Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / Being Right Too Early Killed Tiger Management
Transcript
- 0:00March 30th, 2000. I want you to just picture the
- 0:02scene for a second. We're in New York City.
- 0:05It's the absolute fever pitchofthe.com bubble.
- 0:09Total mania. Total mania.
- 0:11The NASDAQ is sitting at around 4457.
- 0:16You've got taxi drivers giving stock tips to, you know, hedge
- 0:20fund managers. Companies with 0 revenue are
- 0:23worth billions. Just because they have a.com at
- 0:25the end of their name. Yeah, it was a time of, well,
- 0:28what Alan Greenspan famously called irrational exuberance.
- 0:31Right. It felt like a party that was
- 0:33never going to end. And on that day, right in the
- 0:36middle of all this, a litter goes out.
- 0:37It's from Julian Robertson, the founder of Tiger Management.
- 0:40And Tiger wasn't just a fund. At its peak, he was arguably the
- 0:43fund the biggest hedge fund on the planet.
- 0:46And in this letter, he's basically throwing in the towel.
- 0:48He announces he's closing the fund, returning all the money to
- 0:51his investors. You could argue it's, I mean,
- 0:53it's the most tragic piece of timing in financial history.
- 0:56It's almost Shakespearean. And that's the real hook for our
- 0:58deep dive today, isn't it? The irony is just it's crushing.
- 1:02Tiger closes its doors on March 30th.
- 1:04And then what happens? Less than a month later, the
- 1:07whole thing implodes. The tech bubble bursts.
- 1:10Within a year, the NASDAQ is down 75%.
- 1:14All those companies Robertson hated.
- 1:16The mouse click companies. Gone to zero.
- 1:19He was 100% right about the market.
- 1:21Analytically, he was perfect. His view of the world was spot
- 1:26on. And yet he failed spectacularly.
- 1:30So that's what we're untacking. We've got a stack of analysis
- 1:32here covering the rise and fall of Tiger.
- 1:35We're going to look at how a legend, a guy who turned $8
- 1:37million into over 20 billion, ended up, as one of our sources
- 1:41puts it, falling before dawn. And our mission here is really
- 1:45specific. This isn't just about a list of
- 1:46bad stock picks. That's, you know, it's too
- 1:48simple. We need to get into the
- 1:49structural traps, right? We're talking about how things
- 1:52like the sheer size of your fund leverage and investor
- 1:56psychology, how those things can kill you even when your math is
- 1:59completely correct. It's the battle between solvency
- 2:02and rationality. I love that frame.
- 2:04So, OK, let's start at the beginning, just to set the
- 2:06stakes. Before all this, Julian
- 2:08Robertson was a Titan. Oh, absolutely.
- 2:11We're not talking about some flash in the pan.
- 2:13He started Tiger back in 1980 and he was actually 48 when he
- 2:17launched it. Which is pretty late in life for
- 2:19a Wall Street hotshot. It is, and he started with just
- 2:22$8 million. Which today in New York is what
- 2:26a nice apartment. It's basically nothing in Wall
- 2:28Street. Church.
- 2:28Exactly. But over the next 18 years, the
- 2:31growth was just off the charts. He took that 8 million and grew
- 2:35the firm's assets to $23 billion.
- 2:39Wait, say that again, 8 million to 23 billion.
- 2:42That's a 2500 fold increase. That's.
- 2:44It's hard to even wrap your head around that.
- 2:46And the performance backs it up. After fees and hedge fund fees
- 2:50are high, he averaged an annualized return of 31.7%.
- 2:54OK, so let's put 31.7% into context.
- 2:57Everyone knows the big names, right?
- 2:58Warren Buffett? George Soros How did Tiger stack
- 3:01up? Well, during that same era, the
- 3:0380s and 90s, Soros's Quantum Fund was doing around 30%.
- 3:07Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway was closer to 20.
- 3:09So he wasn't just in the same league for almost 2 decades, he
- 3:12was beating them. He was outpacing them.
- 3:14They called him the Wizard of Wall Street, and it wasn't
- 3:17hyperbole. So what was the secret sauce?
