Latest / The Fourcast / Who is winning the war in the Middle East?

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Who is winning the war in the Middle East? · The Fourcast

0:00
At the end of it, we may well have the three main
0:02
protagonists, the US, Israel and Iran, each claiming victory even
0:06
as each will be strategically worse off.
0:09
There's no going back to the 27th of February where oil,
0:14
aviation, all this was flowing nicely.
0:17
If the US wanted to have any exit strategy for this or a
0:20
diplomatic solution, they wouldn't be killing everybody
0:23
possible who can sit and talk to them.
0:25
Iran has taken huge, huge losses.
0:29
The question is, is Iran still maintaining leverage?
0:34
On day 18, who do you think is winning and who is losing?
0:41
Welcome to the forecast. I'm Matt Fry in Jerusalem today.
0:45
You probably won't be able to see the old city of Jerusalem
0:47
behind me, but that is prime real estate for the world's
0:50
three great monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity
0:54
and Islam. And yesterday, one of the
0:56
Rockets, one of the Iranian rockets shot down by the
0:59
Israelis, landed perilously close to the AL Aqsa Mosque.
1:03
So we're in the thick of it. We might get some alarms in the
1:07
next hour or so that compete with the sound of bells and the
1:10
Muradzin. So it's an interesting
1:13
neighborhood, to put it mildly. And it's been a big day for news
1:15
because we heard this morning from the Israeli side that Ali
1:19
Larijani, one of the perhaps the de facto leader of Iran at the
1:23
moment, one of the key figures historically in Iran who's had a
1:28
number of key jobs, has been killed by an Israeli air strike.
1:31
This has been confirmed by the Israelis, but not yet by the
1:34
Iranians. In other news, the head of the
1:37
besiege militia, when I say militia, what I really mean is a
1:40
kind of million man thug army largely responsible for
1:44
suppressing domestic unrest and the protests that we saw in
1:47
January. This man, Golem Reza Soleimani,
1:50
has also been killed by the Israelis.
1:53
That has been confirmed by the Iranian regime.
1:56
So a lot of stuff going on, the usual air strikes.
1:59
Of course, the Israelis again doing that, but also launching
2:03
their attacks, massive attacks on southern Lebanon to take out
2:06
Hezbollah. So to try and get a sense on day
2:08
18 of who is actually winning this war so far, I know it's
2:12
early days, but that is the key question for our podcast today.
2:17
I've got 2 guests here to discuss this.
2:19
One is Emil Hokkayam, he's director of regional security at
2:23
the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
2:25
He's in London today for us. And Mohanad Saloum, he's the
2:29
assistant professor of international politics and
2:31
security at the Doha Graduate Institute in Doha, where he is
2:36
fast today. Welcome to both gentlemen.
2:38
It's a big day. Let's start then with this
2:41
rather tricky question because the different players in this
2:43
war are defining victory in different ways, almost on a kind
2:48
of day by day basis. So first to you Emil, on day 18,
2:53
who do you think is winning and who is losing?
2:57
Very tricky question. I, I don't think anyone is
3:01
clearly winning at at this point.
3:05
The, the danger is to go just by the metrics and the metrics
3:08
would tell you that the US and Israel are accomplishing, you
3:13
know, a massive military victory, which which would be
3:18
true. The question is who's building
3:19
leverage over time. And I think that the Iranians
3:23
are look, the the way this war is playing out is leads us to an
3:28
exquisite irony in away At the end of it, we may well have the
3:33
three main protagonists, the US, Israel and Iran, each claiming
3:36
victory even as each will be strategically worse off.
3:42
And this is the nature of asymmetric conflict that that we
3:49
see. The Iranians have an advent,
3:51
have several advantages. They want this war to last as
3:54
long as possible. They have the advantage of
3:56
geography and they have high pain tolerance.
4:01
The Americans, there are high expectations about what they can
4:04
do in terms of maritime traffic, about the the the post conflict
4:09
situation. The Israelis essentially they
4:13
don't care. What they want is to degrade
4:16
Irans military power and then they're not interested in what
4:22
comes next as long as Iran can no longer project power.
4:26
So we're judging them by very different standards.
4:29
And, and I would argue that Iran is not doing badly.
4:33
Iran has figured out how to align means and ends.
4:37
And while the numbers are not looking good for the Iranians,
4:42
they have developed leverage, significant leverage because of
4:46
their ability to disrupt Hormuz. They've they've imposed a new
4:49
status quo. There's no going back to the
4:52
27th of February where where, you know, oil, uh, aviation, all
5:00
this was flowing nicely. Okay, so that's quite a
5:03
complicated picture you've painted there.
5:05
But essentially what I hate you saying is that the Iranians have
5:08
scored a kind of victory by just, you know, clinging on and
5:12
still being in charge of something, although we're not
5:14
quite sure who exactly is in charge and what they're in
5:17
charge of. There was a report, by the way,
5:19
today as well that Mustafa Khamenei, who took over from his
5:23
father, may be treated for his injuries in Moscow.
5:26
This is something the Russian Foreign Ministry has denied, but
5:29
suffice it to say that we haven't seen him or heard from
5:32
him in recent days since he was appointed.
