02Yeah, you should definitely look him up. He just published a really interesting
- 44:09summary of how China has locked down the South China Sea with Elent and other
- 44:16capabilities. Very detailed and very interesting. But when I was in Taiwan,
- 44:25a t wouldn't touch me, even though I'm personal friends with one of their
- 44:30former senior officers who tried to get me in to talk with them, But
- 44:35former and current Taiwan intelligence and military officials did talk to me, and their
- 44:42outlook was not rosie. They talked about how their mainland organization is set up
- 44:49in Taiwan, for example, to introduce Taiwan men to mainland women. There
- 44:57are organizations that are Buddhist based organizations that go back and forth between the two
- 45:05parts of the Greater China there. And also one of the things that was
- 45:14said to me by more than one person is that they're not dumb enough to
- 45:17use electronic means of communication to do their reporting back to Beijing. They use
- 45:23couriers. And that's really interesting because it underlines the uneven nature of state security
- 45:32operations where you have some really sophisticated officers who are language capable and know what
- 45:40they're doing and follow careful tradecraft, and you have others like Srian Jun,
- 45:47the State Security Bureau officer who was arrested in Belgium, who brought his cell
- 45:53phone with him that was full of all this information and the FBI got a
- 45:59hold of it, and that's why we know all about him because of what
- 46:01was in it cell phone he was carrying, Like this is like we tell
- 46:07don't take your cell phone, for God's sake, don't take your laptop.
- 46:10It's going to be compromised as soon as you check into your hotel, as
- 46:15soon as you get off the plane. But he did that, so very
- 46:17uneven. But in Taiwan they seem to have a tighter operation where they don't
- 46:23do dumb things and they use better trained people. That's just a hypothesis,
- 46:30thank you. So Matt kind of at a concluding question, and it's it's
- 46:37quite a broad one, and basically it comes to this. You know,
- 46:38all these all these efforts are cases of China, you know, making sense
- 46:45of the world for its own gain. And yet and and you know,
- 46:49we talked a little bit about Lea Mang and Fufu, you know, the
- 46:52appearances on the rather amateur approaches that we see on LinkedIn. But this all
- 47:00brings to mind that can I think a concern I'd be interested to hear where
- 47:04your thoughts are. So we have on one hand, now, with the
- 47:07Internet combined with AI, the potential for Chinese type approaches to be successful just
- 47:15to just increase exponentially, right, I mean, especially with integration of AI,
- 47:19you can see potential you know, for coercion for black male. On
- 47:24the other hand, as we see She's party his administration become increasingly isolated,
- 47:34right, I mean, so they're making all these efforts to learn about the
- 47:37world, but culturally arguably they're learning. They they're understanding less and less,
- 47:44and you're going to get a new generation, kind of the the wolf generation,
- 47:49right, of of spies who've grown up in this very kind of muscular
- 47:57vision of China. Aggressive China there, but not necessarily one or but but
- 48:05arguably one that understands the Western world less. So you see, you see
- 48:08this this divergence, and on issues like Taiwan, that that that kind of
- 48:15lack of understanding, but that aggression, aggressive desire to get ahead and learn
- 48:20more is concerning. I'm not asking for a solution. I'm just saying that,
- 48:25you know that to me is real. It is the real problem here.
- 48:30It's not that China or the United States are going to be irrational enough
- 48:34to go to war. It's as that that understanding it diverges more and more,
- 48:42and as China gets increasingly kind of xenophobic, aggressive, you know,
- 48:47cracks in the facade, this kind of increasing existential fear of enemies, the
- 48:54potential for a misstep that causes escalation grows. I think one of the main
- 49:01problems is that Xi Jinping, according to people who know more about Chinese politics,
- 49:08elite politics than I do. Seems to be people like David Shambaugh,
- 49:16for example, the scholar from George Washington University who's now out here at Hoover,
- 49:23and others seem to have concluded, and they have a lot of contact
- 49:29with people on the Chinese side, seem to have concluded that Xijin Ping has
- 49:34surrounded himself with yes men and that his his view of the United States is
- 49:43one of disrespect and and hubris. So that's that's certainly a problem, although
- 49:53it doesn't seem like he is about to just go to war with with the
- 49:59US over Taiwan in the near future. There are too many there are too
- 50:05many disadvantages, there too many problems that could result. It seems like we're
- 50:14kind of in a in a space in between the two possibilities when it comes
- 50:21to that were I think that China no longer feels that time is on their
- 50:25side, nor are do they really feel overly threatened by the current situation to
- 50:34the point like in nineteen eighty nine, when they felt that the party was
- 50:37in danger, they decided against the against the instincts of everybody in the West
- 50:45who thought that China would never shoot itself in the foot by by cracking down,
- 50:57And so that to many people in the West down on June fourth,
- 51:00nineteen eighty nine was a big surprise. It wasn't much of a surprise to
- 51:05people who who know that, who knew that the party was always interested in
- 51:09maintaining its power and was always always felt threatened and still today feels threatened by
- 51:15even the slightest organism organizing against it. So so we're in between those two
- 51:23polls where we're China feels threatened enough to do something drastic or feels the times
- 51:30on its side, and that's the dangerous part of that. So remind me
- 51:37if I'm if I'm answering your question. Yeah, yeah, you are.