- 3:19What was the system? You don't beat Buffett by just
- 3:22getting lucky. No.
- 3:23It was a very disciplined strategy, the classic long short
- 3:26model, but he did it on a massive scale.
- 3:28The philosophy was simple. Go on.
- 3:31Our job, he would say, is to find the 200 best companies in
- 3:34the world. Great management, great
- 3:36products, fair price and you buy them, you go long.
- 3:39OK, so far so good. Buy good stuff.
- 3:43But then here's the other half of the equation.
- 3:45At the same time you find the 200 worst companies, terrible
- 3:49balance sheets, bad management, way overvalued.
- 3:52And you bet against them. You go short.
- 3:54Exactly. The logic is if the market goes
- 3:57up, your good stock should outperform.
- 4:00If the market crashes, your bad stock should fall even harder.
- 4:03You're trying to make money on the spread.
- 4:05So you're hedged, you're trying to take the overall market
- 4:08direction out of the equation and just bet on your stock
- 4:11picking skill. Precisely.
- 4:12But, and this is the absolute key to the whole story, this
- 4:16strategy relies 100% on fundamental value.
- 4:19On things you can measure. Tangible things, earnings, cash
- 4:22flow, PE ratios. You have to be able to look at a
- 4:25company and say this is objectively worth more or less
- 4:29than its stock price, which works.
- 4:31Great, until the world decides that earnings don't matter
- 4:33anymore. Enter the mid 90's, the paradigm
- 4:36shift. Suddenly the market stops caring
- 4:38about any of that. It's all about eyeballs, clicks,
- 4:42growth at any cost. And you have Robertson, this old
- 4:45school fundamentalist, just looking at his spreadsheets in
- 4:49disbelief. We have a note here that he was
- 4:52openly mocking the idea of valuing companies on mouse
- 4:56clicks. He saw it for what it was, a
- 4:58bubble, a Ponzi scheme. He was a value investor to his
- 5:02core, so he did what his strategy demanded.
- 5:05He leaned in hard on the short side bettingagainstthese.com
- 5:09stocks. And at the same time, he's
- 5:10buying up all the old economy stuff, right?
- 5:12The boring companies that actually made money.
- 5:14Exactly. Manufacturing, airlines, banks,
- 5:17companies that were trading at historic lows because everyone
- 5:19was dumping them to buy the latest tech IPO.
- 5:22In a rational world, it was the perfect trade.
- 5:25But the world wasn't rational. No.
- 5:27And that brings us to the first huge problem, timing.
- 5:32The bubble really started inflating around 1995.
- 5:35It didn't pop until 2000. That's five years.
- 5:38And eternity in finance. It is, and we should probably
- 5:41clarify for people how dangerous shorting is.
- 5:44When you buy a stock, the most you can lose is what you put in.
- 5:48Right, your downside is capped at 100.
- 5:50Percent. But when you short a stock, you
- 5:51borrowing it and selling it. If it goes up, you have to buy
- 5:54it back at a higher price and since the stock can in theory go
- 5:58up forever. Your losses are theoretically
- 6:00infinite. And while you're waiting for it
- 6:01to fall, you're paying interest. It's a bleeding process.
- 6:05Every single day that pets.com doubled, Tiger was hemorrhaging
- 6:08cash, getting margin calls. So he's getting crushed on the
- 6:11shorts, but what about the longs?
- 6:13The good value stocks he bought, Weren't they helping?
- 6:16Not really. They were flatlining or even
- 6:18dropping because nobody wanted U.S.
- 6:19Airways when they could buy Yahoo.
- 6:21So he was losing on both sides. The shorts were going up and the
- 6:24longs were going down. The double whammy.
- 6:27But this is where the story gets really fascinating.
- 6:29It wasn't just the bad trades. The fund itself, Its success had
- 6:34become a problem. Let's talk about the trap of
- 6:37size. This is such a critical point.
- 6:40Remember, he's managing $23 billion.
