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The Iran War Stalemate w/ Trita Parsi / The Time of Monsters with Jeet Heer · The Nation Podcasts

• 0:00
  [SPEAKER_01]: With the old world is dying, the new world struggles to reborn, now is the time of monsters.
• 0:06
  [SPEAKER_01]: With those words from Gramsci, I welcome you to the time of monstrous podcast.
• 0:10
  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm G. T. here of the nation magazine, which is a sponsor of the podcast.
• 0:14
  [SPEAKER_01]: We've often taken up the Iran U.S. Israel war over the last year or so and it continues but it's in a kind of strange holding action where the United States has announced a new regimen of sanctions against Iran which is a bit paradoxical because the whole argument for the war in the first place was sanctions weren't working so we need war and now it turns out war was it working so we need sanctions.
• 0:41
  [SPEAKER_01]: And I think that maybe sums up the kind of conundrum or haggmire that the Trump administration has created for itself.
• 0:47
  [SPEAKER_01]: But to talk to all that, I'm very happy to have on once again frequent guests of the program a treat-up parcy who is co-founder and vice president at the Quincy Institute.
• 0:57
  [SPEAKER_01]: And also has a substact where you can read his analysis, which I would highly recommend as among this sort of most informed analysis, not only because of his wide historical knowledge, but because of his contacts with diplomats, both in Washington and in the Middle East itself.
• 1:14
  [SPEAKER_01]: So, first of all, welcome to the program.
• 1:16
  [SPEAKER_00]: Thank you so much for having me.
• 1:18
  [SPEAKER_01]: So let's get started because I mean, I sort of expressed maybe I did a spoiler alert by expressing some skepticism about the sanctions, but what are these new sanctions?
• 1:28
  [SPEAKER_01]: And what are the prospects that they can actually achieve the goals that they hope to achieve?
• 1:32
  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, in general, I have to say there's no reason to be particularly convinced that sanctions will achieve these types of objectives for a variety of reasons.
• 1:42
  [SPEAKER_00]: The first one in this specific case is what are the objectives?
• 1:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: what objectives did Bessent list as the objectives that he wanted to achieve with Iran?
• 1:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: What are the conditions that Iran is going to have to agree to in order for the sanctions to be lifted?
• 2:00
  [SPEAKER_00]: None were listed, not in his FD, not in his press conference.
• 2:05
  [SPEAKER_00]: So it does not actually seem to be a policy that is designed to shift
• 2:13
  [SPEAKER_00]: the conduct of the Iranian government, I think Tehran will be concluding that the absence of objectives with the policy means that the actual objective is regime change.
• 2:25
  [SPEAKER_00]: And if regime change is the policy, then I cannot think of a single case in which sanctions brought about regime change.
• 2:34
  [SPEAKER_00]: oftentimes people would look to South Africa as one such example and there's some interesting realities with South Africa that I think makes it both unique but also not entirely convincing that the sanctions were as big of a role as the literature or the narrative dominant narrative seems to suggest but still that would be only one case.
• 2:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: In almost all of the other cases
• 3:01
  [SPEAKER_00]: sanctions paved the way for military action before you saw any type of regime change.
• 3:08
  [SPEAKER_00]: Look at Syria, it's not sanctions that brought it.
• 3:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: The hell it's at the Turks use this al-Qaeda affiliate to fight the Assad government.
• 3:16
  [SPEAKER_00]: In Venezuela there was a military operation as well, and they're not being a particularly bone-one but nevertheless there was a military operation.
• 3:23
  [SPEAKER_00]: It wasn't a sanctions.
• 3:24
  [SPEAKER_00]: And now we are hearing rumors that Rubio may want to invade Cuba, so after 70 plus years of sanctions, it nevertheless culminates in some form of a military action.
• 3:34
  [SPEAKER_00]: Now, as you point it out, in this specific situation, we're talking about having tried military action and then gone back to sanctions, whereas the usual processes the opposite.
• 3:45
  [SPEAKER_00]: That sanctions are pursued, they don't work, they do weaken the country, but they don't work and then it escalates into military action.
• 3:54
  [SPEAKER_00]: But overall, I would say I have a very hard time seeing this being successful because the objectives are not listed, and as a result, the assumption is that it's regime change.
• 4:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: We have no examples convincing examples of that working, moreover, in order for this to just bite a lot, I'm not saying that he won't bite, but to bite a lot.
• 4:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: The U.S. would have to go after not Iran's trade with Iraq or Afghanistan, who would have to go after Iran's exports to China, such as taking some of the Iranian ships that are going to China on the high seas.
• 4:31
  [SPEAKER_00]: And during the Biden administration, this was done in a few occasions.