5:35
Mohanna, do you agree with that assessment by Emil, or do you
5:38
think actually it's been more of a victory for Israel and the
5:41
United States? Well, I think it's more of a
5:44
victory for the for Israel and the United States, but maybe we
5:47
have to go a little bit deeper. I agree with Emil that numbers
5:52
look good for the US and for Israel, but they are, you know,
5:56
they cannot be translated on the grounds.
5:59
So the US has started off with saying that we want regime
6:02
change. We want the whole Ayatollah, you
6:06
know, mullahs, you know, regime to be changed.
6:09
And this, this is, this cannot be changed from the by planes
6:14
and you know, from the air. But at the same time, the
6:17
metrics, you know, I will come to Hormuz maybe at the end.
6:19
But if we look at what happened since the 28th of February,
6:23
almost the whole, you know, the whole leadership have been
6:27
decimated, have been assassinated.
6:30
And it, you know, the, the process is going on, the
6:32
campaign, the military campaign is not finished yet.
6:35
If we want to have a comparative, if we want to have
6:38
a comparative case, let's look at Iraq in 1991 and Iraq in
6:43
2003. The US took between 4:00 and
6:46
6:00 week weeks to attack Iraq. But then even Iraq, that which
6:51
was eventually invaded, not many of its leadership was
6:56
assassinated. And because, you know, they had
6:59
cohesion insider, they had good security, relatively good
7:02
security services that protected its leadership.
7:05
While Iran last June, we have seen that, you know, many of its
7:08
leader leaders, even though they were not the first in line, they
7:12
were the second line. They were assassinated.
7:14
And this time around the the first day, the US and Israel
7:18
assassinated 39 of the leadership, including the
7:23
Ayatollah Khamenei. And now the Sun is injured,
7:28
reportedly. So what we're looking at here is
7:30
the US being able to degrade what Iran has its military
7:35
capabilities, decapitate its leadership and cause a lot of
7:40
disruption because, you know, I would, you know, refer to what
7:44
you said, Matt, that, you know, we don't know who's leading
7:46
Iran. Now.
7:47
We have Iraqi, we have the political side of the, you know,
7:52
of Iran because Iran has two, if you like a dual system where
7:56
there are, you know, there is the president, the ministers,
8:00
etcetera and Minister of Defence, but also they have the
8:03
IRGC which seems to me to be leading, you know, the charge.
8:08
Then I agree also again with Emil that, you know, the the
8:12
Hermes trade is an issue, but how long Iran can hold that
8:18
against the US ongoing campaign And you know, they have this in
8:24
the plans. Let's not forget that Israel,
8:27
both Israel and the United States have been planning this
8:30
for decades. Not for years, for decades.
8:33
They knew that this day would come and they would confront
8:36
Iran. Equally, Iran had been planning
8:38
this defence for decades as well.
8:41
But to me, Iran does not seem to be doing very well, neither
8:45
militarily nor strategically. And I think Iran, you know, is
8:51
on its back foot at the moment. And you know, we can talk more
8:54
about its proxies in the region, how they are widening this
8:57
conflict and neither there it's not doing very well.
9:01
I want to talk about the Straits of Hormuz, which we are talking
9:03
about far too much these days, but we have to.
9:05
And we've all become geographers and cartographers, haven't we?
9:09
In a minute. But first of all, Emil, tell us
9:11
a little bit about the two people who were killed today,
9:14
Gholam Reza Soleimani and also Ali Larijani.
9:16
I mean, especially Larijani. He was he was kind of regime
9:21
royalty, wasn't he? He was very well connected and
9:24
he's been a veteran for for many years in lots of different
9:27
roles. Can you tell us about him?
9:28
Yeah, I mean, he's one of the most recognizable figures of of
9:32
the Islamic Republic. He belongs to a family that has
9:36
provided a number of apparatchiks in in, in the
9:39
system. You know, he served as speaker
9:42
of parliament. He has at times challenged other
9:46
leading politicians. He he had some international
9:50
experience, you know, he served as as the head of the National
9:54
Security Council, for instance. And, and, and, you know,
9:58
fundamentally he was, you know, someone who who played across
10:05
factions. He was not, you know, a the
10:08
stalwart of the most hardline faction.
10:15
I mean, I'm not trying to suggest that he was a total
10:17
moderate on and reformist. He was not.
10:21
The point is that someone like Larijani would have been someone
10:25
that had enough credibility inside to sell a diplomatic
10:29
solution and had enough experience to deal with with
10:32
outside actors. And one of the the downsides of
10:34
the current strategy is that if at one point we want to get to a
10:40
resolution, who do we talk to in Iran?
10:43
You know who who has enough credibility inside the system?
10:46
As for the other, you know, the message force is, is a, is a
10:49
strong paramilitary force that is associated with the
10:52
Revolutionary Guard. They are, as you said, the Subs
10:55
that that, you know, enforce the will and the ideology the of, of
11:02
the Islamic Republic on, on on Iranian citizens.
11:05
They're the muscles who control checkpoints and and can storm
11:11
schools and, you know, commit some of the, you know, large
11:14
scale exactions, atrocities that we saw in in in January.
11:19
They are fundamental for the coercive control, the controlled
11:24
by coercion of the Islamic Republic and they provide
11:28
manpower to the IRGC when needed.