- 6:43Now. When you're managing 8 million,
- 6:45you can be nimble. You can buy a small company,
- 6:47sell it. A week later, nobody even
- 6:49notices. But with 23 billion.
- 6:51You're an elephant. You are subject to the law of
- 6:54gravity and asset management. To get any kind of decent
- 6:57return, you have to make massive bets.
- 6:59You have to buy huge chunks of entire companies.
- 7:02And the US Airways example is just textbook for this.
- 7:05It's perfect. So in 1999, Tiger owns nearly
- 7:0825% of all the shares of U.S. Airways, 1/4 of the entire
- 7:12company. Robertson thought it was a
- 7:13bargain. And maybe it was analytically,
- 7:16but the stock tanked. It did.
- 7:17And here's the trap. When you own 25% of a company,
- 7:20you are the market for that stock.
- 7:22You can't sell. If Tiger had tried to dump their
- 7:25shares, the price would have collapsed to 0 before they got
- 7:27out. It's like trying to get an
- 7:29aircraft carrier to do AU turn in a canal.
- 7:31You're just stuck. They were trapped.
- 7:33Size kills flexibility. They were married to that stock,
- 7:37for better or for worse, and in that case it was definitely for
- 7:40worse. OK, so you've got the bubble
- 7:42bleeding them on one side and the size trap immobilizing them
- 7:46on the other. But it wasn't just tech stocks,
- 7:48right? There was another big misstep.
- 7:50No, and this is important context.
- 7:52It shows how everything went wrong at once.
- 7:55Robertson also made big macro bets on currencies.
- 7:58In 1998, he made a huge bet that the Japanese yen would fall
- 8:03against the dollar. Which seemed like a reasonable
- 8:05bet at the time. It was, but the market did the
- 8:08exact opposite. The yen surged.
- 8:10That one trade cost them something like $2 billion right
- 8:14before the tech squeeze got really, really tight.
- 8:16So the armor was already cracked before the final battle even
- 8:19started. Which brings us to the death
- 8:21blow, the thing that really kills a fund.
- 8:23It isn't just the losses, it's the investors.
- 8:26The death spiral of redemptions. That's it.
- 8:29You have to remember he's managing other people's money
- 8:32and other people you know, they panic.
- 8:34They don't have a 20 year time frame, they have a one month
- 8:36time frame. I'm looking at the numbers
- 8:38between late 98 and late 99. Investors pulled out $7 billion.
- 8:447 billion and you need to understand what that forces a
- 8:47fund manager to do. To give people their cash back.
- 8:51You have to sell your assets. But his assets are the things
- 8:54he's trapped in, like U.S. Airways or the shorts that are
- 8:57killing him. Exactly.
- 8:58So to pay the people leaving, he's forced to sell his cheap
- 9:01value stocks right at the bottom, locking in the loss.
- 9:05And even worse, he has to cover shorts.
- 9:08He has to buy back those insanely expensive tech stocks
- 9:11at the absolute peak. That's just brutal.
- 9:13It's a feedback loop. Bad performance leads to
- 9:16withdrawal. Which forces you to sell at bad
- 9:18prices, which creates worse performance.
- 9:20Which leads to more withdrawals. It's a run on the bank.
- 9:22It is by the end it was investor psychology that was the real
- 9:25killer. They lost faith.
- 9:27They saw their friends getting rich on tech stocks while Tiger
- 9:30was losing money and they just wanted out.
- 9:32And he tried to stop the bleeding, didn't he?
- 9:34I saw a note. He tried to change the
- 9:35redemption rules. He did.
- 9:38He tried to change it so investors could only pull money
- 9:40out every six months instead of monthly, just to give him some
- 9:44breathing room. But it was too little, too late.
- 9:46The confidence was already gone. So that brings us to March 2000.
- 9:50Assets are down from 23 billion to just 6 1/2 billion, and most
- 9:55of that isn't from trading losses.
- 9:58It's just people taking their money home.
- 9:59And that's when he writes the letter.