• 4:35
  [SPEAKER_00]: It was also done under the Biden Trump administration before.
• 4:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: But now you have a very different context because A, they're already is a war.
• 4:45
  [SPEAKER_00]: B, the Iranians have already shown their willingness to retaliate in kind, which they didn't before.
• 4:50
  [SPEAKER_00]: And C, you have a new leadership in Iran.
• 4:53
  [SPEAKER_00]: Thanks to the US and Israeli assassination campaign that is much more risk-willing.
• 4:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: then the previous one.
• 5:00
  [SPEAKER_00]: So if the U.S. actually does this, then it will lead to Iranian counter-escalation in the region in a manner that the U.S. doesn't want because the U.S. itself just opted for a ceasefire without any agreement after 13 days of fighting in the second round.
• 5:15
  [SPEAKER_00]: Secondly, it means that you're picking a major fight with the Chinese.
• 5:18
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yes, and mindful of the fact that it is a Chinese that are the main reason as to why all prices did not go above 150 or 200 because they slashed about 5 million barrels a day of demand and this helped keep all prices down.
• 5:34
  [SPEAKER_00]: And they did so not to help the US or to hurt the Iranians, but because China diligently pursues its own interest.
• 5:42
  [SPEAKER_00]: and its own interests is to make sure that there isn't any major global economic recession, because that would ultimately affect China as well.
• 5:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: So it's played a major stabilizing role, one that ended up helping the U.S. more and hurting the Iran more, but nevertheless, so on the dual circumstances, if you go after the Chinese and the Chinese decide to start retaliating against you, you're really screwing yourself.
• 6:05
  [SPEAKER_00]: So I have a hard time seeing that they actually would go down that route.
• 6:08
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, no, it doesn't seem like from any logical position that the sanctions could achieve the results.
• 6:14
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, if we're talking about regime change, in a sense, they've have achieved some form of regime change in the sense that the current government in Iran is much more oriented towards the sort of military end of things.
• 6:27
  [SPEAKER_01]: and maybe some of the restraining forces that had previously existed, the more sort of cautious older leadership is gone.
• 6:35
  [SPEAKER_01]: But, I mean, the other aspect, which I think one saw with the funeral for the Eitola, is that the actual strength of the regime in the country seems very strong.
• 6:45
  [SPEAKER_01]: And this is like entirely predictable.
• 6:47
  [SPEAKER_01]: that when you have, like, you know, a campaign of bombing and sanctions that tends to actually like create a rally around, uh, fact, I would argue in this case also, uh, a nationalizing effect.
• 6:58
  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm much more nationalist government.
• 7:00
  [SPEAKER_01]: So, so, well, what can we say about the nature of the Iranian regime right now?
• 7:04
  [SPEAKER_01]: How it may be changed in the last few months?
• 7:08
  [SPEAKER_00]: I would say that it's still a working progress.
• 7:11
  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't think we have reached a stable status quo that tells us what the Islamic Republic is going to be going forward.
• 7:19
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think it is definitely so far far more risk-winning, far more rejecting of a previous strategy.
• 7:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: There was called strategic patience in which the Iranians absorb the lot of hits and try to play the long game without having a short game.
• 7:36
  [SPEAKER_00]: and a reaction to that believing that this is the reason why war ultimately came to Iran's own territory.
• 7:44
  [SPEAKER_00]: And even deeper belief that diplomacy ultimately will not work with the US, but that the Iranians actually have to inflict defeat on the US and then forced the US to come to its terms, Iran's terms.
• 7:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: But we don't know yet exactly what it will mean for the country internally.
• 8:01
  [SPEAKER_00]: We've seen that some appointments, certainly worry people such as the appointment of a former head of intelligence their toy up to a very critical position.
• 8:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: He has seen as someone very much responsible for the internal repression.
• 8:14
  [SPEAKER_00]: And he's been given a senior post again.
• 8:17
  [SPEAKER_00]: But I think it's still too early to say that
• 8:20
  [SPEAKER_00]: the new leadership has kind of gel then we are seeing clear indications of policy direction.
• 8:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think a lot of those shufflings that are taking place about two or three weeks ago were more personal politics and balancing rather than indications of what the policy direction would be.
• 8:37
  [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, for enough, and in terms of the thinking of the Iranian government, it does seem like from their timetable, the midterm might like loom large as something that they'd be concerned but I know you've indicated, you think like, you know, they might think that like the time to escalate or you know, put the pressure on Trump might be like closer towards the election.
• 8:59
  [SPEAKER_01]: Do you want to explain this sort of logic of their position there?
• 9:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I think when you take a look at what the calculation of the Iranians may be, I think it's very, very likely that they will counter-escalate, but only under specific circumstances.