11:32
So these are significant hits. And I want to be clear that, you
11:35
know, Iran has taken huge, huge losses in the past 2, two plus
11:42
weeks. The question is, is Iran still
11:46
maintaining leverage? Has Iran figure out the center
11:49
of gravity of that effort? And I would argue that by
11:53
imposing a new status quo in the Strait of Hormuz, it has you can
11:57
decapitate, you can take out, you know, as many people as you
12:01
want. You don't need to hold the
12:03
straits. You need to pose a credible risk
12:07
to navigation and make it more complicated for the other side
12:11
to operate in it. And so, you know, the, the, the,
12:14
the operation for the moment, yes, it's been years and decades
12:18
in the planning, but it has failed to address a central
12:22
issue, which is, you know, free flow of trade and energy that
12:27
has a, that has global implications.
12:29
And I don't think the Americans or the Israelis for that matter,
12:32
are ready to turn the tide on that.
12:34
It's it's going to take much, much longer than than the world
12:38
economy and certainly regional economies can take.
12:41
Mohanad. I mean, are you surprised by the
12:43
fact that the Iranians, for now, these have been able to kind of
12:46
have a chokehold on the world economy through the Straits of
12:49
Hormuz? I mean, if Emil is right and
12:51
they've been planning this for years, if not decades, this is
12:54
kind of one of the obvious points that people, you know,
12:57
have been pointing to. And I mean, I'm, I remember
12:59
hearing about the Straits of Hormuz and this possibility
13:01
decades ago when I was a very young journalist.
13:04
And here we have this nightmare scenario unfolding.
13:07
What what happened? What went wrong?
13:09
Well, nothing went wrong. I think the US by design and
13:12
Israel, they knew that this would happen.
13:15
And this is part of the pain. They seem to me that they're
13:17
willing to take this. You know, Emil mentioned the
13:21
diplomatic or the, the diplomatic exit strategy, the US
13:25
strategy, an Israeli strategy does not seem to me that, you
13:29
know, by design it doesn't have any kind of exit strategy.
13:32
What they want is the end of the regime and it seems it's going
13:36
in that direction. You know, you wouldn't like if
13:39
you want, if the US wanted to have any exit strategy for this
13:43
or a diplomatic solution, they wouldn't be killing everybody
13:47
possible who can sit and talk to them, including Larijani.
13:50
So what they're doing, basically they're progressing with this,
13:53
saying that, you know, the center of our attention is not
13:57
Hormuz, despite the fact that it is very important.
14:00
And they will try to do something to minimize some
14:02
things to minimize the effect of the the negative effects of
14:07
state of Hormuz or Strait of Hormuz on the international
14:10
economy. But to me, it doesn't seem that
14:13
President Trump is caring too much about it.
14:15
He said this very clearly. He said that, you know, the
14:19
Asian countries, European countries, they should come in
14:22
and help with the clearing or, you know, facilitating the the
14:27
flow of international trade through the state of Hormuz.
14:31
But he's not going, he's not willing to do the hard work.
14:34
And he said that very clearly. He said that the US economy is
14:37
not dependent on this trait of Hormuz and we don't import as as
14:42
much oil. So to me, it seems that the US
14:44
is and Israel, they're going in that direction and they want to
14:48
focus on what is happening in Tehran and how they can change
14:52
the regime in ways that would make this regime does not pose
14:58
any danger to its neighbors or to US and Israeli interests.
15:02
Right. But I mean, the president of the
15:04
United States who started this war 18 days ago, and many people
15:08
still think it was a war of choice rather than necessity.
15:12
Although the view here in Israel is rather different on that.
15:14
As you know, many people would say you cannot declare victory
15:17
Donald Trump, even if you really, really want to, if the
15:20
the price of a barrel of oil is over $100 because that wasn't
15:24
part of the plan. And it it means that this
15:27
victory here looks and feels like a defeat to people at the
15:31
gas pump in Pennsylvania. Well, indeed, and So what he I
15:35
think that's why the President, you know, President Trump and
15:38
Israel, they're saying that we will continue this war.
15:42
We're not willing to sit and talk just yet.
15:44
We think that we can achieve more things more if you like
15:48
advances and on the battlefield than by talking to the Iranians.
15:54
They don't think that it is, you know, the time to talk to the
15:57
Iranians or have any kind of diplomatic exists attractive.
16:01
You have a look at for example, they already their money, the
16:04
money government already talked to the US and to Iran and they
16:08
are one of the credible channels, Qataris as well.
16:11
They have back channels with Iran.
16:13
But then Iran itself is not very much interested neither the US.
16:17
So what we're looking at here is that both parties, they're
16:20
locked into this. They're saying that we're not
16:22
there yet. We need to do more in the on the
16:24
battlefield and then we will talk if at all the US does not
16:28
seem to me planning to sit and talk to the Iranians.
16:31
They think they can finalize things on the ground.
16:34
Emil, even if the the remnants of the regime in Tehran managed
16:38
to use the Straits of Hormuz in their geography to their
16:41
advantage, at the end of the day, blocking the straits also
16:45
means that they are able to export less oil to the people
16:48
who've been buying it. I mean, maybe they can do a
16:51
special deal here, but it's not, it's not, you know, a done deal,
16:54
as it were. And also, they're not projecting
16:56
power anymore. The Ring of Fire has been, you
17:00
know, stuffed out. So I just wonder how long, you
17:04
know, the regime that's clinging on at the moment can carry on
17:07
clinging, as it were, especially when so many of its own people
17:11
are probably cheering right now that Ali Larijani and indeed the
17:15
supreme leader are dead. Look, first, I'm in total
17:20
agreement when it comes to Irans power projection in the region.