- 51:43And I realized my question kind of it kind of answers itself as we talked
- 51:49through this. Yes, absolutely, there's there's reason to concern. The reason
- 51:52to concern, I know that's I said. That was my last question,
- 51:54But you brought up a blankly Tina men square. Uh. My my brother
- 52:00in law was actually arrested that he was a correspondent. Not any case,
- 52:07the total total divergence, but how many people were killed in Tenement Square,
- 52:15because I know there's true numbers of well, we in the West don't really
- 52:21probably don't know the real numbers. And I only asked that question not out
- 52:24of prurient interest. But but it was indeed, I mean it was.
- 52:30Yes, it wasn't the Cultural Revolution, but it was. It was a
- 52:32tectonic event right in in Chinese society. Yes, it was where the state
- 52:42proved everybody who was paying any attention that if you oppose us, you're dead
- 52:47meat. Yeah, you know, in the aftermask, the the uh,
- 52:54the embassy sent people around. I heard these stories because I arrived in nineteen
- 53:00ninety one as a commercial officer, so I heard these stories about how embassy
- 53:05officers went around to hospitals looking for dead Americans. But while they were doing
- 53:07that, they were also counting the dead. And the official number that the
- 53:15US came up with was relatively low, as I recall, but I don't
- 53:19recall the number. The number that I actually trust was in a book by
- 53:27my friend Jan Wong Wong Jan Jan, who was the Toronto Globe and Mail
- 53:36correspondent in Beijing at that time, and who I met when I moved there,
- 53:42and she cited the Chinese Red Cross figure that was initially issued of three
- 53:47thousand dead, which they later retracted, and her reporting indicated that that was
- 53:57the most reliable number. Yeah, phenomenal amount. When you think a relatively
- 54:04short period of time that the actual shooting to you know, the shooting took
- 54:07place, that it gives you some yes, some indication. Well, civilians
- 54:14came out onto the streets because they were mortified and outraged at what was going
- 54:19on, and they were mowed down with automatic weapons. A very difficult situation
- 54:27understatement, just to close out quickly, like what how does the US respond?
- 54:32What do we do to like counter what China is trying to do to
- 54:37us? Great question, Well, we we have a problem, a y.
- 54:44There's real imbalance between China and the US when it comes to one understanding
- 54:50the other. In China, English is available and often required h as a
- 55:00subject beginning in the fourth grade primary four. In the United States, people
- 55:07typically begin studying Chinese if they're interested in that topic at the age of eighteen.
- 55:14I got to jump on that at the age of seventeen, but it
- 55:20was too late in my opinion, to begin learning the language, which I've
- 55:24struggled with for decades and I can use, but I'm only of average competence
- 55:31when it comes to learning languages. I think what we need to do not
- 55:37only language, but also area studies. We need to redouble our efforts there.
- 55:44It's possible nowadays to get a scholarship to study the Chinese language and major
- 55:52in East Asian studies or Russian studies, et cetera. But the amount of
- 55:58money that's pledged to that effort should probably be increased. We should probably have
- 56:07more programs at the high school and younger levels to study the language. And
- 56:15one place to look for this as a model is d D and the Department
- 56:22of State. So when they identify somebody to work on China or Russia or
- 56:27Saudi Arabia, the air world or whatever, somebody who's already cleared, already
- 56:34professionally trained, they send them off for one or two years for intensive language
- 56:39study, and then they send them to a graduate school for a year to
- 56:45do an area studies degree. So that's a three year investment, and then
- 56:52we passed them over for promotion. Mate. But The point is that is
- 57:00that the FBI doesn't do that. They rely on lnquists who are not field
- 57:07agents, and therefore you have field agents who do not speak the language,
- 57:12but they are required to go out and and recruit sources of information in the
- 57:16community, and they they there's some you know, I've I've met one in
- 57:23particular, who went to Taiwan, was really interested in China, got the
- 57:29language, married a local gal, came back and he was recruited by the
- 57:32FBI, and immediately he was put on organized crime, but eventually he was
- 57:38put on onto counterintelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence squad and and did great things. But
- 57:52he was an EXCESI yeah, I mean you think that, I'm sure it's
- 57:57happening that the FBI would make concerted recruiting drive. Now they are. They're
- 58:02trying, they're trying to recruit people who already have the language, and that's
- 58:06great, But I really think that they have another law enforcement Uh, we
- 58:12have other law enforcement out there too. We have the Commerce Department, the
- 58:15Labor Department, et cetera, the Department of Energy. As you point out,
- 58:21it's more than the it's more than the language, and particularly right as
- 58:23you point out, they it's a cultural understanding. It's it's an understanding of
- 58:30uh of what you know, what factors are at play too, you know,
- 58:35for people to do certain things. I think one I mean the problem
- 58:39is that once we start going through the US education system, which I never
- 58:43did, by the way, but once people do, then they become it's
- 58:47hard for them then to imagine it didn't work that very well. But you
- 58:52know, but it's it's the whole problem of human You can learn the language,
- 58:57but it's just it. Even if you if you learned it, picture
- 59:01perfect pronunciation, speak it like a native. That's only part of the puzzle.