• 9:17
  [SPEAKER_00]: So first of all, if you have a situation in which the pain on the Iranian economy becomes
• 9:30
  [SPEAKER_00]: Then, and the status quo ends up becoming much more painful for Iran than it is for the U.S., and yes, on those circumstances, they're going to retaliate.
• 9:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: They're not going to surrender, I don't see any indications as to why they would.
• 9:44
  [SPEAKER_00]: But also if they end up in a scenario in which they recognize that, yes, this is painful for them.
• 9:51
  [SPEAKER_00]: It makes it more painful for Iran than the US, but only in a slight way.
• 9:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: But there is no long-term prospect for the US to change its policy, which then means that over time, Iran would be in a weaker position.
• 10:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: On those circumstances as well, even if the pain is not intense, they will counter-escalate, but perhaps slightly differently.
• 10:11
  [SPEAKER_00]: That raises the question of when they would do so, and I think at least in the second scenario, the counter escalation would not be imminent, but rather they would time it to be as impactful and damaging at to the US as possible, which would likely be just a few weeks before the midterm elections.
• 10:30
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yes, they're doing it right away.
• 10:32
  [SPEAKER_00]: Whereas if let's say that they really on Friday start going after Iran in old tankers on the high seas, yes, then I see an Iranian counter escalation right away.
• 10:43
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
• 10:43
  [SPEAKER_01]: And for the American end, like it does seem like going with sanctions is a kind of holding action that, you know, as you indicated, the possibility of regime change seems very remote.
• 10:56
  [SPEAKER_01]: And it seems like, you know, like the Trump administration is torn between different factions or different arguments.
• 11:02
  [SPEAKER_01]: for either going with trade or renew negotiations or renew hostilities.
• 11:08
  [SPEAKER_01]: And it seems like the sanctions are a kind of way to split the difference.
• 11:12
  [SPEAKER_01]: Kick the ball down and let it further before you have to deal with it.
• 11:15
  [SPEAKER_01]: And it seems like the status quo for the U.S. for the point of view of the Trump administration,
• 11:20
  [SPEAKER_01]: is like we are maybe not certainly not ideal, but tolerable.
• 11:24
  [SPEAKER_01]: That's like there's enough oil that's coming through this trade.
• 11:27
  [SPEAKER_01]: The Chinese are like tightening their belt and allowing oil prices as you indicated to stay lower than they would otherwise be.
• 11:35
  [SPEAKER_01]: So it seems like if I rate in thinking that the corporate administration is trying to kick the can down the road a little.
• 11:42
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think that is likely where the administration wants to be.
• 11:47
  [SPEAKER_00]: So I think you're correct.
• 11:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think that despite a lot of the huff and puff and a lot of the bark, the administration is likely going to go for far less bite for the very simple reason.
• 11:59
  [SPEAKER_00]: They want to shift the status quo so that it's more painful for Iran, but not so painful that Iran retaliates.
• 12:08
  [SPEAKER_00]: and then at a minimum keep that situation until the midterms and then after the midterms we'll see whether they actually want to go towards military action or diplomacy, but they want to kind of calm the situation down while giving the impression that they are on the offensive.
• 12:24
  [SPEAKER_00]: So you want to give this over the top press conference,
• 12:29
  [SPEAKER_00]: all of this language to make it look as if you're really aggressive, but in reality, you keeping a level of stability in the status quo to win yourself sometime.
• 12:41
  [SPEAKER_00]: And whether that will work or not is a different story of course, the stability of that status quo is really dependent on how much fight there is.
• 12:49
  [SPEAKER_00]: If there's too much fights, then there is no stability.
• 12:53
  [SPEAKER_00]: And the early indications, at least,
• 12:57
  [SPEAKER_00]: is that it doesn't seem to be a plan for a lot of light.
• 13:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: There will be some symbolic things probably, but for instance, I spoken to a lot of European and Asian diplomats, many of them expected that they would be getting instructions from the United States on what they can and cannot do or specific trade that they want them to stop with Iran.
• 13:19
  [SPEAKER_00]: Not a single one I've spoken to have received anything from the American Treasury.
• 13:25
  [SPEAKER_00]: And again,
• 13:26
  [SPEAKER_00]: If you want to have real bite, you have to go after the Chinese.
• 13:29
  [SPEAKER_01]: And I just don't see them doing that before she comes on his visit to Washington, D.C. Yeah, no, no, it does seem like this from what you're indicating is an element of sort of performance in play.
• 13:42
  [SPEAKER_01]: And some of that might be like also a reaction to the fact that there's a sort of increasing discussion in the sort of mainstream media that the Iran war has been a failure, that you know, when it's seeing the not just people at the Quincy Institute, but people on
• 13:56
  [SPEAKER_01]: CNN, very vane stream, like, you know, retired generals, saying that the war is a failure.