17:23
I mean, the Irans networks of influence were here to deter and
17:29
punish primarily. Yes, it was about projecting
17:31
influence in a number of countries, but it was about
17:34
deterring the US and Israel and punishing them if need be.
17:38
And at this point, they're unable to do that.
17:41
They're exhausted. The most formidable actor in
17:45
this Galaxy was Hezbollah in Lebanon.
17:47
Yes, it will put a tough fight against, put up a good tough
17:51
fight against Israel in Lebanon. It will bleed the Israelis, but
17:56
it won't change the Israeli calculus or the US calculus for
17:59
that matter. So Iran did take a massive hit
18:02
on its regional power, its credibility, I would say,
18:07
because all this was profoundly mismanaged on the part of Tehran
18:11
since since they won, right? I mean, Iran had built, had had
18:15
sustained that, that security architecture to to deter Israel.
18:19
And then, you know, a pretty small actor within the system,
18:24
Hamas in Gaza starts a a chain reaction that affects the core.
18:29
It was supposed to be the other way around.
18:32
You know, when, when Hezbollah came under attack in, in Lebanon
18:36
in 2024, the Iranians were nowhere to be seen.
18:39
You know, they did not jump into the fight.
18:41
So, so there is a lot of, of, of trouble.
18:43
There is a lot of, of tensions in, in this.
18:46
Now, however, it's different when it comes to I think the
18:49
Islamic Republic and Iran proper.
18:52
Yes, Iran is no longer the regional power that it was, you
18:55
know, a year ago. It's much diminished.
18:58
It's it's poorer, it's losing critical infrastructure.
19:02
But the regime itself is standing.
19:06
It has it has a sense of purpose.
19:08
It's here to to to fight to resist, to survive.
19:12
They can try to change the domestic economy.
19:16
They will struggle to, to get the resources if, if they cannot
19:20
import stuff, more importantly, export, export their oil.
19:24
And so I'm not, I'm not telling you things are going to be nice
19:27
and easy ahead. I, I think Iran is going to go
19:30
through very traumatic times, but for the, for the foreseeable
19:34
future, they can impose a cost on regional economies and on the
19:38
global economy. And, and you know, here's my
19:41
disagreement with Muhammad. I, you know, while the Israelis
19:44
were fine, you know, what happens in the Strait of Hormuz
19:47
is not their issue that, you know, the way they look at Iran
19:50
was at this overwhelming threat and the cost was worth it.
19:53
For the US, it's a very different story. the US is
19:57
risking quite a lot. It's risking its credibility.
19:59
It's, it's risking the global economy.
20:02
It it looks incompetent. In, in, in the eyes of its
20:07
regional partners. If you're in Asian power looking
20:10
from far and you're dependent you, you depend on, on Gulf
20:13
energy, you're wondering what this is about.
20:16
And guess what, you may have to actually talk to the Iranians
20:20
and perhaps bribe them along the way.
20:22
Pay, pay some kind of duty to get some oil out.
20:25
If you are in, in, you know, in East Asia or in South Asia and,
20:30
and need to, to, to fuel your, your economy and get your tanker
20:34
out of the region. So, so I, I think, I think we
20:37
need not, not out of support, but we need to credit the
20:41
Iranians with having achieved strategic effect from their
20:44
perspective. And, and, and this is something
20:48
they, they, you know, for the moment they can, they can use
20:53
as, as currency. It is, it is real leverage on
20:57
the long term. I think that the Iranian system
20:59
is going to struggle to explain to its own population why this
21:04
massive cost was worth taking on, you know, what the prospects
21:09
are for the future and what is the ethos of of that regime
21:13
because it is going to transform.
21:16
That regime is already transforming, I think with, you
21:19
know, the rise of a very different IRGC elite that wants
21:23
to see a very militarized system.
21:25
I mean, Mohan, we really have no idea what Iran will look like at
21:28
the end of this process, Do we? Will it, will it be a sort of a
21:31
smaller, you know, more concentrated, more vicious form
21:35
or shadow of its former self? Could it be civil war?
21:39
You know, will it be some kind of muddling through like in, you
21:42
know, in Libya after Gaddafi, which is a kind of civil war?
21:45
Will it be, you know, could it be a version of, I don't know,
21:49
Sweden in the Middle East? I'm, I'm exaggerating, of
21:51
course, but a, a peaceable, you know, civilized state that, you
21:55
know, that takes up, you know, all the great Persian
21:58
traditions, you know, of culture and this, that and the other
22:01
Persian exceptionalism reinvented for the modern era.
22:04
Do you think that's which one of those scenarios is the most
22:06
likely? I think I will start from there.
22:09
What we're looking at here is an Iran that has been decapitated.
22:13
So which regime we are talking about that would lead, you know,
22:16
whatever is the next stage. So there is no I, there is no
22:21
Khamenei. And the son, you know, we did
22:24
not even hear his voice. The new Ayatollah who is
22:27
supposed to lead the country into the second phase.