- 59:07I think that's correct. And and because we are such a culturally powerful
- 59:15nation, uh and economically powerful nation, Americans do not feel in general,
- 59:23do not feel the same compulsion to learn about foreign countries that foreign countries learn
- 59:30people in foreign countries are compelled to learn about the United States. That's true.
- 59:36But I think there's something to be said about, like you know,
- 59:37second generation kids where you know, they do get targeted, probably because they
- 59:45have family in China still, but there's got to be someone in that generation
- 59:50where there will be our biggest asset in terms of working at the FBI working
- 59:54at the CIA, They're like, yeah, fear has to be overcome.
- 1:00:00Yeah, that's that's exactly. Yeah, understanding that there and then overcoming it
- 1:00:04and being able to balance aspects of American life culture against that. Along with
- 1:00:09that too, I think we also need to tap into working which I've done,
- 1:00:14working with local law enforcement, and not just local law enforcement, but
- 1:00:19also ethnic law enforcement officers ones you know, Chinese, American, Iranian,
- 1:00:24America, whatever it is, because they're the ones who are literally on the
- 1:00:28street, and they're the ones who are not going to stick out like a
- 1:00:30sore thumb. If you send that FBI agent into that neighborhood where he's he
- 1:00:36or she is not known, you have that local law enforcement, it's like,
- 1:00:38oh, that's you know officer X or why you know, I see
- 1:00:43them patrolling every day. We need to start using those folks a little bit
- 1:00:46better as well. Yeah, that's a fair point, right. It's always
- 1:00:52you know, we always try and end these episodes on a little bit of
- 1:00:55a constructive positive point. So that was brilliant, right man, the whole
- 1:01:02Yeah, Well, I'm sorry we went over, but we went over because
- 1:01:06this is you know, we've we've got you I mean, this is a
- 1:01:09nugget that we're going to I'm not gonna be able to finish this metaphor,
- 1:01:14but lean will be information anyway. Thank you so much. Matt. Please
- 1:01:21plug your book when when it's coming out any other previous works you've done,
- 1:01:24feel free. The floor is yours. Okay, Well, please take a
- 1:01:29look if you're interested in this kind of thing. My website is Matt Brazil
- 1:01:34dot net m A T T B r a zil dot net, where I
- 1:01:38try to post as much as I can. There's a I have a a
- 1:01:44newsletter. If you go to the website that I just named, you can
- 1:01:47sign up for the newsletter. And I also write for the Jamestown China Brief.
- 1:01:55There's stuff available there jamestown dot org, as well as spy talkspy talk
- 1:02:02dot co, which is an interesting little online newsletter run by a veteran journalist
- 1:02:09named Jeff Stein. Yeah. We've had Jeff on the Teamhouse before, have
- 1:02:13you. Yeah? Very good. Yeah, So I do my best to
- 1:02:17cover China angles for his audience. And and and it's also good to to
- 1:02:30just just try to do ordinary web searches that will bring you to a lot
- 1:02:37of this stuff. But the one thing I would caution everybody when they look
- 1:02:42at Wikipedia. Wikipedia can be very useful, but you should always check out
- 1:02:49the footnotes because quite often the footnotes lead to absolutely nowhere, as many a
- 1:02:58frustrated thesis. And I'll put all of Matt's links in the description and the
- 1:03:04show notes, so you guys can just go down there and click it and
- 1:03:06find your way to Matthew and his work. Thank you very much. You've
- 1:03:09all been very kind, awesome, So so everyone, I don't know if
- 1:03:17if you had a chance to see the Team House kind of what was it
- 1:03:22called the interval the intermission, but it's a very short video. They're released
- 1:03:29by Jack and crowd was on it. But anyway, bottom line is this,
- 1:03:31please subscribe. Jack made the point that a lot of people sub will
- 1:03:38click subscribe, but they don't get sent reminders. And for eyes On that's
- 1:03:44particularly important because we know when the next episode is coming out kind of the
- 1:03:47day before when we but generally twice a week, either when news hits or
- 1:03:52we have a great guest. So please do anyway and support the team House.
- 1:03:59Please do just click on subscribe. Even better, consider joining Patreon,
- 1:04:04which is five dollars a month, which is poultry. You know what I
- 1:04:09mean. That's a tip, right, Yeah, yeah, that's that's a
- 1:04:14tip. D drops that every time he spends over one hundred bucks on a
- 1:04:17meal. That's a bad tip, the waiter tell us, the waiter not
- 1:04:24to spend it all at once. But yeah, my point is it's it's
- 1:04:28a D tip, you know, per month. That's nothing. Okay.
- 1:04:31Anyway, Hey, great, see everyone in in a couple of days.
- 1:04:35All the best, Thank you, thank you, Matt. That was brilliant,
- 1:04:41really good.