• 14:02
  [SPEAKER_01]: So in some ways, this kind of, you know, like sanctions that looked off, but I would also add other actions in the administration, like this current trade war with Canada, uh, I see like a way of like creating an image of strength rather than like, you know, like, like an actual policy shift.
• 14:19
  [SPEAKER_00]: Is that just a cynical reading or?
• 14:22
  [SPEAKER_00]: No, no, I let us be frank.
• 14:24
  [SPEAKER_00]: That would frankly probably be the best case scenario.
• 14:27
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yes, because if the administration actually wants to do a real economic warfare escalation, then it will very quickly lead to a military escalation and then they're back to the war that they themselves for the second time put a pause on.
• 14:43
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I think also one of the things that's really interesting here, you know, I've been a critic of sanctions for a very long time and for 99% of that time, the US government would never have said that economic sanctions are warfare.
• 14:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: They would use language such as crippling sanctions, maximum pressure, now we're calling it D-Day apparently, but then to me to the turnaround and say, all these sanctions have no impact on the civilian population.
• 15:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: Whatever happens to the civilian population is only because of Iran's or Cuba's or Venezuela's or Russia's own domestic policies.
• 15:18
  [SPEAKER_00]: They're repression, they're incompetence, they're mismanagement, they're corruption.
• 15:22
  [SPEAKER_00]: And a lot of that is true, a lot of that is because of those factors.
• 15:26
  [SPEAKER_00]: But this type of complete innocence, declaration of sanctions, as something that impacts the domestic situation or the civilian population, was always a given.
• 15:40
  [SPEAKER_00]: But now, suddenly, the Trump administration itself is calling it economic warfare.
• 15:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: Using the language that Tehran has been using for 10 years, Tehran has been saying that sanctions are economic warfare and that times they even call it economic terrorism.
• 15:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: And perhaps the administration will, at one point, even call it a economic terrorism.
• 16:00
  [SPEAKER_00]: But the fact that their colleague economic warfare is not only just a major break with previous American vocabulary on sanctions, it is also very honest, because it is a economic warfare.
• 16:13
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I mean, this has been sort of Trump's thing all along.
• 16:16
  [SPEAKER_01]: And he's often turned subtext into text.
• 16:19
  [SPEAKER_01]: That there's a language that the sort of more predatory aspects of American foreign policy, the use of alliances as for protection racket, the use of alliances who enrich the US through purchase of military stuff.
• 16:32
  [SPEAKER_01]: That there's always subrosa, whereas Trump, at least, has the virtue of honesty.
• 16:37
  [SPEAKER_01]: Like he is like, you know, in reading to stuff that critics of American foreign policy have long been sent so.
• 16:43
  [SPEAKER_01]: So we could at least be a little bit grateful for that, I guess.
• 16:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, yeah, exactly, exactly.
• 16:48
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, but no, okay, so let's say, you know, there's a whole day action for now.
• 16:55
  [SPEAKER_01]: And then, you know, there might be, I think you laid out the logic for an Iranian retaliation before the midterms, but I mean, like after the midterms, it's like we're at a very dicey kind of situation because in some ways, the midterms are a restraining factor on Trump.
• 17:12
  [SPEAKER_01]: And, you know, like he can't allow the prices to get too high or they'd be like a, you know, even bigger disaster than what the Republicans are facing now.
• 17:21
  [SPEAKER_01]: But I mean, like, what happens like after the midterms, I mean, like, you know, even assuming there were threats to robustly and take the house and perhaps even take the Senate, like, like, but like, do we actually get to a situation where Trump is like far less restrained than he has been?
• 17:37
  [SPEAKER_00]: This is what I think, where I think the Iranians may actually have committed a major miscalculation.
• 17:44
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think there are two focused on inflicting damage on Trump getting their revenge humiliating.
• 17:54
  [SPEAKER_00]: And in the long run, perhaps it will be beneficial for them to having destroyed his presidency and the midterm, so that it becomes a deterrent to future presidents not to go down this path.
• 18:06
  [SPEAKER_00]: But in the media term, I think they may think that after the midterms, because he will be on the defensive domestically, he's going to face a lot of challenges, particularly if he loses both the house and the Senate,
• 18:19
  [SPEAKER_00]: But when we see what happened in Trump won, in my assessment, the most dangerous period was after he lost the elections in November.
• 18:29
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
• 18:30
  [SPEAKER_00]: So between November 2020 and January 2021.
• 18:34
  [SPEAKER_00]: That's when he saw that he was contemplating a word with Iran just to me able to stay in power.