22:31
Most of the first line of commanders of the IRGC have been
22:35
assassinated. We're talking also about most of
22:38
the commanders of the armed forces have been assassinated.
22:43
So which Iran we're talking about and which is the strategy
22:45
Iran has? What do you, what do they want
22:47
to do next? I think that's a massive
22:49
question, not for us only, but also for the Iranian people.
22:52
And I'm not talking here in terms of like, you know, trying
22:56
to criticize, like to make Iran look weaker than they are.
23:00
Iran is on its back foot. There is no doubt about that.
23:03
the US has the upper hand when it comes to the military power
23:06
and military power might. And as well as the war is
23:10
ongoing. It's, it's not stopping as we
23:12
talk now that there are probably planes all over Iran attacking
23:17
thousands, hundreds of of targets just like what the US is
23:21
saying. So what we're looking at here is
23:23
Iran that is a transforming into something new.
23:26
Would the regime fall? This is what the US is trying to
23:30
do. I think along with Israel.
23:31
They want to have the people rise, you know, against the
23:35
regime once the regime is weak enough.
23:38
But I think the the bigger question that he posed rightly,
23:42
and I agree with Emil as well and everybody else who's talking
23:44
about this, that we don't know what is what, how Iran would
23:47
look like in say a few months if the regime collapses, if it
23:51
doesn't collapse, how would that look like as well?
23:53
Because if the war stops, what? Why would it stop?
23:57
Would Iran surrender? Or would Iran just, you know, Or
24:01
would the US just declare some kind of victory and withdraw?
24:05
I don't see the US withdrawn without making sure that Iran is
24:09
too weak to attack US interests and US allies and as well as
24:13
Iran giving up on its nuclear system.
24:15
So this is what Iran would look like after the end of the
24:20
campaign. But politically, where would be
24:22
where with where the would the country be heading?
24:26
I think that's the $1 billion question.
24:29
But let's dwell on that question for a minute, Emil, because, you
24:32
know, on my visits to Iran, I was always struck by this sort
24:34
of duality. On one side, there's the Iranian
24:38
state that's been captured by the Revolutionary Guard and by
24:42
the revolution and itself. And, you know, these are
24:44
entrenched institutions that have been running the place,
24:47
running the economy, running the security apparatus for half a
24:51
century. On the other side, you've got an
24:53
incredibly sophisticated and educated, proud population that,
24:59
you know, asks you to kind of respect.
25:01
Thousands of years of Persian history points to the great
25:04
monuments in places like Kashan and Isfahan.
25:08
And, you know, and these are the people have been many of whom
25:10
have been demonstrating on the streets, many of whom are in
25:13
exile. And they say, leave it up to us.
25:15
We will be able to to do for Iran what Iran deserves.
25:19
So which one of these two Irans will prevail at the end of this
25:23
process? I mean, look, there's no doubt
25:27
that Iran has immense potential human talent, a sophisticated
25:32
economy, you know, resilience like few other societies given
25:38
what they went through and and so on.
25:41
The, the, the question is what is the macro security framework
25:44
for all that? If, if we're talking about in
25:47
Iran, where there is increasing disorder, increasing instability
25:51
and so on, a lot of those, you know, great people that you're
25:55
talking about, Matt may decide to, you know, just go away,
25:59
become refugees. You know, this is the, it's,
26:03
it's not either the, you know, the tough bad guys today winning
26:07
or the good, the good people coming on top.
26:10
You know, the, it's, it's the scenario in the middle where you
26:14
know, it's, it's a, it's, it's quite unstable.
26:16
People don't want to leave. Some people you know invest
26:21
locally, Others you know, call it a day and and try to find
26:24
opportunities elsewhere. You know the regime itself is
26:29
going to be ruthless. The regime is, is protecting
26:32
first and foremost the regime, you know, the, the, the, the,
26:36
the, the nation of Iran is something they, they hope to
26:39
inspire. And if it works, great.
26:42
But but, you know, if, if the regime was really sinking in
26:45
terms of the the interests of the larger population, then
26:49
perhaps it wouldn't have invested, you know, perhaps, you
26:51
know, up to $500 billion directly and indirectly in a
26:55
nuclear program that has never, you know, benefited the rest of
26:58
the country or in in foreign adventures that that don't
27:02
exist, that haven't materialized into any kind of hard security.
27:09
I think that it's very difficult to see any of those two
27:15
scenarios. These are the tough guys
27:17
prevailing totally and being able to restore the Islamic
27:21
Republic the way it was or the great people of Iran essentially
27:27
taking figuring out a smooth transition that allows for the
27:33
full stabilization of the country.
27:35
And just to be clear, there's more at stake here.
27:40
Let me rephrase that. There's a bigger picture there.
27:44
First, you know, there's a lot of Iran's critical
27:47
infrastructure that's being destroyed in the process.
27:50
Who's going to rebuild that with what money?
27:53
You know, how do you how do you, you know, rebuild an economy
27:58
And, and is the US interested in in accompanying that transition?
28:02
This is not, you know, the the old conflict.
28:04
And the second point is, let's keep in mind one thing.
28:08
We're we're focusing a lot on Iran, as we should.
28:11
The two attackers here. the US has a pretty fraught record over
28:16
those years and Israel, which has spent two years, three years
28:22
committing some significant horrors in in Gaza.