- 10:01He says, and I'm paraphrasing, we can't risk people's money in
- 10:04a market we don't understand. He basically said that rational
- 10:07investing was dead. It sounds like a resignation
- 10:10from the modern world. Like you guys are all crazy.
- 10:12I'm out. It was, and the vindication, as
- 10:16we said, was almost instant. Days later, the bubble pops.
- 10:20If he'd been able to hold on for just a few more months, he would
- 10:22have looked like a genius. He would have made billions on
- 10:24the way down. But the structure, the size, the
- 10:27outside capital, it forced him to fold his hand right before
- 10:31the river card came and gave him the win.
- 10:33It's the ultimate lesson that being right and making money are
- 10:37two very different things. You can be right on the
- 10:39analysis, but if your structure can't handle the volatility, you
- 10:42still lose. Now, you'd think that would be
- 10:44the end, but Julian Robertson didn't just fade away.
- 10:47Did. He not at all.
- 10:48And this is the part of the story that proves his mind was
- 10:50still sharp after he closed the fund to outsiders.
- 10:54He kept his own money, about 1 1/2 billion, and just kept
- 10:57trading. So now there's no panicking
- 10:59investors, no $23 billion anchor, just him and his
- 11:03strategy. And how'd that go?
- 11:05He crushed it. He was totally vindicated.
- 11:07From 2000 to 2008, his personal returns were 403.7%. 400%,
- 11:14that's unbelievable. And get this, 2008, another huge
- 11:18crisis. He correctly predicted the
- 11:21subprime mortgage collapse, used credit default swaps, you know,
- 11:25like the guys in the Big Short and made 76.7% that.
- 11:28Year when everyone else was getting wiped out.
- 11:30That's proves it. The collapse in 2000 was a
- 11:32structural failure, not an intellectual 1.
- 11:35When it was his own money with his own time frame, he was still
- 11:37one of the best in the world. And then there's his other
- 11:39legacy at the Tiger Cubs. Right.
- 11:41He was an incredible mentor. He hired these brilliant young
- 11:44analysts and when Tiger closed, they went off and started their
- 11:47own funds. And these are some big names.
- 11:49Huge Chase Coleman of Tiger Global Andreas Halverson, Viking
- 11:53Global, Stephen Mandel at Lone Pine.
- 11:57By 2008, something like 36 of his former employees were
- 12:00managing over $100 billion combined.
- 12:03So the DNA of tiger management basically took over the next
- 12:07generation of Wall Street. It really did.
- 12:09He created this whole lineage of investors.
- 12:11He taught them how to hunt. OK, so let's synthesize this for
- 12:14the listener. We've got this epic rise, a
- 12:15tragic fall, and then this quiet, successful rebirth.
- 12:19What's the big lesson here? I think it comes down to a
- 12:21simple formula. Solvency is greater than
- 12:24rationality. Solvency is greater than
- 12:26rationality. Break that down.
- 12:27You can have the perfect model, you can see the bubble for what
- 12:30it is, but the market can stay irrational longer than you can
- 12:33stay solvent. Robertson proved value investing
- 12:36works, but over a very, very long time frame.
- 12:40The medium run those five years of the bubble is long enough to
- 12:43wipe you out. You have to survive long enough
- 12:45to be proven right. Exactly.
- 12:46It's all about survival. He failed to survive that period
- 12:49of irrationality because of the traps of size and client
- 12:53psychology. It's a humbling lesson.
- 12:55You can be the smartest person in the room, but if the room is
- 12:58on fire and the door is locked, your IQ isn't going to help you.
- 13:01That's a great way to put it. Investing isn't just numbers.
- 13:04It's about behavior. It's about psychology.
- 13:07So here's a a lot to leave you with, whether you're managing
- 13:09billions or just your own retirement account, in your
- 13:13investments in your career, are you focused only on being right,
- 13:18or are you focused on having the staying power to survive until
- 13:21you are proven right? Because, as Julian Roberts
- 13:24improved, being right too early is the same as being wrong.
- 13:28And that's a very expensive lesson to learn.
- 13:30Thanks for diving in with us. We'll see on the next one.