• 18:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: That's when we saw the January 6th thing.
• 18:43
  [SPEAKER_00]: So I think the most unrestrained Trump is likely going to be the one after the midterms after he suffered a humiliation.
• 18:52
  [SPEAKER_00]: And frankly, when he may be faced with,
• 18:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: real domestic challenges and he will see international escalation as a way out of some of those headaches.
• 19:05
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, yeah, no, I think that's a legitimate worry.
• 19:08
  [SPEAKER_01]: And I think perhaps adding to that worry is like, you know, like, are the Democrats going to be like a sort of effective opposition?
• 19:15
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, we know like the Iran war is hugely unpopular.
• 19:18
  [SPEAKER_01]: Like, perhaps the only war in American history that already started off being more unpopular than popular, break from the start.
• 19:25
  [SPEAKER_01]: And it's only become more so.
• 19:27
  [SPEAKER_01]: And we know that the Democratic Party base
• 19:29
  [SPEAKER_01]: It is like very against this war, but what I want to see in the party itself, I think there seems to be some reluctance to make like anti-war case against Trump.
• 19:41
  [SPEAKER_01]: You know, even, occasionally it's rhetoric from people like Chuck Schumer to say like, you know, warning that Trump might go taco.
• 19:48
  [SPEAKER_01]: which is the credit is that Trump will negotiate a deal, which is like what we should all love.
• 19:54
  [SPEAKER_01]: So I'm also wondering, how much of a concern is that the Democratic Party, at least at the leadership level, seems reluctant to make the anti-war case.
• 20:04
  [SPEAKER_01]: And we'll be reluctant to make it stick after they win.
• 20:10
  [SPEAKER_00]: I had to take a bit of a pause here because I have to admit I get so upset.
• 20:15
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, that's very interesting.
• 20:17
  [SPEAKER_00]: Where the democratic party leadership is right now.
• 20:21
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
• 20:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: The degree to which it is embracing its profound distance from the party base.
• 20:32
  [SPEAKER_00]: is, I think, extremely worrisome, but also indicative of how the party leadership is really not seeing themselves serving the party, the voters, the base, but much more.
• 20:51
  [SPEAKER_00]: serving other elements, including the donor base, of course, because seeing how particularly some, I won't name any names, but certain senators have actually been excellent on this issue.
• 21:02
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
• 21:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: But then when the MOU was signed, they frankly took a position similar to that of the Republicans who immediately reacted to the JCPOA, not even knowing what it was.
• 21:16
  [SPEAKER_00]: and came with a lot of bad faith criticisms against the MOU, just like the Republicans did bad faith criticism against JCPO.
• 21:25
  [SPEAKER_00]: And that to me was profoundly disappointing because this is a moment if you truly want to elevate yourself.
• 21:32
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think you are better off acting like a statesman, rather than acting like someone who's far more, so obviously far more driven by political motivations,
• 21:45
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think it was very easy for a lot of Democrats coming out there and being able to say, look, this war was a huge mistake, it should never have been started.
• 21:52
  [SPEAKER_00]: It was a war of choice, but we're glad that it's put to an end.
• 21:57
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's not perfect, but it's better to end this war than to continue it.
• 22:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: I cannot be against this war, but I'll also be against ending it.
• 22:06
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's a bizarre position to take.
• 22:08
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yet that is the position that many of the leadership of the Democratic Party took.
• 22:14
  [SPEAKER_00]: and had it played out slightly differently, and the MOU would have broken down a little bit differently than it did.
• 22:24
  [SPEAKER_00]: It would have led to a scenario, potentially, in which the ownership of this world would no longer just be Trump's, but it would also be the Democrats who sabotaged the MOU.
• 22:36
  [SPEAKER_00]: And that way, they would actually be owning this disaster, because of this very short-sighted political position that they took on this.
• 22:46
  [SPEAKER_00]: And again, I think the Democratic base is very clear on this, they're completely against it.
• 22:50
  [SPEAKER_00]: And they want this to end.
• 22:52
  [SPEAKER_00]: And the party leadership is just operating in a completely different dimension.
• 22:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: And unfortunately, the thing that really is upsetting is that's where they've been for several years.
• 23:03
  [SPEAKER_00]: That's why they lost in 2024.
• 23:06
  [SPEAKER_00]: That's where they have been on Gaza.
• 23:08
  [SPEAKER_00]: That distance, that complete detachment from the base, and they have only continued it.
• 23:13
  [SPEAKER_00]: Learn nothing.
• 23:14
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, no, I think that's right.
• 23:16
  [SPEAKER_01]: And I think just to draw out a parallel, I mean, I think that there's a somewhat similar situation on the Republican side to say, like Trump is popular with the Republican base.