28:24
So if you're looking from the other side, it's not as if you
28:27
have those nice liberators coming and and, you know, just
28:31
create paving the way for you. This is this is a pretty fraught
28:36
situation more or politically going forward and.
28:42
Mohannad, a really crucial question for me is especially
28:45
someone who, you know, comes from Germany and kind of
28:48
understood how incredibly important the Marshall Plan was
28:51
for turning, you know, the, the ashes and the rubble of Germany
28:54
after World War 2. Having, you know, taken the
28:57
world to total ruin and tragedy. You know, as a result of a
29:01
dictatorship that the Americans and spend a lot of money and
29:04
time to build Germany into a viable, economically successful,
29:12
functioning democracy because it was in their interests.
29:17
Do you think there's anyone at all in the White House or indeed
29:19
here in Jerusalem who is thinking along those terms?
29:23
You know, whether it's a Marshall Plan or, I don't know,
29:24
the Netanyahu plan or any kind of plan that deals with
29:28
rebuilding Iran after it's been, you know, destroyed to a large
29:33
extent. Because I don't see any such
29:35
plan at the moment for the Gaza Strip when we had been promised
29:39
something like a plan for the Gaza Strip.
29:42
The short answer is no. I don't see anybody in the White
29:45
House or in Israel interested in, I don't think they even
29:51
thought about that, what they would do in the next day.
29:55
But I think, you know, we, to answer your question, the
29:58
general one, who is going to prevail in, in, in Iran?
30:01
Is it the radical side of the, you know, of the equation or is
30:06
it the people, the great people of Iran?
30:08
I think the great people of Iran would prevail and they would
30:11
lead their country into the future.
30:13
And the reason why I say this, you know, I lived in Iraq where
30:17
next door to Iraq. So with what means basically the
30:22
what I see is now a regime that has lost military wise, but also
30:28
they have lost what I call the legitimacy narrative.
30:31
You know, in the past, this regime has been promising its
30:35
own people that they would own or they would build their own
30:38
nuclear capabilities. They will impose their strategic
30:42
influence in their neighborhood and export the so-called
30:46
revolution. Since 1979 all these have
30:49
failed. So now their nuclear system is,
30:52
you know, is basically inoperable.
30:55
What the regime has a promises own people, you know, it could
31:00
not deliver on that. They have told the people to,
31:02
you know, withstand sanctions for at least the last 20 years
31:06
or even more so that they, you know, Iran could have this
31:09
nuclear capability and then they would prosper after that.
31:13
All of these have collapsed in front of the Iranian people.
31:17
I don't see, even if, you know, even if this campaign does not
31:20
succeed in toppling the regime, I don't see the regime making
31:25
any kind of narrative to these people what kind of promises
31:27
they would give to the Iranian people.
31:29
They're highly educated. They aspire to integrate into
31:32
the world. They're they have a very, you
31:35
know, lively and educated diaspora who think that Iran has
31:39
a massive potential. But who is holding them back?
31:42
This very regime, this regime that is involved in religious
31:46
wars, sectarian wars, and also wanting to this very regime
31:51
wanted to own nuclear weapons that could not own and also for
31:54
no good reason. And so they don't, even though
31:56
the Iranian people, I don't see them now after what happened,
32:00
supporting these militias in the region that, you know, have the
32:04
banner of liberating Palestine. So we are in, you know, in the
32:08
front of, if you like, a situation where the Iranians
32:11
themselves won't change. And what is happening now, which
32:15
is a war that has been imposed on them is something that they
32:19
hope probably that it would help them to topple the regime.
32:22
I think at least this is what the White House and Israel is
32:26
hoping. But at the same time, the people
32:28
are watching this useless war because they think that what why
32:32
our regime is fighting against these very powerful adversaries.
32:36
While we know that we are going to lose this, it's not going to
32:39
be easy. And if we win this against the
32:42
US and Israel by holding into, you know, the, you know, hostage
32:48
the international economy and also attacking our GCC
32:52
neighbors, but then we would end up after the war with regional
32:55
enemies, no proxies, no good economy.
32:59
And also, again, we are up against the US and Israel.
33:04
I mean, I mean, at the moment it seems to me ever since October
33:06
the 7th especially, that for Israel, every problem in this
33:10
neighborhood is a nail and every solution involves a hammer.
33:13
And the reason why I asked about, you know, any kind of
33:16
Marshall Plan is that at the end of the day, if the Israelis want
33:20
to have in their neighborhood a powerful but benign Iran,
33:26
somehow someone needs to help them build that kind of society
33:29
to bring out the better nature of Iran that has been hidden for
33:33
the last 50 years. And I just wonder, do you think
33:37
in Israel anyone is thinking along these lines?
33:39
And if not, why not? Because ultimately, if they
33:42
don't, then you get getting back to that cycle that we've seen
33:46
over and over again, which is the Middle East of unintended
33:49
consequences. They get rid of Gaddafi, They
33:52
get civil war, they get rid of Saddam, was saying.
33:56
They get ISIS, you know, they get rid of the Iranian regime.
34:00
What do they get? Look, the Israelis are, are
34:04
ruthless and realistic and they of course they would hope from
34:10
for the best, but they're not going to spend a, a, a single
34:14
dime, you know, working towards that.