• 23:27
  [SPEAKER_01]: And there's a large chunk of the party that will go along with them.
• 23:30
  [SPEAKER_01]: But there's also like real indication in the polling that at least for some people who voted for Trump, this war has been a great disappointment.
• 23:37
  [SPEAKER_01]: And this is particularly true of sort of like younger voters.
• 23:40
  [SPEAKER_01]: And there's been a splintering of maga.
• 23:43
  [SPEAKER_01]: over this issue.
• 23:43
  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, so far, politically, the sort of pro-war faction has been winning the sort of political battle.
• 23:50
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, I think this sort of primary race of Tom Massey, well, he did get 45% of the vote and he was like massively, you know, outspent because his opponent was even huge funding from APAC.
• 24:02
  [SPEAKER_01]: But I mean, still Massey lost, but there's a kind of anti-war faction and one is now seeing people like Tucker Carlson talking about third party run.
• 24:10
  [SPEAKER_01]: So to what degree is like this issue, you know, splintering the Democrats, what do you see if this continued splintering of the Republican Party as well?
• 24:19
  [SPEAKER_00]: Oh absolutely, I think you wouldn't see Tucker and others seriously flirting with a third party unless they had come to the conclusion that there is no way of keeping a coalition together that essentially brings forward, you know, neocons and restrainers in the same umbrella.
• 24:41
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's just not possible.
• 24:43
  [SPEAKER_00]: And that the administration has, on the mind, its positions so profoundly that it is not capable of being saved and as a result, a third alternative, is needed.
• 24:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: I personally think that there's been a trend, a very interesting trend in which I think Trump won was a very much a cult.
• 25:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: but by Trump too, in the four years in between, a lot of the slogans were starting to take shape as concepts deeper than just slogans.
• 25:16
  [SPEAKER_00]: I won't go as far as the color of the doctrine, but you started to see a movement in that direction.
• 25:21
  [SPEAKER_00]: And that contributed to some people, a portion, not a majority, but a significant portion of Maga, to stopping a cult and start being more cult-ish.
• 25:33
  [SPEAKER_00]: And in that cultish scenario, certain ideas ended up becoming more important than Trump.
• 25:41
  [SPEAKER_00]: And that's why they were more cultish than a cult.
• 25:44
  [SPEAKER_00]: And the most obvious one is the anti-war sentiments.
• 25:50
  [SPEAKER_00]: Because we did see a portion of Maga Breakwetrump over this issue.
• 25:55
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
• 25:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: And we did see very prominent individuals such as Tucker.
• 26:03
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I think perhaps you should also remind ourselves that, you know, we're talking about an individual who had a very close relationship with the most powerful person in the world.
• 26:13
  [SPEAKER_00]: And he broke that relationship, burned the bridges over this world.
• 26:19
  [SPEAKER_00]: because that principle was not only important to him, but also to a lot of the people at that portion of that manga base.
• 26:26
  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't think I can easily remember a single person of that level of proximity to Biden breaking with Biden over Gaza on the Democratic side.
• 26:36
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I know right.
• 26:37
  [SPEAKER_01]: I can't think of anyone either.
• 26:38
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
• 26:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I think that's noteworthy, that's not to say everything else about Trump, or talk it this way.
• 26:44
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think it's noteworthy for people who are very skeptical about Trump's anti-war sentiments, which I think is totally legit to be skeptical about before this and certainly after.
• 26:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: But to assume that that means that the anti-war sentiments within MAGA itself is as superficial.
• 27:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: That is not my experience, and I think there is a portion, not a majority, but there's a portion of them for which this is so important that they're actually willing to break with Trump on this issue and it's already happened, some very high level, and if this trend then continues and then Trump is completely out of the picture by 2028, or at least he's not on the ticket, he may still have an influence in the party, but nevertheless,
• 27:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: I can see a scenario in which that anti-war sentiment becomes much, much, much more prominent.
• 27:35
  [SPEAKER_00]: Because I think it exists in other parts of America as well in a very strong way, but not strong enough to Trump.
• 27:42
  [SPEAKER_00]: They're allegiance to Trump.
• 27:44
  [SPEAKER_00]: but once Trump is out of the picture, then it may actually be able to come forward in a stronger way.
• 27:50
  [SPEAKER_00]: And that I think is gonna create a problem for the Democrats.
• 27:53
  [SPEAKER_00]: If the Democrats are defined by Chuck Schumer and Jeffries in the House.
• 28:00
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, no, I think that's right.
• 28:02
  [SPEAKER_01]: And I think the interesting figure in this is, I think, JDVans, who clearly is aware that the Tucker Carlson wing is powerful.