34:17
They, I think after October 7th, the view is that we need to, we
34:23
Israel need to establish full military dominance, have
34:28
operational freedom across the region.
34:30
We need to be able to do as we please and we expect the others
34:35
to cave, adjust and so on. But where we Israel are not
34:39
about building a a better tomorrow for, for anyone.
34:43
I think the view is, is extremely cynical on the region.
34:47
It's also, you know, I think there's a lot of opportunism in
34:50
there. I think this Israel is
34:51
expansionist, you know, territorially, politically and
34:56
so on. And, and I, I just don't see the
34:59
Israelis as particularly interested in, in, in, in doing
35:02
that. If, if, if Iran is they should
35:07
just as they should be interested in Palestinian
35:09
statehood and, you know, good humanitarian outcomes for Gaza
35:13
and so on. And yet there is consensus
35:15
across the board in Israel in favor of essentially the, you
35:20
know, ethnic cleansing in, in, in, in Gaza or, or, you know,
35:24
the takeover, the, you know, the even a tougher operation in
35:28
Iran. I mean, you, you will have
35:30
noticed what the, the Yair Lapid and others have said and and
35:34
Bennett have said about all this.
35:36
So, so I don't think one should expect, you know, this, this
35:39
kind of like sensible sinking where there is a win win formula
35:44
at the end of the day that's adopted from from Israel itself.
35:49
And look, while I agree with Mohammad that the regime has
35:52
lost legitimacy and support of, of much of the population, the
35:57
key here is that it takes a small number of very committed
36:01
people with guns and with a reason, with a reason to fight
36:05
with, with enough to lose if they don't stand up and fight to
36:09
control a country. And, and you know, This is why I
36:13
don't write off the, the, the regime.
36:16
You need to have a, a clear alternative or everyone wishes
36:20
the regime away. Almost everyone wishes the
36:22
regime away, but not everyone can actually figure out what is
36:25
the alternative. And the Iranian opposition has
36:27
had almost 5 decades to come up with that.
36:31
And we've seen that Donald Trump at one point embraces Pahlavi
36:34
and then says perhaps not him, and then talks about the Kurds
36:37
and then perhaps not the Kurds. And so that's going to be quite
36:43
fundamental. People want to see a sense of
36:45
order and and it's not clear that this campaign is going to
36:49
provide the kind of like security and order that that
36:52
people need to stay in their homes and build a better future.
36:56
Mohammed, finally to you, you're in Doha.
36:59
Obviously Qatar has been affected by this.
37:01
So have the UAE, so has Bahrain. You know, Dubai airport has been
37:07
closed down yet again. I mean, for those Gulf states
37:10
that were selling life in the Gulf, especially to expats as
37:14
life, you know, in a low tax safe haven in a very dangerous
37:18
neighborhood, that model has been shot to pieces.
37:21
I mean, I would say that they arguably are perhaps the biggest
37:24
losers in all this because they're they're inside observers
37:27
and, you know, they didn't expect this to happen.
37:30
And they really haven't had much of a response.
37:32
And they've got very little tolerance for the kind of pain
37:34
that's been inflicted. How do you see Doha and the
37:37
others in your part of the world, you know, dealing with
37:41
this incredible challenge in the coming weeks and months?
37:44
Yes, so this is basically their nightmare scenario that they
37:48
always wished it would never happen.
37:50
But equally they have been preparing for this for a long
37:53
time. They knew that the day would
37:55
come that some kind of a conflict in the in the region
37:59
would happen with Iran or with somebody else that would affect
38:03
the security of these countries. Iran was obviously the the the
38:07
very potential candidate that would cause this kind of trouble
38:11
to them. Iran has been threatening the
38:13
region for some time. There were, this is not the
38:15
first time that the GCC has or had to deal with with Iran.
38:20
UAE has its own issues with Iran, you know, over the over
38:25
the islands, Saudi Arabia as well.
38:28
The threats have been if you like exchanged for many years,
38:31
even Iran mostly recently Mohammad Javad Vaif, he was here
38:35
in Doha and when he was asked about the islands issue with
38:40
with UAE, he said don't open that kind of warms because we
38:44
still think that we own Bahrain. Bahrain was our 19th province
38:49
and it was the track in that, you know, after so many years
38:52
and with in the middle of a, you know, over over region that is
38:57
marred by conflict. Mohammad Javari, former minister
39:00
of Foreign Affairs of Iran, was talking in this way, this
39:04
language to the region. So they knew about this and yes,
39:07
they have been so far absorbing a lot of, you know, attacks from
39:13
from Iran. But what they see here is
39:15
basically at this point, and I think this is relevant to the
39:18
whole, to the whole conversation.
39:21
What they see is that do GCC countries see that they can
39:25
coexist with the current regime because this current regime has
39:28
across every red line possible and also has done everything
39:33
that, you know, that that all these countries in the GCC
39:37
thought that it was not possible.
39:39
And this explains why all these countries still today, they're
39:43
not calling on the US to stop the war.
39:45
And I read yesterday a Reuters piece saying that, you know, GCC
39:51
countries are calling on President Trump to finish the
39:55
job. And I'm, I'm not sure if this
39:57
is, you know, if you know if if the Reuters piece was coating,
40:02
you know, or. And the sources are from the top
40:05
leaders here. But I wouldn't be surprised
40:07
because now Iran is enemy of the region.