• 28:11
  [SPEAKER_01]: And I think in a lot of JDVans' rhetoric, seems to be trying to square the circle of the loyal to Trump, be the vice president and serving Trump, and then, but also, you know, indicating that he has some allegiance or some belief in the sort of anti-war critique.
• 28:29
  [SPEAKER_01]: of American foreign policy more broadly.
• 28:31
  [SPEAKER_01]: So I think, because Trump has been so pro-war, people tend to discount the anti-war part of Maga, but I think like Bance's rhetoric and the popularity of figures like Tucker Carlton should warn us against that mistake.
• 28:45
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah and I think also to me something that was very interesting was to see when the second round started and I think you know it's very clear that Vance was against this war and Trump has even said it himself but perhaps he thought that that was an insult or a way of hurting Vance so far I think it's worked the other way around.
• 29:05
  [SPEAKER_00]: But after that he went on Rogan
• 29:08
  [SPEAKER_00]: And if you listen carefully to that conversation, the portion of it that deals with the war, he doesn't, in any way, shape a form reject that he was against his war, he embraces it.
• 29:18
  [SPEAKER_00]: But he kind of phrases his own position of saying, look, my job was to make sure
• 29:23
  [SPEAKER_00]: that whatever the president decided, I helped make sure that it's successful.
• 29:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: And then he talked a lot about diplomacy and then he went on very aggressively rejecting the war and saying those were advocating for it, don't have a plan.
• 29:36
  [SPEAKER_00]: They just think that it's just going to go on forever, et cetera, et cetera.
• 29:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: When he took the utility of that conversation, the amount of distance that he put between himself,
• 29:45
  [SPEAKER_00]: and Trump.
• 29:47
  [SPEAKER_00]: Is the largest distance I have seen between a vice president in the second year of an administration vis-a-vis his or her president?
• 29:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: Certainly way beyond what we ever saw between Kamala Harris and Biden.
• 30:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I think again, that is a reflection of the fact that Vance recognizes the potency of the anti-war sentiments in Maca, within what he is based within Maca.
• 30:16
  [SPEAKER_00]: And as a result, it was important for him to make sure that he
• 30:22
  [SPEAKER_00]: had as much distance as possible without having an open rebellion from the policy without necessarily making it very far away from Trump, of course, but never does from the policy, which again, I think is very fascinating.
• 30:34
  [SPEAKER_00]: It's not something we usually see from a vice president.
• 30:37
  [SPEAKER_01]: No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no
• 31:08
  [SPEAKER_01]: the military bases that were destroyed in the Middle East and how that led to the problems on the U.S. has Lincoln.
• 31:15
  [SPEAKER_01]: The other aspect which you mentioned a couple of times is China where like the Trump administration like previous administrations you know have the sort of strategy of we're going to pivot away for the Middle East so that we can concentrate on China.
• 31:30
  [SPEAKER_01]: And now they're actually like the U.S. is very dependent on China since it's Chinese desire to of global stability that is like keeping oil prices low.
• 31:40
  [SPEAKER_01]: And America's ability to project any sort of power in Asia, I think, has been much diminished.
• 31:46
  [SPEAKER_01]: So what's your sense of like, you know, I mean, the sort of like, I wanted to call this sort of larger strategic disaster that this war has meant.
• 31:55
  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't think there's any doubt that it has been a huge massive strategic disaster.
• 32:00
  [SPEAKER_00]: It will have implications for the US's global position undoubtedly the American security umbrella in the Middle East is completely collapsed, but in its collapse severe questions have now also been raised about its security umbrella elsewhere.
• 32:19
  [SPEAKER_00]: If it cannot open up the state of Hormuz militarily, how is the United States going to
• 32:26
  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, these are serious questions that, in particular, when you see that the U.S. is ability to sustain a war from more than 40 days without facing massive depletions of air defense systems.
• 32:39
  [SPEAKER_00]: And this is against Iran.
• 32:40
  [SPEAKER_00]: And Iran's missiles, etc., are far more impressive than people thought, mainly because they looked at or they watched mainstream media that kept on repeating completely obvious lies coming both from the Israeli and U.S. government.
• 32:52
  [SPEAKER_00]: Anyone who scratched the surface would actually have been able to see that there was a lot more than the FBI.
• 32:57
  [SPEAKER_00]: But that is still not anything compared to what the Chinese capabilities are.
• 33:02
  [SPEAKER_00]: So this raises a lot of questions.
• 33:04
  [SPEAKER_00]: I wrote something on my sub-sect that got way more attention than I expected, which was that in a lot of conversation I've had with global leaders from a whole set of different countries, most of them, frankly, in the US cap, I have just been stunned by how many of them quietly were rooting for Yvonne in this war.
• 33:24
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, yeah, yeah.
• 33:26
  [SPEAKER_01]: I'll link to that sub-stack essay, because I think that's actually a very sort of important point that, you know, I mean, they're really in regime, like as you know, I know and have discussed, you know, has a lot of problems internally and certainly like in the Middle East has created a lot of enemies, but there's, you know, like what America has been doing, the way the U.S. has acted as a destabilizing force in the world.
• 33:51
  [SPEAKER_01]: I think has like
• 33:56
  [SPEAKER_00]: I'm not even talked about, we're very, very far from understanding what has happened here.
• 34:00
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I do point out in the piece that I've not come across anyone at all that express sympathy or support for the Iranian government.
• 34:09
  [SPEAKER_00]: But rather,
• 34:11
  [SPEAKER_00]: because of the fact that a perception was created that had Trump in successful in Iran.
• 34:20
  [SPEAKER_00]: He would by now have invaded Cuba and potentially take in Greenland, that he was on some form of a neoclonial spree.
• 34:31
  [SPEAKER_00]: very much as a result of a remarkable and surprising success in Venezuela that went much better than expected.
• 34:40
  [SPEAKER_00]: It gave him some sort of a turbo juice to his boost to his confidence and he thought he's going to take you on in four days.
• 34:47
  [SPEAKER_00]: And if he had, he would have gone on to somewhere else.
• 34:51
  [SPEAKER_00]: And for countries who are close to the US, but now feel completely unprotected against the US.
• 34:57
  [SPEAKER_00]: The question is not which government you like, it's not which ideology you favor or which governing structure you think is the best, it's about where is the most acute threat coming from.
• 35:08
  [SPEAKER_00]: And the answer to that question for a lot of these American allies is the United States.
• 35:14
  [SPEAKER_00]: And as a result, if the US gets stuck in the Persian Gulf because the Iranians were far more effective in resisting than anyone thought it actually ends up satisfying a lot of these different countries who have less to worry about.
• 35:27
  [SPEAKER_00]: of a threat coming from the U.S. as long as that it's the case.
• 35:30
  [SPEAKER_00]: And this is one of those things, right?
• 35:32
  [SPEAKER_00]: At least I did not expect to see.
• 35:35
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, no, I think the way that I might play itself out in the future is the sort of middle power move away from the U.S. People like Mark Carney have indicated, but I want to see it both with Chair of Canada, the U.S., some of America's allies in Asia, and in the Middle East, like the way of increasing willingness to sort of hedge your bets or not find some other pathway
• 36:03
  [SPEAKER_01]: perhaps a pessimistic kind of take on this in terms of American power, but is there maybe I'm more optimistic we have looked at it like maybe it's actually good, a lot of these countries like start thinking about like their own foreign policy in a multi-polar world.
• 36:18
  [SPEAKER_00]: I think more than anything else, it's inevitable, I think multi-polarity, here I would agree with surprisingly in Marco Rubio who says that the unipolarity was an aberration.
• 36:28
  [SPEAKER_00]: Yes, and then we're going to move towards some variation of multi-polarity, and it's unavoidable.
• 36:34
  [SPEAKER_00]: The question is, how do we adjust to it?
• 36:37
  [SPEAKER_00]: And I think there would have been much better ways to adjust to it than the one we're seeing right now.
• 36:41
  [SPEAKER_00]: The manner in which the US is conducting itself is speeding up that process, but also making that process
• 36:48
  [SPEAKER_00]: So the capacity, the ability to manage this very, very important to systemic shift is now really compromised because of the recklessness.
• 36:58
  [SPEAKER_00]: And that ultimately not only undermines global stability, but really undermising our state.
• 37:04
  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I know I absolutely.
• 37:05
  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, it is one of the paradoxes of the Trump era that Trump was responding to real changes in the world that the mainstream establishment wasn't about America's changing position and the changing nature of the world.
• 37:17
  [SPEAKER_01]: But unfortunately, he's responded to it.
• 37:20
  [SPEAKER_01]: It may be the stupidest possible way.
• 37:22
  [SPEAKER_01]: Which is like that one won't want it, but in any case, what's the good?
• 37:27
  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm very grateful for having to be a part of the year.
• 37:30
  [SPEAKER_01]: I will link to that I say that he mentioned it.
• 37:32
  [SPEAKER_01]: I would encourage everyone to go to that as he had also subscribed to his sub-stack route.
• 37:37
  [SPEAKER_01]: They will get some of the most informed discussions of foreign policy available.
• 37:42
  [SPEAKER_01]: So thank you.
• 37:43
  [SPEAKER_00]: Thank you so much, really appreciate it.
• 37:45
  [SPEAKER_00]: Thank you.