40:10
This region would rebound. So maybe I end with this.
40:13
This region would rebound because they have the means and
40:16
the capability. And still they do have, you
40:20
know, they can attract everybody who lost their trust in the
40:24
region, not only with money but also with the model they are
40:27
providing, especially if there there would be in the future
40:30
some kind of regime change in Iran or attitude change in the
40:35
future Iranian government. We don't talk about the
40:38
consequences for very ordinary people living in these countries
40:42
between the missiles and their leaderships enough.
40:45
So I just want to end and I want a brief answer from both of you,
40:48
even if it's going to be a slightly longer question.
40:51
The I mean, the fact is that there is an opportunity here
40:54
that I'm sure some optimists in a in a cave somewhere, you know,
40:59
in, in the Wadi on the other side of the old city of
41:01
Jerusalem still believes in that.
41:02
You can turn all this chaos since October the 7th into a
41:06
massive opportunity for a deal, a comprehensive deal, whether
41:10
Saudis get on with the Israelis, you know, the Iranians end up
41:13
with a better government than they've been served by for the
41:16
last 50 years or subjected to, I should say.
41:19
Is this deal pie in the sky or or is there actually a
41:24
possibility that someone will come along and say we can make
41:28
this happen and this region is full of culture and opportunity
41:33
and so many missed opportunities will finally have it stay in the
41:36
sun. Well, I know to Matt that in
41:39
your description of the deal you leave out the the crucial
41:42
element, which is Palestinian statement.
41:45
That was, I apologize, that was, that was the most important part
41:49
of it actually. That is the cornerstone.
41:50
There cannot be a deal between the Saudis and Israel without
41:53
Palestinian statement, absolutely.
41:55
So take that as given. And, and, and, and that, that's
41:58
still at the heart of the issue. I think, I think a lot of good
42:02
things can happen if you address the, the, the, this issue
42:09
directly, not dance around it, not design A multi year process
42:14
with, you know, weird conditionalities attached to it.
42:17
And, and, and so on. Unless, unless this is front and
42:21
center in a negotiation, I think it's, you know, that that deal
42:24
that we would all like to see. We would like to see a region at
42:27
peace in which, you know, Palestinians, Israelis,
42:30
Lebanese, Iranians, you know, people from the Gulf, from the
42:35
various Gulf countries and Iraq and so on, live in peace and,
42:38
and, and harmony. And yes, there, there is perhaps
42:41
some prosperity at the end of, of, of that, you know, political
42:46
realignment. But, but it would require the
42:49
most, the two most powerful players, Israel as the regional,
42:54
the dominant regional military player and the US, the global
42:58
superpower to make that decision.
43:01
And, you know, we're still where we were at the same place as we
43:05
were on October 6th, 2023. And, you know, for we, it's,
43:10
it's understandable that, you know, some of the stuff was, was
43:13
hotly contested, but it's still at the heart of the, of the, of,
43:17
of the debate. Mohanad by by advocating for a
43:21
kind of comprehensive settlement that obviously starts with the
43:24
Palestinians in their statehood, which seems to be so far off the
43:27
table at the moment in Israel. Am I?
43:30
Is this just pie in the sky stuff which we shouldn't even be
43:33
talking about? I think I agree with the with
43:36
the fact that the Palestinian state, a Palestinian state for
43:40
the Palestinians that they would be content with.
43:43
I think that's the corner store of any optimistic future for the
43:47
region. And I think Arab states, they
43:49
have the so-called Arab initiative where they said that
43:52
if there is a Palestinian state, an independent Palestinian state
43:56
that the Palestinians are happy with, with, with all the rings
44:00
attached, that we know that what Israel has been doing to the
44:03
land and how complicated it is now to, you know, carve out a
44:08
Palestinian state. If, if that can be managed, then
44:10
I think that would be the very solid step towards prosperity
44:15
and stability in the, in the region.
44:17
And even with the, you know, with the probability that there
44:21
would be the same Iranian regime somehow in Iran, which I don't
44:24
think that, you know, that it belongs to the future, but just
44:28
for argument's sake sake that, you know, they, it would deprive
44:31
whatever, you know, such a regime, the narrative of
44:35
fighting against Israel because the Palestinians would have
44:38
their own state, its independence.
44:40
Iran would have no reason to have its proxies or say that
44:44
we're going to liberate Palestine because Palestine is
44:47
an independent place. And so I think that would be a
44:51
really a step forward to stabilize the region, not the
44:54
only step that obviously we need more things to happen, but that
44:59
that that is a cornerstone of peace in the region.
45:02
Now, that would be victory, wouldn't it?
45:04
But I think we're a long way off that.
45:05
And I guess whether you assess victory, when you assess victory
45:08
and defeat depends very much at which point in time you choose.
45:12
Tomorrow's victory for Israel and America could look like
45:15
their defeat in, I don't know, a couple of years time when what
45:17
results in Iran is even worse than what we've had so far,
45:21
unintended consequences. I keep getting back to that as
45:24
everyone else does, too. Gentlemen, thank you very much
45:27
for coming on the forecast. Emil Hokayam and Mohammed
45:30
Saloum, thank you very much to both of you.
45:32
That's it from us here in Jerusalem.
45:34
Hope you enjoyed it. Hope you find it interesting.
45:37
See you soon.